France, The First
Islamic State
in Western Europe?
Martin Sobier
The Lyons region, with more than 100,000 Muslims,1
has seen a rise in Islamic subversive activity against France. Even if only a
minority of the Muslim population is engaged in these acts, it remains
worrying; see, for example, the following excerpt from an interview with the Salafist
Imam of Vénissieux, Abdelkader Bouziane:
Do you wish France to become an Islamic country?
Yes, because people are happier by getting closer to Allah. Moreover, Allah
punishes societies which are sinking into sin, with earthquakes, disease
like AIDS...And I am happy when I see the French converting to Islam,
because I know they are on the right path.
You really want to see the establishment of an Islamic Republic in
France?
Yes, but not only for France. I hope the whole world becomes Muslim.2
Mourad Benchellali, one of the sons of Chellali Benchellai, Imam of the
Abu Bakr Mosque in Vénissieux, was arrested by the Americans in March 2002, as
he participated in the Jihad in Afghanistan.3
Another of Benchellali’s sons, Menad, was arrested by the French Security
Service (the DST), on December 24, 2003, after he prepared a non conventional
terrorist attack:
The court sessions last week revealed that in 2002, during
the time between his return from Georgia and his arrest on December 24,
Menad Benchellali had handled highly toxic products at his parents’
residence, in the Minguettes quarter in Vénissieux, and he would announce to
family and friends that he was ready to act... Menad Benchellali also helped his father
at the Abu-Bakr prayer hall, on the ground floor of their building, to
recruit candidates for Jihad.. There the imam used to organize
film shows on the conflicts in Chechnia, to make young members of the
faithful properly aware of the cause.4
There is no doubt about his motivations:
Without even blinking, he recognized that these odds and ends
of chemistry were indeed intended for “making a bomb”. Was France the
target? “The goal was to perfect my knowledge in case an Emir would call for
a legitimate fight which I would be supposed to lead in the future,” answered
the Islamist. And he continued, “...in case, I would be able to make an
explosive gadget.” After the investigators asked him about the Emir, he
said, “Ibn al-Khattab (a Jordanian-Saudi war leader), is a great Emir,
participating in an acknowledged Jihad...”5
Something is happening in early twenty-first century France. Is France liable
to become the first Muslim country in Western Europe? Pay attention to the
statement of Sheik Yusuf al-Qaradawi, recognized as one of the spiritual
leaders of the Hamas movement and who serves as a member of the
scientific council of the institution, which trains Imams in France.
This means that Islam will return to Europe. Islam entered
Europe twice and left it... Perhaps the next conquest, Allah willing, will be
by means of preaching and ideology. The conquest need not necessarily be by
the sword... [The conquest of Mecca] was not by the sword or by war, but by a
[Hudabiyya] treaty, and by peace... Perhaps we will conquer these lands
without armies. We want an army of preachers and teachers who will present
Islam in all languages and in all dialects.6
Here is a quotation from the Lebanese Shi`ite leader, Moussawi, who presents his
vision in a brief but unambiguous statement: “Perhaps, you, the French, will not, in your generation, become familiar with
the Islamic Republic of France. But it is certain that your grandchildren or
great-grandchildren will, Allah willing, because Islam is good for everyone!”7
The “Islamic
Republic of France”, the “Next Muslim Conquest”, Is the Situation that Bad?
An attempt will be made in this article systematically to analyze Islam in
France as it is reflected in the statements of its leaders and in the media,
in day-to-day life, in the actions of the French people, Muslim and
non-Muslim, while citing quotes which will facilitate entrée into the
“atmosphere” of the hottest topic in one of the largest countries in Europe.
The History of
France-Islam Relations: Ups and Downs
The beginning of Islam in France was in the wave of Arab conquest in the early
eighth century, in the manner customary among armies of Allah:
The conquest of what we call France was
planned by the Muslim invaders of Spain, and it came very near to success.
Al-Semah was the leader of this invasion across the Pyrenees; a gentleman
about whom little is known except that he had distinguished himself as a
soldier and administrator in Spain and was a zealous Muslim, anxious to lead
the Jihad to the land of the unbelievers. He crossed the border into
Septimania, the Catalan province of France, in 721, with a large army which
took Narbonne, killed every male in the city and enslaved all the women and
children.8
During that same year, the Muslims in Toulouse suffered their first
significant defeat in Europe and, in 732, they were halted at Poitiers by
Charles “the Hammer” Martel. During the reign of Charlemagne, who ruled in the early
ninth century, the first agreement between the Muslims and the French was
reached allowing Christians to make pilgrimages safely to Jerusalem. These
relations had their ups and downs: Ups like during the reign of Francis I in the early 16th century, when France was recognized as “Dar al-Sulh”,
meaning Land of Compromise, in the wake of the French agreement to a Turkish
military presence in the port of Toulon; and downs, like during the reign of
Napoleon Bonaparte, when the conquest of Egypt mandated the jihad
against the French: “The harsh criticism of the French was due to the fact
that they were infidels. Thus slaughtering them was fulfillment of a
commandment, which Allah would view positively, and constitutes part of the
holy war.”9
The recurrent abductions carried out by Muslim pirates and the hindrance of
marine commerce in the Mediterranean on the one hand and perhaps setting their
sights on the natural treasures in North Africa on the other led the French to
invade Algeria in 1830. Fifty years later they invaded Tunisia and in the
early 20th century, France conquered the main cities in Morocco. Thus, for all
intents and purposes it completed its conquest of the countries of North
Africa.
However, despite the fact that France ruled over those Muslim countries and,
despite the relative proximity of those countries to France proper, there was
no mass immigration of Muslims to France. Furthermore, until the early 20th
century, there was no real Muslim community in France. The death of
approximately 100,000 Muslims in the ranks of the French army during World War
I led, in appreciation, to the construction of a magnificent mosque in central
Paris; that too did not spur a wave of immigration to France.
The Beginning
of the Mass Muslim Immigration to France
After World War II, the need arose for inexpensive manpower for the
reconstruction of France. Masses of young North Africans arrived or were
brought. “The result was the arrival of young workers, especially men, for
short periods of time, with contracts for limited intervals, who left their
families behind, leading to frequent round trips.”10
During the 1950s and 1960s, the North American countries achieved
independence, in most cases after bloody battles with the French regime.
Paradoxically, the decrease in demand for inexpensive manpower – rather than
limiting the stream of Muslim immigrants into France, led to the opposite
phenomenon: During the 1970s, a massive increase in Muslim immigration to
France took place. If the previous waves of immigration consisted of single
youths who planned to come for a limited period and return to their homes,
this time, things were different: Governmental adoption of a policy of
supervision over immigration increased the apprehension of those young
workers, and they quickly brought their families to France and attempted to
establish their roots there.
The government memorandum on the matter of unification of families, which was
issued in 1981, brought about a drastic change in the quantity and the
demographic composition of the French Muslim population. “Therefore entire
families settled in France, including multiple generations including at least
parents and children, with the conscious objective, to, in one sense or
another, be absorbed there.”11
How Many
Muslims Are There in France?
