In recent years, a worrisome phenomenon has been
effecting Israel’s national security and specifically its deterrence
capability. The diminishing success of Israel and the IDF in wars and “low
intensity conflicts”, climaxing in the recent troubling events
– the IDF’s dishonorable withdrawal
from Lebanon and the halfhearted effort to quell the bloody confrontations
with the Palestinians in Judea, Samaria and Gaza – indicate that there is
a very serious decline in Israel’s deterrence.
Although Israel’s deterrence is still valid with
regard to all-out comprehensive wars, as the Arabs haven’t initiated such
a war since 1973, its deterrent vis-à-vis “low intensity conflicts” as
mentioned above, is almost non-existent. But an effective deterrence
capability has always been a central, even pre-eminent cornerstone of
Israel’s defense doctrine, given its special circumstances. This stems
first and foremost from the quantitative and ethical-conceptual asymmetry,
which places Israel in the difficult strategic situation of “the Few
versus the hostile Many, as well as from its rough strategic environment
in which “might makes right” rules and weakness invites aggression.
Israel needs its deterrent even after the start of
the “peace process”, which is hardly worth its name. Without this
capability there is no chance in the world that Israel’s enemies will be
willing to coexist with it.
The causes of the decline of the deterrence
capability are attributed to three factors: the IDF, Israeli leadership
and society and Arab perspective. The IDF, due to its diminishing victory
curve, is no longer perceived as an invincible army. But more than that,
the aversion of Israeli leadership and society to wield its power for a
long while now, contribute to the decline of deterrence. When this is
combined with Israel’s absences of suitable “staying power”, the miserable
shape of its deterrent is evident. No wonder that in such a situation,
Sheikh Nasrallah well diagnosed in May 2000 that Israel is as “weak as
cobwebs”, with this sentiment being followed by other Arab leaders.
If Israel wants to exist safely and honorably, it
must soon rehabilitate its deterrence, and paraphrasing from an
outstanding article (which appeared a decade ago and in a different crisis
– the Gulf War) – “if there is an IDF – let it appear immediately.”
