The Moslem bloc includes at least
six countries which possess chemical and biological weapons (CBW): four Arab
states - Syria, Libya, Iraq, and Egypt - and two non-Arab states - Iran and
Pakistan. Advanced long-range ballistic missile technologies are concurrently
and persistently being procured by those countries to enable the conjunction of
these two strategic weapon systems. Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Algeria, as well,
are likely to pursue CBW, if not already possessing them.
Kazakhstan, essentially a Moslem
state, forms a most significant bridge for CBW technology transfer from the
former USSR into Middle Eastern Moslem countries, while Pakistan plays a similar
role with respect to technology absorption from the Far East. Likewise, further
neighboring Muslim countries extend their own contributions in this concern.
Three major Moslem states - Iraq, Iran, and Libya - are extreme by nature,
particularly in their attitude towards Israel and the West. Iran and Libya, plus
Syria and Egypt, are being assisted by another non-Moslem radical state of
remarkable capacity - North Korea. In addition, the evolving inter-Moslem,
CBW-related technological cooperation (for instance, Iran-Syria, Egypt-Libya,
Iraq-Sudan) may rapidly develop into a strategic one, and may achieve a supreme
quantum leap if Iraq, for example, decides to share its profound CBW expertise
with other Arab and Moslem countries. The spread of such a critical mass to the
Arab and Muslim world (for instance, to Iran, through Arab countries like Libya)
would create a greater threat to Israel and to southern Europe, at the least and
has far-reaching ramifications because it essentially eliminates dependency on
non-Muslim resources, thereby reducing intelligence sources and allowing maximum
inter-Moslem cooperation.
Extrapolating from the current
ongoing processes, one should conclude that it is only a matter of time before
the amassing of CBW stockpiles, including remarkably long-range ballistic
missile warheads, will be accomplished. This will enable their launching from
every enemy area to any location within Israel, as well as to considerable parts
of Europe. In terms of basic strategic time, there is no fundamental difference
if this will occur in three, six, or nine years.
The uncertainty as to the
validity of an Islamic nuclear umbrella furnished by the nuclear capabilities of
Pakistan may soon diminish if, or more precisely when, Iran (not mentioning Iraq
or other Arab countries) acquires nuclear arms. An expected, virtually
inevitable, development of that sort can generate a severe strategic shift, in
that at least Iran, Iraq, and Libya will feel free to employ CBW in the belief
that they are protected from nuclear counter-strikes, and are even willing to
absorb a CB attack.
All in all, the described
circumstances may evolve into the formation of a hostile Middle Eastern Moslem
bloc that would pose a distinct chemical and biological menace to Israel and
southern Europe, if not further. The increasing offensive potential of chemical
and especially biological weapons constitutes a strategic threat that should be
expediently faced.
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