The Arrow, which is designed to destroy the attacking missile at the stage where it is close to the target, is apparently the most advanced project in the world of its kind. This is mainly because of the series of failures of the THAAD project, which has cost the American taxpayer 3.2 billion dollars since the beginning of the development of the missile and until its fifth consecutive failure in May 1998. The last trial of the Arrow (14.9.98), in which the integrated action of all the systems (fire control radar, control and command system, launch control system) was tested, was crowned by success. It should, however, be stated that in the test, interception was not made of an attacking missile but a simulator was employed, which simulated a ballistic missile according to pre-fed data.

The development of the Arrow project places Israel, therefore, in the foreground of world technology in this sensitive and extremely important field.

It was consequently expected that in the collection of articles, published in a book, dealing with the issue of defense against ballistic missiles, the Arrow project would take an important place.

The editorial board therefore approached Israel Aircraft Industries in order that one of its experts would write the article. The condition imposed was that the article would not be a "press release" or a public relations exercise, but as detailed an article as possible, within the limitations of secrecy, which would reply to the valid criticism directed at the conceptual and operational aspects of the project.

Repeated requests were unanswered. Attempts to approach the former Arrow project manager (Yair Ha'Ramati) resulted only in a series of phone conversations, which, while intrinsically interesting, were no more than that.

We approached Prof. Moshe Arens, who was kind enough to contact the managing director of IAI, Dr. Moshe Keret on our behalf. Dr. Keret appointed a group of experts, headed by the project manager, Dr. Dan Peretz. The group met with the undersigned to discuss the matter. The members of the committee had received two issues of Nativ which contained 12 of the 15 articles and research studies that were to be published in the book.

During the meeting I emphasized once more, to the members of the group, the importance of replying to the criticism of the project. A few days after the meeting, I was informed by the spokesman of the managing director's office that IAI could not provide the desired article without approval of the BMDO in the Pentagon, and this may take time. Consequently, if I have no objection, it would be preferable that the article be written directly by someone from the BMDO. I did not object. As a result, I was informed that a senior representative of the Arrow project administration in the Pentagon would contact me to obtain details and to coordinate the timetable for writing the article. The senior representative did, in fact, get in touch with me and I gave him, for the umpteenth time, what he requested. This person promised to deal with the matter. A week later, he phoned and regretfully informed me that they were not prepared to cooperate because of reasons of classification and secrecy and due to a busy timetable.

However, he suggested that we make use of the overt publications of the BMDO as they appear in the authority's website on the Internet.

At this stage, we gave up, since the accumulative delay had already come to three months and the British publisher of the book had begun to show signs of impatience.

The following article contains, therefore, the minimum possible information available, based on overt sources, such as the publications of the BMDO, Janes', an IAI press release and a number of extracts from the article written by Dan Raviv, one of the initiators of the Arrow project. (The article was sent to the editorial board but not published since it did not meet the basic criteria given above, i.e., referring to the conceptual and operational criticism directed against the project).

A.S.

The Arrow – The Basic Strategic Assumption

Since there is no way to distinguish between the types of warheads of attacking missiles, it is impossible to know if a warhead is nuclear, chemical, biological or conventional.

Consequently, from the moment any Arab country possesses nuclear or biological capability, Israel will be forced to assume that the ballistic missiles aimed at its territory are carrying nuclear or biological warheads, and will have to respond accordingly.

In such an environment of "mutually assured destruction" in the Middle East, there will be a need for an immediate lethal response, in order to preserve the credibility of the second strike. In all cases, Israel will absorb a lethal blow, because of its geographical and demographic characteristics.

A deadly riposte by Israel will not save Israel. It will only inflict a deadly blow on the aggressor, so that both sides will be hit, but Israel will still be wiped out.

Therefore, in the center of Israeli strategic thinking lies the obligation to neutralize the risk of a first strike initiated by the Arabs. If Israel succeeds in doing so and at the same time possesses the potential of destroying the enemy, the Arab motivation to destroy the Jewish State will be eliminated.

The Arrow system, which is designed to eliminate the danger of an Arab first strike, is intended to achieve this aim and provide Israel with a Strategic Depth of Time, which would allow the Israeli Government to act, free of apocalyptic threats.

Operational Requirements

In order for the Arrow weapons system to be able to meet the expectations described above, it must be capable of intercepting a salvo of ballistic missiles attacking from ranges of up to 3000 km., and do this with a maximum leakage rate of one in a thousand, or 0.1%.

There is no system existing today that can guarantee an interception probability of 99.9% (which is equivalent to a leakage rate of 0.1%). However, it is possible to achieve an interception probability of 90%. The transition from 90% to 99.9% is performed by using the multi tiered approach, and by incorporating into the Arrow interceptor and its Fire Control Radar the attributes that support the multi tier operation.

The multi tiered approach is implemented by providing three independent discrete opportunities of interception. The first opportunity is in the first layer at the highest altitude possible. The Fire Control Radar monitors the results of the encounter and provides kill assessment. If there were no kill, two additional interceptors are launched at short time intervals. These constitute the second and third layer.

Using this technique, three independent interception possibilities are provided which raise the interception probability of an incoming ballistic missile from 90% to 99.9%, thus satisfying the leakage rate requirement.

Acquisition Quantities Required

The developers of the Arrow project estimate that the capability of existing ballistic missile systems, currently operated by Arab countries, will not exceed a total salvo of 50 missiles during the next 20 years.

On the assumption that Israel will have to counter an attack on a scale totaling 50 missiles, there will be a need for 60 interceptor missiles (the 1.2 ratio mentioned above). With an additional assumption that there will be a need to guarantee the overall defense of Israel in three distinct regions, the overall number of interceptor missiles reaches 180. To this number, a technical reserve of one third is added, so that the final number is 240 interceptor missiles.

