ISRAEL AND A PALESTINIAN STATE: ZERO SUM GAME?

Edited by

ARIEH STAV
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This book is dedicated to the blessed memory of the Victims of Arab Terror.
PREFACE

This collection of articles, appendices and documents addresses different aspects of the establishment of a Palestinian state in the Western Land of Israel. Most of the material was written in the framework of the activities of the Ariel Center for Policy Research, which was founded in 1997, primarily to warn about the political process that is intended to reduce Israel to the borders of June 4, 1967. This initiative, known as “the peace process”, is essentially the same as the “peace process” that was imposed on Czechoslovakia in 1938. Both cases involve a paradox where a small democracy has demanded to provide to an incomparably larger totalitarian state or bloc of such states the only thing that it lacks: territory, whereas the dictatorial regime promises to provide in exchange the one and only thing that it lacks: peace.

The essence of the current process is the establishment of an Arab-Palestinian state in addition to the one that already exists in Jordan, this time in the Western Land of Israel — that is, in Jerusalem and the territories of Judea and Samaria, which are the cradle of the Hebrew nation and the raison d’être of Judaism and Zionism.

The basic argument of those supporting the “peace process”, as reiterated by Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, is that Israel will indeed have to make “heavy and painful sacrifices”, but the price is worthwhile in the historical accounting because “the Middle East has taken the course of peace and Israel must not slow down the train” (Rabin). The peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan are adduced as evidence of this process.

According to the claims of the Israeli “peace camp”, a far-reaching moderation has occurred in the Arab world and it is now prepared to accept Israel in the region, and Israel must reciprocate by removing the stumbling blocks from the path of peace — that is, hand over the territories of Judea and Samaria and the Golan Heights, eliminate its nuclear weapons, and establish a Palestinian state.

Whereas in regard to Israel’s part the situation is clear-cut, the argument that we are witnesses to a “new Middle East” must be questioned. It is, in fact, completely clear that by relinquishing the territorial assets that have guaranteed its existence since 1967, Israel will return to the “Auschwitz borders” (Abba Eban) and thereby restore the reason for war. It is, therefore, of critical importance to make a careful and precise examination of the claim that the Middle East has in fact taken the path of peace and that the Arab world is prepared to accept Israel in the region. Logic requires that the supporters of the peace process do basic work on the subject and bolster their arguments with solid studies and reliable documentation. Because it was the Israeli Left that initiated, formulated, and to a large extent applied the Oslo agreements, and because, moreover, the Left constitutes an overwhelming majority in the humanities faculties of the universities and controls most
of the political research institutes and centers, we turned to this large camp with the request for a group of studies on the subject for publication in the present volume, as a means of balancing the mainly negative assessment that it expresses. The list of various individuals and experts included everyone who is anyone in the Israeli Left: from Shimon Peres and Yossi Beilin, who have ministerial responsibility, to Ron Pundik and Yair Hirschfeld, who conducted the negotiations in Oslo, through an array of historians, scholars, and politicians such as Uri Savir, Shimon Shamir, Benny Morris, Shai Feldman, Mark Heller, Yossi Sarid, and so on — altogether a total of 120 men and women.

Half of those on the list did not bother to answer at all; others claimed a lack of time (the date for submitting the material was set six months in advance); some replied that this was “not their field”; some agreed to cooperate (Shimon Peres, for instance) but retracted at one stage or another. As for the requests to research institutes, these were sent to three institutes at Tel Aviv University: the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research, the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, and the Dayan Center for Middle Eastern Studies; two institutes at the Hebrew University: the Davis Institute for International Relations, the Truman Institute for Peace Research; as well as the Van Leer Institute, the Givat Haviva Institute, the Peres Center for Peace Research, and the Rabin Center. All those included in this honorable list have a pronounced ideological-political slant and produce papers and studies on the importance of peace for humanity in general and the Middle East in particular. Logic suggests, then, that at least one of them would have checked whether, in return for Israel’s “heavy and painful sacrifices”, the Jewish state has received the goodwill of the Arabs. However, a review revealed that not even one of the above bodies, which are funded with tens of millions of dollars annually, considered examining this issue at all.

Indeed, the supreme issue on the national agenda, which goes to the roots of Israel’s existence, concerns the blindness of the Israeli Left, a Pandora’s box locked with several bolts lest there burst forth from it the truth of Arab hatred. A consideration, free from wishful thinking, of general trends in the Middle East reveals the following reality:

1. Escalation in the Arms Race

In general, the arms race has displayed a direct relation to oil prices. Yet, since Iraq’s conquest of Kuwait and the second Gulf War, there has been, despite sharp drops in oil prices, a considerable escalation of the arms race, both conventional and non-conventional. The background of the arms race in the twentieth century has been the need of totalitarian regimes to justify their existence, with an added touch that unifies the tyrannies of Islam: the principle of jihad and war as ethos. The breakup of the Soviet Union and the end of the bipolar global alignment brought an inundation of cheap weaponry, conventional and non-conventional, into the arms market, without the political inhibitions and global calculations that characterized the Cold War era. The cut in the defense budgets of most of the NATO states and former Warsaw Pact members by 50 percent or more has created a competition for buyers among the Western arms manufacturers. On the other hand, members of the former Soviet Union flooded the market with extremely cheap arms. The performance of the coalition forces in Operation Desert Storm escalated the sales of US weaponry. All of these processes together have transformed the Middle East into a principal market for arms purchases. A publication by the US Congress on the scope of world armament puts the Middle East in first place, accounting for 42 percent of all arms purchases throughout the
globe, or twenty times the world average. (The publication is from 1995; subsequent updateings present a similar picture.)

1.1 The Conventional Arms Race

Although this has involved all of the Arab world, it was mainly manifested in the extensive armament by four Arab or Muslim states that vie for the crown of regional hegemony: Iraq, Iran, Egypt, and Syria. Regarding the first two, this has applied mainly since the war between them; as for the other two, it has included open preparations for war with Israel. The Middle East is the only area of the world where two states have been conquered by powerful neighbors: Kuwait by Iraq and Lebanon by Syria. The West, under US leadership, hastened to rescue oil-rich Kuwait. Lebanon has been abandoned to its fate under Syrian occupation.

1.2 The Nonconventional Arms Race

1.2a Ballistic Missiles

If in 1985 the missiles threatening greater Tel Aviv (in which 70 percent of the Jewish population of Israel is concentrated) numbered a few dozen, the number in 2000 is 2,000. A substantial proportion of them are fitted with weapons of mass destruction. Along with this increase of several thousand percent, the range of delivery has expanded and passed the critical point in terms of the IDF air force's capacity to cope with the threat. Syria and Egypt today possess a missile with a range of 700 kilometers. This means it can be launched from the western desert of Egypt or from the Iraqi border in Syria's case. Yet to destroy the launchers as the air force did in the Peace for Galilee operation in 1982 is not feasible because of the dense anti-aircraft deployment. It is worth recalling that in the Gulf War, the American-British-French air forces failed to destroy even a single battery of al-Hussein (SCUD) missiles, and this was in open skies, with no substantial air defense, in ideal conditions for intelligence, and with decisive strategic and tactical superiority. In case of an outbreak of hostilities in the region, the picture will clearly be different. The force ratios will in any event be favorable to the enemy, and between Israel and the missile sites (a considerable proportion of them underground) will stand the densest and most sophisticated anti-aircraft deployment in the world. Does it stand to reason that where the air forces of the coalition failed under ideal conditions, the IDF's air force will succeed in inferior conditions?

1.2b Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and Libya are manufacturers of WMD at a magnitude that places them among the top producers in the world. The availability, cost, and simple technologies involved in the production of chemical and biological weaponry ("the poor man's nuclear weaponry" as Saddam Hussein put it) have brought an expansion in this domain, primarily over the past decade. Because, as noted, 70 percent of Israel's Jewish population is concentrated around greater Tel Aviv (an area of only 800 square kilometers), this forms an ideal target for attacks with missile-delivered gases or anthrax germs.
2. **The Loss of Nuclear Deterrence**

The principle of nuclear deterrence rests on the basic assumption that a nuclear threat on Israel's part will prevent the Arabs from destroying it if and when Israel is defeated in a conventional war. The Israeli Left has used this assumption to back up its advocacy of a withdrawal to the borders of June 4, 1967. Yet a careful consideration of this cardinal issue reveals that the underlying assumption is fundamentally erroneous.

Nuclear deterrence exists in one of the two following forms: (1) A nuclear hegemony in the hands of a state that is surrounded by an enemy that surpasses it in the conventional balance but lacks nuclear capacity. For a lengthy period (1964-1985), this situation characterized Arab-Israeli relations. (2) A nuclear balance of terror, where on both sides of the barricade there co-exists a conventional and a nuclear balance, capable of annihilating the enemy in a “second strike” and bringing about mutual assured destruction (MAD). This situation existed between the NATO alliance and the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War.

Chemical and biological weaponry has long since balanced Israel's nuclear deterrence; yet the Arab world's great conventional superiority does not enable a balance of terror of mutual assured destruction as between the two superpowers in the Cold War era. For both the Soviet Union and the United States, the control over vast expanses and the large-scale armament with conventional weaponry served as an insurance policy against an existential threat to all humanity. Since Israel lacks this component, what remains is mutual assured destruction, in the course of which Israel would in fact cause the death of many millions and the widespread destruction of the Semitic region, while certain to be annihilated itself. The notion of the “Samson option” is, in fact, not a military issue but rather a moral one, since it is inconceivable that any Israeli Prime Minister would be prepared for national suicide in exchange for the intellectual satisfaction of the comparable annihilation of millions of Arabs.

The other side is well aware of this fact. The “peace process” is one in which Israel loses one after the other of its territorial power multipliers and essentially constitutes “territorial coercion”, since any concession, however “heavy and difficult” (Yitzhak Rabin), is preferable to national eradication.

**Is the Arab World Prepared to Accept Israel in the Region?**

A political process that demands that Israel relinquish its territorial assets and return to the borders of June 4, 1967, is one that re-creates the situation that prevailed on the eve of the Six Day War, and that forced Israel to launch a preemptive war. Indeed, the process is a recipe for war, and in immeasurably more difficult conditions than those of that time because of the deterioration in the military balance in Israel's disfavor.

The above supposition can be contravened only if it can be shown that a substantial change has occurred in the Arab world in regard to Israel, and that the harsh hostility toward the Jewish state has been replaced by an acceptance of the existence of a non-Muslim state in the Semitic region.

Examination of the matter, however, proves that not only has no such moderation occurred but instead there has been an intensification of the anti-Semitic venom. The
phenomenon is especially conspicuous in the case of Egypt. Counter to expectations, there has been a sharp escalation in the level of Egyptian anti-Semitism. The phenomenon has inspired a group of studies examining Egypt's attitude toward Israel since the Camp David accords. Thus Bernard Lewis, a leading Middle East scholar, asserts in his book *Semitic and Anti-Semites* that Egyptian anti-Semitism can be compared to: the Inquisition, the Black Hundreds, and the Nazi era. In her book, *An Arrogant Oppressive Spirit — Anti-Zionism and Anti-Judaism in Egypt*, Dr. Rivka Yadlin of the Hebrew University presents a cruel picture of the intensification of hatred in Egypt; similarly Prof. Raphael Israeli in his book, *Peace Is in the Eyes of the Beholder*, and in my book, *Peace: An Arabian Caricature*, which shows the escalation of anti-Semitism in caricature in the Arab world in general, and in Egypt in particular, since the Oslo agreements.

Considering that the above studies deal mainly with the establishment media that are controlled from above by totalitarian regimes, the purpose of this escalation of hatred is entirely clear: the moral and national delegitimization of Israel so as to prepare the public for war. This situation, typical of totalitarian regimes, prevails in Egypt at an intensiveness that is indeed reminiscent of the Nazi period, and yet at an incomparably greater magnitude. Whereas in Nazi Germany the anti-Semitic venom was concentrated mainly in *Der Stürmer*, in all of the Arab states, with Cairo taking the lead, it inundates the whole media.

Thus, an arms escalation, especially in WMD on one hand, coupled with an intensification of anti-Semitic incitement on the other, creates a lethal combination, i.e., a certain prescription for war. In this context, the Palestinian state has a double function: (1) to bring about Israel's political delegitimization by shrinking it down to the partition borders stipulated by UN Resolution 181, a process that is already in force; and (2) to provide the Arab states, and primarily Egypt, with a springboard for war against Israel from territory abutting Tel Aviv.

**⭐⭐⭐**

It is a pleasant duty to thank Prof. Shlomo Sharan of Tel Aviv University, a member of the Ariel Center, who went over some of the articles, making corrections as well as helpful comments. Thanks are also due to Mr. Christopher Barter for his devoted work in the formulation, editing, and polishing of the English of most of the articles in the book. Finally, heartfelt gratitude is owed to Leah Kochanowitz, for her faithful attention to all the technical aspects of this complex volume.

A. S. Fall 2000

**Note:** As it happens in a book featuring papers written on the same or similar subjects, there is a certain overlapping of related (adjacent) issues among the articles presented in this study. We hope that the reader will take this into account.
“PALESTINE WILL RISE UPON THE RUINS OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL”: YITZHAK RABIN

Arieh Stav

The principle of national self-determination as proffered by the Israeli Arabs, is nothing other than an ideological cover for the constant, unchanging Arab demand to destroy the State of Israel and establish an Arab state in its place.

Hans J. Morgenthau

“Secular, democratic Palestine” will rise upon the ruins of the State of Israel... A Palestinian state will be a time bomb which will draw the Arab world into war.

Yitzhak Rabin

The Arabs foster the separate Palestinian nationalism and the myth of “restoring the rights of the Palestinian nation” within the territory of the State of Israel and in its stead, in order to destroy Israeli nationalism. The Palestinian national demand is designed to abrogate the existence of the State of Israel and not to coexist with it peacefully.

Shimon Peres

A. FOREWORD

The political process transpiring in the Middle East ever since the Madrid Conference (November 1991), and even more vigorously since the signing of the Oslo Accords (September 1993), is referred to by many as a “peace process” whose essence, as characterized by the US presidents George Bush and Bill Clinton, is the principle of “territories for peace”. In other words, it is incumbent on Israel, the sole democracy in the Semitic domain, whose area totals 1/500 of that of the Arab countries, to divest itself of the one and only commodity that it lacks, namely territory. The Arab tyrannies, on the other hand, must provide in return the sole commodity of which they have none — peace. From the standpoint of the State of Israel, peace for territory is a radical move that is liable to place the Jewish state on the verge of existential danger, since withdrawal to the 1967 borders or to a line proximate to them will return Israel to the situation from which it was forced to stage a preemptive war so as to liberate itself from the “Auschwitz borders” as Abba Eban characterized them at the time. Today, however, the situation is far more grave than on the eve of the Six Day War for at least three reasons:

a. Israel is being pressured to embrace a time bomb — in the form of a Palestinian state on the outskirts of Greater Tel Aviv.

b. The firepower in Arab hands and the range and accuracy of their weapons have grown immeasurably since 1967, especially in the realm of ballistic missiles.
c. Since 1967, the ratio of the military balance between the IDF and the Arab armies has increased in Israel’s disfavor from 1.3 to 1.5.

On the other hand, the density of the population in Israel has doubled, creating an unparalleled danger in view of the escalation in the level of weaponry of mass destruction possessed by Israel’s enemies.

For these reasons and many more, the Israeli national consensus, until recently, totally negated the principle of “territories for peace” and withdrawal from the Golan Heights, Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. When President Carter suggested his support for the territorial solution for the Arabs of Eretz Israel by adopting the Arab interpretation of UN Resolution 242, then-Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin reacted sharply, in a manner unimaginable today:

President Carter’s statement regarding the withdrawal to the 1967 borders is very grave; it is lacking in both truth and a clear understanding of the facts. This is a vital issue for Israel, and the president’s statement, which hurts Israel’s position, should be viewed very severely. I cannot agree to this.

The response on this issue is explicit, penetrating and unequivocal: no.

Shimon Peres viewed any withdrawal from “the liberated territories of Eretz Israel” (in his words) as an existential threat to Israel. At the cornerstone-laying ceremony for the city of Ariel, Peres stated:

The lack of minimal territorial domain will place [Israel] in a situation of total nondeterrence and will create an unconquerable desire in the Arabs to attack it from all sides and obliterate the Jewish state.

Peres absolutely rejected the idea of a Palestinian state in his book, Tomorrow Is Now. He writes:

During a war, the borders of the Palestinian state will serve as an ideal springboard for mobile forces to immediately breach Israeli defenses towards the infrastructure vital to Israel’s existence, to limit the freedom of action of the Israeli Air Force in Israeli skies, and to shed the population’s blood through “masses of artillery positions” proximate to the border. In the absence of defensible borders, Israel will be annihilated in a war. (Emphasis added.)

In an article appearing in the Jerusalem Post, he writes: “A Palestinian state means...missiles at the gates of Jerusalem...terrorists along the main arteries of our existence.”

Amnon Rubinstein, former Minister of Education and now a prominent member of the ultra-left Meretz Party, spoke in even more caustic terms:

Since the days of Dr Goebbels, there has never been a similar case in which the interminable repetition of a lie produced such plentiful results, and among all the Palestinian lies there is no greater, more overwhelming lie than the one demanding the establishment of a separate Palestinian state on the West Bank.

Meanwhile, however, the politicians quoted above have undergone a 180-degree about-face, and from a position of rejecting the return to the 1967 borders and a Palestinian state, all three of them — along with what is referred to as the “Israeli peace camp” — have transformed themselves into passionate supporters of “territories for peace” and the establishment of such an Arab Palestinian state.

Rabin and Peres explained the turnaround in their political paths by citing the “changed circumstances” — rebus sic stantibus — in the world in general, and in the region in particular, stemming from the end of the Cold War. Yitzhak Rabin, it is true, admitted that in the name of peace “Israel will be required to make heavy and painful sacrifices,” but from a historical perspective the price would be worthwhile since:

It is our obligation to view the new world as it is today; we must join the journey toward peace, reconciliation, and partnership that is racing forward all over the globe. The entire region has started down the path to peace and we must not miss the train.

Peres frequently speaks of the “winds of conciliation and peace that are blowing in the Middle East”. In his book The New Middle East, he foresees an economic triangle, modeled after the Benelux countries, consisting of an Israeli-Jorda-
nian-Palestinian federation. In Peres’ federation, a “free, democratic, thriving and constantly changing” government will rule. “The increase in the standard of living and the sweeping economic changes will turn Gaza into the Hong Kong of the Middle East.” Peres’ miracle will result from the combination of Saudi money and Israeli technology.

According to the newborn Peres, the territories under Israel’s control not only do not enhance Israel’s security but serve as a stumbling block to peace by creating tension between the Jewish state and its neighbors.

In his opinion, international guarantees in general and those of the United States in particular, will ensure the proclivity for peace in the Middle East and halt Islamic fundamentalism by creating a coalition of pro-Western countries based on stable regimes such as Saudi Arabia, the Gulf Emirates, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria.

Israel’s role in the process is clear. “Heavy and painful sacrifices” means the irreversible loss of the Jewish homeland — the cradle of Hebrew civilization and the rationale for Zionism — both of which are strategic assets of the first order. In contrast to Israel, the Arab side of the equation is to receive everything that is offered at this point and, in return, sign a lengthy series of documents.

With the exception of agreements signed under strategic duress, i.e., the Munich Agreement of October 1938, or the capitulation of France in 1940, this situation is historically unprecedented. Hence, it is imperative to examine carefully whether the “New Middle East” is in fact a durable concept. Have the Arabs “started along the path toward peace”, and is their readiness to accept Israel in the region not a strategic fraud, but rather an authentic step toward peace with Israel on the part of those Arab countries, like Jordan and Egypt, that have reached the conclusion that they cannot overcome Israel in a war?11

This paper aims to analyze the claims of the supporters of the “peace process” in an unbiased manner, in other words, without the self-deception apparatus that is so characteristic of Jewish radicalism, which sees in reality only what it chooses to see.

“Clash of Civilizations”: Dominant Trends in the Middle East

Three central processes have characterized the Middle East over the past two decades and even more vigorously since the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War: a. The proliferation of the arms race, especially non-conventional weapons, b. the struggle for hegemony; and c. Islamic extremism.

The Proliferation of Weapons and the Struggle for Hegemony

The bipolar world alignment was based on the hegemony of the two superpowers, which exercised uncontested leadership. In an alignment of that sort, where the respective treaty organizations held great centralized power, the individual country had very limited maneuverability. Furthermore, in an era when the threat of nuclear holocaust existed, self-restraint as embodied in the principle of MAD (mutually assured destruction) took on even greater significance. The awareness of a possible nuclear holocaust led to the establishment of a system of technical coordination between the two superpowers, such as the “red phone” (hot line) between Moscow and Washington, and of doctrinal coordination. The latter entailed a mutual understanding to the effect that weapons of mass destruction and the means of their deployment via ballistic missiles and/or long-range bombers would not be supplied to unstable regimes, especially those in the Third World. The bipolar world was, therefore, a sort of insurance policy for the survival of the human race.

With the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the superpower hegemony ended. However, whereas the American sphere of influence includes, primarily, the democracies of the Christian West, Moscow’s former protectorates outside of the Communist bloc are mainly the Islamic countries: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Libya, and Egypt, although the latter achieved relatively independent status even before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Excluding Sudan and Libya, these are key countries in the Muslim world. All four have declared their aspirations for hegemony in the Semitic domain and all four are prepared to achieve their goals by the use of force. The Iran-Iraq War, Syria’s occupation of
Lebanon, Iraq's conquest of Kuwait, the threat of Iranian expansionism in the Gulf region, and the massive Egyptian investments in preparing its army for war with Israel attest to this.

With the collapse of the superpowers' strategic reasons for restraining their allies' armaments, commercial considerations have become more significant. The substantial reduction in NATO military expenditures threatened to bring about the collapse of the weapons industry. The severe financial crisis in the former Warsaw Pact countries increased the value of one of the few commodities that these nations could market, namely weapons. Subsequently, the Middle East was inundated with weapons from East and West, sometimes by pushing prices down below cost. The decline in oil prices that began in the 1980s minimized the purchasing power of the countries of the region. Nevertheless, the Middle East quickly became the focus of worldwide weapons sales. During the 1990s the region was on the purchasing end of 42% of all weapons sales worldwide, twenty times the world average.12 The largest increase occurred after Operation Desert Storm, which provided a significant advantage to American weapons sales to Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and primarily Egypt. This was true not only for conventional weapons, which had been supplied primarily by the former Eastern bloc. It was particularly true for non-conventional weapons supplied primarily by the West, headed by Germany, the sale of which was a good deal more dramatic than for the conventional arms. The ballistic capability was provided mostly by North Korea and China, but the relatively cheap and available technology for the production of missiles based on the technology of the Soviet Scud series enabled Iraq, Iran, Libya, and Syria to develop, produce, and upgrade their own missiles.13 The dimensions of the effort by the Arab countries and Iran to supply themselves with chemical and biological weapons, along with the means to launch them, place them today in third place worldwide in this regard, after the United States and Russia. The lethal capability of the anthrax germ is roughly equivalent to the destructive capability of the atom bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Bombs of that dimension are definitely sufficient for wars in the Middle East where the distances between countries are relatively short. As a result, even if the Middle East does not go nuclear in the immediate future, the chemical and biological weapons in Arab hands are sufficient to neutralize Israel's nuclear deterrent and to create a locus of potential danger unparalleled since the end of the Cold War.14

Furthermore, already today, three NATO capitals, Ankara, Athens, and Rome are in ballistic missile range of Syria, Egypt, and Libya. With the completion of the development of the Shahab-3 in Iran, half of Europe will be within this missile's range, and in 2005, according to Pentagon assessments, Iran and North Korea will have the ballistic-missile capability to threaten America's West Coast. Just for example, had Israel not destroyed the Iraqi nuclear capability (though not the potential) in 1981, or if Iraq had had the ballistic-missile capability to threaten southeastern Europe, it is highly questionable whether Turkey, Greece, and Italy, whose citizens would have been the hostages of an Arab despot, would have been prepared to join President Bush's coalition on the eve of the Gulf War. One need not possess a lively imagination to envision the global ramifications of a Middle East under the hegemony of a Saddam Hussein-like ruler who controls the Kuwaiti oil reserves. Although Hussein was stopped in time, the methods used by the Iraqi leader is gaining momentum in a manner directly proportional to the escalation of ballistic-missile capability.

Islamic Extremism

Since the Khumayni revolution in 1979, Islamic extremism has spread from the Iranian center and thrives especially in Sudan, Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, and among the Arabs of Eretz Israel. This chapter cannot undertake a detailed discussion of the characteristics of Islamic extremism (often mistakenly referred to as "Muslim fundamentalism"). Basically, this phenomenon is a spontaneous, authentic reaction of a unified, powerful civilization well aware of its massive scope of a billion adherents, that is anxious about the disintegration and loss of values in the face of the globalization of the Western system of values. Consequently, on the
theological-political level, its two major enemies are America — "great Satan", and Israel, "the dagger in the heart of Islam", or "little Satan".

Nevertheless, the assumption touted by Shimon Peres according to which "Islamic fundamentalism is supported by poverty and therefore raising the standard of living will facilitate its demise" is unmitigated nonsense that lacks any basis in reality. This absurd assertion is an affront to any civilization about which people insinuate that it will sell out its values, moral ethos and cultural code for a "bowl of lentil soup" in the form of an increase in the standard of living in the Western sense of the term, namely "microwaves, Internet, porno, and soap operas" as the spiritual leader of the Hizbullah in southern Lebanon, Sheikh Nasrallah, described it in an interview with a French newspaper. If there was any truth to the claim that there is a direct relation between the material standard of living and Islamic fundamentalism, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Gulf Emirates should all be thriving, modern democracies, since their per capita GDP is ten times that of Syria and roughly equal to those of Western Europe. Syria, on the other hand, should be submerged in the darkest depths of fundamentalism. Needless to say, the diametrical opposite is true. It was Hafez el-Assad who asphyxiated twenty thousand members of the Muslim Brotherhood in Hama with cyanide gas in 1982 out of concern about Islamic subversion. On the other hand, anyone who violates the laws of the Shari'a — Islamic law — in Saudi Arabia runs the risk of execution. Iran descended into the arms of Khumaynism from its previous status as a country oriented toward the West, precisely when its standard of living was then among the highest in the region.

The three trends described above, each one individually and especially in tandem, are liable to create a threat to world peace, more severe than that which prevailed during the Cold War era. Consequently, it is no wonder that they arouse deep concern in the West. In remarks made by Margaret Thatcher marking the fiftieth anniversary of Winston Churchill's famous Fulton speech, which laid the foundations for the Marshall Plan and NATO, the former British Prime Minister cautioned the West that the Islamic genie poses a greater threat than that posed by the Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War. Washington and Moscow, despite the ideological rift between them, spoke the same language in the context of a common civilization, with the hot line between the Kremlin and the White House as its manifestation. This phenomenon is totally absent in a situation described by the American historian Samuel Huntington as "The Clash of Civilizations". In an article of the same name that appeared in Foreign Affairs, the author has bleak expectations from a culture whose "borders are marked in blood". The article made unprecedented waves and became a cornerstone of think tanks in the West about the strategic process in the Middle East.

Bernard Lewis, one of the foremost Orientalists of our generation, writes:

We are facing a phenomenon of state-of-mind and intellectual movement which go far beyond the issues on the political agenda of governments. We are dealing with nothing less than a clash of civilizations, an irrational reaction perhaps but doubtlessly a historically significant reaction of an ancient adversary against our Judeo-Christian heritage from the past and against our secular existence.

Because of the West's huge military, technological, and economic gap relative to any potential Islamic coalition in the foreseeable future, the "clash of civilizations" is not yet upon us. For Israel, however, the situation is clearly different.

B. ISRAEL: "A PEOPLE THAT DWELLS APART"18

The pinnacle of faith is the jihad.  
The Hadith19

The Arab world's long-standing effort to erase Israel from the map is anchored in a system of considerations intrinsic to the relations between the Jewish state and the Arab nation in general, and Egypt in particular. As a result, the jihad (holy war) as the overriding principle of Islam, together with the long-term strategic interests of Egypt, form the dual basis for understanding the process of strategic abuse
that is designed to force Israel's return to the 1967 borders, thereby facilitating its destruction.

The Israeli Anomaly

The *jihad* ethos is a fixed situation in the declared war on the outside world until the realization of its ultimate destiny [which is] the Islamization of all of the people in the world. Until that day arrives the *jihad* will remain an immutable obligation of the entire Muslim community. The upshot of this is that the existence of *Dar al-Harb* (the House of War) is essentially illegal according to Islamic law.20

A practical ramification of the precept of *jihad* is the division of the world between *Dar al-Islam* (the House of Islam), the consecrated realm consisting of all of the territories in which Islam's rule is uncontested, and the rest of the world that has yet to be conquered and is therefore appropriately called *Dar al-Harb*. *Dar al-Islam* ranges over twenty-two countries of the Arab League (not to mention the other Islamic states), from the Atlantic Ocean to the Persian Gulf — an area twice that of Europe — in which Islam reigns unchallenged and in which almost every religious or national minority that has sought autonomy has been destroyed or oppressed. In the spacious Semitic domain there exists only one non-Islamic sovereign entity ─ Israel. As if that violation of the *jihad* ethos was insufficient, in all of their attempts to obliterate the Zionist entity, the Arabs were routed on the battlefield ─ an unbearable, stinging affront to a culture that worships war as an ethos and violence as a principle.

Consequently, Israel is an anomaly that refutes the principle of *jihad*, since, despite its existence in *Dar al-Islam*, it is at one and the same time an extreme manifestation of *Dar al-Harb*. As a result, the standard sobriquets for the Jewish state, such as "a cancer in the body of the Arab nation" or "a dagger in the heart of the Arabs" might grate on the Israeli ear, but they are perfectly accurate from an Arab perspective. It is not Israel's borders that are the cause of the Arab hostility ─ a claim seemingly contradicted by the fact that Israel occupies only about 1/500 of the territory of *Dar al-Islam* ─ but rather its mere existence. This point was elucidated by PLO spokesman Bassam-abu-Sharif: "The struggle against the Zionist enemy is not a matter of borders but relates to the mere existence of the Zionist entity."21

The Palestinian Charter, which represents the essence of the *jihad* principle in political guise, is also the canonized document through which the Arab nation comes to terms with the Israeli anomaly in the attempt to return Palestine to *Dar al-Islam*. Thus, the Charter proclaims the unity of the nation and the land, fundamentally rejects the legitimacy of the Jewish state, and calls for pan-Arab cooperation in the armed struggle to extirpate Israel. The Charter was never amended, not to mention abolished. The show staged for Bill Clinton in Gaza, in December 1998, was nothing but a cynical farce played for the media with the full consent of the American president and ridiculed by the Palestinians themselves.

Egypt and the Israeli Wedge

Egypt, the leading country in the Arab world, is the prime candidate to assume the mantle of hegemony ─ if not Nasserite pan-Islamism, then at least pan-Arabic hegemony ─ thanks to its large population (62 million people), double that of Algeria or Sudan, which rank second in the Arab world in terms of population; its cultural primacy and now, especially, thanks as well to its large army with state-of-the-art Western weaponry. Its geographic location, controlling the Suez Canal and the entrance to the Red Sea, grants it a clear strategic advantage. However, Egypt's main problem in terms of regional hegemony is its geographic separation from Asia by the Jewish state, thrust as a wedge between it and the Arab nations to the east. Hasnein Haikal, one of the most articulate of the Egyptian intellectuals, expressed it well:

> Israel wants to serve as a barrier between Africa and western Asia, and that is the reason the heart of the conflict [is] between Egypt's national plan to forge ties with the Arab bloc and Israel's plan to sever those ties. As long as the peace agreement does not take that into account, peace will not be realistic.22

The Egyptian attempt to reach the Saudi oil
wells through Yemen in 1963; the standing Egyptian claim on Eilat and the western Negev; its uncompromising position regarding the stretch of sand called Taba based on the principle that Sadat never tired of repeating: “up to the last granule of sacred Arab land”; the Egyptian media’s persistent rendering of the map of Israel as “a dagger in the heart of the Arab nation” dividing the two parts of the Semitic domain, or “a dagger in the heart of the nations”, are testimony to this.

The Egyptian attempts to wipe the Jewish state off the map in 1948 and 1967 failed. Furthermore, as a result of the Six Day War, Egypt lost the Sinai Desert, in other words, its territorial geo-strategic asset and its launching point in its war with Israel. With the return of Sinai in the context of the Camp David agreements, Sadat — Hitler’s diligent student and admirer, one of the most vitriolic anti-Semites in the Arab world and one who understood the inferiority complexes of Israel’s leaders so well — conceived the long-range strategic plan to return Israel to what he was wont to characterize as “its natural size”. Sadat internalized well the principle expressed by Shimon Peres when referring, at that time, to the 1967 borders: “Without defensible borders, the country will be obliterated in war,” reflected in the formula that Sadat repeated constantly: “It is incumbent upon us to return Israel to its 1967 borders; the remainder will be accomplished by the next generation” — leaving no doubt as to the nature of the objective resting on the shoulders of the “next generation”.

Egypt’s strategic goal is supported by a comprehensive, coordinated system of tactical steps that for schematic convenience, I shall divide into four:

a. Construction of a military force and preparations for war;
b. Establishment of the “Palestine Liberation Organization”;
c. Political hostility designed to invalidate Israel’s international legitimacy;
d. Brainwashing and “anti-Semitic incitement of a scope unparalleled since the late Middle Ages, the ‘black centuries’ of Czarist Russia and the Nazi era in Germany”.

In this paper, I shall address only points a and b.

C. CONSTRUCTION OF A MILITARY FORCE AND PREPARATIONS FOR WAR

The Egyptian case is characteristic of the trends in the “New Middle East”. Egypt, with a per capita GDP of less than $1,000, is one of the poorest nations in the Third World. In 1990, Egypt was on the brink of collapsing under a mountain of external debt that totaled close to $50 billion and equaled, at that point, its gross national product. Cairo was on the verge of declaring bankruptcy, as it was unable to repay the interest, not to mention the principal. In that year, an exceptional opportunity to escape its economic entanglement presented itself when President Bush offered comprehensive relief of Cairo’s external debt in exchange for Egypt’s agreement to join the coalition against Iraq in Operation Desert Storm. The sweeping remittance, the most comprehensive enjoyed by any country since World War II, totaled $29.5 billion, and Egypt was the beneficiary of a most convenient payment schedule for the balance of its debt as well. At that point, its extensive cooperation with Iraq in the development of weapons of mass destruction was “forgotten”.

However, the remittance of debts and the comprehensive aid that Egypt received from external sources did not help very much, if at all. As the New York Times economic correspondent wrote in 1996:

Egypt’s economy remains as it was, in other words, totally ravaged and it is nothing more than fertile ground for fundamentalism. All attempts at industrialization have totally collapsed, the government bureaucracy is the paradigm of ineffectiveness, sloth and massive hidden unemployment. Schools there furnish masses of ignoramuses for the non-existent labor market.

Moreover, fortunately for Egypt, it is the only country in the Middle East totally without any strategic threat to its territorial integrity. Libya and Sudan are certainly impotent in posing a threat to Egypt and there is a peace treaty with Israel.
Consequently, Egypt’s situation since Camp David resembles those extant in NATO countries subsequent to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Concurrent with the dramatic decrease in the potential strategic threat, the Western countries cut their military expenditures significantly and set their defense budgets at 2% or 3% of the GDP.

One would thus have expected Egypt to follow in the footsteps of the NATO countries, cutting its military expenditures drastically and directing the limited, meager resources at its disposal to enhancing the prosperity of its citizens. In practice, the diametric opposite transpired.

The Camp David agreements deprived Israel of an important strategic/economic asset, the Sinai Desert. The Israeli loss was Egypt’s gain as it received a most significant power multiplier. Yet the prize for its willingness to receive Sinai was comprehensive American military aid totaling $1.3 billion per annum, earmarked for the purchase of American weapons systems, and for upgrading its army based on Western military doctrine — in other words, the elimination of Israel’s “qualitative edge”. Within a decade, Cairo’s military expenditures skyrocketed and are now estimated at $14.7 billion per annum — 28% of the Egyptian GDP (1997). Since the official statistic generally cited, which serves Israel as testament to Cairo’s commitment to peace — $1.7 billion — is totally fictitious, the following is the real basis for reckoning Egypt’s military expenditures.

Egypt’s armed forces number more than a million soldiers, of whom 421,000 serve in the regular army with a similar number serving in a paramilitary alignment consisting of border police (12,000), national guard (60,000), internal security apparatus (325,000) and more. To this number (over 800,000), a quarter of a million reserve soldiers should be added. A schematic calculation of the expenditures for defense and security in modern armies equipped with Western weaponry is done on the basis of cost per soldier (division of the military expenditures by the number of men in uniform). For example, the cost per soldier in the US army is $135,000, a relatively high amount, due to its extremely expensive strategic systems. In the NATO armies, the average is $100,000 per soldier. In the IDF, which is considered a poor army by NATO standards, the cost per soldier is approximately $40,000 (depending on the calculation of the number of reserve soldiers who are in operational mobilization). Since the weapons in use in the Egyptian army today are Western in every sense, and since the costs of those systems are known to a great degree of exactitude, it is possible to estimate to an equal degree of accuracy Egypt’s military expenditures on the basis of the number of men in uniform. Even if we greatly minimize the cost of both the paramilitary units and the reserve forces and set the basis for calculation according to only 600,000 soldiers, underestimate different values such as lower wages and so on, as well as set the cost per soldier at just $25,000, extremely low in Western terms, the final result will be $14.7 billion, or 28% of the GDP (for 1997). This statistic is characteristic of a country at war.

There is no need to elaborate on what could be accomplished with an annual investment of more than $12 billion (the sum that Cairo would save if it would appropriate its funds as the Western countries did after the end of the Cold War and according to its real strategic needs) as opposed to diverting such wealth to the black hole of the next war.

Syria is another case that underscores the trend toward escalation of the arms race, which is, seemingly, strategically senseless for “a country which has opted for peace as a strategic decision” (Shimon Peres). Syria’s economic situation is even worse than Egypt’s. According to World Bank publications of 1998, for the first time in many years, Syria’s per capita GDP has dipped well below $1,000. Yet, like Egypt, Syria diverted all $5.5 billion that it received in the wake of its participation in the Gulf War to an intensive armament effort, especially in the realm of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. Syria purchased production lines for the Scud-C missile from North Korea. Damascus is in the early stages of a comprehensive program to construct underground silos for the storage of anti-aircraft missile systems. The ballistic-missile alignment in Syria is already estimated at one thousand missiles that cover most of Greater Tel Aviv. In deliberations conducted during Assad’s visit to
Moscow in early July 1999, Russia agreed to a far-reaching remittance of the Syrian debt, estimated at approximately $12 billion, in exchange for the extensive purchase of weapons, primarily T-80 battle tanks and squadrons of MiG-29 fighter planes. Indeed, that is the clear Syrian response to Peres’ claim that “peace with Israel is a strategic decision of President Assad.”

A Palestinian Protectorate

It is worth noting that the “PLO”, “Palestinian rights”, and the principle of the “Palestinian state”, even if they are not Cairene creations from start to finish, are manipulated by it for its strategic needs in the struggle with Israel. The Palestinian state, when it is established, will be largely an Egyptian protectorate and a very significant catalyst in Cairo’s aspiration for hegemony in the Middle East. Consequently, it is no wonder that the idea of a “Palestinian state” is greeted with blatant displeasure among the other Arab countries, which see through the Egyptian intentions very well. Assad is the least enthusiastic of all about the idea of a Palestinian state and indeed categorically rejects this possibility, since for him “Palestine” is southern Syria. His hatred for Arafat needs no substantiation. All of the terrorist organizations hostile to Arafat that constitute the “Rejectionist Front” are based in Damascus. Assad repeats at every opportunity that there is no such thing as the “Palestinian nation”.

The Jordanian opposition is also obvious. The overwhelming majority (close to 70%) of the Jordanian population is Palestinian. The establishment of an independent state west of the Jordan will quickly lead, with Egyptian encouragement, to the delegitimization of the Hashemite dynasty. For this reason, over the years the late King Hussein repeatedly claimed that “Jordan is Palestine” and made certain to butcher the Palestinians at every attempt at subversion. In September 1970, which eventually became known as “Black September”, Hussein’s loyalists slaughtered seventeen thousand Palestinians — men, women, and children — in a series of atrocities no less vicious than the massacres perpetrated time and again by Assad in Syria and Saddam Hussein in Iraq. However, Israel’s decision to recognize the PLO spoiled Hussein’s plans since Jordan could not allow itself to be perceived as less pro-Arafat than Israel. The Jordanian monarchy had no choice but to join the bandwagon supporting the establishment of a Palestinian state with an Egyptian orientation.

The PLO, established in Cairo in 1964 before the Six Day War, was totally unrelated to the negation of the “rights of the Palestinian nation”. Abd-el Nasser candidly depicted his establishment of the PLO as a tactical step, part of Cairo’s long-range strategy for the destruction of Israel. Arafat is a Cairo-born Egyptian, and the “Phased Plan”, the political platform for the destruction of Israel, was adopted in June 1974 in Cairo under the direction of Sadat, who foisted it on the Arab League three months later. The “legitimate rights of the Palestinian people” is the phrase imposed by Sadat on Begin at Camp David. Not to be overlooked is the fact that all of Arafat’s decisions since Oslo have been taken in Cairo under the close supervision of Mubarak.

The PLO has been assigned three functions:

a. Internally: terrorism, as murderous as possible, in order to bring about the decimation and demoralization of the Jewish public; this, in an attempt to transform terrorism from a tactical nuisance into a strategic threat;

b. The establishment of an independent territorial entity in Eretz Israel to serve as a springboard for Arab countries in their future war; this, according to the Phased Plan;

c. Negation of the legitimacy of the State of Israel by reducing it to the partition borders on the basis of UN Resolution 181;

As of December 1999, Arafat has completely achieved his first objective, most of the second objective, and is energetically striving to implement the third.

a. Terrorism: From Tactical Nuisance to Strategic Threat

Israel is the first country in the modern era to capitulate to terrorism and act according to its dictates. Yitzhak Rabin, well aware of the strategic
potential of terror, declared to members of his party in Rehovot:

These supporters of the granting of self-determination to the Palestinians are in fact abetting terrorism, the PLO, and constitute a security threat to Israel.\(^{31}\)

His signature on the Oslo agreements accomplished precisely what he foresaw in this statement. In the space of two years, from September 13, 1993, the date on which Oslo I was signed, to the signing of the interim agreement (Oslo II) on September 28, 1995, Arab terror claimed 164 fatalities. The “era of peace” escalated terrorism by 265% relative to the period of the intifada, and by 745% relative to the previous decade, which was the era of open war on Israel by the terrorist organizations. Including those murdered abroad and on the Lebanese border (294), the total number of Jews murdered in terrorist actions since the establishment of the state through September 1995 comes to 1,150. In other words, two years of “peace” claimed more than 38% of all of the victims of Arab terror in the history of Israel.\(^{32}\)

Although it is well known that Arafat is not only responsible on the ministerial level for the murderous acts perpetrated by his subjects but indeed personally directs the terrorism, this “leader of a terrorist gang, who has murdered more Jewish men, women, and children than anyone since Hitler” (Yitzhak Rabin, describing Arafat following the March 1978 massacre on the Tel Aviv-Haifa Coastal Highway), has become an ally of the Jewish state.

b. The Phased Plan

The Phased Plan was adopted by the Palestinian National Council, as mentioned above, in Cairo in June 1974. The crucial section as defined by paragraph 8 of the plan stipulates that:

Once it is established, the Palestinian National Authority will strive to achieve a union of the confrontation countries, with the aim of completing the liberation of all Palestinian territory, and as a step along the road to comprehensive Arab unity.

The Phased Plan as a constitutional decision obligating the Palestinian National Council is unceasingly mentioned in speeches delivered by Arafat and other leaders of the Authority. For some time already, Arafat’s demands have greatly exceeded the territories of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza as they were pledged in the Oslo agreements, and today already they call for forcing Israel to the partition borders. As for control of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, the Arabs now have de jure control of 42% (according to the Wye agreements). Yet de facto, the PA controls 90% of the territories because of its foothold in the areas defined as Area B, in which administrative control belongs to the PA but military control is in Israel’s hands. Since this is a one-way process, in other words, territories defined as Area C (under total Israeli control) become Area B and then Area A (total Arab control), Israel invests nothing in Area B since it only possesses it on a temporary basis. The Arabs, aware of this situation, do as they please in Area B. Since Area B includes, for all intents and purposes, all territories in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza that have not yet achieved Area A status, with the exception of those areas within the fences of the settlements, some of the roads, and the army bases (i.e., Area C), there is substantial justification for the joy expressed by Abu Mazen, a senior Fatah official and close adviser to Arafat, who triumphantly declared that in the wake of the Wye agreements “90% of territories in the West Bank are in our possession.” The Wye agreements, which were designed to provide the basic conditions for the existence of the nascent Palestinian state — in other words, territorial continuity — in practice, transferred Judea, Samaria, and Gaza in their entirety to Arafat. Hence, in practice, the Arabs have achieved the basic objective of the Phased Plan, and the formal confirmation will follow soon.

c. Political Delegitimization

Contrary to conventional wisdom, the negation of Israel’s legitimacy in its present borders is not a product of Israel’s “conquest” of the Golan, Judea, Samaria, Gaza, and Jerusalem\(^{33}\) during the Six Day War, but rather of its “conquests” in 1948 at which time the cease-fire borders, which by definition are tentative, were delineated. The only borders recognized by the international community are the partition borders of November 1947 (UN Resolution 181). The precedents set by the evacuation of Sinai,
the transfer of territories in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza to Arab hands, and the Israeli willingness to withdraw from the Golan Heights have created a favorable atmosphere for a diplomatic campaign to force Israel back to the partition borders. Indeed, already on March 21, 1999, Arafat met with UN Secretary-General Kofi Anan and demanded that he convene the General Assembly for a session to discuss Israel's violations of Resolution 181. On April 28, 1999, the Palestinian National Council raised the demand for the establishment of a Palestinian state within the partition borders and compliance with UN Resolution 194 of December 1948 concerning the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes.

After a series of meetings that Arafat conducted with officials in Europe, the European Union, with the vigorous encouragement of Germany, the dominant power in the EU and holder of its rotating presidency, declared its support for the Arab demand. As a preliminary gesture of good will to Arafat, the German ambassador in Israel publicized a demand to internationalize Jerusalem by transforming it into a corpus separatum, based on the partition borders. (Those alert to historical ironies should note that in the same month Germany dedicated the Reichstag, transforming it into Germany's official parliament in Berlin, the new/old capital of the Reich.)

The UN Human Rights Commission, a prestigious and influential body, passed a resolution in its annual session in Geneva on April 27, 1999, calling for self-determination for the Palestinian nation on the basis of Resolution 181, and demanded that Israel comply with Resolution 194. On July 2, as a direct conclusion of the Geneva Resolution, President Clinton announced at a press conference that "the refugees should be able to settle wherever they want to live," i.e., flooding the Jewish state with millions of Arabs. On July 15, the UN General Assembly, in a special session in Geneva, adopted a sweeping resolution accusing Israel of violating the fourth Geneva Convention forbidding the transfer of population to occupied territories. Although the public perception was that the resolution referred to Jewish settlements in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, there can be no greater mistake, since the reference was to all occupied territories, that is: including those territories "occupied" in 1948. The Israeli claim that Resolution 242 supersedes 181 is baseless, since the UN never officially abrogated 181. On the contrary, 181 is repeatedly mentioned in UN documents (although these references are ignored by the media). Based on this exact principle, the Arab League, led by Egypt, raised the issue of 181 in its session in early September and demanded that the UN implement it forthwith.

Thus, the political process called in Orwellian fashion the "peace process", constitutes the diametric opposite in terms of its consequences for Israel's circumstances and interests, which, as always, relate to the very roots of the Jewish state's existence.

**Strategic Abuse**

The grave process described above has its origins in a series of circumstances. Some are objective, such as the loss of Israel's status as a strategic asset of the United States in the Middle East with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Some are intrinsic to the national ethos of the Jewish people, such as their exceptional talent for self-deception. Both of these manifest themselves in the process of strategic abuse that Israel has been undergoing over the past decade.

Strategic abuse transpires when a nation collapses under the critical mass of an external threat with which it is unable to cope. In this situation, the raison d'état, the spiritual and physical purpose of national existence, disintegrates. From a certain point, a process of self-destruction begins that manifests itself in gradually worsening stages of demoralization eventually leading to collaboration with the enemy.

The enemy, if he is sophisticated enough, will not take any radical action, i.e., war, but instead completely utilizes the strategic abuse in order to minimize the danger posed by the designated victim, until all that is left of the threatened country is an empty shell. At that point, there is usually no need to use force. The exhausted entity, which has lost its existential purpose and survival instinct, falls into the enemy's hands like ripened fruit. This schematic description, which is designed to evoke memories of
the elimination of Czechoslovakia from the map on March 15, 1939, is transpiring before our very eyes, albeit more slowly, in today’s Jewish state under the semantic euphemism “land for peace”, a phrase that never left Hitler’s lips so long as he had yet to acquire all of the territories that he demanded.

Arafat’s unceasing threats concerning a “blood bath next to which the intifada will seem like child’s play, which will transpire unless Israel fulfills the Oslo agreements” are an illustration of this. The well-orchestrated declarations of Hafez el-Assad on the one hand, and Hosni Mubarak on the other, about the impending war unless “peace” is achieved and Israel “evacuates the sacred Arab land until the last grain of sand” are additional illustrations. Israel long ago internalized the threat mechanism, and the “peace process” is now a system of concessions designed to prevent the realization of the Arab threat. A blatant example of the semantic expression of the defeatism of peace was found in the explanations offered by Binyamin Netanyahu and Ariel Sharon after returning from the signing of the Wye agreements. When asked about the considerable concessions, they replied: “We had no choice because the Arabs would have abandoned the peace process.”

An external threat can function in two modes. One is by inspiring national unity in the face of danger. In that case, the most outstanding characteristics of the threatened nation come to the fore. Individual interest is superseded by the common good. Individuals, by being willing to make sacrifices, create a very significant power multiplier. This was clearly exemplified by Israel on the eve of the Six Day War. The weeks before the outbreak of war were utilized for unifying the ranks, the social rifts were healed, at least temporarily, and the people prepared to defend their country. The IDF, the people’s army in its most profound sense in those days, waged a preemptive strike despite the enemy’s 3:1 manpower advantage and achieved one of the greatest battlefield victories in modern history.

The other type of reaction to an external threat is the demoralization of the public, deceit by false messiahs, defeatism, and self-deception, ultimately leading to collaboration with the enemy. In this situation, the principle of “mental block” emerges (as Rabin characterized Israeli blindness on the eve of the Yom Kippur War), which means, primarily, selective vision regarding the enemy’s intentions, misinterpretation of reality, and a compulsive addiction to the mantra of “peace” in the hope that the mere mention of it will transform it from ideal to reality. The following is but one of many examples:

In his speech before an assembly of the Jerusalem branch of the Fateh Youth (on Sunday, November 15, 1998), Arafat spoke of the impending establishment of the Palestinian state. He emphasized that in his remarks about the Palestinian homeland he meant the entire “Palestine”, whose capital is Jerusalem and which he “will defend with rifles”. Arafat quoted a verse from the Koran in which Allah decreed “destruction upon the Children of Israel”. Arafat repeatedly mentioned the “Hudaybiya peace”, which symbolizes the deception of the enemy through the signing of a false peace treaty. The Fateh Constitution, which was first published a few months earlier, was distributed to the participants in the assembly. It was emphasized that this is the constitution of the Palestinian state that will be established. The constitution explicitly declares that its supreme objective is the “destruction of the Zionist presence in Palestine”.

On Monday the 16th, all of the Arab newspapers in the PA published Arafat’s speech in great detail. On the following day, excerpts were published in the Hebrew press.

The Ariel Center sent a copy of Arafat’s speech, a blatant declaration of war and a grotesque violation of the agreements signed by the PA, together with the Fateh Constitution, to the Prime Minister’s Office and to the central committees of all of the political parties. The only one who took the trouble to respond with explicit understanding of its significance was Rehavam Ze’evi of Moledet, who denounced “Arafat’s impertinence” and called to “immediately freeze all actions in accordance with the spirit of the Wye agreements.”

No reaction was forthcoming from Prime Minister Netanyahu’s office (as usual). The Labor Party spokesman responded by saying that Arafat’s remarks were intended for internal consumption and should, therefore, not cause undue excitement. The
Meretz spokesman responded by saying that Arafat’s remarks were no different from statements made by the Israeli right demanding all of Jerusalem (sic) and all of Eretz Israel. The other parties (Likud, National Religious Party, Yisrael Ba’aliya, Third Way, Gesher) were clueless concerning the topic in question. The most typical response came from the office of the spokesman of the Foreign Ministry: “What’s the big deal? We’ve heard much worse things from Arafat in the past.”

As mentioned above, the objective of the strategic abuse, referred to as the “peace process”, is to bring about Israeli withdrawal to the 1949 cease-fire lines as a first step toward its physical liquidation. If this next step is consummated, what will be the results?

D. THE PRICE OF WITHDRAWAL

Without defensible borders the state will be obliterated in war.

Shimon Peres

Until recently, this emphatic pronouncement by Shimon Peres was a fundamental tenet of Israel’s strategic thinking, and its ramifications go far beyond the military. It is a tapestry interwoven from numerous components that together constitute the price that Israel will be forced to pay for allowing the establishment of a Palestinian state. Loss or concession of any of these components separately would result in a grave but manageable threat. Their combination into one aggregate will place Israel on the verge of existential danger. For example, theoretically, Israel could overcome the resulting lack of water by transporting water from Turkey; the military threat from the Palestinian state itself is secondary; the Palestinian demand to contract Israel into the partition borders can be deflected diplomatically, and so on. However, only an insane country would rely on a third party for its water supply; the Palestinian state is not intended to battle Israel alone, but to serve as a launching point for a comprehensive war; the diplomatic struggle is a lost cause since Israel will have no allies in it, and so on. Furthermore, fifty years of existence and five wars should have sufficed to neutralize those precise dangers, why recreate them ourselves?

1. The Loss of National Existential Purpose

One of the gravest phenomena in the demoralization process in Israel is the de-Zionization of the public debate, which manifests itself, first and foremost, in the alienation of the territorial component of Judea, Samaria, and Jerusalem. These “territories” happen to be “the cradle of the Hebrew nation, the historic existential purpose of Judaism, and the one and only rationale for Zionism” (Menachem Begin). Without them, all that will remain of the Jewish nation's yearnings for its homeland will be pure territorialism. And if it is merely territorialism, then the American exile is certainly preferable, for there is no question that New York is much safer and Los Angeles more fascinating than Tel Aviv. The painful abandonment of Judea, Samaria, and Jerusalem (see endnote 28) in 1947, with the acceptance of the partition borders, following the Holocaust — the darkest chapter in Jewish history — was accepted only in the spirit of "ein beira" (no choice) in order to obtain a tract of land, “A Place Among the Nations”, as defined by Binyamin Netanyahu in his book by the same name, for the survivors of the Second World War. Nevertheless, the longing for these areas was and remains a central component of the national consensus. No one elucidated this better than David Ben-Gurion:

No Jew has the privilege to cede the right of the Jewish people to the land. No Jew has that authority. No Jewish organization possesses that power. Not even the entire Jewish nation alive today has the liberty to relinquish any portion of the land. This is the right of the Jewish nation throughout the generations, a right which cannot be repealed under any circumstances. If Jews in any given era were to announce their abandonment of that right, it is beyond their power and authority to negate that right from future generations. No concession of that kind can obligate or commit the Jewish people. Our right to this land — the whole land — is eternal, and until the
realization of the complete and total redemption we shall not abandon our historic right.\textsuperscript{35}

Willingly to cede Judea, Samaria, and Jerusalem — Zion — will empty Zionism of its content and Israeli nationalism of its existential purpose. To abandon the Jewish settlements in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza under Arab sovereignty will essentially constitute the formation of ghettos and the creation of an exile within \textit{Eretz Israel} by the Jews themselves. The dismantling and evacuation of the settlements will mean the displacing of Jews by Jews from \textit{Eretz Israel} and the compliant adoption of the Nazi principle of \textit{Judenrein} in the Hebrew homeland. In either case it will be a fatal blow to the Jewish national ethos.

\section*{2. The Loss of Strategic Assets}

As pointed out above, the liberation of portions of the homeland in the Six Day War provided Israel with a power multiplier of decisive significance in the form of territorial strategic assets without which Israel will not have the ability to exist. Immediately after the war, in June 1967, President Johnson asked the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Wheeler, to draw him a map of the minimal borders required for Israel's survival. The map, known as the "Joint Chiefs of Staff Map", served as the basis for the definition of "secure and recognized boundaries" in UN Resolution 242 of November 1967. It includes most of Judea and Samaria, all of the Golan Heights (before the evacuation of Kuneitra in 1974), in addition to 5,000 square kilometers in Sinai that would enable the defense of Eilat and give Israel control of the entrance to the Red Sea in Sharm el-Sheikh.

Thus, already today, Israel possesses less than the minimal territory required for its defense, as determined thirty-three years ago. Withdrawal from the remaining territorial assets to the 1967 borders, especially considering the present levels of armaments in the Arab world, will rob Israel of the ability to defend itself. The details of the strategic and logistic challenges confronting the IDF as it is required to withdraw from Judea, Samaria, Gaza, and the Golan Heights and of the dangers facing Israel are enough to fill a thick volume. It is worth noting briefly that in the IDF military doctrine, western Israel and the Golan are one organic unit. Consequently, withdrawal to the 1967 borders will cause a collapse of Israel's military doctrine concerning the future battlefield. From a purely logistic perspective, with the population density in Israel, there is insufficient space for the deployment of the army at its present size not to mention firing ranges and training areas. The ground-based early warning capability, a decisive component of the army's readiness in case of a surprise attack, will be critically diminished due to the topography of the area. The airborne alternatives (AWACS or I-STAR platforms) can offer only a partial early warning capability alongside ground facilities. But the airborne alternatives are so expensive and vulnerable that, in terms of cost effectiveness and in light of the topography and the surface of \textit{Eretz Israel}, it is doubtful that they could prove effective.\textsuperscript{36}

Withdrawal to the 1967 borders and the establishment of a Palestinian state will undermine the balance of power between Israel and its immediate neighbors (Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and the army of the Palestinian state). This situation will "arouse an uncontrollable desire within the Arabs to destroy Israel", according to Shimon Peres as quoted above.

\section*{3. The Loss of the Moral Status of a Besieged Nation}

A basic tenet in international law, founded on the principle of justice (\textit{ex iniuria non oritur ius} — a right cannot result from an unjust deed), establishes that an aggressor defeated in war has no right to claim ownership of the territory that it lost, for if that were the case, it would encourage aggression and render the very principle of justice a mockery.

Behavior of that sort would be tantamount to providing a guarantee to every potential aggressor that even if his attempted aggression fails, all of the territories which he might have lost in his attempted aggression will be automatically returned. A rule of that sort would raise the insanity to an absurd level — there is no such rule.\textsuperscript{37}

As a consequence of this tenet, the Axis countries in World War II lost extensive territory. Germany alone lost eastern Prussia, Pomerania,
Silesia, the Sudetenland, and Alsace-Lorraine. Egypt’s loss of Sinai in the Six Day War was based on the same principle of international law. Ceding Sinai to Egypt was, consequently, not only a strategic blunder that destroyed, once and for all, any chance Israel might have had to become a regional power, but violated the basic principle of justice and served as a precedent for the contraction of Israel back to the cease-fire lines of 1949. Relinquishing to Damascus the Golan — a Syrian launching point in attempts to destroy Israel during three wars and countless acts of terrorism — will not only be an act of encouraging Arab aggression, but an admission that the Arab claim that Israel was the aggressor in all of its wars is accurate. In that way, the moral basis for Israel’s right to defend itself will be undermined.

4. The Loss of Nuclear Deterrence

Proponents of withdrawal to the 1967 borders proffer Israel’s nuclear deterrence potential, primarily the principle of MAD (mutually assured destruction) as a guarantor of its existence. The logic supporting this claim is that retreating to the borders that rob Israel of its conventional deterrence capability creates a security risk of such a high danger level that Israel will be left with no alternative other than to put its finger on the nuclear trigger. The Arabs, it is claimed, will be so keenly aware of this delicate “balance of terror” that they will internalize the danger they face if they were to attack Israel, and, consequently, will refrain from doing so. In this way, peace will come to the Middle East. 38

This theory is patently unfounded, if for no other reason than the profound desperation that it reflects. It seriously errs in the understanding of the nature of nuclear deterrence based on the principle of MAD. Not only does nuclear deterrence not obviate the need for conventional deterrence, on the contrary, it is totally reliant on it. “Nuclear holocaust” is not a military term but rather a moral-theological concept, and MAD — in other words, preparedness to commit national suicide — is an untenable situation and must be prevented by the conventional warfare alternatives. For this reason the two superpowers that encompassed entire continents and were armed with the most superior conventional weaponry, never relinquished their possession of territories, planes, and tanks. With the loss of conventional deterrence that will accompany the withdrawal to the cease-fire lines, Israel’s nuclear deterrence will also be lost and the door to strategic abuse will be opened. There is not the slightest possibility that any Israeli Prime Minister would call for pulling the nuclear trigger, i.e., committing national suicide, when the alternative is sweeping concessions or even unconditional surrender.

5. American Abandonment

The American abandonment was blatantly manifested during Operation Desert Storm in 1990-1991. The American decision to prevent Israel from defending itself against the shower of Iraqi missiles by supplying useless batteries of Patriot ABMs — which failed to intercept even one of the thirty-nine Scuds — was a grave blow to Israel’s deterrence capability. The pictures of the panic-stricken Israeli wearing a gas mask in his sealed room, and the public fleeing for its life from the city centers, number among the primary causes for the escalation in the production of weapons of mass destruction and the stockpiling of ballistic-missiles for dispatch toward Israel’s cities.

America’s policy designed to force Israel’s withdrawal to the 1967 borders, despite the clear knowledge that in doing so the very existence of the State of Israel will be placed in question, was also adopted on the eve of Operation Desert Storm. Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia made their participation in the war conditional on the establishment of a Palestinian state, withdrawal from the Golan, and Israel’s expulsion from Jerusalem. The Bush administration had no problem accepting this since, as James Baker pointed out — in Damascus of all places — “Washington never recognized Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights and Jerusalem,” and the “legitimate rights of the Palestinians” were already guaranteed by Camp David. Thus, since 1991, Presidents Bush and Clinton have been implementing America’s existing policy and in no
way does anyone have a right to complain that they were unaware of this policy. The period of the “special relationship” between Israel and the United States, which did in fact exist from 1968 to 1990, is long over. George Ball, the outspoken former Undersecretary of State, described the situation in a picturesque manner: “The aircraft carrier called Israel capsized.” The Israel citizen-in-the-street who has not internalized Lord Palmerston’s well-known statement — “Countries do not have friends, only interests” — refuses to understand this. However, just as Franklin Roosevelt did not raise a finger to save European Jews and thereby cooperated with Hitler, so, too, the administration in Washington will not raise a finger when Israel will find itself in existential danger Washington’s blatant violations of signed agreements on the eve of the Six Day War, and its acceptance of the impending destruction of the Jewish state in those days, is a reminder to those who refuse to learn the lessons of history.

Israel has, in fact, lost its status as a strategic asset; yet it retains a valuable asset, which is significant in the eyes of the White House and the State Department, and that is the State of Israel itself, by whose dismemberment Washington hopes to win the goodwill of the Arabs.

 Needless to say, American pressure at this stage is nothing compared to what Israel can anticipate if it loses the few power multipliers that it still maintains. The abrogation of military aid, the disarmament of Israel’s nuclear potential, a military embargo, and potential support for Resolution 181 will be among the sanctions imposed on Israel within the 1949 borders. And these sanctions will be imposed justifiably, as William Safire remarked in his column in the New York Times.

The United States has no interest in a ‘half-state’ which possesses no oil and no security depth and acts irresponsibly by abandoning its inhabitants to the benevolence of those who seek to destroy it.39

6. The Loss of Water

The water potential of Eretz Israel is 1.8 billion cube (m$^3$), divided among a population of approximately 8 million. On the average, that is 225 m$^3$ per person as opposed to 1,200 m$^3$ in Egypt and 2,000 in Syria. There are three primary sources for this quantity, which is exploited to the last drop and beyond: the Kinneret Basin, the Mountain Aquifer and the Coastal Aquifer. Relinquishing the Golan to Syria will involve loss of territorial control over 70% of the Kinneret Basin. In other words, it will constitute a severe blow to the National Water Carrier, the main artery of the water supply to the Negev.

The Mountain Aquifer, which supplies 600 million m$^3$, especially to Greater Tel Aviv, is destined to fall overwhelmingly under the territorial control of the Palestinian state, which lacks any other source of water. Since the Palestinians intend to resettle the 1948 and 1967 refugees, reaching four million inhabitants by the next decade, the Palestinian state will need every drop of water from the Mountain Aquifer.

The Coastal Aquifer, located overwhelmingly within the Green Line, supplies about 400 million m$^3$ annually. However, most of that water has been polluted by industrial waste and over-salination. Since most of it is unfit for drinking, it has been diverted primarily to industry and agriculture. Thus, the State of Israel, shriveled into its 1949 borders, will relinquish most of the water under its control, and will be left with a sewage ditch.

7. The Palestinian State

In Oslo, the Israeli government signed an agreement with an organization that, at the time of the signing of the agreement as well as today, remains committed to the destruction of the State of Israel. This goal is overt in all of the PLO’s public expressions and pronouncements: 1. in the very character of jihad; 2. by dint of its name: the “Palestine Liberation Organization”; 3. in its constitution, the “Palestinian Charter”; 4. in its political platform, the Phased Plan, which depicts the state as a first step on the road to the destruction of Israel by Arab countries; 5. in the PLO Constitution which is the dominant body of the embryonic Palestinian state and its anticipated ruling party; 6. and in its emblem which is the map of the entire Eretz Israel with no vestige of the Jewish state. Immediately upon its establishment, the Palestinian state will act according to its constitutional, political, and ethical
obligations. The first four steps which Palestine will take upon its establishment will be:

a. The Geographic Dimensions
A declaration will be issued that announces the inclusion of all of Judea, Samaria and Gaza in the Arab Palestinian nation with Jerusalem as its capital. Since this is indeed the geographic dimensions of the Palestinian state as depicted in the Oslo Accords, and since the entire world led by the United States will salute the declaration, Israel will have no choice but finally to accept the decision.

b. Military Cooperation
The next step will be the signing of a military cooperation agreement with the Arab countries, first and foremost among them Egypt, resulting in a comprehensive arms program. Military cooperation agreements as part of the Phased Plan will be required by the Palestinian state in order to neutralize Israel's decisive superiority. Israel will be powerless to do anything about it. On the basis of international law, a sovereign country can sign strategic cooperation agreements and military treaties with whomever it pleases. Moreover, Israel's decisive strategic inferiority due to its untenable borders will likewise preclude any military action on Israel's part.

c. Building an Army
Immediately upon the establishment of the Palestinian state, Arafat will announce mandatory conscription. The present core of the PLO army is now estimated at 40,000-50,000 soldiers, with an additional 20,000 terrorists among the "Rejectionist Front" organizations in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq who will arrive in Judea, Samaria and Gaza immediately upon the establishment of the state. Through mandatory conscription the PA can anticipate drafting at least 100,000 more men.40 Thus, it is highly probable that the scope of the Palestinian army will be 160,000 or more men in uniform, roughly equaling Israel's regular army — 187,000 — within just a few years. This significant force, deployed on the outskirts of Greater Tel Aviv, will not require Merkava tanks, among the most sophisticated in the world, nor F-15 fighter planes in order to constitute a grave threat to the soft underbelly of the Jewish state. Without even firing one shot, they will force the IDF to deploy massive forces in order to neutralize the Palestinian threat.

At this point, Egypt will once again raise its demand to evacuate all foreign forces from Sinai. International law mandates the removal of UN forces from the territory of a sovereign nation upon demand. Based on this legal principle, U Thant, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, withdrew the international buffer force on the eve of the Six Day War. The evacuation of the international force, even without deploying substantial Egyptian forces in Sinai, will compel the IDF to mobilize a comprehensive deployment of forces on Israel's southern border.

The withdrawal from the Golan and the evacuation of Lebanon will lead to the encirclement of Israel's north from Rosh Hanikra to the Kinneret by the Syrian army. It is no secret that Israel will be unable to deploy its small regular army along all of the country's border, the length of which will double from its present dimension, as it will be required to do according to the above scenario.

In a schematic reckoning of soldier-for-soldier, the military balance of regular forces from the "inner circle" threat, including Syria, Egypt, and the Palestinian state will be 5:1.41 No doubt that Jordan, at the moment that it senses Israeli vulnerability, will join the threatening forces as will the "outer circle" countries: Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Libya and Iran. In this situation, again without the need to fire even one shot, the strategic abuse of Israel will reach a new level which will manifest itself in a new series of ultimatums, such as: dismantling its nuclear potential, autonomy for the Arabs of the Galilee, withdrawal from portions of the Negev, etc. The Israeli acquiescence to these demands is inevitable since the alternative will be all-out war under conditions of an unfavorable balance of military forces.

d. The Fate of the Yishuv in Judea, Samaria and Gaza
As an immediate result of the establishment of a geographically defined sovereign entity, Israel will find itself in violation of international law in at least two regards:
1. Its army will be deployed in the sovereign territory of a foreign country.

2. Its armed citizens, who refuse to accept the sovereign's law, will become an irredentist enclave in the territory of a foreign sovereignty.

This situation is clearly intolerable and the Palestinian authorities will demand immediate removal of the foreign force and disarmament of the Jewish settlers.

At this point, Israel will lack the power multipliers needed to deal with the situation, especially since the United States, together with the entire international community, will be arrayed against it. Consequently, it will be forced to withdraw its army to the 1967 borders. However, while dismantling and transferring an army camp can be accomplished in a matter of days, the issue of the civilian population, numbering 200,000 people spread over 144 villages, towns and cities, is immeasurably more complex.

Palestine's unequivocal demand to dismantle the "settlements" will win the support of the international community, which will rely on pertinent UN resolutions concerning the illegality of the settlements and Israel's violations of the fourth Geneva Convention, as well as pan-Arab backing in the form of the threat of a comprehensive war. This situation will prevent Israel from intervening on behalf of its citizens trapped in the Palestinian state, as any military attempt by Israel will justifiably be taken as a casus belli. In the face of the threat of war on the one hand and the confrontation with the international community on the other, with the settlers in any case viewed by the majority of the Israeli public as "obstacles to peace", any prospect other than Israeli surrender is hard to imagine.

The transfer of 200,000 people (50,000 families) constitutes an economic blow with which the Israeli economy is not prepared to deal. Compensation to the population of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, based on the precedent of the Sinai evacuees, is liable to reach the sum of approximately $100 billion, in other words, equal to the Israeli GDP for the year 1999. Needless to say, this fantastic sum, or anything close to it, will cause the Israeli economy to collapse. The alternative solution is to abandon the Jewish settlements to Arafat's goodwill according to the well-known formula proposed by the Israeli Left: "Instead of removing the fish from the aquarium, it is preferable to remove the water from the aquarium" (Dedi Zucker, former Meretz MK).

In the panic that will ensue among the settlement population, any sum they are offered will be preferable to what awaits them in the land of Arafat. Whatever compensation they receive, if any, will still lead to the widespread impoverishment of the Jewish population of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. It will also constitute an unbearable blow to Israel's morale and intensify the public's demoralization.

e. Israel: "A State of Its Citizens"

The establishment of the Palestinian Authority palpably emboldened the process of the transformation of the Israeli Arabs into an active irredentist force. The method is a copy of the one employed by the Sudeten Nazis in Czechoslovakia in the late 1930s, namely, to use the tools that democracy places at the disposal of a fifth column in order to destroy the country from within. For some time, Arafat has been the guiding force behind Israeli Arab institutions. Arafat's adviser, Ahmed Tibi, is an Israeli citizen and at present a member of Knesset. Even the Czechs in the late thirties never lamooned their democracy to that extent. (see the chapter in this book "Czechoslovakia 1938 — Israel Today")

The nature of the Arab fifth column within Israel has manifested itself in a series of activities, primary among them the creation of managerial autonomy by establishing an array of illegal institutions; comprehensive seizure of state lands and illegal construction of dozens of villages; wild anti-Semitic incitement; acts of sabotage and ecological terrorism (approximately 10% of the national forests have been destroyed by fires ignited by Arabs), together with logistic support for Fateh and Islamic jihad terrorism.

On the parliamentary level, the central issue on the agenda is the liquidation of the Jewish state by eradicating its Jewish, and most certainly its Zionist, identity. This is to be accomplished through the slogan "a state for all its citizens". This, too, is a verbatim imitation of the Sudeten Nazis' demand...
that the Slavic character of Czechoslovakia be eradicated using the euphemism of "equal rights". However, there is one difference. When Conrad Henlein, the leader of the Sudeten Nazis, raised that demand in the summer of 1938, he was arrested on the spot, his citizenship was revoked, and the next day a deportation order was issued against him. MK Azmi Bishara, on the other hand, who transformed the demand for a "state for all its citizens" into his party's campaign slogan for the 1999 elections, was running for Prime Minister of Israel!

The establishment of a Palestinian state will provide the Israeli Arabs with that which they are now lacking: political backing for their demands, which will be transformed from subversiveness to an ultimatum. Territorial autonomy for the Arabs of the Galilee, abolition of the Law of Return and the other "Zionist" characteristics in the context of the "state for all its citizens", affirmative action for Arabs in government institutions, and a far-reaching cut in Israel's military expenditures (in other words, a further blow to the IDF, which suffered a 50% reduction of its budget over the past decade) are issues that are repeatedly raised already today. The intimate relationship between the Arab fifth column and the Israeli Left will accelerate the demoralization process.

f. Implementation of UN Resolution 194
The Arab minority numbers 20% of the population. Historical experience has it that a minority of 20% is the maximum that a nation can permit; beyond that the country runs the risk of disintegration. The situation is far more serious when the national minority is related ethnically to an enemy state. The classic case in modern history was the Sudeten Germans, who constituted 23% of Czechoslovakia's population and at the same time were ethnically an integral part of Nazi Germany, the largest, most powerful and violent tyranny in Europe and Czechoslovakia's enemy. The rest of the story is well known.

The establishment of a Palestinian state will lead to a mass influx into Israel of Israeli Arabs who escaped in 1948 along with those who fled in 1967. Even if there was no blood relation or family ties, the economic incentive to earn many times more in the Israeli marketplace than in their present situation would be a powerful magnet for mass immigration. Needless to say, in the 6,000 square kilometers of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza there is insufficient space to settle a population of millions. In any case, the Palestinian state lacks even the most basic economic potential. It does not have the necessary territory and water to develop agriculture to supply food to the populace, and certainly to develop competitive agriculture for export purposes. It has no relative advantage in industrial production, and clearly no human resources for the development of high-tech industries. The primary objective, openly declared, will be to engender international pressure for the implementation of UN Resolution 194 on the repatriation of Arab refugees. It is safe to assume that Israel will oppose this, since it is tantamount to national suicide. However, the combination of international pressure, Arab threats of war, extensive Palestinian terrorist acts, and collaboration with the Arab fifth column in the Knesset and by the Israeli Left will lead to a series of compromises in a humanitarian guise, such as the expansion of the concept "reunification of families". Even with the definition in practice today, the Arab population has grown by more than 100,000 since 1995. The Palestinian Authority's institutions are already preparing precise lists of Arab property abandoned in the War for Independence in 1948, including entire cities such as Lod, Ramle, and Beersheba and most of the kibbutzim. The demand for property will be submitted immediately upon the establishment of the state, which will at that point become the official representative of its citizens.

In response to the threat of inundation with Arab refugees, Israel in the past countered with three arguments that totally contravene the Arab demand:

1. The refugee problem was created by the Arabs in their attempt to destroy Israel in 1948, and they must bear the consequences and solve the problem in their own territory. Based on this principle, three million Sudeten Germans were deported to Germany in 1945-1946.

2. The confinement of the refugees in camps for dozens of years and exploitation of their
suffering in order to fan the flames of hatred toward Israel is a reprehensible act, unprecedented in modern history. The Arabs should do for the refugees that which Israel did for its compatriots who immigrated in destitute condition from many Arab and Moslem countries from which they were evicted or where their lives were in jeopardy.

3. Even though there is no legal basis for the Arab demand for restitution of the refugees, Israel will be prepared to discuss the issue on condition that, at the same time, the issue of property plundered from Jews expelled from Arab countries after 1948 will be discussed.

The Arabs, knowing well that any attempt to force on Israel the repatriation of refugees was tantamount to a declaration of war, refrained from raising the subject. This was the case with the issue of monetary restitution as well. Since the value of the property plundered from the Jews in Arab countries was immeasurably greater than that abandoned by Israeli Arabs, the Arab demand was liable to boomerang.

Today, however, with the sweeping collapse of the building blocks of its existence, Israel has abandoned its policy concerning refugees as well. Jewish war refugees have been forgotten, and the issue of the refugees of 1948 is raised in all its grievousness. Not only was the Palestinian demand to raise Resolution 194 not rejected on the spot by their Israeli counterparts, on the contrary, the Israelis expressed understanding and promised to deal with the issue in a “creative” manner. As noted earlier, a manifestation of this was supplied by President Clinton.

Are There Really “Economic Dividends of Peace”?

Shimon Peres’ mistaken premise, according to which: “Islamic fundamentalism is supported by poverty, therefore raising the standard of living will facilitate its demise,” was discussed above. Similarly, there is no basis for his other economic assumptions, such as his statements about the “dividends of peace” and the “Middle Eastern Common Market in which Israel will participate”.

One of the consensual lies that occupies a place in the public consciousness is that the “peace process” pays economic dividends. Anyone analyzing the impressive growth in Israel’s GDP since 1986 knows its true causes. Israel is a technological and scientific powerhouse, and at the start of the third millennium there is an indubitable correlation between a country’s technological potential and its per capita product. The upper echelon of wealthiest countries in the world are at one and the same time the foremost technological powers, as the added values for one employed in this field are much more substantial than for most economic areas. The impressive techno-scientific potential of the immigrants from the former Soviet Union jump-started this facet of the Israeli economy, and consequently, these are the direct causes of the doubling of the per capita GDP from $8,000 in 1986 to $17,000 in 1998.

A brief analysis of the economic reality among the Arabs of Judea and Samaria indicates the lack of correlation between assumptions and reality in Peres’ outlook.

In 1987, after two decades of accelerated economic growth that began after the Six Day War, the per capita GDP among the Arabs of Judea and Samaria reached $3,000, almost 40% of Israel’s GDP at that time, which was $8,000. Had the economic growth continued at the same pace, the per capita GDP would be $7,000 today, higher than in Saudi Arabia and seven times higher than in Egypt, Jordan, or Syria. Yet the intifada, the Oslo agreements, and self-rule have reversed the trend. During a decade of accelerated impoverishment from 1988 to 1998, the per capita GDP in Judea and Samaria declined and now stands at approximately $1,000 (as of 1998), and is even lower in Gaza. Thus, Arafat has returned the Arabs of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza to the level of per capita income extant in impoverished non-oil-producing Arab countries.

The malaise of the Arab economy has nothing at all to do with the “peace process” and is based totally on the Islamic heritage of totalitarian states, which destroys any glimmer of democratization — a necessary prerequisite for economic growth. Tech-
nological underdevelopment, limited access for women to the workplace, widespread hidden unemployment in the Kafkaesque bureaucratic labyrinth, military expenditures that swallow up a significant portion of the national product, but above all, the corruption of the "rais" ("President") who treats the state treasury as his personal property, are the overriding factors that preserve the poverty and backwardness of the Arab countries. Hafez el-Assad's personal property is estimated by Forbes at $2 billion — this in 1999 when the World Bank publicized the severe economic crisis in Syria. According to the publication, for the first time in many years, Syria's per capita GDP dipped below $1000. The personal wealth of the late Moroccan King Hassan II is also estimated at about $2 billion, which constitutes about 10% of the product of Morocco's bankrupt economy. The royal family of Jordan robs one-third of the kingdom's constantly bankrupt economy. The episodes of Sadat's corruption and the Mubarak family's nepotism are classic. However, all of the above are nothing compared to Arafat's exploits. The private property of the upper echelon of the PLO (in other words, Arafat), primarily obtained through money laundering, counterfeiting, heroin, bank robbery, and extortion of hostages, was estimated at about $12 billion as far back as 1992. With the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, astronomical sums — which Arafat divides among his inner circle at the expense of his unemployed subjects — accrued to him from newly formed monopolies. This does not include the monthly transfer of $8.7 million to his private account in the Bank Hapoalim Hashmonaim branch in Tel Aviv on the direct order of Shimon Peres (and since then honored by the Netanyahu and Barak governments). Since the beginning of the Tel Aviv arrangement in 1994, a total of approximately half a billion dollars has been transferred to Arafat's private account.

At one point, Shimon Peres recommended that Israel join the Arab League. The suggestion was greeted in the Arab world with ridicule and was presented as an additional example of Israel's attempts to undermine the foundations of the Arab world in order to cause its dissolution from within. Similarly, suggestions about regional cooperation and the Middle Eastern Common Market are portrayed as an Israeli plot to dominate the Arab economy.

What prevents the Arab countries from establishing a common market in the Middle East? After all, the cultural homogeneity of the Arabs involving language, religion, heritage, and ethnic origin — which ordinarily is a highly significant impetus for regional cooperation — is immeasurably more uniform than among the countries of the European community. However, not only has the Middle East been unsuccessful in establishing an organization of economic cooperation, it has become the focal point of the gravest threat to world peace. The Arabs are the ones who imposed, and continue to impose, an economic boycott of Israel and not the other way around. However, thanks to a per capita GDP of $17,000, Israel is among the fifteen richest nations in the world, while the Middle East continues, as ever, to wallow in the swamp of poverty, backwardness, and tyranny. How characteristic it is that 5.8 million Israelis produce more than $100 billion — a figure much higher than that produced by the surrounding Arab countries, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan combined, where 86 million Arabs together produce $82 billion.

**AFTERWORD**

**A Historic Window of Opportunity and How to Miss Out on It**

The megatrends in the Middle East described in the first part of this article provide Israel with a rare historic window of opportunity. The most dangerous process from a global perspective is the intensification of Islamic hegemony — a nationalist civilization motivated by imperialist, religious aspirations and armed with weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. Israel is, indeed, in the eye of the storm but it is not alone. Turkey is concerned about Arab-Iranian subversiveness and its influence on the country's Muslim majority, which is liable to bring the Atatürk revolution and the secular government to an end. Syria is a common enemy, and Turkish-Israeli strategic cooperation clearly would neutralize the Syrian threat (as well as the
long-term Iraqi threat). The common interest has created an intricate network of ties between the two countries on the basis of military cooperation, especially in the area of upgrading weapons systems, missiles, and military technology.51

India is an additional, extremely important objective for military/economic cooperation with Israel. It is no secret that the large Muslim minority in India and Islamic subversiveness stand at the top of the list of priorities on the Indian subcontinent. Like Turkey, India is a potential market for Israeli military technology. Both India and Israel are among the world centers in the field of computers. Cooperation between the two in this area, with its high added economic value, could aid the Indian economy and indeed rescue it from the Third World status in which it is mired.

A strategic triangle of India, Israel, and Turkey could create a very powerful center in the Middle East that could contribute much to halting Islamic hegemony. Strategic power centers naturally attract other interested parties. Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Kenya are natural candidates. Halting Islam would have a salubrious effect on democratic tendencies, weak and modest as they may be, in the Arab countries themselves. So, for example, the possibility that Iran, in which the processes of recovery from Khumaynism are beginning, might join the coalition in the future cannot be ruled out. The process of liquidating minorities in the region, especially Christians, would cease or at least be mitigated.

It goes without saying what effect such a turn of events would have on the Jewish state's standing in the international arena. Israel, as part of a powerful strategic treaty, would cease to be the trampled doormat of the European community. Europeans are now located within ballistic-missile range of the Arab countries. Likewise, they are threatened by Muslim irredentism in their own lands: the Muslim minority in France now constitutes 7% of the population and continues to grow rapidly. Europe is well aware of the Islamic threat. The Europeans, who have a well-developed historical memory, do not forget that the defeat of Richard the Lionhearted by Saladin at the end of the 12th century brought Islam to the gates of Vienna by the 17th century. Consequently, Europe is a natural ally for Israel. In order to achieve this, however, Israel must project power, resolve, and strategic backing of other regional powers such as India and Turkey.

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the US Congress became the most significant power center in the world. In contrast to the president who represents short-term American interests, if for no other reason than the time limitations of his term in which he must produce immediate results, the strategic thinking of Congress is long-term, which accounts for the basic difference in their respective attitudes toward Israel. US Presidents Bush and Clinton pursued (and Clinton persists in this policy today) a policy of the dismemberment of Israel and its relegation to the 1967 borders. By contrast, a sweeping majority in the Congress — the authentic representative of the American public — adamantly opposes this policy. That is because a strong Israel with safe borders is a clear American interest. There is no more blatant (and from Israel's perspective, more exciting) manifestation of the polarization between the White House and Congress than the issue of Jerusalem. Whereas both houses of Congress decided by an overwhelming majority to transfer the American embassy from Tel Aviv to “Jerusalem — united forever under Israeli sovereignty” (that is the language of the bill), President Clinton, with the cooperation of Rabin, Netanyahu, and Barak, vetoed the bill. The issue of Jerusalem, of course, with its symbolic and historical significance, involves far more than the geographic location of the embassy. Without a doubt, American recognition of a united Jerusalem as Israel's capital would halt, and possibly even terminate, the “peace process”, and that was precisely the Washington lawmakers' intent. On the other hand, the White House's obvious goal of dividing Jerusalem is what will return Israel to the 1967 borders.

Thus, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, a historic window of opportunity opened for Israel. Actual implementation of the present disastrous political process — designed to emasculate the Jewish state and transform it from a regional power to a divided entity on the threshold of existential demise — would seal the
window of opportunity forever. Strategic cooperation depends on the strength of the ally. What possible interest could Turkey or India have in a shriveled Israeli entity with suicidal tendencies that cooperates with its most heinous enemies? Historical precedent teaches that the political anti-Semitic tendencies of the European Union will continue to develop. The US Congress, the last stronghold still supporting Israel, will abandon it as well, a trend already apparent. And the abandonment will be justifiable, since one cannot expect the average congressman or senator to be more Zionist than the Israelis themselves.

The patient reader who has reached this point, especially the reader upset by the air of pessimism permeating this article, will certainly ask: What can Israel do to escape the murderous trap into which it has fallen? The answer was provided in the 1997 document (The Statement of Aims of the Ariel Center for Policy Research). The following are the main points:

The defining of an alternative political-diplomatic strategy is conditioned first and foremost on acceptance of the basic assumption that the goal of the Arab world is to reduce Israel to the 1949 lines in order to make it easier to destroy the Jewish state. Therefore, consummation of the “peace process” means certain war, and this would take place under conditions, topographical and strategic, of decisive Israeli inferiority.

On the other hand, if the process is stopped now, the probability of war, though still very high, is not absolutely certain. And if war does break out, Israel’s chances of winning will be immeasurably higher in the present borders.

Hence, stopping the process is an existential necessity for Israel.

It is true that withdrawing from the “peace process” would mean paying an international political price. However, this price, high as it might be, would be immeasurably preferable to the existential danger entailed in retreat to the 1949 lines.

Israel will have to struggle in four arenas at one and the same time. This is to be done while conducting an aggressive, unceasing information campaign that corresponds to a variety of relevant target audiences. The purpose would be to achieve world understanding of Israel’s history, rights, and needs, in order to combat effectively the multiform and multitudinous Arab fabrications and inventions. To accomplish this, a government information agency needs to be established.

The four arenas of struggle that policy makers will have to deal with are as follows:

1. The Possibility of War

One must assume that the Arab world will not come to terms with an Israeli decision to freeze the present situation, and to stop “the momentum meant to restore Israel to its natural size”, as Anwar Sadat put it. Therefore, as already noted, a high probability of war exists. Israel must be ready to face it. For that purpose, the Israeli army must recover its deterrent image, which has been severely damaged, and a military doctrine must be clearly defined to deal with the anticipated conflict, which will consist mainly of the enemy’s launching of surface-to-surface missiles at Israel’s home front.

Tough deterrence: a. Israel still possesses strategic assets in Judea-Samaria and the Golan Heights; b. the techno-scientific gap between itself and its enemies is still considerable; and c. the level of armament in weapons of mass destruction in the Arab states has not yet reached the stage of critical mass. In combination, these factors might deter the Arabs from an adventure that they could perceive to be very dangerous.

However, if the factor of deterrence does not work, Israel must deploy for the possibility of a preventive war, and in contrast to the past, Israel must clearly define the strategic/diplomatic/political goals of the war.

2. The European Union

The political-diplomatic cost to Israel’s relations with the member-states of the European Union might be heavy and even involve
economic sanctions. However, a combination of determination on the one hand, and a comprehensive information campaign on the other, might soften European hostility. This will work chiefly if the European Union internalizes the fact that Israel has enduring principles of national defense that it will not violate even at the cost of a general war.

In the information campaign Israel must make it very clear that we have learned our lessons well from the example of Czechoslovakia and the Munich Agreement, and that there is no chance that Israel will commit suicide on the altar of European appeasement. On the contrary, just as Czechoslovakia's power vis-à-vis the Nazi threat was the keystone of peace in Europe in the late 1930s, so now Israel's power facing the Islamic threat is in the paramount interest of the Western world.

3. Relations with the United States

The diplomatic-political cost to relations with the United States might be much lower than we customarily think. Israel has many allies in both houses of Congress, in the military establishment, among Christian fundamentalists, and the broad public. The fact is that whenever Israel made clear that there was a clash of interests between it and Washington, and stood resolutely for its position, it was still able to hold its ground. Three examples are: the application of Israeli law and administration to the Golan Heights; the Jerusalem Law; and the destruction of the Iraqi nuclear reactor.

4. The Internal Israeli Arena

The public in Israel is obliged to pay the price of both peace and war. Hence, without overall support from the public for a decisive political enterprise, it will not be possible to stop the dangerous downhill slide on the slope of the "peace process".

The average Israeli is now in the midst of self-deception that undermines the nation's instinct for survival. This is the result of continuous brainwashing, media distraction, cynical exploitation of accumulated weariness, and economic abundance that emasculates willpower. To restore the Israeli public to rationality, a systematic, constant, and comprehensive information campaign is necessary, both on the level of the elites and of the mass media.

A harsh reality emerges from the above document. It is the result that one may anticipate from political defeatism. However, the undersigned, the Steering Committee of the Ariel Center for Policy Research, believe that Israel has the physical and mental potential to halt the grave developments described above, and to restore the Jewish state to the path of security and prosperity.32

Thus, the optimistic phrasing of the Steering Committee members.

However, the question is not what can be done, but whether there is enough of a survival instinct left in Israel to abandon the "peace process" and pay the heavy price of shattering expectations.

There is not one incident in the history of humanity in which defeatism led to peace which was anything other than a complete fraud.

Douglas MacArthur33
TWO AND A HALF PALESTINIAN STATES?

Raphael Israeli

Following the various Oslo Accords, which the Israeli Labor government initiated and its successor inherited, and the more recent Wye Plantation Agreement, which the Likud government engineered and its predecessor reluctantly agreed to support, there is no longer any question of whether or not there will be or ought to be a Palestinian entity. In fact, the long-held premise of this essay is that not only is it inevitable that a Palestinian state will and should be established, it is in Israel’s interest. Without a full-fledged Palestinian state, there will be neither permanent peace nor stability in the Middle East. Admittedly, a Palestinian state does not guarantee stability in itself, but its absence certainly guarantees instability and maintains Israel in her unenviable image of “occupier” and “oppressor”.

**Drawbacks of Currently Proposed Solutions**

Of all the solutions advanced over the Palestinian question, the one which seems to have made most headway towards implementation is the establishment of an entity in the so-called West Bank and Gaza. Autonomy was first suggested by Israel at Camp David but rejected by the Palestinians. Then, an Authority was offered by Israel and agreed to but only as a temporary, transitional measure by the Palestinians. Lastly, a Palestinian state was recognized by the Palestinians but rejected by Israel.

Regardless of the minutiae governing the nature of this entity, it is already evident that none of the alternatives can constitute a permanent, acceptable and ultimately satisfactory solution for most Palestinians. For all three varieties of settlement are handicapped by the following structural and functional defects:

- Even if Palestinians are given the totality of the West Bank and Gaza, these territories are too small, economically not viable and lacking in contiguity and topographical variety to sustain an independent entity.
- Even if Palestinians took control of the whole of these areas, this population of 2 million would constitute hardly one third of the Palestinian people. This means that two thirds of them would remain outside their homes and as a permanent reminder of the dispersion, misery, uprooting and irredentism that have been their lot over the past two generations.
- Such an alternative would leave unresolved the problem of the Palestinian Arabs living in Israel who long ago ceased to see themselves as a linguistic/religious/ethnic group striving for integration but have come to identify more or less fully with their Palestinian brethren across the “Green Line” and around the world. This feature of the conflict has recently gathered momentum due to the radicalization of the Arabs in Israel by Muslim fundamentalist currents which lead them to identify with Islam at large.

But to allow these defective concepts to govern our thinking and policy, we have made artificial distinctions which have no leg to stand on: we have divided the Palestinian people into four separate parts (Jordanians, Palestinians, Israelis, and Dia-
spora) and we have partitioned Palestine into three separate entities (Israel, Jordan and the Territories). Moreover, we have pretended that keeping them separate and attempting to resolve each of them piecemeal is to our liking. But, over and again, we were confronted with the reality of the indivisibility of the problems of Palestine and of the Palestinians slapping us in the face, and what we set out to do was undone.

First, we said that autonomy would fulfill the aspirations of the Palestinians for self-rule and conducted “autonomy talks” with the Egyptians, without Palestinian participation, in implementation of the “legitimate rights” of our neighbors, which we had recognized and committed ourselves to at Camp David. Soon we realized that the fate of no nation can be decided without its taking an active part in the shaping of that fate. Autonomy remained in the air, with no takers, until the intifada erupted in 1987. In the meantime, pro-Jordanian forces were active among the Palestinians, in an attempt to revive the “Jordanian option”, which many Israelis and Palestinians continued to cultivate, out of the erroneous assumption that King Hussein was moderate and more amenable to a settlement with Israel than any brand of nationalist Palestinians.

The Jordanian Option also had a legal side to it: the West Bank had been taken from the Jordanians during the 1967 War, therefore the Hashemite Crown was the only claimant to it, since no Palestinian entity had ever existed there. Had things worked out that way, the problems of Hussein might have been resolved, but not the Palestinian issue, which had grown independent of Amman since the founding of the PLO in 1964, and had been in competition with Amman since Black September, 1970. But when the Arab Summit recognized in 1974 the right of the PLO to recover any part of Palestine evacuated by Israel; and even more at the outbreak of the intifada, Jordan wholly, and wisely, renounced its claim to the West Bank, the only two contenders which remained face to face were the Palestinians and the Israelis.

Then we went to Oslo to negotiate, not with the representatives of the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza, with whom we could have discussed autonomy, but with the PLO which, purporting to represent all Palestinians, the majority of whom were outside Israeli rule, could not negotiate anything but a Palestinian entity that would resolve the Palestinian problem in “all its aspects”. And since the West Bank and Gaza were only part of the problem, not even the largest or most important part thereof, it was clear from the outset that the assets under Israel’s control were insufficient to address the Palestinian question in its entirety, to produce either a satisfactory or a permanent settlement at the end of the process.

While we were attempting to take the first steps with the Palestinians, transferring to them Gaza and Jericho and plotting the gradual transfer of much of the rest, under the false assumption that we were on the road to solving the Palestinian problem and freeing ourselves of its yoke, King Hussein came in a panicky rush when he realized that the growth of a Palestinian entity in Western Palestine would inevitably undermine his kingdom, inasmuch as Palestinian national sentiment did not stop at his frontier. He understood that heightened Palestinian morale, boosted by territorial independence and national symbols, would be by necessity detrimental to his regime. He feared, and not without reason, that his restive Palestinian subjects might take his rule for what it was, namely a regime imposed from above, not necessarily popular or accepted by the majority, while the nationality and political culture of the population is Palestinian in its majority.

Legitimacy was the magic word. Hussein, like the rest of the Arab leaders, lacked the legitimacy to his rule which in the West is provided by free and fair elections, and a smooth transition of power, something unknown in the Arab world. Again, like other rulers in the Arab world who claim legitimacy via Islam (the Moroccan and Saudi Kings, for example), Hussein needed desperately an Islamic symbol to hang on to, so he approached Israel, the only power capable of ushering him into Jerusalem, for that purpose. The price was clear: signing a contractual peace with the Zionist state. Left and Right in Israel were unanimous in granting Hussein that status, each for different reasons, but both were oblivious to the fact that they were used by the
astute king who could now roll the Palestinian hot potato into Israeli hands. For once Hussein’s Kingdom was recognized as a Hashemite-Jordanian regime, it was evident that the entire Palestinian problem had become Israel’s to solve, and he washed his hands clean of it.

This is precisely the tragedy of the Israel-Jordan peace treaty, which instead of facilitating the solution to the Palestinian issue — Jordan being part of Palestine and its population mostly Palestinian — has severed the link between those two parts of Palestine and of the Palestinians, and made the issue intractable and insoluble. You cannot put a puzzle together if half the pieces are kept apart, and you cannot assemble a car with half the parts missing. And this is precisely where we are today, following the various Oslo Accords and their aftermath. By bisecting the Palestinian issue by territory and population, not only do we encounter difficulties in meeting the minimal conditions of the Palestinians, we end up according them two and a half states: one in Jordan, which they will take over when democratization brings them to the helm; one in the territories, which is now in the making; and one-half of Israel, which the Palestinian Arabs of Israel claim as their own, for they now see themselves as a national minority in a “state of its citizens”, namely a bi-national state.

Is this what our founding fathers envisioned for us? Is it right that Israel give up her Jewish-Zionist identity in order to accommodate her Arab citizens who see and proclaim themselves as Palestinians? Do the Palestinians deserve two and a half states but the Jews none? Moreover, due to the demographic pressures of the Arabs of Israel, and in view of the democratic nature of the state, the time will come when they could increase their percentage in the population and in consequence bring their decisive vote to bear, unless steps are taken now to avert that development by including this population in the desired solution of the Palestinian problem.

The Proposed Palestinian State
The establishment of a Palestinian state is neither a question of morality nor desirability but one of necessity, failing which there will be no peace for anyone in the Middle East. Therefore, rather than devising ways to prevent it from rising or fighting it after it is born, one should focus on defusing its explosiveness, encouraging its creativity, responding to its genuine needs, and channeling its energies toward construction. Arrangements for good neighborly relations with Israel can be made ironclad and irreversible through a system of interdependencies, not verbal guarantees, and an Israeli security presence which would make any departure or deviation from them detrimental to the Palestinians, first and foremost.

Two fundamentals are required to begin negotiations with the Palestinians on this new arrangement: equal rights and maximal demands. Only if we recognize full and parallel rights to the Palestinians can we demand that our own full rights be equally recognized, and only if we make maximum territorial demands, do we have anything to yield while at the same time ensuring our own needs. In other words, we, like the Palestinians, enjoy the full ownership of all Eretz Israel/Palestine, and because we demand for ourselves and recognize in others that right, we are not only willing to compromise through partition, we are also vying for a large enough part of all Palestine, West and East, so as to satisfy ourselves and the others at the same time.

Once this premise is established, a declaration of four principles can be agreed upon with any national representation of the Palestinians willing to negotiate and come into partnership with Israel:

1. The Right of Self-Determination
The Palestinian people in all its components, just like the Jewish people, deserves the right of self-determination, namely the right to nationhood and statehood. But our recognition of this right of theirs is conditional on their recognition of the same for the Jewish people. This is a crucial element that Israel should have insisted on in Oslo, because this was precisely what the Palestinian National Charter denied. Its Article 20 claimed that the Jews are not a nation, Judaism being merely a faith, and therefore they are not entitled to statehood or self-determination. In Oslo we were outmaneuvered by the Palestinians when, in return for our recognition of
the Palestinian people, they recognized the State of Israel, not the Jewish people.

According to the PLO interpretation shared by Israeli Arabs, the State of Israel belongs to all its citizens, not to the Jewish people, and therefore, while there must be many Arab states, even a Palestinian-Arab state, there ought not to be any Jewish state per se. According to this logic, both the demographic growth of the Arabs within Israel and the Right of Return of the Palestinians would eventually generate an Arab majority in Israel which will, eo ipso, bring about the end of the Jewish state. Hence, in the Arab mind, the rhetorical recognition of Israel, as a temporary phenomenon, does not necessarily mean the recognition of the right of self-determination of the Jewish people, and as a corollary, the right of a Jewish state to a separate existence.

The "battle of the womb", as the Palestinians view it, has been a ponzi decided in their favor, inasmuch as demographic projections, as well as past achievements, inexorably tilt the scale their way. They reckon that in spite of the massive waves of aliya to Israel, the Israeli Arabs have kept up and even surpassed their initial percentage in the general population, and that while projected aliya, to which they are opposed for obvious reasons, is limited and finite, the potential for growth of the Arabs is limitless and open-ended, even if temporarily challenged by the new immigrants. Moreover, if Palestinian refugees are allowed to resettle in Israel, even in limited numbers, this would certainly hasten the pace of demographic reversal.

All this means that the Palestinians would have to accept the right of the Jewish people to self-determination, i.e. that it reserves the right, at any time in the future when demographic realities so warrant, to detach itself from the Arab majority and preserve the Jewish majority of their state. This is hardly feasible in the changing demographic conditions of any country, and it would also imply a constantly shrinking area of the Jewish polity every time the Jews have to retreat from a new, overwhelmingly Arab majority; unless, of course, a rectifying mechanism is devised as part of the settlement, which would neutralize the demographic threats that are likely to undo the Jewish nature of the State of Israel.

2. Movements of National Liberation

The failure of Israel to insist in Oslo upon the mutual recognition of Jews and Palestinians as two national groups is further emphasized and dramatized by the one-sided recognition by Israel of the PLO, the movement of National Liberation of the Palestinians, while the parallel recognition by the Palestinians of the Jewish Movement of National Liberation, Zionism, was allowed to be ignored. This asymmetry is not a matter of semantics or of courtesy, but crucial to the substance of the future relations between Israel and the Palestinians. The latter indeed vowed, in fifteen out of the thirty-three articles of their Charter, to eliminate all the manifestations of Zionism in Palestine, and only their recognition of Zionism, exactly as Israel recognized the PLO, could finally overcome this obstacle and indicate that there is a change of heart, not only of mind, among them.

In Oslo, and in all the negotiations which flowed from it, the Israelis demanded that all "clauses in the Charter denying the right of Israel to exist" be amended or extirpated. The Palestinians acquiesced, knowing that such clauses hardly exist at all, since the Charter is poised against Zionism, not Israel, although the two are certainly linked. Therefore, the PLO could continue to skirt the issue and maneuver around it instead of being simply required to recognize Zionism, failing which Israel should not have implemented any of her obligations under Oslo. Such a mutual, parallel and straightforward recognition of the PLO and Zionism would have rendered the Charter truly invalid and could have saved us all the scorn and bitterness that our vain efforts to have the Charter amended have occasioned.

Unlike the peace deals that we concluded with Arab states (Egypt and Jordan thus far), the one with the PLO is with an organization, not a state. Therefore, while our treaties with the Arab states did not include anything on Zionism, with the states remaining, on the whole, hostile to it and equating it with racism, the Oslo Accords opened a unique opportunity for us to get an acknowledg
edgment of Zionism by an Arab body. Had we made our recognition of the PLO conditional on their reciprocal acceptance of Zionism, we would have gone a long way towards normalizing our relations with the Arabs. The fact that we let them escape the issue did not facilitate or soften their attitudes towards us; quite the contrary, they were satisfied to hold on to their beliefs and to get what they wanted without having to pay the requisite price of reciprocity.