It is impossible to know the exact number of Muslims living in France these
days. French law does not allow asking people about the religion with which
they are affiliated, and in the absence of accurate statistics, each source
supplies its own estimate, and the gaps between one estimate and another are
substantial.
The French Foreign Ministry, and in its wake many newspapers, place the number
at between 4 and 5 million people in a country with a population of 60
million.12
Other sources, (including Muslim sources), estimate the number to be somewhere
between 5-7 million.13
A significant statistic is that half of the Muslim population in France does
not have French citizenship.14
The implication of these estimates, none based on scientific research, is that
Muslims constitute 7-11% of the French population. There are several cities
and towns, which have a much higher percentage of Muslims: In Marseilles, for
example, 25% of the residents are Muslim.15
A similar picture emerges in the city of Trappes, which has between 7,500 and
14,000 Muslims in a population of 30,000 residents.16
17 The percentage of Muslims in some schools in northern
France reaches 75-85% (!).18
Forty percent of the French Muslims are concentrated in the Paris region,
another 20% live in the southeast section of the country (the regions of
Provence, the Alps and Côte d’Azur), and another 10% live in the Lyon-Grenoble
region. The rest are scattered throughout France.19
Furthermore, based on the statistics, Islam today is the second largest
religion in France after Catholicism, far ahead of Protestantism. The makeup
of the Muslim concentration in France is also interesting: Most of the Muslims
in France are immigrants from North Africa. The other communities are Muslims
from Turkey, black Africa, Asians and approximately 50,000 Frenchmen who
converted to Islam.20
If we study the demographic statistics and compare them to statistics in other
European countries, such as Germany, Britain, Holland, Belgium or Italy, the
obvious conclusion is that the largest Muslim population in Western Europe is
concentrated in France.
Islam, A
Religion with Momentum
The Islam religion in France is in the midst of a period of great momentum in
every sense. The most significant momentum of course is demographic. The
statistics cited above are various estimates regarding the number of Muslims
in France, however, beyond the debate regarding the absolute numbers, it is
astonishing to consider the trend. Thus, for example, according to a survey
conducted in Alsace (in Alsace a special law permits the conduct of surveys of
that sort), there were 7,000 Muslims in 1962; less than 40 years later, in
1998, their number was estimated at 85,000, meaning that the Muslim community
in Alsace increased tenfold!21
However, the growth was not merely demographic. There was also a tremendous
increase in religious devotion as well: In 1978 there were approximately 70
mosques; just about 20 years later, in 1998, there were more than 1,500 places
of worship! In 1994 only 27% of the Muslims characterized themselves as
“performers of religious commandments”; in late 2001, 36% of the Muslims
characterize themselves as “performers of commandments”. Furthermore, 78% of
the Muslims characterize themselves as “believers”. In 1994, only 30%
supported construction of mosques in France, today 83% support it.22
There is no separation between church and state in Islam, and for Muslim
residents of France, the fact that they are Muslims is a basic component of
their identity:
Muslims abandoning Islam? No, otherwise they would be renouncing their
history. Atheists? Less likely! It is all a matter of criteria: You are born
Muslim, you remain Muslim, even if you eat pork and fail to fulfill the five
pillars of Islam...The republic confined Christianity merely to the realm of
religion. Despite all of the government’s efforts to organize it, Islam
remains an all-encompassing religion.23
The expansion of Islam in the West frequently relies upon moral criticism,
Look closely at what is dubbed the American model, and what do you see? Drugs,
alcohol, drunken driving, sex on television, pornographic films...AIDS which
is caused by the spread of homosexuality...women and men kissing in public,
and growing poverty due to economic policies geared exclusively to serve the
well off... Their very technology is saturated with eroticism, and that is
what they export to Egypt in the form of movies and television serials”24
Islamic
Organizations in France
Islam in France is well organized within the framework of four umbrella
organizations, within which the overwhelming majority of Muslims are united:
The UOIF (L’Union des Organisations Islamiques de France) – “The Union
of Islamic Organizations of France” close to the Muslim Brotherhood,
and the other three: “The Mosque of Paris”, “The National Federation of
Muslims in France” and “Faith and Action”, the common denominator being their
links with foreign regimes.
UOIF –
Close to the Muslim Brotherhood
This is the largest organization, “The Union of Islamic Organizations in
France”, and it is close to the Muslim Brotherhood. It is worth noting
that the Muslim Brotherhood movement developed in the 1920s in Egypt,
quickly spread throughout the Arab world and was the progenitor of the Islamic
terrorist organizations like Hamas, the Islamic Jihad, al-Qai`dah and others.
Muslim Brotherhood members were responsible for a long series of terrorist acts, attacks and
murders throughout the world. The UOIF organization links over two hundred
Muslim organizations.25
In the movement’s charter, formulated in late 1993, one is able to ascertain
the organization’s aspirations:
The Umma has a duty, since it espouses Islam as a spiritual and political
doctrine, to take upon itself the mission of saving humanity from servitude,
misery and absurdity and bringing out of the darkness of error and deception
to let it take in the light of the true path and happiness...to resolve the
world’s problem...by preaching Islam among peoples and nations...by freeing it
from the yoke of ungodly capitalism...The Islamic state, the one and only way
to liberate the Umma and spread the light of Islam in the world..., is an
obligation of Islam.26
The organization has good connections with the wealthy residents of the
Persian Gulf, and its letter of recommendation is a pre-condition for receipt
of support for any activity requiring financing, such as construction of a
mosque or a school. “The organization is known for its ability to provide the
all-powerful recommendations (tazkiyya) to the donors from the Arabian
Peninsula, which are pre-conditions for financial support for Islamic
institutions, particularly construction of mosques.”27
Similar to the situation in the Palestinian Authority, the organization
specializes in different messages in Arabic and foreign languages. Thus, for
example, the institutions, which it established for the training of Imams is
called in French: “The French Institution for Social Sciences”, while in
Arabic it is called: “The European Faculty for Islam Studies”.
As mentioned above, that institution’s science council is headed by Yusuf
al-Qaradawi, famous for his position supporting suicide bombings,.“...suicide
bombings are...heroic operations of martyrdom...are the supreme form of
Jihad for the sake of Allah, and a type of terrorism that is allowed by
the Shari`ah.”28
UOIF sought with all its might to gain legitimacy from the government, which
at first vigorously opposed Muslim representatives in France serving in its
institutions, as Interior Minister Sarkozy said, “I will not allow
fundamentalist Islam to sit beside the Republic’s table.”29
However, the central government was not successful in obstructing the
movement, and in elections for Islamic representatives on the national level,
which were organized with the support of the French Government and conducted
in 2003, the UOIF was placed first, with 11 of the 25 elected regional
representatives.30
Similar to the situation in the Muslim Brotherhood worldwide, the
representatives are not at all uneducated. The opposite is true. Thus, for
example, the representative of South France is Murad Zerfaoui, a biologist and
researcher in one of the most prestigious research institutions in France, who
serves as Imam of the Al-Islah Mosque, the largest mosque in Marseilles.31
In 2002, the organization refused the demand of the French Interior Ministry
to sign an agreement permitting conversion from Islam to another religion.32
Thus it remained faithful to the fundamentals of Islam, according to which
there is an absolute prohibition against leaving Islam (in countries where the
shari`ah, Islamic law, is the law of the land, one who converts is
sentenced to death!), and provided a resounding slap in the face to the values
of the Republic, without the authorities reacting and disqualifying the
movement!
