

**PEACE WITH SYRIA:  
NO MARGIN FOR ERROR**

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NO MARGIN FOR ERROR**

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES

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### PEACE WITH SYRIA: NO MARGIN FOR ERROR

*Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto*

Immanuel Kant wrote his **Perpetual Peace** in 1797, claiming that a democracy is less prone to go to war since its voters are the ones to bear the brunt of the fighting and the costs of damages.

Kant claims that, for dictators, going to war is a relatively simple decision. He has been proven right over the last 200 years. Democratic Israel versus Arab tyrannies is a major Middle East asymmetry, as are the resulting aims, secure growth for one, Israel's demise for the other.

Other asymmetries include the ratios of 500:1 geographical area, 80:1 population, 22:1 UN votes, 4.19:1 tanks, 6.45:1 combat aircraft, and 60% of world oil production (by volume) to none. All these favor the Arab dictatorships.

Weapons technology has undergone nothing short of a revolution since 1967 and the lessons of war have taught that Israeli deterrence has not always been adequate. The Iraqi "trickling" of ballistic missiles on Israel (39 missiles in 14 days) during the Gulf War has taught a major lesson: missile attacks on urban areas, even with conventional warheads, can disrupt and badly delay Israeli mobilization of its reserves and its main forces, creating a situation on the front line akin to that of the Yom Kippur of 1973.

In spite of the demise of the Soviet Union and the peace agreements signed with Egypt and Jordan, the geopolitical situation has not changed realistically for the better since 1967.

Considering all these said changes, Israel, if attacked, is not capable of defending itself any more within its 1967 borders. The protection of the high ground, all of it situated beyond the "green line" (pre-1967 demarcation), becomes a vital condition for Israel's survival, the Golan Heights being more important than all other high ground.

The advocates of “instant peace”, prodded with a heavy hand by the US administration, claim that Israel may withdraw from the Golan – this, against all its own advice, that of the Pentagon, Russian, and others’ military “if peace is agreed upon”, provided the Golan and parts of Syria will be demilitarized under UN/US “observers” and with US guarantees and the Israeli defense bolstered to the tune of some US \$20 billion.

The requirement to “have a strong force to protect the peace” as the US and Israeli governments demand, is proof that the peace anticipated will be a “peace of no war”, or a cold war, US-USSR or Israel-Egypt style, meaning that the lowering of Israel’s level of deterrence increases the probability of war.

Handing the Golan to Syria is equivalent to a catastrophic lowering of Israeli deterrence, broadly characterized by loss of control of 35% of Israel’s water, an unbearable defense burden that will reflect on Israel’s economy and worse, the cracking of the claims of Zionist legitimacy and weakening of Israel’s national and moral fiber. The “window of opportunity”, on which President Clinton insists, is “unique” (for the last ten years) and has no glass pane anyway – it is a virtual window.

There are simply not enough safety margins in an Israeli-Syrian “peace” agreement because demilitarization, third party guarantees, and the rest, have always proven to be valid only when both parties desire them to be so (for example US guarantees and UN troops in Sinai, 1967).

Signing a peace treaty is no guarantee of peace, as, for instance, shown by the case of the Iraqi-Iranian War that erupted in 1980 after a five year negotiated peace was signed in 1978 (among a number of such examples).

Technology is not a substitute for the Golan, as declared by General Amnon Lipkin-Shahak on December 10, 1995, an opinion shared by this writer, who has been involved most of his life in weaponry.

“We are strong enough to afford withdrawal,” claim some. But we are not strong if we lose the high ground of the Golan, which represents the “terrain” asset of the “firepower”, “mobility” and “terrain” triad of which military strength is composed.

Finally, there are the advocates of nuclear deterrence, assuming Israel has this “in the closet”.

Israel may be destroyed completely by 2-4 nuclear charges due to its minute size. For the same reason, given present satellite surveillance, it cannot house a secure second strike capability which has to have a ratio of about 50:1 in Israel's favor. Deploying nuclear deterrence means the legitimization of the Middle East going nuclear, a sphere in which Israel is at its weakest. Nuclear deterrence may also be weakened by international pressures.

The conclusion is that Israel cannot succumb to the "instant peace syndrome" even if a friendly US president insists upon it. This is especially the case when Assad may not be in power for long.

As Motta Gur, former Chief of the General Staff and Labor Party Minister, said in his book **Chief of General Staff** (Ministry of Defense Publishers, 1998): "Israel cannot defend its Eastern flank without the Golan Heights and it cannot defend the Golan Heights without the line of ridges it presently holds."

As Joseph Sisco said at the time: "The (large) areas Israel vacated in 1974 are withdrawal according to 242 and the line retained represents 'secure borders' according to the same 242 (UN resolution)." The writer witnessed the delivery of this statement.

## **PREPARING FOR PEACE? SYRIAN DEFENSE EXPENDITURES AND ITS DRIVE FOR REGIONAL HEGEMONY**

*Shawn Pine*

Both supporters and opponents of the peace process agree that for Israel to take the requisite risks for peace it needs to understand the intentions of its neighbors. A critical component towards understanding their neighbors' intentions can be found in how much these countries are spending on defense. Supporters of the peace process claim that it is ameliorating the prospects for future conflict between Israel and its neighbors. If this is true, then we should expect a simultaneous reduction in arms expenditures by these countries as they divert resources from their military to attend to their acute social and economic problems.

Unfortunately, the peace process, rather than providing a peace dividend, has augured in an unprecedented era of weapons proliferation in the region. Most notable has been the proliferation of weapons from the West which has been precipitated by competition among these western countries for lucrative sales contracts from Israel's Arab neighbors. This proliferation seems to cast doubt on the contention that the Gulf War and the subsequent Oslo peace process have ushered in a new era of peace and prosperity in the Middle East.

More important, it appears that Israeli strategic planners are making a fatal error in their strategic threat assessments of their two biggest contiguous neighbors, Syria and Egypt. Indeed, actual military spending by these two countries far exceeds that reported in standard sources such as "The Military Balance"; the Jaffee Center's "Middle East Military Balance"; and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. For example, these sources report that Syria spends approximately \$1.7 billion in military expenditures. However, a cursory review of the size of Syria's military reflects that these figures are grossly underestimated and that actual expenditures are far greater than those reported. This paper analyzes Syrian military expenditures and examines these expenditures in the context of its declared willingness to make peace with Israel.



## THE SYRIAN OCCUPATION OF LEBANON

*Mordechai Nisan*

The struggle of Lebanon to preserve its national identity and political independence has, in particular, faced the hegemonic ambition of Syria. Since the 1970s, Damascus has succeeded to implement an incremental, yet systematic policy of occupation over Lebanon that has transformed the political, social, and economic character of the country. The Syrian occupation, calling it by its proper appellation, was consummated in 1989 with the Taif Accord and in 1990 with the removal of General (and Prime Minister) Michel Aoun from the Ba'abda presidential palace and with the full conquest of Beirut, Lebanon's capital.

Syrian occupation employed a wide range of policy means to transform Lebanon into a "client state" and a Syrian political satellite. By means of military control and political penetration, media repression and alien colonization, Lebanon has lost its independence. Under foreign rule within the matrix of a foreign-manipulated police state, the Lebanese suffer from Arabization and Syrianization that deny the people, especially the Maronite Christians, their freedom and dignity. Many have been forced into exile across the countries and continents of the Lebanese diaspora.

Syria's occupation regime in Lebanon suggests comparison with the Anschluss of 1936, the Munich capitulation of 1938, and the setting up of the Vichy regime of 1940. Stalinism as a terror state model is also evocative of Lebanon's pitiful subjugation about which, however, the international community shows hardly any concern.

The collapse of a free Lebanon is part of the expanding sweep of Islamic power and the decay of Christian civilization in the Middle East. Perhaps, under circumstances of upheaval in Syria, Israeli military policy, and revivalism among the Lebanese, foreign occupation of Lebanon may come to an end.

## CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS IN SYRIA

*Dany Shoham*

For about two decades, Syria has a consistent policy of chemical and biological arms acquisition that is systematic and determined – and that has never been actually denied by Syria. More than any other country, Syria has a policy of seeking strategic parity with Israel which, in military terms, means getting biological and chemical weapons, given that nuclear weapons are not attainable for now. This pattern was seen by the chemical weapons procured by Syria from Egypt in their joint preparations for the October 1973 Yom Kippur War, and even today, Assad, Mubarak and other Arab leaders coordinate positions on refusing to adhere to the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions.

Moreover, Syria possibly cooperates with Egypt in biological and chemical arms acquisition today, and it certainly does with Iran and probably with Libya. It has been aided – though not necessarily through institutionalized channels – by Russia, China and North Korea, in efforts to enlarge its longer-range surface-to-surface missiles that carry operational chemical and biological warheads, among them the Scud-C, the M-9 and the No-Dhong. Assistance in upgrading and scaling up its chemical-biological capabilities is given also by other formerly soviet countries, India and, still, European firms. Several facilities located in different sites in Syria are involved in these efforts and are in part disguised as civilian buyers.

During recent years, Syria has switched from above-ground missiles and non-conventional weapons facilities to underground storage and production, thereby significantly limiting Israel's ability to monitor and destroy those strategic facilities.

The first and by far only Syrian employment of a chemical warfare agent took place in 1982 – it was the lethal cyanide gas used by the Syrian regime in the slaughter of some 18,000 Sunni residents of the city of Hama, in Syria itself.

Ever since then, Syria has made a very significant progress in the area of chemical and biological weapons, which has various implications of major importance. It built up an elaborate, large arsenal of sarin and VX nerve agents containing aerial bombs and missiles warheads, and formed a delivery

realignment that is capable of instantly launching those deadly weapons at a variety of targets and objects in Israel, both strategic and tactical. Biological warfare agents – anthrax, botulinum and others – have recently been added to the Syrian inventory.



**PEACE WITH SYRIA: NO MARGIN FOR ERROR**

*Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto*



## PEACE WITH SYRIA: NO MARGIN FOR ERROR

*Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto*

Trading vital strategic tangible assets for a piece of paper backed by intangible, reversible collaterals, offered by a tyrant who is supposed to start behaving in a way he never did before – how would a normal (US) businessman handle such a proposal?

### 1. A Cause For Concern: The Assymetries

1.1 Under the emotional impact of the French Revolution, Immanuel Kant wrote his **Perpetual Peace** in 1797. Comparing two types of ruling regimes, he says:<sup>1</sup>

[A state governed according to] a constitution...[which] is republican<sup>2</sup>...established (first)...by principles of the freedom of the members of a society (as men); secondly, by principles of dependence of all upon a simple common legislation (as subjects) and thirdly, by the law of their equality (as citizens)...gives a favorable prospect for the desired consequence, i.e., perpetual peace. The reason is this: If the consent of the citizens is required in order to decide that war should be declared (and in this constitution it cannot but be the case), nothing is more natural than to be very cautious in commencing such a poor game, decreeing for themselves all the calamities of war. Among the latter would be having to fight, having to pay the costs of war from their own resources, and having to repair the devastation war leaves behind.

Of the opposite type of regime he warns:

But, on the other hand, in a constitution which is not republican, and under which the subjects are not citizens, a declaration of war is the easiest thing in the world to decide upon, because war does not require the ruler, who is the proprietor and not a member of the state, the least sacrifice of the pleasures of his table, the chase, his country houses, his court functions and the like. He may therefore resolve on war as on a

pleasure party for the most trivial reasons, and with perfect indifference leave the justification which decency requires to the diplomatic corps, who are ever ready to provide it.

During the 200 years since **Eternal Peace** was published, Kant's observations were constantly proven right, from Napoleon Bonaparte to Hitler, Stalin and the Arab dictators fighting among themselves and, together, fighting Israel.

**This is the number one asymmetry between Israel and Arabia, to be reckoned with when negotiating peace.**

1.2 Before May 15, 1948, the Israel-Arab conflict was limited to Jewish-Western-Palestinian-Arab skirmishes, with the Arabs receiving ample support from their Middle Eastern (and other) brethren.

Since May 15, 1948, to this day, all Israel's existential major wars were conducted between Israel and various coalitions of the Arab states (except the Sinai campaign of 1956). One has to accept the fact that the conflict is between Israel and Pan-Arabia, i.e., the Arab Nation as mentioned in the Palestinian Covenant. These are not separate, "stand alone" conflicts between Israel and Palestinians, Israel and Syria, Israel and Lebanon, Israel and Iraq, etc., which may be handled one-by-one as if there were no interdependence among them all.

Logic dictates that when peace between Israel and Syria is discussed, it would be an exercise in self-delusion to look upon the Israeli-Syrian military balance as a separate matter to be considered. The Israeli-Syrian military balance, serious enough as it is,<sup>3</sup> is only one component of the Israeli-Arabian picture. Who will be able to prevent the present or coming Syrian tyrant from concluding a military alliance with, say, the present or coming Iraqi tyrant and/or any other? A piece of paper? US and UN guarantees and/or observers? We have been through that in 1967.

Relations with Syria, as much as the present "consensus" would wish to forget it, are only one part of the wider, Israeli-Arabic picture.

As a reminder:

- i. Israel-Arabia area ratio is about 1:500.



- ii. Israel-Arabia population ratio is about 1:80.
- iii. Border to vital targets distance (air-defense penetration):
  - in Israel 3-100 km or less.
  - in Arabia, 40-1,000 km and more.
- iv. UN and other diplomatic ratio among states: Israel: 1; Arabia: 22+.
- v. Natural resources:
  - Arabia: 60% of world oil in the Middle East.
  - Israel: some potash, bromide and phosphates; = ± nil.

**This is asymmetry number two, conveniently overlooked by Israeli “general consensus”. It is clearly the basis of policy making in the Arab world. National amnesia?**

1.3 Kissinger wrote that “A prerogative of independence of a state is that its government can change its mind.” True, indeed.

While democratic Israel is chained by its Jewish and Western norms and practices, Arab totalitarian states are not, nor are, to a great extent, the super-powers.

**This is asymmetry number three, a heavy weight to carry. What if the Syrian tyrant changes his mind and goes at it bit-by-bit, with the west censuring Israel for being oversensitive, hence unduly aggressive?**

1.4 The worst asymmetry, however, is the asymmetry of aims:

- i. **Israel’s aims are peaceful co-existence and development.** As Kant says, “the government is a tool of the people.”
- ii. **Arabia’s dictators’, medieval princes’, military-revolutionary tyrants’ or theocratic Islamic despots’, *declared aim is the elimination of the Israeli Western, infidel foothold in the Middle East.*** This is not a mystical-ideological-religious-emotional whim, but rather a very concrete political interest. Doing away with Israel is a condition *sine-qua-non* for continued totalitarian rule in the Middle East, especially in this world embracing media age.

Unless they dispose of it, Middle East tyrants may be asked by their subjects, for example, to explain why arid, resourceless, miniature Israel, “thrown” among the Arabs, drained by their violence and constantly absorbing new, poor immigrants, has a GNP more than double that of all its so much larger neighbors put together? Creation of wealth and a better life may be assumed to be a result of the Jewish infidel, “twisted”, Western ways. They must be uprooted before bringing about that social violent change feared by dictators.

Peace loving, good willing liberals who preach brotherly love, should realize that Israel, the US, and other democracies, are “negotiating peace” with the despots whose basic openly stated interest is the destruction of Israel in order to prevent or delay a Middle East version of a French Revolution or an implosion á la Soviet Union that may, God forbid, sow the seed of democracy in the region.

- iii. The aim(s) of the Arab Middle Eastern masses, its populations, are disregarded, irrelevant. The Arab population is not part of the Israeli and Western Democracies’ “peacemaking”. Democracies team with their oppressors. They may want peace and a better life, but neither the Western liberal governments and media, nor the democratic Israelis, take them into account. Their oppressors are accepted as speakers on their behalf.

**Asymmetry number four is the deep-rooted disparity of peace or “peace” aims between Israel (as a whole: people & government) and the Arab totalitarian despots.**

There are, of course, so many other asymmetries that provide so many other reasons for skepticism. Peace negotiations cannot dismiss them.

## **2. A Cause for Concern: The Ambiguity of Peace Definition**

An Israeli leader defined peace with Syria as the fulfillment of his dream of visiting Damascus and eating humus in its restaurants which he did not do since he was 14 years. A prince’s wish. He even threatened to resign if the people will not let him do it. Some definition! MK Uri Savir, a major peace

promoter, declared that peace is, insofar as he is concerned, “a bus line linking Haifa to Damascus”.<sup>4</sup>

Others, lacking such originality, ask for peace, real peace, really real peace, with embassies, flags and tourism. When invited by Prime Minister Shamir to participate, as a Member of Knesset, in the Madrid comprehensive peace talks in October 1991,<sup>5</sup> the writer, attempting to apply the Cartesian logic acquired in the military, asked for “the purpose of the maneuver”, i.e., the definition of peace.

He did not get one, so he turned to the dictionaries from which all others shied away, inadvertently or, maybe, on purpose.<sup>6</sup>

Dictionaries define peace, as basically one of two situations:

- i. “A state of harmony between people or groups.”
- ii. “A state existing during the absence of war.” (Collins, La Rousse).

The picture becomes clearer: There are two distinct types of peace. There is no bridging between them.

- A “state of harmony”, which is the type of peace between, say, the US and Canada. Its “building blocks” are commonality of political (democratic<sup>7</sup>) regimes, of culture, of economic principles and practices of ethics, of *Weltanschauung*, of norms and aspirations, etc., with no real conflict of interests and, of course, no aggressive motivation. The US and Canada do not need peace agreements, nor armies deployed “to protect the peace”. Across borders movements of people, wares and ideas are free, natural and continuous.
- A “state of no war” would be the “de facto” peace, the Cold War between the US and the now defunct USSR. The clash among the diametrically opposed political regimes, the culture, the economic principles and practices, the ethics, etc., the conflicts of interests and the militant, aggressive motivation of communist expansionism created a war prone reality, with war being averted by the introduction of a new factor offsetting all others, namely: **deterrence**.

A number of treaties were signed and huge military forces were poised to “protect the peace”. Across borders, movements of people, wares, and especially ideas, were limited to a minimum.

It does not take long to analyze the Middle East parameters of peace in order to conclude that peace between Israel and Syria will, per force, be similar to the US-USSR peace or the peace with Egypt. Israel’s peace with Jordan is a unique exception,<sup>8</sup> not logically unlike the US-Mexican peace. Peace with Syria, if concluded the way it is being negotiated, will be founded on third parties’ “goodwill”, protected by military forces, limited in scope, uneasy, totally dependent on the Syrian ruling tyrant’s whim or evaluation of the situation, i.e., looking for a “window of opportunity” to achieve his basic interest, namely, the elimination of Israel.

Interaction between Syria and Israel, as viewed by Assad, will be kept (of course) to a minimum, which is sure to generate friction, meaning that old sores may be reinfected.

Far from becoming the political quantum jump from war to a “peace of harmony”, the Syrian-Israeli peace, like Peres’ “New Middle East”,<sup>9</sup> shows all the characteristic signs of the US-USSR Cold War, which means that the mechanism of preventing war in this basically war-prone situation, is DETERRENCE, even though the bullet ridden walls of antagonisms may be papered over by numerous pages of peace agreements.

### **3. A Cause for Concern: “No War” Peace Agreements that Harm Deterrence**

- 3.1 On October 27, 1997, the writer was invited to formally testify before the Joint Economic Committee of the US Senate and House of Representatives in Washington, in order to elaborate on a position paper named “Israel 2,000 – How Will it Fare if Shrunk to its 1967 Borders”, written within the framework of the “Ariel Center for Policy Research”.

The general idea was to analyze the possibility of revalidation of the US State Department’s Rogers Plan of 1969 (Israel: withdrawal to the 1967 lines “with minor modifications”) which, as it is well known,

was furiously rejected at the time by Golda Meir, the then Labor Party Prime Minister.<sup>10</sup>

The logic followed by the writer was:

- i. Establish the “Red Lines” and “War Strategy” developed during Ben-Gurion’s time, as expressed in (then) Deputy Prime Minister’s Yigal Allon’s formal defense policy declaration of February 22, 1967.<sup>11</sup>

Ben-Gurion’s strategy of “carrying the war over to enemy territory”, tacitly recognized as legitimate by the international community because of Israel’s miniature area and indefensible shape and topography, was elaborated on by Allon who declared that: “In order to win a war or, **in some cases, survive one, Israel should**, when war becomes imminent, **preempt by surprise.**”

- ii. Review the changes in Arab “Aims of War” and “Order of Battle” between 1967 and 1997.<sup>12</sup>
- iii. Review the revolutionary developments in Weapons’ Technology between 1967 and 1997.<sup>13</sup>
- iv. Review of the Lessons of Wars between 1967 and 1997.<sup>14</sup>
- v. Review the changes in the world and Middle East geopolitical realities, for good or ill, and their bearing on Israel during that same period.<sup>15</sup>

3.2 The conclusion, as presented by the writer on Capitol Hill, was that the Ben-Gurion strategy as elaborated by Yigal Allon (as executed during the Six Day War of June 1967), cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be carried out in present circumstances from the 1967 (Rogers) borders.<sup>16</sup> Yet, if Israel will again be confined to the 1967 lines, Allon’s statement that preemption by surprise is vital “in order to win a war or, in some cases, survive one”, remains as true as ever – **only that this is practically impossible to execute. The one factor that may substitute for preemption by surprise is terrain (topography). Up to the present, no real substitute has been found for the “terrain” factor in the Golan Height’s context.**

Military power, the major component of deterrence, is composed of a trained, supplied, controlled, informed, cunning maneuvering of

firepower, mobility *and terrain*. Where “terrain” is almost insignificant in size and topography is dominant on enemy’s side, there is a lid on the firepower and mobility that may be brought to bear. Hence, the level of deterrence is dangerously lowered, *which increases the probability of war* (in a “peace of no war” situation).