3. **Eretz Israel/Palestine Belongs to its Owners**

Historical Palestine, which until the British Mandate encompassed land west and east of the Jordan River, has been the joint home of its owners, the Israeli Jews and the Palestinian Arabs. Jordanian identity is a recent and artificial device to legitimise the rule of the Hashemites, who were expelled from the Hijaz. Whatever the differences one might detect between the Bedouins of Trans-Jordan and the Palestinian majority living there, both belong to the same stock, language and cultural heritage. The PLO, which purports to represent all Palestinians, is certainly aware that half the Palestinian people (some 3 out of over 6 million) dwell in Trans-Jordan where they constitute two-thirds or more of the population. When Palestinians serve as government ministers in the Amman government, they do not cease to identify themselves as Palestinians, as do those in Nablus and Ramallah or Haifa and Ramle.

Since the continuum of the Palestinian population in Palestine extends from Israel to Trans-Jordan, it makes no sense to divide it into its components and try to relegate its various segments to various national entities. Similarly, the land being historically, geographically and demographically one whole, it makes no sense to assign it to the existing regimes but rather to the peoples who inhabit it, relate to it and own it: the Israeli Jews and the Palestinian Arabs. Since both parties lay a legitimate claim to the entire land, it makes sense that they seek to negotiate its partition between them. This does not necessarily mean the liquidation of any other existing entity, for the country now called “Jordan”, its land and people, will all remain where it is, only the political contours of that entity should stand for redefinition.

The redefinition must be based on the premise that since each party is entitled to all Palestine, everything — from the Mediterranean to the Iraqi Desert — must be negotiable. Certainly, there are realities on the ground, whereby east of the Jordan River is entirely Arab and west of the Jordan mostly Jewish. Therefore, no one would envisage the folly of moving the Westerners east and the Easterners west; however, the principle that nothing is foreclosed and everything is negotiable, must remain as the guideline for negotiation. The negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians will be long and difficult, but at the end they will agree, regardless of the population patterns and the distribution of settlements, to a partition of the entire land along either of two options:

- West-East, with Israel keeping most of the heights of the West Bank and excluding the major population concentrations of the Palestinians; and the Palestinians extending their rule over all the East Bank and many of the population centers of the West Bank; or

- North-South (see Annex), with Israel keeping most of Western Palestine north of Beer-sheba and the mountains of Gilead in Northern Trans-Jordan, while the Palestinians ruling central and Southern Trans-Jordan and large tracts of the Negev which would allow them a safe and permanent land link to Gaza.

In the Palestinian polity that results from this new partition of Greater Palestine, the government will have to decide the modalities of their regime. If they wish to keep the Hashemites, and declare a constitutional monarchy, that would allow them to maintain the royal family, with limited powers and those pertaining to protocol as in Britain, while the real power will be in the hands of the elected government which represents the majority. If they should wish to opt for a republic, this is their choice, as long as the popular will is represented and a smooth transition of power is effected from elections to elections, and is not given any longer to the whim of an autocratic king.

4. **A Novel Definition of Sovereignty**

Since this partition will by necessity leave popula-
tion patterns intertwined, a distinction will have to be established between ownership and sovereignty over territory on the one hand, and the personal status of the inhabitants on the other. In other words, regardless of the contours of the permanent boundaries agreed upon between Israel and Palestine, many Palestinians, including Israeli Arabs, would remain under Israeli rule, while Israelis who today live on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, might conceivably remain in Palestinian territory. All inhabitants residing in either party but belonging to, or identifying with the other, could choose among three options:

- To sell their property and move to their homeland (Palestinians to Palestine and Israelis to Israel), where they can rebuild their lives as they choose, with the proceeds of the liquidation of their properties; or
- Acquire the citizenship of their country of residence, by fulfilling the local requirements of either of the two states: language, oath of allegiance, respect for local state symbols, and national services; or
- Remain as alien residents in their country of residence, enjoy local services, the right to work and other benefits, but also pay local taxes and obey the local laws. In a situation of peace and open borders between Israel and Palestine, both populations would enjoy freedom of movement, similar to Canadians in the United States or Belgians in France, with minimal checking procedures at the border check-points. They could exercise the rights and duties of a citizen in their home country, and due to the short distances, could even run for office in their home state while continuing to reside in their towns and villages. It is likely that in the future, many of these people would move to their home country in order to enjoy life among their kin, but until then there need not be any sharp cleavage in their double identity between their country of allegiance and their place of residence. Those who misbehave, break the rules or otherwise disturb the order, can be repatriated to their home countries, exactly like aliens in America, even those enjoying permanent residence, who are excluded without ceremony when they are found to have violated local codes of law.

At stake here are many of the millions of Palestinians presently under Israeli rule: one million Israeli Arabs, and the Palestinians who remain in those parts of the West Bank attached to Israel under the agreement. At stake are also those thousands of Israelis whose settlements, particularly in the periphery of Jerusalem, might fall within the sovereign territory of the Palestinian state. But once the permanent borders are delineated, each party will be sovereign to initiate any policy of immigration and settlement as it sees fit, something that will allow both the continuation of Jewish ingathering in Israel and the settlement of the Palestinian refugees in the vast Palestinian lands.

**Balance of Gains and Drawbacks**

*Israel* at the price of totally and finally renouncing Eastern Palestine, and even negotiating the fate of the territories it now holds west of the Jordan River, would achieve most of its desires:

- It would keep most of the strategic areas west of the river to satisfy its security needs, while the demographic menace against the Jewishness of the state would be neutralized.
- The Palestinian Arabs under Israeli rule, once they are assured of their ability to choose between nationalities and to determine their future, will shed their hostile attitude towards the Jewish state and each individual will be the master of his or her own fate.
- Israel can also regain the image of a peace-loving and generous country, once its crucial contribution to Palestinian independence and construction is proven.
- Israel's eastern border would not only be secure and peaceful, but also stable.
- Israel would be able to maintain and cultivate its nature as a Jewish and democratic state, free from demographic threats.
- Israel's improved image and peaceful boundaries would render it an attractive place for other Jews in the world and for investors at large.
• The Israeli settlements in the territories would not only be maintained, they could even be reinforced, once Israeli sovereignty is confirmed over parts of the West Bank and Gaza. Moreover, under the principle of reciprocity, it would matter little if thousands of Israelis joined existing settlements reverting to the Palestinians, when millions of Palestinians would continue to live under Israeli sovereignty. Quite the contrary, the peace would be reinforced and guaranteed if each side were interested in respecting and attending to the citizens of the other, because at stake would be the interests of its own citizens dwelling under the other’s rule.

The Palestinians would have to compromise by ceding to Israel most of the West Bank. They would have to amend their Charter so as to accommodate the Jewish-Zionist state as their legitimate neighbor, and put an end to the concentration of their struggle on western Palestine. In return, they would gain:

• Three quarters of historical Palestine, where plenty of territory is available to resettle the refugees who have been languishing in fetid camps for more than 50 years.

• They would have a large, viable and defensible state and gain recognition from Israel and secure boundaries with her.

• They will finally control the fate of most Palestinians, either through direct rule over them, or indirectly via the citizenship of those dwelling in Israel and elsewhere.

• They could enjoy Israeli technical and economic aid, labor markets and collaboration against common enemies.

• In short, they would be able to channel their enormous energies, talents, manpower and creativity to developing their country, resettling their refugees and cultivating their heritage and culture. They would also be able to control a large and strong army posted east of the Jordan River, which would pose no danger to Israel.

The Jordanian Royal House would have to renounce a large part of its authority and become a constitutional monarchy and recognize that the popular will in today’s Jordan is expressed by the Palestinian population, not by the Royal House. Certainly, no ruler has ever relinquished power of his own volition, but this would be a much smaller sacrifice than the territorial and ideological concessions that both Israel and the Palestinians would be called upon to make. In return, the King would perhaps:

• Regain some lost parts of his kingdom, as part of a new Jordan-Palestinian realm, rechristened, “The Hashemite Kingdom of Palestine”.

• Double, or more the number of his subjects, enjoy full legitimacy as the constitutional head of the new state, whose government represents the preponderance of the Palestinians within the kingdom.

• Enjoy stability for his crown and be able to devote his energies to the welfare of his people, to cultural and economic matters as a reigning, but not governing, head of state.

• Retain symbolic status as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, the power to dissolve Parliament, nominate the government and the like.

It is evident that if such a plan were announced by Israel, it would immediately be rejected as a nonstarter by both Palestinians and the king, each for their own reasons. Therefore, it is essential that the United States first adopt the plan or a variation thereof, as a basis for negotiation. When the King is then faced with the painful choice of either losing everything or compromising with the Palestinians, he might consider this option. So might the Palestinians who can only gain from a settlement of this sort. No one gets everything, but everyone gets something, and the most vital interests of all parties are served. It may be that this solution is far from perfect, but the others are worse. We have seen the difficulties, the crises and the false expectations created by Oslo, even before the parties got to discuss the really substantive issues. Great statesmanship consists of seizing the imperfect, the difficult and the uncomfortable before it becomes unfeasible and impossible.
A DISASTER FORETOLD:  
THE STRATEGIC DANGERS OF A PALESTINIAN STATE

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In the “Interim Agreement for the West Bank and Gaza” (Oslo II), deliberately or carelessly, the groundwork for the Palestinian state was laid. This manifests itself in the provisions of the foundations of a state for the Palestinians along with clear attributes of sovereignty. However, this state, which is probably the inevitable consequence of the agreement, poses severe strategic dangers to Israel, which ought to be scrutinized systematically.

Such a state poses palpable military hazards as well, but the strategic dangers are no doubt weightier. In any case, prior to discussing these strategic risks, the serious error and folly in granting the PLO the components of a state (as if the Oslo and Cairo agreements were rousing success stories) should be highlighted as well as how the Rabin-Peres government violated the Camp David Accords and the Madrid Framework.

PART I

The Strategic Dangers Emanating from the Oslo II Agreement

A. Distinct Foundations of Independence and Sovereignty in Oslo II

Despite the fact that the heads of the previous Labor government have declared in the past that in the permanent settlement, the Palestinians will have “an entity that is quite less than a state” (Rabin), or a “confederation with Jordan” (Peres), the Oslo II-interim agreement will almost inevitably lead to the establishment of a full, sovereign Palestinian state.

This danger is already obvious from the wording of the preamble to the interim agreement (similar to the wording in the “agreement of principles” known as Oslo I) — “recognition of the mutual legitimate political rights”. The version in the interim agreement is even worse than its counterpart in Oslo I.

Furthermore, the preamble also states that the elections to the [Palestinian] Council will constitute a significant preparatory transition period for the realization of the just rights and demands of the Palestinian people (emphasis added).

These passages can only be understood as advance Israeli agreement and recognition of a separate Palestinian state, although Oslo II is defined as merely an interim agreement whose main purpose is to test the very possibility of any solution.

According to the agreement, the Palestinians will have three state-like bodies — legislative, executive and judicial — just like any proper country. The part of the agreement which quite obviously lays the foundation for the state is the section which relates to the Palestinian Council, its composition and its authority. The Council’s size — 82 representatives according to the agreement and in fact, 88 — characterizes it as a full-fledged parliament. This number is not significantly smaller than the number of members in Israel’s Knesset, and is certainly much greater than that which one might anticipate in a “limited autonomy Council”, as it was called and envisioned by the Israeli signa-
tories of the Camp David agreement. Besides, the agreement enables the "rais" to appoint additional members.4 The Israeli excuse for allowing a Council of that size was pathetic: "We pressured them to have a large Council in order to provide them with some sort of chance at democratization" (said Uri Savir, Peres' aid).

The Council was granted the authority to legislate both primary and secondary legislation including the power to enact "basic" (constitutional) laws. The legislative powers were already granted to the Palestinians in Oslo I (in contrast to the intent of the Camp David Accord), but in the present agreement things went too far, as basic laws are unequivocal characteristics of an independent, sovereign legislature of a political entity.

The Council's mandate — legislative and executive — contains the authority to draft and carry out Palestinian policy. It is true that "the Council will have no authority to conduct foreign policy,"7 but the provision allowing the very formulation and execution of "policy" is itself ominous, certainly with all of the loopholes existing regarding foreign policy activity. One of such loopholes, for example, is that the PLO can "conduct negotiations and sign agreements with countries and international organizations to benefit the Council."8 So, too, it is permissible to establish "representative offices of foreign countries"9 in their territory. In addition, we have, in any case, been told by Arafat that "Israel has agreed to the existence of PLO diplomatic legations around the world."

Regarding the power granted to the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the agreement, the phrase "it will have territorial control"10 whose meaning is clearly obvious and which stands in blatant contravention of the Camp David autonomy accord, appears repeatedly. The territorial control applies to land, infrastructure and territorial waters as well.11 It has been claimed that the Rabin government originally intended to cede to the PA territorial authority over only ten percent of the area of Judea and Samaria, but ultimately tripled the area relinquished. In any event, it is clear from the agreement that the Palestinians have full rights to all lands ceded to them even before the commencement of final status negotiations. It is no accident that the Palestinians insisted on the inclusion in the agreement (a number of times) of the phrase, "the territorial unity of Judea, Samaria and Gaza", as "one unit."

In addition to control over territorial waters, the Rabin-Peres government also recognized the Palestinian "water rights" in Judea and Samaria (even though "they were to be discussed in final status negotiations").12 Yet the recognition in principle of Palestinian water rights itself indicates that even at this stage they already have a right to independence regarding disposition of water resources, a clear prerogative of statehood, and all that is left to discuss is secondary details. Incidentally, the Palestinians claim legal proprietorship over the mountain aquifer (from which Israel draws approximately one-third of its annual water supply) and beyond that — the ownership of the waters of the Jordan River as well!

Jerusalem is, indeed, mentioned in the agreement as one of the topics to be discussed in final status negotiations (along with Israeli settlements, defined military locations, Palestinian refugees, borders and foreign and Israeli relations).13 However, two aspects of the agreement weaken Jerusalem's status as the exclusive and undivided capital of Israel. First, Jerusalem is repeatedly mentioned in the agreement in the same breath as the West Bank and Gaza,14 in other words, not only is it not taboo as a topic for negotiations, but it is implied as an integral part of the PAs territory. Second, as to the "voting arrangement regarding Jerusalem", a "number of Palestinians" will be allowed to vote through the good offices of post-office branches in Jerusalem (for the PAs Council). This severely undermines Jerusalem's status as the exclusive capital of Israel as it recognized Palestinian rights there too.

No less unfortunate was the stipulation that "international observers will be present in the aforementioned post-office branches on the day of elections." It is reminiscent of the disgraceful "capitulation" era under Ottoman rule. According to the agreement,15 these observers were to be present throughout Judea, Samaria and Gaza during the elections. The fact that they were to do the same in Jerusalem proves our claim that the Rabin-Peres government carelessly agreed to
equate the status of Jerusalem with that of Judea, Samaria and Gaza.

Furthermore, Israel’s agreement to designate the three large villages adjacent to Jerusalem (Abu Dis, Azaria and Beit Iksa) as Area B — joint control — indicated that the Rabin government, to some degree, agreed to the de facto partition of Greater Jerusalem. The PLO’s insistence and its ability to “twist Israel’s arm” regarding Jerusalem is no accident, as it is a top priority of theirs to establish Jerusalem as the capital of their future state.

It is worth noting that three villages in the Jordan Valley were also ceded to the functional and personal control of the PA. Even regarding the operationally vital liftik area, the version reached favors the Palestinians. If any illusion still existed that the Rabin-Peres government would minimally demand the implementation of the “Allon Plan” or at the very least insist that “the security border will be the Jordan Valley”, it exists no longer. That, of course, had severe ramifications not only regarding the direction in which the Rabin government was heading and to the size of the Palestinian state, but for Israel’s security as well. There was always a majority supporting the consensus which viewed, at least, the Jordan Valley and the eastern slopes of the central mountain range as Israel’s security belt. This is no longer the case.

“Safe Passage” — paragraph X of appendix I of the agreement relates to “the safe passage of people, vehicles and goods between the West Bank and Gaza”. Although the specific details and the implementation of that section have been delayed (until Barak’s premiership), it granted the Palestinians, in principle, a legal land connection between the two parts of their territory. This strengthens their aspiration for “territorial contiguity” in their future state and fragments Israel’s territory — reminiscent of the 1947 partition plan. In addition, the extra-territorial aspect of the “safe passage” corridor further chips away at Israel’s already shrunk territory.

There is further good indication in the Oslo II agreement of the intention to establish a full political entity separate from Israel. To mention a number of them:

- **Tourism** — Tourists visiting Israel, continuing on to Judea, Samaria and Gaza will be subject to a separate (Palestinian) judicial authority.

- **Exploring and Drilling for Gas and Oil** — Not only will Palestinians be permitted to explore and produce natural gas and oil anywhere in areas A and B, but even in Area C1 (all that we need is for natural gas and oil reserves to be discovered).

- **Air Transportation** — Palestinians will have their own commercial and international air service. Thus, the near-Rafah Airport and a small airline started to operate.

- **The Palestinian Coast Guard** will function up to 6 miles from the coast and its boats will fly the Palestinian flag.

- **Gaza Port** — The port in Gaza was already mentioned in Oslo I. Yet, its establishment will assert clear independence in terms of the entrance and exit of sailing vessels, passengers and merchandise, for domestic and international journeys. Such freedom will have serious security ramifications beyond the fact that it advances the cause of independence.

- **Satellite Network** — The Palestinians will have “the right to establish a satellite network for various services”, except for international services. Why do the Palestinians need satellites already, today — is an appropriate question, but they will not miss any opportunity to attain another accoutrement of sovereignty and independence.

- **Archeological Finds** — “In consideration of the Palestinian demand that Israel return all archeological finds exposed in the West Bank and Gaza since 1967, the issue will be discussed in the final status negotiations.” Beyond the fact that therefore Israel recognizes, in principle, a separate state-like authority, the phrasing is unfortunate — as if Israel has been conquering a foreign country (and not Eretz Yisrael — the cradle of the Jewish People). Moreover, with its withdrawal, all “that was stolen from those to whom the land belonged from time immemorial” must be returned. This was a cynical expression of the Rabin-Peres gov-
ernment's preparedness to undermine the roots and antiquity of the Jews in Israel.

- **Changing the Israeli Status at Border Crossings.** "Israel will consider the Palestinian request relating to control of border crossings. The Israeli military government will replace the Port Authority." The upshot: While the border crossings with Egypt and Jordan are managed by the Port Authority designating, *de facto* and *de jure* Israel's permanent claim over them, it is important to the Palestinians that the border crossings with the PA be controlled at least by military government — characterized by its temporary nature and easy removability — paving the way for them ultimately to control the border crossings — a clear manifestation of sovereignty.

- **Taxes.** "Income tax on Israelis for income accrued (also) in Area C outside the Israeli settlements and military sites will be subject to the Palestinian tax code, and the tax collected will be transferred to the Palestinians." This speaks for itself.

- **The Title of "Rais" — President — for Arafat.** Throughout the text of the agreement, Arafat is referred to as "rais" and not chairman as he was called in his exchange of letters with the late Prime Minister — Rabin. The term "rais" in Arabic is synonymous with president, and it is no accident that Arafat insisted on the title. Moreover, in a number of instances in the agreement, Arafat's title appears explicitly as "President."26

Other than the above-cited indications of statehood, the clear manifestations of sovereignty should also be cited, as most of them were already agreed upon in the Cairo Agreement (May 1994), among these:

- **Mail, Stamps and Communications.** Including international communications implying political independence.

- **Palestinian Currency.** "The two sides will proceed with discussing the introduction of a Palestinian currency by mutual agreement."27

- **Palestinian Passports and Travel Documents.** These were agreed upon in previous pacts and are obviously clear manifestations of sovereignty.

Thus, in the above quotations (and other entries in the agreement), the Rabin-Peres government, despite its denials, agreed eventually to elevate the PA to the status of an independent sovereign state. Whether consciously or otherwise, a terrible blunder was committed — "a disaster foretold".

**B. The Difference between the Oslo Agreements and the Camp David Accords and the Madrid Conference Framework**

There is no doubt that the Oslo agreements differ fundamentally from the Camp David Accords and from the "Madrid Framework" although the words autonomy, self-rule, etc. appear in all of them. Furthermore, the Oslo agreements are an egregious breach of the Camp David Accords.

The autonomy prescribed by Camp David was to apply to the "inhabitants" alone; meaning it was to be an individual and municipal autonomy and not territorial in any way, shape or form ("Autonomy to the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza"). It was clear to the Israeli drafters of Camp David that in this way they could guarantee that a Palestinian state would not emerge, and they, therefore, focused on granting personal, local and municipal autonomy, but not territorial autonomy which would necessarily lead to an independent sovereign entity, something that they neither wanted nor could accept. Hence, there is no mention in the Camp David Accords of "political rights". The term emphasized in Camp David is the Palestinian "inhabitants" and not the Palestinian "people". There is certainly nothing in Camp David describing the autonomy as "a significant preparatory step" toward the realization of the political rights of the Palestinians", and certainly nothing about "mutual rights".

In addition, at Camp David, no responsibility whatsoever for internal security or combating terrorism was transferred to the Palestinians other than the mention of a "strong" Palestinian police force (which was itself a mistake or an unfortunate concession in the phrasing). In any case, neither the PLO nor the Palestinians were
viewed as a "political partner", and certainly not one whom we would entrust with our security. Similarly, they assuredly had no legislative authority and absolutely no mandate to legislate basic laws. Of course there was no mention of Jerusalem nor was it discussed.

It is hard to believe that Rabin and Peres were unaware of the enormous differences between the original Camp David accords and the Oslo Agreements. Their claim that they were simply continuing to implement the Camp David Accords and follow in Menachem Begin's footsteps was especially cynical. It is permissible to change one's opinion or alter an agreement, but it is grossly, brazenly abusive to deceive the public as if such change were the extension of a pre-existing process.

These leaders also claimed that they were acting within the framework established for the Madrid Conference deliberations. This, too, has no basis. Regarding the Madrid Conference, it was stipulated that the Palestinians were to be part of the Jordanian delegation. In that context, as in Camp David, there was no mention whatsoever of the PLO. In Oslo I and II these terms were violated and completely distorted. Again, one might claim that the Madrid Conference framework was not a good one, but one cannot claim that Oslo is a continuation thereof.

Consequently, like its predecessor (Oslo I), Oslo II is unfortunately laying the groundwork for the establishment of a Palestinian state, while misleading the Israeli public that these agreements are direct descendants of Camp David and Madrid.

A. The Strategic Significance of the Success of the Intifada and Terror

There is no doubt that if it were not for the intifada and Palestinian terror, Oslo I and II would never have come about. However, it appears that the signatories of these agreements and their supporters ignored, consciously or due to an unfortunate misunderstanding, the severe consequences which the success of terrorism and violence brings to bear. The main significance of the Palestinians' violent struggle is that after some 50 years of Arab conflict with the State of Israel, the Palestinians, and only they, have found a way to overcome it. Incidentally, they have achieved this in a simpler and more effective manner than through the "classic" wars or terrorist attacks along its borders and abroad.

The Palestinians have succeeded where the Arab countries have failed—in forcing Israel's hand. This was accomplished by employing very primitive methods: the rock, the bottle, activation of women and children, etc. After a long period of violent clashes, they, and not their brethren in Arab countries, found the appropriate "niche" for the struggle against Israel and the formula for its success.

When the then leadership of the Labor Party claimed that the intifada and terrorism had only a "political solution" they decreed its inevitable success. Furthermore, by surrendering to terrorism, Israel, for the first time in its history, made it clear that terrorism pays and that its perpetrators are worthy of being rewarded. But Israel has failed to understand that we are engaged in a continuing existential struggle in which the victor will be the one with the greater breathing space. However, in Israel today (in contradiction to the Palestinians) this commodity is non-existent. But failure in this struggle is an ominous harbinger for the fate of Israel and its future, as it is engulfed in a perpetual strategic situation of "the few against the many".

The Palestinian success in their struggle also signifies a display of Israeli impotence (for the first time) in dealing with a violent power struggle and, at the same time, a general weakening of its deterrent capability, especially vis-à-vis the Palestinians under its rule. Israel's rolling back and its profligate concessions stemming from a position of
weakness illustrate that a violent struggle against it is a rewarding investment. The *intifada* and the violence proved to the Arabs that Israel only understands and can be defeated by the "language of force". But for the Arabs and especially for the Palestinians, this will serve as a paradigm of success and a model for emulation in the continued struggle against Israel, until they fulfill all of their national aspirations. On the other hand, Israel will be held hostage in perpetuity to these tactics.

The demonstration of internal polarization in the face of violent Palestinian pressure is also, for the first time, a clear signal of Israeli lack of resolve to defend itself, by all means, thus striking a severe blow to its national strength. Not only have the Arabs always anticipated Israel's internal dissolution, i.e., the strategy of "inkimash", but the undermining of the State from within can lead eventually to the renewal of the military option (which has faded over the last few decades).

The claim that terrorism cannot be overcome and therefore its perpetrators ought to be appeased, means not only surrender to terrorism and to brutal pressure, but it also creates confusion between Israel's inability to solve the conflict with the Arabs by force (due to the quantitative-physical asymmetry) and the supreme necessity (for the same reason exactly) to emerge victorious from every power struggle with them.

**B. The Palestinian Concept of "Phased Struggle"**

The ultimate Palestinian goal is the establishment of a "secular democratic state in Palestine". However, reality dictates that this be accomplished in stages: First by correcting the "1967 results", then the "1948 results" and so on. The term "Palestine" means, to the Palestinians, all territories west of the Jordan River, although Jordan and parts of Lebanon are also included in the concept "Greater Palestine".

In contrast to some "moderate" Palestinian declarations regarding "existence of two neighboring states", there exists a plethora of Palestinian statements to the contrary, i.e., concerning the non-abandonment of the conflict with Israel until all national goals are achieved in their entirety.

The most significant statements on the matter are those made by Arafat himself, even subsequent to his signing the Oslo I (September 1993), the Cairo (May 1994) and the Oslo II (September 1995) agreements. In September 1995 he said to a Jordanian newspaper that "the Oslo II agreement is a delayed realization of a stage in the PLO's 1974 phased plan." Especially blatant was his statement in a Johannesburg mosque in May 1994 (which he repeated more than once) in which he compared the Oslo agreements to the Hudaibiya Pact. This 7th century treaty serves in Islam as an historical model for suitable behavior when Muslims are in a transitory period of weakness, allowing them to violate agreements at their convenience. In an interview with an Egyptian newspaper in May 1998, he again said: "The fate of the Oslo agreements will not be different than that of the Kuraish agreement." Arafat repeated similar statements in Stockholm in January 1996, again, after Oslo II.

These pronouncements prominently raise two basic issues regarding the relations with the Palestinians — trustworthiness and intentions. Even without these and other similar statements by Arafat, the man never had a reputation for reliability and credibility, all the more so after statements like these.

In the course of the signing of Oslo I (September 1993), Arafat committed, in writing, to Israel that he would abrogate all paragraphs in the Palestinian Charter which invalidated Israel — and he did not. But in Oslo II the commitment was recycled and it was established that the charter would be repealed no more than two months after the election of the Palestinian Council (i.e. till March 1996). Yet Arafat had already declared in the United States (October 1995) before the ink of his signature on Oslo II even dried, that it would not be done. In April 1996, to support Peres' election, Arafat passed a nondescript resolution calling for changes in the charter and appointed a legal committee to review which paragraphs ought to be amended. Once again the promise to amend/abrogate the charter was recycled without anything actually being done. In Gaza, in December 1998, in the presence of US President
Clinton, the charter was “canceled” again... for the umpteenth time.

Israel’s tragedy is that the Rabin-Peres government wanted to put its faith in someone who has never been caught telling the truth. One of the superficial excuses provided is that Arafat’s declarations were intended for internal consumption. Even so, that government should have remembered its own statement in the wake of Rabin’s assassination that “words can kill”, and therefore should not have so casually overlooked Arafat’s pronouncements concerning “jihad”; “Hudaiya”; “the continuation of the struggle until the liberation of Palestine and Jerusalem”; “the internal dissolution of Israel”; “in the name of the suicide bombers”; and more.

Furthermore, Arafat’s words reflect the true intentions of the PLO regarding the unceasing struggle with Israel and its continuation in phases. The failure to read an adversary’s true intentions is what always underlies strategic blunders and surprises, in Israel and the world over. This was the case, for example, in the Yom Kippur War and in the second Gulf War. The oversights took place because the “true intentions” of the enemy were difficult to decipher. But in our case the issues are clear as day. The Rabin government ignored them due to blindness and did not take them seriously due to a mistaken preconceived notion for which we will eventually pay dearly.”

It is worthwhile noting that the recently published constitution of the Fateh (Arafat’s core organization) determines that “the armed struggle for the uprooting of the Zionist existence will not stop until its elimination, and Palestine will be liberated in its entirety.” Even more important is (the fact) that even before achieving their goal of correcting the 1967 results, the Palestinian leaders already started bringing up UN Resolution 181 (from 1947), which is in fact the old Partition Plan, whose terrible meaning is the chopping away of Jaffa, Ramle, the Galil and the Negev away from Israel.

Arafat and his cronies openly admit that the present change in their position is tactical and not strategic, in other words, no major upheaval has taken place regarding their true attitude towards Israel’s right to exist. The “change” stemmed from the Palestinian need to win over world opinion to support their cause, especially that of the United States, and from the awareness that the “balance of power” today does not enable them to achieve their goals all at once. In the summer of 1995, in responding to the critics of the treaties with Israel, Arafat expressed “amazement”; “this is the phased program which we all adopted in 1974 — why do you oppose it?” A senior representative of the PLO added that no difference exists between Hamas and the PLO in terms of goals — a state in all of Palestine — the only difference is tactical: Hamas wants to achieve it all at once, while the PLO method is in stages.

It should be remembered that the “phased struggle” stems from ideological and religious roots, whose core is the inability truly to come to terms with the existence of the Zionist State — “the extension of Western imperialism which stole the land from its original inhabitants and evicted them from it”. There is no doubt that, at first, “after the establishment of their state”, the Palestinians will demand that Israel at least shrink back to the 1947 UN Partition Plan borders — and so on and so forth. Present day pronouncements already corroborate this!

C. Realization of the Right of Return

“The Right of Return” is, to the Palestinians, more important than any other right, even the right of “self-determination”. This right is, after all, the raison d’être of the PLO and the core of its existence. The PLO was born of the “1948 refugees” and to them it owes its very being. The PLO was born exactly to amend the “1948 injustice”, therefore its agenda is not only rectifying the “1967 conquest”. In addition, this right received legitimization being anchored in the 1948 UN Resolution 194. Thus, it is a right which the Palestinians neither can, nor want to forego. No wonder that its realization has been integrated into both Oslo agreements, albeit circuitously — granting visas for “uniting families”, for purposes of “studies and work” and the like.”

Thus we might be witnessing the beginning of the realization of the Palestinian right of return, with Israel’s approval, as Israel will be unable to supervise those entering Palestinian territory and remaining there after their visas expire. And all this was
permitted before the sides have even begun to deliberate the issue and the difference of opinion regarding, for example, the “number of displaced persons and refugees” who will be permitted to enter the PA’s territory.

The severe ramifications of the prospect of 2.5 million (or even fewer) Palestinian refugees and displaced exercising their “right of return” to pre-1967 Israel could not be clearer. Our contention is, that even if only one million refugees exercise this right to return to a “Palestinian state” with limited space,” it will lead to unbearable overcrowding and, along with the economic hardships which can almost certainly be anticipated, to internal pressure which will necessarily erupt violently in Israel’s direction. It is reasonable to assume that even if only a few hundred thousand return they will turn into a time bomb and a threat to the demographic equilibrium. In addition, the success of the Palestinians to return to Judea, Samaria and Gaza first, will be a source of encouragement to the Palestinians and of perpetual pressure on Israel to allow repatriation within the pre-1967 borders. After all, what is the difference for them between Jenin and Acre and between Nablus and Ramle?

Moreover, it must be emphasized that in the eyes of a Palestinian refugee the return to Judea, Samaria and Gaza does not carry with it much significance as it was not from there that he was “uprooted”. His attachment is to Israel’s territory proper. In other words, repatriation of refugees to the PA territories in Judea, Samaria and Gaza will in no way realize the “right of return”, and it will continue to be a Damocles’ sword, pending and used against us.

Similarly, it is not unrealistic to imagine a scenario where tens or hundreds of thousands of Palestinians will decide to exercise their “rights” unilaterally, with their authorities’ encouragement, and will simply march from the Palestinian state towards their “homes” in Israel. The success of the mini-march by the residents of Jericho in the summer of 1995 in which they overran IDF outposts can be viewed as a harbinger of things to come.

Once again, the PLO will not acquiesce to anything less than maximal realization of the “right of return” for Palestinians in exile. If they agree to moderate slightly their demand, it will lead to a persistent counter-demand that Israel correspondingly abrogate the “Law of Return” (which more than anything else, characterizes it as a Jewish state), which will transform it into a “state of all its citizens” if not worse than that.

D. The Risks from the Israeli Arabs
One of the grave dangers posed by the establishment of a Palestinian state to Israel is the possibility of the recruitment of Israel’s Arab citizens to join the continuing battle against the Jewish state. Large segments of the Israeli Arab population who identify nationally with their brethren in the “territories” are ripe, in any case, to join the battle due to their subjective feelings of discrimination and the incipient extremist tendencies among them.

Three months after the Cairo Agreement (May 1994), and after the Rabin-Peres government granted Arafat bases of operation in Gaza and Jericho, a message was sent to Israeli Arabs in his name stating that:

...the activities of the Palestinian Authority will spread within the borders of Israel and will concentrate on the Palestinian Arabs within. The mission will be entrusted to our brother, Dr. Ahmed Tibi. It should be achieved discreetly, far from the media and statesmen."

The PA even issued passports to Israeli Arabs who registered for the haj in Mecca, in blatant violation of Oslo I. In Arafat’s office there is a department which deals with the ongoing relations with the Israeli Arabs — “The Committee for Ties with the Palestinians of Occupied Palestine”.

In any case, the overwhelming majority of Israeli Arabs see themselves as divided citizens: Physically they are indeed in Israel, but their consciousness and national identity are totally Palestinian-Arab."

In this context, a video produced by the Association of Arab Writers in Israel (!), which was circulated among Israeli Arabs in late 1995 and calls for the PLO to take over the State of Israel, is most instructive

(Force 17 will be in Gaza and Jaffa, Jerusalem and Haifa, Jenin and Ramle, Lod and Acre. The Zionist enemy stole our land by force and will return it by force.)
No doubt Israeli Arabs will be unable to remain indifferent if their brethren in the “territories”, who were viewed as their inferiors for many years, realize the national Palestinian aspirations. Especially since their “Palestinian brethren” who achieved their national objective — a Palestinian state through violent struggle, would enjoy enhanced prestige. More importantly, they will serve as role models in the battle against the Jewish state. In other words, it is difficult to imagine that in the wake of the establishment of the Palestinian state, the nationalist feeling resonating within Israeli Arabs will diminish (as was contended). On the contrary, it is almost certain to cause only greater agitation. In addition, the problem is not limited to the close ties between Israeli Arabs and the PLO, but to their ties to Hamas and the Islamic Jihad as well (the security forces’ discoveries in Nazareth and Um-al-Fahm in recent years attest to that fact).

It can be anticipated, therefore, that Israeli Arabs will not remain content with their present minority status in Israel. They will strongly bring up their national demands which will range from annexation into the Palestinian state, to gaining broad political autonomy and self-rule in different sections of Israel: the Galil, Wadi Ara, Rahat and the like. These demands will probably be accompanied by violent struggles, thereby weakening the foundation of the Jewish state. Thus it will accelerate Israel’s disintegration, not to mention increasing the friction and the violence between Israeli Arabs and the Jewish state.

In any case, already today, aided by the support of the Israeli Left, Israeli Arabs, led by the Arab members of Knesset, are voicing the demand that Israel be transformed into a “state of all its citizens”. This demand begins with the call to change the authentic symbols of the Jewish state like the flag (blue-white with a Star of David) or the anthem (“Hatikva” which “doesn’t speak to the Arabs”). The Arab members of Knesset — Darawshe, Dehamshe, Bishara, et. al — went even much further by expressing opinions totally delegitimizing the Jewish state, its army, its government and its right to existence. But most importantly, transforming the State (God forbid) into a “state of all its citizens”, (let alone delegitimizing the Jewish state) means a radical change in its Jewish character and in the intentions of its founding fathers as expressed in its declaration of independence, and in the hopes and prayers of millions of Jews throughout the generations. The State of Israel as a “state of all its citizens” will be a definitely different country which will be one step away from total assimilation in the surrounding Arab region. It will certainly not be a unique, quality state which will exist in calm.

There is little doubt that most Israeli Arabs are undergoing a process of radicalization and Palestinianization. As a result, we witness those sharp and severe pronouncements by their leaders against the State of Israel, leading eventually to an unwarranted cooperation with the PA. It should not be overlooked that the Israeli Arabs are essential for the PLO in implementing the “1947 Partition Plan”, by which they could claim the Galil, Negev and other integral parts of Israel. Consequently, we are not dealing here with an innocent minority, but rather with one that harbors sovereign demands over Eretz Israel and which is an integral part of all Palestinians and Arabs.

E. Terror and Violence as a Strategic — and Not Only a Security — Threat

For years, many in Israel have perceived terror as a “current” (routine) security nuisance and less as a strategic risk. But for a while now, there is no longer any doubt that it poses a strategic threat of the first order. It was with the intifada and “internal terrorism” that the Palestinians succeeded in defeating Israel, or in the words of the Prussian military strategist, von Clausewitz, “imposed their will” upon Israel. That is why the Rabin-Peres government even abandoned the concept that terror must be stopped, and acceded that it would continue to be “part of our reality”. But what is the point of “peace” and concessions if there is no security, quiet or tranquillity, and if the number of victims of terrorism has increased threefold?

From the moment that terrorism achieved its political aims and caused us to change our positions, the fact that it is a “primitive struggle”, an “expression of weakness” and the like, as Israeli leftists try to present it, is irrelevant.

Not only has the Palestinian struggle altered
traditional, bona fide Israeli positions, it has also undermined our self-confidence — including our belief in the righteousness of our cause in the conflict — and above all it has destroyed our willingness and determination to fight back when necessary. At this critical juncture, Israeli society’s battle fatigue has been exposed, but this should not have occurred, as the struggle is, as mentioned above, existential, i.e., “the few versus the hostile many”.

The Palestinian success in the conflict has caused the loss of Israeli territorial assets and the shrinking of its geographic dimensions. Thus the Palestinians accomplished that which we always feared would happen in war: loss of territory. So, the Palestinians achieved, for the first time in the history of the conflict, that which the Arab armies always failed to achieve in “classical wars”. No wonder that even Rabin reached the conclusion that terrorism had become a “strategic threat”.

One of the reasons for our thorny problems with Palestinian terror, especially as it relates to international (and even Israeli) public opinion, is that the Palestinians and the Arabs do not view terrorism and public violence as totally invalid, but rather as the legitimate “armed struggle for national liberation”. Even if they distort (as is their wont) the true meaning of their struggle against Israel, not to mention their improper and even inhuman methods, the strategic and existential dangers which stem from their armed struggle to liberate the land (which the Jews view as their exclusive home), can be found in their terminology.

Palestinian terror has become a strategic danger also because of the difficulty (although it is not impossible) to combat against and crush it in a conventional manner. A central factor disturbing a determined confrontation with terror is the sense that we are militarily superior and “what harm can terrorism cause anyway?” But this sentiment is fundamentally mistaken. Israel is indeed strong militarily, but its power is of not much significance if it does not demonstrate resolve and willingness to exercise it when necessary. One of the proofs of this was the shallow claim that only a “political solution” could put an end to the intifada. Those claimants have ignored that a “political solution” comes only after victory, and after the opponent has been defeated or at least has significantly changed his character or behavior. If a political solution is offered at the outset, it means that we are admitting our weakness and our inability to solve the terror problem in any other way. This, indeed, expresses itself in the unfortunate results of the “political solution”. Likewise, this is a deviation from the principle which has always guided us — that Israel (“the few”) cannot allow itself to lose any significant battle with its enemies (“the many”). Moreover, while we are boasting about our might, we forget that F-15 aircraft, Merkava tanks and sophisticated weapons are of little use against the primitive Palestinian struggle, so our might is practically irrelevant for such a struggle.

The Oslo agreements’ signatories took great pride in their unconvincing claim, that through these agreements they have led a significant portion of the Palestinians off the path of terrorism. But, if these signatories achieved this outstanding “achievement” by capitulation, rewarding terrorism and turning it into a model to be emulated in the continuing struggle against Israel — they accomplished very little and very badly. Additionally, what good is a remedy (the Oslo agreements) if it is worse than the disease (terrorism and violence) itself? Secondly, when the PA is not truly fighting terrorism, not destroying its infrastructure and is even ideologically legitimizing it in the eyes of the Palestinians — of what use is the “remedy”? And third, if some of the Palestinians have laid down the weapon of terror today, there is no guarantee that this will continue in the future, and the bloody events of late September 1996 proved that PA police can also resort to terrorism.

F. Specific Risks of Terrorism and Violence from a Palestinian state

According to the Oslo Agreements, the main responsibility for combating terror was ceded to the Palestinians. “They will do it better than us, without the High Court of Justice and without B’zelem” (human rights advocates) — it was said. But not only did terrorism fail to come to a halt or diminish, but it increased. Since Oslo I (September 1993) the number of victims reached over 300 dead
and 1,000 wounded — more than three times the prior toll: In the 15 years preceding Oslo, "only" about 255 Jews were murdered. The upshot is that even in this pragmatic respect, the signatories' concept was fundamentally flawed, not to mention that Arafat is not truly and consistently combating terrorism.

Moreover, the Oslo Agreements have the real potential to exacerbate the dangers posed by terrorism and violence for a number of primary reasons:

- The terrorists' freedom of action in the autonomous territories has increased, and the cities of Judea, Samaria and Gaza have become terrorist bases and cities of refuge.
- Arafat and the PA will neither have the will nor the ability to combat terrorism wholeheartedly.
- Israel's ability to combat terrorism decisively on its own is drastically diminished, both from the standpoint of intelligence and operations.

The agreements have the potential to increase the threat of Palestinian violence, *inter alia* due to the large number of armed police allowed. According to Oslo II, at most 30,000 police are permitted in Gaza, Judea and Samaria. This number is, incidentally, about double the number of police in Israel[1]. But thousands of Palestinian police beyond the authorized number were recruited (amounting to some 50,000) and were equipped with many more weapons than were sanctioned. Indeed, the growing Palestinian self-confidence and their readiness to confront Israel face-to-face were exhibited during the bloody events of September 1996.

The PA never has been and still is not excessively motivated to combat terrorism and violence, because it views them as legitimate tools which have proven highly effective in achieving their political objectives. In addition, when "peace" is perceived by Arafat in the first place as a transient imperative, it is difficult to expect him vigorously to combat terrorism or bring about a civil war at Israel's behest. Besides, if Israel continues to shower him with generous concessions, despite the continued terrorist attacks and violence, he is perfectly correct in asserting that "the peace of the brave will not be affected by a few acts of terrorism".

No wonder then that not only is Arafat not acting against the terrorist infrastructure, but he does not fundamentally negate or reject terrorism, and he certainly has no intention of indoctrinating his people against it. On the contrary, his statements regarding *jihad* in general, and "in the name of the suicide bombers" in particular, along with statements referring to Israel as an enemy, only serve regularly to pour oil onto the bonfire of incitement and consistently inflame terror and violence. Similarly, he does not extradite (nor is there any chance that he might extradite) habitual murderers and terrorists to Israel, despite the fact that it is mandated by the agreements.

If the PA has occasionally acted against terrorism at all, it has only been in response to Israeli specific pressure, i.e., in the wake of brutal acts of terrorism, and not a moment sooner. Even then its activities were "cosmetic" and short-lived. Thus Arafat and his people can, in fact, be blamed in particular for the savage February-March 1996 wave of terrorism, since, had they combated terrorism earnestly, it is almost certain that this wave could have been avoided. One proof of this is the absence of many brutal terrorist attacks since. So, too, the PA bears responsibility for not preventing the bloody terrorist attacks in Jerusalem (in the Mahane Yehuda market and the Ben-Yehuda promenade) in 1997.

Rabin himself brought up, on occasion, the fact that the PA is not "sufficiently" combating terrorism, and that he is not convinced that they are either capable or willing to do just that. Although Shimon Peres said that the war against terrorism had become a Palestinian interest, he bluntly contradicted himself by stating that "their commitment to agreements is worth only about 40 percent, and all the rest is rhetoric, embellishment and high-flown phrases." Besides, why should Arafat wage war against his own people and endanger his national unity and power base for Israel? True, he has no interest in allowing any factor to endanger his rule, but the distance between that and a civil war over an issue (terrorism) which he himself has a vested interest in its continuation (in order to weaken Israel and elicit concessions) is great. Arafat prefers
occasional minor confrontations with Israel, which in any case will be of limited duration, to bloodshed within his own camp, especially since he eventually benefits from those confrontations.

If a Palestinian state is established, there is no reason to expect that the terror and violence will dissipate. On the contrary, everything which was said about the potential terrorism stemming from the Oslo agreements, holds true here as well. Moreover, one can even foresee a number of "variables" which will exacerbate the situation:

- The Palestinian state, from which the terrorist acts will originate, will have greater immunity against Israeli reprisals and disciplinary measures. A state of that sort will have much greater existential immunity than the PA has today.

- The Palestinian state or its residents will be in a much better position to perpetrate terrorist acts against Israel. Terror could originate among some of its residents whether the state approves or not. Furthermore, if the Palestinian state enjoys, as suggested, greater immunity, it could allow itself greater freedom in fanning the flames of terrorism, and would have limited desire to prevent it.

- As the IDF will not have any presence in the "state", its ability to combat Palestinian terrorism and prevent it independently will diminish even further than it has already.

- With the establishment of the "state", and the aid of the geographic and other conditions extant, many new terrorist threats which today seem unrealistic, might emerge. So, for example, the terrorist cooperation with Israeli Arabs may increase. The "safe passage" which has been provided for the Palestinians according to Oslo II, will facilitate this, despite "creative" solutions to the security problems which were to be invented.

Those claiming that the Palestinian state will have a vested interest in combating terrorism are ignoring the following prominent factors:

- It can be assumed that with the establishment of the "state", not all of the Palestinian aspirations will have been realized (for example "the right of return" to areas within "the Green Line", liberation of all of Palestine, etc.). Thus they will have an overriding interest in obtaining what they were unable to secure in negotiations (as the Palestinians will not be satisfied with anything less than total fulfillment of their national objectives, even if the process is a long one). In order to further the realization of their, as yet, unrealized goals, they will almost certainly choose the path of terrorism and violence, which has proved effective heretofore.

- One may assume that the "security arrangements" (among them demilitarization and the like) which will limit the Palestinians' independence and sovereignty, will not be acceptable to the Palestinians, certainly in the long term. Even if they accept these limitations due to the exigencies of time and lack of alternative, they will strive to erode and revoke them as soon as possible, while conducting a campaign rife with violence and terrorism.

There is no reason to assume that the phenomenon of fundamentalism among the Palestinians will disappear or moderate with the advent of the "state", as the causes of this phenomenon are not tied exclusively to frustration resulting from the lack of independence. The fundamentalist Palestinian organizations themselves will continue to play a leading role in the terrorist campaign in cooperation with fundamentalist elements throughout Moslem countries.

**G. The Threats to Israel's Power Base and National Strength**

The establishment of a Palestinian state will necessarily serve a dire blow to Israel's national strength and deterrence capability, which have already been considerably eroded.

National strength, as known, is not less essential than military power as a central pillar in the overall strength of a nation. National strength engulfs such components as national cohesion, motivation and morale, preparedness and determi-
nation to employ force, staying power, ideology as a national compass, quality of leadership, etc.

Establishing a Palestinian state on the background of the success of terrorism, accompanied by lip service paid to moderation of the ingrained hostility harbored by the Palestinians towards Israel, will necessarily lead to a schism and grievous rupture in Israeli society. Even if it appears that half of the nation believes in the “peace process” ("because there is no alternative" and the like), the fact remains that many Jews in Israel view it as a virtual peace and are not interested in excessive concessions, as was proven in May 1996 elections. It is clear that once the Rabin-Peres government began worshipping the “supreme” value — “peace” — and forced it upon the other half of the nation through reliance on a scant, incidental and non-Jewish majority, a palpable erosion in Israel's national strength took place.

The policy of the Rabin-Peres government which called for the uprooting and gradual isolation of Jewish settlements in Judea, Samaria and Gaza further exacerbated the schism. Yet uprooting Jewish settlements is a blatantly anti-Zionist act, i.e., a mortal blow to the ideology and philosophy which led to the establishment of the State of Israel. The trauma of the obliteration and evacuation, and the psychological jolt which will accompany the uprooting of settlements, pose potentially fatal threats to Israel's national fabric and a grave assault on its national strength, as ideology is one of the components of that strength.

Even worse is that the Rabin-Peres government was not deterred from the idea of transferring settlements in Judea and Samaria to Palestinian sovereignty and rule. The clear meaning of that step was that we, by our own hand, were prepared to create a new Diaspora at our own doorstep. The most pathetic aspect of it all was that the State of Israel — the fruit of the Zionist ideology — intended to take an action whose result would be a fatal blow to the very roots of that philosophy (whose main idea was the elimination of the Diaspora and the creation of Jewish sovereignty in the Land of Israel). It seems that we have not yet completely rid ourselves of the exile (ghetto-like) character of ours."

The establishment of a Palestinian state will be a clear expression not only of victory over Israel, but also of the destruction of the Israeli belief in the justice of our cause. For dozens of years, the majority of Israeli society believed in the justice of its cause in the conflict with the Arabs and the Palestinians, and this belief gave us, the “few”, the staying power to continue in our long and arduous struggle against the “hostile many”. Ironically, in order to resolve the conflict it is we (“the powerful” and “the cruel occupiers”) who must concede, even at the risk of exposing ourselves to far-reaching dangers.

Furthermore, if at one point there was talk of compromise, including territorial compromise, between the two adversaries, the more likely solution, which is apt to lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state, is total capitulation to the other side (with poor demands for “security arrangements”, which will be ineffectual in any case, the exception). Giving up about 80-90 percent of the land (for starters) is not a “compromise” whatsoever.

Abandonment of the firm beliefs which have always guided us (including the non-establishment of a Palestinian state) must severely erode the national strength."

The situation is many times worse in light of the materialistic, hedonistic atmosphere in which we live, which places egotistical self-fulfillment at the top of the list of priorities, and views the individual as principal and the state secondary. However, ideology is no less a fundamental component of the national strength than physical power, and without it, it is impossible to sustain a Jewish state in this troubled region.

Similarly, the leaders of the Left, for some time now, have lost their belief in the employment of power even when it is essential and justified, and instead they endlessly pontificate how using it no longer has any value or benefit."

When they say that it no longer has any usefulness, not only do they transmit to the other side a very dangerous message of encouragement to harm us, but we, ourselves, erode our own deterrent power which has always been one of the pillars of our defense doctrine. The Israeli leadership failed to understand that, although Israel is indeed strong militarily, military power is meaningless unless accompanied by the
willingness and resilience to employ it. Yet Israel has exhibited no real inclination to exercise force to crush the intifada and terror (or to pacify, for that matter, the situation in Lebanon). So Israel has demonstrated weakness and weariness from a just struggle, which can only be interpreted by our enemies, especially the Palestinians, as a comprehensive state of frailty to which our society and state have deteriorated. Again, might is not necessarily connected to the contents of one's arsenal, but more by the readiness to use it when necessary, and it is highly doubtful that that is still the Israeli case. The proof — far-reaching concessions to the Palestinians and preparedness to establish a Palestinian state. It is no accident that the Labor party, in its 1996 election platform, canceled the plank opposing the establishment of such a state.

The above setbacks weaken not only the national consensus but also the morale and the national motivation. Since the IDF is the people's army, it can only be expected that Israel's societal illness will reflect upon it as well. Indeed, there are dangerous indications already afoot. Motivation (along with consensus and the faith in the justice of our cause) has always been the cornerstone of the IDF's might, and its fighting ability against its many enemies. The propensity for self-sacrifice stemmed from a love of the homeland, but, as it is now less important than the new Molot — "peace" — it must fade. The erosion of the motivation, therefore, seriously weakens the IDF and Israel (this was demonstrated just recently in the clear decline in the motivation to serve in combat units and in the reserves).

On parallel, it is distinctive in the last years, especially since Oslo, that both national morale and cohesion have sharply declined. Although many Israelis are longing for peace and personal security (either from mental fatigue or innocent belief in "peace") — many others are well aware of Israel's overall deterioration, as she backs down from every security confrontation, be it in Lebanon or vis-à-vis the Palestinians. Though not all are knowledgeable of the genuine strategic implications — the public's gut feelings, that Israel's plight is bad indeed and will not be better in the foreseeable future — cause much frustration and depression.

A Palestinian state will certainly fatally weaken Israel, including its deterrence ability, and will increase the danger of internal decay. Very instructive in this context are Sheikh Yassin's (the leader of the Hamas) words: "You indeed have lost the will to fight and this draws us nearer to our final victory."

Indeed, if there is no will to fight for our causes and rights, there is no Zionism and we have no reason to be here.

H. "Surrounding Risks": Jordan, Syria and Iran
The establishment of a Palestinian state must inevitably conflict with the existential interests of Jordan, as the PLO had and will continue to have irredentist claims on it. These stem from the historic and geographic ties connecting the two banks of the Jordan River and because the Palestinians form a vast majority (about 60-65%) in the Hashemite Kingdom. The ties connecting the Jordanian-Palestinian majority and a future Palestinian state on the West Bank will have a dire impact on the future of the Hashemite Kingdom. Because of its inherent geo-strategic weakness, Jordan is forced to acquiesce and compromise in its declarative policies, but the fact that the establishment of a Palestinian state will pose a perpetual threat to the Hashemite regime should not be overlooked.

Not incidentally, Jordan prefers Israel to rule in the buffer zone, i.e., the Jordan Valley and the border, thereby separating the kingdom and the Palestinian entity.

Those, (like Peres), who suggest that a confederation will resolve or mitigate the dangers of a Palestinian state, are, for all intents and purposes, suggesting a solution even worse than an independent state. First, a confederate framework means the joining of two originally independent states. Second, it is reasonable to assume that the Palestinian state and not Jordan will be the dominant factor in the confederate framework as Jordan almost always avoids confrontations in general, and with the Palestinians in particular. And third, the framework will not blunt the Palestinians' irredentist aspirations and will simply play into their hands in eventually enabling them to dominate the Hashemite Kingdom due to their dominance and their majority in the population.
Then, instead of a tiny state lodged between two rather strong, established political entities, a large Palestinian state will emerge controlling both banks of the Jordan. In this scenario, the Palestinians will also take over the Jordanian army and alongside its “strong police force”, a significant military force will be at their disposal.

In any event, it is difficult to see the wisdom in a solution which replaces an agreeable, neighboring state, dependent on Israel for its existence, with a radical Palestinian entity. It is no accident that Jordan rejects this solution, although it is repeatedly brought up without consulting “the bride”.

A Palestinian state also contradicts a basic interest of Syria which views the Land of Israel as part of “Southern Syria”. Interestingly, the Syrian Defense Minister, Tlas, markedly expressed this in a summer 1988 interview: “There is no need for an additional Palestinian state. Twenty-one Arab countries — that is enough.” His leader, Assad, said in an interview to an Egyptian newspaper in September 1993 (concurrent with the signing of Oslo I): “When I refer to Palestine, I view it as part of Syria.” It is true that Syria has lost much of its ability to force the PLO (and Jordan) to accede to its wishes, but it is not totally powerless, not least since it remains the patron of a number of Palestinian “rejectionist organizations”. Syria’s subversive arm, which may cause ferment in the Palestinian state, will not add to regional stability and security.

In any case, Syria possesses the capability to undermine the political process or “ending the conflict”, and to upset the stability of the region simply because it can prevent the resettlement of the Palestinian refugees, some 750,000 of whom live under its control in Syria and Lebanon. Therefore, a situation can develop, whereby Syria will have the ability to pressure the Palestinians much in the same way that it does regarding the Hizbollah today. On the other hand, a radical Palestinian state will find a loyal ally, included in a strategic pact in Damascus, in the continuing battle against Israel and in the undermining of regional stability.

A Palestinian state may forge close ties or even make a binding pact with fundamentalist Iran for ideological and pragmatic reasons. The Palestinian state is likely eventually to adopt a radical, militant profile and anyone who maintains that sort of approach is a potential ally or patron. Therefore, Syria, Iran and Libya are “candidates for the position”. After Syria, the country posing the greatest danger to Israel in this context is Iran. Pragmatically, this may be especially true if the “state” feels threatened by Israel and will come to feel the need to have an ally which will provide powerful patronage and an umbrella discouraging Israel from retaliating harshly against the Palestinian state. It should not be excluded that Iran is liable to go even so far as to grant nuclear backing to a Palestinian state when it develops nuclear capability. The end result would be a fundamentalist axis from Teheran to the gates of Tel Aviv.

PART III
Can There Be a Remedy in Case of a Bad Bargain?

A. The Value of a Palestinian Commitment
It has widely been asserted in Israel that the value of a Palestinian commitment regarding Israel is negligible or non-existent. Former Prime Minister Shimon Peres himself said it best when he stated that “their commitment to agreements is worth only about 40 percent, and all the rest is rhetoric, embellishment and high-flown phrases” (as mentioned earlier). If this is the way that the architect of the “peace treaties” with the Palestinians relates to the commitments (ignoring the fact that the percentage ratio might be even worse), how can anyone relate to the Oslo agreements as binding agreements? How is it possible to take the Palestinian commitments seriously, and how is it possible to relinquish Israel’s vital interests and its security to the favor and the pathetic credibility of our new “peace partners”?

Yet the agreements were signed one after another, although prior to each new agreement, the previous agreement was blatantly violated by the Palestinians. The Israeli negotiators repeatedly recycled commitments which had already been made in the previous rounds but remained unfulfilled. In this way, Oslo II recycles Arafat’s commitment to cancel the Palestinian Covenant “two months after the elections and the investiture
of the Palestinian Council.” But Arafat, as stated earlier, said at Harvard, (after signing Oslo II) that he would not do it. (“I’d be lying if I told you that we will abrogate the Charter.”) or after the signing of the Hebron Agreement in January 1997, “I will change the covenant when Israel has a constitution.”) The Rabin-Peres government, and even that of Netanyahu, swallowed every Palestinian lie, and was ready to continue swallowing them incessantly."

Already in the early months of 1995, a number of Israeli publications appeared detailing Palestinian violations of the agreements. In January 1995, a military advocate’s report was published, detailing the many Palestinian violations of the Oslo agreements, among them: Suspects in the murders of Israelis were not extradited to Israeli jurisdiction, no measures were taken to prevent terrorist attacks against Israel, PA activities in East Jerusalem continued, contravening the agreement, torture of collaborators with Israel, the list of Palestinian policemen was not submitted, the Palestinian police force used stolen vehicles, the PA characterized itself in English as the Palestinian National Authority and even as the “State of Palestine”, stamps and international driver’s licenses bearing the heading “Palestine” were printed, passports were issued to the residents of Judea, Samaria and Gaza, etc. When the document was reproofingly presented to the then Foreign Minister, Peres replied: “This report was not commissioned by us and I am not disturbed by the violations.”

In an interview with the Jerusalem Lawyers Association in April 1995, the then legal advisor of the Foreign Ministry, and a close partner in the Oslo agreements, Yoel Singer, launched a strong criticism of the PA: “The violations of the agreement perpetrated by the PA in Jerusalem are the most severe. If I had the authority, I would address those first.” On the same occasion, Singer said that there is no doubt that the declaration of a Palestinian state by the Palestinians would be a substantive violation of the agreement. Singer repeated the same observation as recently as Spring 1999 (in “Mayday for Oslo”, The National Interest, No. 55). It can be assumed that this holds true of Oslo II as well. Yet in Ramallah, Arafat began declaring the establishment of the “state” and he did so repeatedly. However, the Rabin-Peres government remained silent and did not view it as a substantive violation. At the end of 1996, the Defense Ministry’s Coordinator of Activities in the Territories in Netanyahu’s government again reported to the Knesset 50 Palestinian violations of the agreement.

The falsehood and very questionable value of the Palestinian commitment to genuine peace with Israel are especially manifest in the area of incitement against it on the one hand and the total absence of Palestinian education toward true reconciliation with the Jewish state on the other. The consistent Arab incitement against Israel with no attempt, modest as it may be, to facilitate a genuine reconciliation with the Jewish state are, to my mind, the most deep-seated, severe Palestinian breach of the Oslo agreements and prove conclusively that the “peace process” has no basis or future.

All Palestinian leaders and their media unceasingly (years after Oslo) refer to the establishment of the State of Israel as the plundering of their land and country. Israeli cities like Haifa, Jaffa, Lod, Ramle, Safed, Tiberias, Beit-She’an, Acre, Kfar Sava and others are depicted as Palestinian cities while indubitable Israeli cities like Petach Tikva, Hadera and others are referred to as “colonial settlements”. The map of Palestine as it appears in their media includes all of Israel, which is not mentioned by name but rather as the “Zionist entity”, “Tel Aviv government”, and the like.

Even in these few examples there is unequivocal proof of the deep-rooted Palestinian non-acceptance of the existence of the State of Israel despite their explicit commitments in signed agreements to recognize not only its existence, but its right to exist too. Furthermore, not only is there non-acceptance of the Jewish state, (not to mention a total absence of indoctrination towards reconciliation and coexistence) but there is hope extant to expel this state from the region, and in their words — “terminate the Zionist project” and similar.

No less severe is the fact that even the Netanyahu government followed and documented the blatant Palestinian violations without taking any drastic measures to curtail them, other than grumbling and publicizing them from time to time, and even recycling Oslo I and II terms in the Hebron
and Wye agreements. In their lack of drastic reaction to the intolerable Palestinian violations, the Israeli governments have contributed and continue to contribute to, and be responsible for their perpetuation. Moreover, the fact that the Netanyahu government just prattled and lamented periodically about them without imposing any sanctions was not only useless but it encouraged the PA to persist. And the blatant Palestinian violations were all well known and detailed earlier."

Those who back the establishment of a Palestinian state try to tranquilize the Israeli public by contending that it will and must be a restricted state, i.e., completely demilitarized, unable to sign military pacts against us, not allowed to permit entry to a foreign army west of the Jordan, etc. But this is sheer delusion. Will the Palestinians agree to a restricted, crippled state? Will they agree to a state without armed forces when they already possess a solid nucleus of them? Will they agree that we fly over their skies permanently and control the borders and port entrances? And why should they agree to such humiliating restrictions — are they inferior to their brethren — the Lebanese, those from Qatar and Bahrain, et. al?

Netanyahu has introduced into our political polemics the term — reciprocity, which has even gained ground. But this notion was hollow from the outset:

First, the Palestinians are not exactly on the same footing as us, both strategically and in terms of the rights over this land.

Second, they are not in a position to give us what we need, e.g. security (nor should we entrust to them such a task).

Third, reciprocity assumes that the Oslo agreements coincided greatly with our national interests and therefore should be abided by strictly, if only the Palestinians will abide by them too.

Fourth, it assumes that we should strip ourselves from our tiny homeland as well as from our defense essentials, for pieces of paper that are not worth their ink.

And finally, experience with the Palestinians teaches and proves that there is no basis or future to their commitments (except for pathetically recycling them).

The upshot of the reality described above is that it is impossible to believe in or rely on any Palestinian commitment regarding Israel. Their interests are polar opposites of our national interests, and they are interested exclusively in slyly extorting as many concessions, territorial and others, as possible from Israel, and transforming their gains into the basis for the continued struggle with Israel. It is, therefore, to be expected that the more Israel acquiesces and grovels before them, the more they will treat their own commitments with contempt. Weakness certainly encourages violations of agreements, if not worse than that.

B. Is the Use of Force against the Palestinian State Possible in the Case of a Bad Bargain?

Those supporting the establishment of a Palestinian state claim that if it were to take hostile action against Israel or act contrary to its commitments, the IDF would be free to eradicate it or employ effective, forceful measures against it." Without a doubt, Israel will be unable to obliterate an Arab state which was established and accepted by the community of nations. Israel's hands will be tied both by the United States and Egypt, which will certainly hasten to abrogate its peace treaty with Israel and will inspire Jordan to follow suit. As far as the UN, the European nations and world opinion are concerned, they will be more than happy to impose far-reaching sanctions against Israel. Needless to say, the internal situation in Israel will pose problems as well, and its Left will raise every possible objection against harming the Palestinian state. As stated, Israel has lost the will power and the determination to exercise its might in order to secure vital interests.

Furthermore, in the past, the Palestinians tended to act and express themselves in a very open, audacious manner. Today, they behave in a much more circumspect manner, concealing their actions and positions behind smooth talk in order to avoid providing Israel with a categorical pretext to employ strong, forceful measures against them. In addition, even if they continue the violent, terrorist struggle against Israel, whether to express their hostility or to pressure it into further capitulation and concessions, the Palestinians will be careful to
ensure that the struggle not escalate to intolerable extremism but rather remain somewhat “latent”. In other words, letting the blood slowly and periodically, in order to avoid going too far and forcing Israel into a corner from which it will have no recourse but to strike back. If they just act “wisely”, that is, harass Israel and let its blood gradually and in a manner which will not mandate an extreme reaction, they will achieve their goals: weakening Israel and undermining its strength without provoking or creating unreasonable risks. They can endure and continue along such a chosen path while belittling the hollow Israeli occasional warnings (“we cannot and will not accept”, “we will not allow these events to recur”, etc.). The net result will be perpetuation of the situation of insecurity and instability and it goes without saying, no real peace. On the other hand, Israel’s total impotence and inability satisfactorily to remedy the situation will be exposed.

Apropos, historically, it is instructive to recall that the repeated attempts to call the Lebanese government to order, (to restrain the PLO or the Hizbullah) were ineffectual. Similarly, the history of Israel’s reprisals against Arab states is far from a success story. Therefore, once the Palestinian state is established it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to punish it appropriately or to return to the status-quo ante. Despite the flowery promises of the capitulators, Israel’s freedom of action, today and in the future will be severely curtailed.

“They will have a lot to lose,” prattle those who desire a Palestinian state. But already today the PA has a lot to lose and this does not impress them as they recognize Israel’s leaders’ and society’s weaknesses. The latter prefer the “meat pot” to struggling for justified national rights. The Palestinians are also encouraged by the international hypocrisy by which the Palestinians turned into a “darling son”.

**EPILOGUE**

Only one weighty conclusion emerges from the above discussion: Better not to reach a situation where we enable the establishment of a Palestinian state, which will be “a disaster foretold”. If this stems only from analyzing its strategic dangers, consider what will be the true overall consequences when the military-operational dangers are added, such as:

a. Losing the Judea-Samaria mountain ridge and

b. Abandoning “strategic depth”, i.e., Israel’s territorial shrinking into the coastal plain with the width and breadth of 10-15 kilometers only, and
c. The difficulties of mobilizing its military reserves in case of a surprise attack, etc.

It is claimed that already today a Palestinian state does exist. But this is at an embryonic stage and such a distorted entity can still be thwarted. Secondly, today the PA still does not have the aura and full status of a sovereign standing. Above all, Israel should not acquiesce to a crooked reality even if it starts “forming some crust”. The experience with the Palestinians since Oslo is a successive failure story and there is no reason in the world that this will change “if only a Palestinian state will be established”. On the contrary, the cure will only be worse than the disease. And a tiny state like Israel cannot allow itself to blunder or gamble.

As a final word, what is more fitting than quoting Senator Connie Mack’s (R-FL) most telling lines from a speech to the US Senate on March 3, 1999: 

How is it possible to engage in peace negotiations with people who maintain the right to obliterate you, who are filled with hatred toward you, and who harbor the dream of one day destroying your homeland? Peace is a matter of the heart... But what I saw, which was the outcome of the Palestinian Authority rule, convinced me that their hearts and minds are set on other goals. The Palestinian leadership does not want peace. They want, first, their own state which they can control with total power. Then they want to use that state to eliminate the State of Israel.

...if the Palestinian leadership fails to abandon incitement of hatred, persecution and terrorism, then we are all dreaming, only dreaming... There will not be peace until hearts and minds are changed... The United States’ role...stand up for peace — real peace based upon security, freedom and a change of heart.
ISRAEL:
THE WEST BANK AND MODERN ARMS
Edward Saar

Introduction
Among the Middle East peace plans that have been publicized since the founding of the State of Israel fifty-two years ago, one looks in vain for the conventional elements of conflict resolution, such as the rectification of arms imbalances by mutual disarmament, or the redrawing of borders to increase their defensibility. Moreover, none of the peace proposals appears to take cognizance of modern weapons systems and their terrain requirements, on the one hand, and proposed border changes, on the other.

Because of Israel's relative numerical, financial, and territorial disadvantages, its military planners must assume that their enemies' hostile intentions, to date, were thwarted by Israel's deterrent capacity. Yet, recent proposals put forward by Israel's last three governments call for the lowering of the country's deterrent posture by relinquishing the strategic terrain its army conquered in wars the Jewish state did not initiate.

The factors which ought to dominate deliberations on Mideast peace but which, apparently, do not, are the local topography, Israel's need for minimal strategic depth, the sophisticated weapons now in the region, and the country's terrain requirements. Technology, which is a decisive factor in the planning of war, must also play an essential role in deliberations whose purpose is the formulation of policies to prevent war. Specifically if, as is self-evident, peace agreements are designed to bring about measures which will lessen the likelihood of armed conflict, then the military realities of terrain and arms cannot continue to be ignored.

The Terrain of Judea and Samaria: An Overview
One result of the Six Day War of 1967 is that Israel's de facto border today is almost 200 miles shorter than the armistice lines of the 1948-49, its de facto border then. Moreover, except for the 120 miles of the de facto northern border, its present lines are either natural or protected by the largely uninhabited buffer zone of the Sinai Desert. The segment of pre-1967's de facto border, often referred to as the "Green Line", located in the central, densely populated region, followed, more or less, the lowest contours of the Judean and Samarian hills. It outlined the parcel of land now referred to as the West Bank, the collective name for 2,270 square miles of the Judean and Samarian highlands, and 140 square miles of the Gaza Strip, territories conquered by Jordan and Egypt in the war of 1948-49 and kept under their occupation for 18 years. These areas, as well as the approximately 440 square miles of the Golan Heights, lost by Syria in the wars of 1967 and 1973, are now contested by the Arab states and claimed by Palestinian Arabs.

If Israel were to return these land parcels to Arab control, by withdrawing its armed forces, as now demanded by its neighbors, the country's width in the central sector would be reduced from the present 40-55 miles to 9-16 miles. Moreover, the easily concealed control elements of certain weapons systems, many of them requiring line-of-sight
emplacment, if deployed in the central mountains overlooking Israel's population centers and traffic arteries, would render the country indefensible.

For the purpose of this presentation, the West Bank has been divided into three north-south topographic zones: the Jordan River Rift Valley and its limiting escarpments, the central mountainous spine, and the Judean and Samarian foothills (Fig. 1 and Maps 1 & 2). This threefold division of the central highlands, an admittedly awkward device, facilitates analysis of the West Bank's strategic value, that is, its war deterrent qualities in a static confrontation and its movement-impeding characteristics, natural obstacles, and vantage points, under the dynamics of modern war. This approach was also chosen to emphasize the terrain dependence of modern weapons. By discussing one region at a time, no speculation regarding the sequential order of possible events is intended. It should also be noted that the weapons systems and their components considered here are available at this time and are eagerly sold to all comers with cash in hand.

**The Eastern Zone**

The Jordan River Valley is the natural border area for Israel and its first line of defense against a conventional attack from the east. It spans the Israeli side of the river’s flood plain and encompasses the escarpments which form the up-thrusted western margin of the Jordan Rift Valley. The river, meandering through its center, and forming the de facto Israeli-Jordan border, descends here to more than 1,000 feet below sea level as it approaches the Dead Sea. Its flood plain, whose width ranges from 3.7 miles in the north to 14 miles at the river’s influx into the Dead Sea, is the only terrain in the area that permits off-road travel. Because it offers practically no natural cover, all vehicular movement is exposed to surveillance from the cliffs nearby. Any military forces moving east or west would have to fight their way across the open plain as it tilts toward the lowest point on the face of the earth, then scale the cliffs and hills, rising over a distance of only five to fifteen miles to more than 2,000 feet above sea level. (Fig. 1 and Maps 1 & 2). For most of their lengths, the five roads leading up and out of the valley, follow canyon-like wadis. Therefore, before initiating a thrust across the flood plain, an invading army would have to secure the high ground controlling the plain below as well as the traffic arteries.

With the post-1967 constellation of forces in place, a massed assault, mounted by armored formations echeloned in depth, is unlikely to be among the contingency plans of either Israel or its enemies. However, with the valley guarded by the minimal force envisioned in the latest “territory for peace” plan, and the number of Jewish villages greatly reduced, a vertical assault could be carried out in this sector by heli-borne troops. Their likely objective would be to secure topographic vantage points and to link up with paramilitary forces recruited from the local population. The flight distance from possible Trans-Jordanian jumping off points to the populated highlands is only 15 to 20 miles. If well prepared, critical numbers of hostile troops and support equipment could reach their assigned sectors before the Israeli army managed to organize and transport counter forces. Second waves of heavy-lift helicopters, capable of carrying as much as sixteen tons each, could ferry rapid-fire artillery pieces, rocket launchers, and ammunition and support equipment, to platforms prepared and secured by local irregulars. Artillery and mortars, placed on the hills overlooking the five traffic arteries descending into the valley, could effectively cut off the eastern zone from the rest of the country. Thus, by leapfrogging over the Rift Valley's com-

![Fig. 1. Cross-section of Tel Aviv (Israel)](Image)
manding terraces, an airborne assault force, willing to take casualties, could neutralize Israel's present terrain advantage long enough to attempt a conventional armored invasion.

The status quo makes a heli-borne assault less likely. Crossing the Rift Valley, helicopters would have to fly just above the flood plain in order to escape the anti-aircraft fire which would be directed at them from the tops of the cliffs. As was demonstrated in Afghanistan, low-flying helicopters are very vulnerable to shoulder-launched missiles. As a defensive measure, missiles, such as the US-made Stinger, are inexpensive and could be supplied in sufficient numbers to Israeli civilians whose villages in the valley, and on the adjacent hills, would be on the invaders' flight paths.

Today, Israel's border is guarded by a few, barely visible, observation and control points, strung out along the tops of the lower cliffs parallel to the highway below. An alert traveler might note a few anti-aircraft guns and Hawk missile batteries jutting out above the jagged skyline of the second echelon cliffs.

The Eastern Zone is dominated by the Jordan Rift Valley, a deep break in the earth's crust which separates Israel and Jordan almost as effectively as the English Channel separates Britain and France. The symmetry of the topographies of Cis- and Trans-Jordan makes it possible for Arabs and Israelis to blunt an armored assault across the valley with relatively few troops and at a small cost. The terrain facilitates the construction and easy maintenance of defense infrastructures for both sides. Any change in the present de facto Israel-Jordan border would encourage conventional invasions from the east and pre-emptive strikes from the west.

The Central Zone

The Central Zone, delineated by the 2,000-foot high contour line, is a parcel of land, five to fifteen miles wide and eighty miles long (Fig. 1 and Maps 1 & 2). Because long stretches are relatively level, it is also known as the Judean-Samaritan Plateau, although it encompasses ridges and peaks, a few reaching elevations of more than 3,000 feet.

The zone's only north-south road joins Beer-sheba, Hebron, Jerusalem, Nabiis and points in the Galilee. Hills adjacent to the road, many topped by Arab villages, overlook and dominate it for much of its length. It can be assumed that during active conflict, after Israeli forces have been withdrawn, as envisioned under the latest "territory for peace" guidelines, the highway would be denied to Israeli soldiers by irregular combatants recruited from among the Arab villagers and by military specialists infiltrated from bases abroad. Commanders will then have to decide whether to commit sufficient resources to keep all or parts of the road open so that men and ordnance can be shifted laterally in the direction of an assault from the east, or to make use of circuitous routes and paths in the foothills to the east.

A thrust from the Judean and Samarian ridges toward Israel's cities and towns along the coast would be facilitated by approximately 30 paved and dirt roads branching off from the central highway toward the west. The recognition of the importance of secure traffic arteries between Israel's cities and the geographic center of the country is evidenced by Israel's recent widening of the Trans-Samaritan Highway and plans to pave parallel roads. The Trans-Samaritan Highway, connecting Greater Tel Aviv with the Central Zone's only north-south highway, and the roads of the Jordan Valley, is now guarded for almost its entire length by a string of Jewish villages.

The hills, dun-colored limestone, covered by scrub wherever sparse annual rainwater can be retained, are also the sites of most of the country's historic towns and shrines. They were established here for two reasons: the presence of water and the steep approaches which facilitated their defense. Ironically, in our time, when weapons and munitions are propelled through the air and guided from afar, the high ground has again become essential for defense. The reason for this is found in the physical laws governing the transmission of electromagnetic radiation. Because the latter travel in straight paths, almost all sensors and antennas, the primary elements of many of today's sophisticated weapons, communications gear, and control systems, must be deployed in line-of-sight locations. The optimal
places in Israel that furnish suitable platforms for the arrays of antennas and sensors that have become the eyes and ears of modern armies, are located here. For the last fifteen to twenty years, as the devices of electronic warfare have become more sophisticated, so has the value of their potential platforms increased.

Radar

A bomber flying at subsonic speed covers the distance between the Jordan River frontier and the Mediterranean (average: 44 miles) in about four minutes. Scrambling time of Israeli aircrews is also approximately four minutes. In order to intercept the enemy before he reaches a target in pre-1967 Israel, the defending airmen need to be alerted well ahead of the intruder's crossing of the border. Today, the skyline of the highest Judean and Samarian peaks, as well as that formed by the volcanic cones on the Golan Heights, are broken by the arrays of antennas of Israel's early warning radar systems. They attest to the fact that over the last twenty-seven years, the Golan Heights and the Judean-Samaritan Plateau have become the country's primary air defense line. Since then, as was amply demonstrated in the Gulf War of 1991, there have been major developments in radar technology. Today, radar does far more than locate airborne objects. With the aid of ancillary computers, they often help commanders make decisions by suggesting the best actions or countermeasures in situations too fast-paced for human deliberations. Once the target has been identified, tracking radar locks onto it. They are often linked to signal processors that point and fire anti-aircraft guns at the optimal moment. Software is available to activate the launching mechanisms of surface-to-air missiles, and to generate the coded flight instructions that keep remotely controlled missiles on their intercept course. Radar signals are routinely used to vector combat aircraft toward their targets and to inform pilots on intercept missions of dangers beyond the range of the relatively weak radar carried aboard their planes.

In the next war, Israel must expect Saudi Arabia's five AWACS aircraft to join the pan-Arab forces. Because of the vulnerability of these aircraft, they must operate from standoff positions well behind the forward edge of battle. Their radar is not frequency agile; i.e., their transmitters do not have the capacity to change their frequencies rapidly. Once their frequencies are known, it is possible to block one or two degrees of their scan with small, low-powered "noise" or picket-fence jammers. To increase their narrow blocking range, these robot jammers are set out approximately three miles apart in single line arrays, hence their name. The topography of the Judean-Samaritan plateau gives Israel almost ideal platforms for arrays of picket-fence jammers. Israeli villages on the plateau facilitate their maintenance and provide protection against sabotage.

For Israel, the Central Zone is also a passive electronic warfare asset. In 1981, when the US prepared to sell five AWACS planes to Saudi Arabia, government spokesmen defended their sale by pointing out that the Judean and Samarian mountains tended to shield much of Israel from radar surveillance by AWACS aircraft flying at 29,000 to 40,000 feet (the former is the recommended operating altitude) above north-western Saudi Arabia. If Israel relinquishes control of the Central Zone, its enemies could nullify the terrain-shielding quality of the mountain ridge by concealing low-powered radar down-links, i.e., radar relay stations, on the high ground overlooking military targets. Under these conditions, many of Israel's military activities would be exposed to continuous radar surveillance by its opponents.

Ground-based radar is ineffective against aircraft or cruise missiles approaching at very low altitudes, as was dramatically shown by Israel's Air Force when it attacked Egyptian air bases on the first day of the Six Day War. To avoid detection, fighters and bombers are now equipped with sophisticated avionics which make so-called terrain-following possible. With that in mind, it has been suggested that Israel's air defense posture would not be lowered by replacing its early-warning radar installations on the Judean-Samaritan Plateau with airborne warning systems such as AWACS. Airborne radar extends the range of ground-based systems, but they cannot substitute for them.
There are technical drawbacks to all airborne surveillance systems. They are more vulnerable to electronic countermeasures than ground-based facilities, whose power can greatly exceed those mounted on aircraft. Moreover, it is almost certain that missiles will have their intrinsically small radar cross-sections further reduced by microwave-absorbent surfaces, the major element of stealth technology. Airborne targets of that type can be detected only by the most powerful radar, which, because of its size and weight, cannot be placed on airborne platforms.

It is conceivable that Israel's Air Force will make use of remotely piloted vehicles, i.e. small airborne platforms controlled from ground stations on the Judean and Samarian peaks, and the volcanic cones of the Golan Heights, as up-links for its powerful land-based radar. Moreover, Israel is now developing a space-based surveillance capacity. Satellites, remotely piloted up-links, and airborne facilities can significantly extend the range of ground-based systems, but as amply demonstrated by the intelligence failures of the Gulf War, they cannot substitute for them.

Recently a new, not yet battle-tested, US-made airborne facility known as the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System or JSTARS has been suggested as having sufficient electronic warfare capacity to substitute for several of the systems now deployed on the strategic plateau and on the Golan Heights. JSTARS is a long-range air-to-ground surveillance and battle management facility. The processors aboard JSTARS aircraft are programmed to sort out large numbers of radar signals and accurately interpret and analyze them. By maintaining jam-resistant links with ground station modules, they are reported to provide field commanders with real time intelligence on hostile ground movements. Their capabilities are said to meet the requirements of NATO forces, operating in open terrain. However, they appear to be quite inappropriate for Israel. JSTARS, like those systems in AWACS, are installed in Boeing 707s, carrying their side-looking phased array radar in a 24-foot pod attached to the lower fuselage. Planes of that size and shape have large radar cross-sections, meaning they are good reflectors of microwaves and hence are easily detected, not only by ground-based systems, but also by the radar that guides certain ground-to-air missiles. Having the airframes of airliners, the planes cannot take evasive action and are therefore vulnerable to attack. Consequently, JSTARS aircraft must operate from fighter-protected standoff positions. The appropriate distance from battle zones or from unfriendly fighter aircraft should be similar to that recommended for AWACS aircraft, or about 200 miles (320 km.). In Israel's case, that would place its JSTARS plane, or planes, in international airspace above the Mediterranean, closer to the enemy's coast than Israel's, above their naval vessels and thus within easy range of their ship-to-air missiles.

**Missiles**

A fighter-bomber, taking off from the air base in Damascus, can reach Haifa in eight minutes. The almost obsolescent Scud-B missile, with a range of 180 miles, carrying a warhead of one ton, can cover the same distance (104 km.) in two minutes. Speed and assured penetration of enemy airspace make missiles an attractive alternative for certain missions that in the past could be carried out only by manned aircraft. Missiles are a particularly welcome option for Arab military planners. Given their experience in the Lebanon War of 1982, where the Syrian Air Force suffered an attrition rate of thirty percent, and remembering the Gulf War episode where Iraqi planes, at the height of the conflict, fled to safe havens in Iran, it is unlikely that their commanders would dispatch aircraft where missiles could be used.

Most of the missiles in Arab inventories are ballistic, i.e. they are powered during their initial flight only and thereafter fall in meteor-like trajectories toward their targets. To compensate for expected variations in air density, humidity, wind directions and velocities, all of which cause ballistic missiles to drift, adjustments of the guidance system are made prior to launching. Missiles are rated by their so-called circular error probabilities (CEP), a measure of their likely drift from the target. Because of their large CEPs, they are of low military value. Their foremost function is seen as terror weapons to be used against urban populations.
During the last five to seven years, new, yet inexpensive models with small CEPs have come onto the arms markets. Many of them have been procured by Arab armies. Syria, which was rewarded with a bonus of $3 billion by Saudi Arabia for its support in the Gulf War, used the funds to add to its stockpile of missiles. It is known that they obtained a large number of Scud-Cs from North Korea, missiles that have a range of 600 kilometers. It also entered into cooperative deals with North Korea, China and Iran, under which it acquired manufacturing plants and equipment that give their industrial complex the capability to produce Scud-Cs, and possibly also the intermediate range M9s. These missiles have ranges large enough to put all of Israel within their reach. Scud-C missiles are also the likely delivery vehicles for the deadly gases and biological agents, euphemistically referred to as unconventional weapons, that are now produced and stockpiled in Syria and other Arab countries.

So-called smart missiles do not follow ballistic trajectories. Cruise missiles, like the US-built Tomahawk that thrilled television audiences during the Gulf War, are essentially unmanned aircraft guided by sophisticated terrain recognition systems. It is expected that cruise missiles, utilizing the inexpensive global positioning technology used by airliners, ships, and recently even by taxicabs in major cities, will soon become the central elements of processing units in inexpensive cruise missiles.

Other non-ballistic missiles are guided toward their targets during the critical terminal phases of their flights either by homing devices, such as heat-seeking sensors, or by airborne or ground-based operators. Laser-guided missiles, first cousins of smart bombs, used extensively in the Gulf War, have electro-optical sensors called seekers that steer the missile toward laser light pulses reflected from the target. The light pulses are produced by a laser target designator, a man-portable device resembling a hobbyist’s telescope. With a designator, an operator can illuminate any target within his sight (depending on its size, up to 12 miles away). Missiles launched hundreds of miles away then home-in on the reflected laser energy. Designators can be built to generate pulsed and coded beams, and seeker-circuits can be tuned to respond to them. A well-designed system may embrace a number of designators, each generating its own coded signal, and each trained on a different target. The Judean and Samarian hills, overlooking many of Israel’s vital military installations, offer a large number of optimal platforms for laser target designators.

Because of their ease of operation, and assured penetration of air-defense systems of all types, missiles are now rapidly proliferating. Research teams in a number of countries, including Israel, are now engaged in the development of anti-missile missiles with the expected capability to track and destroy a number of missiles simultaneously. None of them are operational, and their projected effectiveness is problematical.

At this time, there is no defense against missiles once they are airborne. On their launchers, of course, they are as vulnerable as aircraft on runways. But unlike aircraft, missiles and their launchers can be effectively camouflaged and, if mobile, quickly relocated. During the Yom Kippur War, Israel’s aerial surveillance efforts failed to reveal Syria’s Frog-7 launchers, although they were deployed close to the front lines. Prior to the assault on Iraq, in 1991, intelligence-gathering systems involving satellites, AWACS, and specialized surveillance aircraft of the US Air Force, revealed only about 15 percent of that country’s Scud missile launchers. According to some estimates, the search-and-destroy missions that followed failed to eliminate any of the mobile launchers and barely damaged a few of the fixed ones. Whether the new and very expensive ISTARs will be more effective cannot be answered with certainty.

Missiles are a new destabilizing factor because they increase the likelihood of a first strike by Arab forces and consequently that of a preemptive move by Israel. With the Gulf War failures in mind, Israel’s only plausible option for deterrence is the certainty of massive retaliatory strikes against near targets by its Air Force, and missile assaults on those farther away.

A viable strategy must be based on a reasonable threat assessment. The Gulf War demonstrated the difficulty of detecting missiles and their launchers and exposed the shortcomings of operational
missile interceptors, such as the Patriot. These technical facts make surprise a central element of missile warfare and leave the side under attack with the single option of a counter, or second strike. They also underlie the anti-missile measures of the United States, still in force in spite of the absence of a credible threat. Their second strike capabilities rest on intercontinental ballistic missiles ensconced in silos, far-flung submarine fleets, and almost continuously airborne bombers, all carrying nuclear-tipped missiles and bombs that assure a symmetry of horror, euphemistically referred to as “MAD” (Mutually Assured Destruction). The hairline trigger readiness of their second strike capabilities is credited with having deterred a Third World War for fifty years. There is no lesson in this for Israel. Except for a modest submarine-based capability, the efficacious second strike potential of the US is not a practical option for a country of Israel’s size and resources. Moreover, in Israel’s case, where defeat is measured in terms of genocide, it would be criminally cynical to propose a policy that would make the nation’s survival dependent on the faultless functioning of a submarine’s or a JSTARS aircraft’s processing units.

Israel’s planners must consider the likelihood that the next war will begin with a lightning attack by massed missiles on population hubs along the coast. The IDF’s posture of deterrence, that is, its second strike potential, is linked to the survivability of its command and control structures. With the contingency of crippling missile raids in mind, Israeli military leaders are expected to redesign the army’s organizational infrastructure to incorporate parallel, secondary and tertiary chains of command. In a near-worst-case scenario, alternative command and control units, operating out of widely dispersed militarily autonomous regions, might enable the army to launch a second strike, regroup, and initiate the mobilization of the reserve units.

Saddam Hussein’s threat to burn one half of Israel’s population becomes a matter of concern when one recalls that more than fifty percent of Israel’s population lives within 19 miles of the center of Tel Aviv. In the absence of a reactive defense against missiles, and irrespective of the political agreements entered into by ephemeral governments and their mortal leaders, Israel will have to embrace an ethos of survival whose major element must be the dispersal of its population. The kill radii of missiles carrying unconventional payloads, and their almost assured penetration of air defense systems, now operational, leave Israel no other alternative.

The Western Zone
The Western Zone of the ‘West Bank’ is defined here as the area between the 2,000-foot altitude contour line and the 1949 armistice line which marked Israel’s de facto boundary until the Six Day War of 1967. The line is also the approximate boundary between the Judean and Samarian foothills and the coastal plain. The lowlands between the “Green Line” and the Mediterranean were pre-1967 central Israel, a 57 mile-long strip extending from Ashdod to Zikron Ya’akov and ranging in width from 9 to 16 miles (Fig. 1 and Maps 1 & 2). Most of Israel’s population and industrial structure are located here.

The Judean and Samarian foothills, towering above the narrow coastal plain, have been called an artillery observer’s dream. From the hills, some of Israel’s military bases and installations, and most of its population centers, traffic arteries, rail lines, fuel storage tanks and power plants are clearly visible. It is believed that most of Israel’s Arab neighbors would enter into peace treaties with Israel if the 1949 armistice line became its permanent boundary again. In the past, none of Israel’s governments have been willing to take up the offer. Israel’s leaders knew that had Arab military commanders recognized their topographic advantage at the start of the Six Day War, they could have interfered with the mobilization of Israel’s citizen-army by concentrating their firepower on two or three communication centers, occupying one or two natural choke points, or advancing through the nine miles that separated their positions from the Mediterranean, thus cutting the country in two. Had they followed any one of these plans, Israel could not have carried out its preemptive and decisive air strikes against Syrian and Egyptian bases on the first day of the war. No peace arrangement can change the fact that the municipal centers of Kfar Sava, Petach Tikva, and Jerusalem are only 4.6 miles, 5 miles, and approxi-
mately 3,000 feet, respectively, from the old armistice line.

Israel needs 48 hours to put its people in uniforms, assemble the units, and transport them to the battle areas. Israelis have no doubt that guerrilla units, recruited in the Arab villages that dot the nearby hills, will attempt to disrupt the timely mobilization of Israel’s citizens. During the first two days of the next war, Israel’s small army and the citizens performing their annual service at the time could find themselves face to face with the numerically vastly superior armies of neighboring states. It is understood that a holding action by Israel’s soldiers and the men and women on annual duty, aimed at slowing the attackers long enough to complete the mobilization process, a tactic that enabled Israel to survive the surprise attack of the Yom Kippur War of 1973, requires that Israel remain in well-stocked fortifications in all parts of the Judean and Samarian highlands, as well as in positions on the Golan Heights and along the Lebanese and Egyptian borders.

A demilitarized Western Zone, as envisioned in recent peace proposals, would permit the intelligence services of the Arab armed forces to install various electronic surveillance devices to record Israeli military moves and activities. Under these conditions, the elements of surprise and deception, so essential to the success of many operations, would be denied Israel’s army. Israeli training exercises, air combat techniques, deceptive tank maneuvers, and the use of decoys could then be continuously monitored and studied by the enemy.

Practically all military communications and most radar emissions consist of coded, often scrambled electromagnetic radiation. The patterns and frequencies of the transmissions, the so-called signatures of the systems, are carefully guarded secrets. Once they become known to an opponent, their commanders have a choice of electronic countermeasures that can blank out, interfere with, or alter the coded messages and signals. The value of signal intelligence was brought home to Israelis on the first day of the War of 1973. It was only then that Israeli pilots discovered that the Soviets had increased the radar frequencies on their SAM-2, -3, and -6 missiles and changed the mode from pulsed to continuous wave emissions. The early warning equipment carried aboard Israeli aircraft was designed to respond to the pulsed signals transmitted at lower frequencies by previously deployed Soviet missiles. Israel paid a high price for that intelligence failure.

As a consequence of the increasing importance of signal intelligence, there has been an intensification of clandestine activities, conducted by the intelligence communities of the defense establishments of many countries, those of the Middle East among them, whose aim is the acquisition of information of that type. Technological spying on one’s opponents’ signals is made possible by the physics of electromagnetic radiation and its transmission characteristics. All antennas leak some radiation. If a receiver is placed close to an antenna, the emissions that leak off can be detected and recorded. The proximity of many Arab villages, in the foothills and on the plateau, to Israeli bases and radar installations, makes it possible for them to select locations suitable for the concealment of micro-electronic receivers-recorders. The post-1967 Israeli civilian presence in the hills, places Israel’s radar and other systems in friendly terrain and obviates the need for the army to police the areas around transmitters continuously.

The electronic elements of modern arms, and their dependence on topography, make the Judean and Samarian foothills prime strategic terrain for defenders and aggressors alike. Their proximity to Israel’s industrial and population hubs, and the unfeasibility of verifying demilitarization agreements, leave little latitude for finding a reality-based formula that would diminish the likelihood of renewed armed conflict and simultaneously satisfy the national aspirations of the antagonists. Moreover, relative stability, even that of the uneasy status quo that has prevailed since 1967, presupposes that the victim of aggression is perceived by the aggressor as being able to absorb the blows of a first strike, and to mount a counterattack whose outcome cannot be predicted with confidence. The territory of a demilitarized Western Zone can be prepared by local Arabs to facilitate an assault and thus narrow the range of doubt regarding the outcome of a surprise attack.
Demilitarization

Taking into consideration the value structures of Middle Eastern cultures, Gulf War lessons and the nature and quantities of the arms now being stockpiled in the region, Israel's public debate has narrowed to two broad military policies along which to plan its defense. The first, widely but only superficially discussed, is demilitarization of sectors of the West Bank's terrain which would be returned to Arab control in exchange for a formal peace treaty; the other is continuation of the status quo. (The legalisms implied by the ultimate designation of the land parcels, evacuated by Israel's armed forces, i.e. autonomous region, sovereign state, or other, have no bearing on military reality.) Demilitarization, as understood by some Israeli spokesmen, would apparently permit Israel to keep small garrisons along the Jordan Rift Valley, recognized as the country's "security border", after withdrawing its forces from most or all of the contested territory. Israel's essential early-warning radar would be either replaced by Israeli or American airborne facilities, or would be permitted to continue to function as islands of Israeli sovereignty. Under the arrangements envisaged, Arab armies would not deploy near the Jordan River or the Golan precipice, presumably assuring an interval of a few hours between the onset of an armored advance and the firing of the initial salvos.

The Arab villagers living along the thirty-odd roads leading from the coastal strip to the Central Zone could significantly lower the defensibility of Israel's "security border" by interfering with the army's chain of supplies. For example, a US Army tank division, engaged in a high intensity operation, uses 5,000 tons of ammunition, 2,200,000 liters of fuel, and 1,200,000 liters of water every day. Except for water, the ordnance requirements for an Israeli armored division ought to be similar. The constraints due to Israel's numerical disadvantage place limitations on the IDF's ability to assign adequate numbers of patrols to the roads and the hills that overlook them; tasks necessary to hold the number of ambushes, mining incidents, and acts of sabotage to tolerable limits. By encouraging Israeli civilians, who because of their intimate knowledge of the land around their homes are well qualified for patrol duty, to leave the highlands, some Israelis are helping to lay the foundation for a major logistics problem for their country's armed forces. Logistics exhaustion has been the cause of many historical defeats.

Under demilitarization, its proponents argue, the mountain ridge would be reduced to a buffer between unequal forces. The reasoning is faulty because demilitarized highlands would provide one side only with forward positions for the collection of intelligence and the opportunity to prepare the ground for invading forces, without violating demilitarization arrangements. The demographic and geographic postures of the two sides do not allow for the equivalence or parity that prevails, and prevailed, in other military and political confrontations.

Compliance with demilitarization agreements will be neither verifiable nor enforceable once Israeli forces have been withdrawn. The likelihood of detecting treaty violations is a function of the characteristics and dimensions of the weapons and devices being monitored. For demilitarization to be effective, all parts of weapons and support systems would have to be discovered and totally removed. For example, the detection and removal of one laser target designator, out of a battery of ten designators, would leave ninety percent of the systems operable. If the chance of spotting a designator is one percent (a reasonable estimate, given its size and portability), then the likelihood of discovering two of the ten, in two search operations, leaving eighty percent operable, would be one hundredth of one percent. The ease of concealing the micro-electronic devices that have become the controlling and guiding elements of many modern weapons restricts the application of the concept of demilitarization to heavy weapons and their support equipment and to troop concentrations. In the case of the West Bank, the notion of demilitarization is almost devoid of meaning.

By significantly reducing the ratio of Jews to Arabs in the contested land parcels, as now demanded as a price for peace, Israel will make it possible for its Arab antagonists to prepare the infrastructure for a battle zone literally within sight of the country's population centers. On instructions
from abroad, local Arabs could build access roads, level sites for artillery platforms, build helicopter landing pads and generally prepare the ground for the flow of ordnance and the forward deployment of troops. By reducing the Jewish civilian presence, the force multiplier of its small army, Israel will actually facilitate the implementation of the first phase of the over twenty-five year old “Phased Plan” for the final destruction of Israel.

The speculative range concerning scenarios for the next Mideast war can be narrowed by noting what kind of weapons are procured in numbers that exceed the customary ratios, and what types of training and maneuvers appear to be emphasized. Assuming that no defense against missiles will have been developed in time, the next war is likely to begin with an attempt to cripple Israel’s defensive capacity with a one-night surprise attack. Older ballistic missiles with large circular error probabilities (CEPs), similar to the modified Scud-B missiles directed against Tel Aviv in 1991, will likely be aimed at its population centers. Warheads carrying chemical or biological toxins cannot be ruled out. Mobilization centers, communication hubs, power stations, and similar point targets located within optical range of the Judean and Samarian foothills, might come under attack by missiles guided by operators of target designators. If the initial missile attacks and the operations by commando teams interfere decisively with Israel’s mobilization process, the aggressors might attempt massive armored assaults in the north, possibly through Lebanese territory, and in the east across the Jordan Valley.

For Arab military planners, expectations involve either total victory or, at worst, temporary defeat. Israelis cannot realistically hope for more than temporary victory. The Arabs, with justification, refer to past armed conflicts with Israel as rounds in an unending war. Under the circumstances, the primary objective of Israel must be a credible deterrent posture. Israel’s control of the strategic terrain enhances that posture.

The Status Quo
Ruling out unenforceable demilitarization of a large enough area of the Middle East, and mutual disarmament, Israel’s only practical alternative is the continuation of the thirty-two year-old mutually enforced standoff. Israel’s outposts on the cliffs astride the key invasion routes leading across the Jordan River and similar outposts on the eastern cliffs (in Jordan) make a conventional armored thrust, directed east or west across the valley, unacceptably costly for the aggressor. The symmetry of the Rift Valley favors the defender.

Under the post-1967 status quo, Israel developed battle plans and defense infrastructures for each sector, making local units autonomous during communication blackouts. Forward-deployed troops, adequate fortifications and pre-positioned ordnance were planned to blunt the effects of guerrilla warfare aimed at intercepting second echelon traffic. Decentralization of the defense structure is undoubtedly facilitated by a civilian presence. The role of Israeli villages near pre-deployed defense units and natural choke points, such as mountain passes, was assessed as far back as the early 1970s, when the State of Israel began to promote its settlement program. Civilian settlements, it was recognized early, can house local command and control units, accommodate repair shops, provide field hospitals with local civilian staffs, build and manage storage facilities, furnish guards and maintenance crews, and offer troops the comforts of homelike rest stops. Under the status quo, it is also possible to limit the number of surreptitiously deployed target designators and intelligence-collecting devices by encouraging Israelis to settle in West Bank locations that are within sight of military assets or population centers, and in those located near Arab villages and towns.

The military potential of the large Arab minority, living on both sides of the pre-1967 border, is considerably lower under the status quo than under conditions of demilitarization. In the presence of Israel’s army, guerrilla forces and sabotage teams, recruited from the local populace, can have only a loose, non-centralized command and control structure, uncertain sources of supplies and a primitive and restricted communications system. It is also a fair assumption that, under the present conditions, Israel can more easily maintain, and possibly
expand, its intelligence resources based on an established network of Arab informers.

The lethal proximity of the opposing forces, Israel’s lack of strategic depth, modern warfare’s dependence on battle-management systems, the crucial importance of signal intelligence and a host of smart weapons requiring line-of-sight deployment, make terrain characteristics decisive factors. There can be no doubt that topography has played a decisive role in the duration of the present armed standoff. Unless mutual disarmament, the universal warrant of peaceful intent, is instituted in the Middle East, Israel has no choice but to remain in the hill country of Judea and Samaria and on the Golan Plateau.

The technological revolution of the last ten to fifteen years requires new strategic thinking and the development of terminology to define the new reality. The concept of demilitarization has undergone a parallel modification, apparently largely unnoticed by some of Israel’s policy makers. It cannot be extended to the many sophisticated systems whose effects on the nature of modern warfare can be compared to those which accompanied the introduction of gunpowder in the fourteenth century. Unless there is adequate territorial depth, so that the side under surprise attack can trade space for time, and a semblance of parity in resources, the stated objective of demilitarization must be ruled out. Neither the status quo nor demilitarization can halt or reverse the Mideast’s drift toward an overwhelming potential for war. However, as long as the armed camps face each other across the Jordan Rift Valley and on the Golan Heights, the onset of active conflict is neither imminent nor inevitable.
ARAFAT'S INDEPENDENT "PALESTINE"!
DEFENSE/MILITARY IMPACT ON ISRAEL

Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto

You may say you have been oppressed and persecuted — that has been your power! You have been
hammered into very fine steel, and that is why you have never broken.

Stated in 1925 by Lloyd George, British Prime Minister
(the engine behind the Balfour Declaration).

Did the Steel Blade Blunt?

1. Objective
For reasons outside the scope of this paper, the writer believes that the “Oslo Process” will crumble
under the weight of the main issues untouched heretofore, or peter out in circumstances of growing
disagreement, reverting the situation “back to square one”, i.e. a period of continued “twilight”.
Were the writer to err and a “Palestinian” autonomous or independent entity were to emerge out of
the Oslo Process, the chances of long term survival of the said entity are assessed to be very slim
indeed, due to physical limitations, structural philosophy, material situation and evolutionary
trends.

However, a certain probability of the emergence of an independent “Palestinian” state, at least for a
limited period of time, exists. Arafat’s statement on the unilateral declaration of a “Palestinian” state
on May 4, 1999 is to be accepted at its face value even though the date has passed and the implications
of such a political move needs to be analyzed carefully.

The objective of this paper is to survey, at policy
making level (and it can therefore by no means replace a detailed study) the defense/military impact on Israel of such a “Palestinian” unilateral step, assuming that Arafat will enjoy Israeli indecision and wide international, not only Islamic, support.