As far as acceptance of the French constitution, there is nothing clearer than
the statement of the organization’s president, Lhaj
Thami Breze, “The Qur`an is our constitution,” a saying that appears at
the top of the Muslim Brotherhood’s website,33
and in the Hamas terrorist group’s charter.
34
The Mosque of
Paris – Under the Auspices of the Algerian Government
“The Mosque of Paris” is supported and partially funded by the Algerian
Government. The ties are so tight that in 1992, after the “putsch” in Algeria,
Tedjin Haddam, the rector of the Mosque of Paris, was appointed as one of the
five members of the interim government in Algeria! And that same Tedjin was at
the same time a member of the committee appointed by the French Government
with the objective of establishing a representation of the Muslims in France,
not subject to foreign influence! “The appointment
was a terrible snub to the French government, which had originally formed the
CORIF as a means of cutting links between Algiers and ‘The Mosque of Paris’.”35
Dalil Boubakeur, head of the Mosque of Paris, claimed after the victory of the
UOIF (close to, as mentioned above, with the Muslim Brotherhood), “I
cannot accept an institution controlled by fundamentalists. French society
must awaken. No one has guaranteed protection against an Islamist outbreak.”36
In that statement he reflected the power struggle extant between the Islamic
movements and the central government in Algeria, which, as mentioned above,
forcibly took control of the country after the 1991 elections, in which the
Muslim Brotherhood emerged victorious.37
Boubakeur is often considered an example of a moderate leader who opposes the
Muslim brotherhood movement. However a quotation in Le Monde
indicates a change in his declarations, in the wake of his receiving Saudi
money:
Dalil Boubakeur, head of the Mosque of Paris, recently stopped attacking
“Wahhabi fundamentalism”. He is no longer crying about the money, which he
lacks... Those days are long gone. The Mosque of Paris, will not only be the
beneficiary of government support to finance its renovations, but it will also
be able to rely on Saudi petro-dollars... The Saudi financing, which was
already approved in principle, led to a confrontation between the Interior
Ministry and the Foreign Ministry. The Foreign Ministry does not hesitate to
characterize the deal in non-diplomatic language: “Abysmal retardation”, as
the Saudis never give without receiving something in return... The Interior
Ministry, which usually seeks to encourage “French Islam” turned a blind eye
with no pangs of conscience. The information was provided by the Saudi
periodical, al-Medina, and was confirmed for Le-Monde by
multiple sources).38
The National
Federation of Muslims in France – Under Moroccan Influence
“The National Federation of Muslims in France” is closer to the Moroccan
kingdom. There are those who consider this movement an empty shell under
Moroccan direction.39
In elections conducted for Islamic representatives in France in 2003, in
certain areas they established joint slates with the UOIF, a significant
number of whose leaders are of Moroccan origin, indicating an agreement to be
partners with a movement close to the Muslim Brotherhood.
Faith and
Action – Under Pakistani Influence
The Tabligh Movement – “Faith and Action”, has its origins in
Pakistan, and it is based on a precise imitation of the Prophet Muhammad down
to the minutest details of life. TheTabligh advocates convincing
Muslims to return to Islam. Frequently it serves as a way station on the path
from secular life to full religious life and association with the Muslim
Brotherhood. The movement attempts to maintain good relations with the other
Muslim organizations in France; it was responsible for the initiative to stage
the first meeting in the Khalid ibn al-Walid Mosque in the 18th quarter
in Paris, in July 1992, with the objective of enhancing coordination between
the Muslim movements in France.40
It is interesting to note that the same Haled Ibn al-Walid after whom the
Mosque was named, was called by the Prophet Muhammad “Sayif Allah”, i.e.
theSword of Allah, due to his acts of “heroism” on the battlefield. The noted
Islam scholar, William Muir, describes Khalid ibn al-Walid in the
following manner:
“From the carnage of his arms, he was named
‘The Sword of Allah’; and so
little care had he for loss of life, that he would wed the widow of his enemy
on the field still sodden with his own soldiers’ blood.”41
“Court Muslims”
There are individual Muslims – an insignificant minority unaffiliated with any
movement, who serve as proof that Islam in France is ostensibly moderate. A
conspicuous example is the Great Mufti of Marseilles, Suhib ben-Sheik, who
vigorously opposes the Muslim Brotherhood. However, while he is the sweetheart
of many politicians and members of the media, he did not receive even one vote
in the most recent elections for the Council of Muslims in France (in which
the representatives of the mosques voted based on the size of the mosque and
the number of worshippers therein).
Religious
Guidance from Abroad
An additional astounding statistic is that about 90% of the Imams in France
are foreign nationals. Approximately 40% are Moroccan, 20% Algerian, 15%
Turkish, 7% Tunisian and 7% are citizens of other countries.42
Of the remaining 10%, approximately half were not French citizens from birth,
but received French citizenship from the authorities.43
*
Thus, the picture is clear: A stream close to the Muslim Brotherhood
dominates Islam in France, and many streams are supported by Muslim nations in
which fundamentalist Islam plays a significant role.
Dar al-Islam,
Dar al-Harb
Hence, the objective of the movement guiding Islam in France seems to be
political. In order to understand this, it is worthwhile to mention the firm
foundation of the Muslim philosophy, according to which the world is divided
into two, Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb.
Dar al-Islam [House of Islam] includes any land, which is, or was in
the past, was under Muslim political and legal control. Dar al-Islam will
forever remain the domain of Islam and there is an eternal obligation
incumbent upon Muslims to liberate those lands from the yoke of the
non-Muslims who gained control over them and to restore the rule of Islam as
it was in its days of glory.44
Dar al-Harb [House of War or House of the Infidels – those who are not
Muslims] includes all of the lands, which have not yet been conquered by Islam
and regarding which there is an obligation to convert them to Islam as the
ultimate objective is Islamic political control over the entire world.45
The Islamic studies scholar, Duncan McDonald, provided a comprehensive
synopsis of this, “For them, the world is divided into two parts, the one is
Dar al-Islam (abode of Islam), and the other is Dar al-Harb
(abode of War). In the end, Dar al-Harb must disappear into Dar
al-Islam and the whole world be Muslim.”46
To these two parts, one has to add a third. Until the late 1980s, France was
considered Dar al-Ahd, something in the middle, between Dar al-Harb
and Dar al-Islam, a type of place where one could stay on a temporary
basis; authorization based on the fact that there one can freely practice
Islam. In the late 1980s the strategy undergoes a complete change, and in a
UOIF convention, it was decided that France is becoming Dar al-Islam!47
From a theoretical point of view, the Islamists interpret the law this way,
...and the jihad will remain an individual obligation until all other
lands which formerly were Muslim come back to us and Islam reigns within them
once again. Before us lies Palestine, Bukhara, Lebanon, Chad, Erythrea,
Somalia, the Philippines, Burma, South Yemen, Tashkent, Andalusia...48
Following this logic, it becomes clear that France, at least up to Poitiers,
conquered in the eighth century, will remain forever a part of Dar al-Islam,
that every Muslim has to free from the “Unbelievers’” yoke.
