Ariel Center for Policy Research (ACPR) |
Turkey and Israel:
An Evolving Partnership
Policy Paper No. 47, 1998
The end of the Cold War has led to a global restructuring, which has had a real
impact on the Middle East. This paper suggests that in the post-Cold War era,
Turkey and Israel have engaged in extensive cooperative ties, which are
stimulated by the uncertain environment and the precarious security
circumstances surrounding them. Turkey has relatively more abundant water
resources when compared to other countries in the region and water enables
Turkey to fulfill its aspirations as an emerging regional power. This paper
analyzes these new co-operation patterns, the strategic alliance between Turkey
and Israel, and the politics of water in this strategic alliance.
Turkey's Rapprochement with Israel
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey has responded to global and
regional changes by reformulating its foreign policy. Faced with uncertainty
regarding its borders and its identity, Turkey has forged new alliances, one of
which includes the Turkish-Israeli axis. Water is becoming an essential
component of political power in the Middle East. Turkey is one of the few states
in the Middle East which enjoys abundant ground-water resources. Since natural
resources are an important element of a country's power in its dealings with
other states, Turkey's water resources give it power vis-a-vis other countries
in the region. Turkey, by providing cheap water on a reliable basis, may be able
to decrease the tension in the region surrounding the allocation of this scarce
resource in the region.
Suleyman Demirel, Turkish President since June 1993, has
summarized the motives behind the Turkish-Israeli axis as follows: "Turkey and
Israel have decided on a regional co-operation for increasing the economic
welfare of the region and curbing terrorism".
Turkey's Motivations
This paper proposes that the Turkish rapprochement with Israel is a result of
the interplay of a number of factors: the end of the Cold War, the 1990-91 Gulf
War, Turkey's Kurdish problem, and the Israeli-Arab peace process. Turkey has
always toyed with the idea of closer ties with Israel and there was always a
political will to associate with Israel, yet the favorable environment for this
endeavour emerged only in the 1990s. From 1945 to 1989, Turkey held an integral
position within the Western security systems because of its role as a buffer
state against the Soviet Union. This position enabled acceptance of Turkey as
part of the European system of states. On the other hand, Turkey is isolated in
the Arab Middle East because of its imperial past, i.e., the legacy of the
Ottoman Empire, and because of its perceived break with Islam, i.e., the secular
form of government in Turkey since 1924. It moved further away from its Muslim,
Arab neighbors during the Cold War era and allied itself with the West, the
United States in particular. Since 1989, Turkey's reluctantly acknowledged
incorporation into the West has been challenged.
In the post-Cold War era, Turkey finds itself in a
turbulent security environment marked by volatility and instability. Such
regional destabilizers as Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Iran have alerted Turkey to
the dangers of isolation in the region. The possibility of isolation and
marginality within the global and regional security order presses Turkey to find
new allies; Israel is the most likely candidate. Thus, the first factor that
triggered Turkey's rapprochement with Israel was this awareness of its increased
seclusion in the post-Cold War era. The second factor, the Gulf War, confirmed
that the Middle East region continues to be a major source of instability with
the potential to threaten global security. It demonstrated that Turkey is still
important for Western security despite the fact that its role as a buffer
against the Soviet Union has ended. It accentuated the similarities between
Turkey and Israel, two states which are not Arab yet exist in a predominantly
Arab region in which neither is welcome and both susceptible to common dangers.
The second factor that enables Turkey to pursue a
pro-Israeli foreign policy more freely is the evolving Arab-Israeli peace
process, though stagnant right now. Turkey recognized Israel in 1949, the first
Muslim state to do so, but until the 1990s, the Turkish government was reluctant
to move towards closer cooperation with Israel because of the Arab countries'
sensitivities. Lastly, the emerging alliance can be viewed placed in a broader
framework with the USA as the power behind its formation.
The emerging Turkish-Israeli alliance has the capacity to
serve the Americans’ interests in the Middle East for a number of reasons.
First, the Middle East ranks very high on the American foreign policy agenda due
to its economic and strategic importance. Second, the demise of the Soviet Union
has increased the strategic importance of the Middle East by shifting the
American administration's attention to the well-armed rogue states that
represent the new threats to Western security. The Turkish-Israeli alliance
might act as a counterbalance against these rogue states as part of the American
‘dual containment policy’. The United States needs regional allies to take upon
themselves such tasks as regional crisis management and peace-keeping, which
would then leave the US free to focus on problems of larger magnitude.
Turkey's Security Interests
Turkey is surrounded by hostile, "rogue" states against which it is caught in a
struggle for power and influence for regional mastery. It has serious conflicts
of interest with these states, the most visible ones concerning Kurdish
separatist terrorism, the distribution of water, and Islamic fundamentalism. The
question of support given to Kurdish separatist terrorism constitutes the core
issue in the Turkish-Syrian relations. The Kurdish problem lies at the core of
Turkish-Iraqi relations as well.
