Israel’s War Against Hizbullah:
The First Stage of the Free World’s War Against the Muslim Evil Axis
David
Bukay*
* This article was written
during the war, between July 17-22, 2006.
The Lebanese Arena
Lebanon is the clearest example of a French
imperialistic creation, whose borders are artificial and a population, composed
of a mixture of various religious and ethnic groups, which is neither interested
nor able to coexist. It is a “stateless state” in which a terrorist organization
established a “state within a state” under the auspices and with the support of
a foreign country – Iran. Lebanon has always been swampy quicksand disguised as
a honey trap of nature astonishing in its beauty to all its invitees and those
who intervene in it. It was established as a Christian state under French
auspices, ran into trouble with the Palestinians, Syrians and Israelis and is
liable to transform into a Khomeini-style Shiite country, the spearhead of the
Iranian Middle East strategy.
The primary objectives of maintaining
internal order and peace in Lebanon were articulated and agreed upon by the
international community in UN Security Council Resolution 1559, which decided
upon the total disarmament of all non-Lebanese forces and militias in Lebanon;
called upon the Lebanese Government to ensure its effective authority over all
southern Lebanon territories, including deployment of the Lebanese Army there;
and decided upon the expulsion of all foreign forces and their equipment from
Lebanese territory and prevention of the re-infiltration of the Syrian presence
there. These principles are perceived, justifiably, as a precondition for the
restoration of Lebanese sovereignty and preservation of its independence.
Israel’s total withdrawal to the “Blue Line” was recognized by the UN Security
Council in Resolution 1310, on July 27, 2000. Syria withdrew its forces from
Lebanon in the course of 2005 after the assassination of Rafik Hariri in
February 2005, although Syrian security officers and intelligence agents remain
a significant factor in Lebanon and especially local personalities and bodies,
like Lebanese President Lahoud.
Nevertheless, the Hizbullah, Iran’s
implementation arm and Syria’s agent, only enhanced its hold on Lebanon and
announced its absolute opposition to disarming. Hizbullah became the primary
power factor challenging everyone creating a situation where all other political
factors, even those that would very much like to expel Hizbullah or at least to
weaken it, lack the military and political ability to do so. Furthermore, to the
extent that Syrian forces left Lebanon, the informal Iranian forces – the
“Revolutionary Guards” and intelligence agents – began to enter Lebanon and
influence the internal political order and in part situated themselves on the
Israeli border. The Iranian ambassador in Beirut has substantial power in the
internal political system and Hizbullah has become a dominant factor, even if
its formal numerical power is limited. Its military might has been enhanced with
its acquisition of Syrian and Iranian short and medium range missiles, with the
ability to threaten most of Israel’s territory. Hizbullah even received official
recognition, when, on June 20, 2000, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Anan met with
Nasrullah and when the commanders of the UN emergency force exchanged liaison
officers with Hizbullah and for all intents and purposes transformed the UNIFIL
force into a full-fledged collaborator with it. Indeed, that led Iran to assess
that if the West took any sort of measures against it due to its nuclear
program, Hizbullah’s power and its ballistic threat could hold Israel hostage
and neutralize its military power.
It is also important to remember that
Hizbullah has no red lines in its strategic activity and all measures are deemed
legitimate and valid. That is the reason that it had no reservations concerning
the introduction of weaponry, including long range missiles, into Beirut and the
transformation of every house and every village into weapons arsenals and
tunnel-digging sites. Today, they do not care about the destruction of Lebanon.
In the acts of terrorism that it perpetrated, Hizbullah was the first to employ
suicide murderers in Beirut against the American and French forces and drove
them out of Lebanon; the organization hijacked planes and liquidated their
passengers; engaged in the large scale abduction and murder of people and
holding others as hostages for years. All these shaped Hizbullah’s image as the
leading terrorist organization in the world. Furthermore, the quantity of
weapons and missiles accumulated by the organization in Lebanon threatens the
entire Middle East, and is designed to generate political power and influence in
the region. Ultimately, Hizbullah is supposed to be a highly influential
political factor and not only a violent terrorist organization functioning as a
major player in the region.
The Israeli Arena
The frantic Israeli flight, on May 25,
called “unilateral withdrawal”, was clear proof of Hizbullah’s victory and led
to Nasrullah’s famous Marj-Ayoun speech in which he established that despite its
nuclear power and the might of its air force, Israel is as weak as a spider web.
During the ‘90’s, Hizbullah was determined to reverse the deterrence equation
with Israel. The successful guerilla war that it waged in southern Lebanon,
without Israel having aligned or prepared itself for that type of combat; the
bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992 in response to the
liquidation of Abbas Moussawi and the car bomb that blew up the Jewish social
club, “Amaya”, in Buenos Aires in 1994; the clever use of propaganda and the
attrition of Israeli public opinion, with the help of Israeli groups and
organization – which are significantly responsible for the war being waged today
– all these clearly symbolized Israel’s absolute failure to deter Israel and to
cut it down to size. On the contrary, Israel inflated Nasrullah’s personality
and image and transformed a small organization into an army with frightening
power. Israel, like the United States, is perceived by Hizbullah as a “paper
tiger”, a country lacking the determination to fight and lacking a strong
backbone. The result was a total reversal of the strategic equation. For the
first time in the history of the State of Israel, not only was it unsuccessful
in deterring its enemies, Hizbullah was able to achieve effective deterrence of
the State of Israel. The phenomenon of Barak’s cowardly withdrawal, not the
withdrawal from Lebanon itself (which should have been undertaken earlier) but
the manner in which it was accomplished; the frantic flight in the middle of the
night, abandoning allies in Lebanon, without demarcating red lines not to be
crossed or grounds for war, granted the Hizbullah a clear military and political
victory and for the first time symbolized its establishment as the sole,
effective force in southern Lebanon, unchallenged by any other element in
Lebanon.
The reversal of the deterrence equation had
its own influence in that it prevented any effective Israeli action; further
enhanced Hizbullah’s prestige as an organization and Nasrullah’s as a leader;
and encouraged Iran’s gradual infiltration of and influence on the Lebanese
political system. This was the clearest proof that terrorism is successful and
provides genuine advantages to the cruel and determined Hizbullah as a terrorist
organization and Nasrullah as a charismatic leader enhanced their influence in
four dimensions: First, by effectively deterring Israel, by severely damaging
its image and by finding the path to victory against it; second, by enhancing
Hizbullah’s political influence in Lebanon and by neutralizing the forces in
Lebanon from opposing its activity. In complete contrast to the assessments of
“experts” in Israel, Hizbullah always employed two concurrent strategies: To
march towards Jerusalem, i.e. to conduct the Palestinian war of independence
from the Jews and to march in a clear and orderly manner towards Beirut, that is
taking control of Lebanon and transforming it into a Khomeini-style Shiite
state. Third, the magnetic influence that it gained among the Palestinians and
the Israeli Arabs and, to a large extent, its having taken control of a
significant portion of their terrorist actions against Israel. Fourth, Hizbullah
showed how to transform a terrorist organization into a guerilla force while
maintaining terrorist methods and how to utilize that power to become a
significant internal political power and at the same time an organization with
influence over Al-Qaeda’s terrorist system. Paradoxically, this tendency became
easier in the wake of the liquidation of Abu-Mus`ab
al-Zarqawi, an avowed enemy
of the Shiites. After Arafat’s death, it was absolutely clear that Nasrullah was
the lead player in implementing Palestinian terrorism. At the same time, he
became the hero of Israeli Arabs and the provider of hope that perhaps this time
they had found the ultimate leader who could overcome Israel and cut it down to
size. A significant portion of the Israeli Arab terrorist attacks were guided
and operated by Hizbullah, by means of its liaison, Kes Ubeid. Similarly, he was
also responsible for smuggling drugs from Lebanon to Israel (narco-terrorism),
in exchange for intelligence information.