2. Frame of Mind: Conciliation or Confrontation?

a. Comparing Quotations
We have come from Jerusalem, the ancient and eternal capital of the Jewish people. We have come
from an anguished and grieving land. We have come from a people, a home, a family, that has not known
a single year — not a single month — in which mothers have not wept for their sons. We have come
to try and put an end to the hostilities, so that our children, our children’s children, will no longer
experience the painful cost of war, violence and terror. We have come to secure their lives and to
ease the sorrow and the painful memories of the past — to hope and pray for peace.

We say with complete faith, loudly and clearly, that the song of the martyrs is etched in the path of
Palestine, and their pure blood upon our necks
intensify the revolution and the blessed intifada.
Reinforce the strong stance and strengthen the faith. **We must burn the ground under the feet of the invaders.** [Emphasis is that of the present author — YTC.]

We respect agreements the way that the prophet Muhammad and Saladin respected the agreements which they signed... All options are open before the Palestinian people.

We are a nation of giants which has been struggling with World Zionism for 101 years, and we are capable of beginning it all again.  

b. Comparing Documents

Article I of the “Declaration of Principles on Interim Self Government Arrangements”:

The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle-East Peace Process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian interim Self-Government Authority, the elected Council (the “Council”) for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole peace process and that the negotiations on the permanent status will lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.  

The “Fateh” organization is Arafat’s own political/terrorist group, the largest and most influential one of the nine similar groups that form the Palestinian National Council which capes the PLO Central Council, the “chief” of the PLO (Executive Committee).

As the majority of the PLO Central Council, the Fateh organization is, in fact, the leading “peace partner” of Israel.

Of late, independently of the Israeli request for the cancellation of the viciously anti-Israel clauses of the PLO’s Palestinian Covenant, Fateh has made public (July 28, 1998), through its internet site <www.fateh.org>, the articles of its Constitution. It may be of interest to quote some of these articles:

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**The Movement’s Essential Principles**

**Article (1)** Palestine is part of the Arab World, and the Palestinian people are part of the Arab Nation, and their struggle is part of its struggle.

**Article (2)** The Palestinian people have an independent identity. They are the sole authority that decides their own destiny, and they have complete sovereignty on all their lands.

**Article (4)** The Palestinian struggle is part and parcel of the world-wide struggle against Zionism, colonialism and international imperialism.

**Article (6)** UN projects, accords and resolutions, or those of any individual country which undermine the Palestinian people’s right in their homeland are illegal and rejected.

**Article (7)** The Zionist Movement is racial, colonial and aggressive in ideology, goals, organization and method.

**Article (8)** The Israeli existence in Palestine is a Zionist invasion with a colonial expansive base, and it is a natural ally to colonialism and international imperialism.

**Article (9)** Liberating Palestine and protecting its holy places is an Arab, religious and human obligation.

**Goals**

**Article (12)** Complete liberation of Palestine, and eradication of Zionist economic, political, military and cultural existence.

**Article (13)** Establishing an independent democratic state with complete sovereignty on all rights without any racial or religious discrimination.

**Article (17)** Armed public revolution is the inevitable method to liberating Palestine.

**Article (19)** Armed struggle is a strategy and not a tactic, and the Palestinian Arab People’s armed revolution is a decisive factor in the liberation fight and in
uprooting the Zionist existence, and this struggle will not cease unless the Zionist state is demolished and Palestine is completely liberated. [My emphasis — YTC]

Article (22) Opposing any political solution offered as an alternative to demolishing the Zionist occupation in Palestine, as well as any project intended to liquidate the Palestinian case or impose any international mandate on its people.

Article (24) Maintaining relations with all liberal forces supporting our just struggle in order to resist together Zionism and imperialism.

Article (25) Convincing concerned countries in the world to prevent Jewish immigration to Palestine as a method of solving the problem.

The PLO's Constitution's articles speak for themselves.

In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the observation that may be made is that the Israeli side may have been over-optimistic when it believed that the spirit of conciliation like that emanating from Rabin's address of September 13, 1993 (quoted above) will prevail.

There are parties that believe that it is the intransigence of the Israeli Likud government that brought about the present (August 1998) de facto standstill in the progress to peace and wasted the PLO original goodwill, bringing thereby a deterioration of the situation.

The following table suggests that this may not be the case:

"Palestinian" Arab Terror as a Function of Israeli Government Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Number of Years</th>
<th>Number of Jews Murdered</th>
<th>Average no. of Jews murdered/year</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intifada</td>
<td>Dec. 7, 1987 to Sept. 12, 1993</td>
<td>-5.75</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Exclusive of Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oslo peak: Rabin-Peres Gov't</td>
<td>Sept. 23, 1993 to June 9, 1996</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>Exclusive of Lebanon &amp; Jewish Institutions abroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likud Gov't: Netanyahu's &quot;anti-peace&quot; policy</td>
<td>June 16, 1996 to Aug. 21, 1998</td>
<td>-2.12</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Exclusive of Lebanon</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: It is painful to try and draw conclusions from one's own body count, it is also not entirely accurate, given the random nature of the results of a terror attack. When counting the wounded, the ratio does not change substantially.

Averaging incidents over lengthier periods of time does provide a trend indication for each of the three periods of different policies (especially the last two). The trends are too diverse to discard. A 3:1 terror murder ratio between the Rabin-Peres conciliatory and Netanyahu's more demanding policies requires an explanation, since the opposite might have been expected. The one explanation that comes to mind is that, conscious of the Israeli Labor government's political commitment to proceed and conclude the arrangements at almost all costs, Arafat unleashed his own and his "opposition" terror groups to add the whip of terror to the carrot of "peace", and thus stampede the Jews out of Judea, Samaria and Gaza as quickly as possible.

When the Israeli Jewish voters reacted with a 55 percent majority in Netanyahu's favor during the May 1996 elections, Arafat may have felt that he "overdid it". However he tried to force the issue again until the costly fake "Temple Mount Tunnel Incident" of September 1996. Realizing that, with the new government, the "whip" may be both too costly...
and counter-productive, the use of terror was relegated to be perpetrated almost exclusively by fringe elements from within or without the PLO, who are alternately wrist-slapped or, again, tolerated, to keep the terror option in plain view.

d. The Inevitable Conclusion
The inevitable conclusion of this part is that, were an Arafat led Palestinian state to emerge, it would not be the result of an “Oslo spirit of conciliation” but, rather, the result of a bitter confrontation, a “tug of war”, where, at certain crucial moments, the US administration reneged on its undertakings, pitching in to help “poor Arafat” and the “poor” bloc of Islamic dictatorships that back him.

This being the case, it is worthwhile to define properly the feasibility of a peace relationship between Israel and the third Palestinian state, as well as the implications thereof.

3. “Territories for Peace” — A Reminder

a. Review
Going back to May 15, 1948: Since that day, the beaten West Palestinian Arabs, who initiated the war with the Jews of Palestine, did not take active part in any major war of the Arab coalitions with Israel and no participant in the pan-Arab effort to wipe out Israel had any plans for the establishment of yet another, second Arab Palestinian state.

In fact, their plans to share the booty of the Jews had been thwarted by the Israeli victory, sealed and legitimized by the Rhodes Amistice Agreements of 1949, and signed by all combatants except Iraq.

Nurturing revanchist hopes, Arabia (the Arab Nation) at large prevented the conversion of the Amistice agreements into peace treaties, kept the conflict smoldering on a “small fire” through a continuous 50 year terror campaign interrupted only by wars and through the prohibition of the resettlement and assimilation of the West Palestinian Arab refugees anywhere within the emptiness of the Arabian expanses.¹³

Not one single Arab country recognized the Jordanian annexation of Judea and Samaria in 1950,¹⁴ the reason for the opposition being that the annexation would create an Arab-Palestinian kingdom, a haven for the Arabs of Western Palestine, and thus emasculate their political clout as homeless refugees who “have to be returned to their homes”¹⁵

So it was neither justice, sympathy or brotherly empathy that kept the Arab flame of war alive against Israel but, rather, the obsessive desire, probably driven by the Muslim culture, by the totalitarian regimes’ fear of the Middle East being invested by democracy and Western values and by the wish to recover the Arab honor shamefully lost in the 1948 military debacle at the hands of the much inferior Jewish ad hoc mobilized army. When Arabia, which refused to allow the Arab war refugees to resettle for the last 50 years, invokes “The Plight of the Palestinian Refugees”, it is, in the circumstances, not for love and compassion for them but, rather, to liven up the fire of hatred against Israel, a cynical but successful policy.

The set of maps at the end of this chapter,¹⁶ (numbered 1 to 8) that tells the story of the seven “Territories for Peace” solutions, presented over time, all accepted by the Jews when proposed and all rejected by the Arabs, a living proof that this aspect of territory is not the real issue. Compromise is nowhere in sight insofar as Arabia at large (and Iran) are concerned.

b. Conclusion, Part 3
The conclusion of this part is that the issue of a third Palestinian state is not solely that of a compromise between Israel and the Arabs of Judea, Samaria and Gaza. It is, rather, part and parcel of a peace to be secured by Israel with its antagonists in war from May 1948 to this day, i.e. Arabia at large (or the Arab Nation), to which Iran is, unfortunately, to be added. Any settlement with a minor segment of Arabia like the Arabs of Western Palestine is commendable on the condition that it does not prejudice the peace with Arabia at large by eliminating some of its major components.

4. Israel’s Defense Territorial Imperatives

a. Peace
Peace is defined in the dictionaries as either “a state of harmony between people or groups” or as a “state of no war”.

“Harmony” exists for example, between the US and Canada, given the similarities of political, cultural, economic, “Weltanschauung”, aspirations, etc., the lack of relevant conflicts of interests and absolute absence of aggressive motivation.

“A peace of no war” existed between the US and the (former) USSR characterized by sharply contrasting political regimes, political culture, economies, “Weltanschauung”, aspirations etc., by worldwide conflicts of interests and by the viciously aggressive motivation of communist expansionism — all the above war prone parameters offset by an added factor named deterrence.

**Peace in the Middle East** cannot, of course, be a peace of harmony, as the protagonists of the Oslo peace process wished to create, given the significant differences among the parameters that define it, the sharp conflict of interests as formally expressed by the Arab regimes and the acute, old, never diminished aggressive motivation of Arabia as such, as expressed by its openly professed intent to destroy the Jewish state. A notable exception to Arabia’s motivation is Hashemite Jordan, whose independence from the “brotherly embrace” of its much more powerful Arab neighbors like Syria, Iraq or Saudi Arabia is guaranteed by Israel’s stated strategic interest of preventing the presence of one or all these countries’ troops on its longest frontier, nearest to its strategic, vital centers.

In the light of Middle Eastern realities, peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors, i.e. the Arab Nation, if attainable, will be a “peace of no war” rather than a “peace of harmony”.

**b. Deterrence**

Deterrence, being the determinant factor in a peace of no war, deserves special attention.

For the purpose of this paper, deterrence is defined as the mechanism of preventing war in a war prone environment.

Its components are:

i. A military might capable of winning a war with the deterred antagonist(s) while inflicting upon them a punishment that they find unacceptable.

ii. A national will to use the might if/when absolutely necessary.

iii. An economy able to support the might, its readiness and the level of national will.

iv. A leadership capable of catering to the might, the will and the economy.

v. A clear understanding by the deterred antagonist(s), of the above points i to iv.

**c. The Military Might**

The military might, being the prime component of deterrence, should be clearly understood: It is a controlled, co-ordinated, informed, supplied, trained, etc., manipulation of:

- Firepower
- Mobility
- Terrain

The classic fielding of a military might includes trade-offs among the three factors, like, for instance, the Russian, and later, Soviet huge trade-offs of terrain in exchange for the wearing off of Napoleon’s or German firepower and mobility while preserving/strengthening their own forces, thereby achieving, in due time, a crushing superiority and victory.

**d. The “Achilles’ Heel”**

The “Achilles’ heel” of the Israeli military might is the absolute lack of the “terrain” factor in terms of relevant geographic expanses.

The other, topographic, feature of Israel’s “terrain” factor is also non-existent within the pre-1967 demarcation lines, rendering Israel totally open, left with only one choice of survival: Pre-emptive war by surprise, which was the case in 1967.

The lessons learned from the 1967 Six Day War, 1973 Yom Kippur War and 1991 (Gulf War) wars, the enormous Arab military build up since 1967 (which continues), the weapons’ technological development and the present geopolitical situation teach that an Israeli preemption, as in 1967 is practically impossible, while an Arab surprise, as in 1973 is not impossible.

This underlines the enhanced importance of the “terrain” factor, at least as far as topographic assets go.
e. The Time Factor and Terrain

Another very acute Israeli weakness is its "short wind". Given the structure of its armed forces whose main component are reservists, that is the same people who drive the economy, Israel will never be able to mobilize fully and deploy its forces so as to discourage the exercise of an enemy threat on its frontiers for a prolonged period of time. It has no economic capability to maintain prolonged total mobilization and/or readiness.

Either the threat is removed, or Israel will have to go to (a preemptive) war to remove it, which was the case in June 1967 (the Six Day War).

The above-mentioned Israeli economic "short wind" has another facet: the stockpiling of ammunition and other war material is also limited, as is their rate of manufacture in real time. Then, there is the international, political "short wind". The duration of a conflict is determined in "normal" circumstances, by the capability of one of the parties to bear a tolerable rate of attrition of its own forces while inflicting intolerable attrition on the other party, until imposing its will upon it.

The case of the Israeli-Arab conflict is more complex than that. It is a highly charged conflict involving multiple world-wide interests, including those of nuclear superpower(s). At least in the past, when Soviet interests were manifest in the Middle East (and nobody can warrant that a similar situation will not be repeated with Russia, China or Middle East nuclear powers), it became obvious that a prolonged conventional campaign might, in a contested nuclear environment, degenerate into a nuclear threat or war situation. The difference between the Israeli victory in the "Sinai Campaign" of October 1956 and the simultaneous Anglo-French fiasco of their "Suez Affair" was made by the fact that, when Bulganin's Soviet nuclear threat came to all three, Israel was in full possession of its campaign objectives, while the Anglo-French were far from achieving theirs, being therefore forced to cease fire prematurely. (Another, third party limiting factor is "friendly" political pressures. The US State Department became very proficient in preventing decision in war by stopping the Israelis through strong diplomatic and logistic pressures, like at the end of the Yom Kippur War of October 1973. This proficiency served Mr. Dennis Ross when he advised the Arabs that "only the US can stop the Israelis.")

The conclusion reached in 1963-6 by the Israeli Air Force Planning Branch (headed at the time by the author) was that the potential nuclear threat (and later "friendly" pressure) is a decisive time limiting factor, especially in a Middle East Israeli-Arab conflict. Given the fact that the decision making process of a nuclear power requires a period of about ten days, the new war contingency plan was built to achieve decision in battle at any costs and risks, as close to the start of hostilities as possible. The lack of time compounds, of course, the problem of the lack of terrain, time shortage becoming a serious threat multiplier. Israel should be ready to break an enemy initiated assault and assume initiative, counter attacking decisively, as fast as possible.20

To achieve this, Israel needs a proper deployment of high-readiness standing units able to stop the enemy by using the combination of firepower and terrain (topography), with an unobstructed supply line to the rear. Were the supply lines and topographical assets in enemy hands, time and force attrition will be required before stabilizing the line prior to the counterattack, if feasible at all. This additional time and the additional forces may not be available — hence the increased importance of Israel holding the topographical assets wherever they may be, because of its "short wind".

Let it be understood that all topographic assets vital to Israel's military might, and thus vital to its deterrence, which is the key to peace that is beneficial to both Jewish and Middle East Arab populations, are to be found only east of the "Green Line", that is on the Golan Heights, Samaria, Judea and the Jordan Valley south of the Lake of Galilee.

Israel's hold onto these vital territorial/topographic assets is a determinant, a "conditio sine qua non", of maintaining the peace in the Middle East, although it raises problems in the domain of the Israeli-"Palestinian" relationship. It must be noted that the "Palestinians" are only a marginal, though painfully close, fraction of the Arab nation with which peace should be concluded.
5. "Palestine" — Arafat’s Independent State

a. The Fake Concept of Autonomy
A lively intra- and inter-partisan debate has been going on in Israel ever since Menachem Begin accepted the notion of “individual autonomy” for the Arabs of Judea, Samaria and Gaza, as part and parcel of the peace treaty with Egypt. This debate, about the nature and application of autonomy, has intensified since the Oslo DOP, when the notion of autonomy had to be put to test. Yitzhak Rabin was a consistent, long time opponent to the establishment of a “Palestinian” state in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. His (1992-1996) ruling Labor Party’s platform, maintained formally, even after the DOP was signed, that Arab autonomy in Judea, Samaria and Gaza was the ultimate solution to the issue of separating the region’s Arab inhabitants from the Jews and Arabs of Israel “proper.” Yet the acceptance by the Israeli political establishment of a “Palestinian” state is slowly gaining ground from the left toward the center. Although legal acrobatics can legitimize or delegitimize anything, real life is less tolerant.

For the Arabs of Judea, Samaria and Gaza to gain a measure of emancipation, they have to belong one way or another, to a state recognized by the family of nations, i.e. become citizens of a state, which they are not at present.

Autonomy, as applied in fact, world-wide, is the delegation, by a source of authority, of certain powers to regional, ethnic, religious or other groupings, while that source refrains from the delegation of all powers (such as for the Basque area of Catalonia, Spain).

- One precondition for delegation of power is the bona fide recognition, by the autonomous entity, of the source of authority as such.
- Another precondition is the acceptance, by the source of authority, of the responsibilities related to those powers that have not been delegated, for instance, in our case, the bestowing of citizenship upon the autonomous group, including the rights and duties emanating therefrom.

The case of the Arabs of Judea, Samaria and Gaza is totally different:
- The Arabs do not recognize Israel as a source of authority over the territory handed over to them and
- Israel does not intend to confer Israeli citizenship upon the Arabs of Judea, Samaria and Gaza, since that would mean, for demographic reasons, the denial of the Jewish character of the state that has painfully been created as a Jewish state. Worse, since a bi-national democratic state means the sharing of the defense burden, hence secrets, by both sectors and since the Israeli defense is orientated in its entirety to face the Arab threat of which the Arab sector of bi-national Israel is bound to be part and parcel, that would border on suicide.

It is, therefore, obvious that a state of autonomy can, in this case of Judea, Samaria and Gaza be only a temporary, transitional state leading either to full, independent statehood or to dissolution.

We shall, however, for the purpose of this paper, assume that a full fledged, independent state of “Palestine” will emerge from the present ongoing negotiations, a state ruled by Arafat, treading the same political, military, mass-psychological, economic, and educational paths that it has done since the Oslo DOP has been signed.

b. “Palestine” — The Israeli Perspective
Since the negotiations are not yet concluded, a map of the final Israeli stand on the territorial compromise with Arafat’s “Palestine” is not readily available.

With no official map drawn yet, there exists, however, an Israeli consensual agreement as to the political-military leeway that Israel can permit any “Palestinian” entity to exercise, be it autonomous or independent.

Following are some of the consensual points:
1. The “Palestinian” entity will be demilitarized, possessing only a lightly armed police force of 8,000 — 16,000 officers.
2. The ingress and exit from the “Palestinian” state will be controlled by Israel to secure demilitarization and prohibition of unwarranted immigration.
3. The “Palestinian” state's airspace will be controlled by Israel.
4. The “Palestinian” state will not conclude with third parties any military or other alliances which Israel will estimate to affect its security.
5. Water resources, drawn from a common subterranean aquifer, will be shared by mutual agreement.
6. Situated on high ground, the “Palestinian” state will make all necessary provisions to prevent potential water, air or soil pollution of Israeli territory (which would be merely a walking distance away).
7. The State of “Palestine” will guarantee a terror and crime free neighborhood with Israel.
8. Israel will provide free transit rights to link the various “Palestinian” regions yet reserve the right to check, for reasons of its own security and for the protection of its other interests, the persons, vehicles, and wares translating from one region to another.
9. Both parties will undertake energetic measures to promote pacific coexistence and reduce tensions.
10. In case of grave criminal or terrorist transgressions, Israel will reserve the right of hot pursuit, which may be forgone in exchange of solid agreement between the parties to extradite criminals/terrorists as per request, etc.

Note: The above mentioned points are not all, nor are they “the” official formulations being negotiated. The purpose of enumerating them is to stress the fact that given the confined geographic space being disputed, given the fact that this area is heavily populated by interlaced populations of very diverse cultures, that the Arab areas' inhabitants are harboring deep antagonism for their Jewish neighbors and are continuously being incited to excel in the exercise of hatred, and last but not least at all, given the pan-Arab and Iranian (Islamic) threat of conventional and total, i.e. mass destruction ballistic missiles war, the Jews of Israel and the Diaspora, although a great many of them favor the establishment of a “Palestinian” state, have a notion of “Palestinian” independence considered, under normal [or different] circumstances, to be absolutely inapplicable, unrealistic and unacceptable worldwide.

Any student of history or political science will attest to the fact that, if accepted, these terms will only be of a short duration, to be followed by tension, maneuvering for more “elbow room” and, most probably, an existential conflict.

c. “Palestine” — The PLO-Arab Perspective
Since Arafat and his team are the “claimants”, the picture from the PLO side, supported, at least for the present by the whole Arab, Muslim and other parties of the world, is pretty clear.

Arafat's map of “Palestine” (Map 7) is published in his brochure of March 199226 named “Master planning — The State of Palestine — Suggested Guidelines For Comprehensive Development”, published in English by “Palestine Studies Project”, “The Center for Engineering and Planning”.

According to the PLO concept, a “Palestinian” land-corridor should link pre-1967 Samaria and Judea with Gaza, a 225 sq. km. corridor whose 8 Jewish villages and a township will have to be evacuated.

At the beginning of 1994 Arieh Stav, the editor of Nativ, decided to learn whether the March 1992 plan was still valid after the conclusion of the Oslo DOP, applying special emphasis on the land corridor. Some of Stav's telephone conversations are enlightening, worth quoting, since they display the clear objective, the singleness of purpose as well as the peculiar logic of a party that lost the war and is about to win the peace.27 The overconfidence displayed is certainly characteristic and bears a transparent tone of threat.

Arieh Stav:
Since the issue [of the land-corridor] is about more than 200 square kilometers where 9 villages, kibbutzim and townships are located, and since the book does not mention what their fate is going to be, I called the Center (Tel. 02-955-65528), to find out whether these [forty-five year old -YTC] settlements are an obstacle to peace.
The man who answered the phone spoke basic Hebrew. He advised that this matter is dealt with in detail by the central branch in Gaza, gave me the branch’s phone number, (07-861-365), and suggested that I speak with Mr. Halil, the engineer in charge of transportation issues at the Center I called. Halil was out in the field. I left my number. Halil called back one hour later. He was polite, presented himself, and offered his service in basic English, not unlike the English spoken by the average Israeli. The conversation was unrestricted. Halil explained that he wrote the transportation chapter of the book, hence he will try to answer the best he can.

“Halil,” I said, “what bothers me is the question of the land bridge between Gaza and Hebron. According to the booklet, you relate to a 5 km. wide, 45 km. long strip of land, that is 225 square kilometers, as if it were under your rule. How will Israel accept it?”

“First of all, this is not a bridge, but a corridor”, corrected Halil, and asked: “Look Mr. Stav, think logically, the agreement on principles (DOP) includes the area of what you call “autonomous rule” and what we call “A Palestinian state” on all the areas conquered by you in June 1967. So, how do you imagine will the 700,000 Gazans be linked to the West Bank? Gaza is our only seaport through which our agricultural produce will be exported and all the raw materials and finished goods imported, for a state that, by year 2000, will have more than 4 million people. The estimate is that on the multi-lane highway, one of the land-corridor’s links, there will be 12,000 lorries (trucks) moving per day, to which 5,000 railroad cars will be added. Your Oslo mission got all this data, understood them and agreed to them”.

“Did they agree?”

“No, obviously not in detail. There was no discussion on details. If there would have been, we would have not concluded the agreement to this day. But we did agree on the principles”.

“Let’s assume this is the case, but how about the sovereignty on that area?”

“Israel will have to put up with our sovereignty. In fact, this principle has already been agreed upon and it is part of the undisclosed clauses. The reason is that Israel knows that in any instant of international litigation it will lose the case. International law and the borders of the UN partition plan of 1947 are both in our favor.”

“I know about the 1947 partition plan lines, but what does international law stipulate?”

“The international law stipulates that the ownership of a land corridor that connects the two parts of a country passing through the land of a third country, is to be decided on according to the needs and the size of the populations it serves. Since all the Israeli population south of the line Beth Hannun-Lida is less than 250,000 people, which is barely one third of the present population of Gaza and going to be only one quarter by the year 2,000, the issue of sovereignty over the land-corridor is clear.”

“The land-corridor is to pass in the area where one town, four kibbutzim and three villages are situated: Sderot, Nir-Am, Mefalsim, Gevim, Dorot, Ahuzam, Lachish and Amatsia.”

“You forgot Shekkel, that one built upon the lands of Beth-Awa, the neighboring Arab village...”

“Yes I forgot Shekkel, well, then four villages instead of three. How can you imagine that Israel will agree to evacuate this land-corridor area for your cause?”

“Only a moment ago you said that you are familiar with the UN November 1947 resolution. All these settlements were not only non-existent in 1947.29 They were built on land that was earmarked for an Arab country, conquered by you in 1948, and whose Arab inhabitants were deported in their majority. Therefore these settlements are just as illegal as your West Bank settlements.”

“In fact even more illegal than the West Bank settlements, since all settlements built there after 1967 were set up on government or private land, without displacing any Arab inhabitants.”

“Exactly.” [i.e., absolutely right — YTC] “How will Israelis travel from north to south and back if the land-corridor will be under your sovereignty?”

“When the day of the final solution will come.”

“Are you aware of how the notion “final solution” sounds in Jewish ears?”

“Your pardon?”
“Never mind, carry on.”

Well, then, when the day of the final solution will arrive and the two peoples will live in peace in Palestine, the question will find its own answer, like the transit within the European Union, where the passage is free, with no trip checks. Till then, I believe that Israel will substantially increase its air traffic, using helicopters as air taxis. For heavier traffic, like lorries (trucks) and rail stock, Israel will have to build an elevated bridging system [over the corridor — YTC] on a string of longitudinal roads like Yad-Mordechai — Gavim, Or Haner — Ruhama, Plugot Interchange to Quama Interchange and Lachish-Lahav. But for an answer to this question you’d better ask the Israeli Ministry of Transportation.”

“On the map of the transportation chapter, the frontiers between the Palestinian state and Israel are marked “temporary”, that means that you will insist on downsizing Israel to the 1947 borders.”

The implementation of the US resolution 181 on the [original, 1947 — YTC] partition borders is our legitimate right, based on an inviolable legal basis. But, then, I understand your predicament. It is therefore that I want to avoid entering a political discussion. After all, I am only a transportation engineer. But as a Palestinian who lives under Israeli occupation since 1967, and as one who is in charge of this sector of the Gaza-Hebron link, it is clear to me that it is inconceivable to have this land-corridor as a permanent feature.

Main traffic arteries are not there in a vacuum. They are a very powerful magnet that attracts settlements on both its sides. This is how the main population centers developed throughout history. The history is with us, justice is with us, the law is with us, the UN is with us, and more important than anything, as one who meets many Israelis, I know that the real peace lovers among you are also with us.”

This conversation took place at the beginning of May 1994. A few more calls made after the rule in Gaza was transferred to the PLO remained unanswered.

The writer believes that there is hardly a more candid, well mannered, **concise and threatening document** presenting the PLO case for all to see:

a. The PLO, considers the initial objective of its negotiations with Israel to be the full recovery of the territories acquired by Israel during the Six Day War of 1967 and the establishment, within the 1949 armistice lines, of a third, full fledged Palestinian state whose capital is Jerusalem.

b. The PLO considers the frontiers between the “Palestinian” state and Israel, as defined by the armistice lines of 1949, to be of a temporary nature, which implies that further territorial revindications are in the offing.

c. The PLO, relying on the Arab/Muslim world as well as on UN and other support, started its countdown for the next stage by including in its claims areas pertinent to the Israeli withdrawal to the 1947 UN partition lines from before the War of Independence.

d. The first test case of the crossing of the “Green Line” by “Palestine”, easiest to “sell” and, according to PLO sources, already unofficially approved by the Israeli mission at Oslo, is the transfer of sovereignty over the 225 sq. km. land-corridor that should connect Gaza with Hebron, which includes the evacuation of nine Israeli towns, kibbutzim and villages built before, during and after the War of Independence.

e. Deftly, Arafat’s PLO which declares in its still valid Covenant and in its new Fateh Constitution, that it is part of the Arab Nation “out to liberate the whole of Palestine”, has succeeded in isolating and separating, during its talks with the Israelis, its present day “modest” requests from its candid, implied, “step 2” of further revindications once “step 1” is accomplished, as it temporarily swept aside the refugee problem.

f. The PLO acts boldly, dismissing the fact that the Arabs of Western Palestine have never accepted any partition plan that would permit the implementation of the League of Nations’ (UN’s predecessor) endorsed Balfour Declaration on the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine (see map 8), or the fact that they had started the war by the end of 1947 to prevent the
implementation of the UN partition plan (accepted by the Jews).32

The conclusion of this Part (5) is that, far from being a goodwill paved highway to peace, the Oslo process has only started an aggressive, acrimonious, vicious “tug of war” between Israel and Arafat’s PLO, the end of which is nowhere in sight, surely not bound to stop with the emergence of a third Palestinian state within the 1949 lines. The way it goes, it seems that the well led, coordinated PLO effort has let it gain and keep a net advantage over the split, disoriented Israelis, whose recovery depends on their unity, will, determination and leadership. One may, therefore, assume that the PLO state will emerge, that its attitude toward Israel, far from being the bucolic idyll prophesied by Mr. Peres, will be one of increased tension, confrontations, renewed revindications supported by the Muslim world and other powers, one of fight for more freedom and elbow room every inch of the way. This implies a steady state of instability of “twilight”, with Israel constantly losing strategic, political, economic and prestige ground, which, as experience teaches, means simultaneous loss of deterrence, friendships and support. Nobody bets on a dying horse.

6. The Defense/Military Impact of “Palestine”
The impact of a PLO state upon Israel’s security/military situation is massive, felt throughout all that defense stands for, namely the three types of threats of terror/guerrilla, conventional and total war. It requires fresh thinking about the strategy and composition of the Israeli armed forces, i.e. a review of Israel’s defense doctrine. It would be advisable to look into that impact while relating separately to each type of threat before drawing a more coherent conclusion.

a. Terrorism and/or Guerrilla Warfare Threat
Much like magnetic or electric field strength, the efficiency of a guerrilla or terror element is inversely proportional to the square of the distance between base and target.

In simple words, the closer the base-target range, the more efficient a terror/guerrilla unit will become, exponentially.

Terrorism is the indiscriminate use of violence and intimidation to achieve, in our case, a political goal. Based mostly on friendly havens, it is not meant to impose its will in battle upon the enemy. On the contrary, it is meant to evade battle. Its success is measured by three yardsticks:

- Whether it keeps the (political) issue “burning”.
- What is its demoralizing effect on the enemy’s population and, thereby, on his decision-makers?
- What is its morale and motivation build up capability in the political faction it represents?

Terror may grow from a threat that is of a mere military “nuisance value” to a political full fledged strategic threat, which seems to have been the case with the PLO, supported by the Muslim world.

Guerrilla warfare is the use of an irregular or semi-regular, politically motivated force against a regular, superior military force, aiming to impose its will outside the classic battlefield.

Both terror and guerrilla warfare are bound to win by merely persisting, which is why the party subjected to their onslaught will have to put them down as fast as possible, be it even by use of excessive power, risking to lose the confrontation if it does not do so (as for example in the Intifada).

One glimpse at the map (Map 2 in Edward Saar’s paper in this book) outlines the enormous advantages gained by any terror or guerrilla organization which finds a warm home in a “Palestine”, fiercely antagonistic to Israel (see parts 2 to 5):

a. A sympathetic, supportive population.
b. A (semi?) sympathetic political regime, ready to turn the blind eye when expedient. A sanctuary and logistic base.
c. A walking distance from most major targets.
d. A light arms fire, portable anti-aircraft missiles, mortar, Katyusha missiles, etc. coverage of most or even all major targets in Israel.
e. A visual observation and laser designation range for artillery or stand off, laser guided weapons.
f. An enormously increased length of exposed
borderline between Arabs/Arabia and Israel.\footnote{33}

g. No natural-topographic obstacles/defenses on the Israeli side, hilly or mountainous terrain on the "Palestinian".

h. An increasingly sympathetic Israeli Arab population, exalted by the establishment of "Palestine".\footnote{34}

i. A large body of "Palestinians" working in Israel.

Reading the above list of advantages, one by one, does raise anxiety. Thinking of the combination of all these is downright scary. To confront this situation, special, dedicated measures are required like, specialized border forces, tedious screening of all people and wares crossing the frontiers (without which "Palestine" has no subsistence), ditches, fences, minefields, hi-tech surveillance, etc.

Co-ordination of classic guerrilla activity of Arafat's "police" and/or militias, within the framework of a major Arab-Israeli conflict, to be certainly expected, is a strategic threat of the first magnitude.

It may slow down or totally close traffic to fronts (the "mobility" element of military might) and/or play havoc in urban concentrations and/or "rear" bases (there is no real rear in Israel) etc.

Combined with a ballistic missile attack or even standing alone, "Palestinian" guerrillas launching assaults timely and properly, may delay the mobilization of the Israeli reserves, their posting and outfitting as well as their deployment,\footnote{35} which may have deadly results on a conventional front line.

These above-mentioned dangers, built-in, inherent in a "Palestinian" state were not, by any means, lost on the leadership of the Israeli Labor Party.

It does sound strange nowadays, but in 1978 Mr. Shimon Peres wrote in his (Hebrew) book, The Foundation of Peace and Security that (quotation, pp. 232-233):

Maybe that the present Arab generation cannot dwell in full harmony and peace with Israel; one has to take this into account. Maybe that the present Arab generation cannot go beyond an interim arrangement, an arrangement that does not result in a withdrawal to the 1967 borders and does not include the establishment of a Palestinian state, since the establishment of such a state means its flooding Judea and Samaria with over 25,000 of its armed fighters. Such a force will double itself in no time through the assimilation of local youth — there is no shortage of arms and equipment. It will not be long before a war infrastructure will be established in Judea, Samaria and Gaza.

Israel will suffer from continuous security problems which may drag it into a war or undermine its population's morale. In time of war, the Palestinian frontiers will provide mobile forces with an excellent "jump off" position to break their way into the vital Israeli infrastructure, to immediately restrain the Israeli Air Force's liberty of movement over Israel's airspace, and draw blood from the inhabitants living within the range of a "mass of artillery".

These dangers — additional to the dangers of war previously described, compel Israel to insist on retaining three imperative territorial components: Secure borders, and military strongholds and warning stations beyond the secure borders which have to be accepted in any arrangement (concluded) during this interim period.

Secure borders are required by Israel as long as harmonious peace does not prevail. The real meaning of this harmony is the acceptance by the Arabs of Israel's existence, meaning that all dangers to its existence, integrity, security and rights of sovereignty have been removed.

Mr. Peres' book contains many repetitions of the above theme.

Between 1978 and 1992-3, Mr. Shimon Peres' opinion on the danger of establishing a PLO governed "Palestine" West of the Jordan has apparently undergone a total change. Currently, he believes that such a state is the way to achieve peace, goodwill and co-operation. Reading the above noted quotation from his book, one's conclusion is that Mr. Peres believes that 15 years after he wrote his book, the same "present Arab generation" (it is the same generation of top and mid-level
leadership, with a new young generation of followers that joined them) can and is now willing to “dwell in full harmony” with Israel, hence his dramatic move to reach the Oslo agreement. Yet one is very hard put to discern any changes in PLO policy, deeds and rhetoric\(^3\) between 1978 and the present.

“Arab Terror as Function of a Israeli Government Policy” (part 2,2) suggests, that, while semantic changes may have occurred in the corridors of power, they have never been manifest in the fields, _casbahs_ or on the road. On the contrary the more solicitous the Israeli government, the more vicious the terror, the opposite of the will to “dwell in full harmony”.

One may wonder how Mr. Peres (with the State Department in tow) reached his Nobel Prize winning new conclusion, but this is beyond the scope of this paper.

Other people have different opinions on the potential “dwelling in harmony”. Following are three of many opinions expressed of late\(^4\):


From a security standpoint, we will live in a much, much more difficult reality than the one currently prevailing when larger portions of territory are not under Israel’s responsibility and control of the areas around some of the roads and some of the settlements becomes more difficult or impossible.

b. Excerpted from Reuters News Service, July 1, 1998:

The Palestinian leadership has no more patience and our people have no more patience. All that’s left for us is to defend Jerusalem in whatever way we can”, Arafat told a special session of the Palestinian Legislative Council. Arafat said the battle for East Jerusalem, which Israel captured in the 1967 Middle East War and later annexed is “one of life and death”.  _There will be no peace, no security, no stability without the return of liberated Jerusalem, the eternal capital of an independent Palestinian state, whether they like it or not_, proclaimed Arafat, drawing loud applause from legislators. [My emphasis — YTC]

c. As to the side that Arab Israeli citizens may take in case of a “Palestinian” Israeli tension or conflict, an unequivocal opinion is presented by MK (Member of Israeli Parliament) Abel Whab Darawshe in an interview in the Arab PLO official newspaper Al-Hayat al Jadeeda. Reported in Yediot Aharonot, July 17, 1998:

Any Arab who serves in the Israeli army is a person who is doing a distinguishingly criminal act against society. I call upon each and every Arab who is serving in the occupying army to leave and instead join the ranks of men of honor who serve their people, [my emphasis — YTC], because it is unthinkable that an Arab should serve in a Jewish army.\(^5\)

Where terrorism and guerrilla are concerned, the conclusion is that the establishment of a “Palestinian” state in Judea, Samaria and Gaza represents a quantum jump in the intensity of threat, given the explosive combination of very much improved tactical circumstances joined, contrary to the Oslo expectations, to an increasingly acute confrontational attitude and high expectations created by initial success, which translate into high motivation, the main weapon of terrorists and guerrillas.

This quantum jump will force Israel to live in a constant “twilight”, i.e. a “stable state of instability” with all that it implies in lives, national morale, quality of life, economic climate, investments’ appeal, international political standing and deterrence posture vis-à-vis the permanent, intensifying, pan-Arab and Iranian threat.

A revision of Israel’s defense doctrine will probably be made, resulting in the establishment of separate anti-terror and guerrilla discrete forces combined with local territorial defense militias, a
significant departure from present day military structures.

b. "Palestine's" Impact on Conventional Warfare
Unless extreme developments occur, the "State of Palestine" will, for the foreseeable future, be no match for Israel in a one on one conventional conflict, but conventional conflict has never been fought between the Arabs of Western Palestine and Israel. The War of Independence, the Sinai Campaign, the Six Day War, the Yom Kippur War, the Lebanon War and the Attrition Wars in between, have all been fought with pan-Arabian coalitions of one composition or another.

Therefore, unlike in a terror/guerrilla war threat, where "Palestine" will most probably play the lead part, its impact on the conduct of yet another conventional war between Israel and pan-Arabia will be reflected in two ways:

i. The denial of strategic high ground, natural obstacles and whatever tactical depth there is to the Israeli forces facing pan-Arabian forces.
This means the burdening of Israel's forces with considerable attrition and additional time requirements if forced to reoccupy the vital areas when facing the imminent threat of pan-Arab forces. This is a significant force-degradation factor, and, obviously, a significant erosion of Israel's grand deterrence posture, the guarantee of regional peace.

ii. The "Palestinian" participation in the war by co-ordinating its guerrilla (and terror) activities with the pan-Arab armies fighting conventionally, and providing the "spring-board" for pan-Arabian forces out to strike at Israel's jugular.

Highground
See Fig. 1 in the previous paper (by Edward Saar) which depicts the "Palestinian" topographic advantage over Israel, when practically all of Israel's eastern flank will be dominated by "Palestinian" high ground.

Since the dawn of history, that is since man started fighting in packs to protect his turf, high ground and space to maneuver have been the name of the game. The story one hears when visiting the magnificent fortified monastery of St. Catherine in the Sinai desert is that the Roman (Byantine) Emperor Justinian, who commissioned the building in the 6th century, had the architect decapitated when learning that he built it in a valley, near the water well instead of setting it on high ground. From medieval castles to Maginot Line, to the Golan, Hermon and other positions, the story is the same.

During all periods of time, regardless of weapons' technology, high ground has been, and remains, synonymous with defense force multiplying, intelligence multiplying and improved control of the surrounding area. Semantics will not change this. Nor, it seems, will airborne or space-borne hi-tech systems, which do provide (partial) complementary intelligence and control solutions.\textsuperscript{41}

While the attributes of the high ground remain the same, modern warfare has changed the range. On one hand, forces move faster, from further away, when storming. The range of their weapons has increased. On the other hand, technology enables intelligence to see or otherwise sense as far as the geographical horizon, i.e. the curvature of the earth permits, night and day and the defensive weapons cover the increased range. The higher they are positioned, the further they "see" or acquire stationary or moving targets.

These being the circumstances, the issue may be summed up:

- By placing natural obstacles in the way of the attacker, high ground enhances defense capability, hence is a defense force multiplier.
- High ground enhances intelligence capabilities, hence is an intelligence force multiplier.
- High ground is vital for proper battle management, enhancing the Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence (C\textsuperscript{3}I) capability of the commander in the field, a combat force multiplier.
- The non-possession of high ground is a force attenuator for the attacker, which is a further force multiplier for the forces possessing it.
- High ground is ideal for the siting of anti-aircraft missile batteries, offering maximum
radar and missile coverage, including “look down-shoot down” at low flying aircraft (cruise missiles) and coverage of fields of fire otherwise obstructed from view of slant radar.\textsuperscript{43} There is no realistic substitute for the high ground siting of anti-aircraft/cruise missiles missile batteries, which become vital in containing enemy air support while the aircraft of the Air Force are diverted against ballistic missiles or other threats.

- High ground provides improved sitings for all variations of electronic warfare, which are constantly growing in tactical and strategic importance.

In case of conventional warfare, if “Palestine” were to hold the high ground, looking down from a negligible distance onto Israel’s flatland entails, it will be able to engage actively about 80 percent of Israel’s “rear”. Reinforced from abroad, it will become an existential threat expressed in the form of harassment, pinpoint attacks on military headquarters, terror (demoralizing) attacks on civilians, strikes at airfields, depots, power, communication lines and transportation facilities (moving or stationary) etc., using a combination of terror, guerrilla, visual/laser guidance of stand-off weapons and anti-aircraft missiles.

Israeli defense imperatives like the protection of vital objectives or the prevention of a major thrust directed from the east against its Achilles’ heel, that is the long, winding, topographically dominated, “narrow waist” borders, may dictate, like in 1967, the reoccupation of the Samarian and Judean highland, be the international implications what may, since this may prove to be a matter of life and death. It also means an additional front.

The conclusion is that, unless unusual circumstances emerge, a conventional Arab-Israeli war should quasi-automatically mean the occupation of “Palestine” by Israeli forces, including the dissolution of its government.\textsuperscript{44} One may assume that a rapid, decisive Israeli victory may influence a “Palestinian” decision to join the fight, but in present circumstances the chances of a rapid decision are next to nil. This being the case, operational exigencies may dictate a return to the Ben Gurion doctrine,\textsuperscript{45} i.e. the pre-emptive occupation of “Palestine”.

\textbf{c. The Impact of “Palestine” on a Total War}

\textit{Waged by Pan Arabia and Iran against Israel}

About 70-80 percent of Israel’s population and wherewithal are crammed together on the coast, within the Greater Tel Aviv megalopolis, about 60 miles long (Gedera-Hadera) and 9 to 20 miles wide. The eastern flank of the Tel Aviv megalopolis borders “Palestine” along more than 60 miles.

The “total war” may, where the Middle East situation is concerned, consist of one or a combination of three distinct levels of intensity:

i. Use of conventional explosive armed ballistic missiles bombardment of urban concentrations, not unlike the Iraqi bombardment of 1991, only on a much larger scale, of hundreds of missiles instead of 39, over a prolonged period of time.

ii. Use of biological and/or chemical armed ballistic missiles.

iii. Use of nuclear warheads delivered by ballistic missiles.

Based upon the discussion in the above mentioned parts 2 to 5, it may be expected that “Palestine” will more than willingly co-operate with any force launching missiles at Israel. (Remember Arafat’s strong support of Iraq during the Gulf War in 1991 and literally the dancing on the roofs of the “Palestinians” who stared down from the high ground upon the Iraqi missile bombardment of the Tel Aviv and Haifa areas.)

In the case of conventional explosive warheads, Palestinian observers, holding binoculars, a compass and a radio set, may help correct the aiming.

If the missile barrage is part of a plan to prohibit or delay the mobilization of reserves in order to cover the deployment of ground forces for a frontal attack, it may be assumed that missile and terror/guerrilla activities will be coordinated a priori for increased efficiency.

When the pan-Arab and Iranian forces are to be equipped with warheads possessing terminal guidance, laser designation by “Palestinians” looking
from uphill is to be anticipated. The same may be expected in the case of biological/chemical warheads, accurate reporting being required on meteorological data, especially local winds, to establish, with fair accuracy, the location, height (in case of air burst), etc. for most efficient dispersal.

The coastal plain ground winds are somewhat whimsical along the Israeli coast. Although they follow a general pattern dependent on seasons and hour of the day, local phenomena bring about temporary changes of direction which may be precisely measured by a properly triangulated observation of plain mortar smoke shells.

In all cases, a panic driven exodus out of the Greater Tel Aviv area is almost certain to occur, with huge car bottlenecks at certain intersections. Under observation from "Palestine", the intersections may be efficiently attacked with biological/chemical agents or with conventional warheads, creating the ultimate chaos and loss of life.

Where nuclear warheads are concerned, some 2-6 warhead hits (depending on yield), on Greater Tel Aviv, will disrupt all activity and cause the loss of life of the majority of the people trapped in the megalopolis. "Palestinian" troops, which may be supported by heli-ported allied special troops or vehicles, will be the nearest available to cut northern from southern Israel by advancing to the sea coast somewhat north and south of the flattened area and out of the lethal radiation belt. It is only 9 to 20 miles!

Note that lethal radiation fallout is bound to be blown eastward by the medium and high altitude prevailing westerly winds, affecting some of the "Palestinian" inhabited areas. Given the Arab attitude to human life, this danger, like that of chemical and/or biological "misses" is not believed to influence the decision to launch, once taken.

- The main hope of survival in case of an imminent danger of an Arab-Iranian nuclear attack on Israel is dispersal of population and facilities, out of the 20 x 60 km. megalopolis and the provision of alternative north-south lifelines (roads, telephones, water, power, etc.) outside the menaced area.

- Since there is only one direction in which to disperse from the Tel Aviv megalopolis, which is east, and since population and facilities' dispersal, like laying the lifelines, require a span of time which is way beyond that of any intelligence or intelligent predictions, the only way to save Israel from caving in after 2-6 nuclear blasts is to re-acquire Samaria and Judea and do the necessary building at the first indication of availability of nuclear weapons in the hands of Arab/Iranian dictatorships.

- Similarly, since the anthrax biological pathogen, if spread over the greater Tel Aviv area, is going to render the area uninhabitable for a considerable period of time, the same dispersal procedure should apply as in the case of an emerging nuclear threat.

- It would be a reckless negligence for any Israeli government considering consent to the "Palestinian" declaration of independence if it will not unequivocally demand a general Arab-Iranian divestiture of, at least, the stockpiled anthrax and of the quest for nuclear weapons as a "conditio sine qua non" for its acquiescence. The non-compliance with the demand by any Arab state should legitimize the Israeli keeping or re-taking of Samaria, Judea and the Jordan depression. This is, again, a matter of life and death.

7. Gulliver in Lilliput

(Where to "park" the Israeli Armed Forces?)

As repeatedly stated, a precondition for the relative stability of an Israeli-Arab peace (of "no war") is the maintenance by Israel of an adequate deterrence that can effectively face the ever increasing threat intensity of Arabia and Iran.

The higher the intensity of threat, the larger the Israeli military forces. The larger the military forces, the more area they require for garrisons, training areas, firing ranges and operational deployment.

For instance, international sources claim that the Israeli Air Force is, in terms of fighter aircraft, of the same order of magnitude as the French, British or German Air Forces, requiring, of course, adequate base facilities, training airspace, firing ranges,
proper early warning and an efficient C4I (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence) which does also require its expanded installations. A quick look at Professor Arnon Soffer's map of military areas in Israel reminds one of Gulliver in Lilliput, or a size 13 foot in a size 8 shoe.

As petty-fogging as it sounds, Israel has to maintain some of its military depots and rear bases in Judea, Samaria and the Jordan Valley as well, to cater to the volume of forces required to try to match the pan-Arabian threat of which the PLO is a forward deployed minor component. The emergence of a "Palestinian" state will probably imply the folding up of these bases and their relocation in an area saturated with military installations (a target hard to miss). This logistic, seemingly "apolitical hence unimportant" requirement will decidedly bear heavily on Israel's defense/military posture upon the emergence of a "Palestinian" state. It is not to be overlooked.
MAP 2
Legend:
- International Border
- State Boundary (Tentative)
- Existing Town
- Proposed Town
- International Highway
- Main Road
- Secondary Road
- Railroad
- International Airport
- Local Airport
- Seaport
- Bridge
MAP 8
I. Introduction

The influx of a Palestinian fighting force (more than 25,000 armed fighters) into Judea and Samaria would mean an excellent starting point for mobile forces to immediately advance towards the infrastructure vital to Israel's existence.³

II. The Geographic Achilles' Heel

The conventional wisdom has it that, despite its obvious strengths, the State of Israel suffers from two chronic, strategic Achilles' heels which make defeating it militarily thinkable: its demographic inferiority, which precludes it from engaging in a prolonged military confrontation, and its mini-state size, which tempts the enemy to plot a potentially decisive lightning strike. The primary goal of Israel's defense strategy since the days when its first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, designed it, has therefore been to develop appropriate responses to these two potentially fatal deficits.

It is a well-known “secret” that Israel's minuscule population, relative to the size of the Arab world which surrounds it, together with the sensitivity of Israeli society to the loss of life, casts a giant shadow of doubt over the country's ability to withstand an extended conventional war. If its enemies could succeed in forcing on it an active military conflict lasting months or years (like the Iran-Iraq War, the Vietnam War, etc.), they could significantly improve their chances of prevailing.
Since this issue is of secondary importance to the discussion at hand, we will limit ourselves to remembering that the traditional Israeli approach to the attrition of its manpower was to force a cease-fire quickly by means of either rapidly transferring the battleground to enemy territory and establishing a ground threat to his capitals, or by attacking his infrastructure via air power. The direct threats against Cairo and Damascus, leading to cease-fires in the 1967 and 1973 wars, are examples of the first method; Israeli air strikes deep into Egypt in the years 1969-1970, which led to the end of the War of Attrition, are an example of the second.4

Of greater importance is Israel's geographic dilemma. The Jewish state's minuscule area, together with its over-reliance on military reserve forces (which partly derives from its demographic weakness) casts another giant pall of doubt over the country's ability to withstand a lightning conventional strike i.e., the enemy's rapid penetration into the heart of the country. If Arab armies could advance just a few miles past the Green Line (the cease-fire line of 1949) at the outset of a comprehensive offensive (as the Iraqis did when conquering Kuwait), they could achieve a total conventional victory over the State of Israel by preventing the mobilization and equipping of military reserves and by interrupting many of its other vital systems.

Israel's traditional response to the geographic Achilles' heel has been two-fold: 1. A system of rapid mobilization of reserve divisions intended to launch them into battle within twenty-four hours (a procedure improved in the wake of its inadequacy when exposed in 1973's Yom Kippur War). 2. Great reliance on the air force (recently with a special emphasis on attack helicopters) to track the progress of the enemy and abort its attack on the first day of battle.

However, our hypothesis is that the influx of Palestinian forces into the country's center has exacerbated the vulnerability of Israel's geographic deficit to such an extent that a total collapse of the strategic balance has become possible before our eyes.5 The traditional responses cited above (mobilization and air power) have become blatantly inadequate. The inevitable conclusion is that Israel must immediately develop a new defense concept.

In truth, Israel was always vulnerable to a strategy of the indirect approach to its rear by light forces, even before the Oslo accords, due to the proximity of a significant portion of its military installations and civilian life to the northern, central and southern fronts. Now this vulnerability has multiplied ten-fold. It is worth noting that some of those responsible for the country's security who were exposed to a different, more detailed version of this article, reacted by saying that heretofore the strategy of an indirect approach has never been employed by the Arab side (with the possible exception of the situation which developed without design in 1948). However, our response is that such a strategy remains not only possible, but more likely than ever.6

Indeed, B.H. Liddell-Hart, one of the outstanding military theorists of the 20th century, asserted that there is no more appropriate strategy for overcoming a military force which has demonstrated its staying power in direct confrontations (Israel, for example) than an indirect approach to its rear.7 And the more the rear under attack is administrative or civilian, the greater the accrued benefit from its sudden collapse during a crisis, and the increased probability of the physical and spiritual collapse of its forces battling at the front.8

III. The Prevalent Dogmas
There are three prevalent notions which enable Israel's experts to disregard the above threats: A. The exaggerated distinction between the enemy's abilities and the probability of his strategies. B. The exaggerated faith in intelligence. C. The classic mistake of an empirical over-reliance on one's personal experience.

A. Probability and Ability
The radical working distinction between the enemy's ability and the probability of his actions is a direct result of the great variety of threats directed towards Israel. The state's limited economic and human resources simply do not allow for developing rational responses to all of them. As a result, the defense establishment's concentration on the more probable threats, at the expense of the threats
deemed of low probability, is a cruel necessity. And since it is perfectly clear that the opponents' intentions constitute a central component in the probability assessment, the security debate tends not to distinguish between intentions and ability.

The introduction of an “assessment of intentions” into the discussion is thus always more comfortable for the planners, psychologically, as it invariably serves to soften the picture, making it less dangerous and easier to deal with, since the operational intentions ascribed to various factors at any given time are no more than a fraction of the range of possibilities.

In any case, the relevant consequence for our purposes is that instead of focusing on the end result of an optimal action by the Palestinian forces in the case of a regional confrontation, the deliberation adopts, as a point of reference, the declared, and therefore moderate, defensive intentions of the Palestinians regarding the outbreak of hostilities.

However, as Winston Churchill observed, the rules of debate are supposed to change drastically when circumstances fateful to national security (e.g., the possible invasion of London after Dunkirk) arise. In that case, it is appropriate and logical to relate to the enemy's ability in a manner detached from its ideological or operational intentions, because when ability provides concrete opportunity to achieve a tempting historic victory, its effect on intentions is liable to evolve overnight. Therefore, when discussing ability which has the potential to tip the scales in the direction of strategic decisions, one must consider all appropriate preventive measures and liberate oneself from the classic obstacle of “assessment of intentions” (even in circumstances in which it is based on “solid intelligence information”).

**B. Sounding the Alarm**

The second factor which facilitates avoiding a discussion of a possible attack by Palestinian guerillas and/or additional commando forces from the neighboring countries, is the aforementioned widespread reliance on a minuscule early warning period of 12-24 hours. This space of time might allow for both rapid mobilization of reserve divisions against the regular Arab armies and the placing of obstacles in the way of Palestinian light forces. Yet this scenario relies first and foremost on the last war. In other words, it relies on the fact that in 1973 the indications of imminent war (or a “massive exercise”) were identified some twenty hours before the first shot was fired.

Here are but two reservations to this approach. The first, to be charitable, assumes that sharp Arab minds are weighing the two alternatives (A) and (B) cited below, as well as the compromise between them in terms of profit and loss, from their respective vantage points:

1. A strike with advance field preparation of 12-24 hours.
   **Advantage:** The full utilization of all forces and equipment at the outset of battle.
   **Disadvantages:** The possibility of a preemptive Israeli air strike accompanied by the placing of the Israeli rear in a defensive, attack-ready position. No less important, it would trigger an unimpeded mobilization of reserve divisions and their insertion into battle just a few hours after the outbreak of hostilities, accompanied by the imposition of a tight Israeli military blockade against Palestinian forces, for the purpose of confining them to their territory.

2. A strike with almost no advance field preparations:
   **Advantages:** Surprise, which preempts Israel from reinforcing the front lines with reserves and even affords real potential for severely disrupting their mobilization altogether. Most profitably, the enemy enhances his chances of infiltrating a greater number of Palestinian saboteurs into the small, limited areas of the Israeli rear at the start of battle.
   **Disadvantages:** The insufficient utilization of ground forces during the early hours of combat, and even more detrimentally, the insufficient preparation of the air force and surface-to-surface missile batteries, deprived of a useful briefing and preparation time. The present Israeli deployment (as will be demonstrated in parts 3 and 4) provides a reasonable response only to scenario A, but if the enemy opts for the less conventional
scenario B, or similar plan, he could improve his chances of success.

3. The experimental method:
The third obstacle inhibiting discussion of this new threat to Israel created by the Oslo agreements is an over-reliance on the military history of the conflict. The record shows that despite dozens of separate and sporadically successful infiltrations by Palestinian guerrilla units into the heart of the Israeli rear over the years, a simultaneous and coordinated attack by dozens of such teams has never been tried. Even during 1967's Six Day War, when the pre-war order-of-battle was somewhat analogous to the situation extant in the field today (i.e. when Jordan's Arab Legion was scattered over the West Bank in immediate proximity to Israel's major cities, airports and reserve bases), the scenario of a breakthrough to the rear imagined by Shimon Peres (see endnote 3) never came about. Therefore, it is only natural that Israeli military strategists overlook this worst-case scenario or dismiss it as not serious.

Unfortunately, the analogy to the pre-1967 situation is irrelevant. First, Israel had at its disposal a weeks-long, tense waiting period which allowed for the complete mobilization of the reserves and their deployment along the Green Line in a manner which would have prevented an attack of that sort. Second, although in the Six Day War, as in the War of Independence, Jordan participated alongside Egypt, Syria and Iraq, its leaders did not aspire to the destruction of Israel or even diminishing its power. Without Israel's existence as a counter-weight to the more powerful Arab nations, weak Jordan's fate would have been oblivion. Partial testimony to this is the fact that both in 1948 and 1967 the Jordanians did not attempt to attack or even to amass forces around Israel's weak underbelly in the coastal plain but concentrated the bulk of their efforts in an attempt to achieve limited ground gains in the Jerusalem district and Mount Hebron sector, which pose less of a problem in terms of their general influence on Israel's staying power.¹¹

There are those who hold that a similar consideration might restrain Palestinian actions against Israel, if and when a similar situation develops. According to this interpretation, there exists within the rational Palestinian leadership a reluctance even to desire a decisive victory over Israel because of its fear that Egyptian and/or Syrian hegemony would undermine Palestinian independence after the destruction of Israel (as domineering Syria interferes with Lebanon's independence today). The advocates of this line of thought emphasize that the Palestinians, no less than the Israelis, are conscious of Egyptian claims to an historic ownership of Elat and almost half the Negev, and Syria's historic claims to owning Haifa Bay and most of northern Israel. However, sweeping reliance on speculation regarding Palestinian judgment and intentions, could prove to be misguided, since Arab pressure on the weak Palestinian Authority could be massive, to the point of the latter's being unable to resist the dictates of the larger Arab nation, if and when a comprehensive Arab-Israel confrontation erupts.

IV. The Palestinian Forces

The primary factor which could make a surprise attack against the Israeli rear look tempting is the semi-trained forces of the Palestinian police. These units are organized in semi-military frameworks, which already number tens of thousands of troops (even before the inevitable establishment of a Palestinian state). Hypothesizing a comprehensive confrontation in which the Palestinians participate, a conservative estimate is that 10 percent of their armed, uniformed forces will be utilized to infiltrate Israeli territory beyond the Green Line, which translates into an invasion of 4,000 men.¹² What might contribute to the success of this guerrilla attack is the total absence of any serious fence and obstacles and the access of these forces to their objectives (described below) through a labyrinthine network of roads and dirt paths well known to them.

In a word, it is incumbent on the Israeli defense apparatus to take into account the possible invasion of dozens or hundreds of small fighting forces, which could vary in size from squads to platoons; an
arbitrary division into Platoons of 10-15 soldiers equals 200-400 units. Although it is reasonable to assume that some of the infiltrating forces would cross the Green Line on foot, most would probably employ pick-up trucks and hundreds of private cars, likely appropriated from the local population of the West Bank and Gaza. Today, the Palestinians are estimated to have some 30,000 automatic weapons, 0.3 mm. machine guns, grenades, LAW missiles, RPGs, land mines, explosives, dozens of jeeps and armored vehicles.\textsuperscript{13}

It should be remembered that while the IDF maintains a fortified line of defense on the northern border, while preparing the bulk of its forces for a conventional war of fronts in the north and the south against Syrian and Egyptian armies, the opening positions of the Palestinian "police" would be inside the country's center. One third of its forces are already deployed in the towns of Qalqilya, Tulkarem, Bethlehem, Ramallah and Jenin, viz on the outskirts of the coastal plain, in the suburbs of Jerusalem and on the boundary of the Jezreel Valley respectively. The remainder are deployed in the Gaza Strip and the three major non-border cities in Judea and Samaria, Nablus, Hebron and Jericho, who would need another 60 minutes (90-120 minutes on unpaved bypass roads) to reach their targets throughout Israel.

The Hamas organization must be considered as well. Hamas demonstrated its ability to dispatch, in the same week in the summer of 1997, two 2-3-man teams of suicide bombers. During a general confrontation, if Hamas receives the blessing and logistical support from the Palestinian Authority, it is liable to arm dozens of such human bombs with explosives, and on short notice, dispatch them to sensitive locations within Israel (television stations, recruitment centers, central intersections, hospitals, etc.).

The best-case, most palatable scenario for Israel is of the Palestinian force mobilized, in the event of general war, exclusively for defensive purposes, so that no real national security threat arises. This assumes that the Palestinians would mobilize their forces in order to waste them on a temporary, useless defense of the territories' cities, as the Jordanians did in 1967. But this assumption is no more than that, and does not render unreasonable the counter assumption that such forces would be deployed in a militarily correct and rational manner, that is, as a force which could be dispatched in order to disrupt the rear systems of the IDF and the state, in a variation of the strategy of the indirect approach.\textsuperscript{14}

V. Goals and Ramifications

Our assumption is that the rational goal of the Palestinian forces described above (with possible cooperation from mobile or airborne commando units from neighboring Arab countries to circumvent front lines) would be to neutralize and disrupt the activity of the military and civilian rear at its most vulnerable points, with the objective of bringing about the serial collapse of all vital systems. All this could be accomplished in a manner enabling the Arabs to avoid the dangers of attempting to achieve the same results via the use of non-conventional weapons.

It is also appropriate to emphasize that there can be no comparison between the effectiveness of ground attacks on the targets described below, versus the utility of attacking them with air-strikes, artillery shells and/or missiles armed with conventional weapons.\textsuperscript{15} Consider the RPG units, which numbered a few dozen young, untrained soldiers who operated in the hills and orchards along the Lebanese coastal highway during the Peace for Galilee War of 1982 and proved themselves much more effective in delaying traffic on that vital artery than batteries of cannon and Katyusha rockets (or, alternatively, than a number of conventional missiles) launched from a distance. If on the roads of Lebanon the effectiveness of mini-units against columns of tanks possessing significant firepower was proven, on the roads of the Sharon, Ramot-Menashe and the Lower Galilee, we are likely to find these same kinds of units taking potshots at columns of buses filled with unarmed reserve soldiers on their way to their bases and equipment depots.

Below are preliminary suggestions as to the type of rear targets the enemy might prefer in an aggression of this sort, schematically divided into
three categories: The organization of the reserves; air force bases and military headquarters; and vital targets in the civilian rear.

A. Organization of the Reserves

As noted, a significant component of Israel's response to the difficulty stemming from its minuscule human and geographic dimensions has always been the reserve system consisting of tens of thousands of civilians who rapidly transform themselves into soldiers by equipping themselves at arsenals and weapons depots. However, as also suggested, there is a serious concern that the enormous masses of as yet unarmed, citizen-soldiers streaming through the streets on the war's first day would already be easy prey for any infantry force targeting them during the period preceding or during their mobilization. The potential damage to the Israeli reserve mechanism during an emergency mobilization is three-fold:

1. The Reservists' Weapons Depots:

   The Palestinians might attempt to advance, within an hour or two of the outbreak of hostilities, to the arsenals where the mobilizing citizen-soldiers transform themselves into fighting units. In the present situation, an Israeli-Palestinian race to these centers might take place. The negative result could be the overrunning and destruction of these bases, whose day-to-day defense is very limited. The strategic significance is that the Palestinian Authority has a realistic potential of neutralizing a significant portion of the armored and infantry divisions of Israel's reserve army (especially in the north), or to impede them even before they enter the fray.

2. Arteries:

   An attack on the primary arteries on which the reserve soldiers travel to the emergency equipment centers could be accomplished by forces of various sizes. Palestinian guerrilla units are liable to gain control of intersections or advantageous locations. Such units could cause dozens of deaths, traffic tie-ups and blockages on roads by employing a variety of measures: LAW and RPG launchers, machine guns, grenades, mines or simply the strewing of nails or the spraying of oil.

   Sensitive areas are the coastal plain arteries such as the old Tel Aviv-Haifa road or newer Coastal Road (which are accessible by car from Qalqilya and Tulkarem in 10-15 minutes or an hour or two, on foot, through fields and orchards); the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv highway, the Trans-Carmel road and other passages in the valleys and the Galilee.

3. Assembly Points:

   A concentrated attack is possible on the assembly and transportation points at which thousands of reservists gather during emergency mobilization, in a chaotic state, by small units which could reach the point of attack in private vehicles, or by Hamas suicide bombers. The mobilization centers in cities located near the Green Line (Jerusalem, Rosh Ha'ayin, Kfar Sava, etc.) are especially vulnerable in this scenario.

   In sum, the current situation presents the Palestinians and their allies with the ability to cause paralysis or at least major disruptions during the main call-up of the reserves during a surprise attack.

B. Air Force Bases and Headquarters

1. Air Force Bases:

   As argued above, one pillar of Israel's traditional defense concept against a lightning attack has been the flexible use of its air force to provide massive support to the quantitatively small forces fighting to halt the enemy's armored columns until reinforced by the arrival of reserves. Therefore, we must not overlook the possibility that air force bases may be singled out by the strategists in Cairo and Damascus as the preferred objective of a Palestinian guerrilla attack at the outbreak of hostilities.

   The fact that the Arabs have always failed to overcome the Israel Air Force through conventional measures, like bombing airfields, destroying Israeli warplanes in dogfights, or by surface-to-air missile systems,
makes an attempt to overcome the Air Force on the ground even more likely.
The vulnerability of Israel’s military airfields to a Palestinian blitz is self-evident: The overwhelming majority of the airfields (with the exception of Ramon and Ovda) are already within a 20-40 kilometer range of the PA’s territory; that is, from hostile paramilitary forces with access to the airfields via an intricate system of roads and dirt paths.
British SAS operations in World War II are testimony to the vulnerability of military airfields to such operations. Colonel David Starling’s fighters, who functioned in teams of 3-48 soldiers, successfully destroyed 250 German warplanes parked on the tarmacs of a dozen military airfields located many kilometers behind Rommel’s front lines in Africa. The operational pattern included penetration on foot or in jeeps and light trucks into the heart of the airfields to cripple the aircraft with light machine guns or by using the smallest of explosives.
Another possibility might be a small arms attack on aircraft taking off or landing, or fire from enemy personnel lying hidden in ambush in the foliage of orchards or crops in the fields outside an airfield’s perimeter fences. Their weapons might include “Strela” and “Stinger” missiles, light mortars or anti-tank missiles. It goes without saying that the effectiveness of such harassment from outside the airfields would be considerably less than invading them, especially since, as far as is known, the quantities of weapons in Palestinian hands required for such attacks are limited. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the danger of anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles could suddenly emerge with the introduction of a significant number of them into PA territory by truck, ship or helicopter.

2. Headquarters:
All the above applies to vital installations like General Staff headquarters in Tel-Aviv, regional commands, intelligence bases, naval bases in Haifa and Ashdod, and the like.

C. The Civilian Rear

1. The Electronic Media:
Perhaps the most vulnerable, preferred targets among the civilian facilities. The obvious operational method would be the infiltration of armed units for the purpose of seizing the national television and radio stations while on air, taking hostages or, alternatively, executing suicide bombings in order to interrupt transmissions and cause further widespread demoralization.

2. Neighborhoods on the Green Line:
The most worthwhile civilian targets in terms of the damage to Israel’s morale and staying power are urban neighborhoods “bordering on Palestine” in Kfar Sava, Rosh Ha’ayin, Modi’in, Jerusalem and little towns like Tzur Yigal, KehoVaYair, Re’ut, Katzar, etc. A genuine invasion into one of these neighborhoods by PA forces of platoon or squadron-size (20-80 soldiers) could cause panic and a massive flight of residents triggering a chain-reaction of flight in adjacent neighborhoods. Its goal would be: to exploit the common Israeli ownership of cars, to cause a mass flight of civilians leading to interminable traffic jams in the arteries meant to speed the reservists to their arsenals and bases.
It should be pointed out that at present, even before the completion of the withdrawal from the West Bank and the enhancement of Palestinian power which will come in its wake, the Palestinian police force has the capability of infiltrating some of the neighborhoods situated on the Green Line by walking briskly just a few minutes from their police stations. The standard response to this threat, that the IDF’s attack helicopter force could provide defense for the border neighborhoods in an emergency, is unreasonable, for three reasons: 1. The short distance which the attackers must traverse; 2. The built-up, civilian nature of the areas; 3. The need for attack helicopters to halt the advance of the enemy’s armed forces on the outer fronts.
At this point it is pertinent to warn against placing one’s trust in the widespread assessment that the dubious “privilege” of being targeted by the Palestinian police is reserved for the Jewish settlements in the “occupied territories”. This assessment is based on past experience (the operational pattern of the Palestinians in the Hasmonean tunnel incident of September 1996) and not on the ascription of any military logic to the planners on the other side. In order to clarify the issue, a very clear distinction must be made between two episodes: a) the tactics employed by the PA during a limited conflict b) the tactics which the PA might employ during a Syrian-Egyptian-Palestinian comprehensive war whose goal is to bring Israel to its knees. In the second case, the potential for similar assaults on towns and neighborhoods just inside the Green Line is no less reasonable for the following two reasons: 1) The probability of the Palestinian police achieving substantial gains in an invasion and occupation of the Jewish settlements is unclear; considering the preponderance of weapons in the hands of the settlers, the perimeter fences, the organized ground system, the platoons at the ready and the psychological preparedness of the settlers. 2) Even if local successes are achieved in taking control of a few Jewish settlements in the territories, it will not arouse nationwide panic and flight in thousands of cars as would a temporary takeover of a few urban neighborhoods or settlements located within the Green Line, like those mentioned above.

3. Technical Installations:
   These are of regional or national importance, e.g. the Hadera power plant, Haifa’s oil refineries, the tank farms in Geliot, and Bezek’s switchboards, transformers and distribution boxes. The desired effect would be power outages, huge blazes near Israel’s largest cities, temporary paralysis of vital telephone lines during the emergency, etc. Disrupting radio, television and telephone lines would also impact negatively on the speed at which reserve soldiers could be called up from their homes.

4. Public Figures and Government Buildings:
The Prime Minister’s office and/or residence, the President’s home, the Knesset, and the Supreme Court could easily be targeted by units which could approach these sites in innocent-looking, private vehicles.

Summary: Even if the PA cannot yet simultaneously attack and damage all of the potential targets listed above, it can attack dozens of them in a speedy operation. In other words, the planners on the other side (the heads of the PA, Egypt, Syria and their Chiefs of General Staff) are liable to calculate the benefits of a sudden, massive carrying out of the above steps during a comprehensive war. In such a case, comprehensive damage to the operational capability of the air force, the severe delay in the deployment of reinforcements, and the severe blow to morale could lead to the collapse of regular forces defending on the northern and southern fronts.17

VI. Apolitical Solutions and Responses
We have found that Israel’s unique geo-political situation encourages an attempt to overcome it with a combination of two components: 1) the light Palestinian forces inserted over the last few years into the heart of the country, a condition which will apparently worsen after the establishment of a Palestinian state. 2) The long-time existence of enormous armed “fists” at distances ranging from 70 (Syria) to 250 (Egypt) kilometers from the three urban centers, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Haifa in which the majoriry of Israel’s population is located. This means that a significant one- or two-day systems failure — which could be produced by the light Palestinian forces that Israel tends to underestimate — would be sufficient to bring about the infiltration of enormous masses of armored and infantry forces into the heart of the Jewish population.

A sober solution to this post-Oslo military weakness-alignment requires Israeli society to transform itself into a community with defense and local warfare capabilities, which do not rely on the
mobilization, transport and relatively clumsy, slow deployment (24 hours) of any sort of armored forces. In other words, in certain respects, Israel must return to the status of an enlisted civilian society as it was in the state’s early decades.

Since such a change in society must include a radical change of hearts and minds, it seems well-nigh impossible. Years of numerous peace ceremonies have led Israelis to believe that the Oslo process means relief from the security burden and to its opposite. We therefore suggest two concrete steps as starting points, which over even a short period of time might lead to significant changes in minds and hearts.

First, Israel should create a sort of “reservists’ permanent response” to the Israeli rear’s Achilles’ heel, while taking into account the substantive issues concerning the diffusion of the threat and its velocity.

1) The danger is of penetration by light, mostly paramilitary forces whose activity is diffuse and fragmented by nature (see the historical antecedents of broad guerrilla attacks by the Viet Cong, the French underground during the invasion of Normandy, etc.). In the words of B.H. Liddell-Hart, dispersal is the need for those battling against partisans, and there is no value to a concentrated force in a narrower sector against invasive forces. The chance of limiting them is largely dependent on the capability of spreading a thin, fine net along as broad an area as possible.  

2) Since we are not dealing with a long war waged continuously, but a sudden attack, there would be severe economic difficulty in providing a complete response by deploying the necessary scope of military and/or police forces on a permanent basis.

However, as opposed to the northern and southern borders, at which reserve forces have a period of 24 hours to get organized in order to defend them, while the standing army forces and air force are engaged in halting the enemy advance, the extreme proximity of Palestinian forces to their ultimate targets requires that the deployment of the main restraining force takes place with an advance warning of no more than an hour or two. Therefore, the solution for which we are searching must find expression in the establishment of small reserve teams, quick and agile, organized on a completely local basis.

Below are two preliminary suggestions:

Solution A:
Rapid Infantry Teams on the Kibbutz
The establishment of dozens of extremely flexible, lightly-armed, mobile patrol teams, each a platoon or larger in size, for immediate local intervention, drawn from reserve soldiers on the kibbutzim. Their bases would be the kibbutzim themselves, their vehicles the civilian pick-up trucks and jeeps belonging to the commune. These forces would train and prepare for action against light forces within 10-20 kilometers of their kibbutz home.

The teams on the kibbutzim in close proximity to the Green Line and the country’s borders could practice performing lookouts and blockades on the border in their sector. Teams on the other kibbutzim could provide an almost instantaneous solution to the problem of controlling rear sectors (by establishing lookouts and moving quickly in the field), as well as mobile protection of the arteries vital to the transportation of the reserves, around the arsenals, access roads to the airfields and the agricultural areas surrounding them, supply bases, power plants and other vulnerable points.  

Solution B:
Guard Militias Consisting of Veteran Soldiers
Discharging a significant number of infantry soldiers between the ages of 35 and 45 from their fighting units and their assignment, until their final discharge, to a type of light militia attached to the Civil Defense Unit in their place of residence, under the command of infantry officers in the same age group. The goal: Preliminary defense of their place of residence and the surrounding areas and of the IDF and civilian facilities nearby, against light Palestinian forces and other potentially hostile forces.

In this way, the late Yigal Allon’s recommendation concerning a militia-like defense would be adopted and play a vital role in the protection and stabilization of areas stretching from the rear to the
approach of the border, by entrusting the task to infantry veterans, i.e. soldiers who find themselves in the throes of a long, damaging and pointless process of displacement from their combat units due to the fact that their physical conditioning is no longer adequate to the intensive exertion demanded of infantry soldiers at the front.21

Three final points concerning the remedies proposed above: We are speaking of steps which would enable, first, significant minimizing of the advance of guerrilla and/or commando forces to the rear; second, stabilizing the rear and providing defense to vital locales, even after an attack of this sort meets with partial success. No less importantly, these goals can be achieved without compelling the IDF to engage in the problematic operation of removing part of the regular infantry and armored forces from the front lines to the rear to stop the advance of infiltrating forces. Such transfer, in addition to the severe demoralization which it usually causes, would mean the thinning of forces at the front during the most critical day or two of the enemy's attack.22

VII. The Double Wall of Themistocles

Approximately 2,500 years ago, according to Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian Wars, Themistocles succeeded in convincing the Athenians to transform their kingdom into a naval power.23 This enabled Athens to take advantage of its cultural-technological superiority over Persia and its economic-commercial superiority over Sparta. However, despite the fact that the state-of-the-art navy and naval superiority which the Athenians acquired provided them with the ability to defend their city by severing their enemies' supply lines, or by attacking undefended targets in the rear (in addition to their ability to acquire spheres of influence abroad), this superiority in no way protected them from a simple surprise ground attack from Sparta. In a word, their huge strategic advantage built by hard labor and with considerable budgetary investment was liable to be erased in one fell swoop. “If our country were an island, then we could stand against the whole world,” the Athenians said to themselves. However, since Athens was not an island, and in fact was even linked to Sparta by a very close land link, Themistocles decided that the Athenians had to defend their strategic advantage, that is, the advanced navy and the port facilities, by linking the port to the city with two parallel walls. These were designed to protect the components of Athens' strategic might and enable their utilization in order to overcome their enemies, even in the case of a surprise attack or a one-time ground failure. The concept which the “walls of Themistocles” expresses, therefore, is the idea that even the most impressive strategic-technological superiority may be fatally vulnerable to the lightest, most primitive forces. Hence the need exists to protect such superiority from “below”.

Like Athens, Israel enjoys strategic superiority over its neighbors, primarily in the realm of aeronautics and technology. Like Athens, Israel's strategic advantage developed, in large part, due to its educational-technological superiority and economic advantages over its Arab neighbors. With the outbreak of armed hostilities, these have enabled Israel to strike at its enemies' strategic and tactical rear in a manner which eventually leads to victory at the front. However, Israel may have its own “walls of Themistocles”.

Truth be told, during the first two decades of its existence, from 1948 to 1967, Israel survived with no walls at all. Its existence depended on the “miracle” of unbelievable deficiencies in the strategic thinking of its enemies. In the three subsequent decades, running from the 1967 war through to the Oslo II agreement in 1995, the geographic expanses of Sinai, the Golan and the West Bank played the role of the double walls and in fact allowed Israel to survive the quite successful surprise attack which opened the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The attack was neither deep nor quick enough to take control of “Israel’s Piraeus”, that is, its airports, reserve bases and the like, before Israel’s strategic superiority was brought to bear.

The trouble is that the 1995 deployment of light Palestinian forces throughout the West Bank has already “collapsed” Israel’s eastern “wall” of mountains and the Jordan River since it has neutralized its most vital function, which, like Themistocles’ walls, is not to defend against the armies of Iraq and Iran, who might join a battle after a week or so, but rather
to protect against a sudden lightning strike aimed at the Israeli rear. An attempt to maintain the wall, that is, the Jordan Valley and the eastern slope of Samaria, even after the Oslo agreements, is like closing the barn door after the horses have fled or, rather, after they have entered. Further deterioration is liable to occur with the anticipated establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip and most of the West Bank.  

But since what is done is done — and there are those who say it is good that it has been done, for it ended the occupation and supplied Israel with significant advantages, both demographic and moral — it seems that Israel must quickly construct a new wall to replace the one that collapsed. This can be accomplished in two parallel ways: The first is an uncompromising insistence on a number of minimal security elements in the final agreement with the Palestinians; the second, even more important, whose general drift was described extensively above, is a fundamental reassessment of Israel’s regional defense policy.  

As to the ramifications of the new reality on the final status agreement, we will suffice with the comment that the analysis provided in Parts III-IV leads to two conclusions: a. Israel must rigorously prevent the Palestinian side from achieving further growth and from procuring additional arms, especially in the West Bank; b. Israel must firmly insist upon significant border modifications relative to the 1967 situation especially in northern and western Samaria, in order to maintain a minuscule security zone on the slopes adjacent to Gush Dan and the coastal plain in which the IDF should construct serious ground obstacles and establish units of light forces able to prevent, or at least delay, a swift guerrilla attack on the heart of the country — the very scenario described by Shimon Peres in his various books. It seems that the importance of these issues to the existential interest of Israel is immeasurably greater than the fate of the settlements in Gaza and the mountain ridges.  

If we could consult that brilliant Athenian strategist Themistocles, he might respond that the current Israeli defense posture is simply absurd. On the one hand, the state invests billions of dollars in building a modern army possessing technical superiority, purchasing state-of-the-art warplanes and constructing modern airfields, equipping and training reserve battalions, and deploying Arrow missiles (an investment reminiscent of Athenian investments in advanced naval capabilities and port facilities). But, on the other hand, allows a situation in which these modern, expensive weapon systems are liable to be rendered irrelevant not by a conventional Arab army’s attack against them, but by light Palestinian forces armed with the most basic weapons and/or by commando forces from Syria and Egypt. If there is no need to prepare for the possibility of a comprehensive war, there is no point in maintaining a large fleet of warplanes and airfields, or need for expensive investments in training and equipping reserves. If there is a purpose in massive investments in the air force and the reserve forces, there is no sense in the widespread neglect of the country’s Achilles’ heel, a weakness which makes the neutralization of those very expensive systems plausible.  

Yitzhak Rabin, of blessed memory, repeatedly spoke about taking risks for peace. It is incumbent upon all Israelis, right and left, to cease ignoring the unpleasant fact that the deployment of a light Palestinian force just a few kilometers from the center of the country brings with it a significant increase in the strategic dangers facing Israel in the event of another comprehensive Arab attempt on its life.
FIGHTING TERROR — AND WINNING

Binyamin Netanyahu

Terrorism is back — with a vengeance. After being subdued internationally and within most Western countries in the late 1980s, it has returned inferocious and fear rous forms. In the United States, the bombings of the World Trade Center in Manhattan and the Federal Building in Oklahoma City demonstrated to Americans that terrorism could now strike on Main Street. Internationally, terrorist attacks from Beirut to Buenos Aires were recalling the familiar scenes of carnage from the 1980s on the television screens and front pages of the free world in the 1990s. In Paris, bombs exploded in a crowded subway after nearly a decade's respite from such outrages. And in Japan, a horrifying new form of chemical terrorism struck fear in the hearts of millions of commuters in one of the world's most advanced societies.

However, the modus operandi of this new wave of terrorism is usually different from that of the earlier terrorism that afflicted the world for two decades beginning in the 1960s. The new terrorism boasts few, if any, hostage takings and practically no hijackings. It specializes in the bombing of its targets. The reason for this change is that punishment meted out in the 1980s to hostage takers and airline hijackers, and to their sponsors, made the more overt kind of terrorism a costly affair. The new terrorism seeks to evade this punishment by hiding more deeply in the shadows than did its predecessors. Terrorism thrives in the dark and withers when stripped of its deniability. Yet it is a fact that today's domestic and international terrorists may be identified fairly easily, and it is therefore possible to deter and prevent them from pursuing the policies of terror.

Today's terrorism can be driven back, even though the current breed of interlocking domestic and international terrorists is certainly not to be taken lightly. They know the West well and have developed strategies designed to take advantage of all its weaknesses. An effective battle against terrorism must of necessity require a shift in the domestic and international policies that enable terrorism to grow and the intensification of those efforts that can uproot it. Domestically in the United States, this requires a reassessment of the legal instruments necessary for combating homegrown terrorism, alongside the means to monitor added powers given to the government to pursue these ends. Internationally, this means identifying the great change that has taken place in the forces driving worldwide terrorism since the 1980s, and shaping a powerful international alliance against them.

What this new terrorism portends for Israel, America and the world and what can be done about it has not yet been sufficiently understood. The growth of terrorism has been accompanied by a steady escalation in the means of violence, arms used to assassinate individuals, from small arms used to mow down groups, to car bombs now capable of bringing down entire buildings, to lethal chemicals that (as in Japan) can threaten entire cities. The very real possibility that terrorist states and organizations may soon acquire horrific weapons of mass destruction and use them to escalate terrorism beyond our wildest nightmares has not been addressed properly by Western governments. It must be recognized that barring firm and resolute action by the United States and the West, terrorism
in the 1990s will expand dramatically both domestically and internationally. Today’s tragedies can either be the harbingers of much greater calamities yet to come or the turning point in which free societies once again mobilize their resources, their ingenuity, and their will to wipe out this evil from our midst. Fighting terrorism is not a policy option; it is a necessity for the survival of our democratic society and our freedoms.

But in order to fight terrorism effectively, we must first understand its nature and its goals. Terrorism is the deliberate and systematic assault on civilians to inspire fear for political ends. Although one may quibble with this definition, for example by broadening political ends to include ideological or religious motives, it nonetheless captures the essence of terrorism — the purposeful attack on the innocent, those who are hors de combat, outside the field of legitimate conflict. In fact, the more removed the target of the attack from any connection to the grievance enunciated by the terrorists, the greater the terror. What possible connection is there between the kindergarten children savaged in an office building in Oklahoma to the purported grievances of the Patriots of Arizona? What do the incidental shoppers in the World Trade Center in Manhattan have to do with the Islamic Jihad?

Yet for terrorism to have any impact, it is precisely the lack of connection, the lack of any possible involvement or complicity of the chosen victims in the cause the terrorists seek to attack, that produces the desired fear. For terrorism’s underlying message is that every member of society is guilty, that anyone can be a victim, and that therefore, no one is safe.

Although their professed purpose is invariably couched in the language of freedom and the battle for human rights, there is a built-in contradiction between such professed aims and the method chosen to implement them. In fact, the methods reveal the totalitarian strain that runs through all terrorist groups. Those who deliberately bomb babies are not interested in freedom, and those who trample on human rights are not interested in defending such rights. It is not only that the ends of the terrorists do not succeed in justifying the means they choose; their choice of means indicates what their true ends are. Far from being fighters for freedom, terrorists are the forerunners of tyranny. It is instructive to note, for example, that the French Resistance during World War II did not resort to the systematic killing of German women and children, although they were well within reach in occupied France.

The unequivocal and unrelenting moral condemnation of terrorism must therefore constitute the first line of defense against its most insidious effect.

Terrorists who blow up buildings in Oklahoma or buses in Jerusalem must never be accorded the status of misguided or desperate men using desperate means. Worst still is calling the murderer a martyr or shaheed.

The citizens of free societies must be told again and again that terrorists are savage beasts of prey, and should be treated as such. Terrorism should be given no intellectual quarter.

To do otherwise is to elevate both to a higher status, thereby undermining the ability of governments to fight back. On the domestic level, the fact that terrorists are politically motivated criminals is irrelevant, except in providing clues for their apprehension.

If the first obstacle to the spread of domestic terrorism in most democracies is in the realm of political culture, the second is in the realm of operations. The advanced democracies usually have at their disposal a vast array of surveillance and other intelligence-gathering capabilities that give them the ability to track down terrorists, put them on trial, and punish them. The United States is especially capable of monitoring the activities of terrorists. It has technical capabilities that exceed anything available to any other country, especially formidable eavesdropping and photographic capabilities. The movements and activities of potential terrorists can thus be observed, and they may be apprehended before they strike — at least when the law enforcement agencies are permitted to act.

The Western democracies are capable of eliminating the domestic terror in their midst only if they decide to make use of the operational tools presently at their disposal. But such optimism
would be misplaced with regard to international terrorism, a much harder and more implacable nemesis. What road should the United States and other democracies pursue if they are to overcome not only the domestic terror of Oklahoma City but the potentially much more insidious international terror which produced the World Trade Center bombing, and which may very well produce other such tragedies before it has been defeated? To answer this question, we must first understand the nature and genesis of international terrorism and the process by which it has assumed its present form.

International terrorism is the use of terrorist violence against a given nation by another state, which uses the terrorists to fight a proxy war as an alternative to conventional war. Sometimes the terror is imported at the initiative of a foreign movement which nevertheless enjoys the support of a sovereign state, at the very least in the form of a benign passivity which encourages the growth of such groups on its own soil. The reason that international terrorism is so persistent and so difficult to uproot is that the support of a modern state can provide the international terrorist with everything that the domestic terrorist usually lacks in the way of cultural and logistical assistance. An alien, non-democratic society may be able to provide the depth of support for terrorist ideas to spawn a genuine terrorist army; it can offer professional training and equipment for covert operations, as well as diplomatic cover and other crucial logistical aid; it can make available virtually unlimited funds; and most important of all, it can ensure a safe haven to which the terrorists may escape and from which they can then emerge anew. Thus, with the support of a terrorist state, the terrorist is no longer a lonely and hunted fugitive from society. He becomes part of a different social milieu, which encourages him, nurtures him, protects him, and sees to it that he succeeds. The absurdly lopsided contest between the Western security services and the terrorist is, under these circumstances, no longer lopsided. It now pits the formidable resources of the West against the nearly comparable resources of a foreign state or network of states — and in this contest it is by no means immediately clear who will emerge the victor.

The second wave of international terrorism, that of the 1990s, is the direct result of all these developments. And the growth of militant Islamic terrorism, with independent states in the Middle East serving as its launching ground, and bases of Islamic militants in the West offering alternate bridgeheads, has already been felt in the West in more ways than one. Just as Soviet-Arab terrorism produced its imitators, so too, the growth of this kind of chaos is bound to have an effect on its would-be imitators. It may not be pure coincidence that the method used to bomb the federal building in Oklahoma City was a mimicry of the favorite type of Islamic fundamentalist car bombing. If this kind of domestic international terrorism is not cut out at the root, it is bound to grow, with disastrous consequences.

Undoubtedly the two greatest obstacles to dealing with this problem are, first, recognizing the nature of the threat and, second, understanding that it can be defeated. My first intention when writing about terrorism has been, accordingly, to alert the citizens and decision-makers of the West as to the nature of the new terrorist challenge which the democracies now face. In this time of historic flux, Western leaders have a responsibility to resist the tendency for passivity, the temptation to rest on the laurels of the victory over Communism as though nothing else truly could jeopardize their societies. The leaders of the democracies must solicit the understanding and support of the public and its elected representatives for vigorous policies against terrorism. Obsta princip — oppose bad things when they are small — was the motto of Israel Zangwill, one of the first leaders of the modern Jewish national movement at the beginning of this century. Alas, many of his colleagues did not heed this warning, and the Jewish people paid a horrendous price in the decades that followed. The same advice must be directed today to presidents and prime ministers, congressmen and parliamentarians, with one proviso: When it comes to terrorism, the bad things are no longer small. They have already reached disturbing proportions, although it must be said that they have not yet grown to dimensions
that prevent them from being contained and defeated with relatively little cost.

Several months before his tragic assassination, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin repeated several times that terrorism in Israel, Judea, Samaria and Gaza had once again become a strategic problem.

Naively dismissing the PLO's professed ultimate aims as propaganda for internal consumption, the Labor government attempted for the first time to grant many of the PLO's demands — in the hope of being able to forge an alliance with it. At Oslo, Israel in effect accepted the first stage of the PLO's Phased Plan: a gradual withdrawal to the pre-1967 border and the creation of the conditions for an independent PLO state on its borders (except for Jerusalem and Jewish communities in Judea and Samaria, which were left for later negotiation).

The Likud Government was determined not to accept a Palestinian state within Israel's borders. We wanted to pursue peace and dialogue with the Palestinians without deluding ourselves and without excusing the dangerous rhetoric and support activities that help spawn terror.

Instead of accepting terror, we propose a global campaign against terror. We will abide by the following rules, and we ask that other democratic societies heed the following rules in order to combat terrorism:

1. **Impose sanctions on suppliers of nuclear technology to terrorist states.** The United States must lead the Western world in preventing the proliferation of nuclear technology, fissionable materials, and nuclear scientists to Iran and any other regime with a history of practicing terrorism. While such action under UN supervision has been taken against Iraq in the wake of the Gulf War, little or no action was taken until recently against the Iranian nuclear program. Israeli efforts to warn of the danger of the Iranian nuclear program and the Clinton Administration's moves to prevent Russia from supplying Iran with gas centrifuges should serve as two examples of what needs to be done on a far broader scale. All nuclear technologies and know-how should be denied to such states, for they will invariably deploy them in the service of their aggressive purposes. It should be noted that all nuclear proliferation is bad, but some of it is worse. Nuclear weapons in the hands of, say, the Dutch government are simply not the same as nuclear weapons in the hands of Qadhafi or the Ayatollahs in Teheran. Action must be directed first against the suppliers and not the buyers, and it must be led by the United States. The supplying countries must be told bluntly that they must choose between trade with terrorist states and trade with the United States. A special American effort must be made to harness to this regime of anti-nuclear sanctions all the Western countries, as well as Russia, China, Japan, and North Korea. The European countries in particular often hide behind liberal trade laws that enable European companies to engage in such trade without strict government supervision. The United States should insist that those laws be changed; i.e., that free trade, like free speech, has its limits, and these limits do not include the supply of laser triggers, gas centrifuges, and enriched uranium.

The United States Congress has successfully pressed for enforcement of other standards of international behavior by denying preferred trade status and other economic favors to states limiting free emigration, sponsoring terrorism, or trafficking in drugs. The Soviet Union was largely moved to permit Soviet Jews to begin emigrating during the 1970s when the Congress passed the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, linking Soviet trade with the United States to freedom of emigration. Similar legislation could create an official list of states supplying nuclear technologies to other countries, which could likewise be subjected to trade sanctions. Countries which have international trading regulations so liberal that they can trade in nuclear death will find themselves having to change their laws or feel the pain where it matters to them most — in their pocketbooks. Such a list should in
theory be maintained by the United Nations in order to have maximum effect, but this is not the essence. The main point is that the United States should adopt a firm policy and then proceed to bring other nations on board. And quickly.

2. **Impose diplomatic, economic, and military sanctions on the terrorist states themselves.** This tested measure has not been applied in any serious fashion to the twin sources of today's militant Islamic terrorism, Iran and Sudan. Where it has been systematically applied, against Libya and Iraq, it has had measurable success. Those regimes have consciously backed off from the energetic sponsorship of terrorism that characterized their conduct in the 1970s and 1980s. In general, the dosage of these sanctions should be on an escalating scale, beginning with closing down embassies, proceeding to trade sanctions, and, if this fails, considering the possibility of military strikes such as those delivered against Libya in 1986, which all but put this fanatical regime out of the terrorism business. While military measures should not be the first option, they should never be excluded from the roster of possibilities. The mere knowledge of painful and humiliating military reprisals may be enough to cool the heels of dictators entertaining the thought of undertaking terrorist campaigns against the West or its allies. Iran in particular is susceptible to economic pressure. The oil-exporting Islamic republic is virtually a single-crop economy, and imposition of a tight blockade against Iranian oil sales will undoubtedly induce in Teheran a prompt reevaluation of the utility of even indirect terrorist tactics.

Similarly, the special exemption hitherto granted to Syria must be brought to an end. It is not enough anymore that Syria merely continues to appear on Washington's list of states sponsoring terror. Over a dozen terrorist groups are openly housed in Damascus, and many have training facilities in the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley in Lebanon. These groups perpetrate terrorist campaigns against Israel, as well as Jewish and non-Jewish targets throughout the world. The US State Department's own 1994 report on terrorism mentions among these groups: Ahmed Jibril's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine — General Command (PFLP-GC), Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Japanese Red Army, and the Kurdish PKK. The idea that one of the most unrelenting of terrorist regimes should be exempted from sanctions so as not to offend its leader and harm the prospects of peace is an absurdity. Both the Soviet Union's Iron Curtain and South Africa's odious system of racial laws were eventually brought down by a firm Western policy of linking sanctions to an improvement in Soviet and South African policies, and there is no reason why a much less powerful state such as Syria should be any less responsive when faced with determined pressure over a protracted period. The tendency to try and bribe Syria to desist from its support for terrorism — with American aid and Israeli concessions on the Golan Heights — is the exact opposite of what is needed. As in the case of the PLO in Gaza, the most that can be hoped for from buying off Syria is a tactical cessation of its proxy terrorism aimed at extracting the latest round of concessions; in this case, the terror inevitably resumes once these concessions have been digested and it looks like the next round is to be had. The cessation of terrorism must therefore be a clear-cut demand, backed up by sanctions and with no prizes attached. As with all international efforts, the vigorous application of sanctions to terrorist states must be led by the United States, whose leaders must choose the correct sequence, timing, and circumstances for these actions.

3. **Neutralize terrorist enclaves.** Efforts must be made to stop terrorism from areas that are less than independent states but nevertheless serve as breeding grounds for
terrorists. The most notable include the Hizbullah enclave in southern Lebanon, the PLO-Hamas fiefdom in Gaza, the Kurdish PKK strongholds in northern Iran, and the Mujahedeen enclave on the Pakistani border with Kashmir. What characterizes all these enclaves is the professed claim of the local government that it is unable to prevent the terrorism launched from its domain. Sometimes, as in Lebanon, this is indeed the case; the Lebanese government is virtually powerless to prevent Hizbullah terrorism, but Syria and Iran — which respectively control the territory from which Hizbullah operates and which give it funds and ideological backing — are perfectly able to do so. Syria and Iran should therefore be pressed to cease not only terrorism which they sponsor directly from within their own borders but also the proxy terrorism which they protect and encourage from beyond their frontiers.

The same applies to Iranian and Syrian agitation in Gaza, with one crucial difference. Here, the local PLO authority is perfectly capable of undertaking a variety of measures that would totally dismantle, rather than buy-off Gaza-based terrorist organizations, but has refused to do so. The United States and other Western countries should in turn refuse to transfer any funds to the PLO until it lives up to its part of the Oslo agreement, beginning with a relentless and all-encompassing war against terrorism. And if such activity is still not forthcoming, then it must be understood that Israel will have to take action against the sources of terror, precisely as it does in South Lebanon and anywhere else.

4. **Freeze financial assets in the West of terrorist regimes and organizations.** This measure was used intermittently by the Carter and Reagan administrations during the American embassy hostage crisis and its aftermath. It should be expanded today to include the assets of militant Islamic groups which keep monies in the United States for the purpose of operating there and elsewhere. In addition, the solicitation and transferring of funds in the United States and abroad for terrorist activity should be considered a form of participation in terrorist acts.

5. **Share intelligence.** One of the central problems in the fight against international terrorism has traditionally been the hesitation of the security services of one nation to share information with foreign services. In this regard, countries have often viewed their terrorists as though they were the only terrorists worth fighting, while turning a blind eye to activities hostile to other governments. The trouble with this method is not only that it is of questionable morality, the fact is that it does not work. Terrorists hide behind the mutual suspicions between the Western security services, seeming to be attacking a particular nation when in fact they often view the entire West as a common society and a common enemy. Only through close coordination between law enforcement officials and the intelligence services of all free countries can a serious effort against international terrorism be successful.

It should be made clear that I am not speaking here of warnings of impending terrorist attacks. Those are now shared instantaneously by virtually all the intelligence agencies of the West. What is not shared is basic data about terrorist organizations, their membership and their operational structure. These cards are often withheld from the intelligence services of other countries (and sometimes even from a rival service in the same country) for two reasons: either to protect the source of the information or else, at least as often, out of a habitual organizational jealousy. But the absence of systematic sharing of intelligence is not a matter of petty one-upmanship. It greatly hinders each democracy as it struggles alone to get a full picture of terrorist activity directed against its citizens, with the
inevitable result that lives are needlessly lost. If the democracies wish successfully to confront the new terrorism, there is no choice but for the scope of intelligence cooperation to be increased and the scope of the jealouslys decreased.

6. **Revise legislation to enable greater surveillance and action against organizations inciting to violence, subject to periodic renewal.** In countries repeatedly assaulted by terrorism, a thorough review of the legal measures governing the battle against terrorism may become a necessity from time to time. The laws of every free society must be such as to permit the security services to move against groups which incite to violence against the country's government or its citizens. The test is simple. If the law does not allow a government to sift through the extremist splinters advocating violence in order to identify which groups are actively planning terrorist actions and to shut them down before they strike, then the law is insufficient.

Legislation should be reviewed and, if necessary, revised to facilitate the following measures in all or part, depending on the degree of the terrorist threat facing each society and its particular culture and legal traditions.

**Outlaw fund-raising and channeling of funds to terrorist groups.** The funding of terrorist activity, both inside and outside a given country, must be made illegal. At present, terrorist groups often skim an allocation off charitable funds raised by sympathetic ethnic or religious organizations. Involvement in any stage of this process is tantamount to facilitating directly lethal terror and should be regarded as a crime of that magnitude. The American counter-terror bill more or less takes this step by outlawing fund-raising for any organization designated by the President to be a terrorist group. It does, however, include the bizarre proviso that such terrorist groups may apply for a US government license to fund-raise for those of their activities which are legitimate. Whether such an approach can have the intended effect of stopping fund-raising for terrorism in America remains to be seen.

**Permit investigation of groups preaching terror and planning the violent overthrow of the government.** Surveillance of and intelligence gathering on groups exhorting violence and suspected of planning violent attacks must be permitted. If the security services cannot research which groups may be dangerous before they strike, there is little hope of being able to prevent terrorism from springing up again and again.

**Loosen warrant requirements in terrorist cases.** Search and seizure, detention, and interrogation may be necessary for short periods without a warrant where there is a strong suspicion of terrorist activity. Strict and prompt judicial oversight of such actions can serve as a sufficient deterrent to most government abuses, but it is important to experiment, as many democracies have done with the particular regulations. Law enforcement officials should be given considerable freedom to respond quickly to information as it is brought to light, but they should know that they will be subject to review of their activities after the fact.

**Restrict ownership of weapons.** Tighten gun control, beginning with registry of weapons. Israeli law, for example, requires careful licensing of handguns and prohibits the ownership of more powerful weapons, yet gun ownership is widespread. Forbidding the ownership of machine guns is not a denial of the right to own a weapon for self-defense; it is a denial of the right to organize private armies — a right which no society can grant without eventually having to fight those armies. The continued existence in the United States of heavily armed anti-government militias numbering thousands of members is a grotesque distortion of an-
other idea of civil freedom, which should be brought to a speedy end.

**Tighten immigration laws.** It is now well known that terrorists from the Middle East and elsewhere have made the United States, Germany, Italy, and other countries into terrorist havens because of laxity in immigration regulation. This era of immigration free-for-all should be brought to an end. An important aspect of taking control of the immigration situation is stricter background checks of potential immigrants, coupled with the real possibility of deportation. The possibility of expulsion must be a threat hovering over all terrorist and pro-terrorist activity in the democracies. The new Clinton Administration initiative, for example, defines spokesman and fund-raisers for terrorist organizations as liable to deportation, makes immigration files available to federal investigators, and establishes a special judicial process for deportations in which classified evidence may be brought without giving the terrorist organizations access to the materials.

**Require periodic legislative review to safeguard civil liberties.** The concern of civil libertarians over possible infringements of the rights of innocent citizens is well placed, and all additional powers granted the security services should require annual renewal by the legislature, this in addition to judicial oversight of actions as they are taken in the field. Thus, hearings may be held to consider the record of possible abuses which have resulted from changes in police authority. If the abuses prove to be too frequent or the results inconclusive in terms of the citizens, the particular provisions in question can be jettisoned automatically.

The legal provisions suggested above constitute a roster of measures available to a democracy subjected to a sustained threat of terror. A lesser threat usually could require fewer measures. In some countries, these measures would necessarily mean shifting the legal balance between civil liberties and security. There is nothing easy in making this choice. But it is nevertheless crucial that the citizens of the West understand that such options are legitimately available to them, and that, judiciously applied, they may serve to put terrorism back on the defensive.