Further causes of dispute between Turkey and Syria
include the question of Hatay province, the distribution of waters from the
Euphrates, Tigris, and Asi rivers, and the 1995 Syria-Greece agreement granting
Greece in which the Syrian government granted the use of its air bases to
Greece. Disputes with for Iraq include the question of Northern Iraq, the
protection of the Turkoman minority in Iraq, and the politics of water. The
politics of water is a major source of conflict in the Middle East and one which
has direct implications for the Kurdish problem. Turkey is faced with a conflict
of interest with Syria and Iraq over the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, which
originate in Turkish territory and then flow into Syria and Iraq, the downstream
countries. The Syrian government perceives a trade-off between its support for
the PKK and the politics of water.
As for Iran, Turkey is also suspicious of Iran’s designs
over Turkey's internal affairs and its support for Islamic movements in Turkey.
In addition, Turkey and Iran compete for influence in the former Soviet Union's
Central Asian republics and in the transport of oil and natural gas. Such
countries are regarded as heavily armed regional destabilisers by both Turkey
and Israel. In short, Turkey has serious conflicts of interests with its
neighbors Syria, Iraq, and Iran over the Kurdish problem, the politics of water,
the role of Islam, and the ir respective political influences in the region.
Israel faces threats to its security from the same
countries in the region which threaten Turkey's national security. Iran finds in
Israel its arch-enemy and has now acquired missile technology and nuclear
capabilities with Russian help. Iraq, during the Gulf War, opened a second front
by sending its Scud missiles into Israeli territory. To top it all, Syria
threatens Israel's territorial integrity and the peace process. The
Israeli-Syrian conflict revolves around such issues as the Israeli withdrawal
from the Golan Heights and Southern Lebanon, and the Syrian support of Hamas and
Hizbullah terrorists opposed to Israel. In the uncertain, volatile post-Cold War
environment of the Middle East, faced with hostility from Iran and the Arab
states sworn to its destruction, Israel requires a reliable partner and the most
likely candidate is Turkey. There is, then, a convergence of interests between
Turkey and Israel for deterring Syria, Iran, and Iraq for similar security
reasons.
Turkey and Israel do not only share security concerns,
but there are other similarities between them that makes their cooperation
likely. Turkey and Israel are the only secular democracies in the region, both
have market economies, and both are integrated into the European economic order.
Their major export and import partners indicate an integration with the states
of the Western states.
Turkey shares a vested interest with Israel in promoting
stability in the highly volatile region in which it is located; they are also
the only two countries in the region with the capacity to do so. Furthermore,
they are also similar in the problems they face: religious fundamentalist
movements, economic difficulties, hostile behavior from their neighbors, and
separatist movements that threaten their territorial integrity. Turkey and
Israel are among the strongest military powers in the region, in terms of
capabilities, military expenditures, standing army, and weapons technology.
Turkey had the second largest army in NATO (prior to the German reunification)
and Israel has superior military technology from which Turkey would undoubtedly
benefit. In addition, Israel has strong, sound American backing and the Jewish
lobby in Washington has the freedom to try to harness power to influence
American foreign policy. The indirect benefits of a pro-Israeli policy for
Turkey may be a change in the attitudes of the American Congress, which has not
been very friendly towards Turkey.
An alliance with Israel has the capacity to
counterbalance the threats to Turkey's national security and to shift the power
equation to Turkey's advantage. For Turkish strategic interests, the
"friendship" with Israel would help strengthen Turkey's position in the Middle
East, curb terrorism, and deter such hostile states from destabilizing Turkey. A
long-term benefit would be to increase Turkey's perceived power in the region by
expanding Turkey's military capabilities through the transfer of Israeli
military technology and sale of weapons. Thus, pushed out and threatened by the
Arab states, and not fully accepted in the Western camp, Turkey's rapprochement
with Israel, the only country in the region perceived to be “like Turkey”, is
understandable.
There is, however, one obstacle to cooperation between
Turkey and Israel: Turkey's internal politics. Turkey's position towards Israel
reflects the internal dynamics and divisions in Turkish society. The
fundamentalist religious groups oppose Turkey's ties with Israel, condemning
Israel as a hostile enemy power which has occupied the Holy Places. In contrast,
the secular military and bureaucratic elite favor ties with Israel in the
post-Cold War era as a rational and realistic foreign policy decision. Relations
with Israel, therefore, are a good barometer in measuring both Turkey's new
stance in the Middle East as well as the relative power of Turkish domestic
groups.
The Formation of the Turkish-Israeli Axis
An analysis of developments that have unfolded since 1991 sheds some light on
what kind of a strategic alliance that is emerging between Turkey and Israel.
Even though mostly the military aspects of the Turkish-Israeli rapprochement are
most often discussed, its economic dimensions are also of importance. The
economic aspects of the Turkish-Israeli alliance seem to prosper quietly as a
result of the vested economic interests of both sides. A range of agreements and
the official state level visits point to the evolution of a Turkish-Israeli axis
in the Middle East. Turkey also became one of the most popular destinations for
Israeli tourists.