Hizbullah’s immediate impact on Palestinian
activity began right after Israel’s flight from Israel in May 2000. During the
Camp David summit, in July 2000, Arafat noticed Hizbullah’s enormous success,
and despite the generous proposals for a political settlement that he received
(during the January 2001 Taba talks, the proposal reached 101.5%: In exchange
for the 1.5% of the territories that Israel would maintain, Arafat would receive
3% of the Haluza Sands), and he refused. From his perspective, it was clear that
Palestine would be liberated only by means of blood and fire – in accordance
with the Hizbullah model – and not by means of political settlement. The path of
terrorism had proved itself effective, and Arafat, who planned his course of
action well, implemented it in an orderly and official manner in late September
2000, under the name of the al-Aqsa Intifada. The connection between the
Hizbullah success and the rejection of Israel’s proposals in Camp David and the
launch of the terrorist war is not merely a chronological connection but a
profound, intimate substantive connection, commented upon not only by scholars
like Professor Bernard Lewis, but also by official Palestinian spokespersons.
Arafat’s base assumptions, again and again, to our chagrin, proved correct:
Terrorism proves itself and is successful, Israel understands only force and
from Arafat’s perspective, the implication was that Israel would collapse in the
face of the intensity of Palestinian terrorism’s resolve, just as it did in
Lebanon.
Nevertheless, to Arafat’s chagrin, it
became clear that in contrast to the extreme weakness and pathetic nature of the
Israeli reactions against the Hizbullah, it did not collapse in the face of the
Palestinians and its harsh military response to terrorism was severe, even if
sobriety was achieved only after a year and a half of inhuman terrorism –
beginning in mid-March 2002. Only then did Israel realize that it was engaged in
a terrorist war, seeking to replicate Hizbullah’s success in Lebanon. We also
believe that Israel does not know how to wage a war on terrorism and has never
combated terrorism effectively, it only reacted never took the initiative – that
explains the lack of significant successes – it prevented the Palestinians from
achieving successes, even approaching Nasrullah’s.
In viewing the Lebanon episode from a broad
perspective, Barak’s march of folly pales when compared to Sharon. Barak carried
out an irresponsible act of frantic flight, which served as a precedent. Its
structure and essence were folly, but they could be perceived as an experiment.
In contrast, Sharon did nothing in Lebanon for five years, despite the fact that
Hizbullah confronted and provoked, humiliated and publicly ridiculed Israel,
attacked cities, abducted soldiers and killed others, including civilians.
Israel’s reaction was pathetic. Not one Hizbullah member was liquidated in
Lebanese territory during the five years of Sharon’s regime. Israeli artillery
fire and air strikes were directed to areas devoid of people, to sand and rocks
and in the best case to Hizbullah outposts that we knew were empty. Israel
flinched and was deterred from activity in the interest of “peace for the guest
houses” and “economic growth in the Galil” (The cynical article by the
journalist Eitan Haber from Metulla against those who warned of the consequences
of the flight and his proof was obvious – everything in the Galilee is
flourishing and prospering, is distressingly memorable). Everyone was marshaled
to maintain calm and to rebuff internal criticism, and Nasrullah’s
accomplishments were, by definition, rejected.
The flight from Lebanon pales in comparison
to the flight from Gaza. It was as if nothing was learned from the flight from
Lebanon and its dire consequences. The Sharon Government again decided to flee
and repeated the Lebanon formula. This is already a crime with a bloody price;
however, of course, a commission of inquiry will not be empanelled. Not only
have we failed to learn the lessons of the frantic flight from Lebanon, it is
conceivable that the flight from Gaza was carried out in order to change
Sharon’s image, so that he would be accepted into the warm bosom of the Left,
enjoy the admiration of the media and enter the history books as a man of peace.
One attorney, two sons and three public relations advisers sealed the fate of
the Jewish people at that point in time and managed the country in a course of
action that bears heavy responsibility for the present situation. This has
nothing to do with the expulsion of 7,500 Gush Katif settlers. The point is the
flight from Lebanon, which escalated the Palestinian terrorist reaction,
endangers the residents and strategic sites in the South, and threatens to
spread to Judea and Samaria. The lessons of Lebanon and the Hizbullah combat
techniques will reach the Palestinians and we, as a result of our flight, are
liable to be destined to a harsher reality euphemistically called
“disengagement” and “realignment”.
As in the case of Lebanon, all sorts of
irresponsible and baseless slogans were aired. Barak declared that if one shot
is fired from Lebanese territory – Lebanon will burn. The only things that
burned over the last six years were the cries of the residents of the North, the
wounded IDF soldiers and our green fields. Sharon’s reaction was identical: If
the Palestinians initiate an attack against Israel, its reaction will be
incomparably severe and this time Israel would have the legitimacy of the
international community. And what actually happened? Hundreds of Qassam missiles
were fired into Israeli cities and settlements; strategic sites are targeted
from Gaza; tunnels were excavated into Israeli territory; violent and virulent
terrorism was generated against us; Gaza became Qaedastan, Hizbullahstan and
Hamastan; the border with Egypt became susceptible to infiltration and terrorist
attacks; and the Rafah crossing invites any interested terrorist to come to
Gaza. These were the results of the frantic flight, however the residents of
Israel were informed, with the assistance of a media supportive of the “new”
Sharon, that although there are some minor problems, the situation is really
okay and the steps taken were extremely successful. Indeed, wise men have taught
us that one who fails to learn from history will ultimately experience it again
and apparently, the “success” of the flight from Gaza, like its predecessor in
Lebanon, was so impressive, that a third flight is already being planned, code
name “realignment”. This course of action, if carried out, will be really
interesting, as this time there is a chance that the terrorism will reach the
“State of Northern Tel Aviv”.
