Peace with Syria cannot be genuine and is
certainly not worth the heavy price of losing the Golan Heights. Since
real peace does not exist among the Arabs or between Egypt and Israel,
what sort of peace is possible with the radical Syrian regime that has
opposed it for so many years? But if it is any "consolation" that the
Egyptian front is quiet, such quiet has reigned on the Golan for more than
26 years, without "peace". Let us not be blinded by the shallow "peace"
mantra.
Not only can true peace not prevail with
Syria, but examination of the Golan's strategic importance to Israel shows
that "peace" whose price is the entire Golan is neither needed nor worth
it. Only the callous can envisage the uprooting of 17,000 people from 33
flourishing settlements – an act of "Ethnic Cleansing" that no peace can
warrant. Only a simpleton would give away a critical asset that deters
war or the launching of missiles (against Israel) and that maintains the
strategic equilibrium between the adversaries. Withdrawal to the 1923
international border is no less grave than withdrawal to the June 4, 1967
lines. In both cases, the Syrians will be fishing in, pumping water from,
and paddling on Lake Kinneret (Sea of Galilee).
The "security arrangements" that were
already agreed upon in 1995 are not worth the paper they are written on.
Certainly, no US early-warning station on Mount Hermon (even with a
doubtful "Israeli presence") could substitute for the worthy
"arrangements" – a drastic reduction of Syria's ORBAT (army), change in
its structure, and redeployment north of Damascus. For the short distance
from Damascus to the Golan, early warning is of little value, particularly
in comparison to the true "security arrangements".
To involve Americans on the Golan would be
folly, since it would enhance Israel's dependence and harm its special
relations with Washington. Also, a "peace" with Syria that results in its
economic and military strengthening (as in the case of Egypt), and by the
US, is sheer folly.
The "linkage" between Southern Lebanon
(suddenly a "tragedy" in Barak's words) and the Golan is most
unfortunate. Not only have we failed to subdue the Hizbullah, we have
extended legitimacy to Syria's conquest of Lebanon, and are even ready to
pay with the crucial asset of the Golan. Syria has critical economic
interests in Lebanon, and if we were only to apply the proper pressure we
could avoid the tragic abandonment of the Golan.
Israel's rights on the Golan are no less
than Syria’s, certainly in terms of its length of tenure there. Israel
will gravely err if it does not make use of the commitments given by
Presidents Ford, Bush, and Clinton that Israel must maintain a presence on
the Golan even in peacetime.
A
feasible solution for Israel on the Golan would not be territorial but
functional, i.e., a division between sovereignty (to Syria) and presence
and control (to Israel). We should bear in mind the precedent of Jordan’s
leasing (1999) of lands to Israel for decades.