For example: Preempting by surprise, means achieving instant air superiority, possible in 1967, given the anti-aircraft defense intensity and control sophistication of the time, and the fact that the enemy aircraft were openly lined up on their aprons, along fewer runways.<sup>17</sup>

Two to four days may be required today to “clean” the battle area of the so much more sophisticated air defense in order to achieve the imperative air superiority. This means that the timing and location of the attack become known and no tactical surprise, as requested by Allon, may be achieved. The attack of anti-aircraft weapons sites and/or their Command, Control, Communications, Computer & Intelligence (C<sup>4</sup>I) is an act of war, to which the Syrian almost instant response may be the ballistic missile bombardment of Israel’s urban centers, i.e, the disruption of reserves mobilization, their outfitting, transport and deployment to the battle front (modern intelligence prevents efficient, prior, secret mobilization and deployment of reserves).

No capability of preempting by surprise – no winning of a war or, in some instances, no survival for Israel within the 1967 borders.

Being absolutely unable to trade off terrain for the wearing out of the enemy’s firepower and mobility (which was the case on a small scale during the Yom Kippur War of 1973 that started on the Golan and the Suez Canal and, of course, the case on a grand scale during the Russian Napoleonic and Soviet-German Wars) requires a substantial increase in firepower and mobility, which as said, has its limits.

As it turns out, Israel’s deterrence at terror/guerrilla, conventional and non-conventional levels will be negatively affected by the loss of its topographic assets, first and foremost the Golan,<sup>18</sup> enhancing the probability of war (in a peace of “no war”).

#### 4. A Cause for Concern – The Proposed Substitutes

The “standard” substitutes for the Golan Heights that are proposed by the “instant peace” protagonists raise more questions about their seriousness than provide answers. For example:

- 4.1 “American military presence on the Golan as observers and international guarantees will assure the Golan (and beyond) demilitarization.”

We have tasted US guaranties and UN troops in the Sinai and their flight in 1967 that brought about the Six Day War.<sup>19</sup>

Czechoslovakia received French-British guaranties for the integrity of its mutilated borders to facilitate the “Territories for Peace” ceding of the Sudetenland to Germany. Six months later, Czechoslovakia did not exist and the rest is history. The US guaranteed the status of Taiwan as “the real China”, etc. There is no case in history where third party guarantees were valid for long, unless desired by both sides, as is the present case between Egypt and Israel. Until when?

- 4.2 “Why insist on deterrence and war talk if you sign peace?”

The facts are that most wars started from a “contracted peace” situation. To illustrate:

The two World Wars of the century did. The 1941 Nazi surprise attack against the Soviet Union started trampling on a “Treaty of Alliance” (not “only” peace), i.e., the Molotov-Ribentropp pact of 1939.

Iraq’s tensions with Iran were relieved by a five year negotiated peace treaty signed in 1978. In 1980, the Iraqis launched an eight year war against Iran where over one million people lost their lives and ballistic missiles, as well as chemical weapons, were used.

Between Iraq and Kuwait, there were tons of agreements. Kuwait saved Iraq during its Iranian war by providing a bypass to the Iranian held-only navigable access to Iraq. So what?

Syria signed an Armistice Pact pointing to peace with Israel in 1949. It started shooting the following day – continuously between 1949 and 1967, breaking over 400 cease-fires it signed, using the Golan as a launching pad.

Syria's "reliable" tyrant, Assad, signed three agreements to withdraw from Lebanon, which he never attempted to honor.

This is why one should insist on deterrence and, as the old and militarily wise Romans used to say, "*Si vis pacem, pare bellum*".

- 4.3 "Today's technology, especially electronics, provide safe substitutes for the Golan."

As a former Head of AF Operational Requirements, a Member of RAPHAEL (Armament Development Authority) Advisory Board until 1995, etc., may I suggest that I agree with General Amnon Lipkin-Shakak's statement as Chief of the General Staff in December 1995 that, "There is no military substitute for the Golan, technological or other."

As the Gulf War and Kosovo proved, the more data links and computers one has to use for a certain mission, the more prone he is to enemy interference with inputs of disinformation and waging of computer warfare. The "shelf life" of Electronic Warfare (EW) arsenals is similar to that of a PC computer. **There is no substitute for the company or battalion commander's hold on his own hill.** High ground provides for defense, for communication and control, for visual and optical, including infra-red, enhanced observation, for radar, for signals interception and most important, when the Air Force may be away fighting missiles, for "look-down shoot-down" anti-aircraft missile batteries. There are hardly any valid substitutes for these aboard aircraft hundreds of miles away, "platforms" that require protection themselves and whose data links and numerous steps to reach the battalion are penetrable.

- 4.4 "We are strong enough to deter and react, if necessary."

Not if you are losing your high ground, especially on the Golan where not only Syria, but also Iraq and Jordan, have in the past, made contact with us at close quarters. Remember: 1,000 tanks in Tel Aviv are either a parade or a target. Deployed in adequate topographical conditions, they are a formidable force.

- 4.5 "To deter, let's take the nukes out of the closet." (Assuming that they are there.)



Nukes would be a worst possible solution. Changing the present situation would mean legitimization of the nuclearization of the Middle East. With the ratios and relationships involved, all conflict with Syria will turn into a general nuclear war in the Middle East, where a 50:1 Israeli superiority is required for a “Samson’s Choice”.

With its micro-miniature area that may be devastated by 2-4 nuclear devices, its arid area open to satellite spying and surveillance that permits no siting of a reliable second strike capability within its borders, Israel is at a total disadvantage in nuclear confrontation and should do its best to avoid such a situation rather than promote it. The suggestion of “let’s sign peace before they have nukes,” is absolutely unrealistic. Iraq and Iran, and possibly others, attempt to acquire nuclear arms for the reason of hegemony, i.e., control of the M.E. oil. Unfortunately, a quest for hegemony is supposed to be legitimate if, like the Iraqi scuds, it is used to threaten Israel. Arab nuclear efforts do not depend on Israel’s peace efforts.

There is a reason for deep concern when the “protagonists of peace”, US, Israelis or others, offer hollow substitutes for an answer.

## 5. The Question of Legitimacy

- 5.1 According to the Allied Middle East partition of the Ottoman (not Arab) Empire at the end of the First World War, **Palestine, including the Golan Heights**, were subjected to the British Mandate which was to be instrumental in creating a Jewish National Home. That was the international trend that created Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Finland, Czechoslovakia, recreated Poland, etc. (as states, not as “fuzzy” homelands).

Trans-Jordan, today’s Jordan, was torn off the Mandate by the British in 1921 to satisfy British Imperial interests, i.e., regardless of “natives” inputs. The Golan Heights were separated from Palestine and offered to the French Mandate of Syria, seemingly in exchange for some areas in Northern Iraq that were transferred by the French to the British (oil). Jewish history and security that suggested, in the first place, that the Golan be part of the Mandate were discarded to satisfy

imperial manipulations. There never was a “sacred” fusion between Syria and the Golan.

- 5.2 The UN partition plan of November 1947 (Resolution 181) has not been accepted by the Arabs who waged war with Israel and lost (except Syria which gained some ground). Therefore, Resolution 181 is as good as dead, superseded by the results of the war. (Syria affirms that Assad requests Israel to withdraw to the June 4, 1967 lines which are **not** the “181 lines”.)
- 5.3 All Arab countries, with the exception of Iraq (that has no common border with Israel), signed the Rhodes, UN sponsored Armistice Agreements of 1949. The agreements, unlimited in time, stated that they are an introduction to peace. (Jordan acted for the Arab Palestinians.) All Arab countries reneged on all of the Armistice Agreements.
- 5.4 In flagrant disregard of the Armistice, Syria started a continuous disruption of life on the Israeli side of its border by firing artillery, mining and raiding the Israeli side more than 400 times between 1949 and 1967. In 1951, a Syrian incursion launched from the Golan went as far west as to threaten the Tiberias-Rosh Pina road. Israel had to use the Air Force to eject them. Then Syria occupied the El Hamma Springs in the Golan which Israel had to evacuate under pressure. In 1964, Syria attempted to divert the Jordan River sources that were in its area, but whose waters were, according to the Armistice, to be used by Israel. The “Water War” resulted, with the Syrians being prevented by force from diverting the Jordan through the Golan Heights (to be wasted, de facto). A series of clashes, including major air battles, resulted.
- 5.5 In 1967, Syria joined Egypt and Jordan in an openly declared attempt to annihilate the State of Israel (with Soviet support), while the West stepped aside in the best Munich (1938) fashion. All paper agreements signed prior to June 1967 were thus annulled by the erupting war as were, for instance, the Versailles or Brest-Litovsk treaties, etc.

In the Six Day War of June 1967, Israel achieved what was considered a “mission impossible” by the Arabs and by the world at large, and took the ever-threatening Golan Heights.

The 20 year uninterrupted Syrian warlike acts carried out from the Golan Heights in breach of the Armistice and 400 “cease fires”, in face of the civilized world’s indifference, are a de-legitimization of Syrian rule over the Golan and a legitimate reason for Israel keeping it. The international *laissez-faire* when Israel had the rope around its neck, disqualifies all those who presently insist upon its withdrawal.

5.6 Syria possessed the Golan for **20 years**, using it as a springboard for war against Israel, with no real peaceful development envisaged. Israel (re)possesses the Golan and for the **last 32 years** it has enriched it with a solid economy, with a per-capita income similar to that of Europe.

Denying Syrians the overwhelming topographic superiority of the Golan and deterring the Syrians by Israel’s proximity to Damascus, resulted in real stability, i.e., a “no war” situation de facto.

Unlike East Prussia, Silesia and other very large chunks of Germany that changed hands when Germany lost World War II, or the Japanese substantial territorial loss, the wars constantly initiated by Syria, should cost it only 0.5 percent of its pre-wars territory (the Golan) to ensure a durable peace. What is not legitimate about it?

5.7 Unlike the status of Judea, Samaria and Gaza with their large Arab populations, the Golan Heights, with no Arab population, has been legally annexed by Israel. An Israeli legal disposing of its sovereignty over the Golan will certainly provide a legitimate precedent with regard to other areas that were accepted worldwide, including the Arab world, as Israeli although they are situated outside the map drawn by UN Resolution 181 of 1947.

The 1947 partition will be on the agenda again, with a fair chance to renew that war again, with Arab firepower, mobility and terrain crushing superiority.

## 6. Conclusion

6.1 Transferring the Golan Heights to Syria within the framework of a “peace of no war” will gravely harm Israel in more than one aspect. It may even become a mortal danger.

- Instead of the regional power, the asset Israel is to the West, which is facing a raising Islam, uncertainty about the final

affiliation of the seven C.I.S. northern republics in Central Asia, the necessity to buttress Turkish resolve, a huge Arab-Islamic conventional and mass destruction arms build up, world-wide Islamic terrorism from China to Chechniya and from Paris to Pakistan and probable Russian revisionism, Israel will turn into a liability and be treated like one. Nobody bets on a dying horse more than on a dead one.

- The costs of the operation, assessed by the writer to be in the order of (more than) \$30 billion, plus about \$5 billion a year to ensure readiness for as long as one foresees, have not been seriously considered by the “peacemakers”, who accepted the amount as an order of magnitude. Who will bear the costs?

If it is the US, it will be a tough problem for the Congress, a rather strange occurrence, to have the US pay such a sum in order to downgrade its traditional, unconditional, democratic ally from an asset into a liability, an invalid at the mercy of some of the most backward tyrants.

If Israel will have to foot the bill, the drain on its economy will become overwhelming, the result being the country’s economic stagnation and, maybe, paralysis with all that bears on its security. Guess who will be asked to bail it out?

If the peace with Egypt will serve as a model, more billions of US dollars will have to be spent on Syrian armed forces’ modernization, an additional threat to Israel.

- The concerns mentioned above and those which were not, leave absolutely no room for error. Either Assad and his successor behave the way they are supposed to by the Israeli peacemakers, or a devastating costly war will ensue, with Israel at a terrible disadvantage.
- Trading (let’s face it) the Golan Heights for a tyrant’s piece of paper backed by makeshift collaterals that never worked in the past, thereby opening, as Gur said, Israel’s Eastern, most sensitive flank to a potential attack by a Syrian-Iraqi alliance (and, in different circumstances, with Jordan and the Palestinian entity participation), will be remembered in history as one of the major

blunders of the Jewish people, something like Massarik's and Benés' acceptance of the Chamberlain-Hitler Munich dictate (with no disrespect for President Clinton).

- Speaking on the Israeli radio on January 3, 2000, at about 08:20, Professor Itamar Rabinowitz, former Israeli Ambassador to the US and one of the “architects of peace”, commented on the Shepherdstown, West Virginia talks, explaining that the difficulties raise from the asymmetry between the democratic Israeli team and the Syrian team appointed by its dictator, Assad, who has no intention of actively participating until a **positive** agreement has been concluded. “This” he said, “is why we have to be more accommodating than in normal negotiations.” (Quoted from memory.) I wonder whether Rabinowitz learned Chamberlain's reasoning by heart.

## 6.2 Some examples:

- Let it be known that, playing big, politicians and Generals make big mistakes.
- The French and British governments were mistaken when tolerating Hitler's malfesance, starting with the occupation of the Ruhr in 1936. Were they (then they had the capability) to react by force, there would probably not have been a World War II.
- The US politicians and armed forces misread the Japanese, with the resulting bombing of Pearl Harbor. But Pearl Harbor was thousands of miles away from Washington.
- Stalin trusted Hitler's friendship (!) in 1941. Twenty-three million Soviets lost their lives. Some say 50 million.
- Hitler was certain he would win the war. Over 11 million Germans were killed and Germany was dismembered.
- Ben-Gurion was certain that the 1949 Armistice would bring peace. Egypt and Syria taught him he was wrong.
- The US denied the French “Imperialists” the aircraft they needed to tilt the anti-communist war in their favor in Vietnam during the late 1940s and early 1950s (Dien-Bien-Phu). The US replaced the French and lost the Vietnam War shamefully, with the Soviets

taking one big step further in the free world. Vietnam was half the world away from the US, yet its long shadow is still darkening its skies and judgment.

- Generals Zeira (Chief of Israeli Military Intelligence) and Dayan (his mentor and Minister of Defense) were certain, in October 1973, that war would not break out in spite of Mossad and other warnings (including King Hussein's, it is said). They carried the day in the government, reserves were not mobilized in time and no preemption requested by the Israeli Air Force was authorized.

Unlike Vietnam, this was on home's doorstep. Israel lost about 3,000 men, a US equivalent of 187,500, in the few days required to redress the situation and to win the biggest armor battle the world has ever seen... but it lost the war on the home and diplomatic fronts.

6.3 The "moral of the story" is that not unlike the old Western intellectuals' communist sympathies, with writers and philosophers (Sartre) heading the crowd, today's liberals, moralists, artists, peaceniks, and "greens" (and yellows), the world over have joined hands to protect the "dear" Arab tyrants and help them recover ground lost to "bad" democratic Israel in wars of aggression.

This delayed, out of place, Vietnam hangover (flower power?) fixation is an easily digested, politically palatable, populist, short-lived act easy to sell, hence adopted by "pragmatic" politicians and the ubiquitous media. Let us only hope that the Israeli public and the US Congress and people will refuse to be carried away by dictators' vague promises.

In a nutshell, Israel is torn between the "peace-right-now" options put forth by those who accept taking a (existentialist) risk gamble tied to a very low probability of success in the hope of hitting the (peace) jackpot and, the sedate, careful, skeptical approach that history warrants.

After all, the "window of opportunity" has been open for the last nine years and, anyway, it turns out that it has no pane.

Clinton's and Assad's style in stepping off the stage of history should not prejudice the fate of Israel's recovery from the ashes of the recent past.

Let us hope that President Clinton, “the locomotive of peace”, will realize that he is about to commit a very costly mistake, gravely endangering Israel’s existence at a charge to be carried by the US taxpayer.





**PREPARING FOR PEACE?  
SYRIAN DEFENSE EXPENDITURES AND  
ITS DRIVE FOR REGIONAL HEGEMONY**

*Shawn Pine*



## PREPARING FOR PEACE? SYRIAN DEFENSE EXPENDITURES AND ITS DRIVE FOR REGIONAL HEGEMONY

*Shawn Pine*

### **Syria's Defense Expenditures**

Any cursory examination of Syria's military strength reflects that traditional sources of military expenditures **information** are vastly underestimating the amount of resources that Syria is devoting to the build-up and development of its military. Accurately determining Syria's military expenditures, given its closed society and dictatorial regime, is an extremely challenging task. However, given the relative availability and reliability of open sources in the West, it is possible to obtain general information on the Operational and Maintenance (O&M) costs incurred in training, fielding, and maintaining various military units.<sup>1</sup>

While this analysis is far from precise, given the enormous cultural and political discrepancies that would result in deviations in amounts devoted toward maintenance and training, it is far more accurate than relying on traditional sources of military expenditures **information**. Moreover, it is important to note that the costs to a third-world country to maintain equipment may actually be incrementally higher since many such components are subject to a myriad of additional importing, shipping, and distribution costs.

### **Army**

Syrian ground forces consist of 11 divisions that include: six armored divisions, three mechanized divisions, a Republican Guards Division, and a Special Forces Division. The Syrian I Corps is deployed in the Golan region and consists of the 1st, 3rd, and 9th armored divisions and the 5th and 7th mechanized divisions. II Corps is deployed in the Lebanon region and

consists of the 10th Mechanized Division, 14th Airborne Division, and seven Special Forces regiments. The Republican Guards Division and 569th Armored Division are deployed near Damascus.<sup>2</sup> Syria fields a 215,000-man army with another 400,000 in reserve.

Virtually all of the equipment in these divisions is Soviet manufactured and consists of approximately 4,600 tanks including 1,500 T-72s and 1,000 T-62s. Additionally, they also **deploy** over 3,000 armored personnel carriers including 2,250 BMP-1s and 60 BMP-2s. The annual cost to field and maintain an active US Army armored **or** mechanized division is \$976 million.<sup>3</sup> Of this amount, yearly operational costs for an armored **or** mechanized division are \$146 million and \$140.3 million respectively.<sup>4</sup> An additional \$175 million is spent on equipment avg./yr, and the remaining funds are associated personnel costs (military pay, family housing, etc). A more detailed breakdown of the yearly operational costs follows:

	<b>Armored Division</b>	<b>Mechanized Division</b>
<b>Consumables</b>	\$48.962	\$47.995
Reparables	\$70.266	\$65.267
POL	\$ 5.651	\$ 5.470
Indirect Costs	\$21.152	\$21.609
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$146.031</b>	<b>\$140.341</b>

**Source:** Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations.

Cost figures are in millions.

This would put Syria's yearly operational costs of maintaining its 6 armored divisions at \$876.19 million, \$421.02 million for its three mechanized divisions, and \$140.341 million for the Republican Guards Division (excluding personnel and equipment costs avg./year).

In addition to its traditional armored and mechanized forces, Syria has one infantry division and ten airborne/special forces independent brigades.

According to a March 4, 1997 Department of the Defense information paper submitted to the House National Security Committee, the yearly operating costs for a light infantry division was \$583 million and for an airborne division, \$733 million. Once we extract personnel costs we arrive at \$204 million for the infantry division and approximately \$750 million for the airborne brigades (excluding personnel and equipment costs avg./year).<sup>5</sup>

Syria deploys over 2,000 major towed **artillery** weapons including D-20 152mm, A-19 Model 1931/1937 122mm and M46 130mm weapons. While the exact construction of these units is not known, their size is large enough to require 15 artillery brigades. A breakdown of the yearly operational costs for an artillery brigade follows:

<b>Consumables</b>	\$3.573
Reparables	\$9.633
POL	\$ .311
Indirect Costs	\$1.822
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$15.339</b>

**Source:** Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations.

Cost figures are in millions and are for a 155SP BN.

By multiplying the 15 brigades by the yearly operational costs of \$15.339 we arrive at a figure of \$230.08 million (excluding personnel and equipment costs avg./year).

### **Air Force**

Syria possesses one of the largest air forces in the region. Its inventory consists of over 575 aircraft, the majority of which are MiG23s, MiG-25s, MiG-29s, and Su-24s. They are deployed across Syria at over 20 bases.<sup>6</sup> The air force is comprised of some 9 fighter

and 15 interceptor squadrons. A detailed breakdown of the 1997 yearly operational costs for a squadron of modern fighters follows:

Aviation Fuel	\$4.0
Depot Maintenance	\$0.8
<b>Consumable</b> Supplies	\$1.7
Depot Level Repairables	\$6.5
Training Munitions	\$1.1
Rel and Safety Mod Kits	\$1.1
Rel and Safety Mod Install	\$0.2
Training	\$0.5
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$15.9</b>

**Source:** Department of the Air Force, 11th Wing.

Cost figures are in millions and reflect the costs for maintaining a squadron of F-16C/D's.

By multiplying the yearly operational costs by the 24 squadrons in the Syrian Air Force we arrive at a yearly operational cost of \$381.6 million (excluding personnel and equipment costs avg./year).

Additionally, Syria possesses over 190 helicopters, comprising some 15 squadrons. These include Gazelle gun ships, Mi-24 Hinds, and Mi8/Mi-17 Hips. A detailed breakdown of the yearly operational costs for a squadron of helicopters includes:

<b>Consumables</b>	\$02.34
Repairables	\$11.02
POL	\$00.46

Indirect Costs	\$00.36
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$14.18</b>

**Source:** Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for operations.

Cost figures are in millions and are for a squadron of AH-64's.