A no less dangerous and irresponsible
phenomenon is that the international community and Israeli public opinion have
over the years become accustomed to the fact that Israel considers terrorism and
violence, suicide bombings and abductions of soldiers a livable situation and
not an egregious offense unacceptable to any sovereign country possessing
national self-respect. Israel’s “deterrence” has become a platitude and a cover
for hedonism, lack of national will and self-deception. In contrast to their
declarations, Israel – perhaps more than any other Western country – has
conducted negotiations with abductors and murderers, has carried out “prisoner”
exchanges and capitulated to terrorism. Furthermore, Israel has revealed to the
world that one Israeli prisoner, even his corpse, is worth thousands of
terrorist murderers. This behavior pattern was the primary incentive for the
abduction of additional soldiers. The opinion that Israel only understands the
language of force has become conventional wisdom among the terrorist
organizations (and Arafat emphasized this point). When Israel initiates a
“sudden” outburst of significant military action, Israel’s enemies and the
international community don’t know what hit them, and characterize it as
“disproportionate”.
Indeed, the dominant characteristic of
Israel’s conduct and its strategic reactions is action in accordance with the
“cup of blood syndrome”: It exercises restraint and self-control and closes its
eyes, until the bloodshed becomes intolerable, then it reacts with military
severity that is perceived as overreaction. This leads the international
community to stop Israel and prevent it from achieving its objectives. The
lesson should have been learned long ago: The political hourglass requires a
military stopwatch and especially adoption of a clear, rational policy and
establishment of achievable objectives, with determination and commitment. In
the absence of policy and set objectives, the war is conducted with objectives
being set and articulated in the course of battle and the result does not always
correspond with that which could have been accomplished. Furthermore, due to the
lack of expertise and experience in conducting negotiations, the achievements on
the battlefield are usually wasted and the policy continues to fail. The result
– the seeds of the next war have already taken root.
Israel is portrayed as a country that fails
to understand that one must fight to the end against repeated terrorist
provocations and threats and that refusal to go out and wage war will ultimately
bring the war home, under much more difficult conditions and at a much greater
cost. It seems that Israel has failed to learn the lesson of European
appeasement and its conciliatory policy vis-à-vis Lebanon and the Palestinians
led to the fact that it did not prepare for the difficult reality in which we
find ourselves. The cruel war, the severe attack on the rear, the loss of life,
the economic damages and the fatal blow to tourism after it had begun to
recover, are the direct result of overlooking that which required drastic action
long ago.
The Crisis That Developed and the Implications
of the War in Lebanon
The crisis that began at Hizbullah’s
initiative, but with the support of its patron, Iran, which became more and more
convinced that Israel’s self-indulgent, indifferent policy, and Hizbullah’s
effective deterrence would prevent any significant Israeli reaction. Israel’s
conceptual weakness was manifest in Olmert’s statement, when he declared in
Washington, even before he became Prime Minister: We have tired of wars, tired
of being courageous, tired of victories, tired of defeating our enemies. This
defeatist statement expressing a sense of gloom indeed embodies the reality in
which Israel unilaterally withdrew twice and threatens to do so a third time.
The fascinating result is that it is precisely in those areas from which Israel
fled that it is now engaged in all out war. Has Israel learned anything from
this experience? Has Israel internalized the fact that one does not flee
terrorism? Apparently not, as it plans on fleeing again, under the code name
“realignment”, and there too, no doubt, it will be forced to fight for its life
and Jerusalem. This phenomenon corresponds with the immortal statement of Haim
Weizmann, the first president of the State of Israel: “The Jewish People are
smart, but they lack sense”. Indeed, it has become clear that even if Israel has
all the capabilities and means to defend itself, it lacks the determination and
will to invest the extended efforts necessary to overcome its enemies. The
present crisis unfolded in the context of that attitude.
A planned action by Hizbullah began on July
12, in an attack on an IDF patrol, wounding some of its soldiers and abducting
two. The action proved just how effective Hizbullah intelligence was and the
implementation was successful. This action followed the abduction of a soldier
in Gaza after digging a tunnel into Israeli territory. The two actions were well
coordinated and could not have been undertaken without the green light from
Iran. The outstanding characteristic is that the war which developed was
asymmetrical: While Israel began a war in the style of Kosovo 1999; Hizbullah
waged a Vietnam-style guerilla war. Israel sought to achieve the same objective
– submission – as in Kosovo, from the air; however that approach is incompatible
with the reality in Lebanon and the guerilla deployment of Hizbullah. It is
indifferent to attacks on empty infrastructure facilities and the destruction of
Lebanon actually serves its purpose – the international community will stop
Israel and condemn it; Hizbullah will actually unite the internal forces in
Lebanon in support of it and will prove to them that they are the only shield
that stood up to Israeli aggression and that its military power must be
preserved; in that way, Iran’s influence will be enhanced, as a patron granting
its patronage to Lebanon.
Iran had six objectives in managing the
crisis:
First, to distract world attention
from the problem of its developing nuclear capability. The United States had
already requested to bring the matter before the Security Council, which would
have started the political countdown to military action;
Second, to ease the pressure on
Hizbullah to disarm and to enable the deployment of the Lebanese Army in the
South. This pressure increased considerably since the Syrian forces exited
Lebanon. By drawing Israel into war, Hizbullah is seeking to prove that it alone
has the means to defend Lebanese territory and justify its refusal to disarm.
This is in addition to its ideological position that Hizbullah will be
established through blood and fire;
Third, to wear out Israel, as the
hostile arm of the West in the Middle East and to remove it from the circle of
the future war on Iran by means of forcing it to confront security difficulties
with its local enemies (Palestinian terrorism and military pressure exerted by
Hizbullah on Israeli cities and their residents);
Fourth, to turn Hizbullah and Iran
into the primary factor dealing with the “Palestinian issue”; Hizbullah,
battling for Palestinian interests and the realization of their just demands and
Iran as the bearer of the standard of the jihad and the war against the
infidel enemy in the Middle East;
Fifth, to turn Iran into an
influential power-factor in the Middle East, whose opinion must be taken into
consideration and thereby accelerate the process of turning Lebanon into a
Shiite state. Even today, the Iranian embassy in Lebanon influences political
actions while Nasrullah is the ultimate hero of the Israeli Arabs and the
Palestinians.
Sixth, Nasrullah absolutely believes
that he will achieve a military victory over Israel and that he will thereby
strengthen his demand for political leadership in Lebanon. He will be portrayed
as the only leader who stood up to Israel’s military might and overcame it,
hence the patronage that he claims over the defense of Lebanon from Zionist
aggression.
In this sense, it is not merely a war
against Hizbullah in Lebanon, but a war with much broader regional and even
international ramifications regarding the position and standing of Iran. These
are the objectives as Iran viewed and assessed them and this is its response to
the American strategy designed to prevent Iran’s nuclear program and minimize
its influence and threat in the region. Not all of the objectives delineated
above are necessarily logical and achievable. Failure to achieve them is liable
to lead Iran to an inferior strategic status. From its perspective, Hizbullah is
considered one of its strategic cornerstones and its first line of defense
against the West. At the same time, Iran, together with Hizbullah, assessed that
taking that course of action and initiating a regional crisis would, in any
case, present many advantages that would overshadow the drawbacks. It was a
large-scale gamble reinforced by the impression of weakness transmitted by
Israel and the United States, which lack the ability to hold the land and above
all lack endurance and internal fortitude. These tipped the scales in favor of
managing the crisis by military means.