The coordination of the means involved is clear for the specialists. Thus, the
Stasi Commission reports, “Today the state is to give room to new religions
while succeeding in their integration and fighting the political-religious
instrumentalizations.”49
And Yves Bertand, head of the Renseignements Généraux (intelligence
services) stated,
I noticed 15 or 20 years ago, the rise to power of the Brothers through a
recognized organization nowadays, the UOIF, part of a European, and maybe
world-wide structure...When I say “worldwide”, it is because of the link
existing with Egypt and Saudi Arabia through the European Islamic
Organizations Union and the so called BOLIM (World Islamic League Bureau), the
UOIF executive. We have seen the UOIF weaving a real web on all the French
territory.50
The analysis of some of the resources used makes it possible to understand the
nature and the extent of the problem.
The Methods to
Achieve the Objective
Achieving the objective is accomplished through varied means, undermining the
foundations of democracy by means of a veil on the heads of the women and
introducing religious-Muslim values to the schools in the guise of language
studies, violent and open anti-Semitism, dominance of Muslim gangs in
“no-man’s land”, etc.
Several examples follow:
Undermining the
Foundations of the French Republic: The Veil – A Political Sign
A pronounced feature of that path is challenging the foundations of
FrenchRepublic, taking advantage of that same democracy in order to
change it substantially.
The first topic is the veil for women, which does not reflect any popular
pressure. These veil cases are only symbols, tiny matters the media deals with
because the UOIF and other organizations want it.51
In 1989, the debate on the topic began, when two high school students who wore
veils were expelled in violation of the neutrality rules in effect in French
schools. UIOF representatives acted vigorously on behalf of those girls, which
led to an increase in the movement’s prestige in France. Today, that topic is
at the center of a public debate, when President Chirac appointed a committee
to redefine neutrality (a translation of the word laïcité
– meaning willful avoidance by the authorities from expressing positions
regarding political or religious opinions, especially in schools and
the administration).52
This is an astonishing step in light of a 200 year tradition of absolute
separation of church and state. It is interesting that while in the Arab
countries the argument proffered in favor of the veils is religious, in
France, the argument is based on individual freedom and democratic ideals. It
is specifically those Muslims who oppose the Muslim Brotherhood’s domination
of Islamic life in France, who deciphered what was going on: Thus Djida
Tazdaït, who was a delegate in the European Parliament, compared the veil
to the “Islamic political flag”,53
and Vassila Themzali, a lawyer and former director of the UNESCO program for
the advancement of women: “The veil has many meanings, but it least of all
expresses an act of spiritual faith. The first reason that women wear them
today in France is political, and that is extremely dangerous.”54
The expert, Yves Lacoste, director of the Center for Geopolitical Studies of
the University of Paris VII analyzes the topic in the following manner:
“Ostensibly religious, however the topic of the veil has a political and even
geopolitical aspect, because by means of the behavior of those girls, a
manifestation of their Muslim identity symbolized by the veil, the question of
control arises: Control over the French Muslim world and perhaps even genuine
Muslim control in those quarters cut off from the French Government.”55
Additional related cases arise on a daily basis. Thus, at the beginning of the
2003 school year, two girls who arrived with veils on their heads were
suspended from their school. Despite their claim that they acted
independently, the French intelligence services discovered that they were
directed by the UOIF.56
Similarly, immediately after the publication of The Satanic Verses by
Salman Rushdie in England, the UOIF and FNMF (National Federation of Muslims
in France) and the Mosque of Paris representatives convened with the demand to
prevent the translation and publication of the book in France.57
After the French Government approved submission of legislation, which would
prohibit wearing veils in schools,58
numerous demonstrations were organized throughout France, in some of which
harsh anti-Semitic slogans were sounded.59
From
Anti-Zionism to Anti-Semitism
The second area is, indeed, a massive assault against the State of Israel and
the Jewish community in France, which supports Israel or points to the dangers
posed by Islam in France or in other places. This anti-Zionist foundation,
mixed with anti-Semitism also has its source in the fundamental philosophy of
Islam, according to which every land, which was once part of Dar al-Islam
belongs to Muslims forever, and Jews there must be second-class citizens
lacking all civil rights.60
Therefore it is clear that for Islam the very existence of the State of Israel
is a threefold crime:
-
The Land of Israel was conquered by Calif Omar in the seventh century, and
as a result became Dar al-Islam forever, mandating that a Muslim
government rule it.
-
The Jews must be second-class citizens (dhimmis), and it is inconceivable that
they rule over any part of Dar al-Islam.
-
Jews rule over Muslims, while the opposite should be the case: The Muslims
should rule over the Jews.
This threefold crime is intolerable and constitutes the primary contradiction
to the Muslim aspiration to rule the world. Total elimination of the “Zionist
problem” will pave the way for the restoration of political Islam to control
the area:
For Hamas, the struggle with Israel also occurs on the level of the
eschatological struggle between Good and Evil: “Israel, due to its Jewishness
and its Jews, constitutes a challenge for Islam and the Muslims” (Charter,
art. 28) and this means “extirpating this cancer which undermines the Land of
the Night Journey and the Prophet’s Ascension and threatens the whole Islamic
world”.61
There are many pro-Palestinian and anti-Zionist demonstrations in France and
anti-Semitic slogans are sounded at many of them. In October 2000 in a Paris
demonstration, they called: “Death to the Jews”; at a March 23, 2002, Paris
demonstration, a drawing equated the Israeli flag with the Nazi
symbol.62 Similarly, the attempts to isolate
the Jewish intelligentsia in France have been increasing as they are accused
of letting their Judaism cause them to level criticism against Islam. A
conspicuous example was the recent article by Tariq Ramadan, grandson of the
founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan al-Bana, which was published on a
website close to the Muslim Brotherhood and accuses the “Jewish
intellectuals” of taking a pro-Israel stance.63
In many schools it is no longer possible to teach the topic of the Holocaust,
due to the vigorous protests of the Muslim students, who prevent the lesson
from continuing.64
65
The phenomenon is not limited to anti-Semitic slogans. Anti-Semitic acts,
initiated by Muslims are not at all rare occurrences. Hundreds of anti-Semitic
acts are committed annually in France, some clearly committed by Muslims and
some in which the police are unsuccessful in revealing the identity of the
perpetrators. They include physical attacks, desecration of Jewish cemeteries,
desecration of synagogues while leaving messages like: “Long live Arafat,
Palestine is free”, or “Death to the Jews, Long live the Arabs”, burning of
synagogues, threats and curses like “dirty Jew”, “dirty race”, telephone
threats like: “Jews to the crematoria” or to the French Jewish radio: “The
camps will reopen...I will slaughter you and there are mosques everywhere”, “I
swear by the Qur`an that we will screw you all, dirty Jews”, etc. etc.66
It is interesting that there is a close connection between events in Israel
and the anti-Semitic acts. Thus, in October 2000, at the beginning of the
Intifada in Israel, there was a massive wave of anti-Semitism in France –
a fact, which underscores the Muslim foundation of the new anti-Semitism in
France.67
Although official statistics ostensibly indicate a slight drop in the number
of anti-Semitic acts in 2003,68
it is important to remember that Jews are often afraid to complain lest the
publicity lead to a proliferation of similar acts, and the police often refuse
to file the complaint.69
It seems that the situation is gradually worsening and in November 2003, a
Jewish school in a Paris suburb was set on fire.70
From Social Control to Political Control
There are areas in France characterized as Zones de non droit – “areas
without law”. In those areas, the law of the land is, for all intents and
purposes, not in effect and gangs intimidate the population. The rate of
growth of these areas is astounding: From 106 in 1991 to 818 in 1999 and to
more than 1,100 in 2001. Muslims reside in many of these areas.71
The everyday life in these Zones de Non Droit is a nightmare:
...the only criteria are power, money and fear...violence is the pivot of the
Zone...Threatening maintains the Law of Secrecy... Doctors do not get in for
long... Letterboxes are smashed, garbage cans are regularly burnt...fire has
become the main tool for threatening youth in these zones. From January to
November 1999, not less than 10,985 cases of fire have been recorded,
willingly lit by “young” people... In Trappes, Marseilles or Lyons, synagogues
are the object of these criminal fires. Many men rape the same woman. In the
newspapers, they call her a “turning one”. This practice has become frequent
in these quarters...everyday teachers and students are insulted or attacked...