Using the figure of \$14.18 million for the yearly operating cost per squadron we arrive at a total figure of \$212.7 million for the yearly operational costs for Syria's 15 squadrons (excluding personnel and equipment costs avg./year).

This brings the total yearly operational costs for Syria to maintain its fighter and helicopter squadrons to approximately \$594.3 million (excluding personnel and equipment costs avg./year). While the actual operational costs may differ due to differences in equipment and maintenance schedules, these discrepancies are adequately overcome by the fact that this analysis excludes the costs of maintaining Syria's transportation aircraft and its training assets.

### **Air Defense Forces**

Syrian air defense forces consist of over 60,000 men **with** 450 SA-2s, 200 SA-6s, over 4,000 short-range air defense missiles, and over 2,000 air defense guns.<sup>7</sup> The size and structure of Syria's air defense forces is well over 75 battalions. The yearly operational costs for sustaining an **Air Defense Artillery** battalion follow:

<b>Consumables</b>	\$1.45
Reparables	\$1.36
POL	\$0.11
Indirect Costs	\$0.77
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$3.69</b>

**Source:** Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for operations.

Cost figures are in millions and are for a U.S. ADA Avenger Battalion.

If we multiply the yearly operational costs of \$3.69 million to Syria's 75 active duty ADA battalions we arrive at a total figure of \$276.75 million for the maintenance of Syria's air defense forces (excluding personnel and equipment costs avg./year). While the actual operational costs of maintaining a lesser quality ADA battalion may be lower, this estimate is viable considering that Syria maintains a totally separate command structure for these assets.

## **Navy**

Syria's navy consists of approximately 50 vessels including; 16 missile patrol boats, 7 mine sweepers, a dozen coastal patrol boats, and four Destroyers/Frigates/Corvettes. (The crux of Syria's navy consists of eight Russian Osa II-class Rocket Cutters armed with updated versions of the SS-N-2 Styx missiles.)

Data pertaining to the number of hours that vessels in the Syrian navy deploy each year are unavailable. However, it costs approximately \$3,000 per hour to operate a patrol boat and over \$1,000 an hour to operate a minesweeper. Given these figures, notwithstanding the relative small size of the Syrian navy, a yearly operational cost of \$75 million is a conservative estimate (excluding personnel and equipment costs avg./year).<sup>8</sup>

## **Personnel Costs**

Thus far, this discussion has only addressed operational costs for fielding, maintaining, and sustaining Syria's military and its command structure. In addition to operational costs, there are a myriad of personnel expenditures associated with maintaining its military. These include salaries, clothing, food, housing, medical costs, etc. Indeed, personnel costs often account for about 65 percent of military expenditures.<sup>9</sup> While recognizing that Syrian personnel expenses are probably significantly lower than those incurred by



the West, the maintenance and sustainment of a large standing army consumes a substantial portion of its military budget.

Syria has approximately 450,000 soldiers in uniform. Of these, approximately 320,000 are conscripts. Additionally, there are another 254,000 in the reserves. Considering the direct costs of sustaining a soldier such as clothing, feeding, housing, health care, etc., coupled with the indirect costs of benefits **paid** to retirees, construction and maintenance of facilities, and dependent care, an average daily cost of \$10 per soldier is modest. Using the figure of \$10 and multiplying that amount by the number of personnel in its active forces, we arrive at an annual expenditure rate of \$54 million (excluding direct pay). The annual per capita GNP of Syria is slightly over \$2500. Assuming that conscripts are **paid** a nominal wage of \$10 per month and that regular army personnel average pay and allowances are equivalent to the per capita GNP, we arrive at a figure of \$35.7 million.<sup>10</sup>

Thus far, the analysis of Syria's defense budget places it far higher than its official estimation of \$1.7 billion. Indeed, as the following table illustrates, Syria actually spends twice its officially reported figures to maintain, sustain, and operate its conventional forces:

<b>Component</b>	<b>Estimated Yearly Operating Costs</b>
Armored Divisions	\$876.18 million
Mechanized Divisions	\$421.02 million
Infantry Divisions	\$204.00 million
Airborne Regiments	\$750.00 million
Artillery	\$230.08 million
Air Force	\$594.30 million
Air Defense	\$276.75 million
Navy	\$075.00 million
Personnel Costs	\$089.70 million
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$3,517.03 million</b>

However, this discussion has not addressed the single most expensive component of Syria's military forces. This is its development, production, and deployment of non-conventional weapons. The economic collapse of the Soviet Union made Syria's attempt to achieve conventional strategic parity with Israel unattainable. As Russia sank deeper into its economic morass, it was unwilling to continue underwriting Syria's defense costs and began pressuring that country for repayment of its \$12 billion debt. This prompted Syria to make the strategic decision to abandon its attempts to achieve conventional strategic parity with Israel. Rather, Syria decided to focus its resources on the development of its non-conventional forces to create a viable first strike option in hopes of compelling an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights.

### **Non-Conventional Weapons**

Syria's chemical weapons program dates to the early 1970s and is the consequence of the recognition that, after three decisive conventional military defeats, Syria lacked the resources to defeat Israel in a conventional conflict. Consequently, Syria embarked on an ambitious non-conventional weapons program. The core of Syria's program is its chemical weapons development and delivery systems. The production of such weapons provides Syria with an answer to Israel's nuclear capability at a fraction of the costs of building a credible conventional capability.<sup>11</sup> Syria's chemical weapons development has developed to such an extent that its arsenal is estimated to be greater than that of pre-Gulf War Iraq's.<sup>12</sup> Included in its massive chemical weapons programs are a large arsenal of both blister and nerve agents such as mustard, VX and sarin.<sup>13</sup>

The primary conduit for Syria's chemical weapons production program is its Scientific Research Council (CERS). Under its cover as a civilian research center, it has developed extensive contacts with a myriad of pharmaceutical centers throughout the world.<sup>14</sup> At least four production plants have been positively identified and it is believed that these facilities are producing hundreds of tons of chemical agents a year.<sup>15</sup> Most of its ballistic delivery systems for these weapons have been obtained from China, North Korea, and Russia. However, France, and to a lesser extent Germany, have played a pivotal role in building up Syria's chemical industry through the sale of various pharmaceuticals.<sup>16</sup>

Concurrent with the development of its massive chemical warfare program has been the acquisition of **numerous** delivery systems for these weapons. Syria has been building its ballistic missile forces for the last two decades and has amassed one of the largest ballistic missile arsenals in the Middle East. Included in Syria's arsenal are: 200 Scud-B missiles with a 985kg payload and 300km range; 200 SS-21 missiles with a 480kg payload and 70km range; approximately 60 Scud-C missiles with a 500kg payload and 500km range; and an undisclosed number of M-9 missiles with a 950kg payload and 600km range.<sup>17</sup> Additionally, Syria possesses an unknown number of cruise missiles including the SS-N-3b with a 1,000kg payload and 450km range.<sup>18</sup>

In addition to developing and acquiring a massive non-conventional arsenal, Syria is devoting substantial resources to the construction of a complex of tunnels to protect its missile ballistic missiles forces from Israeli attack. Thus far, five tunnels have been completed and an additional nine are under construction. Once these are completed, virtually all of Syria's missiles can be hidden and the vulnerability of these weapons to a preemptive strike will have been greatly reduced.<sup>19</sup>

Given the tyrannical structure and closed nature of the Syrian regime, it is impossible to accurately determine how much Syria is spending on its non-conventional weapons development, production, and deployment. However, Western sources, having gained access into Iraq's non-conventional weapons program following that country's defeat in the Gulf War, estimated that Iraq has devoted tens of billions of dollars to its non-conventional program. Given the size of Syria's program, it is easily spending \$1-2 billion a year on its non-conventional weapons program.

It needs to be noted, that this analysis has excluded administrative and support costs needed to sustain divisional units, O&M costs for support facilities, as well as the costs associated with the maintenance of military schools and administrations. More important, this analysis has excluded Syria's military intelligence network including those resources devoted in support of Hizbullah activities in Lebanon.

When these elements are factored it is clear that Syria's actual defense expenditures are probably closer to **5 to 6 billion dollars**. This is more than three times the amount claimed by published sources. However, despite its massive size, Syria's military is ill prepared to militarily force Israel from

the Golan Heights. Many of Syria's major weapons are obsolete and in need of major overhaul. Leadership at all levels of its force structure is weak, and Syria lacks a modern Command, Control, Communication, Computer, and Intelligence structure.<sup>20</sup> Given these factors Syria is ill-prepared to take the Golan Heights by force from Israel. However, Assad recognizes that by participating in the peace process he can not only compel an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan but can also rectify many of his military's systemic problems as he can expect an influx of economic and military aid as a quid-pro-quo for Syria's participation in the peace process.

### **Whither the Peace Process?**

Syria's attempt to achieve strategic parity with Israel is predicated upon Assad's desire to compel Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights without resorting to military force. Assad is dependent upon the Arab-Israeli conflict to facilitate Syria's desire to become the regions hegemon. It's contiguous border with Israel, and its claim to be in the vanguard against Zionist imperialism, has allowed Syria to compete with its rich and militarily more powerful cousins as the leader of the Arab world. Resolution of the Arab – Israeli conflict will diminish Syria's regional strategic importance and marginalize that country. Consequently, Syria is greatly dependent upon the continuation of the conflict for both internal and regional strategic reasons.

However, Assad recognizes that the current geo-political environment does not favor Syria in a military confrontation. Without the political and military support of the Soviet Union, any Syrian attack on Israel would face a devastating counterattack by an Israeli army unencumbered by geo-political superpower constraints. The events in Kosovo, where even vociferous Russian opposition was not enough to deter a NATO attack on Serbia, was undoubtedly closely monitored by Syria. The **lesson** Assad should have learned is that Russia's historical role as the benefactor to countries challenging the West has been greatly diminished by its dependence upon Western economic aid.

Consequently, Assad sees Syria's participation in the peace process as its only viable alternative to achieving an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights and facilitating the modernization of its military. However, Assad will not agree to sacrifice any core Syrian values **by taking such action as normalizing relations** with Israel, relinquishing control over Lebanon, or

agreeing to anything less than a full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights.

Proponents of the peace process have long argued that a new paradigm has risen in the region. Conventional wisdom proclaimed that the economic collapse of the former Soviet Union not only ended superpower rivalries but left many of the former Soviet Union's client states without the ability to wage a sustainable war against Israel. Moreover, it was believed that the United States, as the only remaining regional hegemon, would exert its leadership role and ameliorate tensions between Israel and its neighbors. Unfortunately, the West failed to take advantage of this fleeting opportunity to alleviate regional tensions between Israel and its neighbors **and** proceed toward a comprehensive and lasting peace. Rather, the United States, and other Western countries, acquiescing to the demands of their regional allies, have allowed a facade of regional peace to cloak an unprecedented, and largely unfettered, regional arms proliferation.

There is no reason to assume that this **phenomenon** will stop because of a peace treaty with Syria. Indeed, Assad will exploit his willingness to participate in the peace process by making Syria's signing of any peace accord contingent upon Western commitments to modernize and expand Syria's military. If the past is any indication, Assad will find the West only too willing to oblige and Syria will embark on a massive modernization of its military much of which will be bankrolled by the oil rich states. This will only serve to exacerbate an already dangerous situation. Unfortunately, weapons proliferation in the region is not abating. Despite leading the world in arms imports throughout the decade, there is no sign that the region's appetite for weapons has been satisfied. In March 1999, the United States announced that it would sell Egypt an additional \$3.2 billion worth of advance weapons including 24 advanced F-16 fighters, 200 M1A1 tanks, and a Patriot 3 anti-missile battery.<sup>21</sup> This announcement was followed by a Russian agreement to sell Syria a weapons package valued at approximately \$2 billion.<sup>22</sup> The purchase is reportedly to be financed by the United Arab Emirates and Iran and includes the purchase of T-90 tanks, MiG-29 fighters, and more advanced anti-missile systems.<sup>23</sup>

The peace process has been exemplified by an unfettered arms race, as the Arab states modernize and expand their arsenals, and Israel attempts to maintain its historical qualitative edge. The danger for Israel is that it cannot compete economically in such an arms race. Indeed, should Israel attempt to

maintain its qualitative edge it runs the risk of suffering the same fate as that of the former Soviet Union. It is important to note that each incremental gain in Israel's qualitative advantage will cost it substantially more in research and development. Consequently, Israel's only chance to maintain its qualitative superiority is by diverting resources from its force structure to research and development. Unfortunately, such a decision will exacerbate the critical quantitative gap with no guarantee that Israel will preserve its qualitative advantage. As the following tables illustrate, Israel is losing in its attempts to maintain to stem the quantitative gap.

### Arab – Israeli Quantitative Balance of Power

<b>Main Battle Tanks</b>						
	1967	1973	1985/6	1989/90	1995/6	1999
<b>Total Arab</b>	1,450	4,841	12,870	14,156	14,436	18,019
<b>Israel</b>	950	2,000	3,600	3,794	4,095	4,300
<b>Ratio</b>	1.53	2.42	3.57	3.73	3.53	4.19

<b>Combat Aircraft</b>						
	1967	1973	1985/6	1989/90	1995/6	1999
<b>Total Arab</b>	580	1,038	1,988	1,940	2,190	3,103
<b>Israel</b>	288	360	640	676	699	481
<b>Ratio</b>	2.01	2.88	3.10	3.00	3.13	6.45

Total Arab numbers include Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the UAE, and Yemen.

**Sources: IISS Military Balance and JCSS Middle East Military Balance** for the appropriate year. Data for 1967 and 1973 was

taken from Anthony Cordesman's **After the Storm: Changing Military Balance In the Middle East** (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993). The 1999 data was taken from Cordesman's **The Military Balance in the Middle East, Part V, 1999**.

More disturbing than the expanding quantitative gap between Israel and its neighbors has been the qualitative erosion of Israeli weapons *vis-à-vis* the Arab states. Today, for the first time in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the combined Arab forces are able to deploy more "high quality" combat tanks and aircraft than the Israelis. It is important to note, it was the superior quality of Israeli weapons, coupled with the quality of its soldiers, that allowed Israel to achieve decisive victories in past regional wars. Today, Israel no longer enjoys the advantage of being able to deploy significantly superior weapons. Moreover, the quantitative gap in virtually every major category has more than doubled since the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Equally important is that the technological ease and lethality of the current generation of weapons has neutralized Israel's vaunted human qualitative edge.

There is no doubt that the region is much more unstable than it was a decade ago. Egypt is still battling Islamic fundamentalism. Algeria is in the midst of civil war. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states face growing challenges to regime stability. Saddam Hussein is still in power. Iran still harbors regional ambitions in spreading the Islamic revolution. More important, arms proliferation in the region has greatly outpaced progress in the peace process. Should Israel reach accommodation with its neighbors, and achieve a comprehensive and lasting peace, then a "New Middle East" may indeed emerge. However, for this to occur the peace process will have to overcome the forces of history, religion, culture, hatred, and a growing belief on the part of Israel's neighbors that the military balance of power is shifting in their favor.<sup>24</sup> Given these conditions, proponents of the peace process are being fatefully optimistic in their estimation of where the peace process is leading Israel.

Should Israel refuse to acquiesce to Palestinian core demands such as a division of Jerusalem, right of Palestinian refugees to return to Israel proper, or full withdrawal from territories captured in the 1967 War, then the peace process will collapse and Israel will find itself in a political situation similar

to that faced in 1967, but facing an adversary who is far better prepared to challenge Israel militarily than at any time in the 50 year conflict. Unfortunately, nothing in the actions and rhetoric of Israel's neighbors suggests that they are seriously seeking a resolution of the conflict that will result in the integration of Israel into the region. Given the evolution of the Israel-Egyptian peace accords, and the current direction of the Israeli – Palestinian peace process, it appears that the best that supporters of the peace process can aspire to is a “cold peace”, one in which Israel is seen by the region as a tolerated interloper. Unfortunately, given the recent proliferation of weapons into the region this indeed may prove an overly optimistic assessment and a sixth Arab – Israeli war may well be in the offing in the not too distant future.



**THE SYRIAN OCCUPATION OF LEBANON**

*Mordechai Nisan*



## THE SYRIAN OCCUPATION OF LEBANON

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Throughout many centuries of Middle Eastern history, the inclusion of Lebanon within the borders of Syria was standard political discourse and policy. The notions of *bilad ash-Sham*, Greater Syria, and Fertile Crescent unity all expressed, each in its own way, the ambition of Damascus to dominate its geographic surroundings.<sup>1</sup> Beirut served as the port for Damascus, Tripoli lay on the Syrian coast, and the Bekka valley provided a proximate hinterland. A French author recounted the horrible massacre of Christians in Lebanon in 1860 in a work titled **Souvenirs De Syrie**. Writing about the village of Bhamdoun situated on the Beirut-Damascus highway did not dissuade a Lebanese historian in the mid-1990s from identifying its location within what once was “Ottoman Syria”, and placing Mount Lebanon itself within Syria.<sup>2</sup> Following which, the Syrian political and ideological goal since the mid-1970s, to absorb Lebanon and eliminate any semblance of its separate and autonomous existence, this despite its sovereign independence since the 1920s, evokes a certain historic and geographic resonance.

The contrary and distinctly indigenous notion of a separate Lebanese identity, rooted in particular in the mountain and effusing a Christian mission, rejected the legitimacy and certainly the desirability of a Syrian merger or an Arab affiliation. Resistance to outsiders and the cultivation of a Maronite-dominated Lebanon were hallmarks of the country’s national resilience.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, when Syrian forces entered Lebanese territory in 1975 and incrementally spread the net of their military control and political occupation across the country, the idea of a separate and free Lebanon faced a grave challenge. In a famous speech on July 20, 1976, President Hafez al-Assad of Syria conjured up the historical refrain: “Syria and Lebanon were one state and one people...and have shared interests and a common history.” As foreign occupation settled in as a routine reality, the voice of collaboration added its accommodating consent. On the 1999 anniversary of Syria’s October War against Israel in 1973, Lebanese President Emile Lahoud sent greetings to President Assad in which he declared that “the brotherhood and destiny of our countries is the center of our policy.”<sup>4</sup>

Syrian occupation of Lebanon constitutes the natural manifestation of power by the strong against the weak, with outward submission a demonstration of wise prudence or shameless treason. The hard calculus of power may, however, be transformed over time into the dialectic of power whereby oppression catalyzes its demise by a national uprising and revolution. Such a development would undo the mental construct of *Greater Syria* and expose it as an ideological fabrication and historical distortion of the true identity of Lebanon and the Lebanese people. In fact, it is the differentiation that Syrian occupation and power impose on Lebanon – dominating its thought, manipulating its identity, and engineering its politics – that can ultimately lead to the pulverization of the historical paradigm. Central to this liberating process is to unleash the rhetoric of truth, in the spirit of twentieth-century philosophers as different as Leo Strauss and Michel Foucault, in delineating the reality of Syria's occupation of Lebanon.

## **Modes of Syrian Occupation**

### **1. The Military and Security Domain**

The multi-aspect complexity of Lebanese affairs was a historical and political axiom. But it was the eruption of Lebanese-Palestinian warfare in April 1975, against the background of the intense struggle between the Christian Maronite community and the leftist National Movement coalition that provided the context and pretext for sustained Syrian military intervention. Allegedly fearing a Christian-Muslim partition of the country and/or a wholesale PLO takeover, Assad sent Syrian-commanded Palestine Liberation Army battalions, then *Saiqa* "Palestinian" units, into northern Lebanon during the latter part of 1975 and early 1976. On June 1, 1976, 12,000 regular Syrian troops crossed the border; by September the number reached approximately 25,000 men. Their presence in the northern Akkar region, in the eastern Bekka, at Sofar in the central mountain area and near Sidon on the coast, demonstrated that Syrian policing policy was assuming the form of a comprehensive military domination. By November, 6,000 Syrian troops had virtually taken over West Beirut.<sup>5</sup>

Operating however transparently under the name and guise of the Arab Deterrent Force authorized by the Riyadh Summit in October 1976, Syrian troops acted to disarm some Lebanese militias at the same time that the national army of Lebanon disintegrated to the diminutive size of 3,000

troops. By 1977, the number of Syrian troops exceeded 30,000, with over 200 tanks. After fighting the Palestinian and other leftist forces, Druzes and Sunnis in particular, the Syrian army then confronted the Christian Lebanese Forces. Indeed, if Syria was to control and pacify Lebanon, it would of necessity need to reduce the core Christian community that gave Lebanon its special national distinction. For three months, during “the 100 Days War” in mid-1978, Syria bombarded Christian East Beirut, specifically Ashrafiyya, which led to the flight of 300,000 people; at this time Syrian forces were also capturing Batroun and Besharre areas in the heart of the mountain area. A flood of Christian refugees and the execution of many Lebanese civilians were the direct result at this stage of the intensification and extension of Syria’s ruthless conquest of Lebanon.