Israel’s reaction came as a surprise both
in terms of its intensity and its course of action. The military situation had
become intolerable and the bloodshed was unbearable. This substantive violation
of all principles of international law required a harsh Israeli response, not
only to free the two abducted soldiers but to destroy the Hizbullah’s
infrastructure of military strength and armaments, which threatened the
residents of Israel and create a new balance of power in relations between
Israel and Hizbullah. Any additional Israeli restraint would constitute not only
a severe blow to its strength, but also its strategic decline. In the wake of
Israeli restraint, the Palestinians were supposed to initiate a broad terrorist
offensive against it as part of the continuing steps to wear it down and to
promote its retreat. Nasrullah’s objective is clearly to exhaust Israel’s power
by means of bringing about loss of life and thereby cause the undermining and
erosion of Israeli public opinion. At the same time, Israel also failed in that
it did not take Nasrullah’s strategy, intended to preserve his power, into
consideration. Under the auspices of spilling Israeli blood he sought to achieve
a cease fire, without substantively damaging his chain of command and without
losing his military superiority and his political influence inside Lebanon.
Hizbullah anticipated an Israeli military
action; however it did not anticipate the scope and mode of that reaction. It
sought ground combat, in which it sought to exhaust the Israeli soldiers and
spill their blood and thereby hasten its surrender with the assistance of
pressure exerted by public opinion and organizations of its collaborators in
Israel affiliated with the fanatic, anti-Zionist Left. Israel, which took action
with a broad air offensive throughout Lebanon, striking infrastructures and
imposing a naval, ground and air blockade indeed caught Nasrullah off guard. At
the same time, at this point Israel made its first and perhaps most fatal error,
which would deprive Israel of victory in the war. The air offensive should have
been initiated immediately beginning with precise bombings of all of Hizbullah’s
headquarters in the Dahia quarter in Beirut and to place its emphasis on
liquidating its entire leadership. There was not, nor is there a more
significant or critical objective than eliminating the leadership of a
terrorist, guerilla organization, and that is especially true regarding
Hizbullah. The organization’s entire leadership should have been mortally
destroyed and that would have changed the entire strategic balance, even if the
missiles and the ground warfare would have continued for a while. In numerous
articles in the past, we emphasized again and again the supreme significance of
eliminating the leaders of terrorist, guerilla organizations. This missed
opportunity by Israel is liable, unfortunately, to prevent it from achieving
victory and in fact lays the groundwork for the next war, as it prevents
engendering a decisive result.
It is important to remember that after the
withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon, the internal political forces in
Lebanon began to demand with greater resolve the disarmament of Hizbullah and
the creation of an infrastructure to preserve Lebanon’s independence and
sovereignty by means of deploying its army throughout the country. At the same
time, those voices were not clear and strong enough because there is no internal
political force capable of standing up to Hizbullah’s might. This is one of the
most acute problems in any potential agreement in Lebanon: Who will dismantle
Hizbullah and who has the ability to do so? The possibility that it will become
part of the Lebanese Army and the problem would be thereby, ostensibly, resolved
will almost certainly have tragic results for both Israel and Lebanon and must
not be accepted. The internal forces in Lebanon have neither the ability nor the
will to act independently. We again return to the causes of the Israeli
involvement in Lebanon, as there are those asking Israel to do this dirty work
for them without their involvement. Israel must act exclusively for the
promotion and preservation of its own interests and not for the interests of
others.
Hizbullah’s strategic mistake lies in its
assessments underestimating Israel’s strength and resolve to manage the crisis.
These assessments prove that Nasrullah failed to learn Israel’s response
patterns when bloodshed becomes intolerable and especially when Israel emerged
from its era of overlooking and restraint and has internalized that the
fanatical Islamic axis of evil is seeking to defeat it. Hizbullah – which
represents Iran’s interests, is aided by Syria and serves as its agent – has
transformed Lebanon into a Shiite mini-state. The July 12 abduction of the
soldiers and the attack against Israel was an additional step forward: Hizbullah
acted as a state in and of itself and decided to drag all of Lebanon into a war
with Israel despite the fact that it was clear that the main price would be paid
by Lebanon and its citizens. Israel’s reaction indeed “confirmed” this and the
Lebanese infrastructure was, indeed, severely damaged. The reason is that one of
the methods to defeat a guerilla organization is to isolate it from the aid and
support of external forces and to prevent the existence of the “guerilla base” –
the logistical infrastructure of the population and its role as a human shield.
At the same time, it was Nasrullah who directly and clearly threatened, on
television, the political and governmental elites in Lebanon that “this is the
time for solidarity and cooperation. All arguments should be postponed. I warn
you against making mistakes. It is national responsibility. No one can allow
himself to act in a manner that will encourage the enemy to attack Lebanon”.
Nasrullah is convinced that the belligerent acts promote victory and support his
interests and the interests of Iran in Lebanon; hence his declaration that
Resolution 1559 is buried under the ruins of Beirut.
The Israeli offensive designed to eradicate
Hizbullah and destroy it as a military force and a menacing terrorist
organization is a difficult, complex mission. The reason is not only because it
is a paramilitary guerilla force, well-trained and well-armed with sophisticated
weapons; not only because it is supported by Iran and Syria, but also because of
its deep entrenchment within the Shiite population, which constitutes
approximately 40% of the population of Lebanon and due to the construction of a
combat infrastructure in all of the cities and villages, in the houses and
between them, and especially, apparently, beneath them in the form of long
tunnels (a Hizbullah strategic surprise?). With Syria’s withdrawal, the “Iranian
revolutionary guards” resumed their significant role in armament, guidance and
strategic command of Hizbullah and Iranian officers fill a central role in
strategic and tactical intelligence and political recruitment. The missiles, of
various ranges, manufactured in Iran, reach Lebanon by way of the Damascus
international airport with some manufactured in Syria and deployed throughout
Lebanon. These provide Hizbullah with reasonably significant breathing room to
wage guerilla warfare and Israel must position itself for appropriate
countermeasures.
Critical Steps That Were Not Immediately Implemented
Already after five days of combat in
Lebanon, egregious mistakes, in the form of military actions that were not
taken, were identified:
First, the failure to eliminate
Nasrullah and the military, political and religious leadership of the Hizbullah
right at the beginning of the war. Bombing Hizbullah headquarters in Beirut was
a vital necessity for the conduct of a successful, victorious campaign. What was
accomplished after three days was the destruction of infrastructures with
symbolic, not strategic, significance as the leadership was already in hiding.