Budget Estimation

It is estimated that each interceptor will cost $1.5 million, totaling $360 million for 240 missiles. The interceptor price includes launchers and the ground support equipment required for the test before the launch. The cost of one fire control radar is estimated at $40 million. The cost of 6 radars therefore totals $240 million.

Another $50 million dollars is allocated for communications, command and control.

The total estimated acquisition budget would therefore be $360 + $240 + $50 = $650 million.

The total estimation acquisition budget to be expected on development is $900 million. This will raise the total budget required for the development and acquisition of the Arrow weapon system to $1.55 billion.

It need not be pointed out that based on this data and assuming that part of these costs will be financed through American aid – or to be more precise, according to the figures provided by IAI spokesman in 1997, $565 million – the overall amount is a very small price for ensuring the existence of Israel in an era of a nuclear/biological annihilation threat.

The Strategic Conclusion

In order to achieve the deterrent effect based on an active defense strategy which finds expression in the capability of the Arrow system, Israel must publicly declare that any attack made against her by ballistic missiles will be interpreted as an attack using nuclear or biological warheads, with the intention of annihilating Israel.

The Arrow system has the capability of intercepting any number of ballistic missiles that may be fired at Israel (i.e. a salvo of 50 missiles).

Therefore, there is no possibility of eliminating Israel with a ballistic missile surprise attack. In the event of such an attack, Israel will retaliate with full force, as if the aim of the attack had been achieved by the attacker. The attacker would receive unbearable punishment, of the kind expected in a second strike, in a situation of "mutually assured destruction".

The American Aspect [Based on BMDO Fact Sheet 1997]

Upon signing the memorandum of understanding with the US in 1986, Israel began work on the development of a defense system against theater ballistic missiles (TMD). The threat posed by ballistic missiles has been a concern for Israel since the mid 1980s. However, the Iraqi ballistic missile attacks during the Gulf War underscored the danger posed by the build up of missile technology in the region. Israel is currently surrounded by a long list of simple but efficient ballistic missiles which primarily represent terror weapons against a civilian population. The helplessness of the civilian population during the period of the Gulf War and the overwhelming failure of the Patriot system against the Iraqi SCUD missiles awarded top priority to the development of the Arrow system.

As a result of the lack of available Israeli resources for developing such a defense system and the urgent need for missile protection for a vital ally, the US agreed to co-fund and co-develop an indigenously produced Israeli TMD system.

The American consideration was totally utilitarian, from the American aspect of cooperation with Israel, and was defined by the BMDO, in the Pentagon:

• The aims for cooperation in the Arrow project are intended for theater ballistic missile defense.
   

• It should be ensured that the Arrow and the corresponding American defense system will be interoperable.
   

• The test data obtained from the Arrow launch tests will be utilized for risk reduction when developing US defense systems.

In 1988 the US and Israel began what was to evolve into a three phase program to develop the Arrow series of Anti Tactical Ballistic Missiles (ATBMs). The Arrow project is therefore upgrading the cooperation between the two countries in the field of ballistic missile defense, including cooperation on a testbed and related experiments, and TMD architecture studies. The initial phase involved the Arrow experiments program, intended to validate the Arrow concept and develop the Arrow interceptor prototype and launcher. The second stage of the Arrow development was designated the Arrow Continuation Experiments (ACES) Program. The ACES resulted in a successful missile target intercept by a single stage Arrow 1 interceptor. Work was then shifted to the two staged Arrow 2 missile, which achieved three successful intercepts of simulated SCUD missiles on August 20, 1996, on March 11, 1997, and on September 14, 1998. The final test of the Arrow, in which the integrated working of all the systems (fire control radar, command and control system, launch control system), which was crowned with success, marked the end of the ACES program.

The Arrow Deployability Program (ADP)

The follow-up to the ACES program is the Arrow Deployability Program (ADP), aimed at integrating the entire Arrow Weapon System (AWS) with a planned USER Operational Evaluation System (UOES) capability. Continuing through 2001, the ADP will be the cornerstone for US/Israeli BMD cooperation.

The primary goal of the ADP is to complete the developmental stage of the AWS, fully integrating the different components of the system. This will be accomplished through extended testing of the Arrow 2 vehicle and its support elements, subjecting them to a variety of simulated threats. The ADP is also intended to promote ongoing work to improve inter operability, ensuring that Israeli TMD capabilities are closely integrated with those of the US. Further goals of the agreement are planned upgrades to the Israeli early warning procedures and the creation of a Policy Advisory Group (PAG) to promote the continued integration of the US and Israeli TMD efforts. Under the framework of the ADP, future joint counter proliferation initiatives and joint military exercises were agreed upon. Although the US does not plan to field the Arrow missile, participation in the Arrow project greatly assists the US's own TMD development. Through Arrow, the US seeks to improve its own system capabilities, utilizing Arrow test data for risk reduction when evaluating US systems. In doing so, the US can learn from Arrow's successes and failures, speeding US TMD development.

The paramount objective behind US involvement has always been to promote inter operability between US and Israeli systems, ensuring complementary, not competing systems. While slated to run through 2001, continued US involvement and funding for ADP hinges on certain elements being fulfilled. It must continue to benefit the US; successful test intercepts must be completed under realistic conditions; and Israel must continue to adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Should these criteria continue to be fulfilled, the US TMD effort stands to gain immeasurably.

The Arrow Weapon System

In addition to the Arrow interceptor and launcher, Israel is developing the launcher, Fire Control Radar (FCR), Fire Control Center (FCC) and Launch Control Center (LCC) that comprise the AWS.