7. **Actively pursue terrorists.** Legal powers are of course meaningless if they are not accompanied by a commensurate mustering of will to act on the part of the executive branch and the security services. Rooting out terrorist groups must become a top priority for elected officials of all parties — and one that cannot be allowed to slide from political relevance after a few cases have been cracked. In an age in which the power of the weapons which individuals may obtain grows incredibly from one year to the next, and in which information about how to obtain and use such weapons can be instantly transmitted by electronic mail from any part of the world, an active internal security policy and aggressive counter-terrorism actions are becoming a crucial part of the mandate of every government, and officials must learn to rise to this challenge. Potential sources of terror must be studied and understood, groups preaching violence must be penetrated and catalogued, and groups actually preparing for it must be uprooted.

8. **Do not release jailed terrorists.** Among the most important policies which must be adopted in the face of terrorism is the refusal to release convicted terrorists from prisons. This is a mistake that Israel, once the leader in anti-terror techniques, has made over and over again. Release of convicted terrorists before they have served their full sentences seems like an easy and tempting way of defusing blackmail situations in which innocent people may lose their lives. But its utility is momentary at best. Prisoner releases only embolden terrorists by giving them the feeling that even if
they are caught their punishment will be brief. Worse, by leading terrorists to think such demands are likely to be met, they encourage precisely the kind of terrorist blackmail which they are supposed to defuse: All that Timothy McVeigh’s colleagues need to know is that the United States government would consider releasing him in exchange for the lives of innocent hostages in order to get the terrorists to make just such a demand. Only the most unrelenting refusal ever to surrender to such blackmail can prevent most such situations from arising.

9. **Train special forces to fight terrorism.** Greater emphasis must be placed on the training of special units equipped for anti-terror operations. In anti-terror training, law enforcers learn to fight a completely different kind of gun battle, in which the goal is to hold their fire rather than to unleash it. Operations against terrorists often involve the rescue of hostages or the possibility that innocent bystanders might be hurt. This necessarily means that the soldiers or policemen charged with fighting terrorism must learn to subdue the natural temptation to concentrate overwhelming fire on the enemy. Counter-terrorist operations usually require the barest minimum application of force necessary to overcome the terrorists, who often use hostages as a human shield.

While those branches of Western security services specializing in counter-intelligence and surveillance generally enjoy a high level of professionalism and training, this is often not the case with the forces that have to do the actual fighting against terrorists. It may be impossible to guarantee that there will be no more scenes such as the one in Waco, Texas, in which scores of cultists and four lawmen were killed. But the likelihood of avoiding such catastrophes is considerably increased if the forces involved are proficient in anti-terror techniques. Such units at the national or federal level are usually adequately trained for these missions, but in a crisis it may take them many hours to arrive on the scene. It is therefore important that units of local police forces be trained in anti-terror tactics as well.

Israel has had some spectacular successes in this area, including the rescue of 103 hostages at Entebbe. But it has also had its share of spectacular failures, the worst of which was the loss of twenty-six schoolchildren being held hostage in a school building in Maalot. Having specially trained troops that accumulate and refine anti-terror techniques reduces the probability of failure; it does not, of course, mean that terrorists may be fought and hostages rescued without risk. What is crucial to recognize is that the risk to society of not challenging the terrorists forcefully — that is, of negotiating with them and accepting their demands — is far greater than the risk involved in the use of special forces. For in negotiating, the government issues an open invitation for more terror, an invitation which puts at risk the safety of every citizen in society.

10. **Educate the public.** The terrorist uses violence to erode the resistance of the public and leaders alike to his political demands. But the resistance of a society to terrorist blackmail may likewise be strengthened by counter-terrorist education, which clearly puts forth what the terrorists are trying to achieve, elucidates the immorality of their methods, and explains the necessity of resisting them. Such education is usually unnecessary in the case of sporadic and isolated terrorist attacks, which are almost universally met with an appropriate and natural revulsion. But in the case of a prolonged and sustained campaign lasting months or years, the natural disgust of the public with the terrorists’ message begins to break down and is often replaced by a willingness to accommodate terrorist demands. By preparing terrorism-education programs for various age groups and including them in the school curriculum, the government can inoculate the population
against the impulse to give in when faced with protracted terrorist pressure. Familiarity with terrorism and its complete rejection would create a citizenry which is capable of living with terror — not in the sense of accepting terror, but rather in the sense of understanding what is needed for society to survive its attacks with the least damage. And once the terrorists know that virtually the entire population will stand behind the government’s decision never to negotiate with them, the possibility of actually extracting political concessions will begin to look exceedingly remote to them.

With such a program of steadfast resistance to the rising tide of terror, the United States may once again lead the West, as it did in the 1980s in successfully fighting terrorism. Of course, much of this program is laced with obstacles that only purposeful determination may overcome. The leaders of Western countries may choose instead to avoid taking the tough decisions and continue doing business as usual; they may adopt few or none of these measures, believing that the new wave of terrorism will somehow dissipate of its own accord. It will not. Terrorism has the unfortunate quality of expanding to fill the vacuum left to it by passivity or weakness. And it shrinks accordingly when confronted with resolute and decisive action. Terrorists may test this resolution a number of times before they draw back, and a government has to be prepared to sustain its anti-terror policies through shrill criticism, anxious calls to give in to terrorists’ demands, and even responses of panic. But it is a certainty that there is no way to fight terrorism — other than to fight it.

Undoubtedly the leaders of the United States in particular could be subjected to a barrage of criticism that they are curtailing civil freedoms and that they are over-reacting. They should reject the criticism, responding, as has the Supreme Court of the United States, that it is obvious and unarguable that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the nation — and this includes unlimited civil liberties. Western democracy is strong enough to be able to monitor any added powers given to its security services, especially if the technique of requiring periodic renewal of these powers is adopted. Moreover, the security of the democracies and their well being cannot be governed by the ebb and flow of local political skirmishes. Leaders must have the courage to do what is required even in the face of the most stinging criticism. Courageous action is in itself the best answer to the inevitable slings that the small-minded heap upon the statesman facing great odds. And seldom has there been a menace that called for the courage and resolve of the true statesman as does the resurgent terror which threatens to rob us of the freedoms and values we so cherish.
PALESTINIAN EXPECTANCY IN THE IMAGE OF ZIONISM

Aharon Ben-Ami

— A —

An air of historical finality prevails at the moment in our public opinion regarding the expected settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict by partition of the western side of the Jordan River into two states. The very fact that some territories have already been transferred by Israel to a Palestinian Authority according to the “Oslo agreement”, signed in September 1993, gives a sense of fait accompli to the so-called “Peace Process”.

Nevertheless, in view of the agreed upon postponement of negotiation on the most problematic issues to the final stage, it seems too early to celebrate (or mourn) this anticipation.

The leftover issues are as follows:

1. **Size of the Palestinian entity.** Out of 27,000 square kilometers of western Palestine in 1948, Israel gained about 20,000 in the War of Independence, which amount to 75% of the entire area. In the face of security needs vis-à-vis the enveloping Arab countries, Israel now demands (by national consent) at least another 5% of the area at some vulnerable parts of the borderline. That would leave for the Palestinians not more than 20% of the originally disputed area, namely about 5,000 square kilometers. Would they accept and sign such an agreement as a final solution of their problem? And if so, would they really come to terms with such a partition in the long run?

2. **Jerusalem.** Since June 1967 the entire city has been under Israeli sovereignty, serving as its capital (this too by a wide national consent). The Palestinians now demand for their capital the eastern part of Jerusalem, as a necessary condition for peace.

Can Israel accept a partition of Jerusalem into two capital cities with a wall in its midst, or perhaps an open international borderline?

3. **Demilitarization vs. Independence.** For security reasons (vis-à-vis Arab countries) Israel demands as a necessary condition, that the entire area transferred to Palestinian rule must be demilitarized regarding heavy weapons, including all kinds of artillery, tanks and anti-tank missiles, airplanes and anti-aircraft missiles, and unconventional arms of all sorts. In addition, Israel will require a number of radar bases within the mountainous Palestinian area, as well as flight rights for its air force over the same area. All the above will need Israeli supervision of the Palestinian borders all around, as well as effective control over arms production and/or importation. Can this sort of military control of one state by another, be defined as “self determination” of the former? And, what of the condition forbidding an “independent” state to sign any military alignment with other states, which could bypass or destroy demilitarization. Would the violation of demilitarization constitute a *casus belli*? Or, would sanctions and
supervision guarantee that, as by the UN in Iraq?

4. **Immigration into Palestine.** Israel has, as is well known, a Law of Return, which, by the act of settling in Israel, grants every Jew automatic citizenship. Would the Palestinians be deprived of this same right? And if not, how many refugees and non-refugees, would wish to utilize their right of return? And how many Arab states (and others), would volunteer to finance the absorption of immigrants into this new Arab state? Most importantly, how would this dynamic demographic factor affect the stability of peace in the long run, judging by Zionist experience? On the other hand, can the Palestinians sign peace treaties under such unequal terms, or would they insist upon their prospect for a demographic revolution along the border with a view to reopen the question of partition?

5. **Israeli Settlements in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza.** There exist now over 200 such settlements, with a population of about 300,000, including greater Jerusalem. Some of these settlements are meant to be annexed to Israel in the frame of border amendments, but many others might find themselves under Palestinian rule. Indeed there are within Israel about a million Arabs (Palestinian by identity and Israeli by citizenship), and no one demands to include them in the new Palestinian state (so far). But, what about the future? Should we look forward to a new “solution” in the form of land-exchange or population exchange, may God have mercy on us?

In conclusion, what remains for negotiation, from the Israeli standpoint, is the prospect of creating a dwarfish Palestinian state, with a capital not in Jerusalem, completely demilitarized under humiliating conditions, deprived of the right to free immigration, and including some “foreign” Jewish settlements in its midst. In other words: a precarious pressure-pot, which some Israelis would call “separating the two nations by territorial partition...”

Confronting this prospect with the Palestinian demand for an “independent state with a capital in Jerusalem” leaves much to be desired for a meeting of minds in the final stage of the “peace process”.

In fact one should expect an unavoidable deadlock in the forthcoming negotiations regarding the most crucial issues of the problem, — within the present limited territorial framework.

However one must also remember that the two parties to the “peace process” are now committed, by an interim agreement, to solve all disagreements by peaceful means. For how long? — That is the question. In other words: in case of a deadlock, how long will the Palestinian Authority tolerate the status of a non-state, with the resulting consequences?

The answer to this question has already come from Chairman Arafat (called “President” by his party), in the form of a warning that if no agreement is reached by the time fixed in Oslo (namely May 4, 1999), the Authority will feel free to declare itself one-sidedly as an independent state. In the face of lack of agreement with Israel upon the real terms of independence, this act would automatically lead to “liberating violence” (i.e. terror, or acts of war) which would force Israel to respond with force to such an attempt to change the status quo. But no need to worry. The wheel of history will not turn backwards, because there exists a third party ready to intervene at any such point of impasse.

— B —

The USA is the most recognized mediator in the Arab-Israeli conflict. More precisely it acts as a self-appointed mandatory power (as in other parts of the world) according to its own interests, usually described as “global” interests. Here in the Middle East, the US takes the historical role of Great Britain before World War II, only by indirect control.

With respect to the “peace process”, the US role may turn at any moment from mediation to intervention as soon as the situation is defined as “endangering the peace”, or, when a weak party in the power-system invites intervention for balancing purposes. If we assume the Palestinian Arabs to be a weak party in relation to Israel, we certainly miss the
complexity of the power-system. Behind the Palestinians stands the Arab world with its full geo-strategic weight. Therefore it is not quite clear, when the US intervenes, whether it does so in favor of the weak or the strong party. At any rate, interests are not always a matter of justice.

Well, then, in case the peace talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority should reach the point of impasse, one can expect both sides to approach the US to pass judgment — or else the US itself will approach the parties. In such cases no pre-agreed deadline is absolute. Every deadline has a substitute in the form of another deadline, and even that is not final. However, even when some violence starts, there is still hope for a cease-fire and resumption of negotiations under new conditions.

Be that as it may, one can assume (on the basis of experience) that the work of mediation usually begins by defining the claims of both parities as nothing more than “opening positions”, prior to the anticipated process of give-and-take. If flexibility is not easily shown because the problems are perceived as existential, the mediator too might loose his own flexibility, and become a judge. At a certain stage he might even employ calculated pressures. These sometimes have been gently called: “helping the parties to help themselves”.

There is no way to predict exactly the future in such matters. But one can form models of “compromise”, considering past experience; hypothetical models, of course.

For example, regarding the size of the Palestinian entity, it is possible to ignore the Israeli request for secure boundaries, and allow for only minor changes in the 1949 borderline: namely no security belt along the Jordan River, as prescribed by the “Alon Plan”. On the other hand, this sensitive region might not immediately be given to the Palestinians. An international force could be stationed there for a transition period.

The matter of demilitarization is more complicated. Perhaps here too a transition period of, say 20 years, might be offered. Before then, a “new Middle East” might develop. Meanwhile, supervision over demilitarization might also be assigned to a third party, in order to minimize the offense to sovereignty. Yet the fact that Palestine is blessed with many “sister states”, enables a secret accumulation of heavy arms, let alone arms that could be hidden inside the proscribed area. Also, even a small army can be pre-planned as a big one, if based on cadres of officers. In short, there are “solutions”.

The denial of free immigration to the Palestinian Authority may be compromised by a transition period too. Meanwhile it would be limited to fixed annual schedules for refugees, family unions, tourists, etc. At any rate, full supervision over such a movement (by foreign agencies) is impractical, as we learned during the British mandatory rule. Besides, Israel is the last nation that would prevent another nation from exercising the right of “in-gathering of its exiles”.

For the issue of Israeli settlements there is no simple model. We have already mentioned the possibility of including some of them in the border changes. But this solution is in contrast to the first model of minimizing such changes. Clearly, one must come at the expense of the other. One may assume that the mediator would look for a solution in the way it was informally proposed by the Beilin-Abu Mazen proposals, i.e. by concentration of most settlers in regions close to the borderline while evacuating those who are scattered in the depths of the area. Hence, we are dealing here with an equation of two unknowns, if not three, considering the will of the settlers themselves.

Last but not least is the issue of Jerusalem. Since we are not dealing here with “the end of days”, we may also look at this through the eyes of a mediator. The dispute itself does not seem amenable to any compromise. Israel claims Jerusalem as its eternal capital city, the Palestinians demand “an independent state with its capital in Jerusalem”. Partition of Jerusalem with a Berlin wall in its midst seems inconceivable to both sides. An open international boundary between two capitals is like a prescription for war. Is there any “creative” way to bridge this gap, except by a physical presence of a third party?

Indeed that precisely is what we suspect, not without basis, is the US traditional position regarding Jerusalem. Namely, an American trusteeship over a strip of land within Jerusalem, separating between the two capitals. Not partition, neither a
Moslem extra-territorial “Vatican”, but rather a trusteeship, like a mandate, for a limited period until “peace becomes stable”, and the time comes for a “final” settlement. In this way the mediator would also gain something vital to his own interests, i.e. a key position of influence in the “new Middle East”.

The idea underlying this “model of mediation” in general is not new. Every super-power holds more “global” views than the areas affected do. With respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict, traditional “globalism” contains a certain inclination of appeasing the Arabs at the expense of Israel. Britain tried it before World War II without success, mainly because the Arabs at that period were inclining to the enemies of Britain in Europe. The Soviet Union almost won the inter-power race for appeasing the Arabs, except that their very success caused the US (and other powers in Europe) to stand partly on the side of Israel, in order to convince the Arabs that alignment with the Soviets did not pay. Finally Israel itself surprised the world by its unexpected ability to defend itself.

The war of June 1967 was a turning point in the regional balance of power. As soon as that war ended, the well-known English weekly, The Economist, came out with a big headline: “They Did It.” Its editorial analyzed what happened as follows:

He (Nasser) was halfway to do for the Arabs what Bismarck had done for the Germans in 1870. He could lead them to victory over their common enemy. That could have results beyond the world of Nasser. It would have given the Soviet Union (as the arms supplier and diplomatic patron of the Arabs) a position of tremendous influence in the Middle East. That was the situation on Sunday evening. It was up to the Israelis, since no one was prepared to take military action. They did it and turned the whole pot over.

“But,” The Economist went on, “from an international viewpoint all that happened was that ‘Johnson’s boys hit Kosygin’s boys,’ and therefore Johnson’s situation (i.e. the US situation) became better than if it were the other way around.” Thereupon the editorial concluded that the great patrons of Israel must now deprive it of any support for territorial changes if it claims that these should be used as a penalty against aggression. And Israel should retreat to its “natural size”.

Why did The Economist reach that hypocritical conclusion? Not because of antipathy for Israel or sympathy for the Arabs. It was simply a conception of international affairs in terms of colonial traditions, by which provincial groups must adapt to considerations of balance of power. Accordingly, the real consequence of such little wars must become a bargaining card in the hands of the patron of the victorious party. In other words, cards in the service of the patron’s needs. Israel’s victory in 1967 was good for the US because at that time the Arabs were “Kosygin’s friends”. So, in order to drive Kosygin out of this region and turn the Arabs into “friends of Johnson”, the “global” interests required the convincing of the Arabs that the administered territories were a US asset, and only if the Arabs remain allied with the Soviets, might they lose these territories. That was the beginning of US “peace plans” beginning with the “Rogers Plan” in 1969 and moving on to future “findings” of various research institutes.

As to the continuity of American interest in maintaining stability (i.e. hegemony) in the Middle East, even after the collapse of the Soviet Union as a super-power, there is no need for much debate. The oil wells did not travel to another location. Neither did the Arab world as an object of international wooing.

Let us now briefly review some examples of Middle East power games. Egypt hesitated for a long time in response to US courting at the expense of Israel. Finally, on the eve of the Yom Kippur War (1973) it began showing some signs of disassociation with the Soviets, a move which saved Egypt from a military defeat at the last stage of the war, due mainly to US restraint of Israel immediately following the most crucial battle. Not much later, Sadat and Begin went to Camp David (after some diplomatic maneuvers) and there it became clear that the Sinai peninsula, apparently in Israeli hands, was really an American asset to be exchanged for Egyptian alignment with the US, while Israel
received a “cold peace”. The new friends of Carter won against the old friends of Johnson.

Jordan always depended on Anglo-American interests in its survival as a “separation state” between “western” Arab states and “eastern” ones. When Syria attempted an invasion of Jordan (1970), with Soviet and Palestinian encouragement, Israel was asked by the US to intervene in order to block the attempt. Israel did so, but that did not change the American definition of the so-called West Bank as “occupied territory”, either for the benefit of Jordan or for a future Palestinian state. Had Israel considered the situation as an opportunity to advance the idea of “Jordan is Palestine”, and for achieving American support for the annexation of the Golan Heights, Israel could have avoided any intervention, thereby catching two birds with one stone. On the other hand, perhaps the US made an offer Israel could not refuse. Later it was the PLO which gained American recognition and support for its claim on the “West Bank” in exchange for abandoning its alliance with the Soviets and turning “western”.

The American “dialogue” with the PLO continued secretly for years before the Oslo agreement. Only some naive Israelis believe it was an independent initiative. Oslo became possible due to the gradual change of loyalty by the PLO from the enemies of the US in the Middle East, toward the “right patronage”. The main turning point occurred after the Gulf War (1991) and the collapse of the Soviet Union. That is why Israel reported the negotiation in Oslo to the US, and signed the agreement formally in the White House.

Syria too entered the “peace process” at the point of recognizing US hegemony in the Middle East. Its real negotiation was with the US, not Israel, on issues such as replacement of Soviet arms with more modern American ones (so far with no progress), US recognition of the “Anschluss” with Lebanon (a still undecided matter), the future relationship with Iran, and anti-western terrorist organizations stationed in and outside Syria, etc. No doubt the question of the Golan is also on the agenda, but not before other issues are solved. Certainly the “process” with Syria is not based upon the principle of “secure and agreed upon boundaries”, as stated in resolution 242 of the UN.

To sum up, the real peace processes are carried out essentially on the basis of “territories in exchange for Pax Americana”, and only as a secondary matter, on the basis of the needs of the “local” parties. Seemingly, the US endows the parties with good services, in order to bridge the gaps between them, but this bridge is “Made in the USA”.

Meanwhile, in a world of one super-power, nothing is too urgent. The name of the game is “process”. Yet, the trend of such processes is not open at all. Also the pressures accompanying them are not gentle all the time. That became recently clear at the Wye Plantation near Washington.

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If the first chapter introduced the thesis of a deadlock in the negotiation for a permanent settlement, and the second chapter presented the antithesis of an imposed “solution”, we have now reached the point of synthesis as envisaged by the so called “peace camp” in Israel. Borrowing a phrase from Marx, the idea underlying this synthesis is based on a definition of freedom as “the recognition of necessity”.

First let us distinguish between the vague concepts of “camp” and “peace” (in this context) and political bodies, that must address the public with concrete platforms. In this chapter we will concentrate on the Labor Party, which has initiated (in Oslo) the recognition of the PLO by Israel as a partner for the partition of western Eretz-Israel (Palestine) into two states. Historically speaking we are dealing here with a far-reaching ideological metamorphosis, the end of which has not yet unfolded itself.

I recall a certain public meeting on May 1st, in the mid-1930s, when a debate took place on the question of whether socialism and the class struggle should take priority over the Zionist struggle for Eretz-Israel, or vice versa. One speaker for MAPA'I (the original name of today’s Labor) surprised the audience by an original view of the class struggle at that time. “Our class struggle”, he said, (I quote from memory the essence of that speech)

is that of the proletarian Jewish people, whose homeland is not in its hands, against
property owners, who own homelands including our own. This is a war for justice and equality among nations, and we are managing it by pioneering Aliya (immigration) and settlement, by a renaissance of Hebrew culture, and by developing a military power of our own. That is the meaning of our socialism now, and that is our revolution for this generation.

(Interruptions: “Is that all your socialism?” “Look at the slogan hanging above you; ‘Workers of all lands, unite!’”) But the speaker insisted:

With whom would you like to unite? Is it with the socialists of the Soviet Union, who deny the right of the Jewish people over their homeland and arrest Zionists and imprison them, or is it with the Labor party of Britain, that rules our country and prevents Aliya?

(More interruptions: “Let us start with the Arab workers.”) But the speaker did not yield:

Will the Arab workers build a Jewish homeland together with us? We are not worrying about work for ourselves, but for a place of work for our nation.

After World War II and the Zionist struggle against the oppressive British rule, came the Partition Plan of the UN in 1947, which designed an international rule in Jerusalem, among other complications. The Zionist leadership accepted that precarious partition mainly in order to achieve independence and peace with the Arab world. But the Arab neighboring states together with the Palestinian Arabs reacted with total war, the declared purpose of which was genocide.

The UN partition plan was a peace plan, which resulted in war. Israel won it alone, by its own powers that were accumulated for over fifty years of a national “class struggle”. This revolution may be succinctly summarized by three decisive processes:

1. Demographic increase which caused the ripening of new political conditions,
2. Cultural, economic and military growth which brought about a revolution in the balance of power,
3. A determined underground struggle against any outside intervention in the conflict.

It is these three factors, which have characterized Zionist dynamics before and after independence. If you wish, it was all preconceived in the words of the above-mentioned speaker, at that May 1st rally, concerning the “class struggle of the proletarian Jewish nation among land-owning nations” in its environment.

About fifty years later the political inheritors (or epigones) of Zionistic-socialism have discovered another proletarian nation, right nearby, namely the “homeless” Palestinian Arabs. And, most shamefully, who are the oppressors of this proletarian nation, if not those ancient proletarians that have turned rich in land and are now trying to rule another nation.

The fact that these “homeless” people constitute a majority in a neighboring state called Jordan, which in turn is part and parcel of “sister states” extending in an area as large as a continent, the fact that the only thing that prevents Jordan from being defined as a Palestinian state is the monarchical dynasty which rules there; the fact that the “Palestinian problem” has always served the Arab world as a means to deprive the Israelis of self-determination rather than simply adding another Arab state to the twenty some existing ones; all the above have not prevented our Zionist-socialists from identifying with the idea of “free Palestine”.

Perhaps unwittingly, the Labor movement in Israel is now ready for an exchange of roles with the Palestinian Arabs: a “small” Palestine will take the dynamic role of growth of early Zionism, while “large” Israel will now engage in the static role of containment. In other words: a Palestinian expectancy in the image of Zionism. Paraphrasing Pascal, it appears that history has such Reason, that Reason itself does not know.

One way of understanding the meaning of this metamorphosis is by a glance into the garden of contemporary literature. Self-blame may often flourish in this garden because moral imagination here can go far in a casuistic denial of self-rights together with an enthusiastic support of the other’s rights. Here is just one illustration.

In his article “Between One Right and Another” (in his book: In Favor of Normality), the Laborite novelist, A.B. Yehoshua criticizes the historical right
of the Jewish nation in Palestine. First, let us mention his brilliant remark at the end of this article, defining the Palestinian Arabs as “a potential people” already since the beginning of this century, i.e. within other Arabs in the Ottoman Empire. Namely, the Palestinians were a separate nation before they themselves were conscious of it, naively considering themselves as southern Syrians, the same as other Arabs in the region were natural “potential nations”, and not by virtue of the arbitrary British-French mapping of the region by the famous Sykes-Picot agreement.

Not less far reaching is the initial thesis of Yehoshua that

the concept of historical right is devoid of objective morality and lacking moral justification in regard to the return of the Jewish people to its land.

A people may claim, says Yehoshua, that it is the real owner of a land that was taken away from it providing that this people itself did not take it by force from another people. But,

the Jewish people itself admits (in the Bible) that it conquered this land from other peoples, and its historical right derives, then, from occupation. If so, the Arabs’ right too derives from occupation.

Therefore, concludes Yehoshua, basing his view on the Talmud, for that matter: “one who steals from a thief is not guilty.” And he goes on to use an example from private life: “a person took a house from someone else by force, living in it for a certain period and then was forced to leave the house; then came a second person and settled in that house. Does the first person have a right to return and claim ownership over the house that he himself stole? Certainly not. The first robber does not have any advantage over the second robber”.

What is after all the only right of the Jews which counts in our time? According to Yehoshua it is 'the right of existence distress' (emphasis in the original). But, this right is limited and conditional. Here too he uses a parable from private life: a homeless person may invade the house of another person, as “something done under compulsion is exempt from critics.” But this

on condition that the invader takes only a part of the house. If he takes the entire house and throws its owners into the street, we would not approve of this act from a moral point of view.

The moral of this parable is obvious. On the collective level the Jews could “invade” Palestine by virtue of “existence distress” only, even though the land was occupied by a “potential nation”, providing they take only a part of the land. “Existence distress” is not more than the right of refugees, and the Jewish refugees did not have anywhere to go. However the same is true with regard to the Palestinian refugees Also, as it is not moral to tell the Jews “go and assimilate among other peoples”, so it is not moral to expect the Palestinian Arabs to assimilate among the Arabs, says Yehoshua.

Here comes Yehoshua to a transparent hint with respect to the next stage of Palestinian liberation: The refusal of the Palestinians in 1947 to accept partition, and their total war against us, does not prevent their right to accept now the partition of western Eretz-Israel by the borders of 1949-1967.

Yet, one may ask, if they are entitled to regret their failing attempt at genocide in 1948, why not offer them the more equal partition plan of 1947? Yehoshua does not propose that explicitly, only by implication:

How happy could we be if the Arabs had accepted that partition plan, thereby sparing us the hard and dangerous War of Independence, with all its sacrifices.

Indeed, how happily could we live within the 1947 boundaries without Jerusalem, Jaffa, Ramle, Lod, Ashdod, Ashkelon, Beersheva, Acre, Naharia, and the entire Western Galilee, (also together with 500,000 Palestinians that, if left in their places, would have amounted now to five million (increasing tenfold as the 100,000 who remained); let alone an independent Palestinian state on our side of the Jordan River since 1948.

So happy, just as fatted calves.

One can object to bringing this example as if it were representative of the Labor movement in Israel. It is not. Yet it seems quite typical by its conclusions, if not by its reasons. Moreover, it is not
at all a twisted-mirror of the prevailing ideology in Labor circles, both intellectual and political.

As was suggested here before, the abandoned socialism of Zionist pioneering has been metamorphosed into a new socialism of liberating the “Palestinian proletarians”, with the vision of general peace.

A poet in the early years of this movement once wrote: “Our song is not about blood and battles, our song is of life and creativity.” He did not foresee the future wars, as might be the case with his ideological descendants in our time.

— D —

The questions arising on the trails of our analysis are apparently. What do you propose? What is your alternative? What option do you have in mind?

Surely, these are obvious questions. Only, one must keep in mind that in so far as peace is concerned, the necessary condition is an agreement between at least two parties. In addition, a sufficient condition for the stability of peace would be the measure of realism upon which it is based.

There are various ways of looking at reality. For example, defeatist realism maintains that if you know in advance that your enemy will not accept your plan, it means that you have no peace plan. And if you believe you have no option for war, while there must be “peace now”, then it follows that you must base your plan upon the demands of your enemy. That guarantees in advance both the “peace” and the “now”. Nothing is easier than that. On the other hand, there is a sober realism, which maintains from the outset that the winds of time do not blow only at your back, but also at the enemy’s back. Therefore you avoid falling in the trap of “peace now”. Yes, peace now if you can trust the system within which peace will be arranged. But, if the existing system is entrapping, you may think of an alternative system in which both sides to the conflict could live in peace.

I believe in the latter type of realism. I also think there are alternatives to the present system, in which two peoples are squeezed into a small pressure pot, forced to live with frustrated aspirations. The following two alternative systems, which will be presented here, seem not only enlarged enough to allow peaceful co-existence, but also assure the stability of peace.

1. Instead of an independent state in the so-called “West Bank” and Gaza, Israel should insist on the establishment of a unified Jordanian-Palestinian state, the army of which should all be stationed in the eastern bank of the Jordan River, while the Israeli army will assume the responsibility for security west of the river. Both the Palestinian-Jordan State and Israel will establish a condominium (a sharing of rule) in the West Bank and Gaza with a functional division of sovereignty. The Palestinians will enjoy a full political autonomy, including police functions, and if they so wish they could define their ties with Jordan as a confederation, except that as citizens of this confederation they should elect their representatives to the parliament in Amman. This condominium with Israel over the West Bank and Gaza will create, as said before, a functional partition of sovereignty, so that no side will have to live under an absolute and exclusive foreign sovereignty. In so far as Jordan itself will undergo a process of democratization, the Palestinians on both sides of the Jordan River would enjoy perfect self-determination, while their peaceful co-existence with Israel will depend on the continuity and stability of the condominium.

2. A wider regional confederation, including Iraq and/or Syria and Lebanon together with Jordan-Palestine (and even Israel, if so agreed) might be established. So far as this matter concerns the Arabs themselves, it is their business, and Israel is not involved. However, inasmuch as considerations of regional balance of power are involved, Israel will be in the picture, so to speak, and its security interests must be taken into account. On this condition mainly, Israel may have a positive attitude to a unified Arab national identity in the Fertile Crescent.

The main advantage of a wider regional con-
federation is double. On the one hand, it would fulfill the Arab vision at the end of World War I to establish a single and unified Arab state in the Fertile Crescent such as has never existed since the historical caliphates in Damascus and Baghdad. In this way the “Balkanization” of the Arab nation in this region, that was imposed on the Arabs by British and French imperialism, would be abolished. On the other hand, Palestinians as well as Syrians and Iraqis will return to be authentic Arabs, as they essentially have always been. Thus the so-called “Palestinian identity” will be realized without requiring the eradication of Israel. That indeed was the principle underlying the Faisal-Weitzman agreement of 1919, which was canceled by the foreign interests behind “divide and rule”. That would also endow both Arabs and Israelis with real indepen- dence that even a neo-imperialism of any kind could not sterilize.

The existing Arab states in the Fertile Crescent, if united, will have a population of over 50 million and an area of 700,000 square kilometers, blessed with oil, water, and an excellent prospect of economic development (if only they would devote their energies to peaceful coexistence with their neighbors). This, as opposed to their fatal preoccupation with the relatively tiny Israel. It may also put an end to outside intervention in local conflicts with the pretension of “peacemaking”.

It appears that it is possible for Israel to sign peace agreements with each Arab state in this region, but only with a confederation of the Fertile Crescent can Israel make a lasting and viable peace.

And, if they so wish, it is no dream.2
THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

Elon Jarden

Introduction: International Law as the Key to Peace

In the Western states as in Israel, there exists an inner need to act according to moral principles, or at least to be convinced that one is acting according to them. Under certain circumstances where we have to negotiate with an opponent, we feel compelled to see him as more moral than he really is, so as to justify the negotiations with him from a moral standpoint. This attitude, which is characteristic of most of the public in the Western societies, is rife with dangers in Middle Eastern politics, which is based on power and not on moral principles. Thus, any discussion of the subject of the Middle East must begin from the standpoint of a number of its basic assumptions; otherwise we are likely to be deceived, seduced by rhetoric that states one thing while meaning the opposite.

Ostensibly, as members of the United Nations, the Arab states are supposed to act in adherence to their obligations under the Charter; in reality, however, nothing contravenes their conceptions more than the principles of this organization. The Arab states, despite being members of the UN, negate the existence of international law, and not only in regard to Israel, but even in inter-Arab relations. Even though international law and its institutions provided the basis for the establishment of the Arab states, the Arabs have never recognized them because they stand in opposition to the Islamic conception of law.

International law, like constitutional law, is a European invention, for which no parallels exist in the non-European world. It is based on the idea of freedom: just as constitutional law recognizes the individual's right to freedom, international law recognizes the rights of the various peoples to political independence, to "self-determination", which is subject only to international law. The European conception of law is pluralist, and the recognition of the legitimacy of the existence of many states, side by side in a given region, is derived from it. This conception took shape within the unique circumstances of European history, and to a certain extent even contravened the monist ideal of a united Christian community.¹

Islamic law is, conversely, monistic in essence, and only recognizes the legitimacy of a single all-embracing state — the caliphate — that is based on a single, all-embracing religion — Islam. The caliphate is ruled by a single sovereign — the caliph — who is the leader of the Muslim community by right and by law. International relations, according to this conception, are not relations of equality, but of subjugation between the caliphate and all other entities, to which a certain degree of autonomy is permitted, but not sovereignty. Since Islam is universal in nature, there is no limit, at least in principle, to its extension. Such universalism is, however, the opposite of modern universalism, which is based on the notion of a network of sovereign states — large, medium-size, and small — that maintain relations on a basis of equality and not of subjugation.

The Islamic jurists, who were deeply influenced by the events and ideas that prevailed during the
early stage of the crystallization of Islam, remained 
attached to the unique and universal conception of 
the sovereignty of the caliph, even after it no longer 
accorded with reality. That is why they had no part in 
Christianity's experimental probings toward interna-
tional law during the Middle Ages. There was but 
one caliph; the question of relations between 
Muslim states did not arise at all, at least on the 
level of principle. And when it did arise, the jurists 
ignored it, or dealt with it in casuistic terms — 
under cover of the negotiations that the caliph held 
with a powerful insurgent. Relations with states that 
were not Muslim at all were not considered on the 
legal plane but only on the military plane: such 
relations were regarded as perpetual warfare be-
tween the believers and the infidels — *jihad* — that 
is interrupted by brief cease-fires.2

Because of the lack of legitimacy in Islam for 
political pluralism, the Arabic language did not even 
develop concepts equivalent to those of “nation” 
and “nation-state” (names were not even given to 
particular areas of land), which form the basis of 
international law. The Arabs regarded themselves 
first and foremost as Muslims, even when hegemony 
over the Muslim world passed from a dynasty whose 
ethnic composition was Arab to a dynasty that was 
non-Arab. Hence under the Ottoman Sultan the 
Arabs did not have a feeling of being conquered, 
even though the Ottoman dynasty was, ethnically 
speaking, Turkish and not Arab. The sub-Islamic 
Arab nationality began to crystallize only in the 19th 
century — as the Ottoman Empire began to come 
apart and the Western powers started to penetrate 
the Middle East. Even this, however, was at first a 
pan-Arab nationalism as opposed to territorial 
nationalism. Self-determination in territorial terms, 
invoking an attachment to a particular area of land, 
did not develop until after the First World War, as 
the Ottoman Empire collapsed and was divided up 
into separate administrative units under the Man-
datory rule of Britain and France. That is why the 
Arab states are called by names that were given 
them by the Western powers and not by their own 
names. Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and so on — all 
these are names that were imposed on the Arabs by 
foreign actors, which is also why these territories are 
thought of as kingdoms. Thus even today, after more 
than fifty years of political independence, the Arabs 
have trouble defining themselves in terms of 
bounded territorial nationalism, and prefer to think 
of themselves as part of the “great Arab nation” and 
even as part of the still greater Islamic nation. The 
Arab collective consciousness is not monolithic but 
rather tripartite, in the descending order of: 
religious, linguistic, and territorial. This divided 
personality is manifested par excellence in the 
Palestinian Covenant.3

The Prohibition of War in International 
Law

The difference in legal-political conceptions is 
manifested not only in the disparities between 
pluralism and monism, but even in the definition of 
the relations between peace and war. The criminal-
ization of war in international law, by the UN 
Charter, is foreign to Arab understanding because it 
contradicts basic conceptions of Islamic law, first 
and foremost the institution of *jihad*. *Jihad* is not 
merely “just war” in the European sense of the 
concept, but indeed a religious commandment of 
the first order. For as long as the doctrine of “just 
war” prevailed in international law, the disparity 
between the different legal systems was not so 
great. But once war came to be completely 
prohibited by international law — with exceptions 
for self-defense and collective security — a disparity 
was created that could no longer be bridged. A brief 
review of the history of the criminalization of war in 
international law, and the repercussions this has for 
the texture of international relations, will shed light 
on this matter.

The declaration of war as illegal — “criminaliza-
tion” in legal terminology — by international law 
was done, for the first time in history, in the UN 
Charter. Subsequently some additional documents 
were signed that, together with the UN Charter, 
turned war into an international crime against peace 
and stipulated severe sanctions for its perpetrators, 
part punitive and part financial. The prohibition of 
war is the cornerstone of today's international law, 
whose constitution is the UN Charter.

With its criminalization of war, the Charter put 
an end to the older international law, in which war
was legal so long as its purpose was “just”. The doctrine of “just war”, which began in Roman law and evolved into the modern world by means of Christian theology and the canonical law of the Middle Ages, permitted war in practice so long as each side had a moral justification for its actions. Since justice is indeed immeasurable and no single, recognized and accepted list of such just purposes existed, each legalist determined his own list for himself, and sometimes these lists had a political or religious coloring. These lists contained mostly amorphous purposes, leaving plenty of room for maneuver, especially since no international authority existed that could determine what did and did not justify war.4

In the legal regime that the Charter has established, there is no longer any validity to the traditional distinction between a “just” war and an “unjust” war — instead, only a distinction between an “aggressive war”, which is prohibited by law, and a “defensive war”, which is permitted by it. No purpose any longer justifies the use of force, no matter what the circumstances. In cases of disagreements and clashing interests in international relations, only the law can arbitrate, not force. The use of force is legal only insofar as it is directed against an act of aggression, whether by the party that is attacked (defensive war) or by the Security Council, which is authorized to act against an aggressor (collective security). This distinction is reflected in the stipulations of the Charter, in the general prohibition of the use of force or even the threat of it (Article 4(2)) — and, on the other hand, in the recognition of the right to self-defense (Article 51) and in the authorization to enforce collective security (Chapter 7).5

The Charter’s total prohibition of war — with exceptions for self-defense and collective security — marks a revolutionary shift in international life. This is, without doubt, the most daring reform in human history with its aim of enforcing the rule of law in international relations, and its elimination of force as the sole arbitrator in these relations. What had been a prophetic vision of the End of Days — “Nation shall not lift sword against nation, and they shall learn war no more” — has become, thanks to the UN Charter and its institutions, the legal regime of the nations of the world. International criminal law imposes obligations on the members of the UN in their relations with each other, much as criminal law imposes obligations on persons, as individuals and as groups, on the domestic political plane.

The Muslim Arab world has not succeeded in internalizing the revolution that the UN Charter has wrought, just as it has difficulty internalizing constitutional law and other Western norms. Hence, despite the fact that the Arab states owe their independence to international law, it is difficult for them to adopt its principles, especially the more powerful states among them. That explains why the Arab states fail to recognize not only Israel’s legitimacy but even that of other Arab states; why the strong states among them seek to conquer the weak ones, with the goal of reestablishing the vanished caliphate; why even the many peace agreements that have been signed among them are not worth the ink with which they were written; and it is why, despite the fact that in all of these states the same language is spoken (at least in the Arab states), despite the “normalization” that exists among these states and includes embassies, trade, cultural interaction, and so on — items that the Arab states promise to deliver to Israel in return for its withdrawal to the 1967 borders — a mad arms race is still being waged in the Middle East.

Thus, in the Middle East the recognition of the legitimacy of international law is a precondition for the recognition not only of Israel’s legitimacy but even of that of the Arab states, which arose on the basis of this very international law. And so long as that precondition is not fulfilled, this region will continue to be the domain of a “war of all against all”, in Hobbes’ formulation. From the Arabs’ standpoint, the war against Israel is not only legitimate but indeed a religious commandment. In inter-Arab relations the situation is, of course, more complicated legally, since within the “Muslim house of peace” (a translation of the Arabic term Dar al-Islam), according to Islam’s own definition, peace is supposed to prevail. This peace, however, depends on the hegemony of a particular actor, the inheritor of the caliphate — which does not exist in actuality.
In the absence of international law there are, indeed, restraints on the outbreak of active war, but they reflect only the balance of power. The fear of war is sufficiently strong to make the sides abstain from it, but not strong enough to motivate them to create institutions for conflict resolution. To the extent that it is all possible to call this state of affairs “peace”, it is peace in the traditional sense: armed peace, based on various bilateral, fortuitous, fragile arrangements. Armed, minimal peace cannot be maintained except by a balance of power between adversaries — or by the victory of the stronger party and the establishment of an imperial peace of the pax Romana type. Such imperial peace existed in the Middle East for five hundred years under the Ottoman hegemony, or pax Ottomana. This peace fell apart as the Ottoman Empire collapsed under the weight of British-French imperialism. The pax Britannica in the Middle East prevailed for only one generation, during the 1920s and 1930s, and fell apart with the travails of Britain and France in the Second World War.

The last imperial peace in the Middle East turned into a peace of the balance of power among the new states, which were established in the Middle East after the Second World War. Being preoccupied with the war against Israel, the Arab states succeeded in moderating the war among themselves and even in concealing it from the probing eyes of the world media. The inter-Arab conflicts, which claimed hundreds of thousands of victims, were hidden behind the curtain of Arab propaganda for a generation. Only when the conflict with Israel lost steam in the 1980s did the world discover the rim of the volcano in the Middle East. If the world had some understanding of the war between Iran and Iraq — a continuation of the historical conflict between the western part of the Middle East and the eastern part, between Sunni-Arab Islam and Shi’ite-Persian Islam — the conquest of Kuwait by Iraq would not have been incomprehensible to all. How was it possible that the Iraqi wolf would swallow whole the Kuwaiti sheep, in the Middle Eastern Garden of Eden over which only the Arab-Israeli conflict cast a pall? If the Israelis and the Arabs would only arrive at a settlement, it was widely asserted, the Middle East would again become a Garden of Eden. What Saddam Hussein did in the public eye, in the proximity of the world’s oil wells, Assad did in quiet and obscurity in the Land of the Cedars. He swallowed Lebanon whole, as if not only international law but even the basic morality of the Islamic “House of Peace” did not exist in the Middle East.

In contrast to what is commonly thought, it is precisely Israel’s presence in the Middle East that prevents it from turning into a much worse hell than it already is. The Israeli presence has given it at least a partial stability by directing the Arabs’ political energy from the Muslim House of Peace outward, to the “House of War” (a translation of the Arabic term Dar al-Harâb), which has been “invaded by the infidel Zionist entity”. In the hot war that has been waged in the Middle East between the Muslim House of Peace and the Israeli House of War, there have been far fewer innocent victims than in the cold peace that has prevailed for a generation within the Muslim House of Peace (which occasionally turns into a hot war, such as the Iraq-Iran or Iraq-Kuwait war).

The Middle East in an International Perspective

The lack of peace between Israel and the Arab states does not stem, therefore, from the existence of conflicts between the sides, but from the Arab states’ refusal to recognize the legal regime that international law has established, since it runs counter to Muslim law. Hence their war against Israel is also perceived as normative, even if it contradicts their obligations according to the UN Charter. That is also why they ascribe no importance to the series of agreements they have signed with Israel since its establishment.

With the conclusion of the War for Independence, armistice agreements were signed between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, with the goal of “facilitating the transition from the present truce to a permanent peace in Palestine” as stated in the preamble to these agreements. Thus in regard to all of these states, it was also determined that “the injunction of the Security Council against
resort to military force...shall henceforth be scrupulously respected by both Parties”, and that “no aggressive action by the armed forces...of either Party shall be undertaken, planned, or threatened against the people or the armed forces of the other.” On the Israeli side the cease-fire agreements were taken at face value, the common assumption being that they would be followed by peace treaties, which would in turn give rise to a new Middle East. Thus, Israel’s representatives in the UN repeatedly averred that Israel was no longer in a state of war with the Arab states. This was also the position of the Security Council, and even of courts of law in Israel.⁶

Nevertheless, the Arab states again declared that, notwithstanding the armistice agreements, they were in a state of war with Israel and it was permissible for them to continue fighting it.⁷ The ink on these agreements had hardly dried before Arab states, the first being Egypt and Syria, initiated a series of hostile actions against Israel. In the mid-1960s they escalated these hostile actions, leading ultimately to the Six Day War, and later to the War of Attrition and the Yom Kippur War.

In the perspective of international law, the ongoing threat to Israel’s existence by the Arab states is manifestly illegal. The State of Israel was established legally, on the basis of General Assembly and League of Nations resolutions, and of the principles of international law — hence its right to exist, irrespective of the Arabs’ willingness to recognize it. Israel has been forced to struggle for its existence because, since the time of its establishment the UN has lacked the capacity to enforce international law, mainly as a result of the Cold War, which emerged parallel to Israel’s establishment. From a legal standpoint, the Arabs’ use of force in their efforts to destroy Israel is a gross violation of international law, and indeed a testimony to its impotence throughout this entire period.

There is perhaps no greater disparity than that between the Arabs’ attitude toward international law and that of Israel — and before its establishment, that of political Zionism. Zionism was the only political movement of the 20th century that tried to base its existence not on the use of force but on the principles of international law. For thousands of years the Jewish people lived outside of political history, and hence were able to eschew the use of force. Their historical consciousness still contained great, glorious war heroes from the days of the First Temple, but these were vague memories, intangible. In his daily life the Jew was a merchant and a spiritualist. Although the Zionist revolution changed this situation almost overnight, it did not succeed in uprooting what had been sown and cultivated over thousands of years: the recognition of the supremacy of spiritual and moral values over force, that “Not by might and not by force but by spirit” (Zecharia). Even the 20th century, rife with violence, in which the blood of six million Jews was allowed to vanish into the maws of institutionalized mass murder, did not succeed in uprooting this glorious heritage. In this perspective, the Jewish people is a paragon and a model of “the end of history”, while the world surrounding it is still living the history of force in all its fierceness.

It was by creating the State of Israel that the Zionist revolution changed this situation almost overnight; the whole purpose of the state’s existence being to erect a dam against the murderous modern-day violence. For this achievement, Zionism exacted an enormous price, transforming the Jews, reluctantly and against their nature, into something like participants in the international power game. The Jews’ national revival confronted them with an almost irresolvable dilemma: how to preserve their lives by all means without losing their souls. Israel’s resort to force in order to secure its establishment was nothing but a legitimate defensive war, in the face of the impotence of international law.

**Right Cannot Grow from Injustice**

If we are to consider the future of relations between the State of Israel and its Palestinian minority in light of the principles of international law, we must bear in mind that only the Israeli side comes to this discussion with integrity and clean hands, whereas the Palestinian side not only has blood-stained hands but even an unclean heart. The Palestinian side has set forth its claims in the United Nations only after the frustration of its hope of drowning Israel in blood. Time and again it rose up to destroy Israel, with the aid of the Arab states, and only when
it became clear that it could not do so by force did it begin seeking to shrink Israel down by means of international law. All that I shall say from here on has only one purpose: to persuade the reader that the UN organization — as well as the United States and the rest of the nations of the world — must not award a prize to the aggressor, since they will thereby destroy international law, whose whole basis is the time-honored ex injuria jus non oritur — "Right cannot grow from injustice," or, "The sinner must not be rewarded."

Political Zionism saw morality as an end in itself and not just as a means for attaining its goals. The national liberation of the Jewish people came to be associated with universal liberation. The return to Zion was perceived as part of a process of recreating all of human civilization in the spirit of the prophets of Israel — "that Torah shall go forth from Zion and the word of God from Jerusalem." The goal of Zionism was, as Harold Fisch puts it, "to redeem history by means of justice — justice in society and justice in political life." This was aptly expressed by David Ben-Gurion:

I am convinced that the survival of the Jews is a result of their perpetual and total awareness over hundreds of years of "something", which I am not able to name, but perhaps, in a seemingly archaic formulation — a vision of the messianic redemption, on the national and human level...thus what I refer to is their redemption, with their return to the status of an independent nation in its independent land, where they will be morally renewed and become a precious people, and thus also in regard to the redemption of all humanity, with the victory of peace, justice, and equality in the world, after the elimination of tyranny and wickedness. This double focus of the messianic vision passes like a crimson thread through the entire history of the Jewish people and the Jewish faith. This is the religious, moral, and national consciousness of the Hebrew nation.9

Political Zionism was always moderate and cautious. A pragmatism of maximal morality and law, and minimal force, is what characterized political Zionism before the establishment of the state — and, afterward, Israeli foreign policy as well, creating continuity despite the political vicissitudes. What this policy asserted was, more or less, the following: since Zionism received a writ of authorization for its activity — from the League of Nations, from the Palestine Mandate — it does not need to await a further writ of authorization from the Arabs, and is already authorized to build its endeavor in Israel. And yet — everything in great caution. Not to anger the nations of the world more than is necessary, to strive, so as to play it safe, to have the superpowers on its side; to create facts — but to seek legitimacy for the existence of these facts; to achieve legitimacy — but not to be complacent about it, instead hastening to translate it into the language of facts in the field; not to await the Arabs' blessing — but also not to give up any chance for compromise and dialogue. The Palestinians, in comparison, not only rejected any compromise out of hand, but did not even recognize any other path than the use of force. Their nationalism was not only based on force but actually spurious, a sort of parody of Jewish nationalism. Palestinian nationalism was invented as a sort of antithesis to political Zionism. To balance the Zionist myth, the anti-Zionist myth of the Palestinian liberation movement was devised. The Palestinian-Arab anti-nation is a sort of photographic negative of Zionism. Whereas Zionism was created so as to give political expression to the Jewish people's vision of national and universal redemption, the Palestinian-Arab nation arose only to prevent Israel's establishment by all available means; and after it was established — to bring about its annihilation. Its aim is not to build but only to destroy.10

The Oslo Agreements in Light of International Law

The relationship between the State of Israel and the Palestinians is today dominated by the Oslo agreements. In the context of these agreements, two questions arise: (1) To what extent, if any, are they valid from the standpoint of international law? (2) Do the Palestinians have a right to a sovereign state in part of Palestine according to international law? My answers to these questions are as follows:
1. The Oslo agreements are not valid for two main reasons: (a) They were arrived at in a context of the use of force and/or a threat of the use of force, both of which are prohibited by Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. (b) They are based on an erroneous formulation, from a legal standpoint, of UN Resolution 242 in regard to "territory for peace".

2. Because, according to international law, the State of Israel is the legal sovereign over the entire territory of Mandatory Palestine west of the Jordan River, the Palestinians have no right except to autonomy, with the extent of its authority to be determined in negotiations between the State of Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

The criminalization of the use of force, and even of the threat of it, by the UN Charter has brought a profound change not only in concepts of "war" and "peace", but also in the concepts derived from them, the most important of which is that of "peace treaty". In an analogy with domestic law one may say that from the moment that war was prohibited by law, there was no need to formalize this with bilateral agreements, since a law and a treaty are alternative legal arrangements. In a competition between a law and a treaty, the former prevails — except in the case of a particular behavior that the law provisionally permits. Since, however, one may by no means make provisional laws that are of a criminal nature, under no circumstances can an agreed arrangement serve as a substitute for such laws. In the past, bilateral agreements to terminate a war took different forms and were called by different names, according to their nature: "truce", "cease-fire", "armistice", and "peace treaty". These arrangements, including peace treaties, were of a fortuitous character, and fell apart as soon as the next war broke out. As Franklin Roosevelt put it, "peace should be regarded not as an end to the last war, but as an end to the beginning of the next one." 11

Thus, the various distinctions between the different arrangements were important only so long as war was legal. But from the moment that war was prohibited by law, there was, to repeat, no longer any need for treaty arrangements. That is why, in fact, the use of peace treaties has decreased since the end of World War II. Indeed, World War II itself already deviated from the norm of peace treaties insofar as the German nation, the main defeated power, has not made a peace treaty to this day. 12

Furthermore, in light of the sweeping prohibition of the use of force or even the threat of it, the traditional peace arrangements for bringing an end to war, including peace treaties, are no longer of an validity because they result from the prior use of force. So long as war was considered legal in international relations, international law could not regard it as a factor that nullified the validity of agreements. Hence peace treaties were always considered valid, even though in actuality they were imposed, at the end of wars, by the victorious states on the defeated ones (hence they were popularly referred to as "pacts of surrender"). But with the prohibition and even criminalization of war in international law — subject to exceptions of self-defense and collective security — a perception crystallized within legal theory that a treaty that an aggressive (i.e., criminal) state imposes on a defeated (i.e., the victim of the crime) state at the end of a war (or, without a war, by threatening that state) could have no authoritative validity. The legal rationale behind this principle is that the aggressor must not enjoy the fruits of his aggression — to repeat the ancient Latin legal terminology: ex injuria jus non oritur, "Right cannot grow from injustice," or "The sinner must not be rewarded." This theory received authoritative legal validity with the entry into force of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (hereinafter Law of Treaties) of May 23, 1969, Article 52 of which states that:

A treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. 13

This conclusion, according to which, under the legal regime established by the UN Charter, peace treaties are not only superfluous but even illegal because they result from the prior use of force, has far-reaching implications for the concept of peace in the Middle East. If we add the fact that, according to
Article 103 of the Charter, bilateral agreements can do no more than supplement what is stated in the Charter, we arrive at a revolutionary result that could change the Middle East peace process entirely. In essence, according to the new legal situation there is a place for bilateral agreements only insofar as they formalize positive relations between the different states (diplomatic, trade, cultural, and other relations) — but not in regard to the prohibition of the use of force (except for security arrangements) and not, indeed, in regard to territorial arrangements (except for minor border adjustments).

The invalidation of peace agreements that are signed as a result of the use and/or threat of force has implications, first and foremost, for Israel’s relations with Syria, Lebanon, and indeed the rest of the Arab states. It also has significance, however, for Israel’s relationship with the Palestinian Authority. Although the Palestinian Authority’s status in international law is indeed not clear, for purposes of general legal analysis one may relate to it as an entity with a political status that is less than a state, yet carrying rights and obligations on the international plane.14

The Oslo agreements are invalid because they were obtained as a result of the ongoing use of terrorism over many years, in Israel and outside of it, as well as the popular disturbances known by the name “intifada”. Furthermore, these agreements are invalid because, according to the language of the Palestinian Covenant and other basic documents, the Palestinians have not relinquished the use of armed force as a means of destroying the State of Israel even subsequent to the signing of the Oslo agreements. It is worth noting that a treaty that was obtained as a result of the use and/or threat of force is “null and void”, so that there is no need for a further action to bring about its nullification.15

The Oslo Agreements are indeed invalid insofar as they are based on Resolution 242, with respect to the formulation “territories for peace”, which is a political resolution that not only lacks authoritative legal validity but is even fundamentally erroneous in that it violates the time-honored principle of “Right cannot grow from injustice.” The possibility of nullifying a treaty that was arrived at by error is anchored in Article 48 (1) of the Law of Treaties, which states that:

A state may invoke an error in a treaty as invalidating its consent to be bound by the treaty if the error relates to a fact or situation which was assumed by that State to exist at the time when the treaty was concluded and formed an essential basis of its consent to be bound by the treaty.

Security Council Resolution 242 of November 1967 created the Gordian knot between peace and Israel’s withdrawal to the 1967 borders, known by the phrase “territories for peace”. This resolution has no basis in international law, and even contradicts it insofar as it is an illegal abridgement of the right to peace. Thus, according to the UN Charter the right to peace, which is conferred by the fact of membership in the UN, is absolute, and cannot be made dependent on any additional conditions. Like most Security Council resolutions, this resolution is political and not legal. Likewise it is not an authoritative resolution but only a recommendation, since it was taken in the framework of Chapter 6 of the Charter and not of Chapter 7, which alone can impose enforceable obligations.16

Resolution 242 was a political compromise, an outcome of the Cold War, between the Arab states’ demand to return Israel unconditionally to the 1967 borders, which was supported by the Soviet Union, and Israel’s demand to establish full peace with all of the Arab states, which was supported by the United States. The Arabs rejected it completely because it required them to recognize Israel’s right to live within secure and recognized borders, and even to establish a just and lasting peace with Israel involving the “termination of all claims or states of belligerency”. Israel was prepared to accept the resolution so long as it did not require it to withdraw from all of the territories that were taken in the war, but only from part of them. The Israeli interpretation is supported by the interpretations of American politicians who took part in the resolution’s formulation. The latter confirm that the United States decided not to veto the resolution only because it had been formulated to make clear to all that it did not call for a full Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders, but only to secure and
recognized borders as outlined by Pentagon experts.17

Resolution 242, as noted, is fundamentally erroneous because it makes a unique linkage. The right to peace is absolute and is not conditional on anything. Thus to conjoin it with Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders is not only erroneous but indeed unjust, insofar as a prize is given to the aggressor. The moment the right to peace is associated with any condition, those who reject peace gain a bargaining chip, as the Arab-Israeli conflict has demonstrated. In the legal regime that the UN Charter established, no state has the right to reject peace, and any party that rejects peace is the same as a transgressor on the domestic criminal plane. Thus, any discussion of peace in the Israeli-Arab context must be based on undoing the Gordian knot of “territories for peace”.

**Jordan is Arab Palestine**

The right to peace is thus the cornerstone of modern international law, whose constitution is the UN Charter. The right to peace is absolute and cannot be made conditional in any way. Therefore, Resolution 242, which makes Israel’s right to peace conditional on the handing over of territories to the Arabs, has no legal validity. If, then, the Arabs wish to belong to the international community that the Charter has established, they must clearly declare that they repudiate war unconditionally and unequivocally. They must declare that they recognize Israel’s right to exist in secure and recognized borders, without making this conditional on the handing over of any territories. And if the Arabs refuse to do so, they have clearly removed themselves from the fold of the international community, and are no longer entitled to any assistance that this community is authorized to provide.

The question of territorial rights must be examined separately. The difficulty of regulating territorial rights inheres in the fact that it is doubtful whether, since the criminalization of war, international law enables the acquisition of new territories at all. So long as war was legal, it was possible to acquire territories by means of it, and this was regulated by international law. However, from the moment that war was criminalized, there was no place for the acquisition of territories by means of it, and a territorial status quo was created.18

The UN Charter conferred legitimacy on the territorial status quo that prevailed at the time of its establishment, even if it had been achieved by the prior use of force, on the ground that the territorial integrity of states must be strictly maintained (Article 2(4) of the Charter). The Charter finalized the existing borders, subject to the important exception of “states in the making”, which was established by the Mandatory regime of the League of Nations and was subsequently transferred to the UN’s international trusteeship system. Under the force of this regime all the new states of Asia and Africa were established, including the State of Israel, in the territories that had previously been assigned to the rule of the Western powers (the decolonization process). The Charter regulates the creation of new states in a general way, but does not provide solutions for the settlement of territorial conflicts between existing states, nor for the claims of an ethnic minority that was not recognized at the time by the UN.19

In the absence of a positive regulation on the acquisition of new territories, and taking into account the de jure recognition of the borders that existed before the establishment of the Charter — subject to the exception of decolonization — one may assert that there is no further possibility of acquiring new territories. This is particularly so given that territories may not be acquired as a result of the use of force, in light of the Charter’s criminalization of war. That is, indeed, the basis of the preamble of Resolution 242, which asserts the “inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war”. However, even though this statement is generally correct, it is not correct in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In light of the UN Charter’s fundamental distinction between aggression, which is prohibited, and defense, which is permitted, it may be concluded that the acquisition of territory by means of a defensive war is legal, and supersedes the general principle of the territorial status quo as set forth above. This distinction is reinforced by the precedent of Germany, which does not contest its
present borders even though they do not include territories that were in its possession on the eve of World War II. The legal rationale here is the recognition that Germany was the aggressor in that war, whereas Poland and Russia, which gained parts of its territory, were victims. There is support for this position in the legal literature; for instance, Prof. Yoram Dinstein has asserted:

When a state, which was saved by self-defense, emerges victorious from a war, there is no wrong if as a result of its victory it gains part of the territory of the transgressing state; it is forbidden for the transgressor to enjoy the fruits of its crime, but there is nothing illegitimate in the victim of the crime benefiting...the famous Resolution No. 242, of November 1967, of the Security Council of the United Nations Organization, indeed speaks loftily in its Preamble of "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war", but this formulation (which has no authoritative legal validity) essentially confuses the legal status of the criminal and its victim.22

That the Six Day War was a defensive war is not disputed at all in the Israeli legal literature. It is also agreed that a defensive war gives the defending state rights to territories taken as a result of the war. The issue in dispute is how the act of acquisition may be consummated by combining the right to sovereignty with the right to possession in practice. According to Prof. Dinstein, the right to sovereignty can only be realized through the transfer of territory in a peace treaty, as was done in the past, so long as the government of the state that lost part of its territory continues to exist. Prof. Dinstein thus proposed attempting to reach a peace treaty with Jordan so that it would willingly transfer the territories of Judea and Samaria to Israel.21

Prof. Yehuda Tzvi Blum also believes that the proper way to transfer territorial rights between states is by a peace treaty. In his view, however, because of the special circumstances of Judea and Samaria, including the eastern part of Jerusalem, there is no need for a peace treaty to finalize the acquisition of these territories, since Jordan did not have legal rights to them at the time that they were taken as a result of an act of aggression, when such aggression had already been criminalized by international law. On the other hand, Israel was legally granted these territories, by a resolution of the League of Nations, in order to establish in them a Jewish state in all parts of the Land of Israel. Thus, according to Prof. Blum, there is no need for any further act in order to realize Israel's sovereignty over the territories of Mandatory Palestine. The right to sovereignty is antecedent, in this case, to the right to possession, so that once possession was gained, the acquisition of these territories was complete.23

In my opinion, Prof. Blum is correct in asserting that there is no need for any further act in order to combine the right to sovereignty with the right to possession, since the right to sovereignty precedes the right to possession. I disagree only insofar as he concurs with Prof. Dinstein that today the proper way to transfer territories is by peace treaties — since peace treaties, in the era of the criminalization of the use of force, are no longer valid, at least insofar as the transfer of territories in such treaties is concerned, as explained above.23

The Palestinians' claim that they have a right to establish a sovereign state in the territories of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza rest on two legs: (1) UN Assembly Resolution 181, concerning the partition of the western Land of Israel and the establishment of an Arab state alongside a Jewish state; and (2) Resolution 242, concerning Israel's withdrawal to the 1967 borders. This claim can be dismissed outright, without considering it in detail, on the ground that the Palestinians themselves rejected these resolutions at the time, and did all they could to foil them by force. As noted earlier, the Palestinians presented their claims to the UN only after their hopes of physically destroying Israel with the help of the Arab states had been disappointed. It is only to be on the safe side that I shall now examine the Palestinians' claim in detail, and seek to demonstrate that it has no substance, its only purpose being to squeeze Israel into the 1967 borders and subsequently into the 1947 partition borders, as stages on the path to Israel's final destruction when the time is ripe.

I pointed out earlier that Zionism was the only
20th-century political movement that sought to base itself not on force but on international law. At its inception there was not, in fact, a consensus about the course that Zionism should take, with some arguing that it could be realized even without a legal basis, by means of the illegal infiltration of the Land of Israel. However, the mode that ultimately prevailed was that of rational Zionism, which maintained that the acquisition of legal rights, to be guaranteed by international commitments from the powers, was a precondition for any Jewish settlement and for the establishment of a state in the Land of Israel. Thus, at the First Zionist Congress the objectives of Zionism already were defined in terms of international law, formulated as follows: “Zionism aspires to establish a homeland for the people of Israel in the Land of Israel, which will be guaranteed by public law.”

The first international recognition of political Zionism came in the framework of the Palestine Mandate of the League of Nations of July 24, 1922, which adopted the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917, in regard to the “establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people”, and indeed recognized the “historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and...the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country”. Article 5 of the Mandate states that:

The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that no Palestinian territory shall be ceded or leased to, or in any way placed under the control of the Government of any foreign Power.

It clearly emerges from the Mandate’s wording that the intention of its drafters was to establish a Jewish state in the entire territory of Mandatory Palestine; otherwise there would have been no need for Article 5 above. On the other hand, the authors of the Mandate were well aware of the existence of non-Jewish residents in the Land of Israel, thus emphasizing:

It being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.25

From the standpoint of international law, the Palestine Mandate is the authoritative legal source in regard to rights of sovereignty over the Land of Israel. It is instructive that three years earlier the Balfour Declaration was sympathetically received not only by the Western powers but also by the person who saw himself as the leader of the Arabs, Amir Feisal. In the Feisal-Weizmann agreement of January 3, 1919, Feisal recognized the Jewish people’s national aspirations and right to establish a Jewish state in the territory of the Land of Israel. The agreement speaks not only of vigorous cooperation in the development of the region, but also of Jewish immigration “on a wide scale” and the rapid settlement of the immigrants on the land in “dense settlement”.26 The Zionist enterprise won broad sympathy in the League of Nations almost up to the latter’s demise, notwithstanding the fact that Iran was one of its founders and that during this period four additional Muslim states joined it one after the other — Turkey and Iraq (1932), Afghanistan (1934), and Egypt (1937). Only in September 1937 did a radical change begin in these states’ stance toward Zionism, against the background of the 1936 disturbances in Palestine.27 Britain, too, showed sympathy for the Zionist enterprise up to 1939, when it suddenly shifted its posture as a result of growing Arab pressure.

Up to the mid-1930s, the establishment of an Arab state in the western part of Mandatory Palestine was in no way considered. On the contrary, the establishment of an Arab state in the territory east of the Jordan River, under the rule of Emir Abdullah, was intended to solve simultaneously the problem of the Palestinians. That Jordan was a Palestinian state was not questioned at all, except when the Palestinians in the western Land of Israel began to demand a state of their own. All partition plans that were proposed, beginning with the Peel Commission of 1937, manifestly contradicted what was stated in Article 5 of the Palestine Mandate, which unequivocally rejected the establishment of an additional state in the Mandatory territory, especially since most of this territory had been awarded to Transjordan. Political Zionism accepted the partition plans, which dealt a harsh blow to the Jewish people’s original rights in the Land of Israel, only out of awareness of the regional balance of power, which at that time favored the Arabs.
Similarly, Zionism accepted Partition Resolution 181 of the UN General Assembly, of November 1947, only because there was no alternative, especially in light of the need to solve immediately the problem of the Holocaust survivors in Europe.

The Palestinians' right to a state in addition to the one across the Jordan (which received independence in 1946), as recognized in UN Resolution 181, was controversial in itself, since it was bestowed on the Palestinians in contradiction to the original Mandate of 1922, which the UN had undertaken to fulfill in Article 80 of its Charter. However, the Palestinians, from the moment that they rejected Resolution 181 and chose to attack Israel, aided by Arab states, with the intent to destroy it, lost this right — on the basis of the general principle of "Right cannot grow from injustice," and "The sinner must not be rewarded."

While relying on the short memory of world public opinion, the Palestinians tend to forget the fact that in 1921, Mandatory Palestine was already partitioned in two, and in its eastern part, what was called the "Emirate of Transjordan" was set up, which was designed not only to fulfill the commitments Britain had made to Emir Abdullah during the First World War but also to allocate land for the Palestine Arabs across the Jordan River. Likewise, the Palestinians tend to forget the fact that in 1949 Transjordan annexed the territories of Judea and Samaria, and even changed its name to "the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan" so as to emphasize that both banks of the Jordan were now included in its territory. The Palestinians also tend to muddle the fact that, for twenty years after their right to a state was recognized in 1967, they did not see fit to do anything so as to realize it. On the contrary, from the time of the Kingdom of Jordan's annexation of the territories of Judea and Samaria, the Palestinian residents did not at all feel themselves to be occupied but rather as having been liberated by their country, which, indeed, immediately granted them Jordanian citizenship. The Palestinians not only regarded themselves as Jordanian citizens in every way but indeed played an active and dominant role in Palestinian life in Jordan, including at the level of members of Parliament and government ministers. Only after the Six Day War did the Palestinians of Judea and Samaria suddenly awaken and begin to demand the implementation of Resolutions 242 and 181.

The Palestinians' claim that not only 181 but also Resolution 242 accords them rights is entirely baseless, since Resolution 242 is not only invalid in itself, as explained above, but in fact irrelevant to the Palestinian context. The Palestinians cannot rely on 242 because it has nothing to do with them. The adoption of Resolution 242 by the Oslo agreements is a fundamental error that this article seeks to correct. To begin with, the Oslo agreements ascribe authoritative legal validity to a resolution of a political nature, even though this contravenes international law. Second, they enlist an erroneous resolution in an erroneous context.

Resolution 242 pertains only to Israel's relations with Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, its direct adversaries in the Six Day War, and not to the Palestinians, who at that time had the status of an ethnic minority and/or refugees, but not of a state or even a "state in the making". At the time that Resolution 242 was enacted, no recognized Palestinian political entity existed, not even a "state in the making". This is borne out by the fact that the Resolution's wording makes no mention whatsoever of such a right. On the other hand, Resolution 242 calls for "achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem", together with the need for "guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area". The Resolution's wording makes it clear that at the time there was no intention to support the establishment of a Palestinian state in western Palestine, but rather to solve the problem of the refugees in a humanitarian fashion. That is why, of course, the Palestinians rejected Resolution 242, just as they rejected Resolution 181 earlier even though it was superior from their standpoint. The Oslo agreements are thus fundamentally invalid in being a product of the use of force, which is prohibited by Article 52 of the Law of Treaties, and indeed are worthy of nullification because they are erroneously based on Resolution 242, which is legally invalid and irrelevant to the Palestinian context.

The Palestinians already have, thus, a state of their own — the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan —
where they in fact constitute the majority. This has been officially expressed in statements by government officials in Jordan — “Palestine is Jordan, Jordan is Palestine,” as the Jordanian crown prince put it on February 2, 1970 — and even by top Palestinian leaders. According to international law, the Palestinians realized their right to self-determination with the establishment of the Kingdom of Jordan, and hence there is no basis to their claim of deprivation. Support for this position may be found in the statements of Prof. Julius Stone, an internationally known expert in the field of international law.

According to any accepted interpretation of the principle of self-determination, there is therefore no doubt, that since 1948, Jordan has been a Palestinian state...the Palestinian Arabs already have a homeland in Jordan...the claim that Israel’s existence deprives the Palestinians of a national home is therefore an erroneous claim...it is strange that the UN Secretariat, which ostensibly deals with the clarification of international law, disseminates these claims without any examination or distinction.  

It is indeed true that the reins of power in Jordan are held by the Hashemite dynasty, which represents the Bedouin minority in the country, but in this regard Jordan is no different from most of the Arab states, in which a minority rules over a majority. In Syria, the Ba’ath Party rules, its members belonging to the Alawite community, which forms a minority of the Syrian population. In Iraq as well, the Ba’ath Party rules, its members belonging to the Sunni community, which forms a minority of the Iraqi population. The fact that to a certain extent the Palestinians are deprived in Jordan does not grant them the right to an additional state, but rather to a constitutional change within Jordan. Thus it is indicative that despite Jordan’s being a Palestinian state by every criterion of international law, this fact does not receive recognition from the UN, which for years has submitted to Arab pressure and mendacious Arab rhetoric.

The truth, of course, is that the Palestinians are not at all interested in an additional separate Palestinian state in itself, but view this in terms of pan-Arab unity, which will put an end not only to the State of Israel but also to the artificial Arab political entities that were established by dint of international law. On this point, Palestinian nationalism does not differ from the other extreme nationalist movements in the Arab states which seek to put an end to the territorial fragmentation that the Western powers imposed on them. Thus, immediately after the Palestinians are granted a state in the territories of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, they will — unless Israel moves quickly to prevent it — begin a military and political offensive whose goal will be Israel’s destruction. After that goal is achieved (to repeat, unless Israel moves quickly to prevent it), there will be no further need for a separate Palestine, but rather for integration with “the great Arab nation,” the modern heir of the vanished caliphate. All of this is not whispered in secrecy behind closed doors, but spelled out plainly in the Palestinian Covenant, which was drafted early in 1964 and revised at the Cairo conference of July 1968. The Arabs have often reiterated these points, and there may be no more precise formulation of the real face of Palestinian nationalism than the statements of Zuhair Muhsein, head of the terrorist Saika organization:

The Palestinian people does not exist. The establishment of a Palestinian state is a means to the continuation of the struggle against Israel and for Arab unity...in truth, there are no Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians, and Lebanese. All belong to the Arab people.

Thus, as noted earlier, Palestinian nationalism is not only based on force but is a false parody of Jewish nationalism, created as an antithesis to political Zionism. To ensure the continued realization of Zionism in the third millennium, Israel must strive for peace with the Arab states on the basis of the UN Charter, with no need for any additional peace treaties with these states — such treaties being, from the standpoint of the Charter, superfluos, and from the standpoint of the Law of Treaties, in fact illegal. To the extent that bilateral agreements are necessary, it is not for the purpose of ending the state of war between Israel and the Arab states but so as to create positive bilateral
relations in political, economic, and cultural domains.

At the same time, the State of Israel must do everything in its capacity to prevent the establishment of an additional independent Palestinian state in the territory west of the Jordan River. It must act in the spirit of the principles of international law as well as those of the original Palestine Mandate, which made the creation of the Jewish National Home clearly dependent on the condition that “nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.” The rights of the Palestinians, in the territories of the Land of Israel, should be determined in the framework of Israel's constitutional law, ensuring both their individual and collective freedom, but without relinquishing sovereignty over the entire area of Mandatory Palestine to the west of the Jordan River.

Israel, as a sovereign state, must transfer as many rights as possible to the Palestinian Authority, while at the same time retaining the residual rights of sovereignty, including and especially the following: complete control over internal and external security; complete control over entry and exit to outside of its borders, while ensuring the continuation of the immigration to Israel on the one hand and the rejection of the Palestinian invasion of the “right of return” on the other hand; complete control over the acquisition of properties in its sovereign territory, while ensuring the continuation of Jewish settlement in the entire area of the Land of Israel, but without harming the natural development of Palestinian settlements in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza; and complete control over all natural resources in its territory, and particularly water sources. If Israel does not act in this way, it will find itself facing not only a new White Paper in a Palestinian edition that will put an end to the glorious Jewish settlement of over a century, but an existential danger to the state.

Epilogue

The international posture that will be adopted in the upcoming period toward the Arab-Israeli conflict as a whole and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular may have fateful implications, not only for the future of the parties to the conflict but also for that of international law and its institutions. Modern international law and its institutions came into being after the First World War as a result of the United States' intervention in the war, which led not only to the victory over Germany and its allies but to the establishment of a new world order as well, centered on the recognition of the various nations' right to self-determination in the form of political sovereignty. Until that time, the world had been organized on the basis of loyalty to the dynastic monarchy and to religious institutions rather than to the nation. The monarchy was the single unifying principle of these multiracial empires and the only guarantee of any order, even if it came at the price of the freedom of the masses, both as individuals and as groups with ethnic identities. International law, in other words, lacked its main, fundamental unit: the nation-state. The traditional interstate law could not really be called “international law” because it regulated the relations only of a few European powers, all of which were multinational.

The great flowering of international law and its institutions — the most important of which was the League of Nations — occurred in the 1920s, after which it began to disintegrate. The rise of Nazi Germany signified the end of international law and the reversion to the old world order, in which international relations were based on force rather than equality. The defeat of Nazi Germany gave renewed momentum to international law and its institutions, with the creation of the United Nations and the basing of the world order on the UN Charter, whose most important principles are the criminalization of war and the recognition of equality among nations. However, the UN did not have even the brief grace period that its predecessor, the League of Nations, enjoyed. Immediately after its establishment, the UN became involved in the Cold War, which made it and its Charter almost irrelevant to international life.

During the Cold War period, the UN was disdained as a recourse. For decades the international organization was in fact paralyzed, serving as
an arena for demagogy and empty propaganda rather than political action. The Security Council was neutralized on most important issues, and the General Assembly was dominated by the demagogy of the Third World states. The UN’s failure to implement its declared objective — the establishment of a general security system — stemmed, first and foremost, from the superpowers’ unwillingness to support the organization. Because of the enmity between them, and indeed despite their great military power, the United States and the Soviet Union were almost impotent. The Arab states, like other Third World states, found room to maneuver in the vacuum created by the inter bloc anarchy, and did all in their power to destroy the State of Israel. In the Cold War period, international relations were regulated by crude military power rather than international law, as in history in general.

Once the Cold War ended, international law was no longer regarded as an imperialist tool to gain advantages for the West but as a legitimate instrument for regulating international relations. International law, which up to the late 1980s was regarded only as quasi-law because it was unenforceable in the international arena, has more recently become genuine law, in the sense that we ascribe to domestic law. The historical gap between international law and domestic law is closing, as the major political interests and forces in the world recognize the value of the former and are prepared to endorse it. The UN has suddenly grown teeth and begun to bite. International law has ceased to be a virtuous aspiration and is becoming a strong and definite interest of the entire industrialized North. The international community’s intervention in the second Gulf War in the early 1990s (the first was the one between Iraq and Iran in the 1980s) was the first foretaste of what was likely to ensue in the future whenever consensus was attained in the industrialized North. This, the first crisis on an international scale since the end of the Cold War, demonstrated that where there is agreement among the powers, international law can be imposed on whoever violates it, such as Saddam Hussein. It became clear that Iraq, which saw itself as “the march of God across the nations” (in the words of Friedrich Hegel) and its leader as the son of the gods, was no more than a territorial corporation with a director-general at its head, and that when it violated international law the international community could intervene against it, much as the nation-state can intervene against lawbreakers within the sphere of its jurisdiction. Although this intervention was not done out of abstract considerations of justice but because of economic and political interests, its legitimacy derived from international law.

The history of political Zionism overlaps to a great extent with the history of modern international law and its institutions. The first international recognition of Zionism as a political movement, and of its penetration into the Middle East, was attained as a result of the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the entry of the British into the region. The Balfour Declaration and its adoption by the League of Nations were only made possible by accordance with the political outlook of Britain and the United States, one of whose main elements was modern international law. Similarly, the UN resolution in favor of Israel’s establishment would not have been possible without the short honeymoon between the Soviet Union and the United States, just before the Cold War began. Today, in the aftermath of the Cold War, political Zionism can open a new page in its history if it is perspicacious enough to make use of international law, and even contribute to its development. The change that is required today is one of principles and not of technicalities. If the UN clings to resolutions of a pronounced political character that are fruits of the Cold War, such as Resolution 242, it will not be able to promote international law, on whose basis it arose and continues to exist. If, however, it changes its ways and adopts resolutions of a legal-moral character, founded on the principle that “Right cannot grow from injustice,” then it has a bright future ahead of it. Then the longed-for Copernican revolution in international relations will occur, changing world politics from power-based to law-based: law will no longer revolve around power, but power around law, power in the service of international law.
The conventional international interpretation of the Palestinian struggle against Israel holds that the PLO has abandoned its zero-sum strategy in favor of accommodation with the Jewish state. It is accepted that from the 1964 charter that called for "the liberation of Palestine" and the 1974 decision choosing "the phases method", the PLO haltingly yet consistently turned to limit its goals and recognize its Zionist adversary. This is considered to be the significance of the Palestinian Declaration of Independence in 1988 with its reference to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 (1947), which was designed to partition Palestine into two states, one Arab and one Jewish; so too regarding the wide-spread PLO campaign calling for a two-state solution to the conflict rather than the advocacy of "one democratic state in Palestine", and the culmination of this Palestinian political trend with the signing of the Oslo agreement in 1993 that committed the PLO to "peaceful coexistence" with Israel and recognition of its "legitimate [and] political rights". This is briefly the encapsulation of "the Palestinian peace strategy" with a renunciation of two-thirds of the homeland and acceptance therein of the reality of a Jewish state.\(^1\) The ostensible abrogation of the PLO Charter in Gaza in December 1998, or minimally those articles which contradict the peace policy with Israel, was seen as the final public Palestinian act in the name of rapprochement, no less the fulfillment of Yasser Arafat's commitment to Prime Minister Rabin on September 9, 1993. Therefore, the future founding of a full-fledged Palestinian state would allegedly not endanger Israel but peacefully co-exist alongside her.

This interpretation of contemporary Palestinian strategy presupposes the independent validity of political decisions and regional diplomacy as a mechanism for Israel-Palestinian conflict-resolution and peace making. It also posits the authenticity of a fundamental change in the political thinking of the "Palestine Liberation Organization" despite the glaring fact that the name of the PLO itself posits a clear and absolute purpose to the contrary of the purported peaceful transformation in PLO policy.

With this in mind, we must consider that the idea of fixed goals, unalterable values, and frozen patterns of thought varies from, and is rejected by, the modern Enlightenment conviction in liberty, human reason, and intellectual openness. Darwin posited change, Kant reason, Comte universalistic rationalism, and Spencer evolution, in the spirit of the innate flexibility of the mind and progress of mankind. Breaking with tradition and liberating old thinking were sweeping Enlightenment themes, and that dénارche seemed to resonate within the radical innovation in Palestinian speech and praxis in the 1980s-1990s.

However, thought considered in its continuity and the resilience of older "mental habits" offer an alternative conception of the past connected to the present in creating and conserving human identity. Levi-Strauss analyzed "structuralism in thought" and Foucault probed "the archeology of knowledge": the apprehension of the world — itself the action of a collectivity — was a product of socialization
(perhaps fossilization). The mind works by absorbing and retaining the past and thereby transcribing it into the present, as Freud theorized, and the historian Dilthey posited in his comprehension of meaning as fundamentally drawn from the past. People thus utilize ancient mental materials as a regular and central mode of thinking and action. This approach evolves from J.G. Frazer’s classic study of myth and religion in The Golden Bough, likewise in Evans-Pritchard’s notion of the “function of culture as a whole to unite individual human beings into more or less stable social structures”. Repetition in language and thought, seen perhaps as a pathological blockage in Nietzschean terms, becomes a reservoir for stability, continuity, and identity in a world pregnant with dislocating changes.

Pierre Bourdieu in his sociological investigations questions the validity of abstract rationalism and, like Foucault, recognizes older codes of social discourse as the mental context for durable patterns of thought and culture. Accepted social conceptions, called the “doxa”, channel the thinking and self-image of people. Individuals do not alone and autonomously fashion themselves, but are bound by a kind of cultural geneticism and familial genealogy to the past. Tradition, not modernity, is the axis of their identity in history.

Our examination of the Palestinians and the acclaimed PLO political alteration draws upon an “anti-modernist” critique which will consider Islamic and Arab discourse as enveloped within a meta-language of cultural tradition untainted by Enlightenment presuppositions and prejudices. A protean Koranic mind-set and rigorous Arab character definitively contain the past, and prevent change. The relevant social categories and historical institutions include the Muslim religious community and mandates for leadership, clan affinity and genealogical lists, that together serve as transmitters of the authorized, sanctified knowledge and accepted modes of actions.

The PLO, acculturated by and within its native environment, is a product of its cultural creators and a reflection of them in modern times. Being in modern times but not of modernity constitutes the springboard for this analysis, which is armed with an appreciation of the extraordinary difficulty, perhaps impossibility, for the PLO ever truly to renounce its covenant which was festively annulled, although not formally, in Gaza in late 1998. For the “truth” is not a product of reason and freedom; rather, it is a sacred dogma, beyond the right or liberty of anyone, who is a living link in the chain of the uninterrupted continuum of approved knowledge, to alter.

**Islam, Arafat, and the Palestinian Jihad**

Islam is a monotheistic religion expounded in the early seventh-century by the Muslim prophet Muhammad and centered in Mecca the holy city. Its message was universal and obligatory, its tactics intrigue and war, its goals civilization and conquest. Muhammad broke the Pact of Hudaibya of 628 that he had made with the Qureish Meccans, when his military capabilities had become adequate for further warfare; so too, his Muslim warriors raided even in the sacred month. Competition, rules of domination, and hierarchy — not egalitarianism and cooperation — constitute the building-blocks of Islam’s attitude to the world. This is central in the doctrine of *jihad*: war to transform the *dar-al-harb* (domain of war with infidels) into the *dar-al-Islam* (domain of Islam). War exists until the former becomes the latter, when truth eliminates untruth, justice overcomes injustice, and Islam reigns supreme and achieves peace throughout the world.

The Koranic attitude toward Jews is explicit and predominantly negative. Rejecting the prophetic claim of Muhammad, the Jews were defined as the enemies of Islam and its revelation. “Shame and misery were stamped upon them and they incurred the wrath of God” (Sura 2:61) serves as the categorical theological and historical statement for Muslim animosity toward the Jewish people. Muhammad himself, in his violent treatment of the Arabian Jews in the vicinity of Medina and specifically at Khaybar, left no doubt that Islam would arise as Judaism would decline and perhaps disappear.

Yasser Arafat bears a profound personal Muslim identity and Islamic consciousness. His father was an active member of the Muslim Brotherhood organization and his maternal family included the militant Haj Amin al-Husseini. The name chosen in
the late 1950s for Arafat’s new and radical Palestinian movement was Fath (Fateh) that indicates “a war for Islam”. His underground nom de guerre Abu Ammar, by which he is called and referred to until today by Palestinians and other Arabs, draws upon the formative period of Islamic history. One of Muhammad’s early and dedicated followers was Ammar bin Yasser, and Arafat decided to adopt Yasser as his personal name, no less that of Abu Ammar as his nickname, and thereby bind the Palestinian revolution to the origins of Islam.

Muhammad’s pilgrimage sermon prior to his death in 632 took place at Mount Arafat outside of Mecca. The “Arafat sermon” then and later further provides the symbolic connection between Arafat and Islam, as the PLO leader has been sermonizing for decades on Palestinian national rights and the evil of Zionism.7

The centerpiece of Arafat’s Islamic policy vision is the ultimate demotion of Israeli Jews to lowly “Arab Jews” (al-Yahud al-’Arab). This necessitates their subjugation and perhaps the elimination of such turbulent dhimmis (tolerated infidels) to the lowest rung in a future democratic Palestine.8 The likes of this goal Arafat sketched out in his address to the UN General Assembly in November 1974. But this overlooks the obvious scenario whereby the developments leading up to a single state of Palestine and Israel’s destruction would involve the flight and death of the Jews of Israel, if indeed “the liberation of Palestine” would occur; just as the idyllic image of Muslim/non-Muslim coexistence ignores the long and bitter historical record of Jewish humiliation and decimation under Muslim rule in Morocco, Egypt, Yemen, Iraq, and other Muslim lands.9

These constants in mind and history constitute the political repertoire of Yasser Arafat in the struggle against the Jewish people and Israel. In his famous address in a Johannesburg mosque in May 1994, the PLO leader did not only call for “jihad for Jerusalem” but made explicit reference, in addition, to the Hudaibiya agreement. Muhammad, having violated that agreement, offers very conclusive Islamic evidence and a mighty precedent for Arafat’s similar intention not to comply with the Oslo agreement. The historical code-language employed by Arafat would not be lost on any informed Muslim audience.

Another example of Palestinian Islamic discourse vis-à-vis the Jews concerns the Khaybar massacre of 628 and its use as a powerful rhythmic refrain during the years of the intifada from 1987 to 1992. The Arab chant taunted the Jews with: “Khaybar Khaybar Ya Yahud, leish Muhammad Sauf Ya’ud” (Khaybar Khaybar Oh Jews, Muhammad’s army will return.).10 This conveyed the Islamic religious dimension of the Jewish-Muslim confrontation as did the existence, nomenclature, and ideology of the two key Palestinian Islamic groups: Islamic Jihad and Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement). The Hamas covenant of August 1988 summarized its doctrine as follows:

Allah is its target, the Prophet is its model, the Koran its constitution, Jihad its path, and death for the sake of Allah is the loftiest of its wishes (Article 8).

When all is said and done, the war of Islam against Israel was not, as some assumed, the basis of an ideological rift between the religious and secular elements in the Palestinian political community. In fact, Arafat and the PLO were no less grounded in the substance and symbolism of traditional faith than their more explicit and forthright believing brothers. Immediately after the victorious return of Ayatollah Khumayni to Teheran on February 2, 1979, which consummated the Islamic Revolution and launched the Islamic Republic, Arafat arrived in Iran and declared: “We shall fight together as one Muslim nation.” Islam was cast as the glue for unity and the solution for success in Palestine. Since Palestinian television began broadcasting in 1995, it has had as its logo the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem, on its masthead a portrait of Arafat, and its opening program incorporates Koranic reading and Islamic discussion.

**Culture and Politics in the Palestinian Campaign**

The complex of culture incorporates ideas and attitudes, and mores and modes of action as the natural form and substance of a specific people or society. Culture is native and coherent, binding its
members in a shared universe of meaning and behavior. Together, the various and multiple strands of culture constitute a code for the "insiders" in their communication one with another. Outsiders can, with difficulty, comprehend or accept an alien culture's code.

The Bedouin ethos of hospitality, born of a lawless environment, meager resources, and nomadic hardship, is a positive and comforting Arab characteristic that Westerners have encountered with delight, both in the desert and urban settings. But St. John Philby of Arabian desert fame, known for his great empathy for the Bedouin, his friendship with the Saudi regime, and his own conversion to Islam no less, reported that Bedouins once shot at him because he did not enter their camp to enjoy their hospitality.11

The artful practice of deceit, intrigue, and the use of the ruse, are notorious yet creative and colorful attributes in Arab behavior. But it was utterly inconceivable for A.W. Kinglake, who sojourned to the East in 1834-35, to imagine that Bedouin guards who were accompanying his party across the Sinai desert would suddenly lie about the terms of the agreement between them. However, his native Eastern dragoman (interpreter) clarified for him that Bedouin audacity and cunning were exploiting his naiveté and innate softness of character.12 Only thereafter did Kinglake begin to unlock the Arab culture-code.

Other perceptive Europeans were more easily convinced. It seems that in the Arab East "truth was quite unknown," as British diplomat John Barker experienced the region in the early nineteenth-century.13 P.J. Baldensperger, visiting the area of Judea (Palestine) in the late nineteenth-century, offered a more delicate formulation for the verbal mendacity of the native inhabitants: "These people would not call themselves liars for putting facts in a way to serve their own ends."14

The instances and tales of subtle deceit by concealing true intentions are both legion and legendary in Arab and Muslim history. The Umayyad Caliph Mu'awiya in seventh-century Syria planned a remarkably sophisticated and staged stratagem to trap an unsuspecting Byzantine victim.15 In 1173 Ayyub, the father of Saladin, the holy warrior of Islam, affected a pose of advising submission against Nur al-Din, the Zangi suzerain in Damascus.16 And the Turkish Sultan Mehmet II prepared to confront Byzantium in battle in 1453 by making truces with Venice, Hungary, Wallachia, and Bosnia — or as the historian Edward Gibbon wrote: "Peace was on his lips, while war was in his heart."17 Al-Jabarti, the Egyptian chronicler transmitted the perfect ruse whereby one "would murder his victim and later join his funeral procession."18

For its part, the Palestinian strategy of success has utilized the terminology that conforms to Western expectations and accords with moral and political norms. The advocacy in the 1970s of one "single democratic state in Palestine" was indicative of non-genocidal discourse for Israel's dissolution.19 The demand for "self-determination" sounds legitimate and reasonable although it is, as pointed out by Sami al-Atari, the Secretary of the PLO Central Committee in 1978, "identical with the destruction of Israel".20 The demand for "refugee return" is grounded in United Nations resolutions, while it too is designed to emasculate and dissolve the Jewish state by the influx of many hundreds of thousands of Palestinian returnees. In making peace with Israel in 1993, Yasser Arafat soundly demanding both Palestinian "self-determination" and "the right of return", was artfully playing the role, it might seem, of the murderer in al-Jabarti's aphorism.

At every opportunity and signing ceremony in Washington, Arafat has declared Palestinian commitment to peace in accord with the PLO's adoption of the peace strategy. At the White House on September 13, 1993, he declared that "the battle for peace is the most difficult of our lives." However the language of *jihad* remains as always the mental prism of Arafat's vision. This was the case, as in 1970 in Beirut, when he addressed the Palestinians with the message of "we must fight a holy war (*jihad*) against the Zionist enemy." Arafat broadcast the same message of war through the years after 1993. At a rally in Gaza in November 1994 he said that "our people will continue its *jihad.*" Addressing a rally in Hebron in February 1995 he declared: "Our people is a people of sacrifice, struggle, and *jihad.*" Speaking at a rally at Deheisheh near Bethlehem in
October 1996, he declared that “we know only one word, jihad, jihad, jihad.”

The West and Israel have lived in a world of trance as the Palestinians have deftly juggled the language of war and peace, mouthing their verbal commitments while in essence violating them. From the first Oslo agreement to Wye Plantation, the PLO-PA (Palestinian Authority) has consistently refused to limit the police forces to the prescribed number, to disarm terrorist organizations, to extradite murderers of Israelis, and to stop anti-Israeli propaganda and incitement to violence. Arafat’s culture-code tactic conforms to the “Fahdiaw” personality portrait proposed by Dr. Hamid Ammar for the clever person: that is, to convey “a readiness to express superficial agreement and fleeting amiability which is meant to conceal the situation and his true feelings”.

The war-and-peace strategy allows Arafat to talk of peace but prepare for war, while his Israeli partner offers territories and guns in quest of accommodation and security. This utopian experiment wins concessions and lulls the protagonist with the dream of peace.

The insightful Richard Burton, who journeyed through the Middle East a century and a half ago, related the following Arab proverb: “Conceal thy tenets, thy treasure, and thy traveling.” Burton chose precaution by not revealing his destination in the intrigue- and treachery-filled Muslim lands. Arafat has at times chosen to hide his tenets while traveling toward the liberation of Palestine.

The Palestinian advance and assault on Israel bears the tradition-tried Bedouin virtues of endurance (sabr) and saber-rattling raiding (ghazzia) as terrorism hunts and haunts unsuspecting Israeli civilian victims on buses, in the market-places, and on the roads. From the sociological studies of Ibn Khaldun to Henri Lammens, the Arab fighters have been typed as more audacious and impudent than brave. Palestinian suicide bombers have added a fanatic Islamic touch to the war with Israel, killing some 300 people since the Oslo signing, while paradise awaits the martyrs who obliterate the Jews.

The hallowed political slogan of “territories for peace”, emblazoned in UN Security Resolution 242 from November 22, 1967 and the core of the peace formula between Israel and the PLO, may now be renamed, “territories for terrorism”.

Ambiguity in Palestinian Rhetoric

The two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conundrum serves as the definitive political proposal to resolve the conflict. It has been advocated since the late 1980s by prominent PLO personalities like Abu Iyad, Bassam Abu-Sharif, Ziad Abu Zayyad, and by Yasser Arafat himself. The Oslo peace process as conceived in PLO circles will lead to a Palestinian state and Israel will believe, writes Maimon Noth, a member of the Palestine National Council in 1998, that this is the final solution to the conflict. But the PLO considers the Palestinian state not the end of the conflict, but a vital stage to further the struggle against the constricted and withering remaining Jewish state.

At the core of the PLO terminological ambiguity lies the juxtaposition of language: as an inclusive tool within defined cultural frontiers for generating cohesion and a common universe of meaning for the “family” within, and the parallel and contrasting use of language as exclusive to the foreign audience that is beyond the legitimate perimeter of in-group solidarity. Arafat will refer to Israel by name and identify peace as the mode of conflict-resolution when speaking in international forums. Arafat’s rhetoric and that of his PA media and spokesmen will however differ markedly before Palestinian audiences. Palestinian television will routinely equate Israelis with the Crusaders, who were ultimately defeated by the Muslims during the Middle Ages, and label Israel “the Zionist enemy.” Broad and categorical defamation of Israel as racist, fascist, and Nazi-like have filled the written and electronic Palestinian media since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority regime by Yasser Arafat. In this respect, the language of the PLO covenant in Article 22 continues to delineate the structure of attitudes toward Israel in the period of peacemaking.

The use of political double-talk is standard rhetorical practice in regimes with a clear agenda for control and conquest. This is also part of the theatrical form of Arafat’s own appearance, sporting
a kafiyya on his head and a gun on his hip, with an image that hardly conforms to the moderate peacemaker he has allegedly become.

Central to the Palestinian strategy of rhetorical and policy ambiguity are the terms “state” and “revolution”. These two ideas have represented a dialectical tension in history as in the cases of France and the Soviet Union after their revolutions, or Egypt after the 1952 revolution. In Israel’s case, the Herzlian and Zionist goal of statehood blocked any further impetus for a continuous revolution in territorial terms. But in the Palestinian case, the evidence points to revolution, that is the liberation of all of Palestine, as the final goal which will traverse the period of statehood to full victory. The PLO organizational badge bears the fitting motto: “revolution until liberation”.

The PLO’s historical experience as a liberation movement provides a collective consciousness for full victory and the elimination or utter defeat of the enemy. Born as a Third World movement for national liberation, Fatah and later the PLO identified with the FLN Algerian struggle against French colonialism, the Vietnamese war against American imperialism, and the South African campaign against white racism. Meeting Nelson Mandela in Cairo in 1990, Arafat declared, “We’re in the same trench.”

It is the Vietnam model in particular which seems to have guided the path of PLO strategy, because the Palestinians were not only inspired by guerrilla war tactics from Southeast Asia but also by political tactics of pliancy and subterfuge. The PLO learned from the Vietnamese that signing agreements, like the Geneva Accords of 1954 and the Paris Accords of 1973, would facilitate but not block the dogged advance to complete victory. Thus the “mini-state” approach, as an embryonic fetus within the 1993 Oslo Accords, would galvanize Palestinian revolutionary energies, while atrophying the spirit and eroding the will of Israel. Peacemaking, in essence, was not a matter of principle but practicality. And as South Vietnam and Saigon fell in 1975 following the Paris Accords, so would Israel and Jerusalem fall following the Oslo Accords of 1993 according to this subtle revolutionary and political model of victory.

When Arafat addressed the UN General Assembly in 1974, he made a dramatic gesture that in one hand he held the olive branch and in the other the freedom fighter’s gun. He concluded his remarks with the phrase: “It is in Palestine that peace will be born.” By laying the guilt for the conflict on Israel’s shoulders, and threatening a violent response if Israel would not surrender or be compelled to surrender by the international community (read: the United States), Arafat demonstrated his dexterous capacity for bellicosity couched in a pose of goodwill.

The Palestinians have basically never given up their aspiration for achieving their end through any means and methods available. In 1989 Faisal al-Husseini, a prominent Palestinian responsible for Jerusalem in the name of the Palestinian Authority, intimated the preference for the unity of Palestine, rather than a two-state solution as conventionally advocated. Nabil Sha’ath, the Minister for International Cooperation in the PA, was emphatic in stating in 1992 that:

...nothing that we [the Palestinians] will sign now will preempt our right to negotiate the right of return, or full political rights to self-determination, and our right to an independent state.

These demands together would emasculate the Jewish state.

Some Palestinian leaders abandoned any last shred of circumspection to the wind. Arafat himself reportedly stated in a closed session with Arab diplomats in Europe on January 30, 1996, that the aim was nothing less than “to eliminate the State of Israel and establish a purely Palestinian one”. This would be achieved through the mechanisms of refugee return and psychological warfare which would result in massive Jewish flight from Israel. A thunderous demographic revolution would lead to Israel’s demise.

George Habash, the leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), who officially opposed the Oslo process, did not nevertheless deny its great advantage for the on-going struggle. “I am in favor of a Palestinian state at this stage,” he said in 1998, and this because he wanted all of Palestine. “All of it!” he added for emphasis.
support the establishment of a (mini) Palestinian state is not a moderate concession of that part of Palestine (i.e. Israel) not included within its borders. This is not Palestinian surrender but Palestinian strategy to get what is for getting now and demand the rest later.

While the question of whether or not the PLO/PA/PNC (Palestine National Council) had or had not amended/abandoned the charter at Gaza in December 1998 remained an open political issue, the Fateh constitution in the same month was unaltered, bold in its language and objective. We should recall that Arafat had with colleagues founded Fateh in 1957 and headed the movement even before he took over the chairmanship of the PLO itself. Article 5 of the Fateh Essential Principles states that “liberating Palestine [not parts of Palestine] is a national obligation,” while positing in Article 8 that “the Israeli existence in Palestine is a Zionist invasion.” The Palestinian national revolution aspires in Article 12 of Fateh Goals to the “complete liberation of Palestine and eradication of Zionist economic, political, military, and cultural existence.”

The Fateh constitution serves to highlight the fact, that whether the PNC amended the PLO charter or not, the Palestinian strategy which employs the intermittent dissonant ambiguity of rhetorical tactics continues to pursue the liberation of all of Palestine and nothing less than that.

Concluding Thoughts and a Conceptual Revolution

In “tokens of higher and lower culture”, Nietzsche recognized that habitual and undiscoverable principles contribute to a living sense of community. The individual is subordinated to the group and all the individuals acquire a firmness of character. But this stability, he adds, produces stupidity as the possibility for spiritual regeneration, for creativity and change is aborted without the role of daring people who introduce new ideas and forms of behavior into the life of a society.

An ethnographic and cultural study of the Palestinians could elucidate their coherent character, harmonious within their social structures and political norms. With patriarchal authoritarian leadership, preferential cousin marriage patterns, and disciplined religious faith, this Arab community rigorously preserves its identity and coherency. The Palestinian mental universe is a virtually closed intellectual structure, but this is not so much based on a rigid modern nationalistic consciousness and political unanimity. For the deeper sources of the Palestinian popular narrative and political experience rest upon anthropology more than nationality. Palestinian ideology, in short, is a modern expression of a “tribal” collectivism.

A synthetic tribal existence collates religion and culture, and language and politics, in an ensemble of shared beliefs and rites. The tribe is impervious to the outside world — and this is part of its primitive quality and strength — and has no emotional or practical need for it. Moreover, such an immutable and authentic Palestinian community considers the outside world, in this case the modern West, and its Mideastern Israeli embodiment, an alien force which threatens the inner harmony and coherence of the community's life.

At root, the PLO is a traditional community which rejects the West and its baggage of Enlightenment civilization with fanatical resistance, in order to maintain the tribe's identity and cohesion. Terrorism, blackmail, and fundamentalism feature prominently as the means to stave off the universalizing "end of history" from the tribal habitat.

The Arab world as a whole is in a protracted state of malaise and helplessness. Its political gods failed, Nasser and Saddam Hussein being the two major candidates, and its vaunted ideologies crashed — like Arab nationalism and Islamic integralism. Tyranny and bitterness fill the Arab lands. Only the Palestinians and Arafat offer a bleak hope for rejuvenation and triumph.

Yet, Yasser Arafat is not only a political leader or revolutionary hero, but the tribe's sorcerer and shaman wrapped into one. He has come to exorcise evil and malady whose source is Zionism and Israel in Palestine. With magical incantations like "jihad, jihad, jihad" he will rid the universe of the hoary spirits that threaten the wholesome integrity of tribal existence. Arafat offers his distressed people the legitimate leitmotif for ritual cleansing operations: burning the Israelis in effigy, firing their guns wildly
in the air, mutilating the bodies of Jewish victims who have polluted the sacred space of Palestine. Cathartic violence complements the Islamic conviction that murdering the dhimmi Jew, who has surfaced as an armed demonic Israeli, is never a moral problem. Recognizing the thin line between politics and magic in the case of the PLO is no less compelling than that which in the past and present divides physics from metaphysics, astronomy from astrology, and chemistry from alchemy. The preoccupation and fascination with reason and science have not created such a disenchanted world as many, in the West, naively believed.