Again, it is impossible to beat a guerilla force without liquidating its
leadership. The examples from South America (Topamaros,
Montaneros, Shining Path),
from Europe (the Red Brigades, the Red Army Faction), and the Middle East (PKK)
absolutely support this assertion. An immediate action in the Dahia neighborhood
would also have disrupted the chain of command and the operational initiative of
Hizbullah’s terrorist combat. We could have caught most of the leadership by
surprise and eliminated them.
Nasrullah must die because he is the
liaison to the world terrorism jihad, by means of
`Imad Moughniyah; he is the
critical liaison to the Palestinians by means of Haled Mashal; and he is the
critical liaison to the Israeli Arabs, by means of Keis Ubeid. Nasrullah must
die because his elimination is crucial to Lebanon, just as the liquidation of
Zarqawi has a major influence on the situation in Iraq and on terrorism in the
Middle East (in Jordan and Sinai), and just as Bin Laden is a condemned man.
This is not revenge or sentimentality but rather a cold, rational calculation.
There are people who may not be allowed to live in order to provide a chance for
a better world. Nasrullah has become a world symbol of “how to deal with Israel
and the United States” and he is a critical tool in the Iranian strategy on the
terrorist front and in neutralizing Israel.
Furthermore, history teaches us several
relevant lessons. Only absolute liquidation of the Nazi regime and Imperial
Japan brought World War II to an end. Unfortunately, there is no such thing as
partial peace or partial diplomatic settlements as those are destined to blow
up. A partial diplomatic settlement between Israel and Egypt that was discussed
in 1971 could not have been permanent and when the status quo was violated –
Egypt initiated the 1973 war. A more recent example is Saddam Hussein. In 1991,
the United States under the leadership of President Bush left unfinished
business when it liberated Kuwait fro Iraqi occupation. The United States should
have been aware that Kuwait was the symptom and not the essence of the problem.
It did not deal with Saddam Hussein who was the initiator and the coordinator of
the crisis and the threats that formed in the system. In 2003, President Bush II
recognized the fatal error, overthrew Saddam and his regime – at an infinitely
greater price and with the United States army stuck in an entanglement in Iraq
that is ongoing still today.
Indeed, without the elimination of
Nasrullah and the senior command and without the absolute weakening of
Hizbullah, it is highly doubtful whether the above objectives can be achieved
and we are destined to experience the return of the crises and their
exacerbation in a permanent pattern of escalation. In any case, Israel must
declare that in any circumstances, Nasrullah is a dead man and it will act to
eliminate him at any opportunity, anytime and anyplace that he appears.
Second, the division of labor was
erroneous in the stages of delineating targets. Lebanon as a country was hard
hit while Hizbullah and the Shiites to this point have paid a meager price and
consequently they are liable to re-establish their power quickly with Iranian
help. Israel primarily destroyed and damaged infrastructures; however
infrastructures can be easily refurbished. Money is not lacking. On the other
hand, the still-alive senior command portends the continuation of the war in the
future and a serious blow to Israel’s strategic standing in the future as well.
This situation must not be allowed to continue. It is an Arab-Islamic cultural
phenomenon, reinforced by guerilla tactics: When there is massive pressure, when
you realize that you have no chance – hide and flee and at your first
opportunity emerge from your hiding place making sounds of victory. You
survived, you succeeded and then you must prepare for the next stage of the
conflict. On the other hand, in Israel the pressures are totally different. The
rear is exhausted and the staying power is liable to fall apart if the katyusha
pressure continues, especially with the “encouragement” of the electronic and
print media, which broadcasts cowardice, sows demoralization, collaborates with
the Hizbullah propaganda war in its reports from the home front, issues
directives to the army what to do and especially, over and over again evokes the
trauma of Lebanon and the ground offensive.
Third, more should have been
invested in a massive attack on southern Lebanon in the first stage of the war,
especially in an attempt to neutralize the katyushas there. The decision to
attack the long range missiles first was correct, however attacking the
katyushas that were deployed in the south was apparently characterized as a
secondary objective and consequently the missile threat to the northern
settlements was exacerbated. Without getting into the issue of ground combat,
because we lack the military expertise, perhaps ground pressure should have been
exerted in specific areas in southern Lebanon, concomitant with the air strikes.
In any case, damaging the clearly Hizbullah-supporting Shiite settlements in
southern Lebanon, which constitute part of the socio-political alignment, along
with the physical attacks against the representation of the Hizbullah leadership
in the villages and the resources at their disposal was and remains vital. It is
highly doubtful that the method of air strikes implemented by the IDF modeled
after the attack on Kosovo in 1999 that broke the Serbian Army and led to
Milosevic’s surrender, will have the same effect on the Shiites and on the
Hizbullah response configuration. It is worth adding here that in a war against
fanatics it is impossible and contraindicated to uphold “morality” and “values”.
We must not continue to follow the disturbed morality of the fanatical Left in
Israel - better a dead Jewish child than a Palestinian child, and for our
purposes a Lebanese child. “Charity begins at home”, always. We will pay a heavy
price in ground warfare and we must pulverize and destroy the settlements in
order to avoid casualties among our soldiers. The fanatical Jewish Left must not
be allowed to continue to set the agenda in Israel.
Fourth, it was important to impose a
complete closure on Judea and Samaria immediately at the outset of the war, and
the hope is that that egregious mistake will be rectified. It is absolutely
clear that Nasrullah will activate his cells in the territories and will
encourage all of the other Palestinian terrorist organizations to use all types
of terrorism in order to open an additional front against Israel. Attention must
not be distracted by homicide-suicide bombings and to organized civilian
violence. On the other hand, there is another aspect: Under the auspices of
focusing attention on Lebanon, Israel must implement much more massive pressure
in order to damage terrorist infrastructures in Gaza. Residents uninvolved in
the war should not be hurt. Terrorists should be liquidated. This is an
important opportunity and it is imperative that the Palestinians do not emerge
from this battle with more or less the same strategic standing. It is also
imperative that they not be allowed to take another example from Hizbullah
activity and implement it because if they do, the Lebanese reality will be
transferred to the territories, under more difficult conditions and
circumstances.
Objectives to Be Reached at the Conclusion of the Crisis
First, full and total implementation
of UN Security Council Resolution 1559, which calls for the total disarmament of
Hizbullah from all weapons stockpiled and the deployment of the Lebanese Army
along the Israeli-Lebanese border. The international community must enforce the
implementation of the resolution, which is the formal recourse that will
facilitate independence and sovereignty for Lebanon. The Lebanese Army must be
provided with all of the military and political resources in order to guarantee
that it will be able to deploy its forces in the south and to prevent
Hizbullah’s continued military and political control in the region. Hizbullah’s
ability to act against Israel must be prevented in accordance with its
resolution, along with the ability of its patrons from Iran and Syria, and to
employ every possible method and means to prevent its return to Southern Lebanon
in the future. In that sense, Israel’s war in Lebanon is not only punitive, but
a patently strategic action and Israel’s activity must continue until the
neutralization, isolation and disarmament of Hizbullah, so that it will not be
able to serve as Iran’s terrorist arm. Totally uprooting Hizbullah’s military
capability will put an end to one of Iran’s most serious threats every time that
it is pressured by the international community due to its nuclear activity and
will seek to distract its attention.