In the 1980s, Syria further expanded its military control in the areas of Zahle, Aley, Nabatiyeh, and Jezzine, prior to the ultimate military capture of the presidential palace at Ba’abda, southeast of Beirut on October 13, 1990. In that final confrontation Syrian forces defeated Lebanese Army units under the command of General Michel Aoun, who had failed in his self-declared “war of liberation”. Syrian military occupation of Lebanon, therefore, incorporated the entire country with the exception of the southern “security zone” under the control of the Israeli Army (IDF) and its Southern Lebanese Army (SLA) ally. One reliable source suggests that the Syrians were responsible for the deaths of approximately 100,000 Lebanese and the flight of about a half a million people from the country.<sup>6</sup>

Syria stationed its commanding supervision at the Ministry of Defense at Yerze, while organizing its ubiquitous security and intelligence apparatus (*mukhabarat*) under Colonel Ghazi Kana’an who became the personal notorious manifestation of the occupation regime. In short order the Syrians confirmed that, as Hannah Arendt wrote, “terror is the essence of totalitarian domination.”<sup>7</sup> Political assassination was its most dreadful form attested by the murders of noted **national leaders**, like Kamal Junblatt, the Druze head of the Progressive Socialist Party in 1977, Bashir Gemayel, commander of the Lebanese Forces and president-elect of Lebanon in 1982, and Rene Mo’awed, President of Lebanon in 1989. **Religious dignitaries**, such as Father Philippe Abou-Sleimane in Aley and Sheikh Ahmed Assaf in 1982, and Sheikh Hassan Khaled the Sunni Mufti of Lebanon in 1989, were also disposed of. **Well-known journalists** like Selim Al-Lowzi in 1977 and Riyad Taha, president of the Lebanese Press Association, in 1980 became

victims of the Syrian security hit squads. Certain sources claim that the assassination of Dany Chamoun, son of former Lebanese president Camille Chamoun, in October 1990 was the work of the Syrians with Lebanese collaboration,<sup>8</sup> while others disagree.<sup>9</sup> The attempted assassinations of Pierre Gemayel, founder of the Kata'ib (Phalange movement) and father of Bashir and Amin, Raymond Edde the National Bloc leader, Camille Chamoun former president and head of the Liberal Party, and the Greek Catholic patriarch Maximos V. Hakim, should be noted in this context.

The presence of Syrian soldiers and plainclothesmen at Beirut airport and on the road to Baalbek were two visible signs among many that foreign occupation had become the daily reality of Lebanese life.<sup>10</sup> Monitoring telephone conversations of Lebanese citizens and recording visits to Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir of the Maronite Church in Bkirke are other forms of Syrian "security" measures. While it had been customary within the Lebanese military tradition to send its personnel for officer training to Europe and the United States, it now became mandatory to send them to Syrian military academies. No less ominous in Lebanon's slide toward national oblivion was the choice of Lebanese Army Commander Emile Lahoud as President in 1998, which seemed to signal the transcending Syrian objective to tie the armies of Syria and Lebanon into a joint military force for future warfare, perhaps against Israel to the south. Meanwhile, though a Maronite continued to be the commander of the army, Muslim conscripts constituted about 65 per cent of the total numbers.

Central to the atmosphere of fear that enveloped Lebanon was the practice of kidnapping and arrest of Lebanese citizens, the use of torture against them, and often their virtual disappearance that included, unknown to their families, removal to the Mezza and Palmyra prisons in Syria.<sup>11</sup> Within Lebanon itself, Syria operated detention facilities in Tripoli, Beirut, Shtaura in the Bekka and Anjar on the Lebanese-Syrian border. Some individual kidnapping cases included that of Jihad Eid from Haddess, south of Beirut, in 1990; Boutros Khawand, senior Phalange Party official who was lifted from Beirut in 1992, Albert Shidiyak a sympathizer of General Aoun in 1993; Kaytel Hayek a lieutenant-colonel in the Lebanese Army in 1994; and Albert Jaber Atallah Loh from Zalka in East Beirut in 1995.<sup>12</sup> Intense efforts by family members sometimes succeeded in discovering that the detained Lebanese were being held in the Mezza prison in Damascus. Political activities against the Syrian occupation or contacts with "the Zionist enemy"

were the presumed reasons for the arrests, though no public charges were laid and no trials were held. Lebanese President Elias Harawi had estimated that in 1996 some 210 Lebanese were in Syrian custody, many for prolonged periods of secret detention.<sup>13</sup> In one case that Human Rights Watch reported in November 1999, Syrian authorities in Damascus, offering no explanation whatsoever, returned the dead body of Lebanese citizen Adel Khalaf Ajouri, aged 52, who had “disappeared” in 1990.

The removal, neutralization, and silencing of leading Lebanese political personalities was achieved by various means other than assassination or disappearance. Some were tried and jailed, or first jailed and then tried, as in the case of Samir Geagea accused of the murder of Prime Minister Rashid Karame in 1987 and the 1994 church bombing in Jounieh (which was probably perpetrated by Syrian agents). He was sentenced to death but this was commuted to life imprisonment. Others like Etienne Sakr (Abu Arz), chairman of the Guardians of the Cedars, fled Beirut to Jezzine, under the control of the South Lebanese Army until mid-1999, and then to his native village of Ayn Ebel in southern Lebanon, under the protection of the Israeli Army. Still others went into forced or self-imposed exile abroad, the three most notable cases being former President Amin Gemayel, General (and former Prime Minister) Michel Aoun, and National Bloc leader Raymond Edde, all of whom are living in Paris. Clear and compelling evidence exists that prior to their exile, and perhaps after, Syria had tried to assassinate these three leaders.<sup>14</sup>

## **2. The Political and Judicial Domain**

Lebanon had become, as Amin Gemayel stated in 1997, “a Syrian client state”,<sup>15</sup> a virtual satellite or satrap of Damascus subjugated under “Syrian strategic hegemony”.<sup>16</sup> From mediator in the 1975-76 war to political broker of inter-communal conflict, Syria came to dominate the Lebanese political arena and shaped its evolving power arrangements as the reality of occupation took form.

The formal facade and consensual cast to Syrian rule were a series of agreements that began with the “Constitutional Document” of February 1976 that was prepared through the intervention of Syrian Foreign Minister Abdul Halim Khaddam. While identifying Lebanon as an Arab state, this document proposed a 50:50 division of parliamentary representation, thereby

eliminating the traditional Christian advantage over the Muslims. The “Tripartite Agreement” involving Walid Junblatt (Druzes), Nabih Berri (Shiites), and Elie Hobeika (Christians) of December 1985, and again worked out by now Syrian Vice-President Khaddam, was signed in Damascus and signaled the growing formalization of the imminent Syrian Order in Lebanon: defined as an Arab country with a distinctive relationship with Syria. Following the final conquest of Ba’abda and Beirut in 1990, Syria concluded the Brotherhood Treaty for Coordination and Cooperation with Lebanon on May 22, 1991. It was this agreement, with its spin-off of 14 separate ones, which solidified the integration of the two countries in matters of security and intelligence, finance and trade, industry and agriculture, by establishing the mechanism for Syrian diktat under the cover of “joint” decision-making.

Damascus effected the consolidation of its grip over Lebanon by acquiring a regional Arab political stamp. The mini Arab summit at Riyadh followed by the broader Cairo Summit both in October 1976 provided a platform for authorizing Syrian military occupation of Lebanon under the umbrella of the Arab Deterrent Force. Two years later, the Beit a-Din Arab Conference that convened in Mount Lebanon referred explicitly to the country’s Arab identity. In July 1982, in the throes of Israel’s crushing war against the PLO in Lebanon, the Beirut government took a decision not to renew the mandate of the ADF, in order to bring about a complete withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces – both Syrian and Israeli. But to no avail, as Syria ignored the Lebanese demand for recovering its independence, at the same time ignoring UN Security Resolution 520 from September 17, 1982, that took “note of Lebanon’s determination to ensure the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces from Lebanon.” Thereafter, in 1984, Syria succeeded to compel President Amin Gemayel and the parliament to nullify the May 17 Agreement that Lebanon had signed with Israel in 1983, following which, and obedient to Syrian directives, Prime Minister Rashid Karame declared the closing of the Israeli liaison office in Dbayeh.<sup>17</sup>

But the penultimate political recognition of Damascus’s domination was the Syrian-Saudi prepared Taif Accord in October 1989. Christian and Muslim Lebanese parliamentarians, like penitent sinners going to Canossa, dutifully attended the conference and approved the final document. Admittedly, the Accord called upon Syria to redeploy its forces within two



years to the Bekka valley in eastern Lebanon, which it did not do; while the final withdrawal from Lebanese territory was to be based on a subsequent agreement between the two countries which was never made. Consistent with earlier reform proposals for the Lebanese political system, the Taif agreement erected a re-designed troika regime headed by the Christian Maronite President with reduced powers, the Sunni Prime Minister with increased powers, and the Shiite Speaker of the National Assembly. References to end confessionalism, doublespeak for eradicating Christian primacy, and to confirm the country's Arab identity serving as a euphemism for denying Lebanese particularity, were additional components of the Taif formula that Syria imposed on its fatigued and factionalized tiny neighbor to the west.

Lebanese national political institutions and political figures fell under the tight control of Syria concomitant with its military intervention in the mid-1970s. The political pilgrimages to Damascus of Maronite leaders Pierre Gemayel in December 1975 and Camille Chamoun in early 1976, the latter having not visited the Syrian capital for two decades, illustrated that Lebanon's fate was passing into the hands of Hafez al-Assad. Lebanese President Suleiman Franjieh (1970-76) had been known to be on close terms with the Syrian president, while Syria's nominee Elias Sarkis as his successor, was "elected" president by the National Assembly in 1976. When Sarkis wanted to include the Druze *za'im* Kamal Junblatt in his cabinet in November, Assad blocked the move due to Junblatt's opposition to the growing role of Syria in Lebanon. A year later Junblatt's continued opposition to Syria cost him his life.

President-elect Bashir Gemayel, destined to succeed Sarkis, was assassinated on September 14, 1982 by a member of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) in collusion with the Syrian intelligence services in Beirut.<sup>18</sup> His brother Amin, who became the next Lebanese president, collapsed under direct Syrian political pressure, as already noted, by not adding his signature to the May 17 Agreement with Israel, and appointed under duress the pro-Syrian Rashid Karame as Prime Minister. Meanwhile Amin's government withered in the face of Syrian-supported Druze and Shiite warfare against the National Army in the mid-1980s. At the end of his term in 1988, Amin Gemayel had lost his presidential authority and was forced into exile in France. His successor Rene Mo'awed from Zgharta, stubborn in the face of Syrian directives, was murdered in a road-side

bombing attack against his vehicle on November 22, 1989, after serving just eighteen days in office. Elias Hrawi from Zahle came next, pliant and weak as one might expect thereafter. Syrian concern for Lebanese continuity led to his hasty election that was organized by Col. Ghazi Kana'an at the Park Hotel in the mountain town of Shtaura. Assad later arranged for the extension of his presidential term, scheduled to end in 1995, for another three years. Later, on October 5, 1998 according to **The Lebanon Report**, "Mr. Assad informed him [Elias Hrawi] that his time was up and that Syria supported the candidacy of the army commander, Emile Lahoud."<sup>19</sup> After Lahoud's candidature had "been endorsed by Syrian President Hafez al-Assad",<sup>20</sup> the Lebanese National Assembly slavishly approved the choice on October 15 with a staged vote of 118 in favor and 10 abstentions. No Lebanese deputy dared openly oppose Assad's presidential appointment in Beirut. Thirteen days after the vote, Beshar Assad, son of the Syrian president, and Ghazi Kana'an, Syria's strongman in Lebanon, held a meeting with the new president of Lebanon. For the first time a Sunni officer was appointed to head the presidential guard.

The other two so-called "presidential" offices were subject to the same pattern of Syrian domination. When Assad became disaffected with Sunni Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and the stench of corruption surrounding him in 1998, he replaced him with the more docile Selim al-Hoss. Likewise, in 1984, Syria had Kamal al-Assad the Shiite Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies removed because he had supported the May 17 Agreement between Lebanon and Israel. In his place Hussein Hussein, a pro-Syrian supporter, was appointed.

Lebanese politicians who actively accommodated the Syrian occupation afforded Damascus a mechanism of "indirect rule" through local personages, thereby providing vivid proof of the normative character of Lebanon's quiet dissolution as an independent political entity. Beyond those already mentioned were Michel Murr, a Greek Orthodox from the Metn, who while strong and despised in Lebanon, headed a number of senior ministries, including Interior and Defense, over the years. In his official capacity he had a hand in the repression of popular protest against the Syrian occupation. Another even more notorious collaborator was Elie Hobeika, a Maronite who had fought Samir Geagea for the command of the Lebanese Forces, but then became a turncoat – against Israel his ally and the Christian resistance he had fought for – and joined with the Syrians. This offered him

opportunities for money and power. Close to Rifaat Assad and a central actor in the apparent Syrian-orchestrated massacre at Sabra and Shatilla in September, 1982, Hobeika worked closely with Col. Ghazi Kana'an and went on to become the Minister for Energy and Infrastructure in the 1990s.<sup>21</sup> For the moment, collaboration offered tempting rewards.

The holding of parliamentary elections, as presidential elections, in a political environment of domination and trepidation could not at all provide a gauge of true Lebanese views. Parties had been banned and organized opinion smothered. It was only in 1992 that the last-elected 1972 chamber was finally replaced, but even then, the presence of Syrian troops in Beirut as a conspicuous sign of foreign occupation led the Christian population in the capital and the mountain area, and the Phalange Party itself, to boycott the elections. Farid el-Khazen explained that multiple Christian grievances, including the question of displaced refugees from the 1983 "mountain war" and selective disarming of militias, contributed to widespread alienation and non-participation in the 1992 elections. In fact, only fifteen per cent of all eligible voters participated in these elections. In short, the democratic facade could not conceal the dictatorial hands of Assad from afar.<sup>22</sup> A similar picture of Lebanese politics lacking vigor and authenticity characterized the 1996 parliamentary elections.

It remains to point out that Syria's political machinations of a particularly manipulative kind involved the use of local Lebanese proxies. Assad's tactical goals changed with the circumstances, but focused in fundamental terms on controlling the sectarian conflict, enhancing Syrian domination, and eliminating Israel's role and presence in Lebanon. Thus, he at times used the Christians against the leftist National Movement and the Progressive Socialist Party; then, he changed course and acted in the opposite direction. The Druze and Shiites were employed against the Gemayel government; Hobeika and followers served Syria's interest to exacerbate divisions within the Christian Lebanese Forces; and Amal and Hizbullah were sponsored to fight Israel and the SLA. Syria assigned a central role to the ideologically compatible SNNP as a terrorist and vanguard movement against the Maronite Christian community. Claiming clean hands was another sophisticated ruse of Hafez al-Assad.

Lebanese judicial institutions too have been mobilized to impose Syrian control. Death sentences *in absentia* were routinely issued against patriots and oppositionists, and actual court sentences have been imposed on former

SLA soldiers and civilians associated with Israel in southern Lebanon.<sup>23</sup> The courts have not been a bastion for the protection of human rights nor for their redress when trampled upon. The security forces handily arrested five members of the Lebanese Popular Convention when they merely distributed anti-government leaflets in March 1996. This and more while influential Lebanese politicians and Syrian intelligence officers have intervened to protect their supporters from prosecution. The virtual militarization of the courts led the Chief Judge of the High Constitutional Court, Wajdi Mallat, to resign due to excessive interference by the Syrian-controlled authorities in the execution of his duties.<sup>24</sup> At the “Conference on Judges in Lebanon” organized by the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies in July 1999, the distinguished participants from the legal profession dealt *inter alia* with “constraints facing the corps of judges in Lebanon”. This rather mild formulation covered yet a more sinister reality.

The overall methods of Syrian occupation exacted an enormous human price from exiles abroad who could not return home, dispersed around the world among divided families, and internal exiles like those in the south of Lebanon who could not travel freely to Beirut. The police net was spread wide and far, with no sign at all that the scales were altering away from oppression and toward liberty.

### **3. The Social and Economic Domain**

Syrian occupation inaugurated a period of radical changes in the Lebanese social environment. The death of more than 100,000 Lebanese during the war years and the flight abroad of an estimated half million or more citizens struck fatally and especially at the size and cohesion of the Christian elements of the population. But the really insidious developments concerned the influx of large numbers of foreign elements. Tens of thousands of Assad’s Alawite kinsmen entered northern Lebanon into the area of Tripoli, a kind of extension southward of the Lattakia mountain heartland of the Alawites. More ominous in scope and significance was the influx into Lebanon of approximately one million or more Syrian migrant workers as a virtual colonization movement to change the human landscape in a menacing fashion. Back in 1976, Assad had explained the importance of Syrian involvement in Lebanese affairs at a time when half a million Syrians worked in Lebanon. The eruption of war threatened to cause the Syrian

workers to return home and further burden an existing weak Syrian economy. Better they migrate to Lebanon than destabilize Assad's regime in Damascus. Therefore, Syria created a situation whereby over one million Syrians flooded Lebanon in the 1990s, as menial construction workers, taxi-drivers, and street hawkers. A cold and startling calculation will conclude that more Syrians worked in Lebanon than did Lebanese themselves.<sup>25</sup>

The de-Christianization importance and impact of these developments was further magnified by a 1994 naturalization decree that granted Lebanese citizenship to some 500,000 aliens, mainly Syrians and Palestinians.<sup>26</sup> Non-Lebanese would then become a powerful voting bloc in future "democratic" Lebanese elections. It was estimated that the Christian proportion of the entire population had, though over half of the total in the 1930s and thereafter, sunk to between 30-40 per cent in the 1990s. East of Damour and Sidon large tracts of land were being purchased in the name of the Sunni al-Jamaat al-Islamiyya, a threat to the traditional Christian (and Druze) populations there. Lebanon was thereby experiencing the loss of its native national personality parallel to losing the mainsprings of its political independence.

Rampant small crime and regime repression of popular protest further dampened the remaining spirit and confidence of a once free people famous for its *joie de vivre*. The widespread stealing of cars and acts of arson in Christian areas in particular were reported in the late 1990s. In October 1998, the rape of a young girl in the village of Shehim – allegedly by a Syrian migrant – caused large-scale reprisals against Syrian laborers living in the region.<sup>27</sup> In a different incident, young Christians in the Kesrouan clashed with members of the SSNP in February 1998. But in another incident involving activist youth in December 1997, Lebanese riot police dispersed about 200 university students who had gathered at the MTV television station in Beirut which the authorities had barred from broadcasting an interview with the exiled Christian leader, Michel Aoun. Several people were injured and 63 were arrested. Protests continued as 1,000 university students held a peaceful demonstration in front of the Chamber of Deputies, chanting anti-Syrian slogans. The Lebanese were no longer masters of their house or at home in their homeland.

The liberal and vibrant Lebanese economy had succumbed to Syrian management in the fashion of the public sector dominating the private sector. With a per capita income about four times that of Syria's, and a gross

national product that exceeded hers,<sup>28</sup> Lebanon found herself faltering in the face of massive Syrian intervention. Syria's unemployment problem, being alleviated by a flood of migrant laborers crossing freely into Lebanon, had become Lebanon's reaching to about 30 per cent of the Lebanese workforce. It is estimated that Syrian worker earnings from Lebanon, that returned to Syria to energize its sluggish economy, amounted to \$300 per month.<sup>29</sup> Moreover, Syrian companies received government tender projects; Syrian officials grabbed tax revenues for their own purposes, as Syrian officers/agents collected taxes at army check-points and "protection money" as, for example, from the well-known Shekka cement industry south of Tripoli. Government-imposed bans on certain imports and high customs dues on others, along with Syrian smuggled agricultural produce pouring into Lebanon, contributed to benefiting Syria while damaging Lebanon. Further unemployment and rural pauperization were the results;<sup>30</sup> this, while cars were smuggled free of taxes from Lebanon into Syria. Notorious to mention was Syrian financial gain from its involvement in the drug processing industry in the Bekka, which perhaps ended in the mid-1990s, perhaps not.

Lebanon's shackled economy contrasted with the impression of major reconstruction projects launched by the Hariri government in Beirut. The Hamra district was bustling again with renovated and new hotels and restaurants. Tourism was on the rise toward the end of the last decade of the century, while Lebanon continued to descend into national oblivion. Syrian occupation had severely jolted Lebanese society and economics from their former course despite some outward appearances to the contrary.

#### **4. The Cultural and Media Domain**

Lebanon's historic tradition of political liberty had nurtured an environment for freedom of speech, cultural richness, and media diversity, at the heart of its national experience. Journalism flourished and publishing houses abounded, openness to the world of learning a proud social trademark. Free thinkers and activists would flee the repressive atmosphere of Arab police states and come to produce their works of culture and engage in their passionate ideological struggles in the political refuge of Beirut. Palestinian revolutionaries among them George Habash and Yasir Arafat, and writers like Adonis (Ali Ahmed Said) from Syria and Buland Haidari

from Iraq, benefited from the air of freedom in Lebanon.<sup>31</sup> But that ended with the Palestinian war against the Lebanese in 1975 and the Syrian occupation of Lebanon that ensued. Syria “the great prison”, in the words of Kamal Junblatt, had fashioned Lebanon into a replica of itself.<sup>32</sup> A sad sense of impotence, aspiring for liberty but suffering under tyranny, was the melancholy tone and inward turn in a moving book by Antoun Ghattas Karam.<sup>33</sup>

In matters pertaining to religion, the Syrians could be brutal in murdering men of the cloth, both Muslim and Christian, and yet avoided excessive repression in this sacred domain. In particular, they refrained from any confrontation with the Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir who, though initially voicing acceptance of the Taif Accord, still represented a symbol of Lebanese Christian autonomy and dignity.<sup>34</sup> The Pope’s visit to Beirut in 1997 also served to maintain a semblance of religious co-existence under the Syrian military umbrella.

Nonetheless, the Christians of Lebanon found themselves caught in a persistent siege. Church bombings aroused fear for the future. The introduction of new texts in the school curriculum, that stressed Lebanon’s Arab identity and brotherhood with Syria, yet castigated Israel as its implacable enemy, was central to the cultural assault on the historic code of the Maronites, above all others. Lebanon, with its Arab face, was to go under the knife and undergo the transplant now of an Arab heart.<sup>35</sup> Yet there were no obvious major changes in the area of the arts and theatre and, in fact, some theatre companies, like Les Chansoniers and Theatre de 10 Heures, used their art form as a platform to criticize the Syrians, be it indirectly. At the same time, Syria’s cultural grip reached as far as southern Lebanon still under IDF-SLA control, where in August 1998 Beirut authorities prevented the well-known singer Hani El-Oumari from appearing at the Ayn Ebel summer festival.<sup>36</sup> The stifling of the spirit, with foreign books and movies banned, remained a Syrian objective within its own terrain of occupation and no less within the Israeli-controlled zone as well.