The coherent Palestinian universe faces great danger of disruption and destruction. But Arafat has the magical ability to save the tribe. His mysterious celibate life-style (before and since, with or without Suha) hints at his total commitment and undivided sacrifice for his people. With the mantra that calls for “a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital”, Arafat will push the myth as far as reality will permit. In the end, the myth will become reality or reality will destroy the myth. Certainly any alteration of the myth would be a perilous pollution of the hallowed doctrine that Arafat, like an ijaza Muslim master transmitting the tradition to the next generation, would not permit.

The language of the “peace process” is therefore, in its particular way, the political code for progressively denying Israel any semblance of territorial solidity until its final collapse. Using the mantra of the “peace process” blends psychological warfare and diplomatic legitimization that constitutes a grotesque verbal inversion. For the call for peace is nothing but a declaration of war.
PALESTINIAN IDEOLOGY AND PRACTICE
FIVE YEARS AFTER OSLO

Moshe Sharon

The Oslo agreements were aimed, from the moment they were signed, to end all acts of hostility, both physical and verbal, between Israel and the Palestinians. The Israeli leaders at home presented the agreements in almost Messianic terms, pointing to the “historic reconciliation between the Palestinians and the Israelis”. It was clearly understood that the Palestinians would not only stop all acts of violence against Israel but would change the tone of their propaganda and endeavor to disseminate messages of peace and good neighborliness. The Israeli public was made to believe that similar to Israel, the Palestinian Authority would develop special educational programs for the schools to educate the young generation in the spirit of peace and prepare it to live in a new era of no-war, just as Israel had been doing for years on all levels of education and in the media. It was also hoped that the anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic line of propaganda, common in the Palestinian press (and other sources of information), would at least be tempered if not completely changed.

The least that even those who were most skeptical about the agreements had hoped for was that on the official level, the notorious symbols of the hatred for Israel in the official documentation of the PLO would be modified, notwithstanding the Palestinian Covenant and the Fatah Charter.

In reality, none of these hopes were realized.

After the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip and the “West Bank”, the terrorist actions against Israeli citizens were intensified. Israel became more accessible, and the terrorists now had territories under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority in which to prepare their acts of murder and to which they would withdraw after perpetrating them and be safe. Israeli property also became easily accessible, and the stealing of Israeli vehicles and other property became a Palestinian national sport, causing Israel tremendous economic damage.

Over and above all this, the Palestinian Authority, from the minute of its establishment, did nothing to change the atmosphere of hatred among the Palestinians. On the contrary, the language of hatred, the incitement to war against the Jews, the belligerent speeches, the books in schools, the ideology of negating Israel’s existence and the Jewish right to a homeland remained the same as they had been even since before World War II. Nothing has changed in the ideology but much has changed in the intensification of its dissemination and the availability of the facilities to bring it to almost every individual, via the press, electronic media and Internet.

★★★★

Palestinian Achievements in Oslo
In the eyes of those who signed the Oslo agreements on the Palestinian side, their major achievements were as follows:

1. Territories
The acquisition of real property, namely land, ceded to the Palestinians by Israel, in return for a general,
unbinding declaration “against terror”. According to
the Arab lexicon of the Arab-Israeli conflict, terror
does not exist at all on the Palestinian side. When
the Arabs condemn “terror” they mean Israeli terror,
represented by the sheer existence of the State of
Israel. The Arab definition of the killing of Israeli
citizens by Palestinian terrorists is: “Palestinian
freedom fighting”. For this reason any Palestinian
or Arab declaration “against terror” means abso-
lutely nothing. And if it can bring real profit, as in
Oslo, the Palestinians, will concede to using it at a
price.

2. Army
The formation of an army, under the disguise of “a
strong police force”. The Palestinian Authority,
brought the whole PLO fighting force which had
been stationed in Tunisia and other Arab countries
into the territories received from Israel. This is a well
trained army, indoctrinated for war against Israel. Its
slogan: “With our souls and blood we shall redeem
thee, O Palestine,” which the soldiers, inflamed by
Arafat’s speeches, chant. Most of the members of
this army are not even disguised as policemen. They
wear army uniforms, are organized in military units,
get military training, and none of them have any
involvement in police duties or work. The agree-
ments limit the number of “policemen” to 30,000,
yet the actual size of the standing Palestinian army
is double this number, and its arsenals constantly
swell with arms strictly forbidden by the agree-
ments, including artillery and rockets, smuggled in
by the agents of the Palestinian Authority itself.

3. Legitimacy
The legitimization of the Palestinian Liberation
Organization (PLO), which was, and still is, defined
as a terrorist organization. This legitimization is a
particularly important achievement, because it has
been conceded by the very victims of this organiza-
tion’s acts of terror. In this way Israel, the major
victim of the PLO, accepted it as a legitimate
freedom-fighter body, exactly as this organization
had been claiming it was, and gave up its demand
that the PLO should account for the atrocities which
it had perpetrated for more than a quarter of a
century.

4. Legal Precedent
The setting of a precedent, according to which a
sovereign state negotiates, officially, with a body of
no legal or political standing whose declared aim is
to obliterate it. Israel did this without demanding
the obvious: the abolition and rejection of all the
official documents calling for the destruction of
Israel as a precondition for even meeting for
negotiations.

5. Avoidance of Cardinal Issues
The creation of a situation by which the Palestinian
side acquired meaningful and real achievements
without having to enter into any commitment
regarding the major issues which are the heart of
the Arab-Israeli conflict, such as: borders, refugees,
Jerusalem.

The Israelis, so eager to have the Palestinians as
partners, regarded the sheer act of the negotiations
as a great achievement and interpreted them as
amounting to Palestinian recognition of the State of
Israel.

For propaganda purposes, especially in the
West, official Palestinian bodies adopted this Israeli
interpretation but left out the geographical definition
of “Israel”, namely, they refrained from speaking
about Israel within any borders, not even the armistice
lines of 1949. Similarly, Israel is completely absent
from the Palestinian maps; there is no such country
in the Palestinian atlas (as well as in any other Arab
atlas).

The Voice of Palestinian Rejection
The Palestinians who rejected Oslo, whether these
were identified Islamic bodies such as the Hamas, or
elements inside the PLO, claimed that by recogniz-
ing Israel, even in an indirect fashion, and within any
borders, no matter how diminished they may be,
negated fundamental principles of the Palestinian
Covenant which forbid the division of Palestine, do
not recognize the Jews as a people, reject Jewish
history altogether and any form of recognition of the
Jews’ right to have a state of their own. They regard
Zionism as a terrorist, racial and colonialist move-
ment which should be rooted out together with
Israel, its creation.
The Muslim elements endorsing each one of these ideas emphasized also the fact that the jihad, the Holy War against the Jews, the historical enemies of Islam, could not, and should not, be stopped. The Qur'an holds that the Jews must forever be demeaned and degraded, and it follows that they may never rule, especially over an Islamic land. It goes without saying that the Muslims should not even post facto accept a situation in which Jews rule over Muslims, or that they abolish the principle which prescribes that only Muslims should govern their own holy places and the holy places of others. In other words, it is impossible for Muslims willingly to give up on the cardinal idea that Jews, and Christians, can only be dhimmis, namely, that they may live under Islamic rule only as an inferior class of “protected people”. As far as Muslim organizations led by the Hamas are concerned: “Islam is the solution, and jihad is the way.”

Those who signed the Oslo Agreement, Arafat included, although not defined as “Muslim fundamentalists”, do not oppose this Islamic ideology. Moreover, in essence they even support it spreading in every possible manner. However, their argument is that this Islamic ideology may be implemented at a later date; until then, all efforts must be concentrated on the achievement of real gains (acquiring territory, building a fighting force, receiving international support), which at the right time will enable the successful implementation of the Islamic ideology.

**Arafat’s Policy of Free Gains**

The father of this line of thought is Yasser Arafat himself, and these are its major components:

1. The Palestinian Covenant has not been abolished, even if it is important to present to the world, from time to time, a formula which sounds like its abolishment, taking advantage of the ignorance of the other side and of the sympathy, as well as ignorance, of the Israeli and international media. For example, Arafat declares in Paris (1988) that the Covenant is “caduc”, or the Palestinian National Council takes a decision to nominate a committee to decide which of the articles of the Covenant should be amended (1995), or Arafat announces that Israel herself should adopt a constitution prior to the amendment of the Covenant. The basic idea behind this strategy is that the world and media in general will accept, adopt, and give currency even to the most outrageous absurdity if it is repeated often enough.

2. The presentation of the agreements with Israel as temporary ones. It follows that it is permissible, even desirable, to sign them, especially since they come cheap, even free, and are useful. Their usefulness is important. In this context Arafat speaks the language of the Islamic Hamas, relying on an historical precedent established by no less a person than the Prophet Muhammad himself:
   - Muhammad made a treaty with the tribe of Qureish, his enemy, because he thought that the agreement was beneficial for the Muslims.
   - The agreement did not abolish the state of war, only postponed it.
   - The agreement brought great benefits to the Muslims, enabling them to build their military power, weaken their enemy, and anesthetize it to such a degree that it lost its defensive instincts.
   - The agreement was breached by Muhammad at the first opportunity, once he had readied his army.
   - Those who opposed the agreement at the time of Muhammad said that it was a shameful agreement, but Muhammad proved that in the long run it was a great strategic move, which led to the ultimate victory of Islam.

**The Program for Israel’s Gradual Elimination**

Following Muhammad’s precedent which Arafat loves to quote, the Oslo agreements are therefore presented as a temporary treaty, a mere phase in the overall strategy of destroying Israel in stages.
The theoretical foundation of this strategy was already formulated in 1974. It is based on the principle of using every opportunity to secure territorial acquisitions at the cheapest price. Oslo, Arafat explained, established this principle of cheap acquisition, without giving up the option of war.

Following this line of thought, the Palestinian authorities continue to develop and spread the ideas already extant in the various Palestinian movements, the PLO notwithstanding, long before Oslo. These ideas touch on three cardinal issues which were discussed neither in Oslo nor since Oslo, in spite of the fact that they should have been the first to be put on the negotiating agenda. These are the problems on which the final settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict depend. (Parenthetically, it must be emphasized that the Palestinians have no interest in discussing the final settlement, because such negotiations would, by their nature, prevent them from making the maximal use of the Oslo agreements which enable them, as already emphasized, to acquire maximum property for almost no price.)

The Palestinians have very clear ideas regarding the three (undiscussed) main problems of the final settlement: borders, refugees and Jerusalem, which may be summed-up and are as follows:

1. Borders
Palestine, between the Jordan and the Mediterranean, is indivisible. It belongs only to the Palestinians. It follows that Israel’s existence is just a temporary presence. The final aim is to replace it with an Arab-Palestinian state which would comprise the whole of Palestine as it was drawn during the British Mandate.

For this purpose, the Arab citizens of Israel must be recruited too, to take part in the national Palestinian struggle from within the State of Israel, making use of Israel’s democracy, its media and legal institutions. The aim of replacing Israel with an Arab-Palestinian state can be achieved in two ways.

a. War. This option involves the recruitment of all, or most, of the Arab countries, notably Egypt, Syria, and Iraq at a convenient moment, preferably after Israel has been contained at least within its 1949 lines.

b. Changing Israel’s character. This is a plan which aims at the eradication of Israel as a Jewish state by bringing it to abandon its national Jewish symbols, abolish the “Law of Return” which enables free Jewish immigration, open its borders to the free influx of Arabs, so that in the long run, having been ethnically changed, Israel will be defeated by its own democracy. All agree that this option demands a long time period, but its implementation is possible, especially since it does not involve bloodshed and is likely to gain the support of many Israelis too.

It is possible to shorten the last mentioned process, if the Palestinians begin the negotiations over the borders not as starting from the 1949 armistice lines (or from ‘The 1967 Green line’) but from the 1947 UN “Partition Plan”, according to which they would demand most of the Galilee and the major part of the Negev.

It should be pointed out that already following the Oslo agreement the Palestinians developed a plan to take over parts of the Negev through the establishment of a corridor under Palestinian jurisdiction connecting the Gaza Strip with the “West Bank” and cutting Israel in half. Both sides of this planned corridor are populated by ever increasing Bedouin tribes, Arab-citizens of Israel, who have undergone in the last decade a sharp process of Palestinization and are destined to take an active part in this plan.

2. Refugees
Appended to the definition of Israel’s borders is the thesis which has long acquired international approval, namely, that unlike all the refugees in the world who were ever resettled and rehabilitated after wars, the Arab refugees are to be maintained, fully supported by the international community, as a permanent problem. Moreover, the Arabs have succeeded in imprinting on the international mind the idea that being a Palestinian refugee is not a temporary condition, but a status bequeathed and inherited from generation to generation. A Palestinian refugee is always a refugee, and so also are his descendants. The “Palestinian refugees” therefore are always on the increase, and a whole UN
machinery has been established to support, and to sustain directly this anomaly of human suffering. By now the Arab refugees are as permanent as the weather on the UN agenda.

The Palestinians understand the tremendous advantage of the refugee tool in their plan to destroy Israel, emphasizing that all the refugees, and their millions of offspring, belong to the original places in which they lived before the 1948 war. Their right to return to these places, most of which have long ceased to exist, has been the cornerstone in the Arab-Palestinian policy towards Israel. There is no attempt to disguise the reason behind this demand. Flooding Israel proper even with a few hundreds of thousands of Palestinian Arabs means the end of the Jewish state within a few years. Indeed, the refugee camps are a great asset to the Arabs which they will endeavor to keep even if an agreement on reparations to the refugees is reached some time in the future.

3. Jerusalem
According to the Arabs, Jerusalem belongs only to the Muslims; the Jews have no right to it. In many of his speeches, Arafat repeats the absurdity that since the destruction of the First Temple, the Jews have not been in Jerusalem and that they were only recently brought to it by the British.

Arafat is only repeating the false “facts” which are part of the intensive re-writing of “Palestinian history”, which has been going on for more than seventy years, a process similar to the rewriting of the history of Iraq, Egypt, Syria, and other Arab states which were born after World War I. In their re-writing of history, the Palestinians aim at obliterating any memory of the Jews from Jerusalem in particular and from the historical map of the Holy Land in general, by presenting the whole history of ancient Israel as an insignificant episode between the Canaanites — who are identified as “Palestinians” — and the Islamic conquests, which are presented as just another wave of Arabs coming to historically Arab lands.

The Islamic conquests in the 7th century are introduced as the key to the special position of the Muslim Arabs in Palestine, since these conquests established the legal relations between the Muslim rulers and the Christian dhimmis, the Jews being of no consequence, and possessing no holy places. Only through this twisting of history was it possible to present the Muslim conquests as the legal source for the establishment of a system of protection bestowed by the Muslims on the Christians, who were granted custody of only non-Muslim holy places.

Following this reasoning, Arafat hammers repeatedly the idea that the Jews not only are not in possession of the holy places in the Holy Land, these being either Muslim or Christian, but that Israel as a state has no legal right even to offer protection to the Christian holy places, since it was Caliph al-Umar (CE 634-644) who established the system of protection which only Muslims may benevolently bestow on the Christians.

The Palestinian-Arab-Muslim ideology regarding the Jews, which followed the Oslo agreements, is the same as the one prior to them. It prescribes the total negation of any connection between the Jews and their historic homeland, including all the historical Jewish holy places. All the holy places to which the Jews lay claim are accordingly presented as Muslim holy places with Arab names: The Western Wall is al-Buraq, The Temple Mount is al-Haram al-Quds, Hebron is al-Khalil. Classical Islamic texts already Islamized the major figures of Jewish history from Abraham to Solomon; they are all Muslim personalities, mainly prophets. All the holy places connected with them are therefore, by definition, Muslim holy places. The re-writers of Palestinian history are making maximum use of these old texts.

The Palestinian program as seen in the current policies of the Palestinian Authority’s educational system, media, and literature is clear: The eye, ear, and heart of future generations of Palestinians should be recruited to one and only aim, the removal of Israel. For external consumption, this ideological bundle is covered in the necessary verbal wrapping, pleasant to the Western eye, this dish of deceit spiced to suit the European and American palate.
EDUCATION, IDENTITY, STATE BUILDING AND THE PEACE PROCESS: EDUCATING PALESTINIAN CHILDREN IN THE POST-OSLO ERA

Raphael Israeli

Apologia

As long as the Palestinian entity existed only in slogans and in “armed struggle”, during the long uphill battle which pitted the uprooted and destitute Palestinians against their Zionist enemy, the education of Palestinian children was tackled mainly by the authorities under which the Palestinian citizenry and refugees lived, in various Arab countries or under Israeli rule. In this regard, Jordan, between 1949 and 1967, bore the brunt of that burden inasmuch as more than two thirds of the Palestinian people found themselves under its aegis both east and west of the Jordan. The rest were either under Egyptian military government in the Gaza Strip, or dispersed in the refugee camps of Lebanon and Syria, or as a minority within Israeli, or else engaged in careers in the oil-rich Gulf states, or in search of their future in other diasporas in the Arab world or in the West.

This meant that during the formative period of 1949-67, most Palestinian children who pursued regular schooling, even those in the UNRWA school system, depended more or less on the curricula of the Jordanian Ministry of Education. Not surprisingly, the civic education imparted to Palestinian children under that system was of a general Arab-Islamic character, with special emphasis on loyalty to the Hashemite crown, and a clear skirting of the issue of Palestinian nationalism. Like in other Arab educational systems, it included a strong element of totalitarian political indoctrination founded on sloganeering, memorizing, citations, repetitions and conformity, and little in the way of free thinking, creativity, imagination (in the sense of the imaginative, not the imaginary which was ripe), and innovative spirit. Political education, either explicitly stated or implied, was geared to reinforce Arab and Islamic identity, to bring up children committed to Arab and Islamic causes, to Arab and Islamic unity and solidarity, and to resist the perceived enemies, be they abstract imperialism or colonialism, or concrete Israel and Zionism.

When Israel took over the West Bank and Gaza following the 1967 War, it found itself constrained to maintain the legal and educational systems which had existed in those territories prior to the war on the one hand, but on the other hand it took the liberty to alter many passages in dozens of textbooks which it considered hateful, bigoted and inciting against Jews, Zionism and Israel. The extirpation of those passages from the books predictably produced barrages of condemnation from the interested Arab countries, from Arab educators and from Western countries and UNESCO, to the effect that Israel, as an occupying power, had no business in altering, censoring, rectifying, or otherwise correcting existing textbooks that had prevailed prior to occupation. It is noteworthy that Israel had abstained, during the campaign of revision of those textbooks, from tampering with citations from holy Islamic sources, such as the Qur'an or the Hadith, even when they were considered highly offensive, but the Arab and Islamic ire did not subside.

When the Palestinians gained self-rule in those territories following the Oslo Agreement (1993),
one of their main and immediate concerns was, understandably, to take renewed control of the future of their population and guide it into the new moulds of Palestinian identity, nationalism, statehood, independence and relations with the outside world. Shaping the minds of Palestinian children, via textbooks and the state-controlled media, was considered a supreme priority. Many reasons were implied for this urgency, which also occasioned the prompt restoration of the passages which had been obliterated by Israel during the years of occupation:

a. Palestinian children who missed school during the intifada, which many credit for the Oslo Accords, now deserved to have their future chartered and guaranteed by the new Palestinian Authority;

b. The nascent Palestinian entity was soul-searching for its identity, challenged as it was domestically by the Islamic Movement, notably the Hamas, and it became crucial to educate the new generation according to the Authority’s prevailing vision of a Palestinian society in the making;

c. The new Palestinian entity would need increasing numbers of technicians, teachers, cadres, intellectuals and bureaucrats to man its fledgling state institutions, its school system, its professional associations, its growing security apparatus and its economic management. Planning school curricula was considered vital for the provision of all those needs, and for instilling in them the new state ideology;

d. The Palestinian entity, which grew out of the Oslo Accords, was still locked into a bitter and prolonged struggle to achieve its full independence from an enemy which was not forthcoming in according it all its aspirations. Since the foreseeable Palestinian future seemed tightly tied in with that struggle, it was necessary to define the enemy, to render society resilient in confronting it, and to shape the relations with it. For example, if during the intifada Palestinian children viewed the Israelis as oppressive occupiers who usurped Palestinian lands, they might have to be made to change their perceptions when dealing with a partner for peace, a neighbor, an employer, or perhaps even a legitimate political entity in its own right.

For all these reasons, although the new textbooks sponsored by the Authority, and its policy statements over its media, do not necessarily express public opinion there, they certainly reflect the intentions and state of mind of the Authority as to the policies it wishes to pursue and the way it aspires to shape the thinking of its future citizens. All the more so since the Palestinian Authority has been under pressure to comply with its international obligations under Oslo I and II (1993 and 1995, respectively) and the Wye Plantation Agreements (1998) with regard to eradicating the statements of hatred and incitement against Israel from its school books and state-controlled media. The Palestinian Authority’s unwillingness or inability to expunge such statements from the textbooks it has sponsored since its inception, can also be a measure by which to gauge its intentions and plans for the future.

The textbooks under examination here cover some 140 examples which were published by the Palestinian Authority during the years 1995-8. In the previous years of the existence of the Authority (1993-5), the Jordanian and Egyptian textbooks which had been in use under Israeli rule, continued to prevail, except that the corrections introduced by Israel, which had extinguished the anti-Jewish stereotypes, were abrogated and the original defamatory text was restored for that transitional period. The Palestinian new textbooks are all of the Authority’s making, and in this regard they reflect its educational policy better than the previous two substitutes. The textbooks under discussion cover the whole span of 1st to 12th Grades, not in the fields of science which are supposedly value-unrelated, but in humanities and social sciences which are loaded with values and therefore reflective of policy intentions, such as civic studies, grammar, literature, history, geography and Islamic studies.
Building a National Myth

School education in the Palestinian Authority understandably provides answers to the questions of identity, roots and history of the Palestinians. Enough evidence exists independently of the textbooks to sum up the elements of Palestinian identity since the 1920s when the Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husseini, raised the vanguard of Palestinian nationalism both against the British occupiers and the Zionist contenders. Prior to that, when Palestine was part of the Ottoman Empire, it was divided into several sanjaks (counties) under the Vilayet (province) of Damascus, and not recognized as one political unit.¹ The local inhabitants consisted of several landed clans, some prominent families in the cities, a few nomadic tribes, and a mishmash of minorities and new migrants from Syria and Egypt, and they certainly did not consider themselves as one nation, their focus of identity being either local, tribal, Muslim or Ottoman, or a combination thereof.

Nascent Palestinian nationalism, however, feels the need to lend depth to its history, either because “old is beautiful,” or because there is a necessity to contend with the Jews who provide a millennial recorded history of their link to that land. If there is no Palestinian historical record to satisfy that need, myths are concocted, and school textbooks are one of the most efficient ways to promote and diffuse them. Let us cite several examples from these textbooks and then try to make sense out of them:

1. Dear pupil, do you know who the Palestinians are? The Palestinians are descended from the Canaanites.²
2. Jerusalem is an ancient Arab city, built by the Jebusite Arabs before Islam.³
3. Jerusalem [introduces herself]: I am an ancient city, thousands of years old, I occupy a mountain plateau in the center of Palestine. My most ancient name, Jebus, is derived from the ancient Arabs, the Jebusites.⁴
4. At the conference...the Jewish claims and historical allegations in favor of their right in Palestine were noted, and the historical right of the Arabs over Palestine ever since the dawn of history was stressed...⁵

The claim to Palestine as Arab naturally delegitimizes those who today counter-claim it, and this theme will be discussed in more detail below. Here suffice it to note, that the repeated stress of the Palestinian educational system on the ancient Arab identity of the land is obviously geared to posit Palestinian antiquity, never mind if imagined, created, invented, without even feeling the need to produce any evidence to sustain the claim, much like other mythologies which need only to be repeated, not proven. Moreover, by making Jerusalem introduce itself (citation 3 above), in an innocent and straightforward fashion, as if addressing the third-graders directly, weight is added to the statement of its Arab identity by itself, making any outside evidence redundant.

Evidence by omission is another device used by the writers of these textbooks. For example, both PA Television and the schoolbooks use a map of the Middle East in which Israel does not exist and is replaced in its entirety by a country called Palestine. So it goes for the privately produced new atlas that was adopted by the PA educational system. Illustrations:

1. Under the words “our country Palestine”, a map replaces all Israel.⁶
2. A map entitled “Map of Palestine before and after the war of 1967” defines the area of the State of Israel as the Arab lands conquered before 1967, while the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are defined as the Arab lands conquered in 1967.⁷
3. Maps of the Middle East in which Israel does not exist and its area is marked as “Palestine”, appear in many pages of these textbooks.⁸
4. A map which accompanies the lesson “Palestine our Homeland”, encompasses the entire State of Israel and specifies numerous Israeli cities as Arab even though some of them date from biblical times: Safed, Acre, Haifa, Tiberias, Nazareth, Beit Shean, Jaffa, Jerusalem and Beersheba.⁹
5. A drawing shows a woman waving the Palestinian flag while in the background is the map of Palestine in the place of all Israel.¹⁰
6. Nineteen times in a geography book, maps mark Israel as Palestine.\textsuperscript{11}

The Palestinian Television shows the same map, many times daily, at the beginning and the end of every news report. And so it goes for all geographical features of Palestine which bear present-day Israeli names, some of which relate to Biblical, clearly pre-Arab, locations such as the Valley of Jezreel (called Bani 'Amr Valley in the Palestinian textbooks and media).\textsuperscript{12} Similarly, there are vows to return to Jaffa\textsuperscript{13} which has been part of Tel Aviv for the past 50 years, or continued references to Israel as “occupied Palestine”; or to the Galilee as part of Northern Palestine.\textsuperscript{14}

This substitution of Palestine for anything Israeli, including Israeli industries which are not an intrinsic part of the claimed land (e.g., in Palestine there are two oil refineries...in Haifa and Ashdod),\textsuperscript{15} which is part of myth-building by omission, stands out, incidentally, not only in textbooks and the official Palestinian Television, but also in other media. For weeks in July-August, 1996, the Jerusalem daily, Al-Quds, carried a daily page of chronicles of the history of the “Palestinian-Cana'anite people”, where academics of the West Bank Universities explained how Israeli archaeological finds bolster the claim of the Palestinian-Cana'anites to age-old rootedness in the land. All these write-ups led to the celebration of the Summer Festival of Sebastya that was staged by the Palestinian Ministry of Culture in August 1996, where Arab youth dressed in robes bearing ancient Cana'anite figures brandished torches as they danced about the town square that was packed with officials of the PLO and PA administration. Others arrived atop horse-drawn chariots modeled on drawings found at the Israeli archaeological excavations at Meggido.\textsuperscript{16}

On the same stage in the middle of the square, a dramatic passion was acted out with the Ba'al, God of the Heavens and fertility in the Pantheon of the ancient Cana'anites struggling against Mut, God of the Underworld. Ultimately, the Ba'al emerged victorious and the narrator took the opportunity to heap praise on the loyal Palestinian-Cana'anite nations: the Amorites, Gergashites, Jebusites, and Perizites which had fought at its side in the battle against the Hebrew invaders across the Jordan.\textsuperscript{17}

This part is rather puzzling if one takes into account the numerous references in the Qur'an of God's Covenant with Jews and His promise that they would inherit the Land of Canaan; all the more puzzling is the modern use of Ba'al, a pagan God, in a society where the Islamic trend is a serious contender for Palestinian nationalism.

This whole historical structure that has been created, invented, imagined, adopted and elaborated by the Palestinians, raises several questions. First, the problem of the totalitarian fashion in which this questionable concoction of events is being instilled into the minds of children, not as an idea, an option or a theory, but as an absolute and irrefutable truth, as History, as their history, without criticism, evidence or sources. This is not without precedent in the Arab world: Saddam Hussein's revival of Hamorabi's heritage, linked to his own birthright was stressed during the first years of his rule (1975-90). In consequence of the Gulf War when he needed the help of other Arab and Islamic countries, he had to abandon his claim to antiquity; and Sadat's repeated references to Egypt's "7,000 years of Pharaonic history" which he inherited. In both cases, those cultures were superseded by the Arab-Islamic civilization that bears no resemblance to, nor claims descent from, those ancient cultures. Similarly, Jordan has been claiming as its own the ancient heritage of the pagan Emorites, Edomites, Amorites and even Romans. In all these cases, as in the case of the Palestinians, the attempt is clearly to construct a direct bridge to antiquity in order to gain legitimacy. However, in the case of the Palestinians, and to a certain extent the Jordanians, this myth-building is also designed to deprive their rival, Israel, from it, while in the other cases there are no contenders around to claim legitimacy over those ancient lands.

Indeed, the striking characteristic of the Palestinian version of myth-building is not only the constant need to construct its past from imaginary building bricks, but in so doing to disregard and omit others, even refute them and deny their heritage and existence. For example, the entire 1,000 years of two Jewish commonwealths in ancient Palestine are simply skipped over, and history is so
rewritten as to erase from its pages any mention of the Jews. Or worse, pages of history are torn off, and the remaining pages are re-numbered so as not to disturb the smooth flow of events by the embarrassment of inquisitive questions. However, due to the existence of Israel as a living claimant to that heritage, Palestinians cannot relate to ancient history without displacing their rival first. As we have seen, displacement is achieved either by omission or by active assumption of that heritage as exclusively theirs, by leapfrogging Jewish ties to the ancient kingdoms of Israel and Judea, and rooting themselves in the far past that preceded the Jewish commonwealth.

When acting in this fashion, the Palestinians could have generously and realistically admitted the existence of an ancient Jewish heritage which is past, and reclaimed the Canaanite heritage as preceding it, but they do not. They resort to constructing their bridge to the Canaanite past on an historical void, for fear that a recognized intermediary period where the Jews predominated, might threaten their way to the far end of the bridge. The omission of the Jews on the one hand, and the claim to Canaanite descent on the other, seem inconsistent with each other: if the Palestinians descend from the Canaanites, then the Jews in the intermediary period do not matter anyway because they do not interfere with the neat lineage. But when the Jews are omitted, this in itself raises the suspicion that either the Palestinian myth-builders themselves do not trust in their Canaanite roots, or they acknowledge that their grounds are so shaky that they had better eliminate the contenders who stand on a more solid historical ground, than face them in open debate. If fever cannot be controlled, one may break the thermometer and eliminate any evidence of a threatening temperature.

**Self Aggrandizement and Enemy Denigration**

Jahiliyya poetry in pre-Islamic Arabia, which attained high peaks of imagination, creativity and idiom, stood out in its purple verbiage of self-praise of the poet’s own chief, family, clan and tribe and their feats of heroism and valor on one hand; and his scathing, humiliating and abusive language in denigrating the enemy tribes and clans. This device, which seems to have been borrowed by many a contemporary Arab poet and leader, is also applied by the writers of the Palestinian school textbooks. Apparently, those educators somehow felt that rather than only erecting a peak for their people by singing its praise and making up its history, they also had to dig a pit for their rivals/enemies in order to augment the perceived chasm between the two. Maybe they sensed that rather than being overshadowed by the successful West and its perceived appendix — the Jewish state — both of which are not to their liking, they would rather minimize them to the extent possible, by castigating them, denigrating and diminishing them, in contrast with the lofty innate qualities of the Arabs in general and the Palestinians in particular.

Look, for example, at what a Palestinian textbook for 11th graders instills into their minds:

In the present period...of unprecedented material and scientific advances..., scientists in the West are perplexed by the worrying increase in the number of people suffering from nervous disorders..., and the statistics from America in this matter are a clear indication of this (p. 3).

Western civilization flourished, as is well known, as a consequence of the links of the West to Islamic culture, through Arab institutions in Spain, and in other Islamic countries where Islamic thinkers and philosophers took an interest in Greek philosophy...

Western civilization, in both its branches — the Capitalist and the Communist, deprived man of his peace of mind, stability... when it turned material well-being into the exemplary goal..., his money leading him nowhere, except to suicide (p. 5).

There is no escape from a new civilization which will arise in the wake of this material progress and which will continue it and lift man to the highest spiritual life alongside his material advancement... Is there a nation capable of fulfilling such a role? The Western world is incapable of fulfilling it... There is
only one nation capable of discharging this task, and that is our nation... No one but we can carry aloft the flag of tomorrow's civilization (p. 12).

We do not claim that the collapse of Western civilization and the transfer of the center of civilization to us will happen in the next decade or two, even in fifty years, for the rise and fall of civilizations follow natural processes, and even when the foundations of a fortress become cracked it still appears for a long time to be at the peak of its strength. Nevertheless [Western civilization] has begun to collapse and to become a pile of debris. We awoke to a painful reality and to oppressive Imperialism, and we drove it out of some of our lands, and we are about to drive it from the rest (p. 16).

It is noteworthy in the above, however, that although the argument for Islamic superiority and ultimate victory is clear, an allowance is made for "natural processes" to unfold. Other fervent believers in Allah would rather impute to Him alone the decision and the timing of the Western collapse. One also wonders how the Palestinian Authority in fact expends tremendous efforts in the real world to find solace and seek favor in the West while teaching its school children that the very source of its sustenance is about to collapse. With regard to Jews, Israel and Zionism, statements of vilification are even more straightforward. For Israel, the immediate and most implacable enemy, does not deserve any sparing; it is the source of Arab misery and universal evil; the Jews, who constitute the majority of its population, are corrupt by nature and cannot be expected to improve; and the Zionist ideology which nurtures the Jewish state, is the paradigm of racism and doomed to failure. Consider the following sample:

1. One must beware of the Jews, for they are treacherous and disloyal.\(^{19}\)

2. Racism: mankind has suffered from this evil both in ancient as well as in modern times. For indeed, Satan has, in the eyes of many people, made their evil actions appear beautiful... Such a people are the Jews.\(^{20}\)

3. The clearest examples of racist belief and racial discrimination in the world are Nazism and Zionism.\(^{21}\)

4. Israel's mean, brutal, inhuman, fascist, racist, genocidal, cleansing wars. The Jewish gangs waged racial cleansing against innocent Palestinians..., large scale and appalling massacres, saving no women and children.\(^{22}\)

5. It is mentioned in the Talmud: We [the Jews] are God's people on earth... He forced upon the human animal and upon all the nations and races of the world that they serve us, and He spread us through the world to ride on them and to hold their reins. We must marry our beautiful daughters with Kings, Ministers and Lords and enter our sons into the various religions, thus we will have the final word in managing those countries. We should cheat them and arouse quarrels among them, then they fight each other... Non-Jews are pigs whom God created in the shape of men in order that they be fit for service for the Jews, and God has created the world for them.\(^{23}\)

These passages derive from either ancient Islamic sources, considered irrefutable in themselves, or from speculation which mixes wishful thinking with emotional distress caused by frustration in the face of formidable and successful rivals who refuse to disappear from sight. However, while Palestinian defamation of the Jews and Zionists can be understood in terms of the subjective sense of humiliation caused by a century of conflict and loss, it is much harder to comprehend the fabrication of "evidence" from the Talmud. Unless the writers of the text have themselves fallen into the trap of their own propaganda, it remains incomprehensible how educated people of obvious scholarly merit, could posit a fake text which is verifiable as an authentic textual source. Worse, how could they hope to train a new generation of scholars by feeding them with apocryphal materials as the paradigm of truth. Understandably, the writers of the text refrained from quoting a precise reference and hid behind a general attribution to the Talmud. Thus, instead of erecting a logical case based on evidence, the
writers of the text seem to be content with mudslinging, vilification and deprecation, assuming that by force of repetition some of it will stick and serve the purpose of political indoctrination.

**Jihad and Martyrdom**

This is how Yasser Arafat, the Head of the Palestinian Authority, was introduced on PA Television during a ceremony at Gaza’s al-Azhar University on the occasion of Mi’raj Day.24

This is the Commander, this is the man, his face is like a bright sunny day... May Allah grant him noble qualities of manhood... The leader of this nation whom Allah watches over...

Allah, Allah, Allah!!!

Let Abu ’Ammar25 lead us to Jihad.

And then, came Arafat’s turn to speak to the crowds:

...Bless you! Bless your struggle and your Jihad on this land...

We renew our oath to the martyrs... I say that all of us are made for martyrdom. Hence I say to all martyrs who have died, on behalf of the martyrs who still live...that we stand by our oath to pursue [the battle].26

The message of martyrdom and Jihad carried and repeated by the Head of the Palestinian Authority on its official media could not but influence the textbook writers who cannot help internalize these symbolic and powerful concepts. When Palestinian politicians are castigated for this sloganeering of Holy War in an era of peace negotiations, they always insist that Jihad is meant in its metaphorical and spiritual sense. Certainly, this word may have been made to designate an intellectual striving too, but in Islamic Shari’a it clearly means a military action designed to expand the outer borders of the Realm of Islam or to protect the boundaries of the Pax Islamica from encroaching Unbelievers. Since Jihad does not necessarily have to be offensive and can also apply to defensive wars against aggressors, the Palestinians, like other Muslims, can claim that due to the Jews’ aggression against them in Palestine, they are entitled to thwart the attackers by Jihad.

When at the turn of the century new winds of liberalism and reform began blowing in the Islamic world as a result of the impact of the West, some apologetic currents in Islam attempted to limit Jihad to its strictly defensive scope, or to extending assistance to persecuted or otherwise needy Muslims. But again, the identification of the aggressor against those Muslims remained problematic when it was done by interested Islamic parties against other Muslims (Iran-Iraq; Egypt-Yemen; Morocco-Polisario etc.). Liberal thinking has also been detected by some scholars in the early years of Islam when the Prophet is said to have usually elected peaceful means over violence and war.27 But the violent and warlike interpretation of Jihad prevailed again when the Prophet launched his attacks against Mecca and Khaybar, and especially when Islam sprung out of Arabia after his death, and all through the Islamic conquests. The violent interpretation usually continues to prevail in the modern world, especially in the jargon of the Muslim fundamentalists28 and certainly as regards Israel.29 All the more so when statements of Jihad are coupled with qital (battle), nasr (victory) and shahid (martyr). For it is difficult to envisage a spiritual Jihad where people are enjoined to partake of battles and where martyrs fall in combat, especially in an era of peace where those powerful symbols were supposed to have been abandoned.

The textbooks in Palestinian schools do not lag far behind the statements of the leadership, as reflected in the reports of the Palestinian Television and other state media, which are directly relevant to the prevailing ambiance of a continuing struggle, where the enemy is vilified and made legitimate prey:

1. Know, my son, that Palestine is your country..., that its pure soil is drenched with blood of martyrs... Why must we fight the Jews and drive them out of our land? [The text follows a map of Palestine that replaces all of Israel]. There will be a Jihad and our country shall be freed. This is our story with the thieving conquerors. You must know, my boy, that Palestine is your serious responsibility.30
2. My brothers! The oppressors have overstepped the boundary. Therefore, Jihad and sacrifice are a duty... Are we to let them steal its Arab nature? Draw your sword, let us gather for war with red blood and blazing fire... Death shall call and the sword shall be crazed for such slaughter... Oh Palestine! The youth will redeem your land... [the book then asks questions to emphasize the message that Israel, the enemy, is to be fought and defeated].

3. What is the road to victory over the enemy that the Poet mentions?

4. The Poet urges the Arabs to undertake Jihad. Indicate the verse in which he does so... 31

5. In your left hand you carried the Qur'an and in your right hand an Arab sword. Without blood, not even one centimeter will be liberated... Therefore, go forward crying: Allah Akbar! [Allah is the Greatest]! 32

6. Muslims must protect all mosques...and must wage a Jihad both of life and property, to liberate al-Aqsa Mosque from the Zionist conquest. 33

7. Make use of the following expressions to make logical sentences: The Zionist Danger...; calling for Jihad...

8. A Poem of Palestine:
   To Palestine, greetings from Arab hearts
   Who have stubbornly and successfully resisted the chains of the enemies
   For me, the promise of martyrdom
   And Jerusalem is my song. 34

9. If the enemy has conquered part of the land [of Palestine] and those fighting for it are unable to repel the enemy, then Jihad becomes the individual religious duty of every Muslim, man and woman, until the attack is successfully repelled and the land liberated from conquest. 35

These sample passages from a wide array of PA textbooks, point to the tenacity which the Authority wishes to instill into the minds of its children, from the early ages of childhood until adolescence, with regard to the necessity and inevitability of a prolonged Jihad to liberate all Palestine from the Jewish-Israeli grip. The insistent demand that the children should be prepared to fight and die in the service of this dream is unequivocal inasmuch as the textbooks do not offer any glimmer of hope for a peaceful settlement and way out. Rejection of Israel, Zionists and Jews, which is based on moral, political, nationalistic as well as religious considerations, is total, irreversible and immutable. Thus, a protracted and open-ended struggle is foreseeable, where Islamic and nationalistic rhetoric promises success at the end of the process, if every Arab and Muslim regards it as his/her personal endeavor (fard 'ayn) and not only as a vague commitment of the community (fard kifaya).

This approach is surprisingly identical to that of the Hamas, 36 which means that although the Palestinian Authority has been at odds with its formidable domestic rival for the soul of the Palestinian people, it has conceded to them in matters of school education, inasmuch as the Hamas messages are unequivocally and uncritically echoed in the Authority's textbooks. While this partnership and collaboration might mitigate differences between the two contenders in the short run and make for a Palestinian united facade, it may prove in the long run to be dangerous when the 5th and 7th graders of today come of age and begin to make their political choices.

**Significance and Consequences**

As is often the case in authoritarian regimes in general, the point is not declaring lofty principles and promulgating liberal-minded constitutions, agreements and treaties, but fulfilling them in the real world. Thus, the Oslo Accords notwithstanding, there is a question to what extent do the school textbooks, that are a priori commissioned or a posteriori approved and adopted, by the Palestinian Authority, reflect its thinking and policy. And if they do, are they in accord with the Authority's engagements, obligations and commitments, both domestic and international.

On the domestic front, it is evident that a state in the making must also lay claim to its past, its identity, its myths and its particular culture which make it different from all others, in order to build social cohesion, construct a political consciousness...
and rally the masses behind it. It is less clear why such legitimate claims to the past, or to continuity on a national soil, must delegitimize others and deny their future, and nurture a conflicting and confrontational state of mind among the children, who must grow to accept or reject the counterparts of Palestinian nationalism as enemies or partners, as may be the case. We have seen that in both myth-making and self-aggrandizing, there are strong elements for displacing or ignoring the rival to such an extent as to exclude it from any permanent settlement of the problem. For as the children grow up and imprint in their minds the illegitimacy of the other, and its systematic satanization as the paradigm of evil, there is little hope that those stereotypes could be reversed when the children later become able to see and judge for themselves as policy makers and decision takers, or as common citizens.

Thus, while strenuous efforts are being made in Israel, with admittedly mixed results, to initiate peace education projects and educate Israel's children in the school system to comprehend the concepts of peace, acceptance, tolerance, sharing, listening and coexistence, both as a necessity and as an ideal and a value in its own right; and as several Israeli-Palestinian institutions have been striving to inculcate those values into Israelis and Palestinian Arabs with various degrees of success, the official Palestinian textbooks seem not only oblivious of these valiant efforts, but they appear rather intent on perpetuating the negative stereotypes and scuttling any attempts at reconciliation and goodwill.

On the international front, it appears that the Palestinian Authority, rather than breaking new paths and making its impact on world public opinion, is bent on sustaining the current state of affairs. To be sure, when the Palestinian textbooks adopt or condone anti-Israeli stereotypes they do not operate in a void. They conform, in fact, to much of the anti-Jewish and anti-Israeli stereotyping that has prevailed in the Arab World since before and after the beginning of the peace process in the late 1970s. For example, when Egyptians accuse Israeli expert farmers who help develop Egyptian agriculture, of poisoning Arab land and destroying the local farming industry, no one should be surprised that the Palestinian representative in the Human Rights Commission in Geneva accuses, with impunity, Israelis of injecting the AIDS virus into hundreds of Palestinian children. Or when Robert Garaudy, the notorious French anti-Semite and Muslim convert who denies the Holocaust in his “scholarly research”, is given a hero's welcome in the Arab World, it is no coincidence that denial of the Shoah among Arabs/Muslims becomes a universal consensus. Similarly, in order not to contradict themselves on the Holocaust issue, even the Arabs who have made peace with Israel have banned Schindler's List from their screens although there is little Israeli or Zionist connection in it, but it does illustrate an event of the Holocaust. They overlook and deny the antiquity of Jewish presence in Israel even when they allocate rooms in their museums to other ancient peoples in the Middle East who have long disappeared from the scene. They even attribute Israel's peace measures to dark schemes reminiscent of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, calculated to take over the Arab world culturally and economically in the "New Middle East".

These organized and institutionalized attitudes towards Jews and Israel, which may be hidden or uttered in the privacy of one's intimate circle, once given the official stamp of authority and approval by the Palestinian textbooks, cannot but encourage Palestinian children to express those feelings and attitudes in public, and to sense that it is legitimate to do so. This was the reason why Israel insisted in both the Oslo and Wye Agreements on the eradication from textbooks of the statements of hatred, but it remains to be seen whether a turn-about in the official Palestinian attitude will be implemented. So far, the only changes that the Palestinian Authority made in this regard was, as mentioned in the introduction, to restore the negative stereotypes that had been eradicated by Israel from the Jordanian and Egyptian textbooks when it ruled the West Bank and Gaza.

Constructivists in the domain of educational psychology, such as Jean Piaget, have tackled the question of how the individual learner goes about
the construction of knowledge in his/her cognitive apparatus; for other constructivists, the individual learner is of little interest, and what is the focus of concern is the construction of human knowledge in general. But there are also constructivists who are interested in both poles and who believe that their theories throw light on both the question of how individuals build up bodies of knowledge and how human communities have constructed the public bodies of knowledge. And they raise the question of whether acquired new knowledge is made by the thinking individual, or is out there and merely discovered. Writers in the field of constructivism conclude that construction of knowledge is an active process, whether we define it in terms of individual cognition or in terms of a social and political process. However, even according to Piaget, who is usually labeled as the High Priest of individual cognition, heteronomous morality follows moral rules given by others, out of obedience to an authority which has coercive power. Heteronomous morality means that an individual does not regulate his/her behavior by means of personal convictions. Rather, his/her activity is regulated by impulse or unthinking obedience, in contrast to autonomous morality which follows self-regulating principles. It is argued, however, that without the belief that rises from personal conviction, children will not be likely to follow moral rules given ready-made by adults.

The ramifications of these theories are clear in our context of the Palestinian textbooks: While Palestinian children absorb at home and from their environment basically anti-Israeli and anti-Jewish stereotypes, and bring them as their luggage of knowledge and conviction when they come to school, that body of knowledge and convictions is enhanced when reinforced by the teachers who, regardless of their personal experiences and convictions which they had also picked up within the same environment, must impart to their students the contents of the textbooks, give and take their personal additions, interpretations and elaborations. In the literature dealing with political violence it has been repeatedly demonstrated that verbal abuse and delegitimation of the enemy are necessary steps towards the use of violence against him. Conviction, authority and action then converge in a deadly cocktail to perpetuate hostile attitudes and hostile actions on the part of the children, which are backed by the approval of the Palestinian Authority. This is the most worrying question that arises from the reviewed textbooks: will they only remain part of a political indoctrination program which reflects public opinion and/or shapes it; or will they push the growing children of today and the adults of tomorrow, to transcend rhetoric into the dangerous and ominous grounds of hostile action.
ISRAEL AND THE JEWS IN THE SCHOOLBOOKS OF THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY

Shlomo Sharan

Introduction
What concepts and perceptions of Israel and the Jews has the Palestinian Authority taught Arab children in its territory since the adoption of the Oslo agreements? Can these perceptions and ideas serve as the basis for cultivating peaceful coexistence between Arabs and Jews? The response to these questions would appear to provide a window into the official political-cultural climate prevailing in the two entities. The adoption of the agreements between them was intended to serve as the basis for a peaceful settlement of their conflict.

A study of school textbooks cannot ascertain the nature of the attitudes and perceptions current among the general population, but it certainly can and does reflect the official policy that the government seeks to disseminate regarding its relationship with other social-political entities and their populations. In both Israel and the Palestinian Authority, a central educational authority must sanction textbooks, and in both instances a Ministry of Education actually authorizes the content of the textbooks employed in the public schools. (There is no private education in the PA territories and relatively few private schools in Israel, the majority of which belong to ultra-Orthodox groups.)

The questions posed here are particularly significant in light of the long history of Arab anti-Jewish and anti-Israel acts as well as statements published in a wide variety of media over the past several decades. Researchers whose scholarly credentials and reputations for objectivity are beyond doubt (Bodansky, 1999; Harkabi, 1972; Lewis, 1984, 1986; Porat, Stauber & Vago, 1997; Yadlin, 1988) have documented the fiercely antagonistic views about Jews, Israel, and Zionism, current in many Arab nations, in addition to overt acts of hostility. A meaningful peace between Jews in the territory of Israel and Arabs in the territory now governed by the Palestinian Authority obviously demands a distinct change in official Palestinian political, social and cultural policy towards Israel and the Jews from the attitudes that have prevailed thus far. That is one of the necessary conciliatory steps that must be taken, in addition to the cessation of overt acts of hostility, if the people of Israel are to consider the intentions of the Palestinians as directed toward peace. The demonization of Jews and Israel, cultivated by the Arab nations for decades, should have been terminated immediately after the Oslo agreements (Stav, 1996). In many parts of the world, once warring nations negotiated the cessation of hostilities, the diabolical images of the enemy disseminated by official and non-official groups in each nation were abandoned. Indeed, the need for this change in socio-political-cultural policy was explicitly reiterated in the Wye River agreement with the PLO of October 1998, where it was generally acknowledged that similar proclamations agreed upon in the Oslo accords still await implementation.

Research on Political Socialization in the United States
An extensive research literature on the political socialization of children was published in the United States over the past three decades. At first blush it
would seem that such a large body of knowledge could provide insight and theoretical direction for understanding the phenomena relating to the political education of children in the Palestinian Authority. Yet, several major differences between the social-political conditions reflected in the research literature in the United States and those prevailing in the Israel-Arab relationship must be emphasized. First and foremost, the US research literature on the political socialization of children was generated in a democratic society. True, not all of the investigators were uniformly satisfied with the effects of children's political socialization in the family setting, in schools, or in peer groups, in terms of providing American society with a firm foundation for the intergenerational continuity of democracy (see, for example, Dennis, 1973; Greenstein, 1965; Hess & Torney, 1976). Nevertheless, it is a monumental fact that the United States does not offer investigators examples of totalitarian political indoctrination of young people into a dominant and centrally determined political ideology. Some researchers observed that the United States in general, apart from some radical fringe groups, was a remarkably a-ideological country and US citizens were singularly unconcerned with political ideology of any kind (Merelman, 1969). The youth of the US express generally positive attitudes toward the government as benevolent and protective of human rights. Political cynicism, or a critical perspective on political institutions and leadership, does not emerge in children's thinking until they are of high school age or older.

Another important feature is that US books on political socialization reporting theory and research reflect a geographical horizon limited to mainland United States. What transpired elsewhere in the world is largely ignored, hardly even mentioned in passing. This state of affairs is particularly remarkable because social science research about political socialization of children and youth emerged following the second World War, long after the examples of Italian (Fascist), German (Nazi), Soviet (Communist) and Japanese political education had become known. Consequently, rather than providing a basis for comprehending or explaining most of the important manifestations of political socialization, the horizons of the US research literature remained parochial. This fact alone limits the scope of generalization that legitimately can be made from this body of knowledge because, ipso facto, it limits the variety of political and educational phenomena encompassed by this research. Interestingly, a relatively recent text on political socialization written in Israel (Ichilov, 1984) is divided into two separate sections, one that surveyed the research literature from the US and UK, and the other that addressed the problems of Israel's political system and of political socialization in Israel. Apparently the author was convinced that, even though Israel is also a democracy, its political history and system were so unlike that of the United States, that it is patently unjustifiable to employ the existing research to explain the process of political socialization in Israel. This conclusion is applicable, a fortiori, to understanding and explaining the political socialization in non-democratic regimes such as monarchies and dictatorships.

But, not only Germany, Italy, the former Soviet Union, and Japan — all of whom participated in WWII — are beyond the scope of most of the US research on political socialization. Equally so are the Moslem nations of the Middle East (most of whom are monarchies or religio-military dictatorships) whose social institutions and processes have rarely been studied by social scientists, and whose culture and society are described primarily by Orientalists or political scientists specializing in the relevant nations. Their work is based on available documents or on a few direct observations, but not on systematic data that could be taken to represent the major trends of the society. These nations simply have not cultivated the social sciences, nor do they sanction the use of Western systematic research. Hence, there is as yet no reliable body of knowledge on which to base an analysis of the social processes in these countries, including the manifold phenomena of education. As a result, research on political socialization in the US has not been exposed to, or come to grips with, the two fundamental features of the political regime in the territory of the Palestinian Authority in particular, or found in most of the Arab nations of the Middle East in general, namely: a dictatorship or
absolute monarchy coupled with the prevailing religious civilization of Islam.

The Sources Used for this Chapter
Several experts in the Arabic language examined 140 textbooks intended for all grades of public education (1 to 12) published by the Palestinian Authority's Ministry of Education during the period of 1995 to 1998. Prior to that, during the period of 1993 to 1995, the PA followed the curricula of Egypt and Jordan. The topics taught in these books are: Civics, Grammar, Literature, History, Geography and Islamic Studies. The examiners made selections from peace-sensitive themes, and all selections are representative of a larger body of material with identical or similar messages. None of the statements cited here appear only once in a given text. All of them are repeated often in the same book and in most of the other textbooks as well. The quotations from the Palestinian schoolbooks cited here are only a few out of hundreds of statements collected. However, the material is so repetitive that even the relatively small selection of statements presented in this article suffices to convey both the tenor and substance of the entire collection.

Another source of information about Palestinian education employed in this article are the educational programs broadcast by the PA's television station. The PA's station is a division of the Authority's Ministry of Education. Viewing of the programs broadcast during the period of March to August 1998 revealed that many of the messages appearing in the schoolbooks were repeated on the PA's television station.

No material was included in this article derived from classic Islamic sources even when they portray the Jews negatively. All quotations and references to textbooks refer to, or are taken from, contemporary publications of the Palestinian Authority.

Three Main Themes about Israel and Jews in the Schoolbooks of the PA
Three topics appear as central leitmotifs throughout the books that were examined. These themes emerge clearly from even a cursory reading of the texts. They are:

1. A hostile portrayal of Jews, Judaism, Israel and Zionism;
2. The call for jihad and martyrdom against Israel and its people in order to reconquer all of Palestine for Islam;
3. A radical revision of history denying the relationship between Jewry and the land of Israel, affirming the Arabs' ownership of the territory of Israel since pre-Biblical times.

1. Hostility Towards the Jews
Hostility toward Israel, the Jews, Judaism and Zionism permeates the PA's schoolbooks. The schoolchildren in the Palestinian Authority are actively taught that the Jews and Israel are the enemy. They are the enemy of the Arabs, of Islam, of believers, and of people in general since the Jews are evil and dangerous. They are killers and robbers, and have stolen Arab land. Zionism is a synonym for Nazism, both of which are the prototype of racism. The Jews hate Moslems (from the text: Our Arabic Language, Part 2, 3rd grade, #523, p. 9), they have killed and evicted the Moslem and Christian inhabitants of Palestine. Those Arabs who remain (in Israel) still suffer oppression and persecution under Jewish racist administration (Islamic Education, 9th grade, #589, p. 182). “One must beware of the Jews for they are treacherous and disloyal.” (Islamic Education, 9th grade, p. 79) “The clearest examples of racist belief and racial discrimination in the world are Nazism and Zionism.” (The New History of the Arabs and the World, p. 123) “Zionism is a political, aggressive and colonialist movement, which calls for the Judaization of Palestine by the expulsion of its Arab inhabitants.” (Modern Arab History and Contemporary Problems, Part 2, 10th grade, #613, p. 49) “Jewish gangs waged racial cleansing wars against innocent Palestinians... large scale appalling massacres saving no women or children.” (PA television, May 14, 1998)

One final quotation concludes this section on the teaching of hostility toward the Jews:
Mankind has suffered from this evil both in ancient as well as in modern times, for, indeed, Satan has, in the eyes of many people, made their evil actions appear
beautiful until they thought that their race was the best of all, and their kind better than all others, and that other people are their slaves and do not reach their level. Such a people are the Jews (Islamic Education, 8th grade, #523, p. 9).

2. Jihad and Martyrdom: The Moslem “Children's Crusade”

Jihad and martyrdom are central to an understanding of the entire political orientation of Palestinian education regarding the Jews, and indeed of education in other Arab countries as well. Turning first to jihad, it can be noted that there are different kinds of jihad but the highest level and most frequently stressed meaning is the jihad (Holy War) that involves risking one's own life, as the following quotations from the textbook on Islam for the 7th grade explains unequivocally:

**Jihad involving risk of one's life:** This is by fighting enemies and standing firm against them in wars and battles. This is the highest level of jihad because the jihad fighter sacrifices himself for Allah’s way and for his religion, and to defend the Islamic nation (Islamic Education, 7th grade, p. 107).

If the enemy has conquered part of its (Muslim) land and those fighting for it are unable to repel the enemy, then jihad becomes the individual religious duty of every Muslim man and woman, until the attack shall have been successfully repulsed and the land liberated from conquest and Muslim honor satisfied (ibid., p. 108).

The reference in these quotations to an enemy who conquered Muslim land is to Israel as the conqueror of Palestine, and the name Palestine refers to all of Israel, not just to the territory presently controlled by the PA. In a textbook called Geography of the Arab Homeland directed at the 6th grade, there are 19 maps where present day Israel is marked “Palestine” (see pp. 12, 20, 23, 36, 48, 50, 53, 55, 61, 66, 72, 73, 75, 80, 81, 88, 90, 115, 124). Maps of the Middle East in which Israel does not exist and its area is marked as “Palestine” appear 11 times in the textbook called Social and National Education directed at the 5th grade (part A #549, see pp. 81, 84, 88, 89, 103, 107, 109, 110, 120, 122, 124). The children in the PA schools are being taught to prepare themselves for armed warfare against Israel as the enemy, and that the Jews residing within the present borders of Israel are designated as the objects of jihad, namely, targets to be killed! To dispel any doubt about the meaning and object of jihad and what is taught to schoolchildren in the PA, we quote the following poem which was read aloud from a schoolbook by a young girl attending a PA summer camp and broadcast on the PA's official television station on May 14, 1998 (and repeated on other days as well):

My brothers! The oppressors have overstepped the boundary. Therefore jihad and sacrifice are a duty... are we to let them steal its Arab nature... Draw your sword... let us gather for war with red blood and blazing fire... Death shall call and the sword shall be crazed from much slaughter... Oh Palestine, the youth will redeem your land...

The parallel between this “poem” and many school texts employed by German educators during the Nazi period is striking. The following lines are taken from a poem that appeared in the journal called Der Jungman, published in 1942 at an elite school in Germany named Napoli that supplied a large number of trainees for the SS:

Paradise lies in the shadow of the sword
Courage is more than the power of the sword
No man sees the struggle, which I initiate with steel blades
Effeminate is the man who does not fight with Weapons which he holds in his hands
(quoted from Blackburn, 1985, pp. 136-137).

**The Martyr Fights for Allah**

The second term to be examined is martyrdom, which is part of jihad (although not every act of jihad ends in martyrdom). Great importance is attached to the religious duty fulfilled by someone who dies fighting for Islam, and on the enormous reward provided by Allah that awaits him/her in Paradise. Again, the following quotations from PA textbooks are unambiguous:
Martyrdom is when a Muslim is killed for the sake of Allah... A person who dies thus is called a “Martyr” (Šahīd)... Martyrdom for Allah is the hope of all those who believe in Allah and have trust in His promises... The Martyr rejoices in the paradise that Allah has prepared for him (Islamic Education for Seventh Grade, #564, p. 112).

The Muslim sacrifices himself for his faith and fights a jiḥād for Allah. He does not know cowardice because he understands that the time of his death is already ordained and that his dying as a Martyr on the field of battle is preferable to dying in bed (Islamic Education for Eighth Grade, #576, p. 176).

“Song of the Martyr” (a poem to be learned by heart)

I shall take my soul in my hand
And hurl it into the abyss of death (in war)
Upon your life, I see my death
and am marching speedily towards it
Upon your life, this is the death of men
And he who seeks an honorable death — this
is that death

(Our Arabic Language for Fifth Grade, #542, p. 60), (Guide for Improving Arabic Language for Twelfth Grade, #719, p. 84). (PA television, May 22, 1998).

Teaching Children Self-Immolation for God and Country

The emphasis placed by the PA on jiḥād and martyrdom is not confined to lessons taught in school through books. Summer camps under the auspices of the PLO before the establishment of the PA, and now under the Palestinian Authority were, and are, military training installations commanded by officers in the PLO, as they have been for the past twenty years. Hundreds of boys aged 10 to 15 (contrary to a written order to induct only children aged 12 or above!) were trained by the PLO to operate rocket propelled grenades. During the Lebanese War these boys became known as the “RPG kids” (Israeli, 1983, pp. 222-225). Hundreds of others learned to use Kalashnikov automatic rifles, which, on more than a few occasions, they fired into their own school classrooms. The Israel army arrested over 200 of these boys during the Lebanese War and released them shortly afterwards.

Self-immolation in pursuit of a cause considered to be sacred, either because of its origin in holy writ, as a form of protest (such as Buddhist monks during the Vietnamese War), or in deference to a powerful monarch, is certainly not unknown in history. Yet, the phenomenon of suicide squads whose main mode of operation is to harm an enemy through their own death, has not been widespread heretofore. However pathological the educational indoctrination of the Hitler Jugend in Nazi Germany, or the Komsomol in the Soviet Union, (whose juvenile members were prepared to spy and inform on their own parents and thus bring about their ruin or even death) those countries did not really brainwash their own young children to immolate themselves while they were still children as an act of patriotism, although they committed many acts of violence (Blackburn, 1985). Nor were they ordered as children to confront armed soldiers by pelting them with rocks while their fathers remained in hiding, as was the case during the Palestinian uprising (intifāda) against Israel, and as is still practiced by the Palestinians after the Oslo and Wye River agreements.

In the modern world, the primary examples of religious and/or patriotic self-sacrifice are from the Far East. Two famous examples of children exploited as warriors who committed extreme acts of cruelty, albeit in different forms, are the Red Brigades of the Chinese Cultural Revolution (their average age was reported to be about 14 years old), and the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. The 12 to 14 year olds of the Red Brigades reportedly caused the death of over 40 thousand intellectuals in China. The Khmer Rouge trained tens of thousands of young people to serve as soldiers whose extreme cruelty in exterminating vast numbers (reports vary from one to two million) of their own countrymen is one of the bloodcurdling atrocities of the post WWII era. Only severe ideological blindness can ignore or underestimate the potential impact of long years of indoctrination by a propaganda driven state “education” on the lives of its young victims, and what they, in turn, will be capable of doing, indeed eager to do, when the
opportunity arises. (I’m not sure that William Golding thought of this eventuality when he wrote The Lord of the Flies, but it is consistent with his book.) There is more than ample evidence to demonstrate the effectiveness of prolonged exposure to propaganda on children and adults. Analysts of propaganda, some of whom are sophisticated observers of human behavior, have already identified the critical components of effective persuasion, however false the content of the message may be, and we need not repeat their contributions here (Ekman, 1992; Milgram, in press; Pratkanis & Aronson, 1991). We are attempting to point out some of the relatively unique characteristics of the Palestinian Authority’s particular brand of political education.

The closest precedent to the Palestinian indoctrination of school-aged children for jihad and martyrdom is the Japanese kamikaze pilots of WWII. They sought to inflict maximum damage on an enemy they knew was of superior strength, and they knew too that, in the larger scheme of things, their mission was ultimately of no avail. Nevertheless the kamikaze considered the mission that inevitably entailed their personal death to be sacred, as it intended to restore some of the lost honor of the Emperor and of Japan. Hence it was motivated by the powerful combination of both religious and national (not personal) factors. A noted Israeli Orientalist and political commentator on Islamic affairs (Israel, 1997), writing about the Japanese (Kamikaze) and Islamic forms of political suicide, as distinct from personal suicide (Hara-kin), suggested the term “Islamikaze” and charted the sources and development of this movement. It emerged in pre-Taliban Afghanistan, during the Russian occupation, where it now enjoys considerable support from the authorities. Some indication of the consequences of this development – probably with more events of this kind in the offing – became evident in the damage inflicted on US installations in Africa. However, use of the title Islamikaze does not imply that the Japanese kamikaze actually served as a conscious precedent for the Palestinian Arabs and the training of children to admire killing and strive to be terrorists.

The Islamic Version of Education for Terrorism

The Islamic version of education for terrorism also shares with the Japanese kamikaze the feature of public admiration and sanction for their sacrifice. There are, of course, several differences, the first of which is that the Japanese kamikaze were older than the Arab schoolchildren and were trained pilots in the Japanese airforce. Second, the bodies of the kamikaze pilots were not recovered, so the public acclaim showered on the pilots was demonstrated before their deaths, and in respect to the families of the fallen men.

The children in the Palestinian Authority witness many public funerals of slain terrorists and other rituals where the main theme is support for terrorism against Jews and Israel, in addition to proclaiming the glory of the terrorists. Funerals of young men killed in the pursuit of their missions, including those killed when their dynamite exploded while they were preparing bombs, are accompanied by a huge entourage. Large pictures of the deceased are displayed and their deeds extolled. The atmosphere of these frequent public funerals is charged with high-pitched emotions, loud wailing and chorus-like chanting of fierce threats to the Zionist enemy, to Israel and to Jews. Often the same threats are voiced against the United States as well, and there is the inevitable burning of the flags of the two countries (Israel and the US). Japanese children were not “socialized” into the role of kamikaze by constant exposure to the public display of admiration for the dead kamikaze pilots accompanied by thunderous threats hurled at the US. Furthermore, all during the years of the intifada, up to and including this very day, there have been numerous incidents of Arabs stoning Jews who unhappily found themselves driving through territory governed by the PA. They were, and are, attacked by small bands, or by large crowds, of rock throwing juveniles (and young men in their early twenties). Sometimes these attacks end in death for the Jews, sometimes they manage to escape with wounds of varying severity. This public drama makes a powerful impression on young children of all ages whose daily schooling provides the background for understanding and accepting the bloody spectacle they see so often before their very eyes. What should be
noted is the fact that, as best we know at this time, these violent events involving severe physical harm to people, with much blood pouring from them, do not appear to constitute a trauma for the young onlookers or participants precisely because they have been cognitively and emotionally prepared for them. What to other youngsters without previous indoctrination would be a shocking experience, the Palestinian children and youth (we will never know how many) rationalize and accept these events as legitimate and normative. This is especially true since these acts are carried out with total peer sanction and support as part of a gang or crowd. The psychological consequences of these experiences apparently are not traumatic for youth in the PA, but rather they are assimilated into their character type, becoming part of the personality, with an increase in aggressiveness and hostility toward others. There are few signs so far of intra-personal conflicts resulting from these events that ordinarily, under different circumstances, could produce psychological symptoms or other forms of distress or disabled functioning (Macksoud, Dyregrov & Raundalen, 1993). This topic deserves serious investigation.

Most important, these acts of extreme violence are carried out in the name of God. A discussion of the role of religion in general, and specifically in the modern era, in providing justification for murder and violence of all kinds cannot be undertaken here. As noted earlier, Islam is not alone in exploiting children as cannon fodder, such as was done on a grand scale by Iran in its war with Iraq. Nevertheless, it is deeply distressing to observe that, at the end of the 20th century, after all that has happened in the recent past, the God of one of the world’s great monotheistic religions is invoked by its devotees to consecrate acts of murder by young children who are taught to cry out “Allah Akhbar” (Allah is Great) when smashing the head of their victim with a huge rock! (Stav, 1989) “For God and country” is a battle cry that is no longer trumpeted in our time... or at least, so some people thought! Journalists asked some of these teenagers why they throw huge rocks at a private automobile driven by a Jewish man inside territory already evacuated by Israel and now governed by the Palestinian Authority? The youths’

response, seen and heard on television, is that they, the Arab youth, suffered previously at the hands of the Israelis and they are justified in expressing their rage now at this Jew who was driving his car in their territory! One youth said during a TV interview that the attack on the driver of a private automobile was carried out on “orders from above”. Palestinian Arab youth are primed to carry out acts of violence, even murder, against defenseless people. Their “conscience” is clean while the victim is the guilty one, and the adults who ordered this atrocity remain anonymous.

One final quotation from a PA schoolbook reads like a preamble to the bloody spectacle seen recently on television (December 2, 1998):

The first words the young boy heard were the words “jihad”, “attack” and “conquest”... These words were constantly on his lips... (The boy) Uqba grew up with the love of jihad flowing through his veins and filling every fiber of his being... For him, no joy equaled that of taking part in jihad...Nothing gave him pleasure but the sight of swords and spears shining in the hands of the fighting horsemen. Nothing was pleasing to his ear but the sound of the horses charging into battle and nothing gave him joy but the sight of the enemy lying dead on the battlefield, or defeated and fleeing for their lives. Uqba showed heroism and courage... attacking them from his horse and hacking the enemy soldiers to pieces, coming down on them blow after blow, crushing their skulls. (Uqba bin Nafti, or The Conqueror of Africa, 6th grade, #700, pp. 6 to 7, 43, 93, 96)

The Martyr’s Reward in Paradise

There is one more feature of jihad and martyrdom that provides a powerful incentive for the youth to strive to participate in armed war against Israel and Jews as an ideal in life. That feature is the nature of the personal reward they will receive in Paradise. Of course, only the elite will be chosen to progress from the level of a soldier in the jihad, with possible martyrdom, to the level of being a member of the Islamikaze suicide squads. However, that topic is beyond the scope of this
chapter since it is not related directly to the subject of school based indoctrination by the PA. Nevertheless, the fact that the soldier of jihad will be rewarded in Paradise if he dies for Islam is repeated frequently in the schoolbooks, and the nature of this reward is not an incidental matter. Based on a variety of original sources, Professor Israeli described the nature of this reward as follows:

In the popular image of the Moslem Paradise, the martyr can enjoy unlimited sex with the virgin girls of Paradise. Some say that there will be 70 young women for every man. After each act of love making, the girl’s virginity is miraculously restored in order to provide the martyr with virginal sexual gratification. The same is true for the consumption of alcohol, the second major prohibition of Moslem society...which will flow freely (Israeli, 1997, p. 73, note 21).

Public acclaim, a non-ending orgy of sex and all the booze you can drink, constitute a powerful combination of incentives for igniting the imagination and motivation of pubescent youth, aged 12 and up. Along with the emotionally charged scenes of actually stoning Jews and Jewish property, what more is needed to convince them that killing Jews is a worthy and honorable vocation? The PA is certainly preparing a huge army for the future that, socially and psychologically, will be trained to commit unmitigated violence against Israel and the Jewish People on behalf of Islam, the Arabs and Palestine. As already pointed out, the effectiveness of this early and prolonged indoctrination of school aged children is beyond doubt, nor can this policy of indoctrination be reconciled with the proclaimed desire to achieve peace with Israel.

3. Arab Revision of History

Diplomats, political scientists and others concerned with international relations frequently choose to ignore the historical dimension of conflicts between groups or nations since, obviously, history is not subject to manipulation in the present in order to reach solutions to conflicts. Some authors assert that our so-called post-modern era has sloughed off history to live “better” in the here and now. Nevertheless, the parties to international conflicts often derive their identity, and hence their tie to their claims, on the basis of their historical traditions. Parties to territorial or cultural conflicts are frequently eager to anchor their claims in historical precedent, which carries deep significance for those involved. So much so, that when such legitimacy appears to be weak or lacking, groups may revise or fabricate the historical record to make it appear as if their legitimacy is in fact historically founded, or to attribute their historical legitimacy to factors that heretofore were not recognized as related to the group in question. Historical revisionism thereby serves the twofold purpose of de-legitimizing a given group and attributing legitimacy to another (or to one’s own) group at one and the same time.

The Palestinian Authority’s schoolbooks present to its pupils a far-reaching revision of history that virtually erases Jews from all connection with the land of Israel that is not negative. They also fabricate viciously racist statements that are attributed to classical Jewish sources such as the Talmud, much along lines of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion that has served anti-Semites for close to two centuries, including, but not restricted to, Hitler and Stalin. These fabricated statements, allegedly formulated some 1400 years ago (the Talmud was completed around the beginning of the 7th century) in Babylonia, are then cited as reflecting the views of contemporary Jews. Many readers apparently remain unaware of the bizarre mental acrobatics inherent in these accusations.

Simultaneously, the Jews are summarily de-legitimized: they are not a nation, they allegedly fabricated and falsified their ancient and modern history, and by so doing, they denied the historicity of the Arab claims to Palestine based on their descent from the Jebusites who lived in ancient Canaan.

The Moslem claim that the Jews falsified Scripture is a relatively ancient phenomenon that emerged early in the history of Islam (Lewis, 1984). The schoolchildren in the PA learn that it begins with the Biblical story of Abraham:
Abraham was a Moslem monotheist and was not from among the idolaters (Islamic Education, 5th grade, #540, p. 143).

Allah sent Moses to his people and sent down to them the Book of the Torah... However, later the Israelites rebelled against their Lord and distorted His book. They argued and corrupted the land, and Allah, therefore, threatened them with torments of the Day of Judgement. (Islamic Education, 6th grade, #551, pp. 31-32)

Dear pupil. Do you know who the Palestinians are? The Palestinian people are descended from the Canaanites. (National Palestinian Education, 5th grade, #550, p. 19)

Israel (of the Bible)... dwelled near Yemen... Their original religion in the days of our master Moses... it is strange that the Torah does not give it a name, and I almost dare say, it is Islam... Mt. Sinai is Mt. Sinin in Yemen... today's Jews have no (biological) connection to the Israelites. (Palestine: History and Tradition, PA television, May 26, 1998)

Jerusalem is a Palestinian Arab city, and it has no connection to Israel. (PA television, May 24, 1998: Abd al-Rachman, PA official)

Jerusalem is an ancient Arab city built by the Jebusite Arabs before Islam... (Islamic Culture, 8th grade, #576, p. 50).

Exercise: Distinguish between verb and noun clauses. “The land is our land and Jerusalem is ours.” (Our Arabic Language, 5th grade, #542, p. 74)

The Jews have clear greedy designs on Jerusalem. They believe that their state is not complete without Jerusalem as its capital, which is what they claim. The proof of this is that their Minister of Defense declared on the third day of the war of 1967, together with the Prime Minister, when both of them were standing by “el-Buraq” which they call the Western Wall. “We have returned to you, Jerusalem, and we shall never part from you again. You are not just the capital of ‘Israel’ but the capital of the entire Jewish People.”

Thus do the Jews conspire, before the eyes and ears of the Arabs and the Moslems. What can we do to rescue Jerusalem and to liberate it from the thieving enemy? (Reader and Literary Texts, 8th grade, #578, pp. 96, 99)

Finally, the PA falsely attributes the following quotation to classic sources of Judaism (though no such statement existed prior to its invention by the PA):

It is mentioned in the Talmud: “We (the Jews) are God’s people on earth (God) forced upon the human animal and upon all nations and the races that they serve us, and He spread us through the world to ride on them and hold their reigns. We must marry our beautiful daughters with kings, ministers and lords and enter our sons into various religions, thus, we will have the final word in managing the countries. We should cheat them (the non-Jews) and arouse quarrels among them, then they fight each other... Non Jews are pigs who God created in the shape of man in order that they be fit for service for the Jews, and God created the world for them (the Jews).” (The New History of the Arabs and the World, p. 120).

Islam versus Judaism and the West

Many of the statements found in these texts mention Palestine, invariably referring to all of present day Israel. However, it is abundantly clear that the overall context of the jihad against the Jews and against Israel is the more fundamental war between Islam and the Moslems against Israel and the Jews, not just the conflict between the Palestinian Arabs and Israelis. Indeed, it is a war between Islam and Judaism, and even a war between Islam and the entire Western world. The PA textbooks are careful to avoid stating explicitly that this war includes the Christians and the Christian nations. On the contrary, an effort is made to mention Christians now and then in a positive light despite the frequent sweeping denunciation of Western civilization as if it excluded the Christians. Here are a few typical citations:
Remember: The final and inevitable result (of jihad) will be victory of the Moslems over the Jews. (Our Arabic Language, 5th grade, p. 67)

This religion will defeat all other religions and it will be disseminated, by Allah's will, through the Muslim jihad fighters. (Islamic Education, 7th grade, p. 125).

In the present period, which exceeds all previous periods in the material and scientific advances taking place, social, psychological and medical scientists in the West are perplexed by the worrying increase in the number of people suffering from nervous disorders...and the statistics from America in this matter are a clear indication of this...There is no escape from (the need for) a new civilization... The Western world is not capable of fulfilling this role... There is only one nation capable of discharging this task and that is our nation (Islam)... We do not claim that the collapse of Western civilization, and the transfer of the center of civilization to us (Islam) will happen in the next decade or two or even in fifty years, for the rise and fall of civilizations follow natural processes... Nevertheless (Western civilization) has begun to collapse and to become a pile of debris. (Some Outstanding Examples of our Civilization, 11th grade, pp. 3, 12, 16)

The Jews adopted a position of hostility and deception towards the new religion (Islam). They called Muhammad a liar and denied him, they fought against his religion in all ways and by all means, a war that has not yet ended until today, and they conspired with the hypocrites and the idolaters against him and they are still behaving in the same way. (Islamic Education, 7th grade, #564, p. 123, 125)

Arab Propaganda is Anti-Semitic, Not Anti-Zionist as Claimed

The quotations cited above embody several basic features of Arab hostility toward the Jews, including the reference to the Jews' role in ancient history which the Arabs have traditionally denounced because the Biblical stories do not corroborate Islam's claim to have inherited Abraham's legacy. This sweeping denunciation of the Jews encompasses all of known history, and is uttered allegedly in the name of all humanity. Obviously, such a stance has little to do with Zionism and everything to do with an inveterate anti-Semitism that is being passed on unchanged to all Arab children from an early age in the territory of the Palestinian Authority, just as it appeared in the publications and media of many Arab nations for decades (Harkabi, 1972). In light of these and many similar statements made throughout the PA's books for schoolchildren, it is patently contradictory for the PA to claim that it opposes Zionism and is not anti-Semitic (Israeli, 2000; Wistrich, 1985).

These statements confirm once again, if confirmation is still needed, that the anti-Zionist orientation of the Arabs, of the PLO, and of the other Arab terrorists groups, was only a thin camouflage to veil a more basic anti-Jewish animosity during this entire century. Again, this orientation stems from a long history of enmity between Islam and the Jews, which may have been relatively benign or latent in some periods, but burst out in violence in others. Anti-Zionism has become a convenient code to replace the less palatable term anti-Semitism (Lewis, 1984, 1986; Wistrich, 1985).

Palestinian Reaction to the Quotations from the Schoolbooks

In an interview with an Israeli journalist, the head of the Palestinian Broadcasting Corporation, Mr. Radwan Abu Ayyash, commented on the large collection of quotations from the PA's schoolbooks compiled and made available by the Jerusalem-based Palestine Media Watch. As reported by Isabel Kershner, writing in The Jerusalem Report of December 21 (1998), he said, inter alia:

If some sheikh says live on TV that all Israelis should be thrown into the sea, what can I do? Cut off his tongue? I can't change the hearts, the brains, the language of my people. I can't make them fall in love by force. We are journalists, mirrors, reflectors. I'm not here to lie, or to make propaganda (p. 32).
The Palestinian Authority TV director’s response to the mass of quotations from current schoolbooks is, of course, a skillful avoidance of the issue. It is precisely the official policy of the government that is reflected in the books that all children in school must read, not the sentiments of the population or of any particular individual, in Israel or in the PA’s territory. At the outset of this article we explicitly disclaimed the assumption that a review of textbooks informs us about the ideas, attitudes or feelings of the general population. Mr. Abu Ayyash was certainly aware of that fact when he skirted the question and disingenuously claimed that the quotations, in the schoolbooks as well as those made by children (often reading from those books) on the PA’s television, were expressions of popular opinion about which he can do nothing. Whether the quotations express popular opinion or not is irrelevant.

The point of the entire matter is that the Oslo and Wye River agreements refer to the nature of official policy that the PA undertook to disseminate among the Palestinian Arabs in its territory through official media. Among these media are included the textbooks used in the schools, the radio, television and newspapers. These media are under direct control of government agencies in the PA, they are not privately owned corporations that enjoy protection under a bill of rights or any other law. What they express is government policy, not personal opinion. No one would assert that every citizen of Israel loves the Palestinian Arabs. I would venture to guess that not many Jews in Israel entertain illusions about the feelings of the Arabs in the Palestinian Authority for the Jews. Yet, investigators would search in vain in official publications in Israel and/or of the Israel government, for any expression of hostility toward Arabs anywhere, of the kind found in the schoolbooks of the PA. The assertion made by Abu Ayyash that the television is a reflection of popular sentiments, is a transparent attempt to deny responsibility for what is published and broadcast in the name of the Palestinian Authority. That and other attempts to avoid the truth cannot obscure the basic fact that the Palestinian Authority’s own “educational” doctrine allows for no room in the territory known before 1948 as Palestine, and now known as Israel and the territories of the Palestinian Authority, for the Jews and Palestinian Arabs to live side by side without expecting perpetual warfare.

Israel’s Educational Policy Regarding the Palestinians Following the Oslo Agreement

Israel’s official educational policy never sought to indoctrinate children with any ideology that expressed animosity toward any nation or religion, the Arabs and Islam included. However, I leave that subject for others to investigate and to report their findings as they see them. Here I will concentrate on Israel’s official educational policy immediately following the Oslo accords. Israel (population just over 6 million) has a centralized educational system controlled by one Ministry of Education. The executive director of the Ministry regularly issues a circular setting policy on a wide variety of topics for all of the schools in the nation. This circular is to be found in every school and in the hands of each and every school principal. Some of the guidelines for behavior appearing in this circular are in the form of suggestions regarding which school principals retain a degree of discretion as to their adoption. Other provisions are in the form of requirements that the principal is legally bound to implement. Every year a topic is determined by the Ministry called “The Central Topic” about which a special circular is issued. All schools are asked to discuss that topic throughout the year with the students, often during a particular class session called “the educator’s hour” or “the social hour”, by which is meant one hour during a week devoted to a topic affecting society at large. Often, though not always, it is “The Central Topic”.

In May 1994, the executive director of the Israel Ministry of Education issued a circular entitled “The Central Topic for 1995: “The Peace Process — Israel in the Middle East”, General Guidelines” (Executive Director’s Special Circular, 1994). Similar topics, such as “Democracy” and “Respect for Others”, were announced for succeeding years. These circulars are in the public domain and available in Israel’s main libraries for anyone to read, as well as in all of the schools. A short overview of the general direction
and tenor of this particular (1994) circular follows, including several direct quotations:

Peace is a broad topic, but the primary purpose of proclaiming this subject as the year’s “Central Topic” is to undertake an in-depth discussion and exploration of the process of achieving peace with the Palestinians and with the Arab nations. What will Israel and the Middle East look like in an era of peace? In these discussions, care must be taken to distinguish between the Arabs of Israel (i.e., Arab citizens of Israel), Palestinian Arabs, and the Arabs of each and every Arab nation surrounding Israel and with whom there are now, or will be in the future, negotiations for achieving a peace agreement. The achievement of such agreements is to be presented as an existential need and goal of Israel. Students should understand that disagreements between Israel and the Arab nations are legitimate.

The overriding goal is to cultivate a tolerant citizen, aware of the values of peace, sensitive, attentive, involved, knowledgeable and one with a political perspective that is supported by well-grounded reasoning, one who can conduct a cultured dialogue with those who disagree with his/her perspective, and to develop empathy and understanding, without necessarily reaching agreement, for those with different ideas (p. 8).

The circular goes on to explain to teachers the need for emphasizing the benefits of peace to both Arabs and Israel from social, economic and cultural points of view. Teachers should emphasize the democratic aspects of the peace process, such as accepting the decision of the majority of the population regarding peace, the need for expressing dissent through accepted channels only, the basic rights of each and every person, etc. Israel has begun a process of peace negotiations with groups that thus far have been its sworn enemies. That process could possibly change the political status quo that prevailed in the region heretofore.

Teachers and students alike are undergoing change that is necessary for adapting to the new situation. In particular, students must learn to accept the need for political compromises, and to appreciate the need for “empathy... toward the Arabs with whom Israel is negotiating peace.” (p. 11)

“There is an objective difficulty in the degree to which Israelis are prepared to establish close relations with Arabs and to trust them.” (p. 13) Teachers must help students overcome such difficulties after years of war and terrorism.

This summary of Israel’s official educational response to the Oslo agreement conveys the depth of the chasm between the official educational policies of the Palestinian Authority and of Israel. Obviously the two policies derive from totally different belief systems, as well as reflecting fundamentally incompatible intentions as far as the nature of peace between Arabs and Jews is concerned. This state of affairs begs the question: How long can this asymmetrical set of expectations persist? How long can the Israel public maintain its striving for rapprochement with the Palestinian Arabs in the face of such brute hatred and rejection? Will the Arab media really change their attitudes and depiction of Jews and Israel? Some social-science investigators in Israel claim that stereotypes of Arabs found in children’s literature in Israel theoretically could ultimately lead to violence against Arabs. These researchers are curiously silent about the presence and effects of relentless and flagrant incitement of Arab children and youth by the Palestinian Authority and by various Arab nations to mercilessly slaughter Jews. Will the political socialization of children and propaganda among the adult population continue as it is now, while Israel will be expected to ignore these facts and pursue a unilateral policy of peace (which, of course, is a contradiction in terms)? It seems that Israel is being browbeaten into submission by the Western powers upon whom Israel relies for its survival, and who are largely indifferent to the price Israel pays now, and will pay in the future, for these agreements with the Palestinian Arabs.
THE HYDRO-POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE OSLO AGREEMENTS: AN ISRAELI PERSPECTIVE

Martin Sherman

First of all, my son, see to it you are always camped upstream and your enemies downstream.

North American Indian Adage

A. Introduction

The signing of the 1993 Oslo Accords and more specifically of the pursuant 1995 Interim Agreement ("Oslo II") heralded the onset of new and challenging hydro-political realities for Israel. By agreeing to relinquish her exclusive authority over water-related activity in Judea and Samaria for the first time since 1967, she placed severely onerous limitations on her already overextended water supplies.

Much has been written about the water shortage as the likely epicenter of conflict in the Middle East. However, most of the emphasis has been on hydrological, economic and technical perspectives with little, if any attention devoted to an analysis of the political implications which arise from these hydro/econo/techno realities — especially in terms of the realistic policy options they facilitate on the one hand, and the policy imperatives they impose, on the other.

In this regard, a methodological clarification is in order. It should be pointed out that throughout this study, I shall attempt to eschew partisan connotations in the use of the word "politics" — and its adverbial and adjectival derivatives — and rigorously restrict the meaning ascribed to it by David Easton — i.e. as an "authoritative allocation of social values". Accordingly, I relate to "hydro-politics" as that branch of politics which deals with the authoritative allocation of social values that pertain to hydrological resources.

In theory, there may be ways and means of reducing, even perhaps removing, the potential for conflict over water which appear both technologically feasible and economically viable. Yet for their actual implementation to become a reality, radical changes are called for in the basic nature of many of the region's political parameters. This is an aspect that is often treated with seeming disregard by well-meaning economists, hydrologists and engineers. However, the impact of such changes is likely to be so far-reaching that it can hardly be overstated.

In this paper I endeavor to explore the significance of these political facets of the water issue and their attendant policy derivatives from an Israeli perspective. To a large extent, the conclusions drawn cut across the grain of the prevailing conventional wisdom regarding the Middle East peace process. However, if water is to be eliminated as a potential flash point of violence, it is essential that the hydro-political realities, however unpleasant, be dealt with frankly. Indeed, even if disputes are deemed inherently irresolvable, honest and accurate diagnosis of their intensity can still be of value in inducing stability. For it may well cause efforts, which might otherwise be channeled into futile attempts at unattainable conflict resolution, to be diverted into more fertile avenues of attainable conflict management. Thus attempts to embellish the
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The facts of today should be studiously eschewed for they can only serve to aggravate the conflicts of tomorrow.

B. Defining the Problem

The intrinsic structure of Israel’s water problem can be best portrayed as a twin predicament.

On the one hand, as a country located on the fringe of a desert, it is dependent entirely on the vagaries of the weather (i.e. natural precipitation) for her water supplies; the other hand, if western living standards are to be maintained, the inherent long term inelastic demand (i.e. demand largely insensitive to price changes) will, as a matter of certainty, outstrip long term natural supply.

Both maintaining western living standards and the inelastic demand are of substantive and interrelated significance. Israel is a country virtually devoid of any natural riches. She has no large tracts of land, no great rivers, forests or mineral deposits. The only recourse at her disposal is the human resource. Accordingly, her future development, indeed her very survival, hinges on the quality and ability of her people. Necessarily then, one of her most vital strategic objectives is to generate a quality of life which can compete with that in other countries which constitute tempting, alternative abodes for talented Israelis with high earning capacity. Water is a crucial component in generating the living standards required by this segment of the population, which in effect is no less than the sine qua non for the future viability of the country.

The importance of this point cannot be overestimated. It is virtually inconceivable that in any feasible scenario in the foreseeable future, Israel could sustain itself as an independent political entity without developing and maintaining the prowess of an advanced “Western” country in terms of scientific, technological and organizational capabilities. The development and maintenance of such prowess require the development and maintenance of a commensurately advanced population in terms of its scientific, technological and organizational skills, talents and abilities. This is particularly true in view of the previously mentioned dearth of natural wealth in the country which leaves human ability the only resource on which to draw. To grasp fully the veracity of this statement, one need only imagine how Israel might have fared in contending with the tremendous challenges it faced over the last five decades, had the capabilities of its people not been given it a qualitative edge against its adversaries despite the overwhelming quantitative disadvantage it suffered.

However, it is clearly unfeasible to sustain such a population over time without providing an appropriate standard of living which would be roughly comparable to that which an individual of such ability could attain elsewhere. This is becoming particularly true in an era in which the force of secular ideologies (on which the Zionist movement drew heavily in Israel’s initial years) is waning, and in which population mobility is extremely high (especially in the case of individuals endowed with skills that are in great demand).

Clearly, such a satisfactory standard of living includes adequate levels of personal hygiene, recreational amenities, environmental aesthetics and so on. Frequent bathing, swimming pools, well groomed gardens and public parks all involve water consumption, without which adequate standards of modern life cannot be attained. It is therefore not surprising to find that there is a very strong (monotonously increasing) functional correlation between living standards and water consumption. This is shown in Figs. 1 (a) and (b).

Accordingly, given the maintenance of Western living standards as a strategic objective, it follows that at any given period, the average per capita non-agricultural demand for water will tend to be largely inelastic at minimum required consumption levels. Fishelson, in his study of the demand for water in the Israeli household sector, takes an essentially similar position to that presented above, asserting that:

...even at very high water prices, household consumption of water would hardly decline... Any attempt to lower the domestic water consumption below this level would be rather unsuccessful and its costs in terms of welfare might be quite high.

Other scholars, such as Arlosoroff and Sherman, have also recognized an inherently inelastic compo-
nent in the demand for water. The crucial question therefore is how this minimum, largely inelastic, demand compares with the total overall physical availability of water in the country.

C. Israeli Water Supply and Demand: Present Levels and Future Trends

At present, the overwhelmingly predominant proportion of Israel’s urban water demand is supplied from three major sources which comprise what is known as the National Water System (the NWS):

1. **The Sea of Galilee (Lake Kinneret)** is the country’s only major surface water source and whose drainage basin comprises the northern portion of the Jordan and its major tributaries. As seen in Map 1, the major portion of this drainage area falls within the Golan Heights.

2. **The Coastal Aquifer** which extends eastwards along almost the entire length of Israel’s Mediterranean shoreline between the southern approaches of Haifa in the north and Gaza in the south. See Map 1.

3. **The Mountain Aquifer** in particular the western portion namely, the Yarkon-Taninim aquifer (named after the two rivers which discharge from it into the Mediterranean Sea). The Mountain Aquifer extends from the eastern fringes of the coastal aquifer under the hills of Judea and Samaria (the “West Bank”). As can be seen in Map 1, it comprises three portions:
   a. the northern portion which discharges into the Jezreel Valley;
   b. the eastern portion which extends beneath the eastern slopes of the Judean and Samarian hills towards the Jordan Valley;
   c. the western — and by far the most important — portion, which constitutes Israel’s principal source of high quality drinking water.

As will be subsequently shown, each of these sources is liable to be seriously affected — either directly or indirectly — by the implementation of the Oslo Accords.

The permissible output (or safe yield) of these sources varies according to the amount of annual rainfall. In dry periods, this is barely 600 mill. c³m. For much of the late 1980s and early 1990s, this has been in the range of 600-950 mill. c³m. Compared to these quantities, the annual non-agricultural demand has reached a level of 600-700 mill. c³m, and is rising steeply. According to some estimates, it will reach almost 850 mill. c³m by the end of the decade.

Hence, even at prevailing levels of population
and per capita consumption rates, almost the entire safe yield of the NWS is required to fulfill current non-agricultural demand. This means that under the existing conditions of the surface and ground water reservoirs comprising it, significant quantities of water can be provided to the agricultural sector only by over-exploiting the capacity of the NWS beyond safely sustainable extraction levels. Indeed, according to hydrological estimates in recent years, annual demand has exceeded permissible supply by 100-300 million c\textsuperscript{3}m.\textsuperscript{14}

This analysis illustrates why Israeli agriculture has become increasingly dependent on recycled sewerage and other types of low-grade waters unsuitable for drinking purposes.\textsuperscript{15} Hence, to a large degree, it cuts the ground from under the often expounded claim that Israel could resolve its current water crisis by re-allocating water presently used for agricultural irrigation to the non-agricultural sector. This point was underscored by former Israeli Water Commissioner, Menachem Kantor, who cautioned that:

...we will face an imminent shortage of water of drinking quality in the near future... There will be no water of drinking quality for agriculture in a few years time. There will be no user [i.e. the farmer] whose demand we can reduce so as to allocate more [water] for household usage... There is no agricultural water in the areas of [urban] demand which can be transferred to drinking water.\textsuperscript{16}

At this juncture, the point should be made that, by Western standards, the Israeli urban sector is in no way extravagant in its consumption of water. Present levels of average per capita urban consumption in Israel are in the range of 90-100 c\textsuperscript{3}m per annum.\textsuperscript{17} By comparison, the urban use in southern California, a region of similar climate, ranges from 250 to 300 c\textsuperscript{3}m per capita per annum.\textsuperscript{18} (Also see Fig. 1 (a) above)

However, beyond the relative thrift of the non-agricultural consumer in Israel, the underlying significance of the foregoing analysis is ominous. For if Israel's population, now at 5.5 million (excluding Judea, Samaria and Gaza), were to reach 7-7.5 million and the urban demand were to approach the lower levels such as the demand in affluent Western states, the country's entire safe yield of fresh water\textsuperscript{19} — including from sources not presently incorporated in the national system such as the aquifers in the Arava and the Jordan Valley — would be required to satisfy the urban demand alone. In this regard it is highly significant to note that even analysts such as Arlosoroff, who believe that annual urban demand per capita can be limited to 110-120 c\textsuperscript{3}m, see the inelastic demand over-hauling the natural supply capacity within two decades. He estimates that “[i]nelastic consumption of fresh water will amount to approx. 1200-1650 million c\textsuperscript{3}m per year (in 2020).”\textsuperscript{20}

This analysis underscores both the objective long-term dearth of water in Israel and the crucial importance that control over all the available fresh water sources has for her continued well-being. However, as will be subsequently shown, because of the inherently integrated structure of the NWS, the severity of these implications goes beyond the mere inadequacy of the accumulative capacity of the individual sources to supply future demand. It will be seen that a more serious danger is that relinquishing control over one source in the system is very likely to menace the viability of the remaining sources which comprise it.

D. Deteriorating Quantity and Quality: The Twin Threat to Israeli Water Resources

The quantities of water drawn from any one of the three sources comprising the NWS influence, not only the quantity of its water, but also — and perhaps more seriously — their quality may well deteriorate. For as the quantity in any given source diminishes, the threat to the quality of remaining supplies in it increases — due to increased salinization and the intensification of chemical and biological pollution in a reduced body of water. Clearly shrinking quantities and deteriorating quality in one water source necessarily increase the importance of other sources in the system, thereby underscoring the need for a comprehensive policy for its overall management as a single integrated unit. (This is an aspect discussed in greater detail in Section F.)

Consequently, the responsible management of
the system requires careful and considered coordination of the exploitation of the different sources, so as to minimize the potential danger of serious damage to any one of them. For if in any one year, a certain source is in a critical condition, extraction from it may have to be drastically reduced, or even stopped (such as in the case of the Kinneret in the early 1990s) in order to prevent irreparable damage to the entire source, while utilization of another source is increased to make up the shortfall. However, such coordinated compensation in times of crisis is feasible only if control and authority over other sources are maintained.

The importance of this aspect is increased by the severe deterioration in the levels of both quality and quantity in the Coastal Aquifer. The level of salt and other pollutants in the water has reduced the quality in numerous sites to below that permissible for drinking water.\textsuperscript{21} Hydrological forecasts also warn that by the year 2010, many existing wells will also be forced to shut down, further exacerbating the situation.\textsuperscript{22} For example, Kliot warns that

\lbrack a\rbrack about 10 percent of the coastal aquifer already exceeds the national limit for chloride salts and by 2010, if pumping continues, 20 percent of the water will exceed the limit. Ultimately this will lead to 80% of the wells which pump water from this aquifer being shut down...\textsuperscript{23}

Furthermore, in recent years, whether due to international pressures or government preference, Israel has adopted a building policy which largely eschews expansion of its narrow seaboard metropolis eastward toward the hills of Judea and Samaria. Indeed, intensive construction in these areas would certainly run counter to the underlying rationale of the Oslo Accords. The result has been a great concentration of construction in the coastal region. This serves to exacerbate the water situation even further, as it will necessarily reduce the amount of rainfall that the aquifer can absorb (due to increased coverage by concrete, roads and pavements) and increase the dangers of pollution of the existing ground water (due to increased volume and intensity of human activity above the aquifer).

The same basic pattern has been prevalent in the Sea of Galilee which has often been at dangerously low levels in recent years. The quality of the water has been — and is — continually endangered by chemical and biological pollutants in the lake.\textsuperscript{24} Such processes constitute an ongoing threat to the suitability of the Kinneret’s waters for both agricultural and domestic use.

These factors considerably increase the importance of the Mountain Aquifer as a source of high-grade fresh water for the Israeli metropolis. Recognition of this growing importance was expressed in a special report by the Israeli State Comptroller on the country’s water system:

The Mountain Aquifer, extending eastward from the Coastal Aquifer, from the slopes of Mt. Carmel to Be’er Sheva and from the crests of the mountain ridges of Judea and Samaria to the coastal plain, serves as the principal reservoir of drinking water in the country. It supplies drinking water to the Dan region, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and Be’er Sheva. Today it is the most important long-term source in the [national] water system — due the serious condition of the Coastal Aquifer, both with regard to quality and quantity — and is intended to store excess winter flood waters from the Kinneret.\textsuperscript{25}

Thus, the Mountain Aquifer, portions of which extend into Judea and Samaria (the “West Bank”), almost all of which has been designated for transfer to Palestinian control by the Oslo Agreements,\textsuperscript{26} plays a pivotal role in the functioning of the Israeli water system, not only as a major source itself but in conjunction with the Kinneret as a vital element in the coordinated management of local surpluses and deficits and hence in maintenance of the NWS as a whole. In this regard it should be stressed that the importance of the aquifer as a regulatory element in the NWS is increased even further by the fact that the artificial recharge of the Coastal Aquifer with Kinneret surplus flood water — a measure deemed crucial for the latter’s restoration — must be conducted via the Mountain Aquifer. Of this aspect the State Comptroller observes:

In the program for the restoration of the Coastal Aquifer, emphasis is placed...mainly on the artificial recharge of the aquifer (mostly with winter flood waters from the
Kinneret)... [However] the winter waters of the Kinneret are murky because of tiny algae [in colloidal suspension], which clog the recharge drilling sites. In order to overcome this problem, "a double recharge" [process] is conducted — [an initial] recharge into the Mountain Aquifer (in which there is no such clogging phenomenon as in the Coastal Aquifer) and then re-extraction for recharge into the Coastal Aquifer.27

(This difference in the clogging tendencies of the Mountain and Coastal Aquifers is due to the difference in their geological composition i.e. the karstic limestone/dolomite composition of the former,28 as opposed to the sandstone composition of the latter.)

This dual function of the Mountain Aquifer, both as a receptacle and as a (secondary) source of Kinneret recharge flood water for the Coastal Aquifer, in addition to its own importance as a primary source of high grade ground water, underscores its crucial significance for the preservation of the NWS as a sustainable source of supply. Thus Anderson observes that:

The West Bank...and the Golan Heights are increasingly vital to the water economy of Israel. Apart from the direct abstraction, recharge drawn off within Israel occurs in the West Bank. The Israeli presence on the Golan Heights guards against any possible diversions in the upper Jordan Valley [such as those attempted by the Syrians prior to 1967]... The West Bank has become critical as a source of water for Israel, and it could be argued that this consideration outweighs other political and strategic factors.29

Consequently, three principal factors —

a. the over-exploitation and accumulating pollution of the Coastal Aquifer,

b. the unreliable volatility of the Kinneret as a source of supply, and

c. the crucial role of the Yarkon-Taninim aquifer in the maintenance of Israel's water system as a whole underscores the severity of consequences for Israel inherent in a policy of foregoing one or more of her major water sources. In particular, it highlights the political deadlock which is likely to result from any initiative that entails relinquishing control of the Mountain Aquifer by Israel. In the ensuing section, I analyze several of these ramifications in greater detail.

E. The Waters Of The Mountain Aquifer: A Perennial Potential for Conflict

The durability of any political settlement (as opposed to its formal contractual enactment) of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute will necessarily depend on the question of how authority over various resources and activities is to be divided and administered. Water resources, their exploitation and preservation, are a particularly acute case in point.

Since the Mountain Aquifer extends physically into Judea and Samaria, straddling the 1967 "Green Line", any activity affecting the ground water on one side of this line will, by the Principle of Connecting Vessels, affect the waters on the other side.30 Moreover, the areas designated for transfer to the Palestinian entity envisaged in the Oslo Accords are situated upstream of the subterranean flows and constitute almost the entire recharge zone of the aquifer. Consequently, extraction operations sited on the western slopes of the Judean and Samarian hills lying east of the "Green Line", and/or uncontrolled flows of sewerage or industrial effluent emanating from them, are liable to result in depletion, salinization and/or pollution of the "principal long term reservoir in the water system, and source of drinking water for most the major [Israeli] cities".31 To grasp these dangers, one may visualize, as a schematically simplistic but instructive analogy, a vessel containing liquid, cut by an imaginary line. Extracting liquid on one side of the imaginary line lowers the level of both sides of the line. Likewise, pollution on one side will spread throughout the entire body of liquid, contaminating it on both sides of the imaginary divide.

The State Comptroller's Report warned that the principal danger in operating the Mountain Aquifer lies in lowering the water level below the "red lines":32
In such an eventuality, sea water is liable to penetrate into the aquifer via its interface with the sea, as well as saline water from adjacent sub-salt concentrates. The relatively fast flow of the water in the underground spaces and crevices is liable to cause a rapid spreading of the salt water through the aquifer causing...the ruin of pumping locations.