In my school, I have noticed a virulent anti-Semitism among students mainly
originating from the Maghreb... Firemen are attacked by 100 overexcited
malefactors. A fireman is often injured. A polceman says: “Here it’s the
Bronx and everybody gives up...” On September 1, 2003, in Beziers, a police
van is attacked with rockets... On October 4, 2003, the police tried to save
Sohane, a 17 year-old girl at the Balzac quarter in Vitry-sur-Seine near
Paris, that Djamel was burning alive in a local garbage dumpster.
Youth groups attacked the policemen and only after special police forces came to
help, did the attack stop.72
The policemen did not succeed in saving Sohane, who perished – burned alive!73
These areas are fertile ground for Muslim activity: Initially, they employ
violence in order to restore order and expel the drug and crime gangs. In
Nanterre, a suburb of Paris, Muslims destroyed a café controlled by drug
dealers, and the same is true of Lille in northern France:
In March 1991,
during the first month of Ramadan after the Gulf War, young people identifying
themselves with the cause of Islam wrecked a café in Nanterre which had been
the center of the drug trade. It was the first “anti-drug action” associated
with Islamism; others followed, notably in the Biscottes project in the south
of Lille, in 1993”74
The next step is extensive social activity, while complaining about French
democratic values:
The French youth
places education high on his list of priorities…however he estimates that
French education has failed and that its objective is to brainwash young
Muslims in an attempt to suppress Islam.75
Taking advantage of the law allowing children of immigrants to study the
language of their ancestral land, Muslims are at times successful in
introducing their representatives into the French educational system and teach
values opposed to the values of the Republic:
The curriculum teaching the language and culture of their countries of origin
provides the non-French-born students with the opportunity to be educated in
their mother tongue in their schools... In the 1980s, with the rise of the
re-Islamization movements, the teachers would sometimes serve as religious
educators providing an education, which runs counter to the values of the
secular, tolerant Republic.76
The incidents of violence and rebellion against the law have taken place in
the French capital as well. This is what happened during a raid by tax
authorities on stalls in the 18th quarter in Paris:
Only the arrival of reinforcements saved our colleagues from tragedy; they
were on the verge of being lynched...not far from the police station in Paris’
18th quarter. The police repaid the debt and began systematically checking 150
people... After 15 minutes, agitation increased and dozens of residents, men,
women and children crowded around the police barrier... The police roadblock
collapsed under the pressure of the crowd, some threw shoes at the security
forces, others threw rocks and bottles, the more restive among them roared:
“Long live bin Laden, Allahu Akbar...” The number of assaults against security
forces in France rose 14% last year and totaled 19,740 incidents.77
The French Muslim students movement, associated with the UIOF and consequently
close to the Muslim Brotherhood, has successfully infiltrated the national level
of French student representatives by aligning themselves with the large
student movements.78
This student movement is the only religious student movement running in
student elections, and although in 200 it received less than 1.5% of the
votes, in 2002 it received 8% of the votes.79
French politicians, among them the Interior Ministry, are aware of this and
are not indifferent to the might of the Muslim electorate. They are beginning
to attempt to woo that electorate.80
Islam of
France Versus Islam in France
The French like to be very meticulous in their use of language. Interior
Minister Nicolas Sarkozy, who projects, at first glance, a tough stance (“I
will expel...any Imam who delivers a speech or advocates values
contrary to the speeches and the values of the Republic”81),
sensed the difference between French Islam, similar to French Judaism – in
other words, a community integrated into French life and the fundamental
identity of its members is not in question and Islam in France – in
other words, an Islamic nation some of whose subjects reside in France and
pose a threat to France itself. Prior to elections for the Muslim
representation in France, which, as mentioned above, led to an overwhelming
victory for the movement close to the Muslim Brotherhood, Sarkozy said:
“The objective is to build a representation of Islam of France and not a
representation of Islam in France.”82
Although the UOIF changed its name from the “Union of Islamic Organizations in
France” to the “Union of Islamic Organizations of France”, its Arabic name has
remained the same “fi Francia” (in France).83
In light of the fundamental philosophy of the Central Islamic Organizations in
France, the demographic growth becomes a substantive threat against France. In
lectures delivered by Professor Bernard Lewis in Oxford in March 1990, he
capably described the problem:
Some have even described the present
situation as the third Muslim invasion of Europe, more successful than
either the first or the second. According to this view, capital and labor
have succeeded where the armies of the Moors and the Turks both failed.
There are now close to two million Turkish and other Muslims in Germany,
similar or greater numbers of North Africans in France, and of Indians,
Pakistanis, and Bangladeshis in the United Kingdom, as well as others in
Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, Austria, Spain, Italy, and the Scandinavian
countries, establishing, for the first time since the retreat across the
Straits of Gibraltar in 1492, a massive and permanent Muslim presence in
Europe. These communities are still bound by a thousand ties of language,
culture, kinship, as well as religion, to their countries of origin, and
yet, inexorably, are becoming integrated in their countries of residence.
They, and their children and grandchildren, will have incalculable but
certainly immense consequences for the future both of Europe and of Islam.84
At the beginning of this article, I cited the statement of Sheik Qaradawi, who
said: “[The conquest of Mecca] was not by the sword or by war, but by a [Hudabiyya]
treaty, and by peace... Perhaps we will conquer these lands without armies. We
want an army of preachers and teachers who will present Islam in all languages
and in all dialects.” It is worth noting that Muhammad’s conquest of Mecca was
indeed accomplished without a battle, when Muhammad arrived at the head of a
huge number of soldiers (approximately 10,000) and Mecca surrendered out of
fear of the huge number of Muslims. The crucial question is: Will France
wake up?