A major Syrian imperative was to control the news and political commentary emanating from the Lebanese media. In 1977 seven Beirut newspapers were closed down, including the foremost and widely read **Al-Nahar**, as a number of journalists and editors were arrested. At that time it was forbidden for the press to even mention the name of Kamal Junblatt.<sup>37</sup> Over the years, newspapers and magazines were intermittently closed while

under the supervision of the Surete Generale, and journalists learned through intimidation to practice “self-censorship”. This became a very effective method to silence opposition and limit any criticism of Syria, while strengthening the Arabist orientation of the press. The experience of Pierre Atallah, a journalist for **Al-Nahar**, is a particular and extensively cited case in point: he was arrested in December 1996, accused among other things of protesting Syrian occupation and “contacting Israeli agents”. He fled to France in 1997 and was later sentenced *in absentia* in June 1998 by the Lebanese military prosecution. Tony Shamiyeh, another Beirut journalist, was sentenced to a year in jail on charges of “collaboration with Israel”.

Broadcasting Law no. 382 of 1994 provided the legislative framework for controlling and restricting Lebanese radio and television. Where there once were 54 television stations, the authorities reduced the number to only four. In 1996, pro-Syrian figures received TV broadcasting licenses: one owned by friends of Rafiq Hariri, one affiliated with Nabih Berri, and one in the hands of Gabriel Murr, brother of Minister of Interior Michel Murr. Licenses for independent-minded Christian outfits, like Tele-Lumiere and the Phalange Voice of Lebanon, were either denied or granted with limitations imposed on the freedom of broadcasting.<sup>38</sup> Popular protest against the suppression of freedom of expression, for some and not others, did not alter the situation. A poignant example of information terrorism concerned the Lebanese Broadcasting Company, with the removal of its director Pierre Daher and the hiring of Syrian-appointee Nader Souker, with the inferior job title as “coordinator” and not director of the important LBC.

The muzzle on the free flow of information and opinion in Lebanon is in sharp contrast to the legacy of journalism in that country. Psychological warfare through words and images had to a degree replaced the vitality of the older and impressive tradition. Pro-Syrian/Arabist-oriented and/or auto-censored journalists, like Ghassan Tueni and his son Gebran at **Al-Nahar**, feared to report what happens, and more critical yet, what they really thought. Nothing appeared in the written or electronic media in the spring of 1999, of an incident wherein Syrians had stolen some cars and then, in a clash of some kind with the Lebanese Army, some Syrians were killed. Only in southern Lebanon was this event discussed.<sup>39</sup> It is this seeming unsensational news item which might nevertheless conceal something of important significance. The act of repression indicates that that which is repressed can carry great political weight.



## Models and Meaning of Syrian Occupation

The Syrian occupation of Lebanon recalls the German Nazi *anschluss* with Austria in 1936 in many striking ways.<sup>40</sup> There were many Austrians who had always thought of themselves as members of the German nation in the spirit of a Pan-German ideology; so too many Lebanese Sunni Muslims and Orthodox Christians thought of themselves as part of the Syrian people and the Arab nation, more than as Lebanese patriots. With strong native Nazi sentiments and offering no resistance to the entrance of German troops, Austria lost its identity and existence. Lebanon, which did offer resistance to Syrian occupation in the late 1970s and late 1980s in particular, succumbed with many Lebanese choosing capitulation and collaboration. The fall of Vienna and Beirut, centers of commerce and the arts, spelled the collapse of a country. With Austria annexed, Czechoslovakia was circled: with Lebanon conquered, Israel was circled too.

This introduces another historical analogy to consider: German irredentism *vis-à-vis* Czechoslovakia at Munich in 1938 through the claim to the German-inhabited Sudetenland, relates to the thrust of Syrian irredentism according to the doctrine of “Greater Syria” and the SSNP ideology of a common Syrian racial stock that envelops the people of Lebanon. The Orwellian twist would conceive of the Lebanese fulfilling their right to “self-determination” and “liberated” from alien ideologies and forces, but only when Lebanon came under Syrian occupation in 1975.

The history of Vichy France in collaboration with Nazi Germany evokes a resonance regarding “Vichy” Lebanon in collaboration with the Syrian regime of Hafez el-Assad.<sup>41</sup> Exhausted by World War I, France collapsed as the Germans walked into Paris in 1940; so too Lebanon, exhausted from warfare with the Palestinians, accommodated the Syrian entry of 1975-76. Nazi Germany brought order and discipline to French politics and society, while Syria brought its brand of “law and order” to the streets of Beirut and beyond. The Nazis and their French partners altered the institutions and values of France: so too Syria in Lebanon. French generals collaborated with Hitler as Lebanese generals collaborated with Assad. But De Gaulle, representing *la résistance* and the Free French, challenged the authority of Petain and Laval to speak and act in the name of France: Major Sa’ad Haddad and General Antoine Lahad in southern Lebanon, and Amin Gemayel, General Michel Aoun, and Raymond Edde exiled in France, symbolized the Lebanese resistance, though weak it seemed. As Germany

exploited France for its human and material resources, so Syria does to Lebanon. De Gaulle wanted guns from the United States in order to fight to free France, as Camille Chamoun and Bashir Gemayel wanted guns from Israel to fight for a free Lebanon. Vichy sentenced De Gaulle to death, but he not only survived but later became the president of the French Republic. Petain, however, later died in a French prison.<sup>42</sup> A Lebanese court sentenced Abu Arz to death: perhaps he too will one day become the president of the Lebanese Republic, while Lahoud will languish in a Lebanese prison.

Stalinism in Eastern Europe and Syrianism in Lebanon offer certain parallels for consideration. Military invasion, political manipulation, and ideological co-optation supplied the means for the Soviet Union to penetrate and dominate Eastern Europe; these were the methods employed by Syria against Lebanon. The common goal was the homogenization of thought and culture under centralized rule.<sup>43</sup> A facade of brotherhood, communist in the Soviet case, was riveted to the political concentration on the Stalinist personality cult, along with a persistent cultivation of the theme that a common enemy must be thwarted and liquidated. In the Syrian case, as Assad's picture stares at the resident and visitor of Beirut and Khalde, the Lebanese are being indoctrinated to see Israel as the enemy and Syria as their savior. As the Warsaw Pact exposed Hungary and Czechoslovakia to Russian military intervention, so the Defence Agreement between Syria and Lebanon that arose from the comprehensive treaty between the countries in 1991 opened up the "land of the cedars" for Syrian military domination at any time.

*Anschluss*, Munich, Vichy, and Stalinism constitute four models of foreign domination suggestively comparable to the Syrian mode of control and discourse regarding the occupation of Lebanon.

Lebanon ceased to exist much like Austria ceased to exist under the *Anschluss*.<sup>44</sup> In fact, Syria never recognized Lebanon's existence from the moment of her independence in 1946, refusing to establish diplomatic relations with Lebanon and having foreign embassies in Damascus be accredited to Beirut as well. A form of proximate "imperialism" functioned in both cases under the guise of a shared nationalism.

The Munich Agreement was an act of political homicide that won the approval of the "enlightened" European community. Syria, for her part, strangled any remaining breath of Lebanon's independent existence in

October 1990 with the tacit approval of the United States and Europe. While violating United Nations Resolution 520 from 1982 and even the Taif Accord from 1989, Syria has earned international acceptability and respectability. Meanwhile, like a lone voice of conscience, the U.S. Congress considered the “Lebanon Independence Restoration Act of 1999” as a way of identifying and condemning Syrian occupation as a denial of freedom, that should cost Syria any aid or legitimacy that it desires from Washington.<sup>45</sup> But Churchillian courage and realism did not appear in any international quarter to expose the political naïveté and danger of the “Munich” at Beirut.

The name Vichy has become synonymous with “collaboration”. As a Quisling became generic for betraying one’s homeland, Lebanon provided untold numbers of pro-Syrian accomplices, many of whom were officially and publicly manning the Syrian occupation regime. Others proposed one form or another of accommodation with the reality of affairs while habitually referring to “Israeli occupation” of southern Lebanon, but deliberately refraining from uttering any accusation against “Syrian occupation of Lebanon”.<sup>46</sup> Yet others reprimanded the Maronite Christians for stubbornly refusing to accept their reduced status within Lebanon.<sup>47</sup> The inversion of the linguistic discourse and the sapping of Lebanon’s national vigor were intertwined phenomena, just as Syria’s success in sucking the blood of Lebanon while Damascus was drinking the waters of Mount Lebanon formed both the symbolism and the reality of Syrian occupation. Like Vichy France, Lebanon too was becoming a living corpse.

Stalinism, based on dictatorship and engineered social planning, is a central paradigm with which to diagnose Syrian rule in Lebanon. Syrian police methods recall the practices of the Bolshevik regime in Russia. Perhaps Solzhenitsyn’s description of “the history of our sewage disposal system” goes somewhat beyond the functioning of the Syrian system in Lebanon, yet Assad has in principle adopted the basic repressive methods. There is more than a reminiscent similarity in Stalin’s campaign against “counter-revolutionaries” and “capitalists” with Assad’s campaign against Maronite “separatists” and “Israeli agents”.

Lebanon, lying naked and raped, is in the hands of Syrian rulers. Stripped of its independence and disfigured by an erosion of its identity and spirit, the Lebanese body politic is in a state of severe decline. Such is the condition too of a once vibrant national and cultural ethos, as a less developed society – that of Syria – has plundered and manhandled a more advanced one. This

case study is not an instance of a civilizing imperialist mission in a backward country because Syria conquered the “Switzerland of the Middle East”. Syria’s conquest of Lebanon in the late twentieth-century, we may suggest, is of a piece with the Arab conquest of the sophisticated Hellenic Byzantine Orient in the seventh-century. The lust for acquisition, power, and domination tempted the Syrians to exploit the rich and varied resources of, in this case, a weak neighboring country. When Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk al-Shara’a required an urgent heart operation in October 1999, he was brought from Damascus to the American University Hospital in Beirut. The classic British and French imperialists were not accustomed to seek medical treatment in Sudanese Juba or Setif in Algeria, but rather London and Paris. Damascus gains direct benefits from its “colonial” possession in progressive Beirut. Syrian rule had not brought light to Lebanon but, rather, filled the hearts of the Lebanese with darkness.

No less significant is to recognize the Syrian occupation as an instrument to rend asunder an old Christian land and impose *dhimmitude* on a proud and free Christian people.<sup>48</sup> The events in Lebanon carry broad historical ramifications for the Christians in the Middle East as a whole inasmuch as Lebanon as a Christian homeland was, until now, the major triumph of Christianity in the Muslim-dominated region. For Israel, the end of a free and especially Christian Lebanon leaves her uncomfortably alone as the last remaining pariah *dhimmi* state in the Arab Muslim heartland.

In conclusion, Syrian occupation of Lebanon imposed no risk or cost, incurred no danger and aroused very little active opposition. Quite the opposite; it brought great strategic and economic gains. There was therefore no reason for Syria to voluntarily withdraw. Yet the situation changed markedly in the year 2000 in three major respects:

1. The Israeli army withdrew from southern Lebanon and likewise forced the collapse of its SLA ally there;
2. President Assad of Syria died and was succeeded by his son Beshar; and
3. Voices rose within Lebanon calling for Syria’s withdrawal by the Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir, Walid Junblat the Druze leader, and a variety of political personalities both Christian and Muslim.

Thousands of protesters demonstrated in the streets of Beirut and in various places in Mount Lebanon. Thus, the possibility of Lebanon being liberated from Syria cannot be dismissed.<sup>49</sup> Inherent within the dialectic of domination is the catalyst for a repressed people to rise up and demand its freedom. The Syrian excuse for staying in Lebanon, because Israel is present there, has now been denied. Judgment must be reserved concerning the capability of Beshar Assad to dominate his own political hothouse of Syria, and then that of Lebanon. All this while the Lebanese, disgusted with Syria's extended abusive interference in their lives, seem to have thrown off the cloak of fear in unmasking the foreign occupation for what it is.

Much of Lebanon's long history is a record of alternating scenarios, from military victory to massacre; from independence to foreign conquest. The last chapter in this long history is not yet written.



**CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS  
IN SYRIA**

*Dany Shoham*





# CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS IN SYRIA

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## **Preface**

More than any other Arab or Muslim state, Syria is notable for (at least up to now) a dearth of nuclear capabilities, which radically necessitates, in Syria's view, that it compensate with the development of chemical and biological weapons as a source of minimal, unconventional strategic-military balance of power with Israel. It is clear, however, even without connection to Israel, that the processes of unconventional armament in the Arab states and Iran spur Syria on, lest it lag behind in this domain. Turkey as well, as a neighboring regional power that is identified as an ally of Israel, makes an indirect contribution in this regard.

Syria's journey down the biochemical path began in the period preceding the Yom Kippur War, as it equipped itself with chemical weapons that it had received from Egypt, and increased in stages in the wake of regional events: the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, the Lebanon War, the revelation of Israel's nuclear capacity, the revelation of Iraq's biochemical capacity, and Syria's strategic alliance with Iran. With the beginning of the erosion of Iraq's chemical power at the time of the Gulf War, Syria began to acquire the status of the country with the most advanced offensive chemical capacity (quantitative and qualitative) among the Arab states, and also in comparison to Iran. In terms of quality, Syria had already been characterized as such a state in the previous decade even in comparison with Iraq, which up to the Gulf War had the most impressive arsenal of chemical weapons. There is no doubt that Iraq's power in this regard, together with the perception of strategic requirements *vis-à-vis* Israel, were among the factors that spurred Syria's buildup in the chemical-biological area. It regards this capability, combined with its ballistic capacity, as a paramount component of the

totality of its strategic-military power, and persistently continues to invest great effort in it.

The accelerated pace of Syria's buildup in the area of chemical weapons in recent years has enabled it in this respect to surpass Egypt, which up to fifteen years ago had the largest chemical offensive capacity of all the Arab states; and this despite the fact that the media publicity surrounding Syria's offensive chemical capability has been, and remains quite scant – and also misleading in this sense – compared to other Arab states (and Iran as well) which harbor chemical weapons. In addition to building a chemical arsenal, Syria has embarked on armament with biological weapons, which have much greater strategic value as weapons of mass destruction.

The survey to follow, then, will consider processes that have occurred in Syria over the past twenty-five years – specifically, the development of its strategic concept of chemical and biological weapons, and its acquisition of such weapons, first from Egypt and later, domestically. I shall examine Syria's capacity for independent production of chemical and biological weapons as well as systems for their delivery, the external aid that it has received for this purpose (mainly from Western Europe, India, Russia, China, and North Korea), and the close, outstanding strategic cooperation that it maintains with Iran.

### **The Conceptual Outline**

The incipencies of the Syrian concept regarding unconventional weapons were already evident in the process of Syria's strategic preparations (together with Egypt) for the Yom Kippur War, in the framework of which Egypt transferred chemical weapons to Syria. This was undoubtedly a radical step, which was taken as an essential component of the two states' joint strategic preparations for this surprise war, and reflected a complete and most profound agreement that Assad and Sadat arrived at on this matter. Thus, Syria for the first time acquired for itself a chemical offensive capacity, which was based on a non-persistent, lethal chemical warfare agent (sarin) and on a persistent agent (mustard). The munitions that contained these war gases, namely, artillery shells and aerial bombs, enabled their use for both tactical and strategic purposes. This was the first case in which chemical weapons were transferred from an Arab state to its partner.

The purpose of Syria's equipping itself with chemical weapons as a preliminary measure, and perhaps, in its view, as a necessary condition for the Yom Kippur War, and the question of to what extent it was prepared to use them depending on how the war developed, are not sufficiently clear. One may reasonably assume that in the course of the war the chemical weapons were in constant operational readiness, but that use was not made of them because, apparently, Syria did not fall into severe distress to an extent that would have justified this in its view. Indeed, these weapons were not used even for the purpose of achieving the initial vital objective of the Syrian forces – the conquest of the Golan Heights. Subsequent to the Yom Kippur War, in which, in fact, the Syrian army suffered a failure despite its overwhelming initial advantage, and a real threat on Damascus even emerged, the Syrian president's concept that Syria must create and maintain its own strategic power crystallized; at the same time, it was completely clear that Syria was not, in the foreseeable future, capable of forming a technological infrastructure that would enable the development of nuclear weapons.

This, together with growing awareness of the value of chemical and biological weapons, led Assad to formulate the approach that became known as the "strategic parity concept" (*vis-à-vis* Israel). This concept, whose main aim was to ensure a balanced defensive and offensive capability *vis-à-vis* Israel, both from a deterrent-strategic and a military-operational standpoint, conferred, and continues to confer, central importance on the maintenance of chemical and biological weapons in Syrian hands. Thus, after the chemical weapons it had received from Egypt had become obsolescent, Syria devoted ongoing effort to this enterprise, in two main areas of self-armament – aerial bombs and missiles warheads that contain nerve agents, as well as, moreover, in the field of biological weapons.

This process was already reflected in the pages of **Al-Magla El-Askariya**, the Syrian military magazine, on October 1, 1975, in an article by Amin el-Nafari, the retired Syrian Deputy Chief of Staff, that attested to the existence of chemical and bacteriological weapons in Syria's possession. On August 2, 1977, the head of the unconventional warfare department of the Syrian army stressed, in a newspaper interview in **Al-Sha'ab**, that the Syrian army recognized the importance of unconventional weapons, and was preparing itself for this type of warfare.

After it had been publicly revealed in **Jane's Defence Weekly** that Syria possessed chemical weapons (September 22, 1984), the retired Syrian colonel Bassam a-Shheita published an article on January 9, 1986 in **el-Kabas**, which he confirmed that Syria indeed possessed such weapons. There appeared, later in the article, clear allusions to the existence of unconventional weapons in Syria's possession.

Public reflections of the evolving Syrian concept increased, gradually. In January 1987, President Assad indicated, in an interview with the Kuwaiti newspaper **el-Kabas**, that Syria was seeking a technical solution that would constitute a direct counterweight to Israel's nuclear weapons. A few months later, in May 1987, Radio Damascus emphasized that Syria had an answer to the Israeli nuclear threat, possibly of even greater power. A year later, on the 43<sup>rd</sup> anniversary of the establishment of the Syrian army, Syrian Chief of Staff Marshal Shihabi noted that Syria was satisfied with its achievements in the area of strategic parity, and that Syria possessed deterrent weapons against Israel's extremely lethal weapons. These statements underlined the existence of chemical weapons in Syria and included an allusion to the biological weapons that were already in Syria's possession or in the process of development, implying that the Syrians regarded biological weapons as exceeding even nuclear weapons in their significance.

In **el-Kabas** additional reports were published that were consistent with Assad's and Shihabi's allusions, in which it was stated that Syria was entitled to use various kinds of unconventional weapons, including kinds that go beyond chemical weapons.

By now, in any case, Assad's approach of publicly ascribing legitimacy to Syria's possession of chemical weapons had already crystallized. In his conversation with Senator McCain in January 1989, Assad asserted that Syria's development of chemical weapons was a reasonable course of action. For his part, Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk a-Shara, who was Assad's representative at the Conference on Chemical Disarmament in Paris, alluded at the same time to the appropriateness of this course of action from Syria's standpoint. In an interview with **Le Monde**, a-Shara said Syria was prepared to commit itself to the elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction so long as Israel also committed itself to this. Hence, the primary purpose of developing chemical weapons was deterrence against Israel, to which an unconventional capacity was attributed. Indeed, at the Paris conference a-Shara stressed that together with the elimination of chemical

weapons, there was a need to eliminate weapons of mass destruction of whatever kind, particularly in the Middle East. He called for comprehensive participation in negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention and emphasized the need for sufficient guarantees to states not possessing weapons of mass destruction, and for persuading states that did possess such weapons of the need to relinquish them. Undoubtedly, this stance of Syria's is important in terms of public relations and as a bargaining position. Syria's only public attempt to dispute claims that it produces chemical weapons can be seen, in this context, as the exception that proves the rule.

Syria acted for the adoption of its negative stance toward the Chemical Weapons Convention by other Arab states and by the Arab League, and it apparently invested no less effort on this matter than Egypt, though – typically – without the publicity that characterized Egypt's activity. This was manifested in December 1992, a few weeks before the signing of the Convention, when Syria declared that what would provide “an incentive for Arab states to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention” would be the fulfillment of “the need to act in order to ensure Israel's signing of the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty”, and that in the existing situation, “Syria will not sign the Chemical Weapons Convention because it will not agree to be exposed to the unconventional threat from Israel.”

Indeed, in January 1993 when the Chemical Weapons Convention was signed, Assad gave further voice to Syria's refusal to join the Convention. He asserted, in a joint interview with Egyptian President Mubarak that the proposal that the Arab states join the Convention worked against them, and that raising the issue of chemical weapons without raising the issue of nuclear weapons was very strange and did not make sense. Syria's attitude was also represented simply and directly as a concept asserting that:

The possession of chemical weapons by the Arabs constitutes a minimum of deterrence in the face of Israel's nuclear weapons, and affords them a partial strategic parity, which limits Israel's freedom to use nuclear weapons or to threaten to use them. Likewise, these chemical weapons help to placate the Arabs.

