April 2004
ISRAEL’S STRATEGIC FUTURE:
The Final Report of Project Daniel
Foreword by
Professor
Louis René Beres, Chair
Further to the issuance of
The National Security Strategy of the
United States of America on
September 20, 2002, US President George W. Bush launched Operation Iraqi Freedom
in March of the following year. The results of that war, still substantially
unclear at the time of this writing, derive from a greatly broadened American
assertion of the right of unilateral preemption. A conceptual and implemented right, it expands
the binding and well-established customary prerogative of “Anticipatory
Self-Defense”a under international law. Although there have as yet been no
subsequent legal codifications of this new American expansion, the precedent established by the world’s
only remaining Great Power is certain to impact the actual policy behavior of
other states.
Not surprisingly, many in the international community have criticized this new
policy. Yet history is replete with examples where nations have correctly reserved unto
themselves the right of preemption when they have determined that their vital
national interests, or very existence, were under threat.
In short, whether or not the presumptively expanded right of
striking-first as self-defense will soon become a generally accepted norm of
authoritative international law, this right will, in practice, likely acquire
enhanced credibility and legitimacy. Even if the broadened idea of anticipatory
self-defense does not achieve the status of a peremptory norm as defined at
Article 53 of The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties,b
it will be invoked more often by certain imperiled states. In this connection,
the growing spread of weapons of mass destruction throughout the world – now
exclusively to unstable and undemocratic states – fully underscores the
broadened doctrine.
Israel’s Strategic Future: The Final Report of Project Daniel, was
completed in mid-January 2003, several months before commencement of Operation
Iraqi Freedom. Nothing associated with America’s 2003 war against Saddam
Hussein’s regime in Iraq or the still ongoing conflict within that fragmented
country suggests a changed reality for Israel and the Middle East. On the
contrary, the “lessons” of Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrate not only that our
Final Report remains valid, but that its validity has been significantly
enhanced. Today, more than ever before, the State of Israel – a state so small
that it could fit twice into America’s Lake Michigan – must include appropriate
preemption options in its overall defense strategy. Vastly more vulnerable to
catastrophic first-strike aggressions than the United States, Israel must
prepare now for existential harms in every available fashion. Consistent with
The National Security Strategy of the
United States of America and
the strategic objectives of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Israel has an inherent right to defend itself without
first absorbing biological and/or nuclear attacks. This is true irrespective of
the cumulative outcome of Operation Iraqi Freedom or of particular criticisms
now directed toward the United States.
Project Daniel began with the assumption
that Israel’s security environment must be appraised continuously, and that the
threat of irrational state and nonstate enemies armed with WMD assets represents
the single most urgent danger to the country’s survival. Early on in our deliberations, however, we (“The
Group”) agreed that while the overall impact of this threat was extraordinarily
high, its probability was considerably less than that of WMD assaults from
rational enemy quarters. Reflecting this judgment, we concluded
that Israel’s main focus must now be on preventing a coalition of Arab states and/or
Iran from coming into possession of weapons of mass destruction. Preferably, we
urged this objective be pursued while Israel continues with its present policy of
deliberate ambiguity regarding its own nuclear status. We also concluded that
the classic paradigm of war between national armies could become less predictive
in the developing Middle East, and that an Israeli “paradigm shift” is therefore
required. This shift in orientation and resources would place new emphases on
short-range threats (terrorism) and long-range threats (ballistic missiles and
weapons of mass destruction). Here we also recommended a corresponding reduction
in the resources Israel should now allocate to classical warfighting scenarios.
Today, at the end of April 2004 – 15 months after our presentation of
Israel’s Strategic Future
to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon – we strongly reaffirm these recommendations.
Our Group notes emphatically that Israel should avoid non-conventional exchanges with
enemy states wherever possible. It surely is not in Israel’s interest to
engage these states in WMD warfare if other options exist, but rather to create
conditions wherein such forms of conflict need never take place.
Israel’s Strategic Future
does not instruct how to “win” a war in a WMD Middle-East environment. Rather,
it describes what we, its authors, consider the necessary, realistic and
optimally efficient conditions for nonbelligerence toward Israel in the region.