Second, the kidnapped soldiers must
return home, unconditionally and immediately with the onset of the cease fire.
The voices heard in Israel today evoke tremendous concern and are a honey trap.
Their return is possible and must be accomplished. We must not concede and may
not think in terms of a trade and negotiations. The soldiers were abducted from
Israel to Lebanon, and it is the Lebanese Government alone that is responsible
for their return. There are already influential elements out there and
negotiators on their own behalf (have we mentioned Amnon Zichroni?) who are only
waiting to be invited to provide their mediation services. We must not agree to
a cease fire and only then begin negotiations. There is no negotiation and no
end to the combat until the abductees return home. Israel can be generous after
their return and decide to make gestures. For example, to return prisoners if
there are any and return their corpses, but not negotiations. Nasrullah, if he
is not eliminated is a master of negotiation. Have we not learned this? And if
we hear voices in our midst calling to agree to one formula or another for
negotiation after the cease fire, we will arrive at a situation in which there
will be a cease fire in place and Nasrullah will fray our nerves during weeks,
maybe months of torment and pressure, which will enhance the Hizbullah victory.
We must prepare now for that possibility. Already in the coming days, we will
receive an abundance of messages intended to implement psychological warfare and
exert pressure on the families of the abductees, regarding a political
agreement, the abductees’ status and the willingness to free them and that
international elements (have me mentioned German mediators?) are ready to take
action. There will be announcements and retractions, hopes and disappointments.
Everything orchestrated masterfully by Nasrullah. It is a honey trap, to get us
to agree to a cease fire. We must not give in to the temptation, even if our
hearts are breaking.
Third, all Iranian forces, formal
(“Revolutionary Guards”) and informal (“advisers”, “experts” and even employees
of the Iranian embassy), must be expelled from Lebanon. At the same time, all of
the extensive military equipment that Iran concentrated in Lebanon must be
removed. Any political solution that accomplishes less means a continued
deterioration of Lebanon as a political entity and the perpetuation of the
situation that its territory will serve as a center of control, influence and
threats directed at Israel. Future arrangements must be put into place to ensure
that the situation will not return after another brief period; even if it means
determining that Lebanon will be demilitarized from foreign forces and foreign
weapons that are not agreed upon. A Lebanon liberated from Iran in which
Hizbullah is disarmed is a country that can again thrive and live in peace with
Israel.
Fourth, Israel must declare that
everything that applies to Hizbullah – disarmament and leaving the southern
territories, applies to the Palestinians as well and that any settlement in
southern Lebanon applies to the irregular Palestinian forces that exist in
Lebanon as well. The formal agreement must be phrased both generally and
specifically, with clear and binding designations. A new problem must not be
allowed to arise tomorrow under the auspices of Palestinian terrorism and with
Shiite support.
Fifth, Syria’s role and status in
Lebanon. Syria was only expelled from Lebanon in 2005, however its presence
continues in the form of intelligence agents and senior government collaborators
headed by President Emil Lahoud, who safeguard its interests there. Like Iran,
Syria must put an end to its involvement and presence in Lebanese politics. At
the same time, we recommend to consider the matter a bit differently. Despite
its careful conduct during the crisis to this point, it is very reasonable to
assume that Syria will be subject to heavy Iranian pressure to aid Hizbullah the
longer the crisis continues and the worse Hizbullah’s situation becomes.
Bashshar al-Asad
cannot be relied upon and this is not the place to analyze his childish
and spineless personality. Israel must not open an additional front with Syria
so as not to provide Iran with an incentive and an excuse to intervene. It will
require extreme caution on Israel’s part, not only because Syria and Iran have
signed a mutual defense treaty that determines that Iran will come to Syria’s
defense if it is attacked (the agreement also mentions the opposite situation).
Although agreements in the Arab world (and Iran is an Islamic not an Arab
country) have never had operative significance, but only symbolic significance
of moods and ceremonies, under existing circumstances, the pressure on Iran and
the fact that Hizbullah is its strategic arm, it is important to cautiously
assess that Iran is liable to intervene militarily. Thus, the recommendation is
that Israel convey to Syria, on a daily basis in a direct and open fashion,
through its political and military leaders, that it has no intention to take
action against it. Israel has unresolved issues in Lebanon with Hizbullah alone.
The hope is that
Bashshar al-Asad will thereby be able to eliminate the Iranian
pressure and relax.
As far as Lebanon is concerned, Syria does
not recoil from continuing and meddling in Lebanese politics – in order to
safeguard its interests and prevent the strengthening of other power factors. It
is important to understand that Syria will always consider Lebanon a supporting
pillar in its national security, an almost last line of defense for preserving
the regime in Damascus. Thus, Syria must have a different role and a different
alignment. In contrast to Iran, for whom the connection to Lebanon must be
severed absolutely and unconditionally, Syrian presence in Lebanon is
significant in terms of achieving the above objectives – the disarmament of
Hizbullah and the deployment of the Lebanese army in the south. One must admit
that the withdrawal of the Syrian army from Lebanon was an important factor in
the strengthening of Hizbullah and the enhancement of Iran’s influence. Syria
can and must be a stabilizing factor in the balance of power in the Lebanese
political system. Why?
It is necessary to recognize a fundamental
fact – Lebanon is quicksand not only for those invited from the outside or those
interfering in its affairs but also for its domestic residents. Lebanon is a
country that was established for a religious denomination and it is the least
state-like of any state in the Middle East. It was conceived in double sin:
Internally, to preserve an artificial pro-Christian balance, vis-à-vis the
sectarian structure; and externally, a significant portion of its territory
belongs historically to the Syrian state. Lebanon is lacking in the most basic
characteristics of a country: There is no crystallized political community or
national identity; its borders were shaped by French imperialism with no
topographical or political logic; most of its land was stolen from Syrian
territory; and its internal frameworks are based on severe ethno-sectarian rifts
accompanied by uncertainty regarding its place in the Arab world. Lebanon lacks
a legitimate political framework and is nothing more than a multi-sectarian
system in which the religious community is the focal point of self-definition
and the pattern of loyalty and social identity. The tribal-sectarian loyalty is
a sacred value and a source of identity and ethnicity is the basis of political
and military organization. The upshot is that it is highly doubtful whether
Lebanon can function in an orderly fashion without being drawn to anarchy in the
absence of a strong stabilizing political factor.
If there is a Western country or a
coalition of Western countries that will take the role upon themselves all the
better. However the Lebanese reality does not attract external elements.