Will France
Wake Up?
Seemingly, the answer is yes.
In his late October 2003 speech, President Chirac bemoaned the fact that
“there are those who hide behind a warped notion of freedom of religion in
order to rebel against the laws of the Republic or to undermine fundamental
accomplishments of a modern society, i.e. equality of the genders and respect
for women,” and he mentioned that “he will learn all of the lessons from the
findings of the committee established on the matter and if the need arises, he
will implement the law.”85
Former Prime Minister Jospin said: “I imagine that in the long term we will
have to pass legislation against these deviations, which lead to the
undermining of the fundamental principles of the Republic...Wearing the veil
is the result of political-religious pressure.”86
The members of the parliamentary committee dealing with clothing of a
religious or political nature unanimously recommended legislation explicitly
prohibiting this in public schools.87
(UIOF will emerge victorious in any case, as in the wake of such legislation,
it is demanding support for the establishment of Muslim schools, in which they
will be able to wear veils.88)
A majority was coalescing in support of this legislation.89
And indeed, the Assemblée Nationale has passed the law with an
overwhelming majority: 494 against 36.90
The Sénat has ratified the Law also with an overwhelming majority: 276
against 20.91
Regarding the question of compatibility between Islamic values and the values
of the Republic, 31% of Frenchmen answered in the affirmative, while 62%
answered in the negative.92
Those most aware are those who encounter the problem on a regular basis: 75%
of teachers support the ban on religious articles in schools and 84% support
expulsion from school if a compromise cannot be reached with the student.93
However, one who follows the media and the public deliberations in France
senses the confusion both of the citizens and of the public representatives.
And the State
of France Was Confused
There is no doubt that the topic of Islam troubles the French. News broadcasts
begin daily with information regarding the veil, acts of violence by Muslims
(consistently characterized as “youths”), discussions regarding “one France”
or community class issues and other topics featuring Islam. There is no doubt:
The State of France is confused.
In contrast to the great concern regarding an Islamic political takeover,
which is manifest in initiatives to pass legislation on the matter of religion
and in speeches regarding the curbing of fundamentalist momentum, there is
also fear of the reaction of Muslims who constitute a significant political
force. Thus, Interior Minister Sarkozy, who is perceived as an uncompromising
warrior against fundamentalist Islam, initially opposed legislation
prohibiting the wearing of veils in schools: “We must not take the risk of
humiliating the decisive majority of Muslims in France.”94
Let us not forget that most of the Muslims in France voted for movements
close to the Muslim Brotherhood. And despite the harsh declarations of
the heads of UOIF, like: “The Qur`an is our constitution” or the refusal of the movement to sign an agreement to freedom of
conversion, the inclusion of Sheik Qaradawi who supports suicide bombings, the
movement’s support of the ban on the sale of alcohol and the prohibition
against homosexuality in the Islamic state – despite all that the organization
was not banned.95
Symbiosis of
Cultures
An additional source of the sense of impotence is the Muslim success in
introducing to the public consciousness that anyone who criticizes Islam is
branded an “Islamophobe”, i.e. one that fears (and so hates) Islam. The phrase was coined in
the late 1970s by the Iranians, who referred in that manner to women who
refused to wear a veil! Today it also appears in France as an attack against
anyone opposing the wearing of veils in public service and in schools.
They were also characterized in Le Monde as “Ayatollahs of secularism”.96
For all intents and purposes, a taboo is being established in France
preventing all criticism against Islam and the Islamic fundamentalist
factions.
Towards Which
Future
One can think about three main possible future orientations:
a. Integration of the Muslims, based upon the classical
French model:
French leaders, aspiring to lead the Third World, semi-confident that France
will be able to integrate the Muslim immigration wave, just as France knew how
to integrate previous immigration waves during its long history. Chirac even
hopes that Islam will enrich the French culture:
...Just as France was Celtic, Roman, German, English or Italian in some of its
large provinces...this country, which is zealous about its culture, proudly
takes the diversity of its sources and continues to be enriched by new
contributions, especially those coming from North Africa. A country conscious
of the fact that wealth of traditions shapes and enhances the national feeling
rather than diminishing it, opens the heart and the spirit to thinking,
tolerance and knowledge.97
And more emphatically, Chirac’s statement as quoted in La Figaro, on
October 29, 2003: “The roots of Europe are equally Muslim and Christian.”98
This opinion is shared by many politicians:
We are a land of reception. Those who come to us do so because they have
sympathy or attraction for our customs and our way of life. Individually and
as a group, they have brought, they bring and will bring a lot to France.99
However, facts seem to indicate a direction very different from the previous
waves of immigration which enriched the French patrimony: Communitarism:
The communitarists’ claims take more worrying shapes as for 15 years they
have presented ethnic and religious characteristics: pupils at secondary schools demand veil
wearing in the classrooms, refuse to attend biology classes and to go to the
swimming pool; students dispute the contents of the history classes, recite
aloud the Qur`an during the class, do not respect female teachers. Men refuse to
shake women’s hands, grocers refuse to have alcohol and pork on their shelves, women
demonstrate to obtain separate hours in swimming pools. Colored with Islamic
fundamentalism, communitarism presents the disadvantage of introducing back to
the social corps the principle of a profound inequality between men and
women...100
The growth of Islam in France and the development of the
Islamic communitarism, seem to prove that the classical model of integration
will not succeed in the case of the Muslim community in France.
b. Integration
of the French into Islam: The Islamic Republic of France
Facing the dissymmetry between the aspirations of Islam in France and those of
France’s President and the French, the reciprocal enrichment runs the risk of
changing into a process of absorption of France by Islam, and the fulfillment
of Qaradawi’s
prophecy quoted above, “Perhaps the next conquest, Allah willing,
will be by means of preaching and ideology.”
Others besides the Islamists also envisage such an outlet. The famous
philosopher Jean-Claude Milner, Head of the Collège Philosophique de France,
wrote in a recent book:
The good European is both peace-loving in his way of life and pacified in his
soul. He has a minimal spirituality, below which nobody can drop down, under
pain of barbarity; its content can vary depending upon the country concerned. In
Europe, and especially in France, it seems to come to moderate Christianity,
not confessional and without priests... Taking into account the colonial
history and the migrations, this minimal spirituality is to open itself to
moderate Islam, even if one will have to baptize as moderate something which is not
moderate.101
c. An open,
and maybe violent, conflict between France and Islamism:
France wants to remain republican and secular and the passing of the veil law
testifies to the force of these ideas. Demonstrations everywhere in the Muslim
world from England102
to Indonesia103
through France itself104
accompanied the Stasi law voting, which forbids veil wearing at school. One
has to add to these demonstrations the politics threats, such as that said by
Sheikh Fadlallah, closely involved in the Lebanese Hizbullah, “Moreover,
the French state is present everywhere in the Muslim World. This law, if it
is passed, would create many complications for France in Muslim states, and
these complications will serve the interests of another state...”105
Recently, terrorists like the Islamic group named Movsar Barayev, and the
Chechens responsible for the attack against the Moscow theater in October 2002,
explicitly threatened:
On February 10, a new step was adopted by the Coalition Against Islam,
following the voting by the Assemblée Nationale... Thus we will
regroup, after the success of our brothers between September 11, 2001 through
March 11, 2004, revert to use ceaseless attacks, and we will ask Allah to sow terror
in the hearts of the French... We will hit the descendants of Karl the Hammer
violently and blindly... This is like a declaration of war addressed to the
Muslim world, and if you do not withdraw it immediately, we will reply to it
harshly and with an intensity unheard of in your country since the acts of
1995. We request Muslims not to go to crowded places...106
Will France be the first Islamic state in Western Europe?