Just how crucial the issue of authority and control over the water sources in Judea and Samaria is for the country's future emerges from a report of Israel's Water Commissioner to the government in May 1989. The report entitled “Political Arrangements in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, and their Influence on the Security of the Water of the State of Israel” states (pp. 1-2):

The water sources of Judea and Samaria are intimately interconnected with the principal water sources of Israel...the quantities reaching Israel are exploited entirely as high quality groundwater, and constitute approximately half of the country's supply of drinking water...It is physically possible to increase the rate of pumping in Judea and Samaria in the northern and western regions so as to cause the cessation of pumping operations inside Israel...An additional danger to the groundwater in Judea and Samaria arises from sewage and other sources of pollution which will contaminate the water in the western regions...33

Subsequent developments have shown that such warnings were not unfounded. Although the Oslo II Agreements specifically bind both sides to refrain from increased unilateral utilization of the Yarkon-Taninim aquifer and from pollution of ground water sources,34 there has been growing concern both as to the illegal drilling sites and intensified pollution of Israeli water supplies following the transfer of main population centers in Judea and Samaria to Palestinian control.

Recent media reports provide worrying accounts of the situation. Towards the end of 1995, newspaper reports indicated that the Palestinians had instigated numerous illegal drilling operations in areas evacuated by the Israel Defense Force shortly before. Gideon Zur, then incumbent Water Commissioner, warned that such activities are “liable to cause heavy damage to Israeli ground water supplies”.35 Similar reports of unauthorized Palestinian drilling sites were reported several weeks later by another Israeli daily, Ma'ariv.36

On the pollution issue, things are, if anything, worse. A senior official charged with environmental affairs in the Civilian Authority in Judea and Samaria was quoted in the largest circulation Israeli daily, Yediot Aharonot, claiming that:

...we have exceeded the red line of danger levels and we are already exposed to health hazards due to pollution of ground water. The situation is really critical. These sewage flows must be dealt with immediately...a significant percentage of the water seeping into the ground supplies is Palestinian sewage...This is a real danger to Israeli water sources. 37

Under the prominent headline “Palestinian Sewage Endangers the Public Health in Israel” the newspaper investigation confirmed that “the major portion of the Palestinian sewage flows into wadis, and infiltrates into ground water which is used for drinking purposes in Israel.” Other sources have corroborated the seriousness of the potential dangers inherent in the current situation.38 Then Environment Minister Raphael Eitan, also complained of Palestinian disregard toward their contractual obligations regarding the water issue in an address to the Knesset (December 12, 1996), accusing them of purposeful neglect of the sewerage problem.

These events, coupled with both the great interdependence and scarcity of water supplies, accentuate further the severity of the problem of defining the authority of the various parties over the resources. Under the prevailing hydrological conditions, even in an atmosphere of mutual trust — an element which seems conspicuously lacking at present — the problem of allocating such a vital and scarce shared resource would make disputes difficult to avoid. The mechanism of a Joint Water Committee (JWC) stipulated in the Oslo II accords will be unlikely to alleviate the difficulties.39 Indeed, it is more likely to exacerbate deadlock. For
agreement stipulates that the JWC “shall be comprised of an equal number of representatives from each side” and “all decisions...shall be reached by consensus...” Inevitably, numerous thorny questions will arise, none of which will be made any easier to resolve in light of the unsatisfactory experience encountered hitherto, especially in an inherently deadlocked committee.

For example: Who will have the final say as to where future drilling sites are to be located? Who will determine how much water is to be pumped from them without irreparably damaging the aquifers? Who will decide where potentially polluting industries should or should not be sited within the areas evacuated by Israel? How can Palestinian compliance with agreed restrictions on pumping and standards of pollution treatment be verified without Israel maintaining not only a physical presence in the Palestinian areas but also having extensive powers to monitor Palestinian activity and enforce adherence to treaty terms in case of infringements? Furthermore, on such issues, written agreements will often be of little value. For it is clearly unfeasible for such a document to foresee all possible eventualities and potential sources of friction. Therefore, in cases of disputes as to the interpretation of the agreement, whose will is to be imposed on whom? How could Israel ensure its vital interests without imposing unacceptable constraints on the Palestinians' freedom to determine their own domestic matters? Conversely, how could the Palestinians be given freedom to conduct their legitimate domestic affairs without gravely endangering Israel's vital interests? This is a predicament which has been referred to by both Palestinians and Israelis. Thus, on the one hand, Sharif el-Musa, advisor to the Palestinian negotiating team on water issues, points out that continued Israel monitoring and control of water related activities within the territories administered by the Palestinians after the interim period will constitute a violation of their national right to self-determination. On the other hand, Dore Gold, formerly of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies and later Israel's ambassador to the UN, poses the following question:

What will the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] do if unauthorized wells are drilled on land where the PA [Palestinian Authority] has been given virtually full control? Will the IDF intervene in order to put a stop to the exploitation of water that the PA views as a national right?41

Moreover, the formulation of an agreement is likely to be hampered by the ambiguous legal situation. Existing legal frameworks, chiefly the Helsinki Rules and the ILC (International Law Commission) rules generally pertain to surface water, and are more relevant to the division of waters in river basins or riparian rights of states lying along a common waterway. Not only is their significance for shared ground water resources unclear, but the two systems differ on various points of importance, for example, the weight assigned to factors such as prior use, or the dependence of a population upon a given water source, as a basis for determining future allocation.42 Such inconsistencies, indeed contradictions, can only create an even greater scope for controversy and conflict. Ambivalence of this nature, particularly on issues of such crucial importance, can also only create controversy and a greater scope for conflict. Just how such legal ambiguity is liable to cultivate dissension in the future can be gauged from the attitude of Meir Ben Meir, the incumbent Water Commissioner at the time of writing this article, regarding the division of the waters of the Mountain Aquifer when he stated that, “...we are not going to stop irrigating our preexisting orchards so they [the Palestinians] can plant new ones.”43

Thus, under the Helsinki Rules, the prior use of water and the dependence of Israeli farmers on this water for maintaining such “pre-existing orchards” would constitute factors in determining Israel's reasonable and equitable share of extraction, while under the ILC rules, they would not. Conversely, under the ILC rules, potential future Palestinian orchards must be considered as a valid element in determining how joint water resources should be shared. But this would not be so under the Helsinki Rules, which seem specifically to preclude “future use” of another party as a basis for the division of such resources.44
However, even if all disputes were resolved, and some mutually accepted *modus vivendi* was indeed reached, Israel's future water supply would then be largely dependent not only on such compromise agreements being honored by the Arab party who co-signed it, but also by any potential successor who might come to power in the future. Certainly, militant elements both among the Palestinians and elsewhere in the Arab world (including the growing Moslem opposition elements in Jordan) would oppose any such agreement with Israel and be unlikely to honor it, if they came to power. Furthermore, the enormous socio-economic difficulties that will confront any Palestinian administration greatly increase the prospect of its overthrow and its replacement by some other regime hostile to Israel. It would be highly unlikely that such a successor regime would adhere to the terms of any compromise, especially one on so vital an issue as water. The following excerpt from Article 13 of the "Charter of Allah": The Platform of the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS), which enjoys wide support in many segments of the Palestinian public, illustrates the point well:

Israel will...remain erect until Islam eliminates it... [Peace] initiatives, the so-called peaceful solutions, and the international conferences to resolve the Palestinian problem, are all contrary to the beliefs of the Islamic Resistance Movement. For renouncing any part of Palestine means renouncing part of the religion... There is no solution to the Palestinian problem except by Jihad [holy war]. The initiatives, proposals and International Conferences are but a waste of time, an exercise in futility.\(^{45}\)

Indeed, the compromise accord itself could quite likely be cited as the justification (at least in part) for the overthrow itself. Article 11 of the above quoted Charter is quite specific in this regard, proclaiming:

The Islamic Resistance Movement believes that the land of Palestine has been an Islamic Waqf throughout the generations and until the Day of Resurrection, no one can renounce it or part of it or abandon it or part of it. No Arab country or the aggregate of all Arab countries, and no Arab King or President nor all of them in the aggregate have that right, nor any organization nor the aggregate of all the organizations, be they Palestinian or Arab...\(^{46}\)

Awareness and concern over the problem of future control of the water is not confined to hawkish right-wing politicians in Israel. For example, former Labor Party Minister of Agriculture, Avraham Katz-Oz addressed the issue in a proposed resolution to the Shamir government dated May 5, 1989. In a document entitled "The Security of the State of Israel's Water Today and in the Future", Katz-Oz, then the minister responsible by law for the fate of the water system, proposed that the Israeli government take steps to "prevent any increase of the pumping operations in Judea, Samaria and Gaza" and urged it to

prepare a legal and political basis to ensure continued Israeli control and administration of the water sources in Judea and Samaria, whatever the political situation in the future.\(^{47}\)

However, this is clearly a position with which the Palestinians are unlikely to concur or comply. For the institution of such a "legal and political basis", which could "ensure continued Israeli control of the water sources in Judea and Samaria" would inevitably render meaningless any semblance of Palestinian self-determination. However, the lack of such control would mean that the fate of Israel's water system would be largely dependent on the good will of the Palestinians, a situation which many Israelis would find inconsistent with a prudent regard for their country's national interest.

**F. The Mountain Aquifer as a Vital Regulating Element in an Integrated Supply System**

The issue of control and authority raised by Katz-Oz regarding the Mountain Aquifer is no less relevant with respect to the Kinneret, Israel's only major surface water reservoir. Although it is not directly affected by the Israeli-Palestinian accords, it is nonetheless liable to be exposed to severe indirect influences, since the Kinneret and the Mountain Aquifer constitute complementary and inter-depen-
dent elements in the management of the NWS, especially in periods in which critical shortages or excessive surpluses are experienced in the former.

In terms of a long-term annual average, the Kinneret provides roughly one-third of the supply to the NWS. However, as has been stressed previously, this supply is highly variable and volatile. Variations in the Kinneret are both seasonal (due the seasonal nature of the rainfall pattern in Israel) and long-term (due the erratic and unpredictable amounts of annual rainfall). Consequently, it is necessary to store water during years of plentiful precipitation for use in years of drought.\textsuperscript{48} As mentioned, one of the principal storage facilities for surplus water in years of abundant rainfall from the Kinneret is the Mountain Aquifer. These surpluses have been used to recharge the aquifers and in principle, can be called upon to compensate for reduced extraction rates from the lake in periods of poor rainfall when it is at low levels. In this regard, Grinwald points out that recharge of the Coastal Aquifer is becoming increasingly difficult for a number of reasons, such as the limited capacity of the drilling sites, a lack of suitable recharge locations, and various other operating difficulties.\textsuperscript{49} This, together with the previously mentioned fact that all recharge waters must be routed via the Mountain Aquifer because of the tendency of the Kinneret flood waters to clog drilling sites if introduced directly into the Coastal Aquifer, can only serve to enhance the importance of the Mountain Aquifer as a storage location for future surpluses.

The Kinneret is totally dependent on the winter recharge it receives from precipitation in its drainage area (December to April), and which compensates for the intensified consumption and evaporation of the summer (May to November). The capacity of the Kinneret as a source of fresh water is limited by a minimum level of minus 213 meters, a hydrological "red line" below which extraction is liable to imperil the entire lake due to increased biological activity and infiltration of saline water, thus rendering its waters unfit for drinking or agricultural irrigation.

Accordingly, in years of poor precipitation, Israel is confronted by a decidedly unpalatable dilemma: (a) either reduce or cease extraction from the lake, so as not to breach the "red line", and thereby drastically diminish the amount of available water in the country; or (b) continue extraction below the "red line", and thereby threaten the quality of the waters of the entire lake. Clearly, the ability to adopt option (a) and modulate the extraction rate from the Kinneret, by compensating for deficits through the use of accumulated surpluses is likely to be severely hampered, if Israel forgoes control over the storage location of such surpluses, viz. the Mountain Aquifer.

Thus, the implementation of the withdrawals called for in the Oslo Accords will not only deprive Israel of the ability to determine directly the fate of her principal source of urban drinking water, it will also indirectly jeopardize her current ability to protect her only surface water reservoir from the volatility of its annual recharge and thereby preserve it as reliable, long-term source of sweet water.

Although not directly related to the question of the Israeli-Palestinian Accords, it should be pointed out that, since the Golan Heights comprise the major portion of the Kinneret’s drainage area, Israeli withdrawal from this area will in fact mean that both the quality and the quantity of water flowing into the lake will, to a large degree, be left to the discretion of the regime in Damascus. A special report prepared for the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies by TAHAL (Israel’s Water Planning Authority) entitled “Water in the Middle East: Solutions to Water Problems in the Context of Arrangements between Israel and the Arabs”\textsuperscript{50} specifies the dangers that would arise in the event of Israel withdrawing from the Golan. Apart from the physical loss of up to 40 million c\textsuperscript{3}m of water that Israel would suffer if she were to transfer control of the Golan to Syria, the survey warns that if the Syrians were to establish industrial zones on the Golan, the resultant effluents may become serious sources of pollution, jeopardizing the quality of downstream waters, including the Kinneret. D. Hillel endorses this point, observing that:

If the Syrians resettle and industrialize the Golan plateau after Israel’s evacuation, the area might become a source of pollution endangering the water quality of the Sea of Galilee.\textsuperscript{51}
Thus, Syrian construction of infrastructure systems, industrial zones and residential areas in the Golan may result in uncontrolled flows of chemical pollutant and sewerage into the Kinneret drainage system (much as occurred in the case of the Palestinian pollution of the Israeli water sources mentioned above), thereby upsetting the delicate ecological balance in the lake and endangering its viability as a source of potable water, even in the absence of purposeful malice on the part of Damascus. Moreover, the TAHAL report points out that there indeed still exists a danger of a renewed attempt by the Syrians to divert the sources of the upper Jordan away from Israel, as they did in the 1960s, in a move which many see as the first link in the chain which led to the outbreak of the 1967 Six Day War. Such an enterprise, were it to be implemented, would spell disaster for the Kinneret and the entire Israeli water system.

The survey presents two alternate propositions, the first one a maximalist scenario (from Israel’s point of view), the other one minimalist. The former, which involves only minor territorial concessions to the Syrians (i.e. withdrawal to the line of the watershed which is very close to the existing frontier, see Line 1 in Map 2 below) is clearly not a basis on which some form of a mutually agreed accord could be worked out between Israel and Damascus. But even the latter, which entails the retention of “only” enough territory to prevent Syria from inflicting critical damage on Israel’s water supply (i.e. those areas adjacent to the major drainage courses and from which surface run-off or ground water could be adversely affected (see Line 2 in Map 2), would be totally unacceptable to Syria. For, in effect, this would entail establishing the frontier several kilometers (up to 15 km) east of the pre-1967 border. (The entire width of the Golan plateau under Israeli control is barely 20 km.) The Syrians, however, have stated categorically and consistently that total withdrawal of Israel from all territories taken in the 1967 Six Day War (or at least a specific Israeli commitment to such a withdrawal) is an indispensable pre-condition for any progress toward the attainment of such an accord. Consequently, even the minimalist prescription put forward by TAHAL would seem to be well beyond the bounds of political feasibility.

Israel is therefore faced with the dilemma of either forgoing her control over the Golan and entrusting the fate of the region’s water sources — and therefore the fate of the Kinneret — to the regime in Damascus, so as to comply with the Syrians’ preliminary demands for engaging in a process which hopefully will lead to some form of a negotiated peace; or eschewing the peace process in order to maintain control over these sources and ensure the fate of its water supply. The seriousness of the predicament can be gauged from the words of Ya’akov Tsur, who served as Minister of Agriculture under both Rabin and Peres during the periods in which the Oslo Accords were signed and evacuation of the Golan was seriously negotiated:

The water sources on the Golan [are] a critical, vital and even a fateful matter in terms of the future of the State [of Israel]. I have to say that I am not aware of any replacement for this water.

G. Dividing the Waters of the Mountain Aquifer: An Irresolvable Conundrum

It is presumably the realization of the previously discussed facts that have prompted Virginia Starr to aver categorically that “There is literally no choice. Israel must maintain control of the water. This is not a negotiable issue. It cannot be obscured.”

She goes on to admonish Israeli policy makers in the most severe tones, claiming that “people [are being sold] falsehoods.”

This unequivocally hard-line orientation of Starr’s is somewhat at odds with the far more conciliatory tone and cautiously optimistic views of others such as Hillel and Wolf referred to in the preceding chapters. It would therefore seem appropriate to assess the foundations on which these two divergent perspectives rest.

Hillel and Wolf seem to base many of their arguments for the feasibility of mutual accommodation, in large measure, on findings of hydrological surveys, particularly the previously cited study, “Water in the Middle East: Solutions to Water Problems in the Context of Arrangements between
Israel and the Arabs, conducted by TAHAL (Israel's Water Planning Authority) for the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies. Although successive Israeli governments have opposed the official publication of the study, its substance is generally well known. It included the specification of lines to which Israel could allegedly withdraw in the "West Bank" (and in the Golan — see above), without endangering its water supply.

With regard to the "West Bank", the report suggests that from a purely hydrological point of view, Israel might withdraw from much of the territory, retaining only the western approaches of the Judean and Samarian Hills with an elevation of up to 200m and the environs of Jenin and Jerusalem, i.e. those portions in which drilling and extraction of the ground water would be economically viable. This would leave under Israeli control areas in northern and western Samaria and in western central Judea, including the Jerusalem area. The approximate demarcations of these hydrologically vital areas are shown in Map 2.

On the basis of these findings, several hydroanalysts conclude that much of the "West Bank" could be vacated without creating any serious danger to Israeli sources of supply. Wolf, for example, raises a claim that "provided with an alternative source of water, Israel could relinquish much of the eastern portion of the Mountain Aquifer and up to two-thirds of the territory overlying the western portion of the aquifer without seriously endangering her water supplies." He bases this claim, without specifically identifying what the required "alternative source" is to be, or how it is to be provided, on the assertions that:

a. the eastern section of the aquifer is largely disconnected hydrologically from the western portion, and therefore future Palestinian activity in the area of the former would have very little impact on Israeli wells in the latter;

b. with regard to the western portion of the aquifer, in most of the areas overlying it, which are above the 100-200m contour line, the water table would be at a depth great enough to make drilling wells economically unfeasible, since supplying the Palestinians via pipeline from down gradient Israeli wells would be significantly cheaper.

Wolf's contentions are of course entirely correct factually and entirely erroneous (or at best entirely irrelevant) politically. The political conclusions that he draws from his hydrological observations are demonstrably false or at best non-suitors. There are several reasons for this:

a. The Palestinians are most unlikely to be satisfied with the area overlying the eastern aquifer and more elevated slopes of the hills overlying the western portions of the aquifer as an offer which will allow them to fulfill their national aspirations and facilitate the termination of the conflict with Israel. For the eastern area comprises mainly desolate and barren hillsides, with scant rainfall and sparse population (with the exception of the town of Jericho). Thus, its transfer to Palestinian control would deliver only a very small portion of the Palestinian population from Israeli rule. By contrast, retaining under Israeli jurisdiction those portions of the western aquifer which are hydro-strategically vital, would leave a considerable segment of the Palestinians under Israeli control (including large towns such as Qalqilya, Tulkarem, Jenin, and Bethlehem as well as countless villages, not to mention east Jerusalem).

b. Moreover, such an arrangement, in which the areas transferred to Palestinian control are confined to whose in which the drilling of wells is deemed to be prohibitively expensive, effectively precludes the Palestinians from access to sources of supply of any significance. As such, it will perpetuate the Palestinians' dependency on Israel for almost all of their water supply. Even today, such dependency is greatly resented by them, and they are thus hardly likely to acquiesce to an arrangement which not only fails to decrease substantially such dependency but permanently entrenches it.
MAP 2

1 Minimalist withdrawal line
2 Maximalist withdrawal line

Hydrostrategic areas
Beyond 1967 borders
c. Indeed, economic considerations have been dubious constraints on political desire for independence. Many of the demands for the trappings of political sovereignty on the part of the Palestinians are not consistent with the economic rationale of profit and loss. Thus, for example, the fact that it is highly questionable whether a seaport in Gaza would be more economical than using the existing facilities of Haifa and Ashdod is hardly a factor likely to quell Palestinian fervor to free themselves from their dependency on Israeli harbors.\textsuperscript{60} Likewise, it is quite possible, if not probable, that the Palestinians would be prepared to bear the greater economic costs of providing water from deeper, more expensive drilling sites under their own exclusive control rather than be dependent on cheaper supplies via an Israeli controlled pipeline. Accordingly, if political rather than economic conditions are likely to be dominant in the development of the Palestinian water system, the rational “hydro-economic” assumption that Israeli wells will not be adversely affected by “irrational” drilling policy can no longer be considered valid. For what may appear irrational on the basis of purely economic criteria may be eminently rational on the basis of politically nationalistic ones.

d. Even if one accepts the assertion that the territorial prescription proposed by Wolf would safeguard Israeli drilling sites from the effects of excess Palestinian extraction, they would still be exposed to the dangers of pollution from Palestinian locations higher up the hill slopes which could contaminate ground water in the lower portions of the aquifer. There is little in his proposal to suggest how such hazards could be contended with by Israel. This is not a matter to be lightly dismissed especially in light of the instances of Palestinian pollution of Israeli ground water cited earlier in Section E. Indeed as former water commissioner Meir Ben Meir, observed “...the Palestinians can destroy the western aquifer by pollution alone.”\textsuperscript{61}

e. Finally, while it is true that the hydrological significance of the eastern aquifer is decidedly less than that of the western one, the territory which overlies it is considered by many, including many in the Israeli Labor party, as strategically crucial. Indeed, continued Israeli military control of the Jordan Valley and the slopes that command it from the west have long been an issue of consensus in the Israeli public — indeed far more so than the control of the hydrologically more important western aquifer. Thus, evacuation of this area, widely considered a \textit{sine qua non} for the defense of Israel’s coastal plain, which includes 80% of the county’s population and 80% of its commercial activity, is likely to be opposed by a wide segment of Israeli society.

Consequently, while it is probably true that Israel need not retain the entire territory of the “West Bank” for purely hydrological reasons, the areas which she could relinquish without seriously jeopardizing her own water system are hardly likely to constitute a sufficiently attractive offer for Palestinians to give up their struggle for national self-determination, i.e. sufficiently attractive to attain peace. (Such offers would be even less attractive once territories, which may not be vital hydrologically but may indeed be so militarily, are deducted from them.) Thus, from an Israeli point of view, there would seem little point in making offers destined for virtually certain rejection by their Palestinian counterparts, or from making concessions which only exacerbate the threats to the country’s security without advancing the cause of peace in any tangible way. Consequently, even if one overlooks the previously cited reservations as to the validity of the TAHAL territorial diagnoses as a proposal capable of providing Israel with adequate guarantees against intentional or unintentional damage to her water supply (particularly with regard to the risk of pollution), the structure of the bargain required to be struck between her and the Arabs seems inherently irresolvable.
H. The Hydro-Political Significance of the Oslo Accords

Under the terms of the Oslo II Accord, "Israel recognizes the Palestinian water rights in the West Bank," undertaking that "[t]hese will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations and settled in the Permanent Status Agreement relating to the various water resources". This move has been criticized in the harshest terms by Starr who warns that "by the explicit recognition of Palestinian water rights, Israel has opened a Pandora's box and created the most dangerous precedent in her history," charging that "Israel has made all the mistakes possible in the water negotiations." 62

The hydro-political significance, and the attendant policy derivatives that emerge from this undertaking, are a product of the interaction between two sets of prevailing parameters: (i) those which define the changes in allocation authority and control over the hydrological realities, inherent in the Oslo process; (ii) those which define the political milieu in which that process is to be implemented.

1. Changes in Allocation Authority and Control over Hydrological Realities

In this regard, the Oslo Accords entail far-reaching ramifications for the water system of Israel, its structure, mode of operation and future development. These ramifications which derive from the preceding discussion, may be briefly summarized as follows:

   a. Israeli evacuation called for in the accords in effect creates a situation in which:

      i. Israel will not only lose control over the principal source of drinking water for its major urban centers but will effectively transfer that control to the Palestinian authorities, which will be the party that maintains a physical presence in the territory that overlies the major portion of the aquifer and in almost its entire recharge area.

      ii. Without a physical presence and effective authority in the evacuated areas (situated upstream of the subterranean flows), Israel's ability to contend with the detrimental effects on her ground water supplies (in the downstream portion of the aquifer), which may result from drilling or pollution in the Palestinian controlled territory, will be severely limited.

2. By giving up exclusive control of the Mountain Aquifer, Israel is in effect foregoing (at least potentially) the ability to utilize the aquifer to regulate surpluses and deficits in other major water sources, thereby undermining her ability to maintain them in times of critical shortages. Thus, the evacuations called for under the Oslo process will affect, albeit indirectly, the fate of other water sources, not included in the areas ceded to Palestinian control. (Israeli withdrawal from the Golan, which in effect comprises the Kinneret's drainage basin, clearly increases the severity of this aspect.)

3. Consequently, the withdrawals called for in the Oslo Accords imply Israel forgoing the ability to control the fate of over two thirds of the water sources presently available to her, whether directly, as in the case of the Mountain Aquifer, or indirectly, as in the case of the Kinneret.

4. In this context, it should be recalled that both the envisaged Palestinian entity, which would be entirely dependent on the water resources of the Mountain Aquifer, and Jordan, are in a state of serious water stress. For them, increased extraction from this source may thus appear an enticing option in the not too distant future, however detrimental this may be for Israel.

ii. The Political Milieu

Three major features characterize the Middle Eastern political milieu, its perennial volatility and its inherently conflictual nature, and the predominantly non-libertarian characteristics of its regimes. Agree-
ments have often been transient and violated shortly after being concluded. At the international level, yesterday's allies have frequently become tomorrow's foes. On the domestic level, rebellion and revolution have not been uncommon. Neither has it been unusual for an incumbent ruler to be overthrown and replaced by a regime radically inimical to the values and actions of its deposed predecessor. Fundamentalist fervor, implacably antagonistic not only to Israel but to any non-Moslem influence, is sweeping the region from Algeria to Afghanistan. Even in the stable regimes, domestic characteristics make regional cooperation a doubtful proposition. The centralized, autocratic mode of government is inimical to the open and free movement of people, ideas and information across international frontiers that are essential for the establishment of the conditions required for long-term trans-regional projects. Few dictatorships can risk the decentralization of authority necessary for the intimate international cooperation of an EEC-like community.

Within this general political climate, Arab perceptions of the water issue have typically been of a conflictual, zero-sum nature. Leading figures such as the late King Hussein of Jordan and Egypt's Butrus Ghali have explicitly identified water, more than any other topic of dispute, as the issue most likely to cause a future Middle East war. Israel has been demonized in the Arab press as threatening the water supply of the entire Arab world (see Exhibit 1). Even more disturbing, the Egyptian press, in the third decade following the Camp David Accords, has been vitriolic in its portrayal of Israel in the context of the water issue (see Exhibit 2).

Both exhibits are reprinted with permission from Arieh Stav's PEACE — THE ARABIAN CARICATURE: A Study in Anti-Semitic imagery. (Tel Aviv, 1999)

EXHIBIT 1

The zero-sum nature of the dispute was underscored by a report by the head of Israeli Military Intelligence to the Knesset Committee for Security and Foreign Affairs in which he warned that the water issue will be the most difficult in the negotiations with the Arabs who demand 60% of the amounts presently used by Israel. Indeed, at a conference of Arab parliamentary delegates in February 1997, the Syrian representative, Abdul Kader Kadura, admonished the Arabs for not taking the water issue seriously enough and declared that Israel should be denied use of all Arab water. Any hopes of engendering a spirit of international cooperation into some enterprise...
involving the eastward conveyance of the Nile's waters seemed to have been dashed by Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak himself. Speaking at the inauguration of the Egyptian project channeling water from the Nile delta to Sinai, he categorically ruled out the possibility of extending the canal to supply Israel (or anyone else) with water. When questioned on this he averred, "This is an Egyptian project, and we will give no water to anyone."71

It is against this background of political realities that Israel's relinquishing of direct allocation control over vital water sources, implicit in the Oslo process, should be evaluated.

I. Policy Implications: Options and Imperatives

From the analysis of the prevailing supply and demand trends, it is clear that even without forgoing any of her present sources, Israel would be compelled to find methods of artificial production of water in order to complement insufficient supplies of natural water. Furthermore, since compliance with the withdrawals called for in the Oslo process implies the loss of control over a major portion of the country's natural water sources to Arab authorities in a prevailing political climate of (at least potential) animosity, this need assumes a new and enhanced dimension. Accordingly, this would seem to suggest that three major policy approaches are available to Israel:

1. Compliance with the withdrawal implicit in the Oslo process and planning future development of the country's water system on continued large-scale reliance on natural sources no longer under Israel's control, in the hope that its Arab counter-signatories (and any potential successors) will indeed continue to respect Israel's interests and needs, even if these were to clash with their own.

With regard to this option, it would appear circumspect for Israeli policy makers to recall the *caveats* such as those of such prominent statesmen as Henry Kissinger and Lord Salisbury regarding the non-binding and transient nature of treaties between sovereign national entities. Kissinger com-
mented in a somewhat derisory fashion on Israeli leaders' apparent misunderstanding of this basic trait of international relations, particularly on their insistence on “binding peace [agreements]”  “For what”, asks Kissinger, “is a binding peace [agreement] among sovereign nations when one of the attributes of sovereignty is the right to change one's mind?”  

The essence of this basic tenet of international relations was succinctly articulated by Lord Salisbury's observation that in the international system “the only bond of union that endures [among nations is] the absence of all clashing interests”. For should any clashing interest arise, there is nothing to sustain such a union and all mutual obligations between the previously united parties will be valueless.

Accordingly, if the “absence of all clashing interests” is the only basis for an enduring accord, one could hardly put much credence in the durability of arrangements made under conditions in which clashes of interests, rather than the absence thereof, are liable to be the rule and not the exception.

Indeed, it would seem to require a giant leap of faith in the selfless altruism of the Palestinians to believe that they would give priority to honoring commitments to preserve Israeli hydrological interests (which require restricting extraction rates to prevent depletion of Israeli supplies) to the detriment of their own interest (e.g. which requires increasing the extraction rate to supply Palestinian consumers at the expense of Israeli ones, so as to rectify the allegedly hitherto discriminatory allocation of the water in favor of Israel).

Aversion to surrendering control over water supplies to an alien power should not be considered a uniquely (nor an unfounded) Israeli angst. Indeed, the great “reluctance [of sovereign states] to place themselves in a state of [hydrological] dependency upon the continuing goodwill of an outside power with which their nations had a long and not entirely happy relationship” is reflected in the skepticism and lack of enthusiasm which, as Hillel points out, many of the intended beneficiaries expressed over the Turkish “Peace Pipe Line”. Kliot sees this dependency upon the goodwill of foreign countries as a contravention of an independent state's “sovereignty imperative”. In a similar vein, Soffer denigrates the idea that nations can trust other nations with the fate of their water supply, especially in the Middle East. Nasser, for example, enunciated the rationale behind Egypt's construction of the Aswan Dam in the following terms: “It is inconceivable that Egypt abandon her fate to the countries of the Upper Nile.” Thus, if countries divided by rifts far less acrimonious than that between Arab and Jew, are so loath to deliver their hydrological fate into alien, and potentially adversarial hands, one can but question the prudence of a policy option based upon the principle of precisely such deliverance.

2. Compliance with the withdrawal called for in the Oslo process, and restructuring the entire water system so as to make Israel independent of all water sources under foreign and potentially hostile control.

Without elaborating on the immense technical difficulties involved in such a measure, this option, even if it could be implemented, would in effect make Israel the only industrial country in the world which would be largely (indeed almost totally) dependent on the artificial production of water. For such artificial production would have to be planned to contend with worst case scenarios in which sources of supply under alien control would be permanently or temporarily suspended, whether as a result of purposeful malice (such as intentional over-exploitation or pollution), objective exigencies (such an extended drought) or unplanned misfortunes (such as accidental ecological damage). Consequently, such a system of artificial production would, according to estimates by senior Mekorot (NWS) officials, have to have an annual capacity of at least 700 mill. cm. This is a circumstance that would pose problems of the utmost severity for the Israeli water system.

Firstly, as Soffer points out, the most likely method of such artificial water generation would be large-scale desalination plants (whether of the multi-flash distillation or the reverse osmosis type). Consequently, a large number of consumers would be dependent on a single installation, making much of the entire supply system highly vulnerable
in times of war and to terrorist sabotage. In this specific context, Starr warns that:

The vulnerability of desalination is as follows: To build proper equipment for desalination along the coast takes seven years [or more]. Secondly, desalination equipment will make a wonderful target for anybody with a missile. You can spend a billion dollars, seven years and lose it overnight.\(^{81}\)

Hillel also comments on this aspect of vulnerability, observing that: “During the 1991 war with Iraq, the Saudis worried greatly over the vulnerability of their desalination plants to sabotage, as well as to air or missile attack.”\(^{82}\)

Soffer also draws attention to the vulnerability of desalination plants and the dangers of over-reliance on such installations as the primary source of supply because of their susceptibility to damage from terrorist sabotage or acts of war.\(^{83}\)

Another difficulty which must be addressed is the issue of the storage of the desalinated water. As Hillel observes:

Since a desalination plant, to achieve maximal efficiency, must be operated continuously throughout the year, whereas water demand fluctuates seasonally, some system of storage will be necessary.\(^{84}\)

As this policy option would necessitate the production of very large quantities of water, commensurately large storage facilities would have to be made available. This would seem to make surface storage facilities uneconomical, for such a measure would require the submergence of areas covering tens, perhaps hundreds of square kilometers. Locating suitable sites, especially if located reasonably close to the areas of high demand, would, to say the least, be an extremely remote possibility. Accordingly, the most obvious, if not the only, choice for such storage locations would be the aquifers themselves. Hillel endorses this view, enumerating other advantages of such subterranean storage: “...underground storage is preferable to surface storage, since it entails smaller losses due to evaporation and seepage...”\(^{85}\)

However, storing these waters in the Mountain and the Coastal Aquifers would solve virtually none of the problems discussed in the preceding option. It would still leave them exposed to the very same potential hazards of pollution and excess extraction to which the natural ground waters are exposed. Thus, water stored in the Mountain Aquifer, irrespective of whether its source is precipitation or desalination, could be extracted or polluted from locations within Palestinian-controlled areas. This clearly detracts significantly from this aquifer's suitability as a storage site intended to “immunize” Israel's water supplies from external threats. Likewise, waters stored in the aquifer overlain by the heavily congested coastal plain would be exposed to contamination from both sources within the Israeli metropolis, as well as pollutant effluents flowing westward from the Palestinian highlands. Furthermore, as the aquifer is limited in its absorptive capacity, it is doubtful whether it could hold the required amounts of additional artificially produced waters, over and above the stocks of natural ground waters. (Grinwald estimates that the Coastal Aquifer could not absorb more than 60 mill. c'm per annum.\(^{86}\) Thus, not only is there likely to be a shortage of storage capacity but also possibly a considerable loss of fresh water through seepage into the sea of excess unabsorbed amounts.

Finally, such a radical restructuring of the supply sources will also require a commensurately radical restructuring of the distribution and delivery systems. This is liable to be a task of mammoth proportions, both from the engineering and economic perspectives.

It is important to note that this catalogue of difficulties is not intended to be a condemnation of the notion of desalination. Quite the reverse is true. For desalination is an indispensible necessity for Israel, but not as a replacement for natural sources but as an augmenting complement to them. Indeed, TAHAL hydrologists Schwartz and Zohar are quite explicit on this matter, stating that,

Even when [in the future] desalination becomes a significant source of supply, the importance of the Yarkon-Taninim aquifer will not decrease as a seasonal and long-term reservoir.\(^{87}\)

Given the present state of over-exploitation of natural water sources in Israel, for the foreseeable future, the function of desalination plants would be to reduce the rate of abstraction to facilitate
preservation of the natural sources. Thus, while the above analysis is in no way an attempt to belittle the need for the creation of artificial water producing facilities, it should be taken as a grave caveat against an endeavor to base all (or the great majority) of supply on such sources, which would inevitably be the case (at least in terms of "worst case" scenarios) were the Mountain Aquifer to be relinquished.

In designing such artificial water generation, two major development strategies may be pursued, one oriented toward international cooperation, the other towards national autarky. However, whichever option is adopted, if the water producing installations are to fulfill their strategic rationale (of freeing Israeli water supplies from external control), they would have to be under exclusive Israeli control. This would seem to diminish severely the feasibility of the cooperative option. For given the prevailing political parameters in the region, it seems indeed a remote possibility that any Arab state would be keen to entrust a significant portion of its water supply to wholly-controlled Israeli installations. (The reluctance of the Arabs to entrust the Turks with control over their water supplies in the case of the "Peace Pipeline" mentioned earlier appears to substantiate this point.) Indeed such an arrangement would seem to be a blueprint for tensions and dissension rather than harmonious coexistence. Thus, for example, Shuval points out that the Palestinians resent Israeli supply of water to their communities, seeing this as a form of control over their lives.88 Pearce reports similar sentiments regarding Israel’s "controlling the tap" for supplying Palestinian consumers.89 It appears, then, that prudence militates in favor of eschewing emphasis on cooperative policies and endeavors, of preferring more autarkic-orientated efforts. Nahmani endorses this position, counseling that "each of the Middle East states [should be encouraged] to act independently and to desalinate as much water as possible".90 In this spirit, Wolf remarks:

Many of the hostilities that have occurred in the region over water seem to have come about precisely because the water destined for a downstream user was controlled by an upstream party. Many "co-operative" projects might only provide additional opportunity for suspicion and potential for contention.91

3. Non-compliance with the withdrawal called for in the Oslo process, either by (a) bilateral negotiated agreement; or (b) by unilateral repudiation.

The former variant (of negotiated agreement) would appear to be extremely unfeasible as the Palestinians are most unlikely to consent to giving up their achievements retroactively, simply because the Israelis have had belated second thoughts as to their commitments, especially as any withdrawal limited enough to ensure Israeli water supplies, will deny the Palestinians access to almost all the major water resources in the Mountain Aquifer.92 The second option will almost inevitably provoke vigorous Palestinian resistance. Crushing such resistance forcibly is likely to turn Israel into a pariah-state, bringing with it the threat of international isolation and military intervention by neighboring Arab states.

Thus, whichever policy option it may choose, for Israel, the hydro-political future in the wake of the Oslo Accords appears both bleak and risk-fraught. Her predicament would seem to underscore the validity of Hans Morgenthau’s warning that good intentions are no guarantee of good policy, either in terms of moral merits or political pragmatism.93 Even more, it would seem to underscore the persevering pertinence of the old American Indian proverb:

"First of all, my son, see to it you are always camped upstream and your enemies downstream."
A PALESTINIAN STATE:
THE GEOGRAPHIC ASPECT

Arnon Soffer

The birth of a new state makes an impact on its new citizens who await citizenship with all that that implies. Its birth makes an impact on all its neighbors whether in economic relationships, or in contacts along the frontiers that become international and subject to the laws of the international community. This applies to territorial waters, freedom of navigation, freedom of vehicle traffic, rights to air space and sub-surface space. A new juridical situation emerges different from any previous situation, such as occupation or autonomy in any form. A state has rights to international relations, and among others the right to make economic and military treaties. In short, a state is not an autonomous territory. One state does not enter another in order to punish a murderer or a terrorist, unless that state is crumbling, as we have seen in the cases of Lebanon, Iraq, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. (Shapira and Tabory, 1999)

The birth of a Palestinian state appears to be an inevitable process in view of the reality developing in the Land of Israel west of the Jordan up to the moment of writing this article.

The situation can change only if a dramatic geopolitical upheaval occurs which will change this historic movement. Of course, there may be a long-term arrangement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority without the declaration of a state or Jordan may return to the picture as a full partner in an arrangement or, God forbid, a disaster will occur to the State of Israel that will transform all of western Eretz-Israel into one state with a new name.

A Palestinian state will not be another state like all the other states that have come into the world in the last fifty years. It will probably be one of the peculiar and problematic states. It will be poor, but there are poor states in abundance throughout the world. It will be tiny, but there are many small states as well as states smaller than it in size of population.

Its uniqueness will derive from its peculiar shape — a state that has three parts — the Gaza Strip, Mount Hebron, and the mountains of Samaria (figure 1). Its borders will probably be unclear (see the chapter on borders). The distribution of the Palestinian population contains within it the potential for conflicts between this state and Israel, and between it and the kingdom of Jordan, with implications for Syria and Lebanon as well. It has a complex history and a difficult, profound conflict with Israel (geographic, religious, social, national, historical, and economic — among the widest gaps on earth!). It has a complex, sensitive relationship with the kingdom of Jordan, as well as with the other neighboring Arab states, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and the rest.

Its uniqueness derives not only from its shape, but emerges on account of the implications of its establishment for Israel in everything having to do with Israel’s economy and society, and first of all, Israel’s security. (Inbar and Sandler, 1997; Shueftan, 1999)

The purpose of this article is to present the whole complex of geographic components (and only them) that might influence the future of relations between the Palestinian state and Israel, and the
possibility that it might stand on its own feet as a stable state in the distant future. Since the borders of the state that may arise are not clear and are subject to many changes, we shall assume for the purpose of discussion in this article that its permanent borders will be congruent with the 1949 cease fire lines with only minor changes (in the Latrun area, north and south of Jerusalem) and this means that eastern Jerusalem will return to Palestinian Arab sovereignty.

We may also pose an alternative situation in which Israel will hand over the whole Jordan Valley to the Palestinian state with early warning installations and military camps for a limited time, and will receive in exchange large pieces of land in the vicinity of the green line on the west. Jerusalem will remain in Israel’s hands, in this alternative, with some kind of Palestinian partnership in controlling several parts of the city. Any other alternative will bring about complications multiplying the problems.

Below is a list of the geographic issues that will arise with the establishment of a Palestinian state (figure 1):

- The extent that it may be possible to delineate permanent borders between the two states and to give this demarcation practical force — maintaining corridors between the parts of the new state — the possibility of ensuring the demilitarization of the new state while it has full control over airports, seaports, and the land under its sovereignty — does the Palestinian state have “lebensraum” now and in the future so that it will not constitute a threat to Israel?
- The status of the water sources now common to both Israel and the Palestinians with the establishment of the Palestinian state;
- How will the ecological problems be handled that will arise between Israel and the new state?
- The implications of a Palestinian state for the Israeli Arabs;
- What are the social and economic processes that will take place within Israel with the establishment of a Palestinian state?

The above-mentioned problems will be considered in the article. There are additional issues that will not be considered in this article, such as:

- The functioning of the new capital in the Jerusalem region. The handing over of East Jerusalem, including the Temple Mount, to the Palestinian state will apparently solve some of the problems, but it seems that this cannot be done due to a political reason. In a situation like this too, the city will remain an active volcano.
- The issue of Israeli air corridors in the air space of the new state (for the air force and civilian aviation) — with good will from both sides this issue is minor, in a situation of continuing conflict it can lead to disaster.
- The free movement of persons and merchandise between the two states. This appears to be a minor matter, but it has the capacity to destroy the Jewish state demographically and socially, and in regard to quality of life in the future.
- Pilgrimage to holy places — this subject is dwarfed compared to the whole array of problems waiting to be solved. (Soffer, 1996)

Delineating Borders between Israel and the Palestinian State

A first condition for the existence of a normal state is its demarcation by recognized, defined, and preserved borders. Otherwise, a state cannot realize its “credo”, its raison d’être. In other words, its ability to enforce its sovereignty. Israel has suffered from non-existence of recognized, permanent, defined and preserved borders for fifty years now and the results are known and painful.

The Palestinian state, if it emerges, will find itself in a situation similar to that of Israel. It is difficult to assume that it will be possible to delineate borders that will be recognized by both sides or to defend them and enforce the law on both sides of this border. (Soffer, 1996; Shueftan, 1999)

First of all, Western Eretz-Israel is small in area and populated now by nine million persons, and within 15 to 20 years it will reach a size of population of about 15 to 18 million persons and
will be one of the most crowded places on earth. If we assume that this population will mainly crowd into the Mediterranean coastal strips and the semi-arid areas of the country, then the data will be exactly double in severity. In a reality of this kind, Jewish and Arab settlements or Jewish and Arab agricultural hothouses, will reach each other on both sides of the border and it will be difficult to see a preserved and functioning border (see the paragraph touching on the Israeli Arabs). A solution is possible only if a “Berlin Wall” is built with the means and the intensity of the guard kept there (this cannot be accomplished along the whole line of the border and certainly not with the character of the population here).

According to any delineation that will be decided, there will be a need for many corridors (see the paragraph on corridors below). In any event, border lines will stretch for hundreds of kilometers and we will get a chaos of lines. Especially complex will be the situation in Jerusalem according to any model decided upon, since there it is impossible to set clear borders and to defend them.

An example of such a complicated situation is the line separating the Muslim Temple Mount from the plaza of the Western Wall, a separation that is only two or three meters! Likewise, this is the distinction between the Jewish Quarter and the Muslim Quarter and between the various neighborhoods in Jerusalem or in the “Little Triangle”.

In total, there are now in Jerusalem about 400 access roads and pathways between the city and the Palestinian zones. It is difficult to imagine that it will be possible to close this reality.

We must add to the difficulties in delineating borders the possibility of a breakdown of the transportation systems in Israel and in the areas of the Palestinian state. This potential collapse would require new, original solutions in order to help both peoples. Road No. 8 is an example of this. It is a road that begins in Beit She’an and ends in the Arad area. It passes through the areas of the Palestinian state according to Alternative B, as well as through Israel. This highway is supposed to serve both populations. How can a border be made in a situation and a reality such as we find in the case of Road No. 6 between Beersheva and Jerusalem, and in other cases? In a small country, with a very high rate of population growth and with a constantly rising number of motor vehicles, formal boundaries and separation of populations have no meaning. The reality on the ground is what will win out. If we add to the situation described the situation in the areas where Israeli Arabs live, it is clear that we will be facing a harsh reality when a Palestinian state is established that will want to actualize sovereignty. A no less harsh problem awaits Israel when it too will want to enforce its own sovereignty in the “Little Triangle”, in the northern Negev and in Jerusalem. If we now face massive theft of the order of tens of thousands of cars every year, not to mention hundreds of tractors plus agricultural produce, we must assume that this trend will only go up.

In the 1950s and 1960s too, there was violent robbery and murder, with the labels for the assailants changing through the years from “infiltrators” to “terrorists” to “fedayeen” to mere law breakers and thieves.

Since the Israeli border zones are only a few meters away from the heart of Israel (from Qalkiliya to Kfar Saba, the eastern tip of the Tel Aviv area, the distance is about 1,000 meters!), we must assume that terrorism, violent incidents, and reprisal actions by both sides, will make life in the border areas and the heart of Israel unbearable. In contrast to the 1950s, we must assume that the Palestinians will use their weapons (both legal and illegal) against any Israeli reprisal action, which did not occur in the period of Jordanian Rule in the 1950s.

One way or another, the problems to be expected from the border that will be supposed to demarcate the two states, will be a source of unending conflicts and will be a main cause of deteriorating relations between the two, with harsh implications for keeping various arrangements vital to both of them.

"Lebensraum" for the Palestinian State

The concept of “lebensraum” or living space or area of subsistence has been much used by biologists and ecologists for 200 years, but it is also connected with the Nazi conception that argued for the
conquest of regions east of Germany in order to have them serve as a granary for the Germans. (Galnoor, 1995)

Despite what has been said, this is a legitimate concept for clarifying the situation of the Palestinian state, since it will be notably poor in resources, populated by many millions of people, and possessing a weak economic infrastructure from the outset. A state in this position must ask itself whether or not it can stand on its own feet in the present or the foreseeable future. If not, as a result of a lack of reasonable "lebensraum", it may initiate hostilities in order to broaden its territory. That is how animals behave and that is how men in distress behave. The migration of a population to neighboring areas and assaults on the neighboring population by thefts and terrorism, are patterns of action known throughout human history up until our own times. (Galnoor, 1995)

Facing this argument, one may bring in the opposite argument and say that the territory of the Palestinian state will be in the order of size of Hong Kong, a territory that has flourished and boomed in the last one hundred years, despite being populated by more than six million people. All that is needed to bring the population of the new state to the situation of the Hong Kong population are the following conditions:

A quick passage from an agricultural culture to an urban-industrial culture. This requires technological education, building a suitable national infrastructure and tremendous investments of capital in the new state, in order to hasten these processes. Hong Kong served, among other things, as a commercial and financial center. It is to be hoped that the same will occur in the State of Palestine which will sit at an important crossroads of the Arab world facing the West.

The Palestinian government will be obliged to reduce its bureaucratic mechanisms, and in particular the security apparatus, in order to make its economic systems efficient. There will be a need to develop the tourist industry and to prepare the economy for this sort of development. All this will take place on the account of a reduction in agriculture which has exhausted its potential in this part of the world. There appears to be good will on the part of the rich international community to help this country and there is still a great deal of money in the Persian Gulf. Of course, this counter-argument seems reasonable and obvious.

It only remains to examine whether its suggestions can be carried out. In reality, the Palestinian population is growing at a rate of 3-4% per year. This requires an economic growth rate of 4-6% and more per year in order to overcome the natural growth and advance the state. This is an almost impossible task. Meanwhile, corruption has spread among the ruling leadership and the masses do not get even a small part of the money flowing into the Palestinian entity, and most likely this situation will not change with the establishment of a new state. All this is going on before the "right of return" has begun to be realized. Realization of this "right" could only make the process of recovery more difficult.

In any event, an economic-social revolution will take many years. The question must be asked that is generally avoided, that is, what will occur in the interim period? In this period, Israel will be afflicted with a plague of thefts, violence of all kinds, and unrest within the new state that will push people from the new state to migrate into Israel and will increase the pressure on it. Israeli economic and military counter-measures will strike at the move toward development.

If we take Alternative B, which means handing over the Jordan Valley to the Palestinians in exchange for broadening Israel's "narrow hips", the Palestinians will apparently receive much agricultural land in the Jordan Valley, but this will not be able to change the structure of the Palestinian economy very much. Most of the Palestinian manpower will need to seek employment in Israel and will continue to drag Israeli society down as an exploitative society. Israel's difficulties will arrive from several different directions:

First, millions of Palestinians will live near the Israeli border and as their economic situation worsens, the pressure to enter Israel will increase, whether to steal or to take up residence.

Second, the millions who will live near the border and will cross it legally or illegally will help to erase the border formally and in practice. In the recent past, until the Intifada, hundreds and
thousands of Palestinians crossed over the green line to settle in the poor suburbs of the Tel Aviv area and in other places. Most likely, this phenomenon will return but more intensely. (Grossman, 1987; Soffer, 1997)

This increasing dependence on the part of the Palestinians on Israel will create a lever drawing them to live near the border. The phenomena described above will only intensify.

**Corridors**

As long as relations exist between a state (Israel) and an autonomous zone (Palestinian), then creating corridors (safe passages) is an internal problem from the point of view of international law. With the establishment of a state, the relations will be different and anchored in international law. Hence, there will then be clear rules concerning whatever has to do with corridors, and first of all with the movement of merchandise and persons from a state without an outlet to the sea through its neighbors. The international experience in this matter is problematic. (Soffer, in this book) And if there are passages between Switzerland and Italian ports, or between Austria and the seacoast, then we are dealing with states where the standard of living is about equal and the inhabitants of the inland country have no territorial claims on the coastal country. The situation is different between Israel and Palestine. Here the economic gaps are wide, with a ratio of 1:12 between them.

And the other gaps, religious, national, and social, are wide in addition to harsh, and are still fresh historic memories. If we assume Alternative A, a return to the “green line”, there will be two central corridors in Eretz-Israel, one between Gaza and Mount Hebron, and the other between Gaza and the mountains of Samaria. In addition, there will be a need for a road to bypass Jerusalem (that will probably pass east of the city) in order to connect Mount Hebron and the mountains of Samaria (a total of three corridors). If we adopt the second alternative, thickening the coastal plain, there will be a need for dozens of corridors between the Palestinian state and villages that will remain within Israel (Qalqilya, Hableh, Qaffin...). Likewise, there will be corridors between Israel and Jewish settlements on the other side of the border. Conflicts over everything having to do with territorial rights over these road arteries are inevitable and Israel will be a state cut through by two central corridors of a width that is not yet clear (Soffer, in this book).

If we take the hypothetical alternative of the Israeli government’s plan (Allon Plus), there will be more than 20 corridors in Western Eretz-Israel. This means that there will two states that cannot be separated.

**Demilitarization of the Palestinian State**

Much has been spoken about the need to demilitarize the new state, keeping offensive weapons away from it, and the need to prevent it from making defense treaties or military treaties with the Arab states or any other state in the world.

As long as Israel rules over all the entries and exits of the Palestinian entity, we should assume that it will be only partly possible to prevent the smuggling of offensive weapons into the areas of Gaza and Judea-Samaria, as well as military advisors and various sorts of terrorists. The establishment of a Palestinian state will drastically change the picture, since the international community will not allow infringement of a state’s sovereignty, and this also involves its rights to territorial waters of its own — a total ban will apply to searches of ships entering and leaving the port of Gaza, on searches of airplanes flying in and out of the airport at Dahaniya. Anyone who thinks that Israel will be able to do in regard to this airport and this seaport what it has done and is doing in regard to Tyre and Sidon, is mistaken.

This means that Israel will not have control over what will be brought into the new state, whether this involves heavy or light offensive weapons, or the smuggling in of persons of one sort or another. Nor do arrangements, agreements or commitments have any practical value, because it will be easy to get around them. The meaning of demilitarization is dubious except for preventing the entry of an official foreign army into the territory of this state when and if Israel possesses the means to prevent it. On the other hand, introducing Egyptian military units, for
example, into the Gaza Strip in the guise of students and agricultural advisors will be accomplished with maximal ease. (Steinitz, in this book; Inbar, Sandler, 1997)

The Israeli Arabs

According to experience in various parts of the world, the proximity of a national minority to an international border when members of the same nationality are living on the other side of the border, invites troubles of all kinds. This situation invites irredentist pressures (consider South Tyrol, Kosovo, Kurdistan, Northern Ireland). A situation of this sort invites legal and illegal trade links, help for the men of the underworld, terrorism, and even guerilla warfare (in the areas mentioned, these things have happened and will happen). (Israeli, 1999; Soffer, 1997)

In the Israeli situation, a population of a quarter of a million Muslims is living near the green line from Um al-Fahm and its suburbs in the north to Kfar Kassem in the south (the “Little Triangle”). In a number of cases, continuums of settlement have been created on both sides of the border, as in 'Anin-Um al-Fahm, Barta'a, Baqa al-Gharbiya-Nazlat, 'Issa-Baq'a al-Sharqiya, and at this time, Jat is being linked up to Zeyta and Marja is touching Shweyka, and Taybeh is touching Far'un-Irta-Tul Karem (figure 1).

Around Beersheva, a similar trend is developing, with Israeli Bedouin, who now number 100,000 inhabitants, and physically approaching the settlements of the mountains of Judea. However, the main thing is not especially the physical aspect, but matrimonial links (about a third of all the Bedouin children in the northern Negev were born to Palestinian mothers from the south of Mount Hebron or from Gaza). The ties are economic, social, broad cooperation in the domain of crime, and aid on a national basis. (Soffer, 1997; Shueftan, 1999)

This situation which spreads over other parts of the expected separation lines between Israel and the Palestinian state ensures constant friction, but in particular this sort of situation will contribute to dissolving any formal line that will be decided upon (see above).

Another issue to be taken into account is the strengthening link between the two populations on both sides of the border on a national-political level.

Therefore, irredentist pressures are to be expected on the one hand, and the intervention of the leaders of this population in the politics of both sides of the line, on the other hand. This issue ought to trouble the government of Israel. (Shueftan, 1999)

Water, Sewage, and Ecological Problems

The establishment of a Palestinian state will change the character of discussion of the future of the ground water in the mountains of Judea and Samaria. In the past and the present, Israel has controlled and even exploited most of the water of the aquifers under the mountains. Before the Six Day War, it was by means of the Rosh Ha'ayin springs and a number of drilled wells, and today with the aid of tens of drilled wells and springs. Out of about 600 million cubic meters of water, the potential of the aquifers in the mountains of Judea and Samaria, about 400 million cubic meters, are transferred to consumption in Israel and serve mainly for drinking purposes. (Soffer, 1999)

At this stage of the Oslo Accords, management of Israel's water supply is in Israel's hands, but with close participation of the Palestinians. When a Palestinian state emerges, “the rules of the game will change.” The new state will demand, and rightly so, to get possession of full sovereignty over all the resources below the ground and in the air above — air space sovereignty.

It is difficult to assume that Israel will go to war for a few cubic meters of water and it will be asked to seek them in other places (from desalination!). We ought also to assume that a Palestinian government will demand transfer of surplus water from Samaria and Mount Hebron to thirsty Gaza, which would be accomplished by means of a conduit that would run parallel to the corridor road. This is an expected process and afterwards other demands will come for transfer of fuel, and
electricity lines, and the corridor will have to be widened.

Another issue is linked to massive use of water for a population of 2.5 million persons in the mountains of Judea and Samaria in another ten years' time.

This population will create a great deal of sewage, part of which will go down to the ground water and part of which will flow into the streams and valleys of the country and reach the eventual bottom of its drainage path, that is, Israel. This phenomenon involves the Kishon, Hadera, Alexander, Yarqon, and Shiqma streams on the western side of the country, as well as the Sahannah and the Gilboa springs on the eastern side of the country.

We also need to assume that a population that belongs to the developing world will have difficulty in dealing with this problem and the problem of preventing the pollution from coming down upon Israel.

Similar problems are expected in the matters of rubbish, and the flow of sand along the coasts of Gaza and Israel. With the setting up of a port in Gaza, more breakwaters will enter the sea thus there will be a slight blockage of the sand that still flows from south to north. There is a fear of pollution of the seas (the Dead Sea, the Mediterranean), although Israel's contribution to pollution is no smaller than that of others.

The Palestinian State — Implications for Israeli Society

The establishment of a Palestinian state "in the soft underbelly of Israel" will necessarily be traumatic and bring implications for all sectors of Israeli society. First of all, it will produce a severe ideological crisis over the loss of the land and in particular over the loss of the area that served as the cradle of the Jewish people. It will be an ideological crisis since all the dreams, the Zionist settlement activity by all Israeli governments in the mountains of Judea and Samaria will come to an end, even if this end takes on the coloring of consent of one hue or another. It is difficult to see an ideological society in Israel after this dream has been shattered. Israel will be another cynical capitalist state, but in its geographical location it cannot last that way for more than several years.

This ideological issue will be joined by clear phenomena on the ground. First of all, the challenge to Israel's border zones that will be afflicted by increasing theft, terrorism, daily tensions over every single detail, insecurity in riding the Trans-Israel highway, danger to Israel's energy corridor that will be close to the border, pursuits after thieves and terrorists that will stop at the border line, and in fact Israel's security will be placed in the hands of the Palestinian state.

The Israeli Arabs are reading the picture and it is no accident that they are no longer calling themselves "Israeli Arabs", but "Palestinian Arabs living in Israel". In the next stage, we will more and more hear the demand to change Israel into "a state of all its citizens" at the expense of "the Jewish-Zionist state", and rightly so! If there is no Zionism, if there is no past, if we are like all other states in the world, then let us take another step in this direction and let us be a state of all its citizens, rather than a specifically Jewish state. (Soffer, 1997)

Irredentist processes may be expected from this population at any stage in the future, first in the Bedouin south and afterwards in "the Little Triangle". Of course, flooding Israel with Arab workers will harm the foundations of Jewish society, as in the past, and these will continue to deteriorate.

It is impossible not to take into account that as the frictions increase between the two states, a volley of Katyushas from somewhere in the territories may fall on the Rutenberg power station or on the Azrieli Shopping Center in Tel Aviv. Will Israel in response mobilize armored divisions to enter the territory of this state? (Gelber, 1998)

Conclusion

Setting up a Palestinian state is an apparently inevitable process which is becoming more and more concrete. There is hope that a responsible leadership in the new state will do everything to advance national interests, and will want to maintain friendly ties with its important neighbor — Israel.
On the other hand, we have analyzed many situations resulting from harsh geographic premises — and other factors not considered here — that ensure a great deal of friction, confrontations, and worse. Disastrous processes will apparently develop for the Jewish-Zionist state. As long as poverty prevails in the new state, Israel will absorb all its frustrations — in the form of theft, smuggling, and illegal migration, and life will be unbearable along the borders — from the frontier zone to the heart of Israel, and beyond.

There is a large, ideological opposition to a Palestinian state remaining within the borders that it will receive, an opposition that does not accept Israel for religious-national reasons. This opposition will ride on the back of the waves of poverty in order to incite, to strike and to destroy anything positive that will be built.

There are also historic processes — such as the demographic growth on the other side — that will intensify the pressure on Israel's borders. In less than two decades there will be an Arab majority in Western Eretz-Israel, 6.7 Arabs versus 6 million Jews! And there are processes among the Israeli Arabs that will hasten the processes of Israeli collapse. The military and semi-military strengthening of the new state through absolute control over the Gaza seaport and Dahaniya airport will provide the leadership of this state with new options that will be exercised against Israel when the relationship between them deteriorates. Furthermore, the frustrated, poverty-stricken mass will have to be distracted toward another target...

Awaiting Israel then is a long period of twilight of hopes for peace with frictions and incitements to war, as well as a period of instability that will chiefly serve the Arab world and the Palestinians and will severely strike at Israeli society.

If we add to this the anticipated ideological crisis in Israel upon the establishment of this state and the objective difficulties to be expected within Israel without any connection to this state, then we are facing a rather bleak prospect that awaits the State of Israel.

We have enumerated the dangers of a Palestinian state, but are there other solutions to the process described? There are no good tidings of “the messianic times” that are wholly peaceful, but there is something to do and that is for another article.
THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE ISSUE AND THE DEMOGRAPHIC ASPECT

Atalia Ben-Meir

The Refugee Issue: De Facto Exchange of Populations

The world does not realize that two major refugee problems existed in the Middle East at the same time. One of them has received the widest possible exposure in the public consciousness, while the other has been ignored.

This mass movement in the Middle East took place in the context of tremendous upheaval all over the globe.

During the latter half of the 1940s tens of millions of peoples were uprooted from the homes of their births and thrust into the status of a refugee. The following are some examples of the mass population transfers that took place at that time: 2,388,000 Muslims migrated from India to Pakistan and 2,644,000 Hindus left Pakistan for India; 1.8 million Koreans moved from North to South; 13.5 million ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe to the West, including nearly 3,000,000 Sudeten Germans, all of whom were absorbed by the two Germanies. Between 1949 and 1961 West Germany absorbed more than 3,500,000 East German refugees.

The Expulsion of the Jews from the Arab Countries

There has been an uninterrupted presence of Jewish communities in the Land of Israel since the Assyrian and Babylonian exiles in the Eighth and Sixth Century BCE, 1000 years before the Arab invasion in the region and more than 2,500 years before the birth of the modern Arab states. Empires rose and collapsed, Babylon, Persia, Greek, Roman, Muslim, Turkish and Arab. New religions were introduced to the region and they too disappeared. Throughout all these traumatic upheavals in the Middle East, Jews were a permanent feature.

Without a doubt, the Jews living in Arab countries were “Zionists”. Their prayers were saturated with the longing for Israel and Jerusalem. A central motif of the Sabbath and Jewish festivals was the desire for “Jerusalem”. They never severed their ties with Israel or with their brethren who resided there. Nevertheless, they remained in the Diaspora, establishing flourishing communities throughout the Middle East and North Africa.

Despite oppression, persecution and periods of forced conversion, the Jews did not leave their homelands. This raises a most abstruse question: Why did the Jews of the Arab countries flee, in most cases penniless, leaving behind all their property? Something very compelling and traumatic had to occur to force them to leave behind 25 centuries of history.

From the perspective of the turn of the millennium this is a perplexing question. But if this very same question is asked in the context of the time that this mass exodus occurred, then it can be readily explained. Jews began fleeing the Arab countries from 1947. These were the years immediately after the horrific dimensions of the Shoah had been made evident for the entire world. The “Final Solution” had been planned and implemented by a country at the forefront of culture and science. Regardless of this, Germany jettisoned more than a
thousand years of culture and civilization and carried out the destruction of six million Jews.

So, why did the Jews in Arab countries come to the conclusion that their lives also were in jeopardy?

On November 24, 1947 Heykal Pasha, an Egyptian delegate to the United Nations, in an attempt to intimidate the delegates of the UN from supporting partition, made the following statement:

A million Jews live in peace in Egypt [and in other Muslim states] and enjoy all rights of citizenship. They have no desire to emigrate to Palestine. However, if a Jewish state were established, nobody could prevent disorders. Riots would break out in Palestine, would spread through all the Arab states and might lead to a war between two races. The United Nations... should not lose sight of the fact that the proposed solution might endanger a million Jews living in the Muslim countries. Partition of Palestine might create anti-Semitism in those countries even more difficult to root out than the anti-Semitism which the Allies tried to eradicate in Germany... If the United Nations decides to partition Palestine, it might be responsible for very grave disorders and for the massacre of a large number of Jews.¹

Three days later, on November 28, 1947, from the rostrum of the General Assembly, Fadel Al-Jamal, the then Iraqi Foreign Minister, made serious threats against Israeli Jews: “We are all aware that mob fury is often stronger than the police,” adding:

The United States, which has not been able altogether to suppress outbursts of racial passion in the form of lynching, will appreciate that with the best will in the world, the Near Eastern governments might not be able to control the infuriated Muslims.²

These remarks were not made in a vacuum. The persecution of the Jewish population pre-dated the UN Resolution on partition on November 29, 1947. The rise of Zionism had led to an even more systematic and vicious persecution of the Jews residing in the Arab countries. In the course of the Second World War, and its aftermath, the political and physical status of the Jews deteriorated dramatically. In November 1945, a wave of pogroms swept the Arab countries, killing hundreds of Jews, vandalizing Jewish property and synagogues.³

On the backdrop of official anti-Semitism, it seemed that these were not isolated incidents, analogous to those that had plagued Jews throughout the nearly 1,300 years of Muslim rule. The Jews became apprehensive, fearing an apparent coordinated effort of the Arab countries, acting in concert, to eliminate the Jewish population. As arrests, confiscations, anti-Jewish legislation and economic restrictions became more wide-spread, their fears grew.

In 1947 the Iraqi government began to initiate a period of anti-Jewish legislation culminating in the disfranchisement of Iraqi Jews in 1951. As a result, more than 100,000 Iraqi Jews arrived in Israel penniless.

There is documented evidence that Nuri Sa‘id, head of the Iraqi government, had broached the subject of expelling Jews on several occasions. He raised the subject to Samir El Rifai, the Head of the Jordanian government, in February 1949. He told the UN Reconciliation Commission on February 18, 1949,

Iraq had thus far been able to protect its 160,000 Jews but...unless conditions improved and unless Jews now demonstrate their good faith with deeds not words, Iraq might be helpless to prevent spontaneous action by its people.

He discussed the possibility of an exchange of population with Edward Crocker, US Ambassador in Baghdad, on May 8, 1949, “a voluntary exchange on a pro rata basis of Iraqi Jews and Palestinian Arabs”.⁴

Absorption of Jewish Refugees from Arab Countries into Israel

The definition of a Palestinian refugee used by UNRWA, a person whose normal residence was Palestine for a minimum of two years preceding the conflict in 1948, should have applied also to the 800,000 Jews who had fled Arab and Muslim lands in the face of state-sponsored anti-Zionist violence. It should also have applied to the 40,000 Jews who had fled Jerusalem’s Old City and settlements in the West Bank during the 1948 hostilities.
In practice, however, UNRWA has always focused exclusively on the status of the Palestinians. Certainly no international organization provided any financial assistance for absorbing the Jews from Arab countries that immigrated to Israel. Table 1 presents the distribution of immigration by year of Aliyah and country of origin. In relative terms, this wave of immigration has no equal; the original Jewish population of Israel of 650,000 doubled in size by the end of 1951.5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1948-51</th>
<th>1952-54</th>
<th>1955-60</th>
<th>1961-64</th>
<th>1965-71</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syria-Lebanon</td>
<td>2,913</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>2,102</td>
<td>1,401</td>
<td>2,945</td>
<td>9,975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>123,371</td>
<td>1,934</td>
<td>1,055</td>
<td>541</td>
<td>1,609</td>
<td>128,510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen-Aden</td>
<td>48,315</td>
<td>867</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>50,523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>28,263</td>
<td>16,076</td>
<td>79,869</td>
<td>100,354</td>
<td>30,153</td>
<td>254,715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>3,810</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>2,989</td>
<td>9,680</td>
<td>3,177</td>
<td>20,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>13,293</td>
<td>5,973</td>
<td>17,596</td>
<td>3,813</td>
<td>7,753</td>
<td>48,428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>30,972</td>
<td>1,644</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>2,148</td>
<td>35,517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt-Sudan</td>
<td>8,760</td>
<td>3,157</td>
<td>14,364</td>
<td>1,233</td>
<td>1,730</td>
<td>29,244</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: In 1948-1951, the total immigration to Israel was 686,739.

The process of adaptation was difficult and strewn with difficulties. One of the most significant changes forced upon these immigrants was in the area of employment and professions. For a considerable proportion, the move to Israel meant shifting from one occupation to another, and often from sector to sector, creating a crisis that many never overcame. Israel could take care of the physical needs of these refugees, not the strain of reorientation. Their familiar world had forever disappeared. They had to undergo an adaptation process, which was especially difficult because of the constraints of Israeli’s economic structure, which was so different from that to which they had been accustomed. From being proud citizens they were thrust into a position of inferiority and unemployment, forced to live, for many years, on the margins of Israeli society.

Indeed, it was not yearnings for Zion that motivated the Jews from Arab countries to place themselves in this predicament. It was not the State of Israel that forced them to abandon their homes and wealth and to choose uncertainty and instability. The hostility, the violence and the fear of these escalating forced the decision upon them; Zionism merely provided the direction.

For Israel also, the absorption of these Jewish refugees from Arab countries was marked with challenges and tensions. The fabric of the country’s social, cultural and economic spheres seemed, sometimes, on the verge of breakdown as the demographic makeup of the country underwent far-reaching changes. But the impossible was achieved. More than 50 years have passed since then and although some problems have yet to be resolved, on the whole these erstwhile refugees have integrated within Israeli society, regarding the epithet “refugee” as pejorative, and certainly not applicable to them.
The Legitimate Rights of the Jews from Arab Countries

The subject of the legitimate rights of the Jewish refugees from Arab countries was raised in the course of the peace negotiations with Egypt. The Policy Paper, signed between the USA and Israel on October 5, 1977, stated that the resolution of the Arab refugee problem and the Jewish refugee problem should be in accordance with mutually agreed-upon guidelines. This was concretely expressed by President Carter, who stated at a press conference that took place on October 27, 1977, that: “Well, the Palestinians have rights. Obviously there are Jewish refugees also; they have the same rights as the others do.”

Ultimately, Article 8 of the Framework Agreement for Peace, signed at Camp David on September 17, 1978, recognized the rights of the Jewish refugees, specifically laying down that “the parties agree to establish a Claims Committee for the mutual settlement of all financial claims.”

The Palestinian Refugee as a Pawn

The nearly universally negative attitude towards the Palestinians’ right to return, irrespective of political ideology, is illustrated by a recent comment made by the prominent Israeli author A.B. Yehoshua:

When my Palestinian friends demand the right of return, I tell them that I would be prepared to bring all the Palestinian refugees back to their homes in Israel on condition that they first bring back to life the 6,000 Israeli dead who were killed during the aggressive war of 1948, when Israel was pleading for its life after the UN partition plan and seeking peaceful coexistence.

The origins of the Palestinian refugee problem lay in the refusal of the Arab States to accept the 1947 UN partition plan and their decision to launch a war against the nascent Jewish state. During the war, the Arab states called on the Palestinian Arabs to leave the country temporarily to make room for the invading armies and to return with the victorious Arab armies. Some 590,000 followed this directive and left the area; about 150,000 remained and subsequently became citizens of Israel.

There was no master plan to expel the Arabs; on the contrary, the existence of an Arab population was consistently incorporated in Ben-Gurion’s grand scheme for Israel. In Ben-Gurion’s worldview there was enough room for both Jews and Arabs; Israel’s strength would be based on mutual understanding between Jews and Arabs but also predicated on mass Aliyah:

The starting point for a solution of the question of the Arabs in the Jewish state is, in his view, the need to prepare the ground for an Arab-Jewish agreement.

Flowing from this, the Jewish governing bodies made efforts to prevail upon the Palestinian Arabs to remain and not to heed the call of the Arab leadership. For example, The Assembly of Palestine Jewry issued this appeal on October 2, 1947:

We will do everything in our power to maintain peace, and establish cooperation, gainful to both [Jews and Arabs]. It is now, here and now, from Jerusalem itself, that a call must go out to the Arab nations to join forces with Jewry and the destined Jewish state and work shoulder to shoulder for our common good, for the peace and progress of sovereign equals.

In anticipation of the establishment of a Jewish state, the Jewish Agency announced, on November 30, the day after the UN partition vote:

The main theme behind the spontaneous celebrations we are witnessing today is our community’s desire to seek peace and its determination to achieve fruitful cooperation with the Arabs...

Nevertheless, already on March 8, 1948, the Arab Higher Committee gave instructions to the Arab National Committee in Jerusalem to order women, children and the elderly in Jerusalem to leave their homes: “Any opposition to this order...is an obstacle to the holy war...and will hamper the operations of the fighters in these districts.”

On April 23, the Haganah captured Haifa. A British police report, dated April 26, explained that every effort is being made by the Jews to persuade the Arab populace to stay and carry on with their normal lives, to get their shops and businesses open and to be assured that their lives and interests will be safe.
In fact, David Ben-Gurion sent Golda Meir to Haifa to try to persuade the Arabs to stay, but she was unable to convince them because of their fear of reprisals. By the end of the battle, more than 50,000 Palestinians had left. As the fighting spread, and the possibility of defeat turned into reality, the flight of the Arabs intensified.

On May 15, with the declaration of the establishment of the State of Israel, the Arab armies invaded Israel for the expressed purpose of wiping out the Jewish population. Setting the stage for what was to be achieved, Azzam Pasha, the Secretary General of the Arab League, predicted: ‘a war of annihilation, a colossal massacre that [would] be remembered [alongside] the Crusades and the massacres of the Mongols’.

The invasion failed, but it created a refugee problem, whose plight was exploited by the Arab countries to attain what they had failed to achieve in the war: the destruction of the State of Israel.

Emile Ghoury, the Secretary of the Arab Higher Committee of Palestine, alluded to this problem when he stated in 1948:

The fact [that] there are these refugees is a direct consequence of the Arab States' intervention, of their opposition to partition [of Palestine] and to the State of Israel.

In contrast to the Arab countries’ attitude to their brethren, Israel’s Proclamation of Independence, issued May 14, 1948, invited the Palestinians to remain in their homes and become equal citizens in the new state:

In the midst of wanton aggression, we yet call upon the Arab inhabitants of the State of Israel to preserve the ways of peace and play their part in the development of the State, on the basis of full and equal citizenship and due representation in all its bodies and institutions... We extend our hand in peace and neighborliness to all the neighboring states and their peoples.

Dealing with the Palestinian Refugees

Arabs claim that 800,000 to 1,000,000 Palestinians had become refugees in the period 1947-49, but there is no doubt that these are inflated numbers. The last census taken in 1945 found only 756,000 permanent Arab residents in Israel. A 1949 Government of Israel census counted 160,000 Arabs after the war. This meant that no more than 650,000 Palestinian Arabs could have become refugees. A report by the UN Mediator on Palestine arrived at an even lower figure — 472,000.

On December 8, 1949, the General Assembly established UNRWA as a provisional body to provide relief for the Palestinian refugees. Nevertheless, the Arabs have consistently rejected any plans for alleviating their misery or facilitating their rehabilitation: the 1949 proposals of the Security Council to conduct a survey to determine the best method for settling the refugees in different parts of the Middle East; UN Secretary Dag Hammerskold’s multi-year plan for rehabilitating the refugees; the allocations to UNRWA earmarked for the refugee Rehabilitation Fund. The Arabs did their utmost to frustrate any attempt to solve the Arab refugee problem. Alpen Ross, the adviser on refugee affairs to the World Council of [Christian] Churches remarked:

Without the political aspect, the Arab refugee problem would have been the easiest to solve by integration. Among all the refugee problems after the Second World War...the Arab refugees — in their faith, language, race and social organization — are no different than the other [Arabs] in their countries.

The treatment of the refugees in the decade following their displacement was best summed up by a former director of UNRWA, Ralph Garroway, in August 1958:

The Arab States do not want to solve the refugee problem. They want to keep it as an open sore, as an affront to the United Nations and as a weapon against Israel. Arab leaders don’t give a damn whether the refugees live or die.

No substantial changes have been made in the interim years. The EU report, published during the Oslo process, recommended integrating the refugees, thus arousing Palestinian protests and reservations.

Table 2 presents the current picture of the Palestinian refugees.
TABLE 2 — UNRWA Registered Refugees
(June 1995)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>In Camps</th>
<th>Not in Camps</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>238,188</td>
<td>1,050,009</td>
<td>1,288,197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank</td>
<td>131,705</td>
<td>385,707</td>
<td>517,412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>362,626</td>
<td>320,934</td>
<td>683,560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>175,747</td>
<td>170,417</td>
<td>346,164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>83,311</td>
<td>253,997</td>
<td>337,308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>991,577</td>
<td>2,181,064</td>
<td>3,172,641</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Demographic Implications of Repatriation.

Returnees and Demographics in the Middle East

Demographic forces are gradually changing the population makeup of Israel. By the year 2005, the Muslim population will constitute 1.4 million and the Jewish population will decline to only 77% of the total population. Shlomo Gazit, in differentiating between Israel proper and the territories of Mandatory Palestine, precluded repatriation to Israel proper, stating, categorically, that the return of Palestinian refugees in any significant number to Israel would “threaten the Jewish character of the state”. Moreover, the return of the refugees would significantly worsen this delicate balance [between the Jewish and Arab population within Israel], increase the irredentist threat, and even endanger Israel’s 1967 borders.14

Notwithstanding his acknowledgement of the demographic dangers, he had no qualms in advocating the establishment of a Palestinian state with a “Law of Return” guaranteeing every Palestinian in the Diaspora, who so wishes, the right to immigrate.

In his view, the influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees into the Palestinian state constituted a problem only for the settlers; the crowding of millions of Palestinians on the eastern border of Israel was not perceived as a danger.

Perhaps his analysis was based on false premises. Gazit projected that the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza in 2005 would be 2,491,791, a projection already surpassed by the Palestinian census for 1997.

The crux of the opposition to the Palestinian right of return revolves around the issue of the population balance between Jews and Arabs west of the Jordanian River. Table 5 presents the distribution of the Arab-Jewish population west of the Jordan River. In view of the higher fertility rate among Arabs relative to the Jewish population, clearly parity will be reached in the very near future. The ramifications of such an eventuality are critical for Israel’s very existence.

Although no official estimates exist regarding the probable number of Palestinian returnees, Israeli analyst Zivit Steinboim15 estimated that 1 million people would relocate to the West Bank and Gaza, if given the opportunity to do so. The biggest potential pool of émigrés, about 300,000, is the residents in the camps in Lebanon, 150,000 from Jordan and 50,000-80,000 from Syria.

Economist Ruth Klinov in 1995 cited 500,000 as the number of expected returnees while Mark Heller and Sari Nusseibeh estimated that between 750,000 and 1 million Palestinians would return.16 Donna Arzi17 predicted that about 1.5 million refugees would eventually be rehabilitated in “Palestine”.

The Scale and Region of Repatriation

Those advocating repatriation of the Palestinian refugees cite cases where this has proven to be a successful solution. Unfortunately, they totally ignore two critical factors: the scale of immigration and the percentage of the returnees of the total population of the receiving country. Table 3 presents a bird’s-eye view of the demographic impact of the returnees on the receiving country. As can be seen, the returnees constituted a small, in some cases negligible, percentage of the absorbing population.
Let us compare these figures with various assessments of three different scenarios in respect to the number of Palestinian returnees and the percentage they would constitute within the Palestinian Authority. The baseline is the Palestinian 1997 census: 2,597,616.

Table 4 — Projected Scenarios: Percent Returnees of Palestinian Authority

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Number of Returnees</th>
<th>% Returnees of the Absorbing Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 million</td>
<td>38.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.5 million</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>850,000</td>
<td>32.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 presents three scenarios as to the demographic distribution in the area west of the Jordan River.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population of Israel</th>
<th>Palestinian Authority</th>
<th>Number of Returnees</th>
<th>Muslims West of the Jordan River</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Muslims of the Population West of the Jordan River</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>4,497,416</td>
<td>9,282,516</td>
<td>48.5%</td>
<td>4,785,100</td>
<td>899,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.5 million</td>
<td>4,997,416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>850,000</td>
<td>4,347,416</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Is the “Right of Return” Indeed a Giant Step Towards Peace?

There is No Legal Basis for the “Right of Return” to Israeli Proper

The “right of return” is set out as a provision in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. This right, however, is not inviolable and is subject to derogating clauses that place limits on its applicability. The various provisions of these clauses can be subsumed under the rubric of national security.

Not only is the Palestinians’ right of return not anchored in the Universal Declaration or in the International Covenant, but it is in fact incongruous to them.

- International law stipulates that the return should be to the country of which the refugee was a citizen. Since international law is premised on state sovereignty, the right of return presupposes the existence of a country to which the person can return. Since the Palestinians have never been nationals of Israel, they have no right of return to Israel.
- The right of return is granted to nationals. Yet the Palestinians had never been nationals or permanent residents of Israel: they had either fled before the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 or fled before the areas where they had resided were occupied by Israel in 1948 or 1967.
- The Palestinian Authority did not exist in
1948 or in 1967 so the Palestinian refugees could not have been its nationals and therefore it has no authority to grant them the right of return within its borders.

- Finally, on the basis of the derogating clause contained in Article 29 of the Universal Declaration, the right of return would constitute an existential danger to Israel.

- The right of return does not apply to displaced masses of people. Jagerskiold, addressing the provisions contained in Article 12 (4) in the 1996 International Covenant ("that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country"), writes that these provisions do not apply to the mass movement of refugees from a war zone but rather is an individual right.24

- The general limitation of the clause of Article 29 of the [1948 Universal] Declaration [of Human Rights] permits the non-application of the right. Certainly the influx of more than a million, mostly hostile refugees would "violate the freedoms of others" in Israel, and it would damage "public order and the general welfare in a democratic society".25

- The International Covenant grants Israel the authority to exclude the right of return of the Palestinian refugees on the basis of Article 4 that expressly sets down that this right can be suspended "in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation."26

Thus, Resolution 194 III did not grant the "right of return" but explicitly conditioned repatriation with a desire to "live at peace with their neighbors". The wording of the resolution makes it self evident that the UN recognized that Israel could not be expected to repatriate a hostile population that might endanger its security. The Resolution did not recognize any right of return but rather was a recommendation that refugees, Jewish and Arab, should return and should live at peace.

The Arab governments have based their demand that the refugees be restored to their homes on Paragraph II of this Resolution. Placing all the emphasis, in isolation, on one passage ("to facilitate the repatriation of the refugees"), distorts the purpose and character of the Resolution, which sought to establish a peaceful Arab-Israeli settlement.

UN Security Council Resolution 237 of June 14, 1967 merely called on Israel "to facilitate the return" and not grant the "right" of return to those inhabitants who had fled the areas. Security Council Resolution 242, Paragraph 2(b), adopted on November 22, 1967, also, merely affirmed, in its second paragraph, the necessity for achieving a "just settlement of the refugee problem". It avoided all mention of the Palestinians, implying reservations in respect of their territorial demands. This resolution expressly relied on Article 2 of the UN Charter, which requires "good faith". The resolution did not propose a binding solution, probably in recognition of the fact that the Jewish refugees from Arab countries are also deserving of a just settlement.

The anti-Israeli bias of the UN made it easy for the Arabs to force the issue. On November 22, 1974 the General Assembly adopted Resolution 3236 III of 1974 that called for Palestinian self-determination. It further confirmed the inalienable right of the Palestinians to return to their homes and property from which they had been "displaced and uprooted".

It should be recalled that it was in this context that the UN adopted a year later GA Resolution 3379 that declared that Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination. The resolution was repealed only in December 1991.

In analyzing Resolution 3236 of November 22, 1974, Ruth Lapidoth provides an original perspec-
tive. The formulation of the resolution discarded the humanitarian aspects of the Palestinian refugees and transformed their rights into a political question and in doing so weakened the humanitarian basis for the claim to return. It is precisely the political ramifications of this resolution, which put its legality and validity into question because it was contrary to basic UN Charter principles. K. Radley’s arguments are especially germane to the dispute over the right of return:

At the very least, the resolution proposes that the displaced Palestinians have an absolute right to return to Israeli territory despite any objections that the state might interpose. Such a proposition would alone render meaningless the concept of “sovereign equality” of states upon which, according to Article 2(1) of the Charter, the United Nations is based. But Resolution 3236 goes even further to state that the displaced Palestinians have not only an absolute right to return to the Israeli state but also have the right to do so for the purpose of pursuing their separate nationalist identity. It is difficult to imagine how much closer the General Assembly could have come to endorsing the destruction, in part or whole, of a member state.27

It could not have been expressed any clearer than that: the right of return is incompatible with the principles of sovereignty and equality contained in the UN Charter. The inescapable conclusion is that the Palestinian refugees’ right of return is limited by the right of Israel to exist.

Subverting the Peace
The Oslo process was initiated in 1993 to herald an era of peace in the Middle East. The lynchpin of the agreement was reciprocity. Nearly 8 years have passed since the Declaration of Principles was signed between Israel and the Palestinians and peace has become more elusive.

In anticipation of the Palestinians’ insistence on the right of return, the Knesset passed a resolution, on May 17, 2000, forbidding the settling of Palestinian refugees in pre-1967 Israel. This, however, is a partial solution.

Yasser Arafat plans to declare an independent Palestinian state in September 2000. Under international law, this state will be entitled to grant citizenship to any Palestinian who should so desire. It would also destroy any semblance of peace that may be attained.

Demography was one of the more persuasive arguments of the peace camp to justify transferring territories to the Palestinians. It is no less persuasive an argument as deterrence of the repatriation of a million Palestinians to the borders of the State of Israel would be.

The influx of the returnees will create a destabilizing effect: in the first stage, in the Palestinian Authority, and in the entire region in the second. The Gaza Strip is the most densely populated area in the world; the West Bank cannot support an influx of hundreds of thousands within its small area. The Palestinian Authority does not have the economic basis to support the existing population. It certainly cannot create economic conditions to absorb the refugees who are either very well educated or lack any profession.

At the same time, the loyalty of the Arab Israeli population towards Israel is being undermined. The Arab Israeli Institute at Givat Haviva conducted a survey among Israel’s Arab citizens and found that 11% (in contrast to 38% five years ago) define themselves as Israeli Arabs. 67% define themselves as Palestinians first and Israeli next and 21% as Palestinians only. Leading the way are the Arab students who throughout April—May 2000 organized violent demonstrations against Israel, waving Palestinian flags and making incendiary statements. They have the unreserved support of MK Hashem Mahmeed, a member of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, who declared that Israeli Arabs must learn from Hizbullah how to fight for their lands in the same way that Hizbullah forced Israel out of Lebanon.28

An unprejudiced analysis of the political and demographic trends dominant in the Middle East should alert us to the hazards of capitulating to Palestinian demands. If there is no peace for Israel, there is no peace at all.
ISRAELI ARABS:  
THE DEVELOPMENT OF IRREDENTISM  
REPORTS FROM THE ARAB PRESS  

Haggai Huberman  

The affiliation of the Palestinian people within the Green Line is with Arab nationalism and Palestinian nationalism. We are an indivisible component of our Palestinian nation, however, due to our geographic location, we are considered Israeli residents and carry its identity card. We are proud of our Palestinian identity and affiliation, and we emanate from the wellspring of our original Palestinian heritage, culture and history. We the Palestinians in Israel, feel the pain of our Palestinian brethren wherever they may be, their nation is our nation, their dream is our dream, we share the same blood and attempt to live in peace with this situation. 

This is a quotation from an interview with Darwish Rabi, one of the candidates for the mayoralty of the Jafialya Regional Council, which appeared in the official newspaper of the Palestinian Authority, El-Hayyat-Al-Jedda, on November 5, 1998, during the Israeli local election campaign. It seems that there is no better illustration of the Israeli Arabs’ sense of dual identity: Israeli citizenship — resulting from an accident of history — and Palestinian nationality, resulting from cultural and ethnic affiliation. 

The question of Israeli Arab loyalty to the State of Israel began with the establishment of the Jewish state. It is not merely a theoretical question, as this issue has far-reaching practical ramifications, especially as it relates to the political arena. The “Jewish majority” question was raised more vigorously during the reign of the left-wing government from 1992 to 1996 as a result of extensive political processes initiated by the Israeli government — establishment of an independent Palestinian Authority in Judea and Samaria, withdrawal from sections of the Land of Israel, and laying the foundation for the establishment of a Palestinian state — while relying for support for these measures on the votes of Arab Members of Knesset. 

The loyalty question was exacerbated after the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, when the Arab Palestinian society began to perceive the “fledgling state”. Anyone following the developments among Israeli Arabs in recent years ought not to have been surprised that classic intifada scenes — stone-throwing, Molotov cocktails, rubber-coated bullets and tear gas — were witnessed in September 1998 by the Arabs in Israel’s heartland, in Um-el-Fahm. Since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, the ties between the Arabs of Judea, Samaria and Gaza and the “Green Line Arabs” have grown gradually closer. The State of Israel is witnessing an accelerated process of “Palestinianization” among Israeli Arabs, who are referred to in the Arab media as “the Palestinians within the Green Line.” It is imperative that Israel take action against this state of affairs. 

On September 18, 1998, a mass assembly took place in Um-al-Fahm.
Tens of thousands of Palestinian inhabitants of the triangle, the Galil, the Negev and Jerusalem, swore to defend the sacred Al-Aqsa Mosque from any damage.

The official newspaper of the Palestinian Authority, El-Hayyat-el-Jedida (September 20, 1998), reported excitedly:

The participants in the third Al-Aqsa Congress, which opened the day before yesterday in Um-el-Fahm, repeated three times in response to Sheik Akrama Zabari, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and of the Palestinian holy places, the chant, “I swear by great Allah that I will defend Al-Aqsa Mosque.” At the Congress, organized by the Islamic Movement, monetary donations were collected. Women contributed their gold jewelry for the defense of the Al-Aqsa Mosque...

On December 3, 1998 the Palestinian newspaper El-Hayyat-el-Jedida reported that:

A delegation from Sakhnin and Um-el-Fahm visited the second regiment of the Presidential Security Forces, Force 17, the day before yesterday...The head of the visiting delegation expressed his joy and the joy of the members of the delegation to find themselves among their brothers on the ground of Gaza, the resilient, powerful land, and among the heroes who threw the rocks, and thanked the National Authority for the achievement which it attained in order to guarantee security for our people.

On November 29, 1998 the Palestinian Jerusalem newspaper, Al-Quds, reported that:

A delegation of residents of Um-el-Fahm, Ara and ‘Arara visited the Legislative Council Headquarters in Gaza yesterday. Attending the delegation’s reception was Ibrahim Abu el-Nera, the first deputy of the Speaker of the Legislative Council. At the end of his remarks, Abu el-Nera praised the residents’ position and their resilience in the face of Israeli actions. He emphasized that neither the obstacles, the Israeli actions nor the distances separating us will divide us and our brethren. “We are all one nation.”

Another item from El-Hayyat-el-Jedida on October 20, 1998 stated:

General Mazen Az-el-Din expressed his joy and appreciation of the visit paid by our residents from within the Green Line to the areas of the National Authority. General Az-el-Din praised the positions of our people within the Green Line in their opposition to the racist and immoral activities of the Israeli authorities — expropriation of lands and deportation of the innocent, in order to establish settlement clusters and training camps for the Israeli Army.

On August 10, 1998 El-Hayyat-el-Jedida reported a visit by a delegation from the town Baqa al-Gharbiya in Wadi Ara to Gaza:

The Gaza City council welcomed the delegation from Baka-el-Gharbiya within the Green Line, which numbered 50 men and women from various political and professional walks of life, headed by Kafah Masrawa, who is responsible for public relations in the Baka City Council. The delegation met the mayor and the senior officials of the City Council in City Hall. Aoun el-Sharva blessed the delegation and expressed the joy of the residents of Gaza and their City Council in welcoming their brothers, highlighted the importance of the visit as a unifying experience and emphasized their common roots and destiny. He called upon the Palestinian people from within the Green Line to provide assistance to their brethren in Gaza and the West Bank.

The delegation head thanked, on her part, the Palestinian in charge of international relations and his superiors for organizing the trip to Gaza, and said that the visit was an act of mutual commitment with our people in Gaza. Masrawa posed a question to the mayor regarding the essential areas in which the Palestinian people living within the Green Line can assist their brethren in Gaza and the West Bank. El-Sharva replied that there are a number of areas in which the brethren within the Green Line can provide assistance. The first area is the undermining of the foundation of the extremist Israeli government and
attempting to facilitate its downfall through the use of parliamentary means. Similarly, they can mobilize the “voice of the people” in order to bring about the election of a moderate government which will be positive in its attempt to achieve peace. El-Sharva, who also serves as the head of the Union of City Councils and Local Councils, informed the delegation that the Union had decided at its last meeting which took place in Lenin to initiate ties and conduct meetings with the Arab Central Committee of the local councils within Israel, with the intention of facilitating cooperation and raising the level of mutual devotion and commitment among our people.

On November 2, 1998 El-Hayyat-el-Jedida reported:

A delegation of the Arab Palestinian Front, headed by a member of the Front’s Central Committee, Sa‘id Sueke, conducted a visit yesterday to the headquarters of the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality, in a show of solidarity with the immigrant residents of Kefar Samhata... The delegation met with members of the Front, headed by a member of the Political Office and Secretary of the party branch in Haifa, Isam Nahil, along with the head of the District Committee for the Protection of Immigration Rights within the Green Line and the man in charge of the movement for the return of the immigrant residents of Kefar Samhata, Abed el-Hadi Muhammad Horani. Sueke called for the unification of the ranks and the Palestinian home within and without and for the need of all immigrant residents to return to their villages... He emphasized that our people are one, inseparable unit.

On August 16, 1998 El-Hayyat el-Jedida reported that:

...the delegation of “Arabs within”, led by Yunes Jabarin, head of the El-Neda Society in Um-al-Fahm, visited the Hebron City Council, where they met with Mayor Mustafa Abd-el-Natshe, who provided a comprehensive survey of the state of the city and its changing face. The delegation donated 10,000 NIS, part of which was earmarked for the disabled constituency in the city.

And on August 29, 1998, the Palestinian television reported that the Authority’s Minister of Welfare, Intisar el-Wazir, also known as Um-jihad, said at a meeting with a delegation of Arabs from Galilee:

We sense joy and pride to meet with you, because these meetings deepen the foundations of the struggle, the brotherhood and the nationalism among us, since our struggle is a common one for our nation’s rights, for freedom and independence and for the achievement of your rights in full.

And an item in the El-Quds newspaper on August 17, 1998 stated:

A member of the Legislative Council, Abu el-Nera, received a delegation of Palestinians from Israel. Abu el-Nera praised the Palestinian attitudes in Israel, their opposition to the policies of the Israeli government and their devotion to the land in the face of the attempts to undermine them.

And another item from El-Hayyat-el-Jedida on July 30, 1998 about a visit to the Gaza Strip by a delegation from the villages Sha’ah and Tamra in Galilee, under the auspices of the Palestinian Authority’s “Committee for Ties with the Residents of Occupied Palestine”:

General El-Arez welcomed the delegation and said: “Your presence here today signifies the fact that we reject partition, and these visits express the mutual connection between the people of Palestine, and we are strong, thanks to our people and your virtue and the virtue of our national unity.” Mursad Halaila, secretary of the western Galilee region of the Arab Democratic Party said: “Our visit to the camp, named after the deceased Faiz Gerard, is a visit of brotherhood realizing the mutual connection despite the Zionist actions which divide the people of one nation.”

On December 28, 1997, a delegation from the village Araba in the Galilee conducted a visit to the General Command of the Gaza police, where they met with the Commissioner of the Palestinian police, Razi Jebali, who is wanted by Israel in
connection with the perpetration of terrorist acts against Israelis in the Nablus region, primary among them shooting at the car of Rabbi Elyakim Levanon of Elon Moreh. El-Hayyat-el-jedida reported the next day that

…the mayor of the village emphasized in the meeting the importance of the consolidation of forces by the people of the one nation, and said that the Palestinian nation was one indivisible body, whether they live in the areas conquered in 1948 or within the borders of the Palestinian Authority.

Razi Jebali, it turns out, is not just a wanted terrorist, but also a favorite host. On March 15, 1998, an additional delegation from Israel visited him, this time from the Galilee city of Shfar'am, headed by the City Council Member Karam Sabah. Jebali “explained to his guests the operational tactics of all of the departments of the Palestinian police and the duties incumbent upon them.” Later in the discussion, the terrorist emphasized

the depth of relations and cooperation between the Palestinians within the borders of the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinians within the 1948 borders.

Ataf Jabrin, member of the Um-al-Fahm City Council — according to the Palestinian newspaper — emphasized in the conversation with her Palestinian hosts that “our ambitions and goals are identical”. She added that

the leadership of our nation is one, and it is impossible to divide between those within Israel and those without, as our Palestinian people are one nation wherever they may be located.

Children from the Galilee in Palestinian Summer Camps
The ties binding the two sides of the Green Line, notably, begin at childhood. An increasingly common phenomenon since the onset of autonomy is the field trips organized by schools in the Galilee and the Triangle to the Palestinian Authority, for joint activities with children of similar ages. At IDF roadblocks in Gaza, dozens of buses filled with children from the Galilee and the Triangle can be seen making their way to the autonomy. The children, Israeli citizens, are invariably dressed in identical uniforms: black, green and red — the colors of the PLO flag. The activities include joint trips around Gaza with the Palestinian schools in Gaza. These trips generally concluded with a quasi-military parade, in formation, on the Dahaniya airport runway, even before its dedication in the wake of the Wye agreements.

The reciprocal youth program is called “Children Without Borders” — befitting a trend whose purpose is to erase the Green Line. As El-Hayyat-el-jedida described on August 4, 1998:

The delegation of the ‘Children Without Borders’ concluded a visit to Nazareth. Children from the El-Fawar refugee camp and the Hebron children’s home visited the community centers affiliated with the Nazareth City Council...

The closest ties existed during the Palestinian Authority summer camps, which were military camps in every sense, with weapons and assault training, etc. Israeli Arab children participated in these camps. “Tomorrow, the activities of the joint summer camps for the boys and girls from the West Bank and Gaza and those from within the Green Line will begin” — reported El-Hayyat-el-jedida on July 14, 1998 — “with the goal of continuing the consolidation between our nation’s children in two camps in Jaffa and Nazareth.”

Ten days later, on July 24, 1998 the newspaper described it:

The “Continuity without Borders” camp for the Salfit and Nablus districts opened with 200 boys participating. These camps include many activities and useful lectures and training exercises, and consolidate the participants’ talents and enrich their intellect. In this camp, there are 300 participants, including 100 from the districts of the homeland and 200 from the districts within the Green Line...In the context of its yearly schedule, the General Youth Council is working on building bridges with our brothers residing within by coordinating our activities with all national institutions within the Green Line, and a large number of youngsters have already partici-
pated in the summer camps which were established in Shfar’am, Khocav el-Hira and Nazareth between the 12th and 20th of July... An additional report from July 27, 1998:

The Arab youth joined the Palestinian youth immediately upon their arrival at the camp. Two delegations, from the Galilee and Hebron, arrived at the permanent camp of the Ministry of Youth and Sport in order to participate in the activities of the third Arab camp... The Ministry’s representative greeted the Arab delegations upon their arrival in Palestine... He emphasized to the two delegations that their presence today in Palestine underscores the unity of the joint Arab aspirations and added: “How we would have hoped that all of the youth of the Arab nation were here with us so that we may proceed together towards Jerusalem...”

And on August 3, 1998, El-Quds reported that:

On Saturday the abu-Ammar youth camps opened in the South — el-Arub and Bethlehem — with the participation of 300 boys and girls from Hebron and Bethlehem... delegations from Gaza and delegations from “Palestine within” (that is, the State of Israel).

Another report in the same newspaper on the same day:

The Um-al-Fahm all-star team from “Palestine within” played a football game at the Nablus City Council field... A large number of national figures attended the game... The head of the Um-el-Fahm delegation inspired the crowd toward national unity among the Palestinian people wherever they may be...

**Demonstrations of Israeli Arabs Identifying with the Palestinians**

At the beginning of December 1998, after the signing of the Wye agreements, when the streets of Judea and Samaria were shaken with riots referred to as the “prisoners’ intifada” (with the demand to free terrorist murderers from Israeli jails in the context of the agreement), the streets of the Arab cities and villages in Israel filled with demonstrations supporting the Palestinian demand. In Nazareth, for example, a massive demonstration was held on December 5, 1998, organized by a group called the “Association of Friends of the Detainee and the Prisoner”, to protest the non-release of the terrorists. Nazareth’s mayor and his deputy, a number of members of the City Council, members of the “Association of the Detainee and the Prisoner” and Member of the Knesset, Ahmed Sa’ad participated in the demonstration —

“Yesterday there was a mass procession organized by the Prisoner’s Club in Jenin” — El-Hayyat-el-Jedida reported on November 30, 1998, “in which the participants in the procession demonstrated and called out slogans demanding the release of the prisoners... A delegation from the Democratic Front participated in the procession...along with a delegation from the Nazareth City Council led by Mayor Rahman Jeraisa”. A day before, the Palestinian newspaper reported that

a delegation from within the Green Line visited Jenin yesterday... The delegation was headed by the Mayor of Nazareth, who, in his remarks, dealt with the fraternal relations between Palestinian residents on both sides of the Green Line.

**Member of Knesset Darawshe: “We are an Indivisible Part of the Palestinian Nation.”**

The standard bearers of the Palestinianization trend among Israeli Arabs are first and foremost, the Israeli Arab Knesset members, who pledged allegiance to the State of Israel, and display allegiance to its enemies instead.

On November 26, 1998, after the opening of the Palestinian airport in Dahaniye, Members of Knesset Abd el-Wahab-Darawshe and Abd el-Malk Dehamshe appeared on Palestinian television. Their remarks were unequivocal.

Darawshe:

When we landed in this airport, we experienced a feeling of pride and satisfaction over the great, influential and important accomplishment — greater independence for our Palestinian people... I have landed in many Arab and international airports and I never experienced such a positive, warm feeling of excitement in any airport in the world as I felt
today when the plane which brought me to the Gaza International Airport landed. I felt as if I were landing in the Land of Palestine at a Palestinian airport, under Palestinian sovereignty. When I saw the Palestine youth, the officers of the liberation army who are responsible for the airport, the members of the Legislative Council and the Secretary-General of the Presidium at our reception, feelings of brotherhood and indescribable, total joy overwhelmed us.

Dehamshe:

We were the first to come from within, from Palestine ’48, or Israel as it is referred to today, to congratulate you on the opening of the airport, and to be the first who land at this airport. We view the opening of the airport as a new and additional building block on the way to constructing a complete, independent Palestinian state, whose capital is Jerusalem, possessing full sovereignty over the territories of the homeland.

At the end of the interview, Darawshe said something very significant:

Allow me to say something to our beloved people in Gaza... We convey in the name of our Palestinian nation within, all of our love and pride to the battling nation of Gaza, and to our heroic Palestinian nation wherever they may be. Allow me to congratulate this heroic nation for all its accomplishments and the history of its struggle. We were there during the intifada, during the present period of accomplishments and Allah-willing, we will come when the independent Palestinian state has already been established in all Palestinian lands and we will all live as brothers and family in one Palestinian state.

This was not the first statement of that sort by an Arab Member of Knesset. On July 3, 1998, Palestinian television aired a talk show, with audience participation, in which Abd el-Wahab Darawshe and Taleb a-Saana, two Arab Knesset members took part. We will paraphrase the transcript of the program in a manner which does not affect its meaning:

Interviewer:

...a meeting with two Palestinian brothers who came to us from within the Green Line, two who raise their hands in demanding legitimate Palestinian rights, Abd el-Wahab Darawshe and Taleb a-Saana. I want to thank you for joining us on Palestinian television here in your city of Gaza. And what do you think of Gaza?