Everyone remembers the terrorist policy of implementing suicide bombers against
American institutions and interests, the campaign of killing and murder, the
taking of hostages and their execution, the abductions and violence of all
types. Syria can fill the role – under an international mandate mandating rules
and methods of operation – until the formation of a stable political community
in Lebanon. This is a clear Israeli interest, because the two primary
alternatives are multi-sectarian anarchy or Iranian intervention that will
transform Lebanon into a Khomeinist Shiite state. Despite the fact that Syria is
despised in Lebanon and has earned a bad reputation, it can fill a vital role
there, which will help it escape its “leper state” status. Thus, with
international recognition as a “respectable country” and with international
recognition of its role in Lebanon, Syria could become a critical stabilizing
force in the Lebanese political system.
Sixth, determining an obligatory
modus operandi for Israel as far as its future conduct in southern Lebanon,
which must be based on a new, clear Israeli policy of “pretexts of war” and “red
lines”. The upshot is Israeli military intervention – immediate and in all
circumstances – if a hostile military/terrorist force enters southern Lebanon.
It must be anchored in the cease fire agreements and arrangements that will be
signed and receive international recognition, it, however, places a greater
responsibility on Israel’s shoulders. The cowardice and wretchedness of the last
six years, under the auspices of “peace for the bed and breakfasts” must not be
allowed to prevent Israel from taking action to prevent Lebanon from being
transformed into a territory where violent forces hostile to Israel will be
situated and to specifically create a buffer zone in southern Lebanon, sort of a
firewall that will prevent hostile forces from reaching the border with Israel.
These will lead to the drafting of clear guidelines regarding the new situation
in the region, which will stabilize the “Pax Israela”.
In addition, Israel must grow accustomed to
certain other behavior patterns. It must internalize that in the Arab-Islamic
political culture appeasement means tragedy; flight means cowardice;
self-control, restraint and biting one’s lip mean extreme weakness; disregard,
lack of determination and lack of willingness to confront challenges and threats
means more severe pressure to undermine it militarily and politically. Israel
must understand the significance of “mirror image” in which it ascribes to its
enemies its values and perceptions. Relevant to the Lebanese issue was the
traumatic meeting between Prime Minister Begin and Bashir Jumayil in Nahariya in
the final weeks of the 1992 war. Jumayil explained to Begin that if he really
wants to facilitate change in Lebanon and create the conditions for a stable
regime, it must act in Lebanon “like in Lebanon”. Begin, the liberal democrat,
was unable to accept those positions and the result is written in blood in the
annals of Israeli history. It is important to emphasize that realization of
these conditions will enable the granting of an opportunity for Lebanon to
emerge from its internal and external reality as an independent, sovereign and
democratic state. This position is in accordance with the vision of the Bush
Government to assist the nations of the Middle East to liberate themselves from
the coercive world of oppressive rulers, fanatic Muslim regimes and violent,
irresponsible opposition and to provide themselves with the chance, unrealistic
though it may be, to encourage the growth of a democratic regime in Lebanon. If
all the diplomatic efforts end with Israel being forced to conclude its military
effort before the above objectives are achieved regarding Lebanon and if
Hizbullah is not disarmed and continues to be a significant military and
political force – it is liable to be a catastrophe for Israel and for the
international community. This trend, if it continues, is liable to herald a
substantive change and a dramatic rise in the Palestinian level of violence.
They will attempt to imitate the Lebanese model and bring to the doorstep of the
regional and international alignment new crisis issues, acts of terrorism and
violence at unprecedented levels (also because Iran will attempt to intensify
its hold on the terrorist Palestinian political system). The critical problem
is, are the objectives delineated above realistic and achievable? The answer is,
unfortunately, no. In an imperfect world in which politics are the essence of
“unfinished business” and political life is compromise, temporary arrangements
and repeated crises; a world in which conflicts cannot be resolved but rather
minimized or managed – it is difficult to speak of what apparently seems to be
an ideal situation. Therefore, the question is what is imperative and what is
not?
Disarming Hizbullah, preventing it from
being an armed military force and distancing it from southern Lebanon is a
fundamental condition and a vital imperative. This must be undertaken at all
costs and without compromise. The same is true regarding the Palestinian
organizations in Lebanon, which must be neutralized and disarmed. On the other
hand, regarding the strengthening of the Lebanese army and its deployment in the
south, we must come to terms with the fact that it will not happen and certainly
not in any significant manner. Why? Because the Lebanese army has a Shiite
majority and their identification with the Shiite sectarian interest is
critical; because they will do nothing to maintain the situation that will
develop; and that like UNIFIL, they will not endanger their lives even if they
want to. Furthermore, preparing, arming, training and strengthening of the
Lebanese army is a multi-year process and its success is not guaranteed. What,
therefore, do we do until then? There is no such thing as a vacuum, and the
issue of southern Lebanon must be dealt with immediately and urgently, taking
into account the fact that the central ruling power in Lebanon is not only
lacking in determination but is also neutralized and lacking the formal ability
to take action.
Iran must remain outside the political game
in Lebanon. Another Shiite-Khomeinist country in Lebanon is a nightmare, the
prevention of whose realization must be a clear commitment of the international
community. Iranian aggression in Lebanon must be halted, unrelated to any
binding international action regarding the Iranian nuclear issue. Lebanon, as a
stateless state creates a vacuum that Iran aspires to fill. That is the danger
and it must be filled at all costs. On the other hand, the Syrian issue is
different and intimately tied to the potential for political stability in
Lebanon. There too, the involvement of the international community is critical.
Action must be taken to accept Syria, grant it legitimacy, support
Bashshar al-Asad,
aid Syria economically and politically and at the same time set clear and rigid
guidelines regarding its conduct in Lebanon. In that way a Syrian interest that
corresponds with that of Lebanon (stabilizing the political system), Israel
(preventing mutual enemies and threats at the border) and the international
community (a free Lebanon and a Middle East that is not so severe a focal point
of danger), will develop. Syria could stabilize the rival political forces in
Lebanon. It did so in the past, especially in the October 1989
al-Ta'if Agreement
in which it established a different and more logical formal governmental
framework in Lebanon and that is in its interests today as well.
Finally, if these steps are taken in a
realistic but resolute manner, in other words with the knowledge of what must be
achieved, what can be achieved and, on the other hand, what cannot be achieved,
Lebanon will become more stable. Another matter must be established – Lebanon
will not be transformed into a democracy. The entire Middle East, all of the
Arab and Islamic regimes are far removed from practicing liberal democracy.
These are authoritarian, dictatorial and oppressive regimes in which leadership
is inherited. Although Lebanon is different, democracy will not grow there
either. At least it will be provided with an opportunity to flourish and
prosper.
It is imperative to insist on these
principles, including the unconditional release of the abducted soldiers, even
if there are those who tend towards compromise, who will assert that this
package is beautiful and desirable, however those are demands that cannot be
achieved and we must strive to fulfill the demands that can. Those people who
are lacking in faith and/or patience are liable to lay the groundwork for the
next war, which will take place with much greater intensity and under much more
difficult circumstances. For example, all of the American losses in the 1991
gulf war are negligible relative to the disaster taking place in Iraq today in
terms of the number of American fatalities. The cost of the unfinished 1991 war
is being collected in all its horror since 2003. In addition, it is worth noting
that the international reality today understands Israel better, certainly at the
governmental level, even though, as usual, much less in the media. Many hope for
an Israeli victory, not for Israel’s sake, but due to the understanding what
Hizbullah is and what the significance of its victory in Lebanon, including the
Iranian victory, will be.