Endnotes
1 |
“Un Islamisme à la française”,
Le Temps, October 19, 2001. |
2 |
“Les imprécations du cheikh de Vénissieux”, Lyon Mag, April 2004, cité par
proche-orient.info, April 19, 2004. |
3 |
Atmane Tazaghart, “La filière terroriste des Minguettes”,
Le Figaro, January 17, 2004. |
4 |
“Les policiers sont convaincus qu'un attentat chimique était
en préparation en France”, Le Monde, January 10, 2004. |
5 |
Christophe Dubois, “Je pouvais fabriquer un engin
explosif”, Le Parisien, January 13, 2004. |
6 |
Sheikh Yousef Al-Qaradhawi, Al-Jazeera Television (Qatar), January 24, 1999, quoted in Memri, “Special Dispatch
Series”, December 6, 2002, No. 447. |
7 |
Quoted by Philippe Aziz, “Le Paradoxe de Roubaix”,
Plon, 1996, p. 91 |
8 |
Paul Fregosi, Jihad, Promotheus Books, 1998,
p. 113. |
9 |
André Castelot, Bonaparte, Librairie
Académique Perrin, Paris, 1967, p. 327. |
10 |
Alain Boyer, L’Islam en France,
Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1998, p. 63. |
11 |
Alain Boyer, ibid, p. 90. |
12 |
Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, <http://france.diplomatie.fr
/culture/france/ressources/letour/fr/text/religion.doc> |
13 |
“Notre patrie, c’est la France”, Entretien avec Zuhair
Mahmood, Religioscope, May 18, 2002, see also:
Nicholas Lequesne, “Islam
in Europe: A Changing Faith“,
Time Europe, August 28, 2002. |
14 |
“L’Islam en France”, La Documentation Française, Ministère
de l’Emploi et de la Solidarité, Ministre de l’Intérieur, Paris, 2000, p.
21. |
15 |
Le Figaro, October 9, 2003. |
16 |
Claire Chartier, Besma Laouri, “L’extrême voile”,
L’Express, November 20, 2003. |
17 |
Nathalie Simon, “Quand Trappes se dévoile”, Le Figaro,
February 12, 2004. |
18 |
Claire Chartier, “Le privé, refuge du voile?”,
L’Express, October 23, 2003. |
19 |
Alain Boyer, L’Islam en France, Presses
Universitaires de France, Paris, 1998, p. 21 |
20 |
“Les
convertis à l’Islam radical, une minorité croissante d’activistes”,
Le Monde, June 3, 2004. |
21 |
Alain Boyer, ibid., p. 17-18 |
22 |
“L’Islam en France et les réactions aux attentats du 11
septembre 2001”, enquête IFOP pour Le Monde, Le Point et Europe,
1, October 5, 2001. |
23 |
Dominique Vidal, “La France des ‘sans-religion’”,
Le Monde Diplomatique, September 2001. |
24 |
Abd al-Aziz Dweik, quoted by Emmanuel Sivan, “Eavesdropping
on Radical Islam”, The Middle East Quarterly, March 1995. |
25 |
<http://www.uoif-online.com>. |
26 |
Quoted by Gilles Kepel, Allah in the West,
Stanford University Press, 1997, p. 202. |
27 |
Gilles Kepel, ibid, p. 295. |
28 |
Quoted by David Zeidan, “The Islamic Fundamentalist View of
Life as a Perennial Battle”, Middle East Review of International
Affairs, Vol. 5, no. 4, December 2001. |
29 |
Catherine Coroller, “L'Islam de France attendra son
instance”, Libération, June 21, 2002. |
30 |
Xavier Ternisien, “L’UOIF domine les instance régionales du
culte musulman”, Le Monde, June 17, 2003. |
31 |
Le Monde, June 17, 2003;
Libération, July
1, 2003. |
32 |
Astrid de Larminat, “Les organisations islamiques au
congrès du Bourget”, Le Figaro, May 9, 2002. |
33 |
Le Parisien, February 12,
2003. |
34 |
<http://msanews.mynet.net/Launchpad/index.html>. |
35 |
Gilles Kepel, Allah in the West, Stanford
University Press, 1997, p. 192. |
36 |
Le Figaro, June 16, 2003. |
37 |
Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria,
Ithaca Press, 1996. |
38 |
Xavier Ternisien, “L'Arabie saoudite invitée à participer
au financement de la rénovation de la Mosquée de Paris”, Le Monde,
December 5, 2003. |
39 |
“Les neuf familles de l’Islam français”, Le Nouvel
Observateur, no. 1946, February 21, 2002. |
40 |
Gilles Kepel, À l’Ouest d’Allah, Éditions du Seuil,
Paris, 1994, p. 327.. |
41 |
Sir William Muir, The Life of Mohammad,
Edinburgh, 1923, p. 19. |
42 |
L’Islam en France, La
Documentation Française, Ministère de l’Emploi et de la Solidarité,
Ministre de l’Intérieur, Paris, 2000, p. 32. |
43 |
Xavier Ternisien, “Les imams de France prêchent un Islam
moralisateur et non belliqueux”, Le Monde, February 7, 2002. |
44 |
Alfred Morabia, Le Gihad dans l’Islam Médiéval,
Albin Michel, 1993, p. 202. |
45 |
Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam,
Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1955, p. 53. |
46 |
Duncan B. MacDonnald, Development of Muslim Theology,
Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory, Russell & Russell, New York,
1965, p. 55. |
47 |
Gilles Kepel, À l’Ouest d’Allah, Éditions du Seuil,
Paris, 1994, p. 227, p. 300. |
48 |
Abdallah Azzam, Bacha’ir al-nasr (The Omens of
Victory), Beirut, 1992, cité par Gilles Kepel, Jihad, Expansion et
déclin de l’islamisme, Éditions Gallimard, Paris, 2000, p. 220. |
49 |
Texte intégral de la Commission Stasi, December 11, 2003. |
50 |
Compte-rendu de l’audition de M. Yves Bertrand, directeur
central des Renseignements Généraux, devant la mission d'information sur
la question des signes religieux à l'école, Assemblée Nationale, July 9,
2003. |
51 |
Ibid. |
52 |
Béatrice Gurrey, “M. Chirac crée la ‘commission Stasi’ pour
redéfinir la laïcité”, Le Monde, July 1, 2003. |
53 |
Philippe Bernard, “Ces Musulmans de France hostiles au port
du foulard à l’école”, Le Monde, October 13, 2003. |
54 |
“Enquête sur le voile”, Le Nouvel Observateur,
2010, May 15-21, 2003, p. 22. |
55 |
Quoted in Alexandre Del Valle, L’Islam de France, <http:
//www.aipj.net/
analyses/inter32.html>. |
56 |
Cécilia Gabizon, “Les lycéennes d’Aubervilliers seraient