Altogether unchanged by Operation Iraqi Freedom, these conditions include a
coherent and comprehensive Israeli doctrine for deterrence, defense, warfighting and
preemption.
Our precise strategic theses, validated
by the 2003 Iraq War and its aftermath, are intended to aid policymakers in
bringing stability and predictability to a troubled region.
Following the main body of
Israel’s Strategic Future,
which remains exactly as it was completed originally in January 2003, a
newly-prepared “Addendum” will bring the reader up-to-date with current
circumstances and allow him or her to better understand the Final Report in full
and proper historical context. It is strongly suggested, therefore, that the
reader consider this brief annex as an integral part of
Israel’s Strategic Future.
Louis
René Beres, Ph.D.
Professor of International Law
Purdue University
Chair of Project Daniel
Notes
a
The right
of anticipatory self-defense under international law was established by Hugo
Grotius in
Book II of The Law of War and Peace (1625). Here, Grotius indicates that
self-defense is permissible not only after an attack has already been suffered,
but also in advance – “where the deed may be anticipated”. Or as he says later
in the same chapter: “It be lawful to kill him who is preparing to kill...” A
similar argument is offered by Samuel Pufendorf in his treatise, On the Duty
of Man and Citizen According to Natural Law (1672). The customary right of
anticipatory self-defense has its modern origins in the Caroline incident, which
concerned the unsuccessful rebellion of 1837 in Upper Canada against British
rule (a rebellion that elicited sympathy and support in the American border
states). Following this event, the serious threat of an armed attack has
generally been taken to justify militarily defensive action. (See J. Moore, A
Digest of International Law 409 (1906)). Today some scholars maintain that
the customary right of anticipatory self-defense expressed by the Caroline has
been overridden by the specific language at Article 51 of the UN Charter. In
this view, Article 51 fashions a new and far more restrictive statement of
self-defense, one that does rely on the literal qualifications contained in the
phrase, “...if an armed attack occurs”. This interpretation ignores, however,
that international law cannot logically compel a state to wait until it absorbs
a devastating or even lethal first strike before acting to protect itself. And
the argument against the restrictive view of self-defense is reinforced by the
well-documented weakness of the Security Council in undertaking collective
security action against a prospective aggressor. For supportive positions on the
particular reasonableness of anticipatory self-defense in the nuclear age, see:
Louis Henkin, et.al., International Law: Cases and Materials 933 (1980)
(Citing Wolfgang Friedmann, The Threat of Total Destruction and Self-Defense
259-60 (1964); Joseph M. Sweeney et. al., The International Legal System:
Cases and Materials 1460-61 (3rd ed., 1988) (citing Myres McDougal, The
Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense, 57, American Journal of
International Law 597, 598 (1963)).
b Concluded at Vienna, May 23, 1969, Entered into force,
January 27, 1988, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; 1969 U.N.J.Y.B. 140; 1980 U.K.T.S. 58, Cmnd
7964; reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
ISRAEL’S STRATEGIC FUTURE
PROJECT DANIEL
Final Report
Prepared Especially for Presentation to the Hon. Ariel Sharon
Prime Minister of the State of Israel
January 16, 2003
Project Daniel is a private and informed effort to identify the overriding
existential threats to Israel and their prospective remedies. These remedies
must be both plausible (capable of achievement) and productive. With this in
mind, the Group met in both Washington DC and New York City on several
occasions during 2002. In the periods between meetings,
members of the Group regularly exchanged information. The result of this effort
is conveyed in the following Final Report: Israel's Strategic Future. The
perspectives expressed in this document are those of the individual members, and
do not necessarily reflect views of any institution or government. Our hope is
that Project Daniel’s unique configuration of member background and experience
will contribute to the strengthening of US-Israel strategic relations and to the
ongoing debate over how Israel should best respond to existential threats to its
national security.