If Israel fails to achieve its war
objectives, it will not only be an unforgivable wrongdoing, but it is liable to
pay an extremely high price indeed both in terms of its relations with the
international community, and especially in terms of its relations with the
United States. The United States considers Israel a strategic asset and an
extremely important regional political factor. It provides Israel with unmatched
political and international support, supplies all its military needs in terms of
weapons and equipment and it is reasonable to assume that it will give Israel
economic aid to cover the costs of the war. It expects Israel to get the job
done: Weakening Hizbullah and preventing it from serving as an Iranian political
factor; striking at Iran’s terrorist strategy and its regional influence; and
beginning the process of fighting the Iranian nuclear issue. Failure to achieve
the Israeli objectives against Hizbullah and the severe damage caused to the
Lebanese infrastructure are liable to lead to different thoughts in the United
States regarding Israel’s strategic status. This will have incalculable
consequences for the future. Israel must, if for no other reason then for its
own interests, to bring about a drastic change in the Lebanese reality. American
disappointment is liable to be an additional negative bonus which will damage
Israel’s status as a strategic asset.
Some Important Conclusions Regarding the Status Quo and Its
Consequences:
-
First, Israel is fighting in
precisely those places from which it withdrew to the international border. It
is precisely there that it is fighting for its life. Despite this clear
conclusion, the fanatic Left will not learn a thing. It will never understand
that it is neither about the 1967 occupation nor about the one in 1947 or even
the one in 1917. The occupation is the least relevant matter in our
relations with the Palestinians, it is rather an additional pathetic
excuse on the path to destroying Israel.
-
Second, the Geneva conventions of
war are totally irrelevant vis-à-vis terrorism and as a result,
terrorism must be combated into oblivion. That is what was considered success
against nihilistic (in Europe), ideological (in South America), nationalist
(in Turkey) and fanatical Islamic (in the Arab countries) terrorism.
-
Third, in contrast to the opinions
of “experts” and “pundits”, terrorism has a political solution beginning in
military defeat and modus operandi arrangements can be imposed upon it,
conditional upon the existence of the determination and willingness to fight.
-
Fourth, as far as terrorism and
guerilla warfare are concerned, appeasement is a tragedy and restraint is bad
news for a country and its citizens. Forbearance in Israel has become
paralysis and restraint has led to destruction and payment on a high price in
terms of casualties.
-
Fifth, to the degree that those
experts and pundits ridiculed the slogan “let the IDF win” in the Palestinian
context, it turns out that that is precisely what the IDF is doing in Lebanon:
winning, deterring and creating a balance of power.
-
Sixth, the slogans “negotiation is
the solution” and “it is precisely with enemies that one must talk” are
nonsense lacking insight as every negotiation requires a common basis and
common achievable objectives.
-
Seventh, Arab combat, especially
of the terrorist variety, has always been cowardly: Violent aggression, bitter
crying if the rival reacts powerfully due to a sense of victimization (I have
a problem? – It’s his fault!), and harshly phrased complaints to the
international authorities in the rich Arab tradition of hyperbole.
-
Eighth, Israel is actually
battling Iran, against the Iranian doctrine and its weapons. The Hizbullah
members are not as great as the media portrays them. They hide in tunnels and
attack with anti-tank missiles. This is not bravery in combat. In any place
where there is combat between a soldier and a guerilla, there is no doubt that
the Israeli soldier will win.
Perhaps this time Israel will learn to plan
and act with a long term strategy, with political intelligence. Returning to the
status quo ante is not an option and partial action must not be taken only to
again deal with the problem in several years:
-
First, south Lebanon must be
restored to its status before the entry of the PLO in 1970: Neutral and
peace-loving or isolated and in ruins;
-
Second, Hizbullah must be
militarily weakened and neutralized, left without missiles and other weapons
of destruction. Its method of combat like that of the Palestinians is
cowardly: Terrorism by means of rockets and missiles fired from the midst of
the civilian population. Everything is legitimate – hospitals, schools,
kindergartens – in order to gain civilian protection. According to
international law, that is a war crime. No one has yet dealt with a war
against evil without hurting innocent people. Thus, the harsh reactions of
world public opinion are not only hypocrisy but anti-Semitism. The question
that Israel must pose as a challenge is – how would you and your country react
to a situation in which missiles are being intentionally fired from the midst
of a civilian population against your population?
-
Third, Iran must be left out of
the game in Lebanon, if one wants to avoid a Khomeinist, Shiite state in
Lebanon as a prelude to a Shiite victory in Iraq and the entrenchment of Hamas
among the Palestinians. The result: A fanatical Shiite
Iran-Iraq-Lebanon-Palestine axis that will threaten Israel, the moderate Arab
countries and Western interests in the Middle East and will open the
historical struggle between the
Shi`ah and the
Sunnah;
-
Fourth, Syria must influence the
political arrangement – until Lebanon ceases to be the “sick lady of the
Middle East”, “a stateless state”, which enables other players to manage its
affairs.
-
Fifth, establishing a policy of
“modus operandi” of rules of the game and a clear, binding operative
definition of Israeli “red lines” and “pretexts of war” are mandatory.
Appeasement and restraint do not prevent
aggression but rather raise its price. It is an Arab cultural characteristic
“the cry and complain syndrome” while they are the violent aggressors. At the
moment that the media appears, at the moment that the television cameras start
rolling, the crying old lady and the tearful child will always be found. Israel
never cried and never complained and that lack of symmetry has caused it great
damage in world public opinion. The Arabic language, which is characterized by
overstatement, contributes to this phenomenon: Everything is described it
absolute terms. Everything is bombastic, terrible and colossal and in contrast
to the “beastly aggression of the enemy” – they themselves are the unfortunate
victim who did nothing. In contrast, the language of the West, employed by
Israel as well, uses understatement, which minimizes the description of the
problems and difficulties. The lack of symmetry and the pathetic nature of
Israel’s information efforts severely harm its image in the world.
The abduction of the soldiers and the war
in Lebanon are the first stage of the mutual struggle between the free world and
Iran. This is the raising of the curtain of the total war that the Nazi-Islamic
regime against the Jewish state, in the words of Amnon Rubinstein (Maariv,
July 21, 2006). Iran began the process with the aspiration to bring the war to
the West’s doorstep, while managing a local terrorist conflict by means of its
emissaries, Hamas and Hizbullah, which fight against the ally of the United
States and its strategic arm in the Middle East, Israel. In that sense, The
United States was the first to fully understand the format of the campaign and
understood that this was the beginning of a world struggle against the evil
axis. Has Israel understood this? Is Israel capable of withstanding the
challenge?