This stance reflected Syria's aspiration to bring about the elimination of Israel's weapons of mass destruction, with the indirect use of its chemical weapons as a lever. This is also manifested in Syria's opposition to the American demand that, in the framework of progress in peace negotiations

with Israel, Syria commit itself to destroy its own unconventional weapons. This Syrian stance gathered strength along with Egypt's stance, no doubt in coordination with it, and it may have taken on a final, irreversible character. Today as well there is coordination of stances between Syria and Egypt, with respect to leadership of an Arab camp that opposes joining the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention.

The Gulf War of 1990-1991 brought Syria for the first time to formulate a comprehensive public stance on strategic weapons in their totality (including ballistic missiles). Syria stressed that the destruction of Iraq's strategic weapons under the umbrella of the United Nations must be linked to the destruction of the strategic weapons of all Middle Eastern states. This stance indicates, at least theoretically, Syria's readiness to relinquish its chemical and biological weapons and missiles in exchange for the elimination of all of Iraq's, and of course Israel's, strategic weapons. When asked about the Scud-C missiles and Syria's unconventional capacity, Assad himself declared, in an interview with **Newsweek**, that their purpose was defensive.

At any rate, this capacity is described as a clear materialization of President Assad's personal strategic vision, as Syria's optimal embodiment from the standpoint of military and technological power, and as a component of power that gives the Syrian army a sense of self-confidence and an appropriately modern image.<sup>1</sup>

In 1993, Assad stressed that a Syrian solution exists for regaining the Golan Heights, at whatever cost entailed and despite Israel's nuclear supremacy. In this Assad alluded, to some extent, to scenarios of Syrian use of its chemical-biological weapons. This was also alluded to in the Syrian information minister's declaration in 1995 that Syria possessed "cards" that it had not yet played, but would play according to need in case of a military confrontation with Israel, and in the most recent warning by Syria's ambassador to Egypt that Syria would threaten the use of its chemical weapons against Israel in response to an Israeli threat to use its nuclear weapons.

"The other types of weapons" – as Assad habitually referred to Syria's chemical-biological weapons, in distinguishing between them and the nuclear weapons that are attributed to Israel – "Syria and the Arabs are ready to get rid of them, but only after Israel's nuclear disarmament," as he put it. Recently, Assad declared that Syria can cause Israel great damage with the

“special weapons” it possesses, and that the Syrian army has arrived at strategic parity with the Israel Defense Forces.

Furthermore, the exposure of the Syrian operational deployment of Scud-C missiles by satellite photographs shows that chemical armaments are integrated into it, in a way that provides an option for a surprise chemical strike, and that the missiles are aimed at the Dimona nuclear reactor, the airports, and the large cities in Israel – without Israel being capable of carrying out a preemptive strike.<sup>2</sup> Meanwhile, the exposure of the nuclear operational system that is attributed to Israel by the magazine **Jane’s**, using satellite photographs, seemingly enables Syria to carry out a chemical strike against this system. This is a strategic option of the first order that is possibly in Syria’s possession or quest for it. Also notable in this context is the transition from aboveground installations for production and storage of chemical and biological weapons to underground installations, which makes intelligence monitoring, as well as the possibility of striking them, difficult.

One of the main repercussions of this state of affairs is Syria’s inclination to achieve an initial total neutralization, in terms of seeming first strike capabilities – at least theoretically – of Israel’s nuclear threat, which would likely foil Syrian military attainments on the Golan Heights, if and when Syria deems it appropriate to launch an attack there, particularly if it would include Syrian use of chemical and biological weapons. Syrian chemical weapons are apparently maintained or exercised adjacent to the Golan Heights.<sup>3</sup> Beyond the Syrian ballistic capacity, and despite the supremacy of the Israeli Air Force, it is also clear that the Syrian Air Force is set up and designated for the use of chemical weapons by means of aerial bombs. It is worth emphasizing that the Syrian threshold for use of chemical and biological weapons will be substantially lower once Syria is protected by an Iranian nuclear umbrella, since it will not have to fear a situation of an Israeli retaliatory nuclear strike, and will probably be willing to absorb an equivalent Israeli retaliatory strike (chemical/biological).

In the conceptual context, also notable are the budgetary allocation and the comprehensive effort that Syria’s building of its chemical-biological capacity consumes, particularly when this is combined with a ballistic capacity – an enormous share – up to a sum between one to two billion dollars annually<sup>4</sup> – compared with the other components of power and other budgetary allocations in the Syrian army. From this standpoint, the picture in

terms of the poorness of the Syrian army's conventional ordnance is extremely misleading.

In summary, there is no doubt that Syria will not decrease its buildup in the area of chemical and biological weapons, at least as long as no agreement is reached involving Israel's nuclear disarmament.

### **The Camouflaged Program**

Prof. Abdallah Wattek Shahid, a senior Syrian nuclear physicist, was appointed Minister of Higher Education in Syria in 1967 (when the Syrian army was encamped on the Golan Heights), and also served as a member of the Committee for Atomic Energy in Syria. He thus conveyed his view on how to fully exploit Syria's resources in the area of technology and science for national goals having strategic priority. These resources were very scant, and with the task of advancing them and applying them in a camouflaged manner to the development of weapons, Prof. Shahid was appointed Director-General of the Scientific Research Council.

The Scientific Research Council (hereafter "the Center") was established in 1971, ostensibly as a civilian scientific body, on the basis of Presidential Directive No. 193 of August 13, 1969, when President Assad still served as Defense Minister; yet in 1973 another presidential directive was published that gave official authorization to interrelations between the Center and the Syrian Army. By then Assad was already president. The Center was established – with a link to the President's Office – as a principal engine for the development or refinement of weapons for the Syrian army within Syria itself, even if there was a need for a great deal of assistance from foreign actors. In 1974 Prof. Shahid was appointed Chairman of the Committee for Scientific Manpower in Syria, apparently so as to provide him a convenient position for the regulation of manpower resources and means in the interest of the Center. He also controlled the Supreme Syrian Committee for Science.

When it became clear to Prof. Shahid and to President Assad that Syria was unable to develop nuclear weapons, preparations began in the latter half of the 1970s for local production of chemical weapons, and a mechanism was established for the camouflaged acquisition of the components needed for the development of chemical and biological weapons under the auspices of the Center. Thus Syria became the second Arab state (after Egypt, and in



parallel with Iraq) to orient itself to the development of chemical and biological weapons.

On the one hand, it was reasonable to maintain, from an official standpoint, a department for chemistry and biology in the framework of a body that was defined as a “Scientific Studies and Research Center”. But on the other hand, the revelation of work on the development of conventional means of warfare in the framework of this body would cast great doubt about the actual purpose of having a department for chemistry and biology under the same roof. Thus the department’s activity was officially concealed under the pretense of work on chemical and bacteriological pollution of rivers, sewage treatment, and the building of water purification facilities.

In 1978, the Center began to operate an open scientific body called the Arab School for Science and Technology; in this framework it received, at least to some extent, the backing and the cover that were needed in this context.

The uniqueness of the Center and the effort to conceal its military importance were well reflected in the summer of 1979, when Prof. Shahid participated in the United Nations Conference on the Development of Science and Technology that was held in Vienna, as head of the Syrian delegation. In the working paper that he submitted to the conference, the Center was described in a general and obscure way as

...designed along the lines of other national institutions, and devoted to research that is specifically aimed at serving various aspects of development. The Center is autonomous, and most of its researchers work full-time. Some [also] serve in faculties of state universities.

Although this opaque characterization did not reveal the Center’s real nature and its link with the army, the “scientific” institution did not receive the international funding that the Syrians anticipated. The Syrians’ resentment at this was expressed when the Lebanese journalist Zaidan Sardar interviewed Prof. Shahid for the prestigious scientific journal, **Nature**. Prof. Shahid complained about what he referred to as the prevailing biases and injustice in the world scientific and technological order. He criticized the budgetary allocation on the ground that the lion’s share was received by the more advanced states among the developing countries, such as Yugoslavia and Brazil, whereas it was precisely the less advanced states, such as Syria,

that needed to receive most of the funding. In another interview, Prof. Shahid stated that

The Center concentrates its attention on a number of critical technical problems of interest to Syria in the fields of: applied and industrial chemistry, applied physics, electronics, mechanical engineering, applications of computer science and science policy.<sup>5</sup>

The Center's financial needs for ostensible civilian purposes increased; moreover, at the same time Syria's program to replace aging Egyptian chemical munitions in its possession with self-produced chemical munitions, as one of the essential projects of the Center, took shape. Three years later Zaidan Sardar published his book **Science and Technology in the Middle East**, and did not refrain from characterizing the Center as a body that "belongs to the Syrian Defense Ministry, and conducts military research".

At the same time, the Center received financial support from UNESCO for the purchase of equipment. It also received financial support, mainly from the Kuwaiti National Institute for Scientific Research, for organizing professional symposiums, which from an official standpoint were held in the framework of the Arab School for Science and Technology. Leading foreign scientists, mainly from the West, took part in these symposiums, and the Center was the main beneficiary. The Arab League gave these conferences, which were held in Syria, its official sponsor. The definition of their purpose as "strengthening and cultivation of cooperation between Arab and non-Arab specialists, in every technological field, by creating a framework for close interactions", did not distort the truth. This formulation was, indeed, general enough to cover any sort of cooperation.

In actuality, the framework of the conferences was Syrian-Kuwaiti rather than all-Arab, although scientists from other Arab states participated in them. The Kuwaiti National Institute for Scientific Research was blessed with suitable budgetary allocations and even maintained a reasonable professional level on its own; hence, over the years it accorded well with the needs of the Syrian Center. Thus the Center also benefited from its guise as a civilian body, which enabled it to dispatch dozens of scientists abroad to acquire vital technological information, and to obtain whatever equipment and materials were desired over the course of years.

A further presidential directive that Assad published on October 4, 1983 accorded great priority to the Center, and stressed its growing importance. The director-general of the Center was given the powers of a minister, and it was stipulated that except for the director-general (who is appointed by Assad), the commander of the military and the armed forces would choose the members of the board of the Center as well as its technical personnel, and all departments of the Center would be elevated to the status of research institutes. Thus, the Center's Department of Chemistry and Biology became the Institute for Chemistry and Biology. The directive also enjoined the establishment of a new institute: the Higher Institute of Applied Sciences and Technology. The directive defined this institute as an outgrowth of the Center, which would be managed by the Center's administrative council and subject to the Center's laws in all matters that were not mentioned in the presidential directive. Like the Center, this institute maintained a tight link with the army, inasmuch as the commander of the military and the armed forces appoints its director, determines its regulations, and approves the decisions of the administrative council. In actuality, the institute belonged to the Center, trained its professional personnel in the chemical, ballistic, and other fields, and supplied it with technological infrastructure. Dr. Abdel Halim Mantzur, Shahid's deputy, was appointed head of the institute. Thus, the Center is in the Damascus area, in a place called Barzeh, and has an extension in the Aleppo area, in a place called al-Jedida. The Center thereby set up, in a camouflaged manner, the first facility for the industrial production of chemical weapons in the form of the "Boro-Silicate Glass Project" (actually – production of di-chloro, a substance that is the main source of the nerve gas sarin), carried out by the West German company Schott-Boresist. The components of the facility included chemical-reaction vessels and pipes, all of them chlorine-resistant.

The British press reported that the production of chemical weapons was being carried out in plants in Damascus and in Homs. Subsequently, it was published that a plant for the production of nerve agents had been established in the Syrian desert, far from Damascus, that development of chemical weapons is being conducted at a site near Aleppo, and finally, that development and production facilities exist near the village of Sefira (in the Aleppo region), south of Homs, and adjacent to Lattakia. Later, near the city of Hama, not far from the Chinese missile plant in Syria, the establishment of a plant for the production of VX was completed, while an additional

facility for biological weapons was set up in Cerin. Some or all of these facilities were ostensibly founded as civilian extensions of the Center.

Somewhat late it seems (October 1992), the German government warned German research institutes not to hold contacts with the Syrian Scientific Research Council on the grounds that it belonged to the Defense Ministry, simultaneously conducted military and civilian activities, including the production of chemical and biological weapons, and was directly linked to President Assad.

Up to that point the Center had operated for years without disturbance, and constituted the heart of the Syrian camouflaged program. Operating along with it, though secondarily, was the General Syrian Institute for Chemical Industries, which in September 1989 signed an agreement with the Syrian-Jordanian Company for Industry on the establishment of a plant for the production of insecticides and detergents in Syria, apparently based on the idea that by the acquisition of chemicals through such framework (possibly via Jordan) it would be possible to provide for military needs of the Center in a camouflaged legitimate way, similarly to the camouflaged maneuvers made by Iran, Egypt, and especially Iraq.

Thus, Syria exploited a plant for production of the insecticide DDVP in order to camouflage the acquisition of raw materials for the production of nerve gases. Ninety tons of the raw material tri-methyl-phosphate were supplied by the Indian United Phosphorous Company to a Syrian company from Damascus called Setma, in two shipments. According to those who ordered the materials, and according to a final user's license that was issued by the Syrian Office of Commerce, the material was intended for the production of the insecticide (DDVP) in a Syrian civilian plant. Camouflaged backing for these and similar activities was also provided by the Syrian company, Gasgroup. Subsequently, the Syrian program of camouflaged activities was further refined with the establishment of a new underground plant for chemical weapons near Aleppo, ostensibly as a warehouse, with the "National Syrian Company for Security and Safety" (which actually belongs to the Syrian intelligence establishment) leading the project.<sup>6</sup> The Center remained, at any rate, the major "civilian" buyer, having its ramified connections with many central chemical producers all over the world.<sup>7</sup>

## **The Suppliers of Technology**

Syria is without doubt the most impressive state in the Arab world, in terms of the wide gap between the level of its techno-scientific infrastructure, which by all accounts is very low, and its technological achievements in practice, which clearly are noteworthy, with respect to the local development and production of chemical weapons. How then did this occur?

First and foremost, there was an optimal integration between the conceptual framework and the camouflaged program, as described above. The Syrians were wise enough to create such an optimal integration thanks to the sober and pragmatic approach of the regime, an awareness of existing limitations, an ability to distinguish between limitations that could be altered and those that could not (and therefore dictated ongoing dependency on external suppliers), and adherence to the objective.

Second was the response of the suppliers of the technology – whether with or without the knowledge of the home country; whether with or without awareness of the actual purpose of the technology being supplied – all of these combinations having occurred over the years, in many and repeated instances.

Third was the Syrian resourcefulness in utilizing a wide variety of suppliers, and in shifting the bulk of the weight, with effective timing and the appropriate pace, from European suppliers to Asian suppliers. The Egyptian assistance that Syria, as noted, received in preparation for the Yom Kippur War (Egypt transferred to Syria small quantities of chemical warfare agents for research purposes, as well as technical knowledge about them, and subsequently a considerable quantity of chemical munitions) was a onetime affair, and in its aftermath Syria was left isolated in this regard (only recently has the Syrian cooperation with Egypt been renewed). Yet, wondrously enough, Syria was nourished at the beginning of its independent course – the late 1970s and early 1980s – with information and knowledge that were in fact obtained both from the Soviet Union, by means of the interface between the Syrian army and the Soviet Chemical Corps, and from France, by means of the interface between the Center and French scientific institutes. These two interfaces intensified over time, although in a very hushed-up and controlled manner, but their benefit for the Syrians was certainly substantial.

The link with the Soviet army was clear from the strength of its patronage of the Syrian army, and the link with France, for its part, stemmed from traditional relations, which found a special manifestation in regard to the Center, whose name in French – *Centre Etude Recherche Scientifique* – sounds very similar to the name of a French network, *Centre National Recherche Scientifique*. It is still not completely clear how the Soviet Union contributed to the Syrian chemical enterprise, but it appears that its contribution involved the institutional transfer of information and sample components of munitions<sup>8</sup> together with self-restraint in regard to “initiated collection” of such information by the Syrians. Arsine-methyl-cyanide was the first substance about which the Syrians acquired Soviet scientific knowledge, when in the 1970s and early 1980s a Syrian chemist named Ramadan, of Aleppo University, received training in the Soviet Union.

When the Syrians first developed an aerial bomb containing binary sarin, they made use of the Soviet aerial incendiary bomb ZAB for the weaponization of DF and isopropyl alcohol. From these, sarin is obtained in a binary system. At a later stage, also tested was the possibility of developing chemical warheads for the Soviet aerial cluster bomb PTAB-500 (which contains bomblets), and for short-range Soviet missiles that were in Syrian possession – FROG-7 and SS-21 – and in the wake of this, experimental development began. Against the background of the visit to Syria of General Pikalov, commander of the Soviet Chemical Corps, in 1988, it was assessed that Syria had acquired from the Soviet Union, the capacity to arm Scud missile warheads with the persistent nerve agent VX.<sup>9</sup>

Furthermore, in Russia in 1993, Syria acquired at least 800 kg of raw material for production of an updated version of VX, by means of a straw company that was established by General Konzevitz, Yeltsin’s adviser on chemical disarmament and commander of the Russian Military Academy for Chemical Warfare. The material was smuggled from the academy, apparently together with technological knowledge about how to use it. Over a few years, the Russian assistance grew in scope – not necessarily on an institutional basis—to encompass the clandestine supply of additional raw materials via Cyprus (supplied by Russia as well as by Cuba), Syrian production of advanced VX, the application of sophisticated chemical weapons technologies, the development of improved cluster chemical warheads, as well as cruise and homing systems.<sup>10</sup>

From the Soviet Union, the transfer to East Germany (still in the 1980s) – and from it to West Germany – was quite plain and natural.

Thus, in Syria in 1986-1987 there were experiments on the spraying of organo-phosphorous compounds (in that case – an insecticide), involving cooperation between Dr. Ismael al-Hussein, who officially belonged to the Faculty of Agriculture at Dir-a-Zor, and the East German professor Theo Wetzel of Martin Luther University in Halle-Vitenberg, a specialist in this field. It appears likely that this was only the tip of the iceberg of East German interface with Syria, with much greater assistance being provided clandestinely (as it was provided to Iraq).

In regard to West Germany, the situation was clearer. The production line that Syria planned for a serial production facility for di-fluoro (DF, from which sarin for binary munitions is obtained) included two stages: the first required resistance to a compound that included chlorine, which had to be produced before the DF, and the second required resistance to fluoride, an even more destructive component than chlorine. For the carrying out of the two stages, two West German companies were chosen: Schott and Zigri.

The Schott Company is one of the largest industrial-glass manufacturers in Germany. The company's commercial name, Boregist, stresses its specialization in installations for the production of chemicals, made from glass of high durability, which is provided by boric oxide as a supplement to silicon oxide. In fact, the Syrian Center came up with the camouflaged name Boro-Silicate Glass Project, whose components the Schott company supplied to the Center. These components included chemical-reaction vessels and pipes, all of them chlorine-resistant.

A few years later, after many tons of the chlorine compound di-chloro (and from it, DF) had already been produced on the glass-made production line, Dieter Kepler, spokesman of the Schott company, explained that the company did not know for what purpose the manufacturing equipment it had sold to the Syrians was intended, and that in most cases the customer does not tell the company the purpose of the purchase. This, however, was inadequate, since the substitution of chlorine with fluoride in order to obtain DF, from which is obtained the sarin in binary munitions, requires additional components that are fluoride-resistant, this being among the most destructive elements from the chemical standpoint.

In this regard the Germany company, Zigri was well suited, since it specializes in internal teflon coatings for reaction vessels and for other instruments in the chemical industry that are made of stainless steel. The teflon, in its optimal configuration, is fluoride-resistant, and the accumulated experience of the Zigri company taught its engineers that it is possible to derive, from blocks of teflon that have undergone an upgrading process, welded teflon surfaces at a thickness of 4 mm. This surface has a high level of crystallization, and thus also satisfactory low permeability and mechanical strength. Ultimately, the production facilities acquired in West Germany were erected in Syria with foreign assistance, apparently West and/or East European.

The German companies Weber, Leifeld, Carl Schench, Ferrostaal, and others supplied the Center with mixing vessels, high-temperature furnaces, hot isostatic presses, and sophisticated mechanical instruments.<sup>11</sup> The raw materials for DF production were obtained from various West European companies, which did not even bother to evade the question about the real purpose of the materials; conspicuous among them was, again, a German company, Geritt-van-Delden. The technologies, equipment, and raw materials for production of chemical and biological weapons were supplied to Syria mainly by large chemical middlemen and brokerage offices in Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, France, Britain, and Austria. Syria – together with Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Sudan and some further 50 countries – still appears as importer of chemicals included in the Australia Group List from Britain.<sup>12</sup>

In regard to munitions that contain sarin, it appears that the Syrians were also aided by classified information that was obtained by a German physician born in Syria (Dr. Rifat Ramahi), who was suspected of spying for Syria in the context of his work for a company that specialized in the cleaning of chemical munitions sites. Also, during 1992-1994, Syrian military intelligence in Syria operated a key German (Hans-Joachim Rose) who supplied, by means of industrial spying, information on the production of chemical weapons.<sup>13</sup> In addition, and despite the German government's relatively sincere attempt to halt the assistance extended to Syria by West German companies in recent years, it appears that the involvement of German suppliers in projects for the production of chemical and biological weapons in Syria – continues.