The
Group is comprised of the following individual members:
Professor Louis René
Beres, Chair, USA
Naaman Belkind, Former Assistant to the
Israeli Deputy Minister of Defense for Special Means, Israel
Maj. Gen. (Res.), Israeli Air Force/Professor
Isaac Ben-Israel,
Israel
Dr. Rand H. Fishbein, Former
Professional Staff Member, US Senate Appropriations Committee, and former
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs to Senator Daniel K. Inouye, USA
Dr. Adir Pridor, Lt. Col. (Ret.), Israeli Air Force; Former
Head of Military Analyses, RAFAEL, Israel
Fmr. MK./Col. (Res.), Israeli Air Force,
Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto,
Israel
Summary
-
Considering issues
of both probability and disutility (harms), the principal existential
threat to Israel at the present time is a conventional war mounted against
it by a coalition of Arab states and/or Iran.
-
Israel is also
endangered (presently or
potentially) by Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), nuclear and/or biological
weapons that could be used against it either by enemy first-strikes or via
escalation from conventional war. Israel’s particular vulnerability to
such weapons is a consequence of its tiny area, its high population
density and its national infrastructure concentrations. We recommend,
therefore:
-
Israel do whatever
possible to prevent an enemy coalition from being formed and from coming
into possession of WMD. This could include pertinent preemptive strikes
(conventional) against enemy WMD development, manufacturing, storage,
control and deployment centers. This recommendation is consistent both with
longstanding international law regarding “anticipatory self-defense” and
with the newly-stated defense policy of The United States of America.
-
Israel should
continue with present policy of ambiguity regarding its own nuclear status.
This would help to prevent any legitimization of WMD in the Middle East. It
is possible, however, that in the future Israel would be well-advised to
proceed beyond nuclear ambiguity to certain limited forms of disclosure.
This would be the case only if enemy (state and/or non-state) nuclearization
had not been prevented.
-
Israel should
provide all constructive support to the United States-led War Against Terror
(WAT). It must insist upon aiding the American objective to
prevent/eliminate WMD among rogue states and terror groups in the Middle
East. There is a clear coincidence of interest between Israel and the United
States in matters of security and counter-terrorism.
-
Israel
must do everything within its means to prevent a Middle Eastern rogue state
or terror group from attaining WMD status. Irrespective of its policy on
nuclear ambiguity vs. disclosure, Israel will not be able to endure unless
it continues to maintain a credible, secure and decisive nuclear deterrent
alongside a multi-layered anti-missile defense. This recognizable
(second-strike) retaliatory force should be fashioned with the capacity to
destroy some 15 high-value targets scattered widely over pertinent
enemy states in the Middle East. The overriding priority of Israel’s nuclear
deterrent force must always be that it preserves the country’s security
without ever having to be fired against any target. The primary point of
Israel’s nuclear forces must always be deterrence ex ante, not
revenge ex post.
-
If WMD status were attained by any
Middle Eastern rogue state or coalition of states, the probability of
joint-enemy conventional attack against Israel would be raised
considerably. Faced with adversaries who now might believe themselves
shielded under a WMD “umbrella”, Israel would have to do the following:
-
Maintain its
conventional forces at full war-waging strength and with a decisive
qualitative edge. Hopefully this would be accomplished with full
material support from the United States, whose interests would be
coincident with Israel’s interests.
-
Adapt its planning priorities and
budgetary requirements to the “paradigm shift” described later in this
Report. In this connection, Israel is urged to reduce the priority it
assigns to conventional warfighting without impairing its undisputed
superiority against any plausible enemy coalition.
-
The Group is aware
that many of its strategic recommendations are contingent upon adequate
funding. Should the substantial funds needed by Israel to deal with
so-called “Low Intensity” and Long-Range WMD threats be sought via
increased taxation, it could threaten Israel’s economy and (ironically)
undermine Israel’s security in other ways. To deal purposefully with these
threats (threats which are delineated in this Report’s following
presentation of “paradigm shift”), Israel’s government must trim all
nonproductive costs and seek to encourage dramatic increases in
productivity. The resultant rise in per capita GNP could allow the needed
increase for Israel’s national defense.