proches des milieux fondamentalistes”, Le Figaro, October
13, 2003. |
57 |
Alexandre Del Valle, L’Islam de France, <http://www.aipj.net/analyses/
inter32.html>. |
58 |
Guillaume Tabard, “Le Conseil des ministres approuve le
projet de loi”, Le Figaro, January 28, 2004. |
59 |
Mohammad Laterche’s statement at the mass demonstration
held in Paris on January 27, 2004 can be heard on the
<proche-orient.info> site. |
60 |
Bat Ye’or, Islam and Dhimmitude, Madison,
2002. |
61 |
Jean-François Legrain, “La Palestine, de la terre perdue à
la reconquête du territoire”, Éditions L’Harmattan, Paris, 1996. |
62 |
François Dufay et Emmanuel Berretta, “Juifs de France, Le
chagrin et la colère”, Le Point, October 20, 2000. |
63 |
Tariq Ramadan, “Critique des (nouveaux) intellectuels
communautaires”, October 3, 2003, <www.umma.com>. |
64 |
Paul Giniewsky, “French Jews and the Suburban Intifada”,
Nativ, September 2003. |
65 |
Emmanuel Brenner, Les Territoires perdus de la
République, Mille et Une Nuits, septembre 2002 |
66 |
See, for example, the Paris Rabbinate’s website, which
lists hundreds of anti-Semitic incidents since 2000, <http://www.consistoire.org>. |
67 |
Shmuel Trigano, “Les Juifs de France visés par l’Intifada”,
Observatoire du Monde Juif Bulletin, no. 1, November 2001. |
68 |
Cécilia Gabizon, “Les actes antisémites diminuent mais le
malaise persiste”, Le Figaro, January 31, 2004. |
69 |
From the author’s conversations with
representatives of various communities in
France.
See, for example, <http://www.consistoire.org>,
which notes a significant number of anti-Semitic acts, some of which were
not reported to the police.
|
70 |
“L’incendie d’un college israélite à Gagny suscite
l’indignation”, Le Monde, November 15, 2003. |
71 |
Vincent Trémolet de Villers, Les Zones de non-droit dans
la République Française, mythe ou réalité, Diplôme
Universitaire de 3ème Cycle, Université Paris II, 2001-2002. |
72 |
Ibid. |
73 |
Ariane Chemin, “Une plaque pour Sohane sur la tombe de
Simone de Beauvoir”, Le Monde, October 5, 2002. |
74 |
Gilles
Kepel, Allah in
the West,
Stanford
University Press, 1997, p. 262. |
75 |
Alain Boyer, L’Islam en
France, Presses Universitaires de France,
Paris, 1998, p. 95-96. |
76 |
Alain Boyer, ibid. |
77 |
Christophe Cornevin, “La foule prend douaniers et policiers
à partie dans le XVIIIe arrondissement”, Le Figaro, November 13,
2003. |
78 |
Estelle Chavastelon, L'Express, December 12, 2002. |
79 |
Jérôme Cordelier et Jean-Michel Decugis, “Islam: La
conquête du pouvoir”, Le Point, April 18, 2003. |
80 |
Catherine Coroller, “Les politiques convertis à l’électorat
musulman”, Libération, October 20, 2003. |
81 |
“Respect de la laïcité: M. Raffarin annonce une
‘disposition
législative’”, Le Monde, November 28, 2003. |
82 |
Alain Auffray, “A la recherche de délégués pour l'islam de
France”, Libération, October 5, 2002. |
83 |
Gilles Kepel, À l’Ouest d’Allah, Éditions du Seuil,
Paris, 1994, p. 227, p. 300, no.1, and see the name of the UOIF in Arabic
on its website, <http://www.uoif-online.com>. |
84 |
Bernard Lewis, Europe and Islam, Brasenose College,
Oxford University, February 26, March 5 and 12, 1990. |
85 |
Anne Fulda, “Quand Chirac revient à la fracture sociale”,
Le Figaro, October 22, 2003. |
86 |
Le Figaro, October 28, 2003,
quoted in “L’Élysée préparerait une loi contre le voile à l’école”,
Le Nouvel Observateur, November 5, 2003. |
87 |
“Les députés pour une loi contre les signes religieux à
l’école”, Le Monde, November 12, 2003. |
88 |
Antoine Guiral et Thomas Lebègue, “L’UMP exclut le voile de
l’école”, Libération, November 29, 2003. |
89 |
“Le Parti socialiste
‘souhaite voter’ la loi sur les signes
religieux”, Le Monde, February 5, 2004. |
90 |
Le Figaro, February 11, 2004. |
91 |
Olivier Pognon, “Laïcité, le feu vert du Parlement”, Le
Figaro, March 4, 2004. |
92 |
“Islam, l’inquiétude des Français”, Le Point, May
16, 2003. |
93 |
“Trois enseignants sur quatre veulent l’interdiction des
signes religieux”, Le Monde, February 4, 2004. |
94 |
“Respect de la laïcité: M. Raffarin annonce une disposition
législative”, Le Monde, November 28, 2003. |
95 |
Interview de Michèle Tribalat par M. Ibn Guadi, <http://www.proche-orient.info>,
<http://www.proche-orient.info/xjournal_pol_int.php3?id_
article=5975>. |
96 |
Fiametta Venner et Caroline Fourest, “Ne pas confondre
islamophobes et laïcs”, Libération, November 17, 2003. |
97 |
President Chirac’s speech in Uran, Algeria, March 2003. |
98 |
Le Figaro, October 29, 2003;
see also: Yvan Rioufol, “L’Europe et ses racines musulmanes”, Le Figaro,
November 7, 2003. |
99 |
Claude Allègre, “La Loi et le Voile”, L’Express,
December 25, 2003. |
100 |
Lucienne Bui-Trong, “Éloge du creuset français”,
dans Yves Charles Zarka, L’Islam en France, PUF, 2004. |
101 |
Jean-Claude Milner, “Les penchants criminels de l’Europe
démocratique”, Verdier, 2003, p. 86. |
102 |
“Mobilisation contre le projet de loi sur la laïcité”,
Le Monde, January 17, 2004. |
103 |
“Des Indonésiennes contre la loi française sur la laïcité”,
Libération, January 15, 2004. |
104 |
“Manifestion contre la loi sur la laïcité”, Le Monde,
December 21, 2003. |
105 |
“Lettre ouverte menaçante de Fadlallah, fondateur et guide
spirituel du Hezbollah , à Jacques Chirac”, <Proche-Orient.Info>, December
23, 2003, la lettre étant datée du December 20, 2003. |
106 |
“La France menacée d’attentats dans une lettre au
‘Parisien’”, Le Parisien, March 16, 2004.
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