A range of military pacts was put into operation in 1997.
The agenda of the meetings were not made totally public, but they probably also
included agreements on intelligence sharing, joint naval operations, regional
balance of power concerns, and mutual threats to security. It may even be that
the role of Israel in the sale of weapons serves to indicate that the American
administration does not object to an influx of such weapons to Turkey, and that
this may be a device developed to circumvent the Congress.
Thus, the expansion of ties between Turkey and Israel on
a number of levels seems to answer the question, whether Turkey and Israel are
moving towards a strategic cooperation scheme, in an affirmative manner.
Turkey, Israel, and the Regional Destabilizers
The Turkish-Israeli alliance is condemned by all the Arab states which see the
alliance as a direct threat to their own national securities. But the Turkish
and Israeli officials emphasize that the alliance is not directed against any
particular state. In the words of David Ivri, the adviser to the Israeli Defense
Minister, "the security pact signed is not aimed at any state, but it seeks to
build confidence in the Middle East and to contribute to peace and stability in
the region". Yet, despite all the statements confirming from the Turkish
government that the military pact is not directed against any state, the
Turkish-Israeli alliance seems to be a clever move against Syria. Seen in such
terms, the alliance is an encirclement of Syria and a challenge to Damascus
which Syria is quick to realize. Syrian government officials have declared that
the alliance is “an act of aggression against the Arabs and an act of hostility
to pan-Arab existence”. Assad claims that the Turkish-Israeli axis aims at the
destruction of the Arab world and what is happening to Iraq is an example. He
even claims that the axis aims at evacuating northern Iraq and settling the
Palestinians there.
Assad may be wary of the consequences of the
Turkish-Israeli axis for two reasons: first, increased Turkish power in the
region will prevent the resolution of the water conflict to Syria's advantage,
and second, increased Israeli power may erode Syria's power to block effectively
the peace process. Faced with the combined power of Turkey and Israel, Syria may
have a harder time promoting its own interests in the region. Such possibilities
push Syria to devise strategies to counter the Turkish-Israeli alliance. In
response to the Turkish-Israeli axis, there seems to be a rapprochement between
Syria and Iran. Although the Iranian government denies that a Syrian-Iranian
axis is forming in response to the Turkish-Israeli military pacts, it may very
well have been triggered by the Turkish-Israeli axis. On the other hand, Iran's
acquisition of nuclear technology from Russia shows the timeliness of the
Turkish-Israeli alliance.
Russian involvement in Iran's quest for missile
technology, if true, violates the “Missile Technology Control Regime”. Russian
motives for such involvement may include an attempt to regain a foothold in the
Middle East through Iran. In response to the rumors of Russian involvement, the
Israeli government has suspended a natural gas deal with the Russians. Even
though there were always some reports that the Iranians were developing nuclear
weapons and missile technology, it is only recently that the issue has received
attention from the USA. Furthermore, the missile issue indicates that the Middle
East is still a battleground in the struggle for power between the USA and
Russia.
In terms of American interests in the region, the
Turkish-Israeli strategic realignment should rank high on the American foreign
policy agenda. Both of these countries are pro-American and their alliance would
promote America’s dual containment policy against rogue regimes such as Iran,
Iraq, and Syria, all of which are engaged in military build-ups, especially with
weapons of mass destruction, and which pose a major threat to American
interests. The military build-up in these regimes partly explains the American
push for the alliance as a strong barrier against these rogue states. Given the
strategic importance of the Middle East and the desire for an uninterrupted flow
of oil, the Turkish-Israeli alliance with its stabilizing and balancing
capabilities might be the blessing the United States has been looking for in its
post-Cold War Middle Eastern foreign policy.
To sum up, Turkish-Israeli security cooperation seems to
be the dominant event of post-Cold War Middle Eastern politics. Turkish concerns
over the threats that Syria, Iran, and Iraq pose to Turkish national unity and
territorial integrity are the factors that led to Turkish rapprochement with
Israel. The end of the Cold War, the Gulf War and its impact on Turkey's Kurdish
problem, and the Israel-Arab peace process prepared the fertile ground for
Turkey openly to follow a pro-Israeli foreign policy. The alliance serves a
number of Turkish security interests.
Water acts as another policy tool for Turkish-Israeli
rapprochement by creating a common interest between the two parties.
The Turkish-Israeli axis indicates an evolving
polarization in the Middle East. One pole consists of the Turkish-Israeli
alliance backed by American power, and the other pole is the Iranian-Syrian axis
which seems to be supported by the Russians. Such regional polarization coupled
with high levels of militarization is not a good sign. What may have begun on
Turkey's behalf as an initiative to find a reliable ally may degenerate into an
ugly conflict. Thus, whether the alliance will ultimately help to preserve
stability in the region remains to be seen.
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