In France, the Syrians acquired valuable scientific knowledge whose main application is in the biological field (see below), while in the chemical field, various chemicals have been supplied from France to Syria.<sup>14</sup> Also, the Syrian-French tracks led to Iran: the Syrian chemist Fayez Falouh was sent to Iran to conduct a joint research in the area of synthesis of organo-phosphorous compounds, “relatives” of nerve agents, while his partners in this research were Iranians and Frenchmen. One of the conspicuous manifestations of the tightening of the Syrian-Iranian chemical connection was that Syria and Iran were aided in their purposes by the same European firms. Thus, the West German Karl Kolb company helped with a system for production of chemical weapons in Iran, after it had previously aided Syria (and Iraq); the West German Uhde company assisted in the establishment of a suspicious plant for medicines in Syria, after it had previously established a suspicious plant for insecticides in Iran; the British M.W. Kellogg company simultaneously set up identical plants (for ammonia and for urea) in Syria and in Iran. These plants have, at least apparently, both a civilian and a military chemical-technological potential. At any rate, the Syrian-Iranian connection, on the whole, has developed into a wide and profound strategic-military cooperation, including in the chemical-biological field. This pertains especially to the development of chemical-biological warheads for surface-to-surface missiles that are acquired and produced by Syria and Iran in the framework of cooperative projects between them, which are aided by North Korean, Chinese, and Russian technologies. In this respect, Iran constitutes, in regard to Syria, a technology supplier on the first order, if not a full strategic-military partner in every respect.

Thus, the Iranian-Syrian strategic interface led to very substantial technological assistance from North Korea, China as well as Russia – each of which possesses an arsenal of missiles with advanced chemical and biological warheads and stocks of chemical and biological warfare agents. Further, China supplied raw materials for the production of chemical warfare agents to Syria.<sup>15</sup> Syria’s assistance from Russia and North Korea is massive and of great significance, since it appears that it encompasses or will encompass in the near future all of the factors that are still delaying the completion of the processes of development of chemical and biological weapons in the desired advanced fashion; China also makes a considerable contribution here. As a closely related matter, also to be noted is India’s substantial assistance to Syria. As mentioned, in 1992 the Indian United Phosphorous Company supplied to Syria the raw material tri-methyl-

phosphate (used in the production of nerve gases). Although the company was accused of including a forbidden substance in its exports, it asserted that it would continue to supply it to Syria, in the absence of evidence that it was not being used for the production of insecticides. Undoubtedly this was, in any case, only one example of India's technological assistance to Syria.

And from India, to the Islamic bloc itself: within the Islamic bloc, Syria thus certainly cooperates with Iran in processes of chemical-biological development, almost certainly also with Libya, probably also with Egypt, and possibly even with Iraq. In the Syrian-Libyan context, Syria apparently established (with the help of a West German firm), thanks to its cooperation with Libya, a large, up-to-date plant for chemical weapons identical to the one that Libya had previously established in Tarhunah.<sup>16</sup>

### **Chemical Weapons**

The chemical weapons that Syria possessed at first were obtained from Egypt and included, as noted, nerve agent (sarin) and blistering agent (mustard), artillery munitions, and aerial munitions. By the late 1970s, the Egyptian chemical munitions in Syria's possession had begun to age; yet, the mustard, which is a stable substance, had been produced by Egypt between 1963 and 1972, while the sarin, which is much less stable, had been produced between 1968 and 1972 and the munitions that contained it had to be replaced.

Hence, by today the sarin (of the unitary, as opposed to binary, type) that Syria received from Egypt is undoubtedly worthless because of decay, whereas it is certainly possible that the mustard that Egypt supplied to Syria is still usable. Beyond that, for the first time Syria amassed on its own, a simple asphyxiant gas – cyanide – on a limited scale. In the summer of 1980, Iraqi intelligence raided the Syrian embassy in Baghdad, against the background of the deterioration in relations between the two states. In the embassy, liquid cyanide was held in sealed bottles, and solid cyanide in sealed boxes. Iraqi intelligence claimed that the substances were intended for the carrying out of a small military action and for extensive poisoning of water sources.

A year and a half later, however, as of February 1982, the Syrian secret police itself invaded the Syrian Sunni neighborhoods in the city of Hama, in

order to suppress “rebellious actors that endanger the well-being of the Syrian nation”. The head of the Syrian secret police was then Rifat Assad, brother of the president. After a heavy bombardment of the city, it emerged that the number of fatalities was lower than expected, only coming to “thousands”. Thus, the rebels were given “special treatment” in the form of cyanide gas containers that were conveyed in rubber pipes to the entrances of the homes, after these were sealed. The lethal gas was funneled into the buildings and killed 18,000 people who were inside them.

These were, in any case, only preliminary stages of the preparations for a powerful Syria. In order to avoid the need to repeatedly refresh the sarin depots, Syria formulated a program for domestic production of chemical weapons, according to which, at first, aerial bombs would be developed in Syria, containing sarin nerve agent in a binary format; the bombs would be manufactured on an industrial scale, and would gradually replace the aging nerve agent munitions of Egyptian origin. Indeed, after a few years (on August 7, 1986), the Israeli foreign minister noted, in an address to the National Security College, that Syria had begun the industrial production of aerial bombs containing binary sarin. There are, in addition, unverified indications of the existence of sarin-filled operational artillery munitions as well in the hands of the Syrian army.<sup>17</sup>

The process moved forward at the laboratory level up to the year 1980, with the Soviet incendiary aerial bomb ZAB serving for the placing of the DF and the isopropyl alcohol. The Syrians chose this bomb because its internal structure, as an incendiary bomb, was divided into sections that were designed for mixing phosphorous with combustible material. The mixing was done after an impact fuse fixed in the nose of the bomb activated an explosive charge, thus removing the separating partition. As of 1983, the Center began the serial production and accumulation of DF. The chemical warfare agent containers were stored in the Damor area. Thus, Syria began to accumulate quantities of DF intended to be placed in the binary ZAB aerial bombs, together with isopropyl alcohol and the catalyst, and for the first time possessed chemical weapons, in this format, that it had produced itself.

By the mid-1980s the Syrians already possessed a stock of aerial bombs loaded with chemical warfare agents that it had succeeded in producing, and began to amass chemical warheads for missiles. New facilities were planned for the production of chemical warfare agents, in addition to the already-

active production facilities; the accumulation of chemical warheads for Scud missiles continued, and a major stage was completed in Syria's preparation for the use of chemical weapons.

Syria now turned to the addition of the nerve gas VX to its arsenal of chemical weapons. In contrast to sarin, VX's persistence, and also its lethality both through the breath and the skin, are particularly high. Hence, it is considered a more valuable nerve gas than sarin (which was then already in Syria's possession), or at least as a chemical warfare agent complementary to sarin, in operational terms. In 1988, and also subsequently, it was reported that Syria was equipping itself with VX. It appears that in that period Syria already approached the adaptation of VX for installation in aerial bombs and Scud warheads. The head of the Scud-B, and the head of the SS-21 missile, underwent experimental adaptations for the carrying of the large nozzles and dispersal equipment that are needed for chemical warfare agents, especially for the spraying of a persistent agent such as VX. Indeed, Syria was already assiduously planning new systems for the delivery and dispersal of chemical warfare agents. The possibility was checked of developing chemical warheads for the Soviet aerial cluster bomb PTAB-500 (which contains bomblets), and for short-range Soviet missiles that were in Syria's possession – FROG-7 and SS-21; subsequently, experimental development began.

In the Center's laboratories, there was already progress in the development of an up-to-date aerial bomb containing VX, and in April 1992 a Syrian bomber plane made a test flight for dropping the bomb in an experimental field north of Damascus. At least one test-firing of a Scud-C missile tipped with VX occurred near Damascus in May 1998.<sup>18</sup> Near the city of Hama, not far from the Chinese missile plant in Syria, the building of a plant for the production of VX was completed. More specifically, in technical terms, the CIA director noted that Syria completed the development of more potent, more toxic and more persistent nerve agents,<sup>19</sup> referring, actually, to VX.

Worth noting is the first public reference by the Russian foreign intelligence service to Syria's offensive chemical capability, which was published in 1993. This intelligence service, which over the years certainly closely accompanied the processes of Syria's development in this context, holds the view that the chemical warfare agents produced by Syria include, in addition to nerve gases, mustard gas, and are based on partially finished

products (in binary formats) and on raw materials of Syria's own production capacity. Another report indicates that the mustard is loaded onto rockets and artillery shells, in other words, for tactical purposes. All in all, it is estimated that chemical warfare agents in quantities of thousands of tons are produced annually.<sup>20</sup>

Not long ago, Syria also armed its Scud-C missiles (a total of about 60 missiles) with chemical warheads. This is in addition to the stock of thousands of chemical aerial bombs that are carried by Sokhoy-22, Sokhoy-24, and MiG-23 planes, as well as 100-200 chemical Scud-B warheads. The assistance from Russian specialists has also brought about the successful development of chemical cluster warheads for missiles. Moreover, the Syrian army performed a series of experimental deliveries of various model Scud missiles, intended for use with improved chemical warheads, as part of the tightening cooperation with Russia in the chemical area. Meanwhile, this cooperation has facilitated the effective development of chemical warheads. British intelligence officials have confirmed the extension of Russian assistance.<sup>21</sup> Moreover, successful field tests of Scud-D missiles armed with advanced conventional/unconventional warheads have lately taken place in Syria. A cluster warhead, capable of containing chemical or biological bomblets, is being developed for the Scud-D, and a hot-agent field test of an improved chemical bomb dropped by a MiG-23 aircraft has recently been conducted.<sup>22</sup>

Syria's main aspiration is, according to all assessments, the completion of an arsenal of enhanced-range surface-to-surface missiles that carry operational, chemical and biological munitions, including the Scud-C, Scud-D, M-9, and No-Dong. Beyond that, the anticipated next stage might include cruise missiles that carry warheads with chemical-biological cluster munitions. Presently, Syria apparently possesses SS-N-3b cruise missiles. In parallel, an immense effort is being conducted by Syria, in order to conceal and shield her ballistic arsenal, together with its related CB munitions, in underground tunnels.

### **Biological Weapons**

Syria is well aware that in the foreseeable future its optimal strategic armament, which in its view is achievable, includes biological warheads for long-range surface-to-surface missiles, and it is acting accordingly.

Syrian spokesmen have indicated that Syria is building a technical answer to Israel's nuclear weapons, which is of even greater power, and that it is legitimate for Syria to develop a variety of types of weapons of mass destruction. In response to the growing pressure that the United Nations has exerted on Iraq as the latter attempts to conceal its biological weapons, the Syrian defense minister stressed (December 1997) that this pressure could not be justified while, at the same time, Israel was given a free hand to develop all kinds of weapons of mass destruction, and that therefore Syria and other Arab states had a right to develop means to counter hostile Israel.<sup>23</sup> It appears that the Syrian statements regarding biological weapons, despite – and because of – their paucity, reflect an intention to disclose indirectly the trend of Syria's buildup of biological weapons, while maintaining maximal vagueness. This is in the context both of the general awareness that Syria already possesses chemical weapons, and, at the same time, of the doubt concerning whether the maintenance of chemical weapons is sufficient in itself to erode the nuclear deterrent capacity that is ascribed to Israel. Furthermore, within the Syrian army itself, a background (general) document about biological weapons was distributed, which highlights its great strategic value in this army's view.

Public references to Syria as a state that is developing biological weapons in addition to chemical weapons began in 1988 and have continued up to the present. Yet, this development started much earlier. Today, nearly two decades after the exploration and development of these weapons commenced in Syria, Syria is sometimes described as a producer of biological weapons, and this in regard to two toxins, botulinum and ricin, and a bacterium, anthrax. Significantly, Russian experts hired by Syria are engaged in cultivating a highly virulent anthrax germ and effectively installing it into missiles warheads. At the Center in Damascus, which has already been vigorously active as we have seen, in the development of chemical weapons, a biological department is also in fact operating. Studies that it has published indeed point to work with germs and proteins.

Two bacteria – anthrax and cholera – as well as two toxins – botulinum and ricin – have been reckoned to mainly constitute the Syrian biological weapons inventory. Botulinum is an extremely toxic protein (derived from a germ) whose toxic power exceeds that of any other substance, natural or synthetic. Ricin is a lethal protein (derived from beans of the castor-oil plant, easily grown in Syria) that offers an optimal relation between cost

(production) and toxicity (respiratory). Anthrax is an easily grown, deadly germ with maximal stability under extreme conditions (storage, delivery, environmental durability in the field). Cholera is a contagious bacterium, suitable for contaminating food and water supplies through guerrilla-warfare, thus bringing about violent alimentary epidemics. Reportedly, ricin, at the least, is already being weaponized for delivery by Scud missiles.<sup>24</sup>

Presumably, the new plants for the production of chemical weapons, in the Aleppo area and at other sites, also include branches for biological weapons. Moreover, an additional facility for biological weapons has been mentioned, in Cerin, as well as facilities for the development and production of medicinal preparations, in whose creation France, apparently, is playing a key role.<sup>25</sup> In fact, scientists from the Center have been trained in knowledge-rich institutes in France in the fields of toxinology and virology.

The Syrian biotechnological infrastructure is basically inferior, but in this context as well, as in the chemical context, the Syrians have created a narrow bridgehead that enables them to ascend to the next level. Syria has ongoing experience in the industrial cultivation of germs and viruses for the production of some vaccines, especially anthrax and smallpox.<sup>26</sup> The smallpox virus, which is considered a reliable and effective biological weapon, last visited Syria in 1972,<sup>27</sup> but it is feared that with its development and production as a biological weapon by Russia, it was secretly delivered to Syria, among others.<sup>28</sup> In the bacteriological field Syria's activity is considerable, focusing on, in addition to anthrax and cholera germs, the brucella germ, and involving the establishment of a biohazard facility for this pathogen as well as its isolation from sheep.<sup>29</sup> *Pasteurella*, another bacterial pathogen, has been investigated as well.

In the field of toxins, there is intense Syrian activity; in addition to the botulinum and ricin toxins, cooperation has emerged between the Center and the Center for Marine Research in Lattakia, most probably in the context of lethal toxins that are derived from marine animals and plants.<sup>30</sup>

A considerable portion of the Syrian knowledge in the biological field was obtained by means of the Arab Science Week conferences that the Center regularly organizes. Over time, conferences were held in this format on practical subjects, such as a conference on the issue of atmospheric pollution (bearing implications for modes of dispersal of biological warfare agents from the air) that was hosted in Syria in October 1985. At the Center

itself a high-capacity sampler for aerosol particles was developed which was used in fieldwork that dealt with the analysis of micronic particles.

Knowledge with operational value concerning the possibility of additional dispersal techniques of biological warfare agents was acquired in the framework of research work on the packing, release, and effects of weed-controlling material in a polymer format, and was performed by scientists from Aleppo University and from West Germany. This technique, which is called micro-encapsulated packing (in tiny capsules), enables the controlled and ongoing dispersal of biological warfare agents (and chemical warfare agents) in inconvenient environmental conditions.

The knowledge that Syria is accumulating in these contexts is intended to serve its goal, which is to arrive at biological armament with warheads that are carried by all of the types of long-range surface-to-surface missiles in its possession. Presumably this goal is applicable within the range of a few years, if not already realized, in part.

According to Syria's official stance on biological weapons, Syria "supports very close international cooperation in the field of biological activities for peaceful purposes, which is certain to strengthen the influence and the realism of the Biological Weapons Convention." Despite its positive tone, there is of course nothing whatsoever in this vague formulation of the Syrian stance to indicate a lack of Syrian activity in the field of biological weapons. Actually, since 1983, if not earlier, Syria has conducted a considerable effort in the area of biological weapons, and it is likely that since the beginning of the 1990s, biological weapons have already been in its possession.

### **Concluding Remarks**

Undoubtedly, Syria represents the widest gap in the Arab world, if not beyond that, in terms of extreme techno-scientific inferiority, basically speaking, as against supreme know-how attained by weapons-oriented Syrian bio-chemical experts, possibly autonomously. Syria has thus been ranked (by the US Defense Department), unsurprisingly, yet outstandingly, as the sole Moslem state (together with merely China, the former Soviet Union, France, Germany, Israel, Taiwan and United States) possessing "chemical systems capability in all critical elements".<sup>31</sup> It indeed masters



cardinal technologies in that concern. At the same time, Syria recognizes the superb strategic value of biological weapons and – particularly in light of her present incompetence to acquire nuclear weapons – arms itself accordingly. The conjunction of those Syrian capacities with her remarkably increasing ballistic ordnance – especially compared with the relative decline of her non-ballistic conventional power – forms a formidable strategic menace, that certainly may not be ignored, to say the least. Moreover, as of 1996, Israeli defense officials acknowledged a “newly acquired capability by Syria to produce chemical and biological warheads and place them on Scud missiles”.<sup>32</sup>

Further, the strongest bonds Syria maintains strategically are with the most powerful Moslem state in the Middle East, namely Iran, which is also the closest one to nuclear weapons, and this may expectedly generate, in due time, an Iranian nuclear umbrella furnished to Syria. In such case the threshold of first employment of CB weapons would certainly regress. The yet unresolved profound Syrian-Israeli dispute, as well as the futility of all past Syrian attempts to gain military superiority over Israel by means of merely conventional forces – might be further encouraging the employment of CB weapons. Such employment may possibly occur in three major modes: against targets that are intended to be occupied, against military targets that are not intended to be occupied, and against civilian targets that are not intended to be occupied.

The acknowledged Syrian-regime-oriented observer Zoheir Diab stated recently that Syria would be defeated by Israel in case of a conventional conflict between the two armies in the Golan Heights,<sup>33</sup> implying perhaps that an unconventional confrontation would expectedly be in favor of Syria, thus constituting, apparently, a preferable option. At any rate, the Syrian-Iranian axis is of paramount strategic importance in general, and concerning imminent unconventional threats in particular. As long as Israel is reckoned by Syria to possess unconventional weapons, Syria would unquestionably persist in perpetuating a bio-chemical arsenal. Adhering to this paradigm, Syria lately stipulated total Israeli non-conventional disarmament in return to not only a reciprocal step of her own, but rather as one major move that ought to be included in a peace process.<sup>34</sup>

Indeed, the senior status of Syria, in global terms, is eventually well recognized. Thus, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service regards Syria – plus Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, India, Israel, North Korea and

Taiwan – to pose the greatest concern from a proliferation perspective, with respect to biological weapons. The concern presently pertains to the

...“classical” forms of biological warfare agents, whereas in the long term, however, there is fear of the spread of genetically-engineered biological warfare agents that may be more effective militarily, more difficult to detect, and not susceptible to standard vaccines and antibiotics.<sup>35</sup>

Similarly, Syria – together with Iran, Iraq, Libya, Israel, North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan, China and Russia – is reckoned as a biological weapons possessor or developer by the US DOD.<sup>36</sup>

Broadly presented, though merely in general terms, CIA director Tenet’s recent testimony in the US Senate (March 2000) suggested significantly that

Syria, Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea – amongst about a dozen states – either possess or are actively pursuing offensive biological and chemical capabilities for using against their perceived enemies, whether internal or external. Some of these countries are pursuing an asymmetric warfare capability and see biological and chemical weapons as a viable means to counter overwhelming US conventional military superiority. Other states strive for biological weapons for counterinsurgency use and tactical applications in regional conflicts, increasing the probability that such conflicts will be deadly and destabilizing.<sup>37</sup>

All in all, the trend underlying the Syrian profile of activities related to chemical and biological weapons, is obviously augmentation. This trend perfectly serves Syria’s supreme national strategic goal militarily, and is being productively and consistently materialized. Though primarily intended to balance the non-conventional capabilities attributed to Israel, there is, presumably, a future temporal point at which the very augmenting power endowed by those weapons may provide the Syrian leadership a drive or ambition to employ them in actuality. Such a step could become appreciable and may be taken by Syria alone, or by Syria in coordination with Iran or some other Arab state.

## ENDNOTES

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### PEACE WITH SYRIA: NO MARGIN FOR ERROR

- <sup>1</sup> Quoted from: **Despots, Democrats and the Determinants of International Conflict**, by Martin Sherman. McMillan, St. Martin's Press 1998 pp. 61-62.
- <sup>2</sup> "Republican" in Kant's 18<sup>th</sup> century wording should read "democratic".
- <sup>3</sup> Arsenals may be upgraded which will probably be the case if "peace" will bring about US modernization of Syria's armed forces. But, even in its present state, Syria presents a formidable challenge to Israel. With its considerable stock of SCUD ballistic missiles and non-conventional warheads, Syria, when its ruler will so desire, may paralyze the mobilization of Israel's reserves, its major force, through the systematic bombardment of urban concentrations. This may buy it the time to concentrate and deploy its "obsolescent" but considerable forces and strike at the token standing forces deployed on the demarcation lines, 1973 (Yom Kippur) fashion. Let's not get caught again in the "politico-generals' consensus syndrome", as we did in 1973.
- <sup>4</sup> "Ambassadors Forum", Tel Aviv University, Dept. of Political Science on November 29, 1999 – "The Israeli-Syrian Peace Process", Round Table Discussion attended by both Savir and the writer (Y.T.C.).
- <sup>5</sup> Charged with what I define "enlightenment", which is neither propaganda, nor information and surely not PR, but the presentation of our case as if it were in front of a jury, in a court of justice, which I believe, is a battle of minds that may, in many circumstances, replace a battle in the field.
- <sup>6</sup> Kissinger's **Constructive Ambiguity?** It reminds one of the celebrated "Balfour Declaration" of November 2, 1917, endorsed by the League of Nations, the UN Predecessor: "A Jewish National Home in Palestine". For almost a century Jews

and Arabs spill blood to decide what is a National Home, what is Palestine. Was the Home meant to be in the whole of Palestine or part thereof? If part, which part? Vague definitions are the seeds of war.

<sup>7</sup> The writer did not find a case of war between two veritable democracies during the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

<sup>8</sup> The Israeli-Jordan peace may in spite of its opposing parameters, become a stable peace because of the predominant commonality of strategic interests of both countries. Jordan wishes to stay independent and its best guarantee is Israel's adamant insistence on preventing the deployment of powerful Iraqi, Syrian or Saudi troops along its longest, twisting border that is just steps away from its vital strategic objectives.