Darawshe:

Praise the Lord. After crossing the Erez roadblock — and I hate that roadblock — I hope that the Palestinian police will be there too... I personally feel pride, and my Palestinian sense of belonging to this homeland, the Palestinian homeland which unites us all, is enhanced.

When Darawshe was asked about Jerusalem, he said:

It is not that we support the Palestinian nation in the matter of Jerusalem — Jerusalem is our interest. We are an inseparable part of the Palestinian people, hence the joint concerns and common hopes.

And in response to an additional viewer’s question:

Our Palestinian nation will not relinquish its right, though fifty years have passed, a Palestinian will not forget his right to the homeland. A native of Jaffa will remain a genuine citizen of Jaffa... We have remained possessors of a homeland, and we the Palestinians from within Israel who have retained our land, despite the military government, the policies designed to harm us and the policy of racial discrimination which continue to be implemented against us, even so we have remained in firm possession of our land.

Darawshe continued by stating that he bestows his blessing upon every joint Palestinian summer camp initiative which unites youth from Palestine and youth from within the Green Line:

Every week, large delegations of the Arab Democratic party conduct visits to Gaza. Today we arrived as part of a group numbering more than 100 people, men and women, for a two-day visit to Gaza.
Taleb a-Saana contributed his part to the program as well:
We aspire to unity...that is a Palestinian need. And as far as what the brother said, "Green Line" or "within the Green Line", we claim that they are trying to divide us into '48 Arabs and '67 Arabs, but we will remain members of our Palestinian nation. It is true that we have different citizenship, but in our hearts we bear the Palestinian pain and hope.

In a memorial assembly conducted in the middle of April 1998, marking the tenth anniversary of the death of Abu-Iihad, who was Arafat's deputy during the PLO's terrorist years, heading the murderous "Western Sector Apparatus" and was eliminated in Tunisia, Member of Knesset Azmi Bishara said:

We require the values which Abu-Iihad represented more than we need air to breathe. The Arabs within are the sons of the Palestinian Arab nation who regretted the martyrdom of Abu-Iihad. The martyr, Abu-Iihad, exemplified the connection between the Palestinians "within" and "without" and the connections between the National Movement and the Islamic Movement.

The apex of the political ties materialized during the Knesset elections in 1996, during which the Arab parties received instructions from Yasser Arafat for whom they should vote. The political reporter for Channel One, Keren Neubach, revealed this information in her book, The Election Campaigns 1996, (Yediot Aharonot Publishers). Neubach describes what transpired behind the scenes in the Arab sector:

Senior officials in the Palestinian Authority wielded their influence among the Knesset members of the Arab parties, so that they would not hurt Peres on Election Day. In a meeting between MK Muhammad Darawshe and Abu Mazin, about three weeks before the elections, Abu Mazin said: "Come down from the tree upon which you climbed. We are hurt by the Israelis on a daily basis and we keep our mouths shut, so, too, you go and vote because you have a historical role to play." In terms of the pressure exerted by Arab members of Knesset on the government to rescind the closure, Abu Mazin said: "Stay out of our business. Concentrate on your local demands from Peres." Even Arafat got involved. In a meeting with Hashem Mahmeed of the "Democratic Front for Peace", the "rais" said: "The closure is temporary. Peres was the one who helped us raise millions from foreign countries." Messages of this sort, which, it is true, were not publicized in the media, were subtly delivered to the Arab public, and they had a significant influence on the Arab voters, which in the case of a standoff or a slight Netanyahu advantage in the Jewish sector, could have decided the outcome of the elections. (p. 299)

The journalist, Pinhas Inbari, one of the experts in Israel regarding the behind-the-scenes happenings in the Palestinian institutions, wrote in his book With Drawn Swords (pp. 251-2).

One of the requests which the Labor Party directed towards the PLO was that the Palestinian Organization refrain from declaring its support for the party. The Labor Party told Said Canaan that the conducting of talks was contingent on total secrecy. If the contacts had been revealed, the Labor Party would have immediately disavowed any knowledge of their existence. The Labor Party's response was positive but equivocal. Arafat and Abu Mazin were happy with the Labor Party's reaction, and decided to open five liaison offices with Israel in Europe... After the elections, lines of communications were reopened through the good offices of Said Canaan. He conducted a round of shuttle diplomacy between Cairo and Tunis as the main liaison between Rabin and the PLO. The difficulties encountered in the Washington talks led Rabin to seek an alternative to the Palestinian delegation and to the somnolent course of the negotiations, and before long it was decided to arrange a meeting between Rabin and Abu Mazin in Paris...

The conclusion is famous: The Oslo Accords.

Ahmed Tibi is an especially unique phenomenon, an Israeli citizen who became adviser to the
head of the Palestinian Authority, Yasser Arafat. Tibi cemented his senior status as a Palestinian adviser during the negotiations which were conducted at the Wye Plantation in October 1998 pertaining to the withdrawal agreement from Judea and Samaria. Tibi was a full-fledged member of the Palestinian delegation. This was an unprecedented exploit in the history of relations between Israel and the Palestinians.

A Theater in the Galilee Presents a Palestinian Play: “A Returnee to Haifa”

An additional facet to the drift towards Palestinization is in the area of culture and the arts. On September 13, 1998 the “Palestinian Exhibit for Embroidery and Heritage” opened in the village of Iksel in the Jezre'el Valley, not far from Tel-Adashim and Nahalal. The military governor of Jenin, General Zahir Munzara, and the Palestinian Legislative Council member, Jamal Shati, participated in the opening ceremony. They were greeted, naturally, by the senior resident of the village, Member of Knesset Abd el-Wahab Darawshe. According to the reports in the Palestinian media, Munzara expressed his appreciation for the cooperation among the members of the Palestinian nation wherever they are found and emphasized the development of ties of affinity and trust among its children.

His closing sentence was: “Our nation is determined to establish its independent state on its entire national land.”

In the town of Sakhnin in the Upper Galilee, a new theater opened in the middle of August — the El-Jouel Theater. The first play staged by the theater was A Returnee to Haifa, a play based on the book written by the Palestinian author, Asan Knafani, about the Arabs' flight from Haifa and their dream of return. The administrative director of the theater explained at the press conference why this play specifically was chosen for the opening. Because “the establishment of the theater marks the fiftieth anniversary of the Nakba and the immutable steadfastness.” He added proudly that the play “A Returnee to Haifa” will be staged both within the Green Line and in the Palestinian Authority.

On July 15, 1998, a cultural festival, organized by the Charity Association of Jaffa in concert with the Association of Jaffa Residents, opened in Nablus. It was sponsored by Yasser Arafat who was represented by Nablus resident Asan Shaka, Esq., a member of the PLO's Workers’ Committee. The gathering began with the recital of verses from the Qur'an and a moment of silence in memory of Palestinians who had died. After the anthem, the head of the Association of Jaffa Arabs, Omar Siksik, delivered a speech which “surveyed the suffering of the residents of Jaffa and their relationship to their brethren in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip” — according to a report in El-Hayyat-el-Jedida the next day.

The Palestinian newspaper reported that at the Grosh Festival in Jordan, ...on two consecutive days, the Mowal Company of Folk Culture of Nazareth staged the operetta 'The House' as its entry to the festival...The operetta is a sort of dialogue in verse between Rim, symbolizing Jerusalem, the spiritual and political capital of the Palestinian nation, and Khalil, who symbolizes the departure from it...The operetta was written by the poet Samakh-el-Kasem...The Nazarene Company of Folk Culture was established in 1982 under the auspices of the Nazareth City Council.

At the beginning of February 1998, at the Casablanca Hotel in Ramallah, Yasser Arafat opened the ceremony marking “Fifty years since the tragedy of 1948”. The head of the Supreme Tracking Committee of Israeli Arabs, Ibrahim Nimer Darwish, the Secretary General of the Israeli Communist Party, Muhammad Nefa and the Secretary General of the “Democratic Front for Peace and Equality”, Mahmud Braha — each an Israeli citizen — participated in the ceremony. Presumably, it was they to whom the Palestinian Minister of Culture and Information, Yasser Abed Rabu referred when he said at the ceremony:

The gathering today, after fifty years, symbolizes the fact that we are one nation. The Palestinian nation, despite its long years of tragedy and defeat, has remained committed to international legitimacy and its rights: the
right of return to its homeland, the right of self-determination and the right to establish an independent state whose capital is Jerusalem.

On March 18, 1998, a study day dealing with the topic of Palestinian identity was held in Kefar Yasif in the Galilee, in the context of a memorial ceremony for the Arab-Israeli intelligentsia. Many intellectuals from the ranks of Israeli Arabs and Palestinians participated in the ceremony. Their remarks were quoted in the official Palestinian Authority newspaper, El-Hayyat-el-Jedida (March 19, 1998). Dr. Ramsi Suliman said:

There is no debating that we are part of the Arab nation and all that distinguishes us is our unique situation since the “tragedy” and the establishment of the State of Israel. The basis for the discussion of the uniqueness of the Palestinian experience within the State of Israel lies in understanding the fundamental contradiction between Zionism as a settlers’ movement and the Palestinian minority which remained in our homeland.

And Dr. Azziz Haydar said:

We can state that we have succeeded in consolidating an opinion based on a challenge to the Israeli, Zionist side, an identity based on societal memory, sympathy for our nation, an Arab culture and our own way of life. We must be convinced that we will not achieve our personal goals until we achieve our societal goals.

Member of Knesset Abed el-Malk Dehamshe:

We are Palestinian Arabs, and that is a fact that no intelligent being can deny. As far as we are concerned, the year 1948 is the year of the “tragedy” and not of independence, not a holiday and not a celebration, and it is unthinkable that anyone would ask that of us.

Member of Knesset Hashem Mahmeed:

On the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of the State of Israel, 300,000 Palestinian Arab Israeli citizens remain refugees within their homeland...

It will not be long until the Israeli government — regardless of which ideology is in power — will be forced to confront Israeli Arabs with the choice — loyalty to their country Israel, or drawing the necessary conclusions based on their loyalty to the Palestinian government. The latter alternative robs them of the privilege of remaining a fifth column in the heartland of the State of Israel.
WHY DEMILITARIZATION IS NOT THE REMEDY: ISRAEL, PALESTINE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Louis René Beres

Palestinian statehood\(^1\) is now a fait accompli. To make this intolerable situation tolerable for Israel, then Prime Minister Netanyahu tried to focus upon the alleged security advantages of Palestinian demilitarization. Preempting opposition and condemnation from his political Right, Netanyahu made the argument that a demilitarized Palestine would not represent a serious threat to Israel. Indeed, some would argue that such a state would be the foundation for a truly auspicious culmination of the “Peace Process”.

From a purely tactical and political perspective, the fragility of this argument is well known. The hidden dangers of demilitarization are clear and compelling. The threat of Palestine to Israel will not only in the presence or absence of a national armed force, but also in the many other Arab armies and terrorists\(^2\) that will inevitably compete for power in the new country.

But there is another reason why a “demilitarized” Palestine would present Israel with a substantial security threat. International law would not necessarily expect Palestinian compliance with pre-state agreements concerning military deployments and armed force. From the standpoint of international law, enforcing demilitarization upon an independent state of Palestine would be exceedingly problematic. As a sovereign state, Palestine might not even be bound by any pre-independence compacts that had been secured by US guarantees. In this connection, international law imposes unequal obligations on state and non-state parties to agreements. In a concurring statement in the case of Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, a 1981 civil suit in US federal courts (where plaintiffs were Israeli survivors and representatives of persons murdered in a terrorist bus attack in Israel in 1978), Circuit Judge Harry T. Edwards stated:

> I do not believe the law of nations imposes the same responsibility or liability on non-state actors, such as the PLO, as it does on states and persons acting under color of state law.

Regarding the validity of Oslo and Wye under international law, this statement suggests that the Palestinian Authority (PA), the non-state party to Oslo and Wye, cannot be held jurisprudentially to the same standards of accountability as the State of Israel. This is a most important point to keep in mind when assessing the prospective viability of plans for Palestinian demilitarization.

Because treaties can be binding only upon states,\(^3\) an agreement between a non-state Palestine Authority (PA)\(^4\) and one or more states would be of no real authority and little real effectiveness. Technically, an agreement on demilitarization under international law must always be “between states”. Hence, any agreement on demilitarization that would include a non-state party would be prima facie null and void.

But what if the government of Palestine were willing to consider itself bound by the pre-state, non-treaty agreement, i.e., to treat this agreement as if it were an authentic treaty? Even in these relatively favorable circumstances, the new Arab government would have ample pretext to identify
various grounds for lawful treaty termination. It could, for example, withdraw from the agreement because of what it regarded as a “material breach” (an alleged violation by Israel that undermined the object or purpose of the treaty). Or it could point toward what international law calls a “fundamental change of circumstances” (rebus sic stantibus). In this connection, should a small but expanding Palestine declare itself vulnerable to previously unforeseen dangers — perhaps from the forces of other Arab armies — it could lawfully end its codified commitment to remain demilitarized.

Rebus sic stantibus means, literally, “so long as conditions remain the same”. It is a legal doctrine with a long history. In the traditional view, the obligation of a treaty terminates when a change occurs in those circumstances that exist at the effective date of the agreement and whose continuance forms a tacit condition of the ongoing validity of the treaty. The function of the doctrine, therefore, is to execute the shared intentions of the parties. Rebus sic stantibus becomes operative when there is a change in the circumstances that formed the cause, motive or rationale of consent.

There is another factor that explains why a treaty-like arrangement obligating a new Palestinian state to accept demilitarization could quickly and legally be invalidated after independence. The usual grounds that may be invoked under domestic law to invalidate contracts also apply under international law to treaties. This means that “Palestine” could point to errors of fact or to duress as perfectly appropriate grounds for termination.

Moreover, any treaty is void if, at the time it was entered into, it was in conflict with a “peremptory” rule of general international law (jus cogens), a rule accepted and recognized by the international community of states as one from which “no derogation is permitted.” Because the right of sovereign states to maintain military forces essential to “self defense” is certainly such a rule, Palestine could (depending upon its particular form of authority) be entirely within its right to abrogate any treaty that had compelled its demilitarization.

A theory, following Hegelian ideas, is that any treaty obligation may be terminated unilaterally following changes in conditions that make performance of the treaty injurious to fundamental rights, especially the rights of existence, self-preservation and independence. These rights have been summarized in law as “rights of necessity”.

Thomas Jefferson, who had read Epicurus, Cicero and Seneca, as well as Voltaire, Montesquieu, Holbach, Helvetius and Beccaria (and who became something of a philosophe himself) wrote as follows about obligation and international law:

The Moral duties which exist between individual and individual in a state of nature, accompany them into a state of society and the aggregate of the duties of all the individuals composing the society constitutes the duties of that society towards any other, so that between society and society the same moral duties exist as did between the individuals composing them while in an unassociated state, their maker not having released them from those duties on their forming themselves into a nation. Compacts then between nation and nation are obligatory on them by the same moral law which obliges individuals to observe their compacts. There are circumstances however which sometimes excuse the non-performance of contracts between man and man; so are there also between nation and nation. When performance, for instance, becomes impossible, non-performance is not immoral. So if performance becomes self-destructive to the party, the law of self-preservation overrules the laws of obligation to others. (emphasis added)

Later, Jefferson concluded:

As every treaty ought to be made by a sufficient power, a treaty pernicious to the state is null, and not at all obligatory, no governor of a nation having power to engage things capable of destroying the state, for the safety of which the empire is trusted to him. The nation itself, bound necessarily to whatever its preservation and safety require, cannot enter into engagements contrary to its indispensable obligations. (emphasis added)
Here it must also be remembered that, historically, demilitarization is a principle applied to various "zones", not to still-emergent states in their entirety. For some examples of demilitarized zones, consider the following: In 348 BCE, a treaty between Rome and Carthage included a provision for the neutralization of Corsica, a neutral zone "in the middle" (Corsica esset media inter Romanos et Carthaginenses). The Treaty of Radzin in 1681 between the Russian and Ottoman Empires created a vast buffer zone between both parties south of Kiev. More modern forms of demilitarization were developed in the nineteenth century from measures that prohibited fortifications in designated areas, normally imposed by the victor upon the vanquished.

After World War I, Germany, as a consequence of the Versailles Treaty, had to demilitarize the Rhineland. Permanent demilitarized zones have been created in the Straits of Magellan (by the border treaty of 1881 between Argentina and Chile); in the Aaland Islands belonging to Finland (according to the Aaland Islands Convention of 1921 between Finland, Sweden and other European powers); and in Norway's Svalbard Archipelago and Bear Island (by terms of the Svalbard (Spitsbergen) Treaty of 1920 between Norway, the United States and the former Soviet Union). The Outer Space Treaty of January 27, 1967 demilitarizes the moon and other celestial bodies (prohibiting the stationing of nuclear weapons and other mass destruction weapons) while Antarctica has been demilitarized by the Antarctic Treaty of December 11, 1959.

From these examples, we see that a new state of Palestine might have yet another legal reason not to comply with pre-independence commitments to demilitarization. As it could be alleged, inter alia, that these commitments are inconsistent with traditional bases of authoritative international law found in treaties and conventions, international custom, and the general principles of law recognized by "civilized nations", etc., they are commitments of no binding character.

Now, it is certainly possible (albeit unnecessary) that a state of Palestine would act contrary to its legal commitments on demilitarization. Here the demilitarization "remedy" could prove no less injurious to Israel. One can easily imagine what would happen if, following a clear breach of the Palestinian demilitarization commitment, Israel would be compelled to act militarily. In such circumstances, the entire global community, including the United States, would likely respond to imperative Israeli self-defense/law enforcement actions with both private pressures and public denunciations of Israel in the UN Security Council. The term "law enforcement" applies here because of the persistently Westphalian (decentralized) nature of international law and its derivation from underlying natural law. According to Blackstone, the Law of Nations (International Law) is deducible from natural law and is therefore binding upon all individuals and states. Each state is expected "to aid and enforce the law of nations, as part of the common law; by inflicting an adequate punishment upon offenses against that universal law.

Additionally, there would be a great deal of internal pressure within Israel, with the Israeli Left claiming yet again that this or that Palestinian violation is not a clear and present danger to Israel's survival. If further evidence is needed of the plausibility of this scenario, one need only recall that although Gaza and certain portions of Judea/Samaria already under Palestinian control do not yet fall under Palestinian sovereign authority, Israel has not had effective capacity since Oslo to combat violence and terrorism from these areas.

It follows from all this that Israel should take little comfort from the legal promise of Palestinian demilitarization, and that such a promise would pose absolutely no problems for Yasser Arafat. Indeed, should the government of the new Palestinian state choose to invite foreign armies or terrorists on to its territory (possibly after the original government authority had been displaced or overthrown by more militantly Islamic anti-Israel forces), it could do so not only without practical difficulties but also without necessarily violating international law. Ironically, if the original PA/Fatah government of Palestine saw itself threatened by aggression from outside Arab forces, demilitarization could even produce a Palestinian invitation to Israel, an invitation to protect Palestine from mutual enemies.
The prospect of such an invitation is not as strange as it seems. And as acceptance would likely be seen to be in Israel’s own best interests, Jerusalem’s requested military involvement in Palestine could surely happen. Significantly, this involvement could bring Israel into a much wider and potentially catastrophic war, into exactly the intolerably dangerous kinds of conditions that a demilitarized Palestinian state was intended to prevent in the first place. That such an outcome could be the result of an Israeli attempt to stabilize a new and demilitarized Arab neighbor would add yet another irony to tragedy, a tragedy based in part upon misunderstanding of pertinent international law.

Of course, the overriding danger to Israel of Palestinian demilitarization, more practical than jurisprudential, would stem from Israel’s self-inflicted abrogation of its own essential security role. In the final analysis, this Oslo-driven abrogation derives from a profound and possibly willful misunderstanding of Palestinian goals and expectations. While Israeli supporters of Oslo II continue to believe in a “Two State Solution,” and in an associated mutuality of interest in coexistence, the PA has other beliefs. Significantly, these beliefs, which are essentially genocidal with respect to Israel, are often stated openly and unambiguously.

Here are some pertinent examples of statements by Palestinian officials that are not only in obvious violation of the Oslo Accords, but are also illustrative of sentiments which exclude mutuality of interest in peace with Israel:

O our beautiful land imprisoned in a cage and surrounded by wolves, My shaded garden, the tormentors have destroyed you, and the dogs have settled in you, O Jerusalem, O my city, With my notebook and pencil and the fire of my rifle I will shatter the cage, I will kill the wolves and plant the flag, The dogs will not bark in the heroic cities.

I now see the walls of Jerusalem, the mosques of Jerusalem, the churches of Jerusalem. My brothers! With blood and with spirit we will redeem you, Palestine! Yes, with blood and with spirit we will redeem you, Palestine!

Israel is attempting to obstruct peace. If Israel continues to succeed in this approach, then she is destroying the peace process. The only option remaining for us will be an alternative option... war. Allow me to say that it takes only one side to start a war. At the end of the path on which Israel is proceeding, a declaration of war awaits.

We shall always stand against them, threaten their future, and not permit them to expand. We shall stand with all our might against any attempted settlement effort. If they do not implement the agreement, we shall determine what the essential locations are in each settlement, and we will turn the lives of the settlers into hell.

All options are open for defending the land of the Palestinian people.

The Zionist entity exists on seized land. The Jews remain enemies because they expropriate lands, build settlements and pay high sums to buy properties. They are the greatest enemies of us Muslims.

The struggle we are waging is an ideological struggle and the question is: Where has the Islamic land of Palestine gone? Where is Haifa and Jaffa, Lod and Ramle, Acre, Safed and Tiberias? Where is Hebron and Jerusalem?

We did not pay with the dear blood of thousands of martyrs so that the Israeli government could establish settlements on our land in the name of peace. We have sacrificed in the past and we will be ready to sacrifice again in the future for the sake of liberating our land and returning it to the bosom of the Palestinian nation and for the sake of establishing an independent Palestinian state whose capital is Jerusalem.

In the strict Islamic view, the Jewish state is always the individual Jew in macrocosm. This Jewish state must be despised because of this relationship, because of the allegedly innate “evil” of the individual Jew. This is a far cry from the view that Jews should be despised because they are associated with the State of Israel. Exactly the opposite view prevails. Hence, the Israeli must be despised
not because he is an "occupier" or because of his 
"expansionist" policies (these traits are seen as 
merely *epiphenomenal*), but because he is a Jew, 
period.

In an article published in Al-Ahram, on Sep-
tember 27, 1982, Dr. Lufti Abd al-Azim wrote:

The first thing that we have to make clear is 
that no distinction must be made between 
the Jew and the Israeli, which they themselves 
deny. The Jew is a Jew, through the millen-
nia...in spurning all moral values, devouring 
the living and drinking his blood for the sake 
of a few coins. The Jew, the Merchant of Venice, 
does not differ from the killer of Deir Yasin or 
the killer of the camps. They are equal examples 
of human degradation. Let us therefore put aside 
such distinctions, and talk about Jews.  

In an Egyptian textbook of "Arab Islamic 
history", used in teacher training colleges, we 
discover the following:

The Jews are always the same, every time and 
everywhere. They will not live save in dark-
ness. They contrive their evils clandestinely. 
They fight only when they are hidden, because 
they are cowards... The Prophet enlightened 
us about the right way to treat them, and 
succeeded finally in crushing the plots that 
they had planned. We today must follow this 
way and purify Palestine from their filth.  

Ayatollah Khumayni, in the Foreword to his book 
on Islamic Government, remarked:

The Islamic Movement was afflicted by the 
Jews from its very beginnings, when they 
began their hostile activity by distorting the 
reputation of Islam, and by defaming and 
maligning it. This has continued to the 
present day.  

And again, on the "Zionist Problem" as a mere 
manifestation of the underlying "Jewish Problem", 
Dr. Yahya al-Rakhawi remarked on July 19, 1982, in 
*al-Ahram*:

...we are all — once again — face to face with 
the Jewish Problem, not just the Zionist 
Problem; and we must reassess all those 
studies which make a distinction between 
"the Jew" and "the Israeli"...and we must 

redefine the meaning of the word "Jew", so 
that we do not imagine that we are speaking 
of a divinely revealed religion or a minority 
persecuted by mankind. Every word has an 
origin, a development and a history, and it 
seems that the word "Jew" has changed its 
content and meaning. We thus find ourselves 
face to face with the essence of a problem 
which has recently donned the gown of 
religion and concentrated itself on a piece 
of land. In this confrontation, we cannot help 
but see before us the figure of the great man 
Hitler, may God have mercy on him, who was 
the wisest of those who confronted this problem...and who, out of compassion for 
humanity, tried to exterminate every Jew, but 
despaired of curing this cancerous growth on 
the body of mankind.  

Conventional wisdom often maintains that the 
PLO/PA opposes Hamas, and that the two organiza-
tions are entirely separate and discrete. This 
"wisdom", however, is contradicted by considerable 
available evidence. According to the September 
1995 PLO/Hamas Understanding, Hamas commits 
itself to refrain from terrorism only in PLO/PA 
controlled areas. Arafat, in turn, recognizes Hamas, 
Islamic Jihad, the PFLP and DFLP as legitimate, 
reaffirming the predominance of inter-Palestinian 
solidarity over PLO/PA Israel relations.  

According to the Charter of Hamas:

Peace initiatives, the so-called peaceful solu-
tions, and the international conferences to 
resolve the Palestinian problem, are all 
contrary to the beliefs of the Islamic Resis-
tance Movement. For renouncing any part of 
Palestine means renouncing part of the 
religion; the nationalism of the Islamic 
Resistance Movement is part of its faith, the 
movement educates its members to adhere to 
its principles and to raise the banner of Allah 
over their homeland as they fight their jihad. 

...There is no solution to the Palestinian 
problem except by jihad...In order to face the 
usurpation of Palestine by the Jews, we have 
no escape from raising the banner of 
Jihad...We must imprint on the minds of
generations of Muslims that the Palestinian problem is a religious one, to be dealt with on
this premise...
I swear by that (sic) who holds in His Hands the Soul of Muhammad! I indeed wish
to go to war for the sake of Allah! I will assault
and kill! Assault and kill, assault and kill...36

Regarding relationships with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the Hamas Charter
instructs:
The PLO is among the closest to the Hamas,
for it constitutes a father, a brother, a relative,
a friend. Can a Muslim turn away from his
father, his brother, his relative or his friend?
Our homeland is one, our calamity is one, our
destiny is one and our enemy is common to
both of us...37

Finally, on the primacy of hatred toward Jews,
not Israel, the Hamas Charter states as follows:
Israel, by virtue of its being Jewish and of
having a Jewish population, defies Islam and
the Muslims. Let the eyes of the cowards not fall asleep.38

Both Palestinian organizations are now prepar-
ing for war against Israel, and war need not be
exclusive of genocide under international law.
Rather, war may be the means whereby genocide
is efficiently operationalized. According to Articles II
and III of the Genocide Convention, which entered
into force on January 12, 1951, genocide includes
any of several listed acts that are "...committed with
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnic, racial or religious group as such..."39

This means that where Israel is recognized as
the institutionalized expression of the Jewish People
(an expression that includes national, ethnic, racial
and religious components), acts of war
intended to destroy the Jewish state could assuredly
be genocidal. The internet website of Yasser Arafat’s
Fateh Movement recently released a constitution
that calls openly for the "eradication" of Israel.40

The Genocide Convention criminalizes not only
the various stipulated acts of genocide, but also
(Article III) conspiracy to commit genocide and
direct and public incitement to commit genocide.
Articles II, III and IV of the Genocide Convention are
fully applicable in all cases of direct and public
incitement to commit genocide. For the Convention
to be invoked, it is sufficient that any one of the
State parties call for a meeting, through the United
Nations, of all the State parties (Article VIII).
Although this has never actually been done, the
United States should consider very seriously taking
this step while there is still time. Israel, too, should
be an obvious co-participant in this call, but it is
hardly likely that a government that does not even
insist upon its basic rights under Oslo will now seek
redress under much broader multilateral conven-
tions.

The Genocide Convention is not the only
authoritative criminalization that should be invoked
against ongoing and illegal Palestinian calls for
mass murder of Jews. The 1965 International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination could also be brought pro-
ductively into play. This treaty condemns "...all
propaganda and all organizations which attempt to
justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination
in any form", obliging — at Article 4(a) — State
parties to declare as

an offense punishable by law all dissemina-
tion of ideas based on racial superiority or
hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as
well as all acts of violence or incitement to
such acts against any race or group of
persons.

Article 4(b) affirms that State parties

Shall declare illegal and prohibit organiza-
tions, and also organized and all other
propaganda activities, which promote and
incite racial discrimination, and shall recog-
nize participation in such organizations or
activities as an offense punishable by law.

Further authority for curtailing and punishing
Yasser Arafat and other Palestinians calling for
genocidal destruction of Jews can be found at Article
20 (2) of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights:

Any advocacy of national, racial or religious
hatred that constitutes incitement to discrим-
ination, hostility or violence shall be
prohibited by law.

At its heart, the problem of Israel’s survival now
lies in the Pal’s basic assumptions concerning war,
peace and genocide. While Israel's regional enemies, including PLO/PA and Hamas, believe that any power gains for Israel represent a power loss for them — that is, that they coexist with Israel in a condition of pure conflict — Israel assumes something else. For Israel, relations with Arab-Islamic states and organizations are not, as these enemies believe, zero-sum relations. Rather, they are a mutual-dependence connection, a nonzero-sum relation where conflict is mixed with cooperation. Israel, unlike its enemies, believes that any gain for these enemies is not necessarily a loss for itself. Indeed, since Oslo, Israel is unwilling even to identify its enemies as enemies.

Israel believes that its enemies also reject zero-sum assumptions about the strategy of conflict. Israel's enemies, however, do not make such erroneous judgments about conformance with Israeli calculations. These enemies know that Israel is wrong in its belief that Arab-Islamic states and organizations also reject the zero-sum assumption, but they pretend otherwise. There is, therefore, a dramatic and most serious disparity between Israel and its multiple enemies. Israel's strategy of conflict is founded upon miscalculations, false assumptions and an extraordinary unawareness of, or indifference to, enemy manipulations. The pertinent strategic policies of Israel's enemies, on the other hand, are grounded upon correct calculations and assumptions, and upon an astute awareness of Israeli errors.

What does all of this mean, for the demilitarization "remedy" and for Israeli security in general? Above all, it positively demands that Israel make far-reaching changes in the manner in which it conceptualizes the continuum of cooperation and conflict. Israel, ridding itself of wishful thinking, of always hoping too much, should immediately recognize the zero-sum calculations of its enemies and begin to recognize that the struggle in the Middle East must still be fought overwhelmingly at the conflict end of the continuum. The struggle, in other words, must be fought, however reluctantly and painfully, in zero-sum terms.

Israel should immediately acknowledge that its support for Oslo is fully inconsistent with both the zero-sum calculations of its enemies and with its own newly-recognized imperative to relate on the basis of zero-sum assumptions. By continuing to sustain Oslo, Israel, in effect, rejects correct zero-sum notions of Middle East conflict and accepts the starkly incorrect idea that its enemies also reject these notions. By rejecting Oslo, Israel would accept correct zero-sum notions of Middle East conflict and accept the correct idea that its enemies base their policies upon exactly these notions. By such rejection, Israel would also be acting in support of international law.

Israel should also remind the world about the authentic history of "Palestine". It should remind the world that a sovereign state of Palestine did not exist before 1967 or 1948; that a state of Palestine was not promised by authoritative UN Security Council Resolution 242; that, indeed, a state of Palestine had never existed. As a nonstate legal entity, Palestine ceased to exist in 1948, when Great Britain relinquished its League of Nations mandate. When, during the 1948-49 War of Independence, Judea/Samaria and Gaza came under the illegal control of Jordan and Egypt respectively, these aggressor states did not put an end to an already-existing state.

From the Biblical period (ca. 1350 BCE to 586 BCE) to the British Mandate (1918-1948), the land named by the Romans after the ancient Philistines (a name intended to punish and demean the Jews) was controlled exclusively by non-Palestinian elements. Significantly, however, a continuous chain of Jewish possession of the land was legally recognized after World War I at the San Remo Conference of April 1920. There, a binding treaty was signed in which Great Britain was granted mandatory authority over Palestine (the area had been ruled by the Ottoman Turks since 1516) to prepare it to become the "national home for the Jewish People". Palestine, according to the treaty, comprised lands encompassing what are now the states of Jordan and Israel, including Judea/Samaria and Gaza. Present day Israel, including Judea/Samaria and Gaza, comprises only twenty-two percent of Palestine as defined and ratified at the San Remo Peace Conference.

In 1922, Great Britain unilaterally and illegally split off 78 percent of the lands promised to the Jews — all of Palestine east of the Jordan River — and
gave them to Abdullah, the non-Palestinian son of the Sharif of Mecca. Eastern Palestine now took the name Transjordan, which it retained until April 1949, when it was renamed Jordan. From the first moment of its creation, Transjordan was closed to all Jewish migration and settlement, a clear betrayal of the British promise in the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and a contravention of its Mandatory obligations.

On July 20, 1951, a Palestinian assassinated King Abdullah for his hostility to Palestinian nationalist aspirations. Several years prior to Abdullah's killing, in 1947, the newly formed United Nations, rather than designate the entire land west of the Jordan River as the Jewish National Homeland, called for a second partition. Ironically, because this second fissure again gave unfair advantage to the Arabs, Jewish leaders accepted the painful judgment while the Arab states did not. On May 15, 1948, exactly one day after the State of Israel came into existence, Azzam Pasha, Secretary General of the Arab League, declared to the new tiny nation founded upon ashes of the Holocaust: "This will be a war of extermination and a momentous massacre..." This declaration, as we have just seen, remains at the very heart of all Arab policies toward Israel.

In 1967, almost twenty years after Israel's entry into the community of nations, the Jewish state, as a result of its stunning military victory over Arab aggressor states, gained unexpected control over Judea/Samaria and Gaza. Although the idea of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war is enshrined in the UN Charter, there existed no authoritative sovereign to whom the territories could be "returned". Israel could hardly have been expected to transfer these territories back to Jordan and Egypt, which had exercised unauthorized and cruel control since the Arab-initiated war of extermination in 1948-1949. Moreover, the idea of Palestinian "self-determination" was only just beginning to emerge after the Six Day War, and was not even codified in UN Security Council Resolution 242, which was adopted on November 22, 1967. For their part, the Arab states convened a summit in Khartoum, in August 1967, which concluded with the cry: "No peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it..."

We have come full circle. A Palestinian state is now being erected by an authority that will ultimately brook no serious form of demilitarization and that will reject altogether a two-state solution. The Palestinian Authority is committed to a strategy founded upon unhindered control over the instruments of violence. This means that if Israeli government leaders prepare to accept the Oslo-driven Palestinian state because such a state would presumably be demilitarized, they would be making an uninformed and fatal mistake.
A PALESTINIAN STATE IN AMERICAN POLICY

Ezra Sohar

The British Royal Commission (the Peel Commission) proposed in 1937 to divide western Palestine into two states — Arab and Jewish. Ben-Gurion, in his testimony before the commission, supported partition. Ever since, the idea of partition, or in other words, the existence of an Arab state beside Israel, has accompanied all deliberations and proposals on the future of the State of Israel. In the original Peel Commission proposal, a broad corridor from the shore of the Mediterranean to Jerusalem was delineated as an “international zone”.

The UN Committee’s proposal in 1947 also envisioned two states (with different borders) and a limited area around Jerusalem, under UN jurisdiction, instead of the international corridor stretching from the coast to Jerusalem. The General Assembly adopted that proposal which served as the basis for its decision on November 29, 1947.

Since then, these two concepts have formed the basis for American policy in the region. The USA deviated from the policy only for a brief period in March-April 1948 when the State Department supported an international “trusteeship”, as an alternative to the establishment of a Jewish state. During the 19 years (1948-1967) of Jordanian rule over Judea and Samaria, and Egyptian rule over the Gaza Strip, Washington viewed that situation as an acceptable alternative to a Palestinian state. After the conquest of Judea, Samaria and Gaza by Israel in the Six Day War, America readopted the previously held principles. Although these have appeared in various forms over the years, fundamentally the United States has readopted the previously held principle that Israel must return to the 1949 borders, with minor adjustments, after the Arab states sign peace treaties with the Jewish state, thereby ensuring Israel’s survival.

In order to guarantee a complete Israeli withdrawal, America exercised continuous pressure on Israel, except during the Reagan era, including a demand to refrain totally from the establishment of settlements in Judea and Samaria, which were considered to be “obstacles to peace”.

This American policy deviated from the Security Council Resolution 242,¹ which accepts the legitimacy of Israeli control over all territories occupied in the Six Day War, until peace is achieved between Israel and its neighbors and “recognized, defensible borders” established. It also disregarded the so-called “Pentagon Map”, which depicts the minimal territories necessary to secure Israeli borders. The map was ordered by President Johnson, prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and presented to the President at the end of June 1967. The map accorded to Israel most of the “West Bank”, parts of Sinai and the Golan Heights.²

So, too, the administration opposed construction in the new, post 1967, Jewish quarters in Jerusalem (and at times even in the older Jewish neighborhoods) and insisted that Jerusalem be granted “special status” in the final agreement. The United States did not recognize the Israeli annexation of so-called East Jerusalem, nor Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, and did not agree to transfer its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, despite extremely strong pressure and repeated requests.
from the American Congress with overwhelming unprecedented majorities.³

In the first decade after the Six Day War, the State Department assumed, that Jordan would once again rule over the “West Bank” of its kingdom. However, in the interim, the PLO became an international terror organization and established close ties to the Soviet Union. The PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) was established in 1964 by Gamal Abdel Nasser, who installed Ahmed Shukeiri at its head. It was an umbrella organization for a number of Palestinian groups. In 1969, Arafat and his organization (Fatah) seized control of the PLO. But even though the PLO was routed in 1970 by King Hussein and its cadres expelled from Jordan, the PLO could no longer be disregarded by Washington, which never ceased to maintain ties with it. Although the ties were not immediately fruitful and had their ups and downs, they indicated an option that a Palestinian state be established by the PLO as the authentic Palestinian organization, and not by Jordan.

Israel vehemently opposed relations between the United States and the PLO due to its vital interest in the struggle against a terrorist organization dedicated to its destruction, an “interest” which is self-explanatory. Needless to say, in the long run, Israel was concerned that relations with the PLO were liable to serve as a prelude to the establishment of a Palestinian state. Due to Israel’s strong objection, ties between the State Department and the PLO were conducted secretly, and their existence was invariably denied. In September 1975 President Ford pledged in writing that the United States would not conduct negotiations with the PLO, “unless it recognizes Israel’s right to exist and accepts UN Resolutions 242 and 338.”⁴ This was a very important document for Israel, and it was signed after significant concessions on Israel’s part.

Consistent with its actions in the past, the United States did not think that it needed to keep its promises to this small state, even if that state happened to be its only dependable ally in the Middle East. Secret talks with the PLO were, in fact, conducted throughout the years.⁵ A well-known episode in this context took place in July 1979, a planned meeting between Andrew Young, the Carter administration’s UN Ambassador, and the UN’s PLO representative. After denials and evasive maneuvers, the truth prevailed and Young was fired.⁶ In its early days, the Reagan administration also conducted negotiations with the PLO, although it later claimed that they were not negotiations but rather an attempt to convince the organization to accept the conditions set by the United States in order to initiate a dialogue between them. Despite that claim, it is obvious that enticements were offered in return for the PLO’s acceptance of the United States’ conditions.⁷

In the meantime significant developments in the PLO’s status occurred. At the summit of Arab states held in Rabat in 1974, the PLO was recognized as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. In the same year, the UN General Assembly recognized the “unassailable rights of the Palestinian people”, appointed the PLO as the Palestinian representative and granted the PLO observer status (Resolutions 3236 and 3237).⁸ A year later, in 1975, the PLO had a diplomatic presence in 40 countries and shortly thereafter the number grew to 105. In March 1977, President Carter called for the establishment of a “national home” for the Palestinian people.⁹ It seems that severe pressure was brought to bear on him, and in July 1977 the White House spokesman “moderated” the earlier declaration by explaining that the phrase “national home” referred to an entity affiliated with Jordan and not to an “independent state”.¹⁰ In this context Carter’s following statement is remarkable:

I have never met an Arab leader who in private conversation has expressed aspirations for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. However, publicly, they all demand an independent Palestinian state because that is the commitment they made at the Rabat summit. The diplomatic undertone in private conversations is much more genuine than it is portrayed in the press.¹¹

Meanwhile, the Camp David conference came along, where President Carter forced Begin to agree to the “legitimate rights of the Palestinian people”, to autonomy and to much more besides this. Inclusion of a “strong police force” to be established
in the autonomy attests to the fact that Carter did not see the essence of autonomy as “personal autonomy,” as Begin wished to believe.

In June 1980, the “Venice Declaration” of the European Community accentuated the Palestinians’ right to self-determination and the need to involve them in the peace process. Prime Minister Menachem Begin furiously attacked the declaration. The US administration also rejected the European Community’s declaration and demanded that the PLO fulfill the American conditions prior to being included in the peace negotiation. It is nevertheless reasonable to believe, as many do, that the European Community would not have issued such a declaration without previously consulting the State Department.\(^\text{12}\)

On March 4, 1988, George Schultz, the American Secretary of State, sent identical letters to the heads of the Israeli, Egyptian, Jordanian and Syrian governments. This letter later became known as the “Schultz Initiative.”\(^\text{13}\)

1. Negotiations on a comprehensive peace to provide security to all the countries in the region and will see to the legitimate rights of the Palestinian nation.
2. Palestinian representation will be in the context of a joint delegation with Jordan.
3. An interim agreement which will last three years.
4. The negotiations to achieve a final status agreement will begin even before the application of the interim agreement and its implementation.
5. The negotiations will commence with an international conference, at the invitation of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and with the participation of the permanent members of the Security Council.
7. Any negotiation between Israel and its neighbors will be based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Participation in the international conference is contingent on a commitment to non-violence.

The initiative was rejected by the Arabs (excluding Egypt) and by the Shamir government. The Schultz initiative included elements from President Reagan’s 1982 plan in which participation of a Palestinian delegation was first mentioned. However, it is important to note that the United States took into account Israel’s absolute opposition to a Palestinian state and to PLO participation and, therefore, the Palestinian delegation would be part of the Jordanian delegation and not an independent entity.

Even though the PLO was not yet officially recognized, the Camp David agreement and the intifada which started in December 1987, weakened the American position. At the Democratic National Convention in July 1988, a clause supporting “the Palestinian right to self-determination”\(^\text{14}\) was included in the Democratic Party platform, under pressure of the pro-Arab supporters of Jesse Jackson. This took place shortly after Jordan announced its disengagement from the West Bank in May 1988.

In light of these developments, the PNC (Palestinian National Council) felt powerful enough in November to declare its aim at its 19th convention in Tunisia: “Palestinian independence and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with Arafat at its head.”\(^\text{15}\)

A month later, in December 1988, a significant development took place, when Yasser Arafat wanted to address the UN Assembly but American Secretary of State George Schultz refused to grant him a visa to the United States. As a result, the assembly was transferred to Geneva. There, Arafat delivered a speech from which it was hard to understand clearly whether or not he accepted the American conditions for participation in the negotiations. The next day, December 14, 1988, at a press conference, he stumbled on certain key words, but what he said was interpreted by the State Department as fulfilling its requirements, and Schultz announced the reopening of a dialogue between the American government and the PLO.\(^\text{16}\)

Prof. Shlomo Slonim, of the Hebrew University interpreted Schultz’s action as follows:
This act, which was a radical deviation from the anti-terrorism policy conducted by Reagan, was perceived in general as the parting gesture of an outgoing administration for the good of the new, incoming administration. The Bush administration would have experienced difficulty in initiating talks with the representative of what had heretofore been considered a terrorist organization. Since no one could question the Reagan administration's commitment to Israeli security, it was much easier for the outgoing administration to facilitate this revolutionary change in American foreign policy than it would have been for the new administration. 

This interpretation was deemed reasonable by most reporters and observers. Indeed, shortly after assuming the presidency in March 1989, President Bush said that "Israel must enter into negotiations with the PLO." 

It is commonly accepted that America’s attitude toward Israel changed radically with the onset of George Bush’s Presidency. There were two causes for the change: First, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, dissipated Israel’s status as a “strategic asset” in the struggle against the “evil empire”. The second, more immediate, factor was Iraq’s conquest of Kuwait which was liable to serve as a prelude to the conquest of Saudi Arabia and endanger the flow of oil to the West.

The American response was operation “Desert Storm”. In this war, the United States felt it required the cooperation of Arab countries in order to lend legitimacy to the struggle against Saddam Hussein. Egypt and Syria joined the coalition. Syria actually sent a rather symbolic unit which did not participate in the fighting at all and Egypt took part in limited operations in Kuwait, but refused to cross the border into Iraq. As a token of gratitude, Egypt had most of its foreign debt of 29 billion dollars renounced and as a result avoided bankruptcy, and Syria enjoyed an inflow of 3 billion dollars which was spent mostly on weaponry.

From the Arab perspective, their “participation” in the war was a legitimization of the Saudi monarchy which came under attack from the local theocracy, accusing the king of allowing infidels to tread on Saudi land, even though it was to save Saudi Arabia from Kuwait’s fate. Bush was required to provide additional remuneration to the Arab countries which formed the “coalition”, and what could be more appropriate than payment in “Israeli currency”? Testimony to this can be found in General Schwarzkopf’s farewell statement when he left the desert: “The greatest contribution to peace in the region is the just solution of the Palestinian question.”

Brent Scowcroft, George Bush’s National Security Advisor, viewed the Madrid Conference as one of the significant ramifications of the Gulf War. Martin Indyk, after his appointment to the Middle East desk in the State Department, also claimed that the success in the Gulf War was an essential prerequisite for convening the Madrid Conference.

President Bush exerted heavy pressure on Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir to participate in the Middle East Peace Conference (the Madrid Conference) in which some Arab countries, as well as Russia and America, would take part and at which the peace negotiations would commence. Shamir agreed, contingent upon three conditions which were accepted by the Americans: That the PLO not participate, that a Palestinian state not be discussed, and that the peace negotiations not be based on “land for peace”. Needless to say, the reality in Madrid was different. The delegation from Judea and Samaria separated from the Jordanian delegation upon its arrival. Its members immediately traveled to Tunisia to receive instructions from Arafat. In his opening statement, President Bush said:

We plan to reach an agreement within five years. Afterwards, temporary self-rule will last five years and we believe that territorial compromise is essential for peace.

President Bush and his Secretary of State, James Baker, did all they could to unseat Shamir. Verbal attacks and expressions of dissatisfaction, demands for far-reaching concessions, use of undiplomatic language, and withholding “loan guarantees” requested by Shamir to absorb Russian immigrants and partially to cover the damages of the Gulf War, eventually led to his downfall. After the 1992 elections, Yitzhak Rabin was appointed Prime
Minister of a Labor-Meretz government. He estimated that he had a better chance of success in direct negotiations with the PLO than in negotiations under the auspices of America, and as a result, the Oslo Agreement was born.

From the early stages of the implementation of the Oslo Agreement, the PLO was moving in the direction of declaring a state and indeed, conducting elections, establishing an army (under the transparent guise of a “strong police force” as it had been characterized since the days of the Camp David agreements), government offices, an airport, a seaport, and all the other trimmings, clearly proved that the PLO was not preparing for autonomy, certainly not autonomy under Israeli rule, but rather an independent state. It is worth noting that in the Oslo Agreement (the Declaration of Principles on the Interim Agreements of Self-Rule from September 13, 1993), there was no mention of a Palestinian state. It is stated, in paragraph 1, that

the goal of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations is, in the context of the present peace process, to establish a Palestinian Authority for an interim period which will serve for a transitional period of no longer than five years and which will lead to a final agreement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

The Rabin-Peres government tried to circumvent the issue of the Palestinian state in order not to come into conflict with the national consensus in those days which opposed its establishment. But the support for a Palestinian state among the Israeli public steadily grew and Peres expressed open support for its establishment during his tenure as Prime Minister after Rabin’s assassination in November 1995. Netanyahu, after assuming the office of Prime Minister in 1996, ceremoniously declared: “You will wake up every morning and see that no Palestinian state has been established.”

The American administration did not officially support the establishment of a Palestinian state, at least not openly, unless it was agreed upon in the final status negotiations which had then not yet begun. In the periodic status report delivered by the administration to Congress on January 12, 1997, in order to receive approval for continuing dialogue with the PLO and for financial aid to the Palestinian Authority, it was stated that

repeated Palestinian rhetoric concerning a ‘Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital’ is merely a declaration of principle and is not a ‘move’ which affects the status of Jerusalem. 23

In order not to provide the Israelis with an excuse to suspend the talks, the United States and the European Community pressured Arafat “not to declare on the 4th of May” (at the end of the five year transition period). But the positive can be deduced from the negative. They did not tell him not to declare, but rather “not on the 4th of May 1999”. Hence, at a later date it may be fine, and in addition, one may assume that in return for the delaying declaration, Arafat will receive appropriate compensation. 24

Various signs and indirect expressions leave no doubt that the United States is today closer to the Arab position than to the Israeli. An instructive hint is Madeleine Albright’s words telling Netanyahu blatantly that he should compromise and save the peace process and thereby “help rehabilitate America’s credibility in the eyes of the Arab world.” 25 America promised “to deliver Israel” and does not intend to allow Netanyahu to prevent it.

An event proving the heavy pressure exerted on Israel (Clinton: “I am in the process of preparing hard decisions”) 26 was the statement by the President’s wife, Mrs. Hillary Clinton, in May, 1998. She said that in her opinion it is in the best interests of the Middle East that Palestine become a state, taking upon itself responsibility for its inhabitants. After the ensuing storm, Mrs. Clinton added that this was merely her personal opinion. 27 However, even in the Clinton administration the president’s wife does not issue political statements without the president’s approval.

After the meeting at Wye Plantation, during the US aerial bombing of Iraq, a significant converging of interests took place between the US administration and the heads of the Palestinian Authority. Arafat was invited to the White House and was received there with ceremony usually reserved for heads of state. Senior officials in the Palestinian
Authority interpreted President Clinton’s visit to Gaza in September 1998, in a gathering where the Palestinian Charter was supposedly “abrogated”, as testimony to the revolutionary transformation which American policy in the Middle East had undergone.\textsuperscript{28} In their opinion, it seems that America is rapidly progressing toward a policy of neutrality between Israel and the Palestinians. Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazar), the head of the Palestinian negotiating cadre, claimed that Clinton’s statements were de facto recognition of the Palestinian state.\textsuperscript{29} The New York Times correspondent who was present at the meeting reported in much the same vein.\textsuperscript{30}

In summary, it appears that the United States remained committed to the partitioning of Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian state, a concept which has been a guiding principle of its Middle East policy since 1947. As in many other areas regarding the Middle East, America has learned nothing and forgotten nothing despite its conspicuous and repeated failures in the region (the banishment of the Persian Shah, the Baghdad treaty, the support for Saddam Hussein, the wooing of Nasser and later Assad, and this is just a partial list of Washington blunders in this area).\textsuperscript{31} In this way, the Americans perpetuate a policy from the late 1940s, which is, in part, a legacy from the British Foreign Office’s policy at the end of World War I. The dangers posed by a Palestinian state to Israel are clear and grave, and the Americans are well aware of them. Despite this, the United States is willing to sacrifice its only ally in the region which in effect is its most loyal ally in the world.

It is now widely admitted that Israel served as a forward outpost for western civilization, which blocked the Soviets from reaching the oil fields and other parts of the strategically important Middle East. The 1967 war was a turning point in the Cold War, following which the fortunes of the Soviets in the third world declined visibly. Without Israel, the Middle East, and therefore the history of the late 20\textsuperscript{th} century, would be different. A strong Israel guarantees stability in the Middle East and the survival of any other American allies in the region.

It is customary to describe the relationship between Israel and the United States as a one-way street in which Israel is the recipient. This description is clearly mistaken and stems from the lack of understanding of the nature of international relations. International relations are determined exclusively by national interests. No superpower grants aid to a small country unless it is worth its while, meaning that it serves its geo-strategic goals. The relationship between Israel and the United States has always been notable for its reciprocity. The aid which the Jewish state provided to the superpower during the Cold War, if it were translated into dollars and cents, was greater than that which Israel has received over the years.\textsuperscript{32} Even today, the United States receives from Israel technologies on the cutting edge of development, designed for the battlefield of the future, at negligible prices compared to the cost of development in the United States.\textsuperscript{33} Moreover, the United States is facing, according to President Clinton, an unparalleled danger at the beginning of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century — non-conventional terrorism.\textsuperscript{34} The only active ally in the fight against this danger is Israel, which is geographically located as an outpost in the most relevant region. There is the strategic alliance developing between Israel and Turkey, which Iran, after the Islamic revolution has faded, and India, might one day join. This alliance is capable of stopping the threat of Islamic fundamentalist hegemony in the region. Despite all this, the White House prefers short-term tactical gains, which are most probably illusory, and is ready to sacrifice its most loyal ally.

No doubt, Israel bears partial responsibility for the failures of the American administration. Israel entered the Six Day War with no defined aims, has since initiated no positive solutions, and supported the recognition of the “legitimate rights of the Palestinian people,” to mention only some of its omissions and mistakes. Today, a large part of the political leadership has come to terms with the establishment of a Palestinian state and, if it were not for the issue of Jerusalem,\textsuperscript{35} it is conceivable that this solution would be universally accepted. The reliance on America will eventually lead to Israel being “compensated” by American guarantees, which according to the American constitution are meaningless.\textsuperscript{36,37} The first sign
of the "bananaization" of Israel can be detected in Netanyahu's acquiescence in the Wye Plantation agreement:

The CIA will be the sole determining factor regarding whether or not the Palestinian Authority is fulfilling its commitments. The CIA is not required to share its findings with Israel. These will be sent directly to the State Department in Washington and it will hand down the verdict.38

If a revolutionary change does not occur in Israel's policy — a change which is not apparent yet, in the absence of a political force capable of preventing the establishment of a Palestinian state — a sovereign Arab entity reaching the outskirts of Tel Aviv, Kfar Saba, Beersheva and Afula will appear. Israel's emasculated dependency on the United States will continue to grow and with it, the danger of losing extremely vital national interests. It seems that no one in the highest echelon of Israeli decision-makers understands or is willing to deal with these grave facts.
THE EU VIEW OF A PALESTINIAN STATE

Christopher Barder

The Oslo Accords, predicated on ideas with a long history, Israeli land surrender and Palestinian self-determination, were, rumors have had it, quite possibly a sequel to Labor Party negotiations with the PLO, in defiance of Israeli law, well before the so-called “back-channel” to the talks begun at Madrid. What then emerged in the DOP and subsequent agreements had a previous history both within, and outside, Israel. The unfolding “process”, no less than a covenant with death, represents a series of enduring ambitions which may be documented in the United States and in Europe. It is little wonder then that the world has in fact been educated to anticipate a Palestinian state. It is also not surprising that as a result of the widespread acceptance of this possibility,

...the PLO’s observer to the United Nations, Nasser el-Kidwa, has appealed to the UN General Assembly to support a Palestinian state once it is established on May 4, 1999, and said the Palestinians would seek UN recognition of it. (The date has been superseded but not the intentions.)

Given this international awareness, it is perhaps all the more significant that Europeans should seek a good deal of the credit for the processes which are leading towards the further partition of the original Mandated territory for the Jewish homeland. They are in the forefront of an international endeavor.

In the Middle East [too] the peace process has incorporated ideas originally advanced by Europe, first in the 1980 Declaration of Venice, and it will again be Europe that provides much of the assistance that will allow a new form of coexistence between Arabs and Israelis. Yet when it comes to political decisions, Europe’s authority is not commensurate with the burdens it assumes.

The ambition to create that commensurate authority is present amongst the leaders of the European Union. The reference to ideas current for some fifteen years reflects the ability to maintain long-term intentions and to see them through to ultimate application. It is important to assess these aspirations because they represent means by which to evaluate whether or not the EU may indeed achieve its objectives in sponsoring a Palestinian entity determined to gain statehood. Its track record may indicate the EU’s ability to gauge viable policies.

When Jacques Santer declared:

Some of our big countries still perceive European foreign policy as one option among others, which should be used or left aside according to circumstances,

he was confronting a problem presented by only some of the countries, and expressing his own vision concerning what he desired should happen. Yet it is clear that scholarly opinion is divided about how seriously to take European references to common defense and security policies. After all, Europe lacks common identity, interests and institutions with sufficient capabilities. Furthermore, there is a “capabilities-expectations” gap which has not yet been bridged successfully, difficulty with decision making on policy questions, and a range of issues concerning the determinants of its external role. However there is a strong evolutionary side which means the rhetoric points towards the desired reality and indicates the intentions which will
govern the shaping of it. In the case of the Arab-Israel conflict, the involvement of the Europeans is on quite a different footing to that pertaining to Bosnia-Yugoslavia. For instance, there is a far longer history of attitudes and stances as well as proposed solutions. And these have stood the test of time, been relatively constant, and now appear a long way towards implementation. This is in spite of the variables of the Franco-German alliance, the performance of the Commission, the transatlantic relationship, and the frequency of political crisis in Europe. One expert has commented on the need to co-ordinate diplomatic missions to the Middle East and the failure for three months to respond by declaration or initiative to the defeat of Shimon Peres in the election of May 1996, presumably thereby implying that the co-ordination process should be improved and, secondarily, that there should have been preparation for a Netanyahu victory and a speedier response to this. The point is, however, that such expectations do drive Europe forward in the region, and it is this fact, rather than the failures on the way, which makes Europe's attitude to a Palestinian state so significant in terms of its support from a major power bloc in the making.

Since, during the Cold War, Israel could appear important as a bastion against Communist-backed states in the region, and could therefore be seen as a useful strategic ally for the USA, NATO, and perhaps for the European Community to some degree, European and American plans for the region's future could not be implemented too easily, especially while Israel refused to attend an international conference as a victim. The international diplomacy surrounding the various Arab-Israeli wars had shown that a line had always to be drawn by Israel against the endangering quality of other countries' tendencies to appease the Arabs and to withdraw support from Israel (France after the 1967 War, Britain after the invasion of Lebanon), or even to “lose” written commitments (the State Department before the Six Day War). Even so-called “friends” were seen to vary in their de facto friendliness and reliability in a harsh world. These, and countless other experiences, could and should have taught a wary realism about international relations and others' true intentions. For example, Golda Meir, following the Yom Kippur War, told the cabinet to accept that giving way to US demands was just that and must be faced fairly and squarely for what it was. She further commented:

At times we have all been tempted to give in to various pressures and to accept proposals that might guarantee us a little quiet for a few months, or maybe even for a few years, but that could only lead us, eventually, into even greater peril... The world... is insensitive to the sufferings of small nations. Even the most enlightened... are not much inclined today to concern themselves with problems of justice in international relations. At a time when great nations are capable of knuckle under to blackmail and decisions are being made on the basis of Big Power politics, we cannot always be expected to take their advice, and therefore we must have the capacity and the courage to go on seeing things as they really are and to act upon our own most fundamental instincts for self-preservation.

Since those words were written, the blueprint for the future, laid out by the European “Nine” at Venice in June 1980, has been largely adopted as Israeli policy. Europe claims historical and geographical ties to the Middle East. It has hosted the Madrid conference, London talks and the Oslo meetings. The European Union (so-called) remains the largest donor to Arafat's coffers — despite the certainty that corruption, fraud and embezzlement by him and his oligarchy mean wastage of donor money. This reality sometimes hits the headlines but seems not to deter governments. Indeed, demanding “much greater accountability and openness from the Palestinians” is not much punishment for British aid earmarked for poor Palestinians being “used by the European Union to finance luxury flats — with Italian granite-fitted designer kitchens — for rich supporters of Yasser Arafat.” Given that “More than £1.2 billion has been given by all international donors to the Palestinians in the past five years,” and that

The Palestinian Authority's own auditors have already embarrassed Arafat with an inquiry which showed that nearly 40% of his admin-
istration's budget was misused or stolen through 'kickbacks', and that 'The EU auditors warn the same corruption could apply to money in its projects and demanded 'extreme vigilance',17 more notice could have been taken of the nature of the regime, which shows none of the hallmarks of being suitable for building a stable state in the region. But nonetheless, European policy seems undeterred. Nor has there been significant pressure for serious reform and restructuring from the EU.

Details concerning the Arafat regime matter because they raise starkly the issue of explaining and justifying favorable attitudes towards it. The statistics of economic and social decline since Arafat came to power are appalling.18 Yet they are blamed on Israeli closures in a propaganda campaign that European statements appear to take seriously19 despite the obvious effects of the kleptocracy surrounding the exercise of authority in PA controlled areas, and manning levels which, like the salary totals, are inappropriately inflated.20 Again, demands for reform and the rule of law do not seem to have been prosecuted with any determined seriousness by the main benefactors of this corrupt and brutal regime, and nor is there an emphasis on the true causes of the economic and social problems.

After many years of not falling into line with others' plans for the region, Israel did so with its commitment to "Oslo" and what it stood for. Before then,

The Venice Declaration marked a low-point in Israel's relations with the European Community from which it has never fully recovered. From the issuing of the Declaration in June 1980 to the convening of the Madrid peace conference in November 1991, Israel vigorously opposed any European attempt to play a significant role in the peace process. In January 1989, Shamir told the chairman of the European Parliament, Lord Plumb, that because of the Community's pro-Palestinian bias it was difficult to conceive of the Europeans as participants in the political process in the Middle East. Israelis from across the political spectrum were united in their criticism of Europe's approach to the conflict, which they saw as representing solely the Arab position. In particular, they were angered by the series of declarations and statements issued by the European Community following Israel's invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 and the start of the Palestinian Uprising (intifada) at the end of 1987, became increasingly critical of Israel's policies and more open in their endorsement of the PLO as the representatives of the Palestinian people and of the rights of the Palestinians to national self-determination... Not surprisingly, the Arab states drew great satisfaction from the stance taken by the European states and saw them as an important counterweight to the near blanket support given to Israel by the United States. Accordingly, they were eager to afford the European Community a greater role in any efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict.21

Thus the Arabs' eagerness for European involvement has been paralleled by the Europeans' own. In this extract, Dr. Peters draws attention to the overt support given to the Arab cause and describes the rebuttal of the Europeans before the cave-in "at Oslo". Whereas the Europeans could be declaratory, they were not equipped with the means of implementation, at least until the end of the 1980s.22 Although Yitzhak Shamir apparently had to attend Madrid,23 he knew that the Europeans harbored ambitions for similar co-sponsor status to the USA and Russia, and of their pro-Arab stance.24

Subsequent trends towards European aggrandizement make European plans potentially more difficult to resist and so their incorporation through Oslo appears even more dangerous as these plans seem to anticipate a Palestinian state.

The European Council calls on Israel to recognize the right of the Palestinians to exercise self-determination, without excluding the option of a State.25

Crucially, an objective evaluation of this outcome should involve at least an assessment of its potential for evil or good in the region, and towards Israel. But there are no serious doubts expressed in
European attitudes concerning such a state’s existence. This may be partly because Israel scarcely matters in the context of a much bigger range of issues. The US wants to keep French, and other West European influence, out of the region and some in the State Department and in the CIA would be quite happy if Israel disappeared and wish it had never existed. This appears true of some Europeans, too. In certain instances Israel’s position is portrayed as seriously illegitimate. The portrayal may be of a “strategic liability” to the United Nations or of “one religion trying to allocate an entire city to itself” or of Israel merit bombing “into compliance with international law, rather than Iraq” due to the Israeli electorate supporting Benjamin Netanyahu. This latter remark, by a Westminster MP, was greeted by prolonged applause (and was supposedly suggested “rhetorically” not for “actual” implementation, meaning presumably as an indicator of at least an appropriate attitude).

It was also suggested that Israel would lose its strategic and political importance altogether, after the Gulf War, when the Americans would ally simply with the Arabs. The (British) Foreign Office Minister responsible for this piece of perhaps wishful thinking became a cabinet minister and in one respect at least he might be proven partially right — he hoped Congress might learn this lesson from Israel’s non-belligerent involvement in the Gulf War — that Israel might be seen as not really of much use. He spoke with feeling, however, about the need for the Palestinians to correct their tragic mistake in supporting Saddam Hussein.

There is a rivalry between Europe and the United States concerning influence in the Middle East and the effects of an EU backed Palestinian state on Israel do not, ultimately, seem to need taking into account. This rivalry may not however mean disagreement over the main thrust of the Oslo process, despite its origins, or about its favorable outcome for the Palestinian Arabs.

Whereas it may rightly be observed that Norway is not part of the EU, nonetheless the deal which emerged was that which the Europeans had envisaged and it certainly had the backing of the Norwegian politicians involved who knew that European position; and who worked with Yossi Beilin and Abu Ala and the others seemingly without US involvement at least at the initial stages, even if the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Dan Kurtzer was kept periodically updated subsequently. The search for a role for Europe was therefore gaining some fulfillment. Its determination to matter was paying off.

The terminological changes whereby the Common Market became the European Economic Community, the European Community and then the European Union, reflect an expanding range of political aspirations as well as the formation of an economic bloc of formidable geographical extent, creating EMU and the Euro. It has been suggested that these developments are actually modeled on Hitler’s 1942 plans for Europe. A Foreign Minister in common and a shared defense and foreign policy have been called for. Crucially, “The formulation of the [Venice] declaration was in itself a milestone in the EC’s quest for a common foreign policy.” There should be ministers, policies, resources and empowerment in common which “will enable Europe to take assertive action toward governments that are often hanging in the balance between war and peace.”

European ambitions to forge a common, international diplomatic and foreign policy influence mean that “the peace process” is a handy means:

It [the EU role in dealing with the Israel-Arab conflict] would also illustrate the potential, and serve as a small, yet important, step in the construction of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) for the European Union.

If the European understanding of the causes of “Peace Process” log-jams is really “Israeli intransigence and Palestinian frustrations”, then, at least diplomatically, Israel may be pressured by Europe to give way on disputed issues to a Palestinian state, as Europe uses the opportunity to assert its voice and influence.

The significance for the Europeans of a more single voice in foreign and defense affairs is considerable. It increases their influence. It thereby makes their demands harder to ignore and it means a capacity to deploy militarily, and to use the levers behind diplomacy such as trade sanctions. It is
therefore very relevant that such strong stands are made on topics at issue between Israel and the Palestinian Arabs. The context for these European attitudes, and the single voice with which they are declared, is one of enhanced co-operation and capability for forcefulness. In what Tony Blair called "an historic agreement", he and President Chirac agreed to "create an European Union framework for military initiatives either inside — or outside — the NATO alliance". This allows Britain and France to strengthen the WEU independently of NATO and to draw together in a sphere they agree needs developing and in which Germany cannot (yet) be so dominant. The common defense and foreign policy initiative may be pushed forward by a Britain uncertain about its position in relation to the Euro common currency. There is no reason to assume that difficulties between participant countries cannot be dealt with by demands for increased conformity and uniformity in these security and diplomatic areas as in the economic and political, given sufficient will. Britain and France recognize themselves as alone possessing, as President Chirac put it, "a strong military and diplomatic capability". And they have obvious attitudes to the outcome of a Palestinian state.

In October 1996 President Chirac, in Ramallah, became the first foreign leader to address the Palestinian "national assembly". He declared that Palestinian statehood

is not in any way a danger to the security of anyone. On the contrary, a Palestinian state and comprehensive and just peace guarantees security for all.

He stressed "Changes on the ground in Jerusalem, like confiscation of land and demolishing houses, must stop," and while saluting the US role he felt there was a loss of trust causing the peace process to falter, whereas "I see the European and French role in building more trust." Seemingly France and Europe spoke as one to all intents and purposes, in support of a Palestinian state, and in defiance of any Israeli assessments of the danger to it of such a state.40

This appears not to have fallen on deaf ears. Not long after the Wye River deal, Yasser Arafat visited France. Layla Shahid, Arafat's ambassador there, told Voice of Palestine Radio,

The issue of declaring the independent Palestinian state was discussed during the Palestinian-French talks. We also discussed at length the issue of ways to declare the Palestinian state. You know that we must primarily approach the Europeans, because they are the group that we would like to recognize the Palestinian state, which the brother President will declare on 4 May 1999. Therefore, it was very important for President Arafat to discuss with President Chirac, Prime Minister Jospin, and Parliament Speaker Fabius ways to persuade France to advocate the Palestinian cause and, more specifically, the declaration of the Palestinian state. France and Europe had already recognized this right. Several world states, including the Arab, Muslim, African, and Nonaligned states, recognize this right.

Apparently France reaffirmed its political and economic support for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and it decided to increase its economic aid to finance economic projects. France also announced that it will contribute $20 million to help finance the building of the Gaza port.41

Both Gaza airport and the port referred to here represent elements which are suggestive of statehood (hence the rejoicing at the airport opening). France and Britain are, after all, the European countries most able to play a role in foreign and diplomatic affairs and they are thoroughly involved in the financing of, and diplomacy surrounding, Gaza's development. Significantly at least in symbolic terms, Arafat made a surprise stopover in Austria immediately following the Wye River agreement. Europe's patience and partiality were paying off. The position taken up so long before was becoming a reality.

Although a subject sometimes subsequently cloaked in diplomatic language, the intended outcome of a Palestinian state was evident at Venice. Self-determination must mean the capacity to choose for itself. This element was given particular force in Article 6 of the Luxembourg Declaration
which declared that the Palestinian problem (as it put it) was “not simply one of refugees.” It continued:

The Palestinian people, which is conscious of existing as such, must be placed in a position, by an appropriate process defined within the framework of the comprehensive peace settlement, to exercise fully its right to self-determination.

Article 4 referred to “the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people” in the context of justice for all. Heedless of the appalling record of murder and cruelty which its very name should have evoked, Article 7 stressed that the PLO “will have to be associated with the negotiations”. Eyes were closed firmly even to the unspeakable acts perpetrated in Lebanon and to the international dimensions of PLO training in terror techniques which were occurring there. The PLO shipping line, SUMUD, had business arrangements with the PLO offices throughout Western Europe but governments and their intelligence units looked the other way.43 Before its expulsion from Lebanon in 1982, the PLO earned approximately three times from the narcotics trade what it gained from Arab governments’ support and, six months after its expulsion, its then treasury chief, Sallah Dabbagh, commented “the entire future of the PLO operation for liberation may hinge on our exporting more drugs throughout the world.”44

The ugliness of Palestinian society has, however, not prevented its ambitions and agenda being accepted by the European Union. The European Council expressed the EU’s readiness to contribute to permanent status negotiations, by offering specific suggestions to the parties on related subjects, including possible Palestinian statehood, borders/security arrangements, settlements, refugees, Jerusalem and water issues.45

Already, in 1989, Dr. Asher Susser had pointed out that the idea of Palestinian self-determination applied not solely to the Palestinians in Gaza, Judea and Samaria, but to those identifying as Palestinian wherever they were, according to the PLO concept of the term. By accepting, in November 1988 the 1947 partition resolution only in relation to statehood and sovereignty, “the PLO has left an opening for... a fundamentally irredential strategy towards Israel.” In Dr. Susser’s understanding, the Israeli Arabs also come under the aegis of PLO representation, according to this all-embracing view of self-determination, as put forward by Yasser Arafat in Geneva in 1988.46 It was, and is, accompanied by the intention of “refugee right of return”. These aspects together — the Palestinian perception of national rights, including self-determination and refugee return — “could face Israel with challenges that might undermine its very existence at a later period of time.47 Since he was addressing, among others, politicians from both Houses of Parliament at Westminster, academic opinion, relating the danger to Israel of the oft-repeated European position on these matters concerning Palestinian statehood, seems to have gone unheeded, or been dismissed.

Article 8 of the Venice Declaration (17 years before the above Luxembourg Declaration) shows that attention was already being paid to the issue of Jerusalem; the angle on it is specifically pitched against the Israeli position.

The Nine recognize the special importance of the role played by the question of Jerusalem for all the parties concerned. The Nine stress that they will not accept any unilateral initiative designed to change the status of Jerusalem and that any agreement on the city’s status should guarantee the freedom of access for everyone to the holy places.

The fact remains: the undivided capital of Israel will not be recognized as this would represent, seemingly, a change in status following the 1967 War and a change in relation to the Islamic claims which appear recognized as having equal validity to the Jewish ones.48 Articles 8 and 9 combined suggest Israel should surrender those parts of Jerusalem taken in that war.49

Thus Article 9:

The Nine stress the need for Israel to put an end to the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the conflict of 1967, as it has done for part of Sinai. They are deeply convinced that Israeli settlements constitute a serious obstacle to the peace process in the Middle East. The Nine consider that these settlements, as well as modifications in
population and property in the occupied Arab territories are illegal under international law.

This means exactly what it says, and reflects the European standpoint's lack of regard for Zionist aspirations, Jewish history, and for relevant historical background (against which legal and political issues must be measured), and for the finer, detailed subject matter of international law which the late Professor Julius Stone analyzed in depth.\textsuperscript{50} His comments on the United Nations made in 1980 apply fittingly to the European Declarations.\textsuperscript{51}

What is reflected here is the way in which international legal principles are flouted by those with power who are willing to challenge historical veracity and, crucially, context.\textsuperscript{52} The late Professor Harkabi powerfully warned against trying to grasp both sides of an argument so as to distort the truth in the interests of "fairness".\textsuperscript{53} Rejecting Israel's case, the Europeans have not really sought to be objective and even-handed. Their \emph{ipse dixit} cannot be challenged as it represents their policy means and ends. There is no appeal court. What they have decided is translated directly into diplomatic pressure and manipulation, regardless of what principles are flouted or the justice of the case. For example, Professor Beres has emphasized that in international legal theory, there can be no crime without punishment.\textsuperscript{54} Yet the Arabs gain from the European stance an impunity despite their waging full-scale wars and incessant low intensity (so-called) conflict against Israel. They receive no punishment or loss of diplomatic position as a consequence of their attitudes, incitement to hatred, boycotts or terrorism.

Nor does there appear to be a conscience concerning the dangers Islam poses to Israel and the Middle Eastern Christians or an appraisal of Israel's true needs for self-defense. The overall pattern of US and European policies pandered to Islam for reasons of greed continues unerringly.\textsuperscript{55} A former Downing Street insider has drawn attention to the long history of the Foreign Office dislike of Israel and the contemporary increasingly greater political weight of Muslims than of Jews in Britain.\textsuperscript{56} Even the emphasis which the Netanyahu government has tried to place on "security" has been ridiculed by the Arabs\textsuperscript{57} and minimized by the Europeans — as Article 10 of the Venice Declaration demanded.

Concerned as they are to put an end to violence, the Nine consider that only the renunciation of force or the threatened use of force by all the parties can create a climate of confidence in the area, and constitute a basic element for a comprehensive settlement of the conflict in the Middle East.

Apart from the over-ambitious, somewhat unrealistic nature of "comprehensiveness", the idea that Israel could hold down the violence of Islam, and indeed of Arab politics, without force, or that terrorism would cease without Israeli use of force, makes this article border on the superfluous. The statement appears tantamount to demanding a total revision of the nature of Arab political culture as a precondition for a "climate of confidence"; this cannot be what it was intended to convey! Instead Israel is expected to espouse the same policies of appeasement of Islam (or credulity concerning its innocuous qualities) as the West.

Where Article 11 declares the intention of making contact with all the parties concerned "to ascertain their position" on the contents of the Declaration, there is suggested an obvious willingness to talk to the PLO, an organization accurately characterized at the time by one perceptive Conservative Westminster MP in a question to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher when she reported to the House of Commons on the Venice Summit.\textsuperscript{58} There was no doubt in her mind that the PLO stood for terror\textsuperscript{59} and she seemed to recognize that dialogue with all the parties meant with the PLO — as she had previously stated that no discussion of follow-up talks with the "relevant parties to the conflict" had been entered into with President Carter: the Americans regarded the Communiqué as "trying to help with the Camp David process, which is still very much alive."\textsuperscript{60} Yet recognition of the PLO's nature failed to mean that Mrs. Thatcher withheld support from the Venice Declaration. The key issue was whether the PLO would be "associated with" the talks or "participate in" them and since she disapproved of the latter "as long as the PLO did not reject terrorism" she
regarded the final communiqué as reflecting “the right balance”.61

The way that Mrs. Thatcher explained the European position later emphasizes the deliberately anti-American nature of the Declaration,62 so that the Arab perception of a pro-Israel USA would be counteracted by a pro-Arab policy from the Europeans. This meant trumpeting European independence of, and distinctiveness from, America.63 Europe has continued to produce, as Moshe Arens aptly phrased it, “pious sermons on human rights, self-determination, and calls to leave the ‘occupied territories’”.64 The Venice Declaration has therefore formed the basis of subsequent European statements, policies and aspirations concerning the Middle East. From it have flowed a series of condemnations of Israeli policy.65 The momentum gained thereby leads inexorably to expectation of a Palestinian state within the EU and among Palestinians.

A number of EU states, including France and Austria, are known to favor Palestinian independence. The prospect of Yasser Arafat declaring independence has resulted in “mixed signals” from Whitehall. A senior Foreign Office official is said to have conveyed to Arafat, the Palestinian Authority’s representative in Britain, that there was no obstacle to recognizing a Palestinian state, if one was clearly favored in a referendum by the residents of the Palestinian areas. Having responded, the Israeli ambassador was told by Robin Cook that Britain did not believe the establishment of a Palestinian state should be ruled out and favored Palestinian self-determination. But it considered statehood a matter to be discussed between Israel and the Palestinians during the final-status talks. “Political sources” have said a memorandum has been circulated in the Foreign Office which cautioned against public declarations differing from the official line.

There is no doubt that discussions are going on in Whitehall about how the UK would react if Arafat were to make his declaration, but the issue is so crucial that when the issue has to be faced, it is likely to be a joint decision between the Prime Minister and Mr. Cook.66

By its stance on Palestinian statehood and its frequent statements implying some kind of delegitimization of the Israeli response to the threat posed against the state in 1967, the European approach may, perhaps unwittingly, perhaps not, be setting up a range of circumstances in which Israel may have little alternative but to strike out against the anticipated threat again, and with somewhat similar incumbency and legal right.67 The re-creation of Abba Eban’s “Auschwitz borders” is plainly outlined by the EU attitude. But there is no appropriate European caution in recognition of the potential for conflict, outlined as a possible war scenario in a recent study published in Washington.68 It is not fanciful to regard the European political elite as considering Israel as something of a colonist whose future de-colonization will mean agreeing to the Palestinian demand for destruction of its “settlements”. Implicit is the view that the communities in Judea, Samaria and Gaza are indeed, in terms of the well-worn cliché, “on Arab land”. This is by inference and logical extension not all that far from accepting the Arab notion that Israel itself is an “imperialist plant”.69 One commentator suggesting that there should be restitution by Israel for confiscated Palestinian lands creates context by referring to the Holocaust as not comparable.70 There is no mention of compensation for the losses of Jews expelled from Arab lands.

Nor is there comparable sensitivity to the pain suffered by Jewish refugees to that described for the Palestinians who are thought to have suffered identity loss. Indeed the whole idea of Palestinian identity as separate from that of the surrounding Arabs is, whether debatable or not, taken as a sine qua non. It is therefore regarded as something requiring at least flexibility on Israel’s part. The potential effects of such drastic concessions is not seemingly regarded as of much moment. Acceptance of Palestinian statehood and Israel’s recognition of its culpability for the Palestinian plight are necessary steps, along with toleration of some right of return and compensation to be paid by Israel. These measures appear somewhat embedded in a good deal of European thinking.71 But they represent an unadvertised and unscrutinized risk-taking with more than just Israeli’s security. In fact there are
good grounds for asserting that “Believing a Palestinian state will contribute to regional stability demonstrates plain ignorance of Middle Eastern realities.” Rather “The Americans and Europeans fool themselves in believing that a Palestinian state will be their friend.” And

The embryonic Palestinian state has great potential for becoming a source of regional instability, a fact which most of the world, including, unfortunately, the US, seems unaware of.72

Recent European development reflects a purpose and method by which policy objectives are achieved opportunistically with an eye on the intention and a cynical disregard for anything in the way. The blueprint was deliberately obscure early on “in order to achieve greater gains later on”.73 This is the methodology behind the Venice Declaration and the determination to be a political force as well as an economic one and may supply clues as to the motivation behind European support for Palestinian development. The investment in all aspects of the Palestinian entity including its statehood is not simply altruistic. A state sponsored by Europe in the region has significance for its backers.

The European strategy in the Middle East was designed not only to enhance its role there — and this may serve at least in some respects to explain its backing of an entity apparently in need of a sponsor (it is at the least ironic that the EU should step in further after the Gulf War and Yasser Arafat’s support for Saddam Hussein had done damage to his relationship with some Arab sponsors) — but also

...to strengthen its overall sphere of intra-regional influence among Europe, Eurasia and the Middle East. The ultimate aspiration is the emergence of an economic zone incorporating around forty countries and some 800 million people.

Whatever the threats to stability in the region, the EU solution is the creation of a free trade zone incorporating its own values. This strongly suggests that money will change the values and political culture of the Middle East. It is very close to Shimon Peres’ “New Middle East” vision. The stability brought to Europe through economic cooperation would be transposed to the Middle East, incorporating the two areas into a co-prosperity sphere.” It is highly debatable whether European stability is ultimately largely economic in origin and whether, even if the European analysis of its own position were correct, such a transposition would be possible.74

Not only has Europe set itself up as something of a rival to American influence, but it has also posed as an adjunct to and supporter of US policy. It has the intention to develop its own influence and foreign and defense policy apparatus. It can differ from and add support to US positions.75 But above all, it should be recognized as a growing force, economically, diplomatically and indeed strategically. In June 1997, a Council on Foreign Relations Majority Report suggested a stronger use of the Europeans working in line with the Americans to coerce Israel and the Palestinians.76 It was left to a dissenting voice, Lester Pollack,77 to point out:

...the United States for decades has sought to limit the involvement of others, including Russia and the Europeans, in the Middle East peace process. To involve the Europeans at this stage, in a new dialogue, would seem to be as counterproductive in the future as it has been in the past.

But the point remains that there is now an alternative to the Americans to which appeal can readily be made. And members of the European Union may supply arms and biological and chemical material, whether of dual use or not, in ways that deeply affect the fighting capability of countries hostile to Israel.

Just over a year after the CFR report, The Times ran a large headline “Assad Urges EU to Fill Void in Peace Process.”78 It reported that President Assad warned on French television that “If we achieve nothing, war will break out and spread to several countries, directly or indirectly.” However true, this appears hardly the outlook of a negotiating partner seeking peaceful relations: it represents blackmail and coercion. Assad commented: “France and the European Union have a right and even a duty to play a role. It is in their interest.” The Syrian press was apparently full of praise for President Chirac
according to The Times, and not surprisingly: the previous month Chirac had said that Damascus was “entitled to the return of the Golan Heights.” British ambassador to Syria, Basil Eastwood, commented:

Our decision to send two of the most modern ships in the Royal Navy to visit Latakia is intended to symbolize our determination to build a relationship of partnership between Syria and the United Kingdom.79

The failure of France to use this visit by President Assad to any advantage has been closely assessed by Professor Gerald Steinberg who stresses Assad’s gains and how he circumvented American demands.80

The significance is all the greater if the assistance given to the Palestinians by Syrian intelligence personnel in Gaza and in the Palestinian autonomy in Judea and Samaria is taken into account. Research on Syrian military personnel and assistance in the PA controlled areas is in the public domain.81

Syria saw the US initiatives as failing and wanted a strategic partner with an ambition to play a role in the region. This example illustrates the general point: France and Britain had made public their willingness to be drawn in and to counter-balance US influence by securing their own role (and that of Europe). This issue is relevant to the perceived “read-across” by Arab countries concerning the UN treatment meted out to Iraq and the lack of similar towards Israel “due” as a result of its “mistreatment” of the Palestinian Arabs. The British Minister responsible for Middle East affairs made this clear to the House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs showing how pressure was deservedly being put on Israel.

There is no doubt that there is a substantial read-across from the Middle East peace process to other issues. One of the aims of the United Kingdom during its presidency of the European Union is to try to give a higher profile to the role of Europe in that peace process and look for a way in which Europe can make a distinctive contribution which is complementary to and supportive of the peace process. We have received very warm words from President Arafat for Britain’s role in that process. We have set out our own position time and again.

These opinions are very much those that are held in the region. First, there should be substantial further redeployment by the Israelis. Secondly, there should be no action that pre-empts the final status of the negotiations. During the course of our presidency we have already criticized two decisions made by the Israeli Government: to open up and deepen settlements. Thirdly, there should be movement on the interim confidence-building measures. We have drawn attention to the need for an agreement on Gaza Airport, the industrial estate in Gaza and safe passage. Fourthly, we have talked about the requirement to make progress on security. We have made an offer to the Palestinians, which President Arafat accepted in Hebron during my visit to the occupied territories in January, to provide additional security advice and assistance. That was an offer made by the United Kingdom on behalf of the European Union.

We have been active. There is a read-across — we would be foolish to deny it — in the Arab community on this particular issue. That does not mean that they fail to see the nature of the regime in Iraq, but they also want to make progress, as we all do, on the peace process.82

Noticeably, Israeli security concerns play virtually no part in the provisions specified in points one to four. Israeli needs are almost incidental relative to what Israel is expected to do. It is precisely such an echo of the emphases in the Venice Declaration which makes clear the level of continuity between that and what Europe, and the “Oslo process”, are now demanding of Israel. That this means a Palestinian state may be picked up from press attitudes. Ian Black has pronounced: both sides know that there will be a Palestinian state, and that Israel must go back to the pre-1967 lines “give or take the odd hill”.83 This represents not just radical opinion: The Independent trumpeted “Power for Palestine is the way to Israeli security.”84 These were the responses to Jerusalem bombings.

Similar points are reiterated frequently:

2. Recalling its Declaration at Florence and
the Declaration at Luxembourg, it [the Council] reaffirms its support for the fundamental principles of land for peace and self-determination for the Palestinians, with all that this implies. 5. The settlements issue is eroding confidence in the peace process. Settlements contravene international law and are a major obstacle to peace. 6. Palestinian social and economic development require the immediate lifting of the blockade.85

How absurd it is to suggest that Israel has enhanced security from a financially endowed Palestinian entity — let alone a state — may be gauged from the fact that even "the judicial field has become a battlefield which broadcasts hostility and alienation, just like between two hostile entities." The "Firearms and Ammunition Law" gives legitimacy to the Palestinian Authority itself, to manufacture weapons and permits citizens to bear arms. The "Law on Foreign Ownership of Real Estate in Palestine" rules that any Israeli citizen or institution, certainly any settler or the IDF, holding land in "Palestine", is harming Palestinian "national security". Together with this, any Palestinian who aids, in any way, the acquisition or possession of land by an Israeli — is guilty of treason. It is safe to conclude that

the two laws, on land and on weapons, constitute a single unit of land and fire, and constitute a new and additional stage in the Palestinian struggle against Israel.86

Indeed, the difference between European perceptions of what will help the region, and what really would do so, seem poles apart, unless threats to Israel's existence and at the least causes of serious conflict, are ignored and regarded as somewhat insignificant. The paradox is remarkable. The failure to respond appropriately to the nature of Yasser Arafat's regime, and to Israel's legitimate requirements of its neighbor, exposes the investment of the Europeans in Palestinian self-determination and statehood to sinister interpretations. Their failure to publicize and reveal knowledge of its nature cries out for explanation.

Through symbolic gestures, European diplomats have conspicuously shown their leanings towards the Palestinian position. Visits to Orient House were even formally objected to by Shimon Peres, to no avail.87 Robin Cook's famous visit represented not simply miscalculated clumsiness but a clear series of signals: Deir Yasin visited this time rather than Yad Vashem; the Israeli briefing on Har Homa summarily dismissed but an Arab ambush produced a handshake; the British-European view of Jerusalem was reiterated. The Times slammed the tactless indelicacy of Mr. Cook and pointed out how perceptions of the EU partiality towards the Arab side and indeed the way Britain's policy seemed to be filtered through Brussels damaged the EU's chances and also left a mess for the Americans.

Mr. Netanyahu came to the opinion that Mr. Cook's central objectives were his own credibility as an ambassador for European Union foreign policy and a desire to court favorable reviews in the Arab world. This trip has been an unequivocal disaster. Mr. Cook has offered the distinct impression that British policy towards the Middle East is made in Brussels, not London. The European Union's prospects of becoming a substantial player in the peace process have been retarded.88

Even the 1996 Israeli elections were commented upon in a manner suggesting that only the Oslo process would deliver security, when in fact it may well jeopardize it.

We note the pre-eminence of the theme of security in Israel's recent election campaign. We are convinced that the security of all people of the region can eventually be achieved only through comprehensive, equitable and lasting peace.89

This appears tautological nonsense.

...the European Council calls on Israel to recognize the right of the Palestinians to exercise self-determination, without excluding the option of a state. At the same time, it calls upon the Palestinian people to reaffirm their commitment to the legitimate right of Israel to live within safe, recognized borders.90

Here the Europeans go beyond UNSCR 242 and equate a Palestinian state with Israel's right to live securely within recognized borders. The same discriminatory tone was evident when the then Irish
Foreign Minister addressed the United Nations General Assembly for the European Union.\textsuperscript{91}

References to "occupied territories" represent a clear interpretation of their status. In early January 1988, Foreign Office Minister David Mellor officially visited Israel and spilled out his view of the causes of the intifada, making plain that there could be no long term peace and security for Israel until Gaza and the West Bank were no longer occupied and the Palestinians gained the right of self-determination. All fedayeen and other outrages previous to 1967 were not referred to. Rather, observations were made about poor living conditions (which Israel should have improved) in the territories.\textsuperscript{92}

Willems Beelaerts, since 1994 the head of the Netherlands Representative Office to the Palestinian Territories, has suggested that the European Union has played a role in changing the Dutch perceptions of the Arab-Israeli conflict, away from post World War II and religious sympathies towards Israel\textsuperscript{93} — hardly surprisingly, the European Union, with its immense financial resources and political influence, sought support for the Arab case, and influenced public perceptions, and the media, towards it. Furthermore,

repeated experience shows that Israel is extremely sensitive to pressure and that when used on several occasions to constrain Israel to respect its obligations, each time this had led to the desired result.\textsuperscript{94}

Obviously such opinions work towards Israel being pushed to accept a Palestinian state.

Shmuel Katz pointed out that the Venice Declaration should be interpreted in the context of the unwillingness of the states which signed it to allow US supply planes to refuel using their airfields when en route to Israel with essential supplies during the 1973 war. He sees the clause (number 5) which offers guarantees as the most dangerous because it implies indefensibility and yet those offering guarantees were the very countries which had, of their own free will, refused to come to Israel's aid. Mr. Katz interprets the Declaration as a sign of weakness by countries which did not count for much (by their own admission in 1973).\textsuperscript{95} Whilst true then, importantly, this is no longer the case.

David Kimche portrays the Venice Declaration,\textsuperscript{96} as "PLO sponsored" and intended, as Mrs. Thatcher said, to distance Europe from the USA. Support for the Arab position on Jerusalem was a prerequisite for Arab favor and uninterrupted oil supplies.\textsuperscript{97} But since the intention was a circumvention of the Camp David Accords and Sir Ian (now Lord) Gilmour failed to gain Anwar Sadat's agreement to the scheme, it fell flat. The initiative also foundered on PLO failings, in the short term, but in the long term it has been of real importance, and did not represent the end of European use of Arafat or vice-versa.\textsuperscript{98}

Once Israel accepted the principles of Oslo, so the Declaration, and the policy statements which flowed after it, were legitimized. Israel had taken a road which mirrored the very attitudes it had vehemently opposed before, destroying its defenders' long-held positions and leaving it with very little room to maneuver against external and internal pressure and EU official opinion. The logic of Oslo led where the Europeans had from 1980 been trying to drag Israel. To make matters more difficult for Israel, its acceptance coincided with the advance of European confidence and unity and a surge in its aspirations to global power and influence. In 1986 had come the Single European Act. In 1993 came Maastricht.

This growing sense by Europe of its own power was something anticipated by Benjamin Netanyahu in 1989 for whilst he acknowledged that over the previous twenty years "major political effort" had been made with the United States, over the same time-span,

...pro-Arab views have made headway among European opinion leaders. And it will not do just to brush aside the unfavorable voices. As Europe's political and economic clout grows, so will its stature in world affairs and its influence will be felt in the policies of other nations.\textsuperscript{99}

The problem, for Israel, of Europe being more likely to succeed in its intentions lay, as still it does, with the plans for a Palestinian state and with the strategic and military damage to Israel as a consequence of this and of the Oslo and EU assaults on the Jewish presence in Judea, Samaria, Gaza and even the Golan. The dangers posed by the
existence of a Palestinian state are not reflected or respected in EU Declarations or diplomatic moves.\textsuperscript{100} Indeed there is the capacity to cause very serious disruption to Israel's security which goes unrecognized by the EU.\textsuperscript{101} This lack of recognition seems to be part and parcel of the EU's attitude to a Palestinian state. The failure to respond responsibly to the verbal threats of the Palestinian entity's leadership and to the strategic dangers to Israel seem to go together. Their overlooking seems nothing short of irresponsible given the acclaimed desire of the Europeans to be peacemakers.

Miguel Moratinos, the European Union's special envoy to the region,\textsuperscript{102} told \textit{Ha'aretz}:

...It is sometimes said that the EU is "pro-Arab", but the facts suggest the contrary. In recent years, more than half of Israel's imports have come from the EU (vs. 23 percent from the United States), and about 30 percent of Israeli exports went to the EU (vs. 31 percent to the U.S.). Moreover, two important agreements have recently been signed by Israel and the EU: the Scientific and Technological Cooperation Agreement in 1996 and the Association Agreement in 1997. Both underscore the strong political will to strengthen the EU's relationship with Israel.

Although he pointed out "economic action is synonymous with political support,"\textsuperscript{103} the figures he cites may reflect the capacity for a good deal of hostile economic — and diplomatic — leverage against Israel.\textsuperscript{104} Signs of this have already occurred: "PM Blasts EU's Boycott Threat" declared the \textit{Jerusalem Post} in May 1998.\textsuperscript{105} Moshe Arens has recalled

The heads of the European Community were scheduled to meet the following week and on their agenda was a resolution...to impose economic sanctions against Israel as a demonstration of the EC's displeasure with Israel's policy towards the Palestinians.\textsuperscript{106}

This was in 1990. Just these two examples taken together do not suggest that Mr. Moratinos' protestation in refutation of the EU being pro-Arab should be accepted: there are no accounts of threatened sanctions against the corrupt and brutal regime of Yasser Arafat, for all its plainly lawless activity.\textsuperscript{107} Recent portrayal of Europe as a source of bright ideas for co-operation ignores the basic reality of the European policies' harmful effects on Israel's security and territorial claims.\textsuperscript{108} Nor does the economic balance necessarily favor Israel, but rather the finances of the EU.\textsuperscript{109} The dispute between the EU and Israel over the category for the products from Yesha shows how closely bound together are politics and economics.

The EU is prepared to use its economic weight for political and security objectives. In part, the EU has linked treatment of Israel on economic issues to its position on the peace process. Under the Maastricht Treaty, the EU pledged to develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), with emphasis being given to Middle Eastern policy. The EU increasingly has the capability to balance US actions in the region.\textsuperscript{110}

A further, very important thread concerns the changes in direction of NATO and in the role of the European Union within it.

The formula of building a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO aims to reconcile greater European autonomy in security and defense matters with the maintenance of the transatlantic link.

It will give "the Europeans more clout in Alliance decision-making and provides the WEU the tools it needs to carry out its own missions". The aim is clear enough:

The first precondition for progress along these lines is for the European states to maintain, at least collectively, a sufficient level of forces and assets to enable them to justify a reasonable international profile.\textsuperscript{111}

The new NATO strategic concept explicitly mentions the Middle East and Mediterranean periphery as areas which could affect the security of Europe.\textsuperscript{112} Indeed, after the future successful integration and stabilization of the east European new democracies, a RAND report specifies:\textsuperscript{113}

NATO will need to shift its attention to where its most pressing security challenges are likely to lie, on its southern periphery... in the context of growing instability in the southern and eastern Mediterranean, NATO's vital
security interests may be affected... A number of policy proposals and prescriptions are therefore offered to bolster NATO’s budding Mediterranean initiative with the six non-NATO Mediterranean dialogue partner countries — Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.\textsuperscript{114}

Crucially, the involvement of external forces to ensure “peace” and European/NATO identified interests in the region may focus culpability upon Israel.\textsuperscript{115}

Demographic trends in North Africa have been identified as causing

...massive flows of migration towards southern Europe in the 21st century. This has social and domestic security ramifications for the countries of Europe which are ill-prepared to absorb large influxes of immigrants.

There is already a huge economic interdependence such that

developments in the south-eastern Mediterranean can also directly affect the stability and well-being of European members of the Alliance through disruption of energy imports and trade.

European-Arab economic links are clearly statistically very significant, whereas Israel counts for nothing comparable.\textsuperscript{116} The West has caved in to Arab economic pressure in the past, Arab states profess support for the “Palestinian cause”, NATO and the EU have identified powerfully that their security interests directly involve the Middle East and North Africa. So Israel emerges appearing perhaps expendable, often a nuisance, in the post-Cold War world.

The “Barcelona process”, which aimed at peaceful relations and maybe a treaty in the Euro-Mediterranean theater, involved contention between Israel and the Arabs which appeared to focus on the “occupied territories” due to the Arab League meeting of September 1996 and the Malta (April 1997) Arab condemnation of Israeli “settlements” in East Jerusalem. Yasser Arafat and David Levy were brought together by the Dutch and the process went on more or less unhindered, perhaps indeed a sign that the Barcelona initiative and the EU “were finding their niche in regional politics.”\textsuperscript{117} Perhaps more compelling as an argument that there is a dynamic by which politicization is emerging via agreed policy than exclusive analysis of CFSP is the proposition that “the flag follows trade,” according to which foreign policy and order derive from economic strategy creating “soft security” and “soft power”.\textsuperscript{118} This may help in attempting to explain and understand European support for Palestinian statehood and economic investment in it.

In any case, however much different EU countries may in the past have had differing policies towards the participants in the Arab-Israel conflict, the European integration process has entered a qualitatively new stage — the genesis of the European Union (EU) — with a Common Foreign and Security Policy, an institutionally autonomous defence component — the WEU — a single market and a project for a single currency...at Maastricht, the middle and small-sized European powers joined forces to become a new world power center in the 21st century.\textsuperscript{119}

This is something of which the Arabs are well aware.\textsuperscript{120} Israel must analyze its threat potential.\textsuperscript{121}

Robin Cook has declared:

During our Presidency of the European Union, we secured a stronger role for Europe in the peace process. We now have routine meetings with our American partners to influence the shape of their proposals and to reinforce their commitment to resist attempts to weaken them.\textsuperscript{122}

This is all quite consistent with the European Union’s outlook:

The Israeli settlement policy is contriving international law and is a serious obstacle to peace. Sweden like the rest of the EU considers the West Bank and Gaza [as] well as the Golan Heights and Southern Lebanon as occupied territories. It is the Swedish opinion that Israel, in accordance with international law, must withdraw from the Golan, South Lebanon and the West Bank including Eastern Jerusalem and Gaza. The people of Palestine have also the right to self-determination and we support your quest for statehood and sovereignty. Sweden stands firm in political, economics and moral support to the
Palestinian people. The aim of our development co-operation and our policy at large is to support the progress of a democratic Palestinian state.\(^{123}\)

Such an incipient state has already received considerable financial and political backing without ever ceasing its belligerent rhetoric or incitements to violence against Israel. And yet its future menace to Israel has been explored and made plain\(^ {124}\) — significantly, without even a European blush.

Shlomo Argov saw in 1981 that once the US and the Europeans were in agreement, there was serious danger.\(^ {125}\) The Bush, and Clinton, administrations have brought this harmonization into being. Despite Arab accusations of its favoring Israel, mistaken US priorities in the region and the degree to which it has failed to grasp the usefulness of Israel as a strategic ally against the political and expansionist nature of Islam, have brought its policies in line with those of Europe, de facto.\(^ {126}\) The result of their “peace process” is demoralization in the Israeli army.\(^ {127}\) Oslo has had a disastrous effect also on Israel’s deterrent capability\(^ {128}\) — along with strategic weakening and loss of intelligence gathering capability.

Ever since the 1956 Suez crisis, Britain and France nurture a deep resentment against US policy in the region. Their preoccupation with profits from oil, arms sales to Arab states, contracts, etc. prevents serious attempts to play the Israeli card. The knowledge that the US State Department, as well as important circles in the CIA, FBI and Pentagon, are anti-Israeli and are therefore less likely to resent anti-Israeli policies from others reinforces this attitude. Therefore, West European efforts to gain influence in the Middle East have been based on trying to be more anti-Israeli than the US and are usually concerted with Arab states.\(^ {129}\)

How true this is has become abundantly clear.\(^ {130}\)

Whereas the Europeans were once limited from playing a key role in the Middle East, since Israel acceded to the policies of the Venice Declaration, through “Oslo”, the will of the PLO with its Arab backers, has been increasingly effective. The 1974 “Phased Plan” has been enacted, terror has continued, the issues of “refugees”, a Palestinian state west of the River Jordan, and the internationalization or division of Jerusalem, have become topics “on the table”. Israel’s interests have been portrayed as dependent on “the only game in town” succeeding: a “process” which was embarked upon without consultation with and analysis from, any think-tank or security service in Israel. The Europeans, with a financial investment, are seeking a role, preferably with US support, through NATO infrastructure, and through other political and economic institutions. Oslo has opened the door to their policy becoming implemented and Israel arguably indefensible. Israel’s options are narrowing all the time this process of diminution continues. A Palestinian state will almost certainly seek expansion and Israel’s extinction (more land for the peace of the grave) — unless it is prevented.\(^ {131}\) Undervaluing this is a serious comment on the European position. For

Unlike the Western countries, our [Israelis'] existence is in constant danger. In Paris, London and New York an inferior lifestyle means anxiety and decadence. For us, [Israelis] it means extinction.\(^ {132}\)
SHOULD AMERICA GUARANTEE ISRAEL'S SAFETY?

Irving Moskowitz

One hears a great deal these days, from people whose vision is shorter even than their memories, about the wisdom of international guarantees as a means of assuring Israeli security. I can't imagine a more misguided policy than to ask Israel, which has been the model of the self-reliant ally, to transform itself into an American dependency... Much of the history of international guarantees is the history of countries who have lost their territory, their freedom and even their sons and daughters... It is a history that the Israelis, for their reasons, and we, for ours, ought to do everything possible to avoid.

Senator Henry M. Jackson, December 18, 1973

The United States will consider offering Israel some kind of “security guarantees” in conjunction with an Israeli surrender of the Golan Heights, Secretary of State Warren Christopher declared in June 1993. Such “guarantees” might include American troops being stationed between the Israeli and Syrian lines, according to then Defense Secretary Les Aspin. An even more explicit description of this possibility was offered by Israeli cabinet minister Moshe Shahal, who said that the Israeli government and the Clinton administration discussed an arrangement whereby Israel would withdraw from the Golan and American soldiers would be stationed in some parts of the territory for a period of fifteen years.

Such a commitment on the part of the United States would represent a startling departure from the norms of the traditional American-Israeli relationship. Unlike America’s other allies around the world, Israel has never requested that US soldiers risk their lives to protect it from its Arab attackers. The Jewish state always only asked that the US, in the framework of a mutually beneficial strategic relationship, provide Israel with the military assistance it needed to fight its own battles. For more than five decades, Israel has stood alone in the Middle East as an outpost of Western values, as a guardian of Western interests in a strategically crucial region, and as an unbending buffer, first against Soviet encroachment, and now against the spread of Islamic fundamentalism. Israel freely shared vital intelligence data with the United States, battle-tested American weapons, took military action at America’s request, as in 1970, when an Israeli show of force prevented Syria’s invasion of Jordan. In return, the US has generously provided Israel with the weapons it has needed to defend itself against Arab invasions and terrorism. But never was there any suggestion that America should send its troops to fight for Israel, as they fought for South Korea, South Vietnam, Grenada or Kuwait. On the contrary, Israelis always prided themselves on their independence and self-reliance. It makes no sense for the United States to deviate from the norms of this time-honored, and consistently productive, relationship with Israel.