<sup>9</sup> Mr. Shimon Peres, the politician who coined the verbiage "New Middle East", defended this brainchild of his by stating that it may be useful to dismiss history as a source of wisdom so as to be unchained when creating a better future. Given Mr. Peres' socialist upbringing, it is no wonder that he drew his disdain of history ("disregard history, we'll write a new one") from the "Internationale" anthem of the communists and socialists, where mention is made of destroying the old world in order to create a new one – with probably the same success (what source of wisdom is there without history?)

<sup>10</sup> Mrs. Meir answered Mr. Rogers' offer of US military support in case of Arab breach of peace with an angry: "Mr. Rogers, by the time you'll be here, we won't be here anymore."

Looking at the time factor of the US buildup to confront Iraq, following Saddam Hussein's occupation of Kuwait (six months), Golda Meir did not exaggerate. Imagine what would have been the Kuwaiti's fate, were they Jewish!

<sup>11</sup> This policy was applied "ad lettera" some three months later, when Egypt (allied with Syria and Jordan) broke, in May 1967, the agreement on Sinai's demilitarization and blockaded the shipping to the Israeli Red Seaport of Eilat.

The said agreement was signed by Egypt in 1957 in exchange for an Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai and was guaranteed by the US and "secured" by the presence of UN troops in the Sinai, with both guarantees and troops "evaporating" at Nasser's request.

<sup>12</sup> Customarily, the Arab Middle East is the major arms purchaser in the world, its acquisitions accounting for about 40 percent of the world's arms trade, excluding major powers. Between the years 1993-1997, the height of the Oslo Euphoria, the Arab reported arms purchases were \$100 billion against Israel's \$3 billion.

<sup>13</sup> Including standoff weapons, weapon delivery systems, electronic warfare, anti-aircraft and ballistic missiles, mass destruction weapons, satellite intelligence, etc., and their bearing on the conduct of war. Nothing short of a total revolution.

<sup>14</sup> Like:

- i. Six Day War Lesson: – Israel’s level of deterrence was not clear enough to Egypt and the Soviets.
- ii. Yom Kippur (1973) Lesson: – All coming peace agreements have to include margins for Israeli government and defense establishment errors. Errors are human and the People of Israel should not be threatened with Capital Punishment for errors committed by its government.
- iii. Gulf War (1991) Lesson: – The major concern of Israel, in case of a sustained ballistic missile attack against urban concentrations, should be the disruption these attacks may create, resulting in delays or obstruction of the mobilization of Israel’s reserves, which are the major component of its military, thus subjecting the thin standing forces holding the lines to the onslaught of major Syrian (Arab) formations that may be deployed under the (time) cover of the ballistic missiles, etc.

<sup>15</sup> Like:

- i. Is Israel still a US strategic asset in the post-Soviet world?
- ii. US versus Soviet arms in Egypt and, potentially, in Syria.
- iii. The failure of US/UN containment of mass destruction weaponry.
- iv. The fading away of the Soviet Union disciplining power over its rogue client states to prevent local conflicts turning into major power confrontations.
- v. Islamic fundamentalism and its bearing on Israel.
- vi. Arab and/or Iranian quest for Middle East (oil) hegemony and its direct, negative bearing on Israel. Islamic bids for leadership traditionally start by assuming a militant, aggressive, “breast-beating” stand vis-a-vis Israel.
- vii. The Western threat interpretation of Iran’s aiming at the development of missiles of global range along with its SCUD “B” arsenal that reaches the Arabian oil fields only. Is that to provide an anti-Western deterrence to preempt a Western Gulf War II type reaction to an Iranian bid for Arabia’s oil? The missiles’ ranges are below and beyond “Israel proper”.
- viii. The geostrategic position of Turkey and the seven formerly Soviet Moslem republics, etc.

<sup>16</sup> Which are still the borders viewed as legitimate by the State Department and the Clinton Administration, unlike the Pentagon, whose maps have been classified

by state because professional truth was unpalatable to political virtuality practiced by Foggy Bottom.

- <sup>17</sup> The operational concept has been presented by the writer, at the time Chief of Operational Requirements and Chief of Planning of the Israeli Air Force, in his then top secret paper named “Attacks of Airfields”, dated August 1964. With a 2.83:1 enemy superiority in strike aircraft, a ridiculous Israeli depth of air-defense (given the topography around and country’s size) and ranges of up to hundreds of miles to reach some main enemy airfields, the Israeli Air Force reached, already in 1964, the conclusion that there is no alternative to preemption by surprise.

The enemy numerical superiority has increased, weapons range and precision have increased, the enemy aircraft are well dug in, the number of runways has increased, the anti-aircraft defenses are “airtight” unless receiving prior attention, yet the topography and size of Allon’s time remain the same. There is no valid technological answer to this situation, especially where the Golan Heights are concerned.

- <sup>18</sup> In his book **Chief of General Staff** (Hebrew), published by the Ministry of Defense Publishers in 1998, the late General and Labor Party Minister (“pristine dove”, as he stated) Mordechai (Motta) Gur writes, among others, that “the State of Israel cannot defend its eastern flank without the Golan and cannot defend the Golan without keeping the line of ridges it holds, from the Hermon Mountain in the north to the Rokadde River in the south”.
- <sup>19</sup> See **Head On**, by Meir Amit, (the Head of the Mossad at the time) published by Hed-Arzi, 1999 (Hebrew). On page 235, he relates the story of the US guarantees turned threat: John Hadden, the CIA head representative in Israel, is mentioned by Amit to have said, on May 25, 1967: “If you are going to strike, the US will land forces to protect the Egyptians.”

## SYRIAN MILITARY EXPENDITURES

- <sup>1</sup> O&M costs represent the operating costs of fielding a force. It includes costs for purchasing and distributing spare parts and supplies to support the military members and equipment.
- <sup>2</sup> International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) 1993-1994, London, UK.
- <sup>3</sup> A Department of Defense information paper dated March 4, 1997 used a higher figure putting the time cost of operating a heavy division at \$1,014 billion.
- <sup>4</sup> Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, letter dated July 18, 1997. The Department of Defense information paper

dated March 4, 1997 used slightly higher figures of \$617 million on personnel; \$184 million on operations; and \$175 million on equipment avg./yr.

<sup>5</sup> The costs of maintaining an independent brigade is usually about 30 percent higher than the costs associated with maintaining a brigade within a division. This is because an independent brigade has its own combat support and combat service support elements to support it.

<sup>6</sup> Anthony H. Cordesman, **The Military Balance in the Middle East – Arab-Israeli: Part VI, 1998/9.**

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Department of the Navy, Freedom of Information Act. These figures exclude personnel and equipment costs avg./yr.

<sup>9</sup> Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, letter dated July 18, 1997.

<sup>10</sup> There is no denying that the standard of living enjoyed by the American soldier is far greater than his Syrian counterpart. However, Syria has a GNP of approximately \$2500 yet has one of the highest reenlistment rates in the region. See Cordesman, **The Military Balance in the Middle East – Arab-Israeli: Part VI, 1998/9.**

<sup>11</sup> **Jerusalem Post**, August 7, 1994.

<sup>12</sup> See the internet site of The Center For Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, CA. Additionally, this claim was made by former Israeli Chief of Staff Ehud Barak, quoted in the **Jerusalem Post**, December 8, 1991.

<sup>13</sup> Center for Defense and International Strategic Studies, 1996 country report on Syria.

<sup>14</sup> **The 1995-6 Military Balance.**

<sup>15</sup> See the internet site of The Center For Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, CA.

<sup>16</sup> See Federation of American Scientists (FAS), report titled “Syria – Special Weapons”.

<sup>17</sup> Reported in Special to ABCNEWS.com, August 23, 1999.

<sup>18</sup> See Federation of American Scientists (FAS), report titled “Syria – Special Weapons”.

<sup>19</sup> The Center For Security Research, No. 99-D 54.

<sup>20</sup> Anthony H. Cordesman, **The Military Balance in the Middle East – Arab-Israeli: Part VI, 1998/9.**

<sup>21</sup> **New York Times**, March 11, 1999.

- <sup>22</sup> **Ha'aretz**, January 29, 1999.
- <sup>23</sup> British Broadcasting Corporation, July 27, 1999.
- <sup>24</sup> It is generally believed by observers in the region that preventing a future war is predicated upon Israel's neighbors perceiving that Israel still maintains a superior military position *vis-à-vis* the Arab states.

## THE SYRIAN OCCUPATION OF LEBANON

- <sup>1</sup> Daniel Pipes, **Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition**, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.
- <sup>2</sup> Kamal Salibi, **Bhamdoun: Historical Portrait of a Lebanese Mountain Village**, Center For Lebanese Studies, Papers on Lebanon no. 15, October 1997, Oxford, pp. 4 and 10.
- <sup>3</sup> Walid Phares, **Lebanese Christian Nationalism: The Rise and Fall of an Ethnic Resistance**, Boulder and London: Lynne Reiner Pub., 1995.
- <sup>4</sup> *Al-Hayat* (London), October 6, 1999.
- <sup>5</sup> Some basic sources that detail the process of Syria's military build-up in Lebanon include: Naomi Joy Weinberger, **Syrian Intervention in Lebanon: The 1975-76 Civil War**, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986; Walid Khalidi, **Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East**, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984; and Reuven Avi-Ran, **The Syrian Involvement in Lebanon Since 1975**, Boulder: Westview Press, 1991.
- <sup>6</sup> Based on a four-page Arabic report on Syrian occupation of Lebanon sent to the author by Etienne Sakr (Abu-Arz), Chairman of the Guardians of the Cedars Party, dated Oct. 7, 1999.
- <sup>7</sup> Hannah Arendt, **The Origins of Totalitarianism**, New York: The World Pub. Co., 1966, p. 464.
- <sup>8</sup> Robert M. Hatem, **From Israel to Damascus**, USA: Pride Int'l Pub., 1999, pp. 161-162.
- <sup>9</sup> Amnesty International (editions francophone), **Liban: La Situation des droits de l'homme**, Paris, November 1997, p. 35, mentions that Samir Geagea, leader of the Lebanese Forces, was responsible for the murder of Dany Chamoun.
- <sup>10</sup> From **The New York Times Index 1997** for May 8<sup>th</sup>.
- <sup>11</sup> Based on the Amnesty International and Etienne Sakr reports already cited.
- <sup>12</sup> Information in SOLID (Support of Lebanese in Detention), **Semaine D'Action Et De Soutien Des Libanais Detenus Dans Les Prisons Syriennes**, 26 janvier-1er fevrier 1998, Paris, Le 20 Fevrier 1998.



- <sup>13</sup> From the U.S. Department of State, **Lebanon Country Report on Human Rights for 1998**, Feb. 26, 1999, printed on <<http://www.aflnet.com/hrreports>>, p. 4 [“AFL” stands for Americans for a Free Lebanon].
- <sup>14</sup> Information on the attempts against Aoun from interview with him in **Al-Sharq Al-Awsat** (London), October 23, 1997; against Gemayel and Edde, see Reuven Avi-Ran, ch. 10.
- <sup>15</sup> Statement of Amin Gemayel, former President of Lebanon, before the United States House Committee on International Relations, **US Policy Toward Lebanon**, June 25, 1997, Washington, DC, p. 45.
- <sup>16</sup> William W. Harris, **The Christian Camp on the Eve of the 1988 Lebanese Presidential Elections**, Occasional Papers 104, Tel-Aviv University, The Shiloah Institute, November 1988, p. 11.
- <sup>17</sup> **Letter From Lebanon**, no. 3, August 1, 1984, Jerusalem.
- <sup>18</sup> On the SSNP, see Labib Zuwiyya Yamak, **The Syrian Social Nationalist Party: An Ideological Analysis**, Harvard Middle Eastern Monographs, XIV, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966, and extensive discussion in Pipes, **Greater Syria**, op. cit.
- <sup>19</sup> **The Lebanon Report**, no. 4, Winter 1998, Beirut, p. 3.
- <sup>20</sup> **Keesing’s Record of World Events 1998**, vol. 44, no. 10, p. 42584; and **The Reporter** (Arabic), no. 1, October 1998, London, which referred to “the election” of Emile Lahoud.
- <sup>21</sup> Revelations on Hobeika’s role in the Sabra and Shatilla events are found in Hatem, **From Israel to Damascus**, op. cit.
- <sup>22</sup> Farid el Khazen, **Lebanon’s First Postwar Parliamentary Election, 1992: An Imposed Choice**, Center for Lebanese Studies, Oxford, February 1998.
- <sup>23</sup> **Lebanon Bulletin**, July 28, 1999, Beirut/Jezzine.
- <sup>24</sup> **United States Policy Toward Lebanon**, op. cit., p. 33.
- <sup>25</sup> Information from Col. Sharbel Barakat in South Lebanon to the author, November 1999.
- <sup>26</sup> **Le Livre Noir De La Syrie Au Liban**, published by the Comite Pour Le Liban Libre, Juillet 1998, Paris; and from the **Testimony of Amine Gemayel**, Address at the Library of Congress, Washington, DC, June 11, 1999, printed on <<http://www.free.lebanon.org>>.
- <sup>27</sup> From **Lebanon Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998**, op. cit., p. 8 of internet print-out.
- <sup>28</sup> Data from the **London Economist World in 1999** and **London Economist Intelligence Unit**, 4, 1998.

- <sup>29</sup> Statement by Daniel Nassif, Washington representative of the Council of Lebanese-American Organizations, in **US Policy Toward Lebanon**, op. cit., pp. 32-33.
- <sup>30</sup> **Financial Times**, London, June 17, 1997.
- <sup>31</sup> Fouad Ajami, **The Dream Palace of the Arabs**, New York: Pantheon, 1999, chs. 1-3.
- <sup>32</sup> Kamal Jumblatt, **I Speak for Lebanon**, London: Zed, 1982, p. 88.
- <sup>33</sup> Antoun Ghattas Karam, **Le Livre De Abdullah**, Paris: Arcantere Editions/UNESCO, 1993.
- <sup>34</sup> An article by Fu'ad Hubayqah, "Al-Hariri: 'Godfather' of the Damascus-Bkirke Dialogue", **Al-Watan Al-'Arabi**, Paris, June 6, 1997, dealt with the attitude of Damascus toward the Patriarch.
- <sup>35</sup> It had been customary, since its adhesion as a founding member of the League of Arab States in 1945, to describe Lebanon as having an Arab face but a Lebanese heart.
- <sup>36</sup> Mordechai Nisan, "Christian Decline and Models of Lebanon", Policy Paper no. 83, Ariel Center for Policy Research, Shaarei Tikva (Israel), May 1999, p. 17.
- <sup>37</sup> Tabitha Petran, **The Struggle Over Lebanon**, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1987, pp. 220-221.
- <sup>38</sup> **Human Rights Watch/ME**, 9, April 1, 1997, pp. 2-20.
- <sup>39</sup> Conversation with Salam 'Eid of METV in Marja'youn, South Lebanon, October 1999.
- <sup>40</sup> Radomir Luza, **Austro-German Relations in the Anschluss Era**, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975.
- <sup>41</sup> See Robert O. Paxton, **La France De Vichy 1940-1944**, Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1997.
- <sup>42</sup> Jean-Raymond Tournoux, **Sons of France: Petain and De Gaulle**, New York: The Viking Press, 1966.
- <sup>43</sup> George Schopflin, "The Stalinist Experience in Eastern Europe", **Survey: A Journal of East and West Studies**, 30, October 3, 1988, pp. 124-147.
- <sup>44</sup> See Habib C. Malik, "Is There Still a Lebanon?", **Middle East Quarterly**, IV, December 4, 1997, pp. 17-23.
- <sup>45</sup> The "Lebanon Independence Restoration Act of 1999" was introduced by Representative Michael Forbes in the 1<sup>st</sup> Session of the 106<sup>th</sup> Congress, H.R. 2056, June 8, 1999.
- <sup>46</sup> For example, Raymond Edde in **Al-Hayat** (London), November 6, 1999.

- <sup>47</sup> Article by Emile Khoury in **Al-Nahar**, Beirut, May 10, 1993, p. 2. Another typical reference to *l'occupation israelienne* appears in the "Message Final De L'Assemblee Synodale Pour Le Liban", **Les Cahiers De L'Orient**, Quatrieme trimestre, no. 48, 1997, p. 154.
- <sup>48</sup> The term *dhimmitude* implies the Islamic imposition of servitude and humiliation on the inferior non-Muslims. Bashir Gemayel introduced the term in a public address on the very day of his assassination on September 14, 1982 (after Israel had liberated the Christian population in particular from the terror of the Palestinians and the oppression of the Syrians). See Selim Abou, **Bechir Gemayel ou L'Esprit D'Un Peuple**, Paris: Editions anthropos, 1984, pp. 407-415.
- <sup>49</sup> See Walid Phares, "Liberating Lebanon", **Middle East Quarterly**, III, December 4, 1996, pp. 21-30.

## CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS IN SYRIA

- <sup>1</sup> T. H. Clark, "Proliferation of Surface to Surface Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction in Israel, Syria and Iran", Ph.D. Thesis, Tufts University, 1993.
- <sup>2</sup> **Foreign Report** (London), May 12, 1998.
- <sup>3</sup> **Hatzofe** (Israel), August 7, 1997.
- <sup>4</sup> Shawn Pine, "Syrian Military Expenditures", **Nativ**, vol. 73, no. 2, March 2000.
- <sup>5</sup> A.B. Zahlan, **Science and Science Policy in the Arab World** (London: Croom Helm, 1980), p. 66.
- <sup>6</sup> **Stern**, June 4, 1996.
- <sup>7</sup> **The Military Balance**, 1995/96
- <sup>8</sup> Yosi Melman (**Ha'aretz** reporter), personal communication, December 1996.
- <sup>9</sup> J.H. Jackson, "When Terrorists Turn to Chemical Weapons", **Jane's Intelligence Review – International**, November 1992, p. 520.
- <sup>10</sup> **Jerusalem Post**, August 30, 1996; **Ha'aretz**, April 29, 1997; **Foreign Report** (London), May 12, 1998; **The Times** (London), January 24, 1999.
- <sup>11</sup> "Investigation: Syrian CW Programs", **Mednews**, September 28, 1992, p. 5.
- <sup>12</sup> **The Third Annual Report on Strategic Export Controls for 1999**, published by the UK government, July 2000.
- <sup>13</sup> **Reuters** from Bonn, September 16, 1998.
- <sup>14</sup> Shawn Pine, "Syrian Military Expenditures", **Nativ**, vol. 73, no. 2, March 2000.
- <sup>15</sup> Semiannual Report of the CIA to Congress on the Distribution of Weapons of Mass Destruction, January-June 1998.

- <sup>16</sup> **Stern**, June 4, 1996.
- <sup>17</sup> AP from Washington, June 24, 1997; **Hatzofe** (Israel), August 7, 1997.
- <sup>18</sup> “The Great Arsenal of Autocracy: Syria’s Weapons of Mass Destruction”, **Middle-East Intelligence Bulletin**, Vol. 1 No. 2, February 1999.
- <sup>19</sup> CIA Periodical Report to the Congress on acquisition of weapons of mass destruction related technologies by foreign countries for January 1 through 30, June 30, 1998. Website: <[www.Odci.gov/gov/cia/publications/bian/bian..html](http://www.Odci.gov/gov/cia/publications/bian/bian..html)>.
- <sup>20</sup> The Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute for International Studies: Website: <[www.cns.miis.edu](http://www.cns.miis.edu)>.
- <sup>21</sup> **Times** (London), January 25, 1999.
- <sup>22</sup> **The Washington Times**, November 26, 1999; **Jerusalem Post**, November 26, 1999.
- <sup>23</sup> AFP from Kuwait City, December 6, 1997.
- <sup>24</sup> **Yedi’ot Aharonot** (Israel), May 12, 2000.
- <sup>25</sup> “Investigation: Syrian CBW Programs”, **Mednews**, September 28, 1992, p. 5.
- <sup>26</sup> **Al-Thawra** (Syria), September 12, 1982.
- <sup>27</sup> UPI from Damascus, March 26, 1972.
- <sup>28</sup> Wendy Orent, “Escape from Moscow”, **The Sciences**, May/June 1998, p. 26.
- <sup>29</sup> Mustafa et al., “Isolation of Brucella Melitensis from Sheep in Syria”, **Veterinary Records**, vol. 117, no. 11, 1985, p. 277.
- <sup>30</sup> UN Food and Agriculture Organization Publication: **Marine Environmental Centers – Mediterranean**, Rome, 1985.
- <sup>31</sup> The Military Critical Technologies List, USA Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, October 1992, page 13-2.
- <sup>32</sup> **Jerusalem Post**, December 2, 1996.
- <sup>33</sup> Arab MBC Television Channel (London), May 26, 2000.
- <sup>34</sup> **Al-Safir** (Lebanon), January 15, 2000.
- <sup>35</sup> Biological Weapons Proliferation, Report by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, June 9, 2000.
- <sup>36</sup> DOD Biological Warfare Threat Analysis, US Department of Defense Information Paper, December 15, 1997.
- <sup>37</sup> Prepared statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 21, 2000, Website: <[www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/00033321\\_tenet\\_terrorism.html](http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/00033321_tenet_terrorism.html)>.

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2. **ISRAEL AT THE CROSSROADS**: ACPR Publications, 1997 – A compilation of policy papers (9-14) which were presented before a Congressional Hearing in October 1997.
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- 3a. **BALLISTIC MISSILES – THE THREAT AND THE RESPONSE**: Brassey's (UK) Ltd., 1999 (English).
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12. **איבדנו כל אשר יקר היה: שורשיו של השמאל הפוסט יהודי** by Amnon Lord, Tammuz Publishers, April 2000.

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2. **Nativ in Russian and English:** Sample issues are being planned.