Perhaps it is not surprising that there are those who assume that a foreign military presence would be necessary to protect the Jewish state, when one considers the vulnerability of the pre-1967 borders to which the Clinton administration apparently
expects Israel to retreat. If it surrendered the disputed territories, Israel would be reduced to a strip of land just nine miles wide. The well-equipped Arab armies that surround it would have little trouble slicing the country in two. What portion of those territories would Israel need to protect itself? To answer that question, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara asked the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, shortly after the 1967 war, to study Israel’s borders and determine, “without regard to political factors”, what territory Israel needed to retain to defend itself against future Arab aggression. Their conclusions are instructive.

Regarding the Golan Heights, the Joint Chiefs noted that before 1967, the Syrians had used the Heights to launch “sabotage and terrorist acts”, and also to carry out “shellings of villages overlooking the [Galilee]”. “Therefore,” the Joint Chiefs concluded,

Israel must hold the commanding terrain east of the [pre-1967] boundary... To provide a defense in-depth, Israel would need a strip of about 15 miles [on the Golan], an area even larger than that which Israel currently holds.

Surveying Israel’s security needs in Judea and Samaria, the Joint Chiefs found that the area had been used for “sabotage and mining activity” by Palestinian Arab terrorists before Israel took over in 1967. Furthermore,

the high ground running north-south through the middle of [Judea and Samaria] overlooks Israel’s narrow midsection and offers a route for a thrust to the sea which would split the country in two parts.

At “a minimum”, the Joint Chiefs concluded, Israel needs to control that high ground — in other words, an area comprising the majority of the Judea-Samaria region.

With regard to the Gaza Strip, the Joint Chiefs minced no words: Israel needs the entire territory.

By occupying the Gaza Strip, Israel would trade approximately 45 miles of hostile border for eight miles. Configured as it is, the strip serves as a salient for [the] introduction of Arab subversion and terrorism, and its retention would be to Israel’s military advantage. 4

The question that must be faced then, is whether or not the US should urge Israel to put itself in a vulnerable position, surrendering those vital strategic territories and relying on American troops to defend it against future Arab attacks. Would the US be prepared to activate those troops and risk their lives if a Syrian-Israeli crisis develops? Is it possible to be confident that five or ten years from now, US public opinion will support such military action? How will Americans react when US troops on the Golan are attacked by the same fanatical anti-American Hizbullah terrorists who attacked them in nearby Lebanon not so long ago?

What is at stake is not the sincerity of America’s intentions but the inevitability of America’s ever-shifting agenda. Political and social circumstances often produce sharp changes in public and Congressional perceptions of US military interests abroad. Commitments made with all good intentions by one administration may fall by the wayside when a different administration, with different goals and a different world-view, assumes power. The history of American guarantees to its small allies is not a laundry list of betrayals but rather a manifestation of the simple reality that in a democracy, voters, Congressmen and presidents often change their minds about commitments made by their predecessors.

**US Guarantees: The Case of Vietnam**

Warfare carried out by the Communist forces in northern Vietnam resulted in an agreement in 1954 by the French colonial authorities to withdraw from the country. Determined “to prevent the loss in northern Vietnam from leading to the extension of Communism throughout Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific” (as Secretary of State John Foster Dulles put it), the United States initiated the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and Protocol, known as SEATO. It was intended to protect the southern portion of Vietnam (the non-Communist region), as well as neighboring Cambodia and Laos, against Communist aggression by promising that any “armed attack” upon those regions would be regarded by the United States as “endanger[ing] its own peace and safety”. 5
The gradual escalation of North Vietnamese attacks upon South Vietnam persuaded the United States to act upon its SEATO pledge. After the North Vietnamese attacked a US ship in the Gulf of Tonkin in August 1964, President Lyndon Johnson, for the first time, dispatched American military forces on an offensive mission against the North. Pointing to America’s obligation “to assist nations covered by the SEATO treaty,” Johnson sought, and received, overwhelming Congressional approval (466 to 0 in the House, 88-2 in the Senate) for US military action in Vietnam. The Gulf of Tonkin resolution authorized the president “to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.” It was, Johnson said,

the spirit that motivated us to give our support to the defense of Western Europe in the 1940s [that] led us in the 1950s to make a similar promise to Southeast Asia

— and that promise had to be kept. After all, Johnson once remarked, to surrender Southeast Asia to the Communists meant that “we would say to the world in this case that we don’t live up to our treaties and don’t stand by our friends. This is not my concept.”

As direct American military involvement in the Vietnamese war increased, so did domestic opposition to the US role. By the time Richard Nixon was elected president in 1968, the Vietnam controversy had engulfed American society. Mass demonstrations against US involvement, combined with escalating criticism by Congress and the media of American policy, challenged the Nixon administration’s declared commitment to the protection of South Vietnam. In theory, Nixon felt as strongly about America’s guarantees to the South Vietnamese as had his predecessors.

If we suddenly reneged on our earlier pledges of support, because they had become difficult or costly to carry out, or because they had become unpopular at home, we would not be worthy of the trust of other nations and we certainly would not receive it,

he asserted. But at the same time, Nixon was anxious to extricate the US from that increasingly unpopular war, even if that meant risking South Vietnam’s future. Henry Kissinger, the architect of the 1973 treaty that provided for the withdrawal of US forces from Vietnam, was quoted in 1968 as privately remarking that

the appropriate goal of the US policy was a ‘decent interval’ — two to three years — between the withdrawal of US troops and a Communist takeover in Vietnam.

The terms of the treaty to which Nixon and Kissinger agreed allowed the 120,000 North Vietnamese troops then occupying portions of South Vietnam to remain where they were. The South Vietnamese vehemently protested the treaty, but to no avail. In order to persuade the South Vietnamese to go along with the agreement, Nixon guaranteed them, in writing, that America would return if needed: “You have my absolute assurance,” he wrote to the South Vietnamese leaders on November 14, 1972, “that if Hanoi fails to abide by the terms of this agreement it is my intention to take swift and severe retaliatory action.”

On January 5, 1973, Nixon repeated that pledge, promising that “we will respond with full force should the settlement be violated by North Vietnam.” Whatever Nixon’s ultimate intentions, his guarantees were soon made moot by Congressional action: all funds for US military action in Southeast Asia were cut off shortly thereafter. Nixon himself was forced to resign the following year as a result of the Watergate scandal, and by the time the North Vietnamese were ready to begin their final conquest of the South, the guarantees of SEATO had given way to the reality of American withdrawal, and the promises offered by Nixon had been obviated by Congress.

**US Guarantees: The Case of Taiwan**

Citizens of Taiwan who were keeping an eye on the American presidential campaign of 1976 must have been impressed by the statements made by the Democratic candidate regarding America’s long-standing pledge to protect their tiny island nation from Communist China. “We are bound by a treaty to guarantee the freedom of Formosa, Taiwan, the Republic of China,” Jimmy Carter declared at one point in the campaign. “I wouldn’t go back on a commitment that we have had to assure that Taiwan
is protected from military takeover."11 During one of the televised debates between the two contenders, Carter reiterated that he "would never let that friendship [with Peking] stand in the way of preservation of the independence and freedom of the people of Taiwan".12

Carter's statements were faithful to long-standing US policy. Following the conquest of mainland China by Communist forces in 1949, the Chinese nationalists, led by Chiang Kai-shek, fled to the neighboring island of Taiwan, where, with American support, they established themselves as the Republic of China. Their Communist rivals, declaring themselves to be the People's Republic of China, refused to relinquish their claim to Taiwan. Threats by Red China to Quemoy and other small islands off the Taiwan coast in the early 1950s prompted the Eisenhower administration to formalize its commitment to protect Taiwan from Communist aggression by signing a US-Republic of China Mutual Defense Treaty, in December 1954.

The text of the Defense Treaty committed the US "to resist armed attack and Communist subversive activities" aimed at Taiwan's "territorial integrity and political stability" (Article II). The US pledged (Article V) that it would regard any "armed attack in the west Pacific area directed against the territories of [Taiwan]" to be "dangerous to its own peace and safety", and "would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes".13

Not surprisingly, Red China was furious at America's commitment to Taiwan. It conditioned the establishment of relations with the US on full American recognition of Communist China as the sole legitimate government of both the mainland and Taiwan; the complete withdrawal of US military forces from Taiwan, which numbered about 8,500 by the early 1970s; the formal abrogation of the US-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty; and a halt to US arms supplies to Taiwan.

While American military strategists consistently regarded the US defense of Taiwan as integral to the protection of American interests in south Asia, and while public opinion surveys consistently found that a substantial majority of Americans favored maintaining the US-Taiwanese alliance, other considerations eventually began to erode America's commitment. Foremost among these was the foreign policy orientation of President Richard Nixon.

Although during his vice-presidential years Nixon had distinguished himself as an unbending opponent of Communist China and vociferous defender of Taiwan, the foreign policy theme of détente, which President Nixon shaped together with Henry Kissinger, called for accommodation of Communist regimes. The Vietnam debacle put additional pressure on Nixon to produce a foreign policy triumph that would shore up his domestic support. China, he decided, was the answer.

Within two weeks of his inauguration, in early 1969, Nixon arranged for secret contacts to be made, in Poland, with the Communist Chinese to help pave the way for a US-Red China rapprochement. That fall, during the United Nations debate over the admission of Communist China, there were further signs of a shift in America's backing for Taiwan. Whereas previously the US had unalterably opposed admitting the Red Chinese, it now changed to a position of opposing admission only if the expulsion of Taiwan was made a precondition for admission, as the Communists insisted. The American shift helped pave the way for the October 1971 expulsion of Taiwan and admission of Red China, over nominal US opposition.

In February 1972, Nixon made his historic visit to China. The Shanghai Communiqué, issued jointly by Nixon and his Chinese counterparts at the conclusion of the visit, marked a sharp break with previous American policy. The statement began by asserting that the US "acknowledges" that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is but "one China" and that Taiwan is part of China. Technically, the "one China" position could accurately refer to both the Red Chinese claim that they are the legitimate rulers of both the mainland and Taiwan, as well Taiwan's official position that it is the legitimate ruler of the mainland. In practice, however, there was a vast difference between the two claims: whereas for the Taiwanese the concept of one China is a distant dream that they have never taken any steps to advance, for Communist China it is an active policy goal that it pursued during the
1950s by shelling Taiwan’s offshore islands and which it would have pursued further if not for American intervention. (This difference between the theory and the reality of the competing claims finds echoes in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although Israelis are aware that their Biblical and historical rights give them the superior right to considerably more territory than is presently in their possession, they have never made any attempt, except in absolute self-defense, to capture any of those areas. The Arabs, by contrast, have not merely dreamed of conquering all of Israel but have waged active warfare for nearly a century to attain that goal.)

From the practical point of view, the most significant aspect of the Shanghai Communiqué was Nixon’s declaration that the US

...affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all US forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.14

During Nixon’s term of office, and that of his successor, Gerald Ford, who followed Nixon’s lead on China, American troop strength in Taiwan was reduced from 8,500 to just 1,400. A Republican president had fulfilled the first two conditions laid down by Red China for normalization of relations with the United States. A Democratic president would take the final step.

Jimmy Carter’s plan to reverse American policy regarding Taiwan was not supported by domestic opinion, which polls showed to be consistently sympathetic to Taiwan.15 Congressional sentiment was also consistently pro-Taiwan, as manifested in the Dole-Stone resolution of July 1978 (passed by the Senate by a vote of 94-0), which asked the administration to consult with Congress before changing US policy towards China. Yet Carter believed, correctly, that support for Taiwan was wide but not deep; most Americans did not care enough about the issue to impede a presidential policy shift. Thus on December 15, 1978, Carter announced that he was scrapping the US-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty, ending US arms sales to Taiwan (except for a limited number of defensive weapons) and extending full US recognition to Red China. Shifting perceptions of US strategic needs and the desire to impress domestic constituencies had prompted three American presidents, two Republicans and one Democrat, to reverse a commitment made to an American ally by their predecessors.

Israelis were shaken by Carter’s shift on Taiwan. In a statement that was forceful despite the requirements of diplomatic protocol, the Israeli government declared:

Israel must give thorough consideration to the US decision about Taiwan and reconsider Washington’s ability to maintain its obligations under its agreements and treaties with other nations.16

**US Guarantees: The Case of Israel**

Egypt’s military buildup during the early 1950s, combined with its sponsorship of incessant terrorist attacks on Israel from the Gaza Strip and northern Sinai, brought tensions between the two countries to a violent climax in 1956. Determined to put an end to the terrorism, to deal a blow to the Egyptian military before its strength reached dangerous proportions, and to secure free passage for its ships through the Straits of Tiran — which the Egyptians were blocking — the Israelis moved into Gaza and the Sinai Peninsula in November 1956. President Eisenhower acknowledged that the Israeli action “resulted from grave and repeated provocations”, but in an effort to bolster US relations with the Arab world condemned Israel and demanded its immediate withdrawal from the captured territories.17

Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion was “profoundly” reluctant to accede to the US demand. In a letter to Eisenhower he outlined the security considerations that justified Israeli retention of the Gaza Strip, noting that as a result of Israel controlling the region,

...the inhabitants of our villages in the South and the Negev could, for the first time in eight years, live in peace, knowing that grenades would not be thrown into their homes at night, and that they would not be ambushed on their way to work in the fields during the day.18

Nevertheless, after three months of steadily
intensifying US pressure, Israel reluctantly agreed to withdraw from Gaza and Sinai — but only after receiving a written guarantee that the US would take action to rectify any repeat of the provocations that had resulted in the Israeli military action.

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles handed the guarantee, in the form of an Aide Memoir, to Israeli Ambassador Abba Eban on February 11, 1957. It promised that the US would “use its best efforts to help assure” that a United Nations Emergency Force, placed in Gaza, would prevent that region from continuing to serve as “a source of armed infiltration” of Israel. The document further guaranteed that the US would “secure general recognition” of Israel’s right to free passage through the Straits of Tiran.19 When Eban questioned Dulles about the “danger of precipitate withdrawal by the UN” in the event of some future crisis, Dulles “argued with emphatic conviction that nothing of the sort was conceivable”, according to Eban’s memoirs.20 Six years later, President John F. Kennedy strengthened the US commitment to Israel, vowing that in the event of Arab aggression, the US would not merely endorse steps taken by the United Nations in response, but would itself “adopt other courses of action on our own to prevent or to put a stop to such aggression.”21 But Dulles’s conviction and Kennedy’s vow could not withstand the changes in political and military circumstances that lay ahead.

In the spring of 1967, Egypt began preparing for war. On May 17, Nasser ordered the UN Emergency Force to vacate Gaza and Sinai. Within hours, the UN meekly complied, “destroying” — in Eban’s words — “in a single stroke, the most central hopes and expectations on which we had relied on withdrawing from Sinai in 1957”. Egyptian troops began pouring into the Sinai. Israel warned that any attempt by the Egyptians to block the Straits of Tiran would be regarded as an act of war. Washington, for its part, remained neutral. Stung by the failure of US allies to support American policy in Vietnam, the Johnson administration was not prepared to act unilaterally to stymie the Egyptian aggression. An official US statement on May 22 declared that America would “support” UN action — not “adopt” action against Egypt on its own. The difference “between adopting courses oneself and supporting other measures is not trivial,” Eban noted. “It is the distinction between responsible initiative and mere joining.”22

Even after the Egyptians blockaded the Straits of Tiran later that day, there would be neither “initiative” nor “joining” by the United States. The Johnson administration urged Israel to postpone any military action, prompting the Israeli cabinet to send Eban (now Foreign Minister) to Washington to determine if the US would take concrete steps to fulfill the 1957 guarantee. To Eban’s “great alarm”, he found Secretary of State Dean Rusk treating the crisis in a “leisurely” manner. What “depressed me most,” Eban later recalled, “was that instead of planning for US action, Rusk was talking about seeking steps by the United Nations,” which, in Eban’s view, “conjured up nothing but a vista of delay and procrastination”. And in the meantime, Egypt was readying for battle. Eban hurried to the Pentagon, only to discover that Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and General Earl Wheeler, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were not convinced that an Egyptian attack was imminent.

On the afternoon of May 26, Eban was finally granted an appointment with President Johnson. Armed with the minutes of the meetings between US and Israeli officials in 1957, Eban insisted that there was “an explicit American commitment” to open the Straits, by force if necessary, and what he wanted to know now from Johnson was if the US would “take a special initiative” to accomplish that aim. He was to be disappointed. Johnson said that he could do nothing until he was sure that his cabinet, Congress, and the American people would all support US action. Even after that, the president said, “we have to go through the Secretary-General and the Security Council and build up support among the nations.”23 Johnson urged Israel to delay taking any steps. In the hope that the US might succeed in organizing some sort of multinational force, the Israeli government agreed to wait.

Even after nine more days, however, nothing concrete had been attained. Various diplomatic contacts by the US had accomplished little, and a letter from Johnson on June 4 reaffirmed that neither the US nor its allies would take any action “until UN
processes were exhausted”. Nasser was not willing to wait that long. On the morning of June 5, advancing Egyptian planes were spotted by Israeli radar. The Israeli air force flew into action, and the Six Day War had begun. The Johnson administration did not want war to break out, nor did it want Israel to be harmed. But the military and political circumstances that prevailed when the Eisenhower administration offered its guarantee to Israel in 1957 were no longer relevant in 1967. A different perception of American interests had resulted in a different American policy.

Three years later, America’s guarantees to Israel were again tested by Egyptian belligerency. Sporadic Egyptian assaults on Israel, beginning in late 1968, gradually escalated until, by mid-1969, a full-fledged War of Attrition was underway. Egyptian missile attacks and bombing raids launched from the western side of the Suez Canal were met in kind by the Israeli forces stationed on the eastern bank of the canal. A diplomatic initiative by the Nixon administration resulted in an August 7, 1970 cease-fire agreement according to which Egypt promised not to place any missiles within an area extending twenty miles westward from the canal. The agreement included American “assurances” to Israel “that the US would use all its influence to maintain the cease-fire.”

Within days of the cease-fire, however, General Aharon Yariv, head of Israeli military intelligence, reported to the government that “the Egyptians had begun to move their missiles forward as soon as the ink was dry on the cease-fire agreement.” Hundreds of SAM-2 and SAM-3 surface-to-air missile batteries were rushed to the canal; the Egyptians, who had been unable to construct missile sites near the canal because of Israeli firepower, now did so under the cover of the cease-fire. Yet the Nixon administration, which had sponsored the cease-fire talks and pressured the Israelis to accept the terms of the agreement, was reluctant to acknowledge the Egyptian violations. After ten days of official US silence, Defense Secretary Melvin Laird declared that it was “impossible to prove or disprove Israeli charges” about the missiles. He said that the US would undertake a “study” of the Israeli allegation. America’s refusal to accept the inconvenient facts of the Egyptian breach of the standstill has undermined Israeli faith in American intentions more than any watering-down of earlier commitments or expressions of goodwill that could be interpreted as commitments, a Jerusalem Post editorial noted.

State Department officials whose sympathy for Israel had always been thin, took advantage of the situation, responding to Israeli complaints with hostile leaks to the press. “Washington sources” told reporters that the Egyptian missiles may have been moved up, but “only in completion of movement started earlier — the Egyptians simply having missed the deadline.” All that really mattered, the “sources” insisted, was that with the cease-fire in place, Israel should agree to broader Arab-Israeli negotiations sponsored by UN Secretary-General Gunnar Jarring. The US officials charged that Israel’s complaint had become “a more central cause for the delay” in Jarring’s mission, and berated Eban for engaging in “overkill” by publicly criticizing the Egyptian action. State Department spokesman Robert McCloskey asserted that the administration’s “primary interest” was the Jarring talks, not the missile crisis, to which Israeli officials responded that if facilitating the talks “means overriding Israel’s legitimate concerns, it will undermine Israeli confidence in American guarantees.”

Finally, on August 19, the US announced the completion of its “study”. There had indeed been “forward deployment of missiles by the Egyptians around the time the cease-fire went into effect”, the State Department announced, but the evidence that the movement continued after the deadline was “not conclusive”. Rather than offer to take action against that portion of the “forward deployment” which it acknowledged, the US offered a vague assurance that it “would not permit any developments to occur in the Suez Canal zone to shift the military balance against Israel”. Israel was outraged by the US position. “I think that the US, as the party that was a go-between and made all the arrangements, is duty-bound to see the situation is corrected,” Prime Minister Golda Meir asserted. She was hardly alone in that view. Senator Abraham Ribicoff (D-Conn.) called the US
position “a sell-out of Israel”, and even the New York Times warned in an editorial that the episode “raises serious questions” about America’s role in the Middle East negotiating process.34 Despite Israeli protests, the missiles remained.35 Three years later, when Egypt launched its Yom Kippur invasion of Israel, the proximity of those missiles to the Canal enabled the Egyptians to inflict severe casualties on Israel’s front-line forces.

The problem was not that the US had acted in bad faith, or that it was indifferent to the threat posed to Israel by the Egyptian violations. The problem was that by injecting itself between the Arabs and the Israelis, the US was soon compelled to balance conflicting global interests that quickly dragged it into a conflict with an ally. The administration’s desire to help Israel was challenged by its desire to avoid a conflict with Egypt’s Soviet sponsors. The dilemma inevitably led to tension between the US and Israel and left the Jewish state in a weaker position.

Five years later, America made another commitment to Israel that circumstances would eventually challenge. As part of the deal offered by Henry Kissinger to persuade Israel to surrender strategic mountain passes and oil fields in the Sinai Peninsula in 1975, the US signed a joint Memorandum of Agreement with Israel pledging that the US would not recognize or negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization so long as the PLO does not recognize Israel’s right to exist and does not accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

The Israelis understood this US promise as a guarantee that they would not be pressured to accept the creation of a deadly PLO state on their doorstep. What the Israelis did not understand was that State Department officials had privately decided that the agreement does not rule out contacts that would be limited to trying to get fulfillment of the American conditions. Despite the danger that a PLO fulfillment obtained through American coaxing might not demonstrate a sincere change of heart by the terrorists, subsequent administrations opted to woo the PLO. Throughout 1977, the Carter administration used the Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, as an intermediary to lure the PLO into saying the “magic words”. The PLO refused — for the time being.36

Efforts to romance the PLO continued under Carter’s successors. In 1981, Secretary of State Alexander Haig received authorization from President Ronald Reagan to woo the PLO. From August 1981 until May 1982, US emissary John Mroz held more than 50 meetings (totaling over 400 hours) with PLO leader Yasser Arafat. Despite Mroz’s tireless efforts, Arafat would not budge. After Arafat and his forces were expelled from Lebanon in the autumn of 1982, the US tried again. The new secretary of state, George Schultz, sent Mroz to PLO headquarters in Tunis on several occasions, but Arafat refused even to meet him, on the grounds that the US had collaborated in Israel’s strike against the PLO in Lebanon.37

Schultz nevertheless decided, in March 1988, that a deal with the PLO would facilitate American attempts to achieve an Arab-Israeli settlement. The Secretary of State arranged a “precedent-shattering meeting” [as the Jerusalem Post called it]38 with Edward Said and Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, two Arab-American professors who were members of the PLO’s “legislature”, the Palestine National Council. The State Department defended the meeting by attempting to draw a distinction between the PNC and the PLO, although Said and Abu-Lughod, in their remarks to the media, described the PNC and PLO as being intimately related, and said that they had consulted with Yasser Arafat just prior to the meeting.39

According to the State Department, the Schultz meeting did not constitute a violation of America’s 1975 promise regarding the PLO, because “these two individuals came as American citizens, as prominent Americans who know something about the region, and who have some special insight, and with whom the Secretary had a useful discussion.”40

PLO spokesman Bassam Abu Sharif, by contrast, declared that the meeting was “important” precisely because Said and Abu-Lughod represented the PNC, which is “the highest legislative body of the PLO”.41

Whatever it was that Schultz offered the PNC men, or offered in subsequent, as yet unrevealed,
contacts with other PLO representatives, he succeeded where earlier US efforts had failed. At a press conference in Geneva on December 14, 1988, Arafat declared that he accepted UN Resolution 242, asserted indirectly that he recognized Israel's right to exist, and renounced "all forms of terrorism". The Reagan administration immediately announced that it regarded the 1975 American promise to Israel as null and void. Formal US negotiations with the PLO ensued, despite the fact that within days of the Geneva press conference, other PLO spokesmen, and even Arafat himself, made statements that contradicted the Geneva declaration.42

If militant PLO statements did not shake the US decision to deal with the PLO, neither did militant PLO actions. The US had promised Israel that its dialogue with the PLO would be conditional upon all PLO factions refraining from terrorism, the PLO publicly dissociating itself from any acts of Palestinian Arab terrorism anywhere, and the expulsion from the PLO of any faction that attempted to carry out acts of terror. Yet each time PLO terrorists struck, State Department officials found a way to avoid acknowledging that PLO behavior contravened any of those three conditions. Some attacks were said to have targeted soldiers rather than civilians and therefore did not qualify as "terrorism". In other instances the attackers were said to have acted "without Arafat's authorization" — although that claim still did not excuse Arafat's failure to condemn the deed and to expel the faction responsible, as the US had promised should occur.

A grim illustration of the Bush administration's approach was provided by the July 6, 1989 incident, in which a Palestinian Arab terrorist steered an Israeli bus off a cliff, killing fourteen passengers. State Department officials called the attack "senseless", but at first refused to call it terrorism, in what Israel said was "an effort to justify Washington's continuing talks with the PLO". Not until five days after the attack — when another Arab terrorist group claimed responsibility for the deed — did the State Department finally concede that it was indeed terrorism, but even then it insisted that the PLO had condemned the attack, which it had not.

Legislation passed by Congress in early 1990 forced the Bush administration to issue regular reports concerning PLO compliance with America's terms for the dialogue. The first report, issued on March 20, 1990, "reads more like a defense of the PLO than a balanced account of the PLO's record," noted Senator Connie Mack (R-Fla.). It acknowledged nine "cross-border attacks" by PLO factions since December 1988, dismissing six on the grounds that the "intended target of the attack was unclear", and the other three on the grounds that although the targets were civilian, the attacks were not authorized by Arafat. Steven Emerson, the award-winning investigative journalist, confronted the State Department over a January 26, 1990 incident in which three armed terrorists were captured near Israel's northern border with a map revealing their sole target was a kibbutz. A State Department spokesman said that since the attack and others like it did not succeed, it was wrong to call them "terrorist" — "we don't know what they were planning?" Offered transcripts of the captured terrorists' confessions, the spokesman called the Israeli interrogators "unreliable". Asked if US officials were interested in interviewing the terrorists, the spokesman declined.43

Multinational Intervention: The Case of the UN Forces in Lebanon

The military successes of the American-led multinational force that expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait has generated talk of composing a similar force to be stationed as a buffer between Israel and Syria on the Golan Heights, or as a deterrent to Arab terrorism, along the border between Israel and a Palestinian Arab entity. Israel's experience with such a multinational force in Lebanon, however, raises questions about the wisdom of such proposals.

In response to persistent cross-border attacks by Arab terrorists based in southern Lebanon, Israel launched a retaliatory incursion into the region in March 1978. After overrunnig PLO bases and driving local terrorists out of the region, Israeli troops temporarily occupied a narrow strip of territory ranging from Israel's border to the Litani River, some six to ten miles to the north. The Carter administration coaxed the Israelis to pull out by initiating the creation of a new multinational force,
the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, or UNIFIL. Its purpose was to protect Israel by keeping southern Lebanon clear of terrorists. Within days of UNIFIL's arrival in the region, Israel had reason to fear that it would not fulfill its mission.

In early April 1978 Israel withdrew from Kaukaba, a Lebanese village from which PLO terrorists had recently been ejected. The Norwegian contingent of UNIFIL occupied the town. Within three days the PLO had reoccupied Kaukaba, and a UNIFIL commander was photographed giving a warm reception to his PLO counterpart. In an editorial, the Jerusalem Post noted that the events in Kaukaba seemed to fulfill the dire predictions of those who had warned that a multinational force could not be trusted to protect Israel:

The UN forces, the critics predicted, would in no way prevent the PLO from infiltrating the area again and from using it as a staging base for incursions into Israel, whereas Israeli preventive and punitive actions, whether by way of air strikes, artillery or land raids, would be inhibited by the fear of causing casualties to the UN forces. Reports from some of the areas now having been vacated by Israeli forces would seem to indicate that the criticism has been vindicated...

The conclusion of the Jerusalem Post editorial contained a prescient warning:

If southern Lebanon is not maintained meticulously PLO-free, the last shred of credibility inherent in the American arguments of eventual Israeli withdrawal from the administered territories will be undermined.

By June 1978 — just two months after UNIFIL was initially deployed — at least three hundred PLO terrorists had reoccupied UNIFIL-controlled areas of southern Lebanon. Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan complained that UNIFIL not only had permitted PLO terrorists to infiltrate southern Lebanon but was allowing PLO headquarters in northern Lebanon to supply the terrorist groups in the south. Dayan's charge was rebuffed by UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, who said he saw nothing wrong with UNIFIL permitting the delivery of "supplies" to "limited Palestinian groups still in its area of operations". By July, reports from the region revealed that some UNIFIL units had reached informal deals with the PLO according to which PLO gangs were allowed gradually to infiltrate the south so long as they refrained from attacking UNIFIL outposts.

Several years later, Israeli troops, who captured a PLO bunker in southern Lebanon, discovered a written agreement between the commander of the Norwegian UNIFIL unit and the PLO that promised non-interference by the Norwegians in any terrorist activity that took place in their zone. Other captured PLO documents included PLO intelligence reports that quoted UNIFIL sources for estimates of Israeli troop strengths and movements — evidence that high-ranking UNIFIL officers have been passing intelligence information on the Israeli Army to the PLO, according to the Chief of Staff of the Israeli Army.

The UNIFIL forces made little effort to hide their bias. They stationed themselves along the edges of areas controlled by Israel's allies, the Lebanese Christians, and faced south toward the Christians, rather than north toward the part of the country from which PLO terrorists were coming. Those units known for their military prowess, such as those from Fiji and Senegal, were deployed in spots where the PLO ruled. But it was more than a matter of careless deployment; there was evidence of genuine fraternization between UNIFIL and the PLO. Lebanese villagers who were interviewed by Israeli journalists (at the "Good Fence" crossing, at the Israel-Lebanon border) described seeing UNIFIL soldiers and PLO terrorists socializing together and, in some cases, living side by side. UNIFIL men were spotted taking part in a funeral and rally held in the town of Tir Ziba in honor of a terrorist who had been killed nearby. In another case, Nepalese UNIFIL soldiers posed for souvenir photographs with a Hizbullah terrorist.

It was not long before episodes of direct collaboration began to emerge. More than forty members of the Iranian UNIFIL contingent deserted their unit to join the terrorists. An officer from the Senegalese unit was caught attempting to smuggle...
a large quantity of explosives from Lebanon to PLO cells in Israel, and a senior UNIFIL officer from Nigeria was arrested near Jerusalem with two suitcases full of explosives, detonators, machine-guns and ammunition that he was going to deliver to a PLO gang.\textsuperscript{57} In other incidents, a French UNIFIL officer and a Swedish UNIFIL soldier were arrested (by the Lebanese Christian forces) for photographing Israeli military installations.\textsuperscript{58} and a captured PLO terrorist revealed that the PLO had purchased missiles from the Irish unit, and had paid $25,000 to a senior Irish UNIFIL officer to provide photographs and data concerning Israeli military positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon.\textsuperscript{59} Israeli Army officials, commenting on the latter episode, confirmed that the PLO often bribed UNIFIL men for such purposes.\textsuperscript{60} As the \textit{Jerusalem Post} noted, the fact that the gun-smuggling activities of the UNIFIL men came to light by chance would seem to indicate that many other UNIFIL arms smugglers have actually delivered the murderous goods entrusted to their hands to terrorist contacts on the West Bank and in Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{61}

The most striking fact to emerge about the activity of UNIFIL was that instead of fulfilling its ostensible purpose — the protection of northern Israel from the sort of terrorist attacks that had provoked Israel's 1978 retaliatory strike in the first place — it did precisely the opposite. Within six months of UNIFIL's arrival, more than 700 PLO terrorists had returned to the area under its jurisdiction and established 42 bases there.\textsuperscript{62} (The UNIFIL's own estimates, of "only" 350 terrorists and 15 bases, were hardly comforting.)\textsuperscript{63} To make matters worse, if Israel sent its troops into southern Lebanon to strike at the terrorists, they risked clashing with UNIFIL and setting off a torrent of international criticism. After several such clashes, the Israeli government felt it had no choice but to tie its soldiers' hands; it issued guidelines instructing soldiers that "it is preferable not to open fire at all, even at hostile forces, if such fire could endanger UNIFIL personnel."\textsuperscript{64}

The PLO exploited Israel's sensitivity to world opinion by using UNIFIL as a shield against Israeli retribution. If Israeli targets were within firing range, the PLO men fired from within UNIFIL territory.\textsuperscript{65} If it was necessary to reach the Israeli border to find suitable targets, the terrorists were careful to cross through UNIFIL areas on the way to and from Israel. Thus two PLO terrorists who were caught as they were about to carry out "an indiscriminate massacre" in the Israeli moshav of Zarit revealed that their orders (from Yasser Arafat's deputy, Abu Jihad) were to return after the killings to the region supervised by the Dutch UNIFIL brigade and surrender themselves there; the Dutch could be counted on to take their weapons, hand over the terrorists to the neighborhood PLO liaison officer, and then return the weapons a few days later.\textsuperscript{66} There have also been cases in which PLO terrorists fleeing Lebanese Christian militiamen actually took refuge in UNIFIL outposts.\textsuperscript{67} In other instances, UNIFIL men have "preferred to turn a blind eye" when terrorists plant mines on roads near their outposts, according to the then spokesman of the Israeli Army's northern command.\textsuperscript{68}

UNIFIL units have sometimes even directly interfered in attempts by the Israeli Army to strike at, or capture, PLO terrorists in southern Lebanon. In May 1979, an Israeli patrol spotted a terrorist gang approaching a kibbutz near the border. There was an exchange of fire, and several of the terrorists escaped northwards, their tracks leading to an area under the control of the Irish UNIFIL brigade. When the Israeli troops approached, UNIFIL officers ordered them to withdraw or be shot at, and reinforcements from the Dutch, Nigerian and Senegalese units were rushed to the scene. The Israelis retreated, and the terrorists returned safely to their bases.\textsuperscript{69}

In 1981, an Israeli Army unit pursuing terrorists in the Lebanese town of Ras Bayadda, near the area of the Dutch UNIFIL battalion, was fired upon by the Dutch soldiers, while Israeli soldiers chasing terrorists through the village of Shuba were blocked by a Norwegian unit that opened fire to force them to withdraw.\textsuperscript{70}

The following year, the Norwegians did it again: an Israeli force pursuing PLO mine-planters near the Syrian border tracked them to a site in the Norwegian zone, only to be subjected to a barrage of bazooka and small arms fire by the Norwegians.\textsuperscript{71}
Then-Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin testified before a Knesset committee in 1985 that French UNIFIL soldiers had engaged in “particularly abominable” behavior by deliberately interfering with Israeli anti-terrorist operations. The Dutch, for their part, in one case planted obstacles in the path of an advancing Israeli tank column (damaging one tank), while an Irish outpost turned off its night spotlight to help a gang of terrorists evade their Israeli pursuers.

The recent proliferation of Muslim fundamentalist Hizbullah terrorists in southern Lebanon has not changed UNIFIL’s pattern of behavior. When the Israeli Army launched a major counter-terror strike against Hizbullah positions in February 1992 (in response to incessant Hizbullah rocket attacks on northern Israel), UNIFIL units actively interfered. As the first Israeli armored columns made their way into the region, a Nepalese unit blocked the roads to prevent the Israeli advance. The subsequent clashes between the Israelis and the UNIFIL brigades alerted the local terrorists, thereby robbing the Israelis of the element of surprise. While undertaking the time-consuming process of detouring around the UNIFIL roadblocks, the Israelis were ambushed by Hizbullah terrorists who killed two Israeli soldiers.

If UNIFIL’s record in Lebanon may be regarded as the archetype of multinational forces’ ability to protect Israel, one must wonder if a comparable multinational force could be relied upon to guard Israel from PLO terrorists stationed in a Palestinian state in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. Certainly the conditions along Israel’s eastern front make it unlikely that an international force could ensure Israel’s safety. Unlike southern Lebanon, Judea, Samaria and Gaza straddle Israel’s major population centers, thereby making the Israeli civilian population an easy target for terrorist attacks. The availability of sophisticated shoulder-launched missiles makes the proximity of large Israeli cities to the borders of such a Palestinian state all the more frightening. Even with the best of intentions, a multinational force would be saddled with a task far too burdensome to fulfill. The fact that it would likely be under United Nations authority means that the large Arab-Third World voting bloc at the UN would have a say in what the multinational forces would be permitted to do. Since the Arabs and their allies would regard PLO terrorist attacks as “legitimate resistance” or “freedom fighting”, they would surely seek to limit the ability of a multinational force to combat PLO terror gangs.

Who Should Guarantee Israel’s Safety?

Every new president has his own particular perception of America’s foreign policy interests. Alliances that seemed vital to one president may be regarded by his successor as irrelevant. An interventionist president may be followed by an isolationist, who in turn may be followed by another interventionist. There are no eternal principles; there are only ever-changing perceptions of what is in the US interest. “Guaranteeing” Israel’s security may impress one president as being in the American interest, while his successor may adopt an entirely different perspective. The problem is not that a new president would harbor anti-Israel bias but simply that his calculation of what is best for US foreign policy may conflict with the promises that his predecessors made. That is what happened in regard to Vietnam and Taiwan. That is also what happened to America’s promises to keep open the Straits of Tiran (1957), to prevent Egyptian missiles from being stationed near the Suez Canal (1970), and to refrain from recognizing the Palestine Liberation Organization (1975). In each case, a president’s new understanding of US interests clashed with the attitudes that had led a predecessor to make commitments to the Jewish state. Congressional and public opinion, while generally sympathetic to Israel, did not alter the course of events.

Pressing Israel into territorial vulnerability and reliance on American or multinational forces would therefore seem to be the wrong course for US foreign policy. It would place a strategically valuable ally at the mercy of domestic US political and social circumstances, the shifting tides of American public opinion, and, in the case of a multinational force, the conflicting (and possibly anti-Israel) agendas of the sponsoring governments. The America-Israel alliance is best served by ensuring that Israel has the territory and military wherewithal to defend
itself, not by weakening Israel and forcing it into a dependency relationship which ultimately will serve neither American nor Israeli interests.

"A security guarantee is no substitute for defensive strength," Abba Eban remarked in 1956.75 Israel's experiences with foreign guarantees since 1956 have demonstrated that Eban's words are even truer today than when they were first spoken.
A PALESTINIAN STATE AND AMERICAN INTERESTS

Rudy Boschwitz


A Personal Note

While in the Senate, and especially during my time as a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and chairman of the Middle East Subcommittee, I was often asked, by both Israelis and others, how Israel should structure a peace with its neighbors, and particularly how much land should be "traded" for peace. My answer was always that this was for the Israelis to decide, and we Americans should not seek to compel the Israelis to make a deal they found inimical to their interests. Nor should we create a situation that would compel a certain outcome.

I often told the Israelis that I was a Senator from Minnesota, that my state was about 1200 miles from the oceans, and that even on the other sides of those oceans there were no real foes that threatened our existence. Israel, on the other hand, was a small, narrow country, not as wide in spots as the distance from downtown Minneapolis to downtown St. Paul, the Twin Cities. Additionally, most of Israel's neighbors are larger, more populous, and sworn enemies of that democracy which refuse to make peace with Israel. Then consider that the West Bank, which rises to heights of 3000 feet above the Mediterranean, is the high ground that overlooks the narrow plain where most Israelis live (in the Tel Aviv area particularly). Occupying that high ground is an enormous strategic advantage.

Security is so different for Americans, I believe, that it is impossible to substitute our thoughts and feelings for the problems facing the Israelis. Their long "special relationship" with the United States is based upon shared values of democracy, justice and human dignity. I felt that we could rely on them to make a just peace. It is with these thoughts in mind that I approach the question of Palestinian statehood and evaluate the actions of Yasser Arafat's Palestinian Authority.

☆ ☆ ☆

Members of a Palestinian Authority delegation that visited Washington in February 1999 boasted to reporters that relations between the United States and the Palestinians are warmer under the Clinton administration than under any previous American government.

In a meeting with congressional staff, Nabil Sha'ath of the PA reportedly talked about creating and sustaining some five separate committees that fall under the aegis of the "US-PA Bilateral Committee usually chaired by Secretary of State Albright and Yasser Arafat". According to Sha'ath, these committees include economic investment, economic assistance, legal assistance (rule of law, legal training, drafting legislation), exchange programs with Congress and the Executive Branch, and businessmen's committees. These committees, he suggested, are separate from the peace process and the CIA-PA security cooperation group.

Such US-Palestinian coziness is a tragic mistake—because morally, strategically and economically, an American-Palestinian entente is a disaster for
American interests. American support for a Palestinian state would be a mistake of enormous proportions. It would undermine our ally Israel and reward violence, demagoguery and treachery.

It is morally wrong because Yasser Arafat consistently sides with tyrants and America-haters. His closest allies are Iran and Iraq. He has warm relations with North Korea, Syria, and Cuba. His own regime suppresses and tortures political dissidents, shuts down opposition newspapers, brutally persecutes Christian Arabs, and provides a haven for terrorists who have murdered American citizens. The Palestinian Authority has executed three people in the past six months — after trials lasting only hours, with no right of appeal. Nothing in the formative years of the Palestinian Authority gives us reason to believe that a Palestinian state would have standards of justice, freedom, rule of law and personal liberty that in any way mirror the operative principles of the United States or our ally Israel.

Economically, an American-Palestinian alliance would also be a disaster for the United States. Foreign donations, earmarked for social services and education, have more often than not ended up lining the coffers of Arafat's ministers and government officials. The $500 million already sunk into Gaza by the United States has joined billions of dollars of foreign aid that have disappeared into a black hole of Palestinian Authority graft and mismanagement. The additional $900 million that the administration wants Congress to give the PA will probably end up in the same place; the corruption of the Palestinian Authority shows no sign of abating. In his February meeting with congressional staff members, Nabil Sha'ath denounced Congress as "unhelpful", "nosy" and wrongly biased in favor of Israel for wanting to determine what had happened to the previous donations.

Supporting Palestinian independence is a strategic mistake as well. America's security interests in the Middle East require stability and moderation. Arafat represents exactly the opposite. He coddles and collaborates with radical terrorists who wage war on Israel, and has made the West Bank and Gaza Strip internationally recognized as havens for terrorists. He has made no bones about his expansionist desires, coveting Jordan, which he considers part of "Greater Palestine". If there is a Palestinian state, it will be a launch pad for military adventures that will drown the Middle East in bloodshed.

Arafat has already shown in Lebanon what he can do if given military control over territory. It was Arafat's 1970 attempt to overthrow King Hussein of Jordan that led to the PLO's expulsion from that country. Arafat led his troops to Lebanon, subverted the fragile balance of the existing Muslim-Christian government there, set up a puppet state in the south of Lebanon and fomented the Lebanese civil war of 1976. This, in turn, led to a Syrian occupation of Lebanon that continues to this day — with 40,000 Syrian troops in Lebanon and another 100,000 "guest workers" there. It is Lebanon's continuing inability to assert government control in the south that gives Syrian and Iranian-backed Hizbullah terrorists free access to Israel's northern border.

The United States should not be part of giving Arafat the opportunity for a similar performance on Israel's eastern border.

Palestinian subversion of Jordan would be a direct threat to the security of Israel and a blow to American interests in the region. Amos Perlmutter, editor of The Journal of Strategic Studies, wrote in The Washington Times (March 1999) about the potential takeover of Jordan by "peaceful" means:

Now that King Hussein is dead, Mr. Arafat is setting the stage, ideologically and tactically, for eventual Palestinian domination of Jordan. He is certainly not foolhardy enough to try to overtake Jordan by force as he failed to do in 1970, nor is he in a hurry. There is a more subtle way to achieve the same result: calling for democratic elections.

Palestinians are estimated to comprise more than 60% of the population of Jordan. Palestinian intellectuals in the West Bank and the United States have all of a sudden begun calling for democracy in Jordan.

Perlmutter believes Arafat is still aiming for "Palestine" on both sides of the Jordan River, and that Israel and Jordan must work together to prevent it.
Separate bilateral security arrangements must be signed between Israel and Jordan, and Israel and the United States. The reason is clear. This will weaken any Palestinian effort to create conditions for a confederation with Jordan, a military alliance with Saddam Hussein, Hafez al-Assad, revolutionary Iran, or any other present or future belligerent Arab or Muslim state that has no peace treaty with Israel. It is in the interest of both the Israeli government and the Jordanian Hashemite monarchy to deter and discourage Palestinian utopian expansionist ideas that could be fulfilled through democratic means. There is nothing wrong with democracy in Jordan or Palestine, unless it means a step toward the fulfillment of the complete Palestine utopia. In view of present Palestinian aspirations, a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation will only threaten Israeli security.

Under Perlmutter's utopian scenario, a "peaceful" confederation between a Palestinian state and Jordan would only be a stage leading to the bloody subversion of Jordan, Israel and American interests. Under Perlmutter's scenario, moreover, the United States would be called upon to fulfill security obligations to Israel.

Over the past decade and a half, the United States and Israel have established strong security ties, including a rotating American military presence in Israel. The US Sixth Fleet is a frequent and welcome visitor in Haifa harbor, with thousands of American service personnel on ships and on land. The US Army and Marines hold exercises both with the IDF and using Israeli ranges in the desert. Military-to-military exchanges are a frequent occurrence and groups of American military personnel find Israel an excellent place for vacation and R&R.

Thus far, however, nothing in those arrangements requires the United States to provide for the defense of Israeli territory, nor is such a possibility an attractive one for either country.

The West Bank is a formidable barrier to conventional military attack from the east, providing a vital shield for American interests in Israel. Dr. Dore Gold, Israel's permanent representative at the United Nations, in a paper entitled "Fundamental Factors in a Stabilized Middle East: Security, Territory and Peace", described the geography protecting both Israel and American activity in Israel:

[The West Bank's] north-south hill ridge might only be 3,000 feet high, but it is set against the Jordan River and the Dead Sea, which is 1,200 feet below sea level. Therefore, an attacking army from the east faces a net 4,200-foot incline that must be traversed over 15 miles. Again, since there are only five east-west routes connecting the Jordan River to the Mediterranean, the attacker must move along predictable axes that can be anticipated and defended with relatively small forces.

The Iraqi-Jordanian border is approximately 210 miles east of the West Bank; advanced units of an Iraqi division could easily traverse this distance in 36 hours — in less time than the reserve mobilization of the IDF.

He continues later in the same article:

Since the Palestinians are not a major Arab power, an Israeli-Palestinian understanding would not directly modify the hostile intent of a major adversary of Israel. The Palestinians have laid claim to territory that is vital to Israel's defense against an Arab state war coalition to its east. Thus, an Israeli-Palestinian territorial understanding might only increase Israeli vulnerabilities without addressing the claims of a major Arab military power like Iraq or an Islamic power like Iran further eastward. A stable peace must preserve Israel's access to the West Bank in order to defend itself against enemy attacks from the east, while removing the burden of military rule for its Palestinian Arab population.

Israel and the United States share concerns about terrorism, instability, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile capability in the region. The two share technology and weapons systems and Israel is a partner to the United States in the development of ballistic missile defenses. The emerging Turkey, Israel, Jordan security axis benefits the United States as well as the parties.
The United States and the Palestinians share no strategic interests, and share only a limited interest in Palestinian self-rule — which is already a reality, with 97 percent of the Palestinians once governed by Israeli military occupation now under the political control of the PA.

The Palestinian Authority, and its appointed religious leaders and PA-controlled media have engaged in a continual campaign of anti-American rhetoric. It is impossible to ignore the possible impact that this will have on the opinions and actions of the Palestinians — directly or indirectly placing Americans in the region in danger. Following American raids on Iraq in December, tens of thousands of Palestinians rioted on the West Bank, burning American flags and loudly supporting Saddam Hussein. Arafat has, in fact, been Saddam's chief supporter during and since the invasion of Kuwait.

Ultimately, the question for the United States boils down to whether the Palestinian Authority (or a future Palestinian state) will be a friend to the United States or will be simply another violent, anti-democratic, anti-Western country hostile to American principles and American interests in the region.

So far, at least, there are few promising signs.

And, as so often happens in regional matters, the United States and Israel are asking themselves the same question about their future with the Palestinians. What kind of government will the Palestinians have? What kind of neighbor will they be? A story, apocryphal perhaps, is told about a discussion in the Israeli cabinet about maps of hypothetical borders with a Palestinian Authority. Two maps emerged prominently. The first gave the Palestinian Authority 60 percent of the territory of Judea and Samaria, and suggested that Israel annex the other 40 percent. The second reversed the proportions.

When asked to justify the borders, the proponent of the first map said:

When the final status negotiations are finished, our problems with the Palestinians will be resolved and I believe they will cease to be a hostile neighbor. Therefore, my borders reflect the “good neighbor” status I believe we will achieve.

The proponent of the more conservative map said:

I believe that even after we finish our negotiations and the last paper is signed, the Palestinians will still be hostile to the premise and the reality of the State of Israel. Therefore, the borders reflect my belief that Israel must hold defensible positions against future Palestinian attacks.

The dangers posed by the Palestinian government to both Israeli and American interests should be recognized in the process of creating a viable peace formula. The eventual shape of Israeli-Palestinian borders and relations should, first and foremost, reflect Israel's determination of its security needs. The United States should be Israel's patron and supporter, without trying to substitute its vision of the future for that of the Israeli government. But, there are definite American interests at stake. The central dilemma for both the United States and Israel, according to Gold, is:

...finding a formula for peacemaking that reduces the chances of conflict breaking out without increasing Israeli vulnerabilities to a point that necessitates greater American interventionism in the future.

Therefore, the United States should clearly enunciate its moral, strategic and economic concerns about the behavior of the Palestinian Authority over the past six years and reject calls to recognize a unilaterally declared independent Palestinian state.

And what if the circumstance should arise in which a Palestinian state is declared as a result of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations?

Israel, certainly, will determine the quality of its relations with the new state. But the quality of the relationship any Palestinian entity or state has with the United States should reflect American standards of democracy, freedom and respect for the rule of law. The United States must insist on justice in the name of American citizens murdered by the PLO and under the rule of the Palestinian Authority — from US Ambassador Cleo Noel in 1973, to Leon Klinghoffer, Nachshon Wachsman, Alissa Flatow and many others, nothing less will do.
It is for good reasons, based on shared values, that the United States has for so long had what it calls a “special relationship” with Israel. The Palestinian Authority has exhibited none of these values. Since the Palestinians have as yet done nothing to deserve a special relationship with the United States, it would be wrong to treat them as if they have.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1938 — ISRAEL TODAY

Arieh Stav

From now on, I have no more territorial demands in Europe.

Adolf Hitler

Our goal is to achieve cooperation with all the nations...in building permanent peace in Europe. This will be peace for our time.

Neville Chamberlain

(Both statements were made just after the Munich Conference.)

PART ONE
Czechoslovakia on the Way to Munich — A Short Historical Cruise

The first Czechoslovak Republic was established in 1918 after hundreds of years of Austrian (i.e., German) domination over the Czechs and Slovaks. The new state arose on the ruins of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and in a certain sense was a miniature heir to the Empire. As its name indicates, Czechoslovakia was made up of two Slavic nationalities, the Czechs and Slovaks, who together constituted 9.5 million out of a total population of 14.5 million people in the Republic. The largest minority, more than three million, were Germans, the 1.7 million remaining were Hungarians, Ruthenian Ukrainians, Poles, and Jews.

The large German minority made up 22% of the whole population. They were a classic example of an irredentist ethnic group, a fifth column that rose up against their country and undermined it from within until it was totally destroyed. Nevertheless, the Germans and the other minorities enjoyed a generous system of national cultural rights and political equality. The Czech leaders, Masaryk and Beneš, were alert to the danger from the German minority concentrated in the mountainous Sudetenland fringe of the country. They could not do much about this dangerous situation since the principles of the democratic system required them to bring the Sudeten Germans into the workings of government. As early as 1925, there were two Sudeten Germans in the cabinet and the strength of the German minority rose in direct relationship to the consolidation of Nazism in Germany. Autonomy under the guise of self-determination became one of Hitler’s demands, and in 1938, the Sudeten German minority became Berlin’s agents in all respects.

The two founders and shapers of the Czechoslovak Republic were Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, called the father of the Czech nation, and Dr. Eduard Beneš. Masaryk was the national leader and president starting from the establishment of the Republic in October 1918 until 1935 when he retired at the age of 85. Beneš had been the foreign minister under Masaryk from the Republic’s first day until December 1935 when he succeeded Masaryk as president. He was president during the great crisis
until just after the Munich Conference when he was dismissed on Hitler’s orders (October 5, 1938). He later went off to Britain where he set up the Czech government-in-exile.

Masaryk and Benes were among the greatest statesmen of their time. No better evidence for that is Czechoslovakia’s situation in the second half of the 1930s. On the eve of the Munich crisis, Czechoslovakia was an exemplary democracy, the only one in Central Europe. It was one of the wealthiest states on the European continent, and stood at the forefront of technology and industry. Its security was guaranteed by a series of international agreements and its army was well armed and trained, and very large in relation to its population. These accomplishments are especially impressive since they stand out in comparison with the nations surrounding Czechoslovakia: Germany sinking into the age of Nazi barbarism, and semi-fascist regimes treading on economic failure in Romania, Hungary, and Poland.

In March 1935, Hitler proclaimed a military draft in Germany. This crude violation of the Treaty of Versailles was quietly accepted by France and Britain. In March 1936, the Germans violated the demilitarized status of the Rhineland (in fact occupying it). A direct threat was thus created to the French border because Germany thereby regained the springboard it had controlled prior to the First World War, from which it could attack France. This decisive change in the strategic disposition in Europe was accepted with a shrug in Britain. “The Germans are making order in their backyard,” the London Times wrote. In March 1938 (indeed the Ides of March), the Anschluss with Austria was carried out. This dramatic change in Germany’s status did indeed arouse some expressions of dread among the decision-makers in Britain, and especially in France. But the press in both democracies displayed complete understanding for Hitler’s claims that what was involved was “a measure aimed at unifying the German nation”.

The next stage that had been carefully prepared in Berlin, at least for three years, was the liquidation of Czechoslovakia. The order for the elimination of Czechoslovakia, code named “the Green Plan”, was given to the Wehrmacht on June 1, 1935. The date for implementing the plan was set for October 1, 1938.

The fall of Prague would grant Hitler three priceless advantages at one and the same time: 1) the system of European alliances would fall apart; 2) a Central European power would be eliminated, and Germany would obtain the Czechoslovak facilities for manufacturing arms, including the Skoda Works; 3) The road down the Danube Valley to the Black Sea, the resources of corn and oil... has been opened,” as Churchill put it. The last was a basic condition for Hitler’s war in view of the British capability to impose a sea blockade on strategic raw material imports to Germany.

In contrast to the defeatism of the two major European powers, Hitler’s moves aroused Prague to wide-ranging defense activity. The parliament passed “the Defense of the Republic Law” which granted the president far-reaching powers bordering on a state of emergency. The army was strengthened and reached some 1.5 million men in uniform in 40 divisions. The military industries were expanded and many improvements were made to the fortifications in the Sudetenland, most of which were manned.

Moreover, in 1938 the military balance between Germany and her potential enemies still leaned decisively against Berlin. In view of Germany’s clear military inferiority, the attempt to destroy Czechoslovakia by force might bring about the end of Hitler’s career and a greater defeat than that of the First World War. For this reason, it was not possible to consider the conquest of Czechoslovakia in the same fashion that later brought about the defeat of Poland in September 1939.

The option that Hitler had was to use the Trojan horse represented by the Sudeten Germans to undermine Czechoslovakia from within. The German tyrant would carry out this stratagem as a masterpiece of diplomacy with the generous help of the two victims next in line: France and Britain. As we noted earlier, the consolidation of Nazism in Germany quickly transformed the Sudeten Germans from a minority seeking equal rights into a fifth column openly declaring its intention to dismantle the Mother State.

In November 1935, long negotiations began between Konrad Henlein, the “Führer” of the
Sudeten Germans, and the Prague government over the issue of autonomy for the German minority. Benes who had meanwhile become president of the Republic, appointed his Prime Minister, the Slovak Milan Hodza to conduct the negotiations with Henlein. The appointment of Hodza the Slovak was a clear signal of "flexibility" in Prague’s positions. Henlein was instructed by Berlin to always demand of Prague more than whatever the Czechs offered. He played his role with exemplary faithfulness. Already at the beginning of 1938, the Sudeten Germans constituted an autonomous entity in all respects. After the Anschluss of Austria in March 1938, the Czechs found themselves surrounded on the south, west and northwest by the Third Reich. Surrender to the Sudeten Germans' demands gathered momentum although the negotiations had their ups and downs. In the discussions at Karlovy Vary (Karlobsk) in April 1938, Henlein raised a series of demands, among them the right of overt loyalty on the part of the German minority to the Nazi principles of the Third Reich. This cynical demand for violation of the constitution of the state would have wrecked the raison d'être of the Republic and even Hodza could not agree to that. The talks foundered.

With the collapse of the Karlovy Vary talks, Hitler complained bitterly about the attack on the rights of his people who were a minority in Czechoslovakia by "the Slavic gang that had not long ago signed an accord with the Communists for the Bolshevization of Western culture". (In 1935, Czechoslovakia had signed a mutual aid pact with the USSR.)

On September 12, in a speech to the Nazi Party conference at Nuremberg, Hitler attacked Czechoslovakia, and its president in particular, in his notorious gutter style. The Czechs, who were well fortified in their Sudeten Mountains and who relied on their military pact with France, reacted with a series of steps. The most determined of them were the dismissal of Milan Hodza as Prime Minister (September 22) and the setting up of a national unity government headed by General Jan Syrovy, the chief inspector of the army and a prominent "hawk" in the perception of his contemporaries. The Czech army expanded the draft of the reserves, and military rule was imposed on the Sudetenland. Henlein and his men fled to Berlin. The feeling in Europe was that war was imminent.

At this critical stage, the two official allies of Czechoslovakia rushed to Hitler’s aid. These were the Prime Ministers of the two great democracies of the continent, France and Britain. Both Neville Chamberlain and Edouard Daladier accused the Prague government of fouling the atmosphere in Europe by ill-treatment of the German minority. In London as well as in Paris, complete understanding was expressed for Hitler’s desire to unify his people under the shelter of the Third Reich, just as he had done not long before with Austria. The European press consistently described the Czechs’ abuse of the German minority, and Benes was presented as an obstacle to peace and a warmonger. It was explained to the Czechs, both in speeches in the French and British par limaments, and in the press, that handing over the Sudetenland to Germany would bring them only good, since in that way they would be rid of a large, militant minority that endangered the Slavic character of their state. The Czechs claimed that handing over the Sudetenland to Germany would expose their country's defense system to Hitler's armies. In response to that argument, they were told that in the age of peace there was no value to territorial assets, and in any case the two major powers were ready to guarantee Czechoslovakia’s integrity in its new borders.

However, the international pressure campaign did not work. The Czechs were not convinced. On the contrary, sure of their military strength and of their system of pacts with France and the USSR, the Prague government made thorough preparations to repel a German attack if it came. Hence, it was decided in London and Paris, in light of Prague’s stubbornness, to take the initiative themselves in cooperation with Hitler.

Don’t Be Vague — Ask for Prague!
(The above title is a “joke” that circulated in London on the eve of the Munich Conference. It accurately reflected Prime Minister Chamberlain’s defeatism and toadyism to Hitler.)

On September 15th, Chamberlain flew to the Führer’s private residence at Berchtesgaden in the
Obersalzburger Mountains in an attempt to placate
him at Czechoslovakia’s expense. The issue on the
agenda was not handing the Sudetenland over to
Germany. There was already full agreement on that.
All that Chamberlain asked was that delivery of the
Sudetenland be carried out with Prague’s agreement
in order to prevent the area from being conquered
by force by the Wehrmacht. A German attack on
Czechoslovakia would oblige France to go to the
defense of Prague. A clash between France and
Germany would require England to come to the aid
of its ally, and that meant a major war in Europe.
Chamberlain wanted to avoid that at all cost, and
the price was the vivisection and liquidation in fact
of a small democracy in Central Europe.

It is superfluous to point out that Hitler knew
very well the considerations of the British Prime
Minister. Hitler carefully avoided mentioning any
threat of war during the whole seven hours of
discussion, in which he did most of the talking.
Finally, Chamberlain took it upon himself to
convince Daladier of the justice of the Führer’s
arguments, and together with him, they would break
Benes’ stubbornness.

Chamberlain’s return to London (September 16)
was concomitant with the return of Lord Runciman
from Prague. Runciman headed a commission that
carried his name, which was supposed to present to
the Prime Minister recommendations on the Sude-
ten issue. Runciman and the commission he headed
were a creation of the Prime Minister and it is no
wonder that its conclusions fit in with the appease-
ment policy. Runciman’s support for the German
minority was total and sweeping. The commission
recommended unambiguously that the Sudetenland
be transferred to the Third Reich as soon as possible
without any need for a plebiscite. (It should be
pointed out that even Hitler and Henlein had not
gone so far in their demands on August 3, when the
Runciman commission arrived in Prague.)

The author of the report accused Czechoslo-
vakia (“The territory now called Czechoslovakia...”
in Runciman’s words) of warmongering and
recommended outlawing those elements and
parties “that encourage an antagonistic policy
towards its neighbors”. Hence, the Czechoslovak
government must
change its foreign relations in order to give
 guarantees to its neighbors that in no
circumstances will it attack them or join in
an attack on them as is required by the
agreements that she has with other states.
(This was a clear hint to France and the Soviet
Union.)

While he was still holding the commission’s
documents, Chamberlain summoned Daladier to
coordinate their positions in order to steamroll
Czechoslovakia. Within two days, the “Anglo-French
Plan” was drawn up and presented to the Czech
government on the nineteenth of the month. The
Plan was in the main a sweeping acceptance of the
German dictates, that is, the demand (formulated as
an ultimatum) to transfer the Sudetenland to the
German Reich in exchange for guarantees of
Czechoslovakia’s integrity in the territory remaining
within Prague’s sovereignty. These guarantees were
to take the place of her present treaty with France.

As expected, Benes’ reply to the Anglo-French
paper was negative. Prague’s refusal to commit
national suicide was met in London and Paris by
an outburst of anger and insulted feelings. In the
middle of the night, Benes received an ultimatum
from Chamberlain. He accused Czechoslovakia of
bringing about war in Europe by refusing the
Anglo-French Plan. Therefore, if he did not
immediately reverse his refusal, the two powers
would eliminate their readiness to guarantee
Czechoslovakia’s integrity. In this manner, Prague
would bring disaster upon itself, since (it was
indicated in the telegram) Hitler’s intentions in this
matter were well known.

The Anglo-French ultimatum placed Benes in an
intolerable dilemma. Not only had his allies
abandoned him and cause Czechoslovakia to face
German power alone, but Poland and Hungary
might also stand with Hitler and demand that
Prague return the territory she had annexed from
them in 1918. The only way out in the president’s
opinion was the pact with the USSR. Indeed, the
Russians, for their own reasons, were ready to
activate their alliance with the Czechs immediately.
Litvinov, the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, sent a
letter to Benes on this matter. However, the Russian
proposal was rejected due to Prime Minister Milan
Hodza's opposition. He expressed the fears of the Slovaks toward Russia. Eduard Benes, worn out, sick (after a heart attack) and fearing a civil war, surrendered on September 21 to the Anglo-French pressure and announced to both powers that his government was ready to accept their plan.

Benes' surrender was accompanied by an unprecedented outburst of anger and mass demonstrations in Prague. There were demands that he be tried for treason. The Hodža government was forced to resign and, as was noted earlier, a new Prime Minister was appointed, General Syrový. The latter symbolized Czechoslovakia's readiness to fight for its principles.

Chamberlain was pleased and showered praises on Benes whose "country had made heavy sacrifices for peace". He then asked for a meeting with Hitler as soon as possible in order to give him the good news personally that his conditions for vis-à-vising Czechoslovakia had been accepted. Hitler summoned the British Prime Minister to come to him on September 22 at Bad Godesberg, on the east bank of the Rhine. Chamberlain gave Hitler the details of the Anglo-French Plan, he indicated the fact that in the main the plan was a copy of the Führer's own demands, and he stressed his own part in breaking Prague's resistance. However, to the Prime Minister's great astonishment, Hitler's response was: "I am very sorry, but I am no longer interested in this." (In German, as usual, the sentence is more musical: Es tut mir furchtbar leid, aber das geht mir nicht mehr.) The Prime Minister was astounded. However, after he "slept on it", in his words, he asked the Führer for (and received) the German demands in writing. Hitler's memorandum was formulated in the style of an ultimatum. The demands made were each one in itself and all of them together, a crude violation of the Berchtesgaden agreement of only a week before. In the main, the component of humiliation of the Czechs and their allies was emphasized. Thus, for example, it was demanded that the Czechs begin evacuating the Sudetenland on the morning of September 26 and must finish the evacuation by September 28 in the evening. That is, in less than three days, the state had to evacuate hundreds of thousands of citizens and hand over a military and economic infrastructure stretching over 35,000 sq. km. In order to make the Czech effort "easier", the diktat demanded that:

The Sudeten-German area be evacuated without causing damage to the military, economic, and transportation infrastructure... all the commercial and transportation infrastructure, especially railroad cars with their contents... Food, commodities, cattle, raw materials, etc. are not to be evacuated....

Hitler's ultimatum was rejected by both London and Paris, however, this was only out of tactical considerations. The Czechs, it is needless to point out, rejected it outright: "The Bad Godesberg conditions are absolutely unacceptable under any conditions," Jan Syrový, the Czechoslovak Prime Minister, wrote.

Jan Masaryk, Czechoslovakia's ambassador in London, formulated the document in response to the ultimatum. (He was the son of Thomas Masaryk.) An excerpt from his statement is particularly instructive:

It is a de facto ultimatum of the sort usually presented to a vanquished nation and not a proposition to a sovereign state which has shown the greatest possible readiness to make sacrifices for the appeasement of Europe... The proposals go far beyond what we agreed to in the so-called Anglo-French Plan. They deprive us of every safeguard for our national existence. We are to yield up large proportions of carefully prepared defenses and to admit the German armies deep into our country before we have been able to organize it on the new basis or any preparations for its defense. Our national and economic independence would automatically disappear with the acceptance of Herr Hitler's plan. The whole process of moving the population is to be reduced to panic flight on the part of those who will not accept the German Nazi regime. They have to leave their homes without even the right to take their personal belongings... Against these new and cruel demands, my Government feels bound to make their utmost resistance, and we shall do so, God helping. The nation of St.
Wenceslas, Jan Hus, and Thomas Masaryk will not be a nation of slaves.

Masaryk concluded his response:

We rely on the two great Western democracies, whose desire we have decided to honor despite their being in opposition to our opinion, to stand with us in our difficult hour.²

As we mentioned above, the rejection of the Nazi diktat by France and Britain was nothing but a trick. Both powers knew very well that they would have to back up in practice the decision to reject the German conditions, namely, to face the possibility of war against Germany as required by the Franco-Czechoslovak agreement and the Anglo-French agreement. Britain and France had no intention of doing that.

Hence, on September 25, Chamberlain summoned the French Prime Minister and his foreign minister to London. The transparent aim was to accept Hitler’s diktat through eliminating the French commitment to Prague. This would be done in order to release the British from their commitment to Paris. Needless to say, the French did not need too much convincing. Georges Bonnet, the French foreign minister, quoted the minutes of Chamberlain’s talk with Daladier:

“If Germany then invades Czechoslovakia what will you do?” Chamberlain asked Daladier.

“In that case, France will come to the assistance of the Czechs,” was the answer.

“But with what will you fight?” Chamberlain asked, “Can you put the requisite numbers of troops into the field? Are your mechanized forces equal to those of the Germans? Is your air force capable of opposing the Luftwaffe? How will you meet the rain of bombs which will fall on Paris’ train stations and air fields? Do not forget that the Czechs will be overwhelmed in a few days at most, and that then you will have to face Germany alone.”

Daladier was cringing uncomfortably under this rain of questions, because he knew that the answer to all of them was negative...

“Do you then suggest that France should remain aloof if Germany attacks Czechoslovakia?” he asked the British Prime Minister.

Chamberlain retorted: “It is not for the British government to express an opinion as to what France should do. That is a matter for the Government of France.”³

The next day, September 26, Hitler spoke to the nation in the Sportpalast in Berlin. Together with his slanders about “this Benes” who was responsible for “the war that is about to break out”, the Führer declared openly that if the Czechs do not evacuate the Sudetenland by October 1, the German army will liberate them by force that very day... Now the choice is in the hands of this Benes...

This time Hitler did not need to coordinate positions with Chamberlain, since the latter for his part sent a telegram to Benes the very next day after the speech, in these words:

If by tomorrow (September 28) at 14:00 the government of Czechoslovakia does not accept the German conditions, the armies of Germany will receive an order to cross the border. This means that no power or powers will be able to save your country from the fate anticipated for it, and the results of the world war will be what they may.⁴

It seems that Chamberlain feared that the telegram was not formulated aggressively enough, since a few hours later another telegram was sent to Prague in which Prague’s refusal to commit suicide was defined as: “An aggressive provocation towards the German Reich that will free Britain and France from their commitment to Czechoslovakia”. Therefore, “Whatever the results of the anticipated conflict may be, Czechoslovakia will not return to its previous borders.” Two hours later, a copy of the telegram was sent to Berlin. Indeed, one must admit that in view of such a depth of British hypocrisy and fraud, even Hitler begins to look like a man of truth.

Since the Prague government did not hurry to answer his two telegrams, Chamberlain appealed to the nation in his hysterical speech of September 27 in which he said, inter alia:

How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas masks here because of a quarrel in a far away
country between people of whom we know nothing.

His remarks made in a panic, weary voice drenched Europe with a feeling that war was about to break out the next day.

However, the unbelievable happened. While he was speaking the next day in the Commons, summing up in a broken, tired voice his Via Dolorosa of diplomatic torments, Chamberlain received “a personal letter” from Hitler in which the latter withdrew substantially, both in style and in content, from the Bad Godesberg ultimatum, and even more so from his denunciatory speech in the Sportpalast. The letter was politely formulated. It complimented Chamberlain, stressed the Führer’s devotion to peace and his revulsion from the horrors of war. In particular, it proposed an orderly transfer of the Sudetenland after a plebiscite (1), without the use of the army and with international supervision. He proposed concluding this the next day at a peace conference in Munich.

When the Prime Minister read the main points of Hitler’s letter before the assembly, an orgy of joy broke out that the mother of parliaments had never known since its founding.

As we know, historians are divided in their interpretations of the surprising letter from Hitler. One may see it as a Machiavellian move by a skillful practitioner of diplomacy who recognized the structural weaknesses of democratic states. For that reason, precisely at the decisive point on the verge of actual war, he proposed a way out of the tangle. This was because he knew that the next day the thankful democrats would hand him on a silver platter what they refused to grant him today. However, another factor should not be overlooked, namely: the military balance and the fear that he might have gone too far in his gamble. This combination of factors is what motivated Hitler in this classic fraud which undoubtedly was the climax of the procession of his diplomatic victories, a fraud that exposed at one and the same time the despot’s cunning and the astounding defeatism of the democrats.

The fear that he might have gone too far was apparently based on the harsh picture presented to him over and over by the high command of the Wehrmacht.

A Fleeting Moment of Historical Benevolence

As we have seen, developments unraveled one after the other and quickly got out of the Führer’s control. The main events were: general mobilization of the Czech army; the manning of the Maginot Line and the French army’s preparations to mobilize 80 divisions; the rejection of the Bad Godesberg accord in the British parliament and the French National Assembly; the placing of the British navy on alert; the readiness of the Czechs to fight whatever might come; the mobilization in Germany and the movements of the Wehrmacht’s armies to both the Czechoslovak borders and to the Siegfried Line (then in the process of construction) facing France.

The feeling on that terrible day of September 28, engrained in the European memory as ‘Black Wednesday’, was one of inevitable war. A third of the population of Paris had fled the city, an evacuation of the civilian population was taking place in the big cities of Britain, and heavy gloom and the fear of another defeat loomed over the cities of Germany.

The series of the Führer’s gambles serving his overt intention to eliminate Czechoslovakia, had reached an intolerable threshold from the army’s point of view. The Wehrmacht high command knew well that in view of the severe gap in the military balance between Germany and the joint forces of Czechoslovakia, France, and Britain, Hitler’s adventure had to end in military disaster. The commander in chief, General Ludwig von Beck, wrote a series of memoranda, the first one on May 5. The substance of these memoranda was that a German attack on Czechoslovakia would start a general war in Europe due to the commitment of France and Britain to Czechoslovakia. In this war, Beck wrote, Germany would have no chance and the destruction caused to the country would be even greater than that caused by the First World War. (Beck’s forecast was accurate, albeit after a delay of several years.) Since he had not succeeded in convincing the Führer, Beck handed in his resignation and retired from the army. His
successor in the post of Chief of the General Staff, Franz Halder, quickly reached the same conclusion and joined the group of conspirators that was planning to arrest Hitler and bring him to court on the charge of treason against the fatherland. The commander of the western front, General Wilhelm Adam, was ready to risk a face to face confrontation with Hitler on the grounds that the western front and the Siegfried Line fortifications, under his command and still under construction, would collapse in the face of the tremendous superiority of the French army that he estimated at a ratio of 7.1 in favor of the French.

Fieldmarshal Wilhelm Keitel himself, the supreme commander of the army and a slavishly devoted lackey of Hitler, admitted Germany's inability to break through the Sudetenland defenses. Fieldmarshal von Manstein believed the same. However, in order to take such a radical step, the opposition in Germany, which included a series of outstanding personalities both within and outside the army, needed help from outside Germany. This meant a resolute stance by France and Britain against Hitler, which would have been interpreted by the German public, and rightly so, as a threat of general war in a state of decisive German military inferiority. It should be recalled that every German aged 30 and over at that time had experienced the horrors of defeat in the previous war and its results. The understanding that Hitler's adventure would bring another disaster down upon Germany, and perhaps even worse than the previous one, would have given the conspirators a firm basis of public support.

The conspirators presented the entire body of information, including the exact date of the expected German attack on Czechoslovakia, to Chamberlain (through Winston Churchill and senior officials in the foreign ministry). They promised that at the very same time that a warning by a senior British personality was broadcast against an attack on Czechoslovakia, the conspirators would act to arrest Hitler and liquidate the Nazi regime. However their failure was total. With supreme historical irony, not only did Chamberlain and Halifax, with Henderson's encouragement, do nothing in this matter, but the revelations that had reached them deepened their dread of Hitler and intensified their readiness to placate him by cutting up Czechoslovakia.

The Munich Conference was the culminating triumph for a process that had begun five years earlier when the Nazis came to power. It was a ceremony of humiliation for the democracies in which Hitler won the whole pot, Czechoslovakia lost its independence, and Britain and France lost their honor. It was a ritual which put on display the structural defeatism of the democracies and the groundless illusion that a dictator could be placated by concessions.

A somewhat grotesque feature was the absence of Czechoslovakia from the discussions. Hitler had made this a condition, and it was accepted without question by Chamberlain and Daladier. The two Czech representatives were indeed summoned at the last moment in a gesture of good will on the Führer's part, but they were not allowed to sit in the discussion room and were told to wait in the corridor. The sentence decreeing the extirpation of their country was handed to them by the allies only at the end of the conference.

The agreement itself went far beyond the Anglo-French Plan and it was a kind of compromise between the Bad Godesberg diktat and the British and French proposals formulated two days before the conference. The Sudetenland would be annexed to Germany, the Nazi occupation would begin on October 1, that is, the day after the conference and would last for seven days. Britain and France would guarantee the new borders of Czechoslovakia, but only after a territorial arrangement for the Hungarian and Polish minorities, that is, removing additional territories from the Czechoslovak state. Prague was required to deliver everything undamaged to the Germans. France and Britain had guaranteed that.

Hitler had achieved everything. His army had conquered Czechoslovakia without the need to fire a single shot. France had lost her most important strategic asset in Central Europe and had been shown to be a harmless scarecrow against German power. The military defeat, the demoralization and the moral rot reached full expression under the Vichy regime. Britain lost her only ally on the
continent, Poland was isolated and moved towards her own liquidation in September 1939, the USSR had been neutralized for a decisive period of time of nearly three years, and Hitler acquired the huge arsenals of Czechoslovakia as well as an important extension of another year to pursue a process of accelerated rearmament.

The discussion in the British parliament on the Munich agreement, which was called "Peace in our time", took place in an unprecedented mood of exaltation. The speech of Victor Raikes, a Conservative deputy, earned thunderous applause when he enthusiastically said about the Prime Minister: "Our leader will go down in history as the greatest European statesman of this or any other time." Everyone sang the praises of Czechoslovakia in general and its president in particular: "The Czechs have kept the peace of Europe...their sacrifice is what saved us from war." Everyone spoke about the "moral commitment" of Britain to the Czechs. The crowns placed on Benes' head bore an especially macabre character since in the very course of the discussions in the British parliament, on October 5, Benes had been removed from his presidency. In this orgy of emotional debauchery, hypocrisy, and confusion, it was Churchill who saved the honor of his country. He said:

We are in the presence of a disaster of the first magnitude which has befallen Great Britain and France... The system of alliances in Central Europe upon which France has relied for her safety has been swept away... The road down the Danube Valley to the Black Sea, the resources of corn and oil, the road which leads as far as Turkey, has been opened.  

Churchill earned crooks of contempt and slander for his remarks. The scorn for him continued for months after Munich. Even in the middle of December, after the formal elimination of the First Republic of Czechoslovakia and in view of Hitler's open preparations for war, the London Times proposed bringing Churchill and his supporters to trial, standing them before a firing squad and/or hanging them.

The war-mongers [Churchill and his supporters], those who would make war against another country without having counted the cost, ought to either be impeached and shot or hanged. There has never been a Prime Minister in the history of England who has in nine months achieved such agreements as those Mr. Chamberlain has made with Czechoslovakia, Italy, and with Hitler at Munich. [The Times, December 15, 1938]

In historical perspective, the remarks of Chamberlain himself — a grotesque distortion of reality — take on the appearance of the theater of the absurd:

Ever since I assumed my present office my main purpose has been to work for the pacification of Europe, for the removal of those suspicions and those anxieties which have so long poisoned the air... The question of Czechoslovakia is the latest and perhaps the most dangerous [obstacle to peace]. Now that we have got past it [through the Munich Conference], I feel that it may be possible to make further progress along the road to sanity... I believe that good will exists, and readiness on both sides... Our goal is to achieve the cooperation of all the nations... in building permanent peace in Europe.

The Prime Minister won an overwhelming majority of the vote, 366 for the Munich pact, 144 against. The discussion in the French parliament on October 4 was very brief. Little was said, a sense of gloom pervaded the air. To the credit of the French, let it be said that they at least avoided the sad spectacle of self-deception that the British parliament had displayed. Even the defeatists of Bonnet's ilk (and Bonnet had chosen not to take part in the discussion) realized that France had in fact dug its own grave by its betrayal of the Czechs. In contrast to Chamberlain, Daladier had no illusions about the results to be expected from the clauses of the Munich pact which he defined with fitting cynicism as: "des propositions pressées et d'application immédiate et pratique..." [precise statements to be immediately applied in practice...]. The Communists under Moscow's orders indeed attacked the government, but in the vote, Daladier won a majority even more overwhelming than that of Chamberlain, 543 for, 75 against.
Hardly six days passed from the day the pact was signed until the territorial clauses in it were violated. The international commission that was supposed to draw the exact boundaries of what remained of Czechoslovakia convened in Berlin. The Germans delivered an ultimatum, the French and the British immediately gave in, the Italian delegate hesitated, the Czechs opposed, the proposal [ultimatum] was accepted, and the Czechoslovak Republic was reduced to a sawed-off stump. Czechoslovakia had lost a quarter of its territory, all of its strategic assets including "the best line of fortifications in Europe", in the words of the French commander in chief, General Gamelin, and her "war potential" as it was defined by the Germans. Eight-hundred thousand Czechs became exiles in their own country, hostages of Germany in the Sudetenland. Czechoslovakia had lost a considerable part of its strategic raw materials: 73% of its coal and lignite deposits, 70% of its iron and steel works, 80% of its textile manufacturing plants, 75% of its railroad tracks, 86% of its chemical and glass industry, 40% of its wood manufacturing and 70% of its electricity production.10

Within a week, one of the richest and strongest states in Europe had become an emasculated economic entity, without an army, without the capacity of self-defense, betrayed by its allies, subject to the mercy of a notorious criminal. This was "Peace with honor" as Chamberlain defined it.

The second republic that arose on the ruins of Czechoslovakia, headed by Emil Hacha, held out for 105 days until March 14, 1939. On that date, the Wehrmacht conquered the rump of Czechoslovakia without firing a shot. In the afternoon of March 15, 1939, Hitler came through the gates of Hradcany Castle, the palace of the kings of Bohemia. He went up to Eduard Benes' work room, sat down, and wrote on the table of the president of the Republic the following sentence: "Czecho-Slovakia has ceased to exist."

***

PART TWO

The Dialectic of Historical Comparison

Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.

George Santayana

The past interests me as much as the snows of yesteryear.
There is no greater mistake than learning from history.
We have nothing to learn from it.

Shimon Peres

Historical analogy between two nations distinct from each other in many variables is extremely complex even under the best of circumstances. A comparison between Czechoslovakia at the end of the 1930s and Israel at the end of the 1990s, inevitably must encounter two major obstacles in addition to those that usually plague historical comparisons. One is the lack of historical perspective concerning the Jewish state, the other is the Jewish anomaly which requires criteria that diverge considerably from what is conventional among ordinary nations.

Nevertheless, despite the many differences in the conditions and nature of the two periods in question, a basis exists for comparison between the two. The fundamental objective conditions for national destruction are chillingly similar. Israel, as will be demonstrated below, is repeating all the errors that Czechoslovakia made and is adding original touches of her own. Hence, Karl Marx's epigram nicely fits the Israeli situation: History repeats itself, the first time as tragedy, the second as farce.

Israel's economic well-being imbues its citizens with an illusion of security and prosperity that conceals from most of the public the fact that their state is on a track toward national suicide. Only a radical, unexpected step (such as a major war) might check Israel's reckless rush amok to its bitter demise. Even a discussion of these matters is rather macabre in character. This in turn creates defense mechanisms that thwart rational and thorough consideration of the situation. What remains is cognitive dissonance that basically means: the more
mistakes you make, the more you dig in behind them.

Israel's behavior is clear testimony to a structural failure which thwarts the principle of the learning process: Deducing lessons and applying them. For this reason, Santayana's well-known aphorism, "Those who do not remember the past are condemned to relive it," more than being a cry of alarm, is a kind of lugubrious summary after-the-fact of the history of peoples who strenuously refuse to learn the lessons of history.

Let it be said to the credit of the Czechs that they at least had no one to learn from. Their tragedy was a kind of historical precedent. Indeed the defeatism of politicians and the treachery of allies have been part of the world order since the dawn of written history. But we must admit that the Czech case should be considered classic, since it combined all the ingredients that, together, brought about the greatest disaster in human history, the Second World War, which caused nearly 50 million deaths, more than all the wars in the history of the human race combined.

No nation lost more in the war than the Jewish people. Between six and seven million, more than two thirds of all the Jews in Europe, were massacred in an orgy of lust for industrial murder for its own sake. Thus it might have been expected that the Jews, more than any other nation, would learn the lessons of history and would engrave them with an iron stylus in their hearts and minds. But Israel, under the Orwellian guise of "the peace process", persists in running amok like someone bewitched into the death trap of the 1967 borders. This is because Israel is the expression of the Jewish anomaly which is comprised at one and the same time of anti-Semitism and self-hatred, a deadly hybrid which contributes to creating a mechanism of self-destruction, a phenomenon that has no counterpart among other nations.

The principles of comparison relate to that stage in which the state loses its purpose for physical and spiritual existence, its raison d'être. In this situation, it is hard to judge what came first, the loss of defensible borders which transforms the struggle against the enemy into a heroic but hopeless struggle, or the heedless shedding of defensible borders because of spiritual demoralization that strikes at the nation's survival instinct.

The comparison below will be made on three planes: 1) balance of power, 2) defeatism, and 3) the Jewish anomaly.

**BALANCE OF POWER**

**Secure Boundaries**

Hans Morgenthau devotes the foreword to his well-known book, *Politics Among Nations*, to indicating the permanent factors upon which a state's power rests. The permanent ingredient of decisive importance for a nation's power is, in Morgenthau's concept, the nature of the nation's boundaries which derive from the size and strategic depth of its territory, the structure of the territory and the capacity to defend it by natural obstacles. Hence, defensible boundaries are a condition for the survival of a nation in a hostile environment. Needless to say, this basic proposition of Morgenthau is a fundamental assumption that unites all historians and military thinkers from Thucydides to Liddell Hart. Czechoslovakia and Israel are two examples in the modern age of small states facing an enemy superior to them in every component of the balance of forces: military power, territory, and population. In this situation, not only do defensible boundaries become a crucial power multiplier but they are a condition for the very existence of the state. It was Shimon Peres, an outstanding pupil of Morgenthau, who wrote, after analyzing the problem of Israel's narrow waist in the center of the country, that: "Without defensible boundaries, the state will be destroyed in war." And it was Abba Eban who defined Israel's frontiers of June 4, 1967 as "Auschwitz borders" (in an interview with Der Spiegel, June 1968).

**Czechoslovakia**

From the point of view of secure boundaries, Czechoslovakia's situation was uncomfortable. The most outstanding component was the lack of proportion between the state's width and its length: 200 km. against 760 km., that is, a ratio of about 3.8:1. This meant that Czechoslovakia had particularly long borders which made a defensive disposition
difficult and expensive. Czechoslovakia was and is a continental state without an outlet to the sea, and except for Romania, it was surrounded on every side by hostile states, to some degree or another. The common denominator of all of them (Germany, Poland, and Hungary) was their territorial demands on the state of Czechs and Slovaks. For example, Bohemia and Moravia, the two regions that make up the Czech lands (the Czech Republic today), were like an enclave in the German Reich, while most of Slovakia’s territory — that had been torn away from Hungary after the First World War — bordered on Hungary, and was the constant object of Magyar revanchisme. Czechoslovakia had no common border with its military allies, France and the USSR. This geographic flaw had decisive importance in the critical days on the eve of the Munich Conference.

Czechoslovakia’s territorial strategic asset was the ridge of mountains called the Sudetenland which separated her from the main source of threat, Germany. The Sudetenland was well fortified, a “little Maginot Line”. However, thanks to its location between mountain ridges, its defensive capacity was immeasurably superior to that of the French Maginot Line. The loss of the Sudetenland and its fortifications meant loss of defensible boundaries which was tantamount to the elimination of Czechoslovakia. That is precisely what happened on March 15, 1939.

Unfortunately for the Czechs, most of the population of the Sudetenland was made up of ethnic Germans, a large irredentist minority that drew its strength from its ethnic affiliation to the declared enemy of the Czechoslovak Republic.

Israel
Israel’s geographic situation does not need to be detailed. It is enough to say that the Judea-Samaria mountain ridge in the center of the country, and the Golan Heights in the north of the state, are territorial strategic assets without which Israel would be left without defensible boundaries. Although Israel has an advantage over Czechoslovakia in having a seacoast, Israel’s situation is much graver for at least two reasons:

1. The distances from the Sudeten mountains to the main concentrations of population in Czechoslovakia were at least tens of kilometers. For example, the shortest distance between Prague and the new border after giving up the Sudetenland was 80 km. A not inconsiderable distance in view of the fire power, the range, and the accuracy of weapons of the 1930s.

2. The central portion of Israel is the Dan region that encompasses 70% of the entire Jewish population of the state, as well as a similar percentage of production facilities. These are within zero range of the green line to which — or close to which — Israel will be forced to withdraw in the final stage of the “peace process”. The performance capacities of conventional weapons in the year 2000 is far superior to that of weapons of the 1930s. Again, it was Shimon Peres who clearly stated what might be expected to occur if and when Israel withdrew to the outskirts of Kfar Saba and Rosh Ha’Ayin:

The lack of minimal territorial space would place it [Israel] in a situation of absolute non-deterrence... and would create among the Arabs an irrepressible lust to attack it [Israel] from all sides and to destroy the Jewish state.12

Arab strategy would also aspire in the future to exploit the weak point in Israeli strategy — the deployment of the reserve army during the course of the war itself — and to prevent this deployment by a surprise attack, or an offensive with a short warning time for Israel.13

AN IRREDENTIST MINORITY

Czechoslovakia: Sudeten Germans
The Sudeten Germans were the central pretext for dismantling Czechoslovakia. They possessed all the structural components of an irredentist minority that created the critical mass needed for the final destruction of Czechoslovakia. Hence, they are the classic example of a Fifth Column. The main components of this situation are as follows:
1. A minority that belongs ethnically to a neighboring power that is an enemy of its state. The Sudeten Germans were of one flesh with the largest, most violent, most powerful nation in Europe — Germany.

2. An economically powerful minority. The 3.5 million Germans possessed nearly 50% of the whole Czechoslovak economy, and mainly in raw materials. (See above, the list of economic losses after giving up the Sudetenland to Germany.)

3. A minority that inhabits border areas of the state in physical proximity to the enemy. Not only did the Sudetenland lie along the border with Germany (and Austria before the Anschluss), but these areas were the only fortified defensible borders that Czechoslovakia had facing the German enemy.

4. A large minority of 23% of the total population taking advantage of the individual liberties and right of association which were granted to it by virtue of the democratic system, in order to destroy the democratic state from within. Indeed, the Sudeten Germans, a minority identified with Nazi totalitarianism, have been the most obvious example in modern history that demonstrates the structural weakness of a democracy with a large, hostile minority within its borders. Such a minority constitutes the basis of self-destruction.

The consolidation of the Nazi Party in Germany was accompanied by considerable enthusiasm among the Sudeten Germans. A branch of the Nazi Party in Bohemia sent eight delegates to the Prague parliament as early as 1929. The rise of Hitler to power in early 1933 gave great momentum to the German Nazis in Czechoslovakia. In a short while, they had won the political backing of a major power in Europe, with generous financing for their activities. And the Prague government could no longer outlaw them. The first stage was the establishment of a Nazi party headed by Konrad Henlein that was formed in October 1933 as the national front of the Sudeten Germans (SDP — Sudetendeutschepartei). The party grew rapidly as the time approached for the general elections of May 1935. Ironically, the SDP emerged from the elections as the largest party in Czechoslovakia. This was because of the divisions that splintered the Czechoslovak electorate as well as the successful muster of all the Germans behind the Nazi banner. Aware of his great power and Hitler's aggressive backing, Henlein began negotiations with the Czechoslovak government with the surprising demand: Prague must turn its back on the League of Nations and Western democracies and orient itself towards Berlin as a basic premise of policy. Needless to say, this groundless demand would have resulted in the collapse of the Republic's raison d'être, and was rejected by Prague. Yet this demand represented a major intensification of the irredentist character of the German minority.

Benes' treatment of the Sudeten Germans, with all its ups and downs, was in the main feeble and irresolute. Of course this observation is made from hindsight, and it ought to be pointed out that the Czechs were working under an unbearably heavy steamroller of German-British pressures. Nevertheless, we must not avoid identifying the fundamental structural flaw in the negotiations that the Prague government conducted with the Sudeten Germans. The very recognition of the autonomous status of the German minority as a party to negotiations while they were citizens of the state, was a clear signal of surrender, and surrender as usual invited pressures. This was why, even if it is difficult to describe a more repulsive combination of hypocrisy and political foolishness than that of Britain on the eve of the Munich Conference, the British pressure was in direct proportion to Prague's readiness to surrender. In the end, matters reached the point of British intervention in Czech politics through a delegation that London sent “to mediate” between the Sudeten Germans and the Prague government. The outlook of the mission's head, Lord Runciman (“compared to him even Chamberlain was an extremist warmonger,” as the London Evening Standard wrote of him), and his sympathy with the “bitter fate” of the Sudeten Germans, were notorious. The very consent of the Prague government to Runciman's role as an “honest broker” (the common expression then as now) was an outstanding act of political folly and one of the last
nails in Prague’s coffin. As anticipated, the mission’s visit was accompanied by constant media coverage in Europe that presented “the Slavic abuse of the oppressed German minority”. Runciman’s report which unequivocally recommended the vivisection of Czechoslovakia (see above) was therefore a document custom-tailored according to Hitler’s dikat and a fig leaf for Chamberlain at Munich.

It was Milan Hodza, the Slovak Prime Minister, who worked tirelessly to satisfy the Sudeten German demands as early as 1935 when it was painfully obvious that Konrad Henlein’s party was an offshoot of the Nazi party. The principle in the negotiations that Henlein conducted with Hodza was to always demand more than what was offered. In this way, the Sudeten Germans won full de facto autonomy. The excision of the Sudetenland from the mother country was accepted among Czechoslovakia’s allies as something that was taken for granted.

The Sudeten Germans had absolute cultural autonomy. As early as the beginning of the 1930s, that is, quite a while before the 1938 crisis, 96% of their children were being educated in German-language schools (417,000 out of 433,000). They had their own radio station as well as 12% of the time on the Czech and Slovak stations, and three universities (two of them technical institutes). All of the libraries in the Sudetenland zone were purely German. They had 63 daily newspapers and 143 weeklies. Most of them supported Nazism, preached separation from the mother state and, at least starting from 1935, a considerable part of them were a propaganda arm of Goebbels.14

The Sudeten Germans earned a fine reward for their part in the destruction of the Czech Republic. Indeed, starting from March 1939, the Czech lands (separated from Slovakia) became a German protectorate under the rule of Konstantin von Neurath, but in practice, affairs were managed by the leaders of the Sudeten Germans, Ernst Kundt and Karl Hermann Frank.

The Arabs of the Land of Israel (“Palestinian” Arabs)

A striking parallel between the Sudeten Germans and the Arabs in the Land of Israel is: just as the Germans lorded over Czechs for hundreds of years (in the Austrian Empire), Arab society traditionally oppressed Jews living in Moslem regimes who were kept in the inferior dhimmi status decreed by Islam for non-Muslims.15 Yet, just as European diplomats and “humanitarians” justified Sudeten German irredentism in 1938, so international self-styled humanitarians advocate Palestinian Arab claims against Israel today. Indeed, just as Lord Runciman complained in his report about Czech “colonists” in the Sudetenland,16 so the serried ranks of the press, diplomatic and humanitarian corps today complain about Jewish settlers in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza.

Israel’s Arab citizens too have attracted the solicitude of the diplomats. On the Sabbath, December 14, 1996, Israeli Arabs held a convention in Nazareth. It was organized by “The Higher Follow-Up Commission for Affairs of the Arab Population”, a subversive, clearly illegal body that has become institutionalized over the years and is now a kind of roof organization for the Israeli Arabs. The main decision made — unanimously and to storm applause — affirmed that the conference “was aimed at achieving our national and everyday rights in a democratic state of all its citizens”. That is, the destruction in fact of Israel as a Jewish state.

The guests of the conference included foreign consuls, the minister of justice of South Africa, as well as the representative of the UN agency to prevent discrimination against minorities. Shulamit Aloni headed a large delegation of the Israeli Left.

The conference called for establishing a “Palestinian state” with Jerusalem as its capital; it called for cooperation among “all the democratic forces in the Peace Camp”; it sharply condemned the incumbent Prime Minister, Benyamin Netanyahu, for his policies, and expressed its resolute opposition to Judaizing the Galilee. A tone of overt threat towards “the fascist right-wing government which works hand in hand with black clerical forces”, passed through the remarks of all the speakers. (Stalinist terminology is still routine among these speakers, many of whom are old Communists.) The speakers were careful not to mention the forbidden phrase “the State of Israel”. The accepted terms were “homeland” (Palestinian Arab) and “the country” (of the Palestinian Arabs), or in a pejorative context: “Israel”.
The conference and its decisions were mentioned on the inner pages of the press as an afterthought. Not one member of the Knesset of the “right wing” (sic!) coalition bothered to point out from the podium of the Knesset that this conference was a clear instance of sedition and treason that embodied a palpable threat to Israel’s national existence.

Israeli Arabs constitute nearly 20% of the population of the state. Together with the Arabs of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, they number fully 46% of the whole population of the Land of Israel west of the Jordan. These facts alone are enough to demonstrate that the huge Arab population is an irredentist group that makes Israel today far more vulnerable to an internal threat to its survival than was Czechoslovakia in 1938.

1. Like the Sudeten Germans, the Arabs of the Land of Israel are of one flesh with the larger Arab nation, 50 times larger in population and 500 times larger (!) in territory than the Jewish entity. Similar to Germany’s attitude toward Czechoslovakia, the Arab world is united in its will to destroy Israel.

2. We have already noted that the mountains of Judea and Samaria, and to a considerable extent, the Gaza Strip as well, are strategic territorial assets for Israel. These areas are overwhelmingly inhabited by Arabs.

3. Israeli democracy is a powerful tool in the hands of Arab irredentists, both Arab citizens of the State and the PLO, each in its own way. The PLO is committed by its Covenant to destroy the Jewish state which it aims to dispossess in the entire Land of Israel west of the Jordan, and the Israeli Arabs support this goal wholeheartedly. The Arab parties in the Knesset avowedly identify with the PLO and their role is to strive to destroy Israel’s national existence from within, precisely as the Sudeten German irredentists did to Czechoslovakia. In both cases, the parties involved enjoyed parliamentary representation while being a self-avowed tool of the enemies of the State.

4. From one point of view alone Israel’s situation is better off than that of Czechoslovakia. Israel’s economic and technoscientific superiority (a mighty power multiplier on the eve of the year 2000) compared to the Arab irredentists is overwhelming. (Israel’s GDP is nearly $100 billion, some 16 times larger than the $6 billion GDP of the Arab entity in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza.)

However, the Israeli situation is immeasurably more grave than the Czechoslovak situation in terms of political circumstances. No sword of Damocles hung over the Czechoslovaks in the form of a “Palestinian state”. The principle of self-determination which gave “moral” legitimacy to the Sudeten-German demands was aimed at annexing the Sudetenland to the German Reich. The Palestinian Arab issue is totally different. The PLO was set up by Nasser in 1964 with the purpose of fulfilling three functions:

1. To nullify the legitimacy of Jewish existence anywhere in the Land of Israel through inventing a “Palestinian people” that never existed in history. This in turn was to create a pretext for Arab irredentist claims to the whole country which are supported both by the Arabs of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, and by Israeli Arab citizens;

2. To destroy the fabric of Israel’s life through indiscriminate, maximally murderous terrorism. These two purposes are unequivocally explicit in the PLO’s Covenant;

3. To transform the future “Palestinian state” into a staging area for Arab armies to mount their attack to destroy Israel. This goal too is openly and avowedly expressed in the PLO’s Plan of Stages adopted by the PLO’s Council in June 1974 in Cairo and ratified by the Arab League at its conference in Rabat that same year. Once again, it was Shimon Peres who best defined the danger to Israel from the establishment of a Palestinian Arab state... The Arabs are fostering a separate Palestinian nationalism and the myth of “a restoration of the rights of the Palestinian people” in the territory of the State of Israel and in its stead. They are doing this not in order to solve the refugee problem but in
order to destroy Israeli nationalism and in order to create anew a Jewish problem of a scope many times greater. The Palestinian national demand is aimed at abolishing the existence of the State of Israel and not at living alongside Israel in peace.\(^{17}\)

In time of war, the frontiers of the Palestinian state will provide an excellent starting line for mobile forces to break through directly into the infrastructure vital to Israel’s existence, to disrupt immediately the freedom of movement of the Israeli airforce over Israel’s skies, and to drain the blood of the population by bombardment from artillery massed next to the border.

On September 13, 1993, Israel signed an accord with an organization dedicated constitutionally to annihilating Israel. By so doing, it abandoned the spiritual and physical purpose for its existence and signed its own death sentence. The fact that Shimon Peres was the driving force in this event belongs to the domain of psycho-pathology to be discussed briefly at the end of this article.

**ALLIANCES AS A POWER MULTIPLIER**

**Czechoslovakia**

Eduard Benes, who acquired the status of a senior European statesman by virtue of his work in the League of Nations, did a great deal to strengthen the alliances in Europe with the aim of preventing future war. Czechoslovakia indeed signed a series of treaties and formed alliances with key states including a non-aggression pact with Weimar Germany.

Three treaties of special importance guaranteed the security of Czechoslovakia. They were a three-party pact (the Little Entente) between Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. The agreement was meant to defend the three states from Magyar revanchism, because before the First World War, large parts of the three states in the alliance spread over areas of Greater Hungary (within the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy). The 1921 three-party pact managed to withstand a series of tests until it collapsed with the destruction of Czechoslovakia at Munich in September 1939.

Yet the most important pact — for Czechoslovakia and all of Europe — was the Franco-Czechoslovak Treaty of Mutual Assistance that was signed at Locarno on October 16, 1925. The pact stated that:

In the event of a unilateral attack on France or on Czechoslovakia, France or, reciprocally, Czechoslovakia...will immediately come to the aid and assistance of the other.

This alliance between a major European power and a powerful democracy in Central Europe was a crucial axis for maintaining European security, and all the other pacts and alliances revolved around it. Such were the Anglo-French pact that required Britain to go to the defense of France; the Franco-Soviet pact; the Franco-Polish pact; the Soviet-Czechoslovak alliance, as well as the triple alliance mentioned above (the Little Entente).

The French appraised this well. After the *anschluss* of Austria in March 1938 and the increase in German power as a consequence, a shock wave went through Europe that more intensely consolidated Czechoslovakia’s status as the cornerstone of the European security order. Indeed, on March 14, 1938, Leon Blum, French Prime Minister, saw fit to declare firmly that “France is committed to the alliance between her and Czechoslovakia and will keep its commitment in full.” One of the first declarations of Daladier who took over from Blum, was (June 12): “The accord with Czechoslovakia is sacred and we must honor it in full.” Blum and Daladier knew what they were saying, since they should have mobilized the French army immediately in light of the escalation of German military might. But the solid backing of 40 Czechoslovak divisions, well trained and armed with the best equipment, freed France from the financial burden involved in a comprehensive mobilization of reserves at a time when France was undergoing a severe economic crisis.

In fact, the system of alliances that we have described (“pactomania” as some cynics called it at the time) collapsed at the critical moment of the trial of Munich, but when the Czechoslovaks originally signed the accord with France, they gained a power multiplier of the first order. This was, from the vantage point of Masaryk and Benes, an
especially wise diplomatic move, since it was based on a common national interest in face of the German danger.

The accord between France and Czechoslovakia was then, as said above, the cornerstone of the collective security system of Europe as a whole. Violation of this pact would necessarily have a domino effect on all the other accords and would expose a crumbling Europe to German power, which is what did indeed happen.

We emphasize once more that, from France's point of view, the agreement with Prague had decisive importance. The Little Maginot Line, as the fortifications in the Sudetenland were called, was modeled on the original Maginot Line and constituted a firm foundation for France's strategic planning. Even according to the most cautious estimates of the French general staff, the Czech army could withstand the Wehrmacht for a period between six weeks and two months. That would be enough time for the French army to prepare and launch a massive attack on the Rhineland, in order to make the Germans taste the permanent nightmare of Germany's geo-strategic predicament: a war on two fronts. On the basis of the agreement with Czechoslovakia, Paris reached three cooperation accords, with Britain, the USSR, and Poland, all of which were supposed to go into effect at the same time as the Franco-Czechoslovak agreement.

But all the many advantages deriving from this system of alliances would be shorn away and quickly become stumbling blocks, if the main pillar of the whole complex system — the Franco-Czechoslovak Alliance — were to collapse.

**Israel**

There is no room for comparison between the Israeli situation and that of Czechoslovakia as a keystone in a regional security arrangement. In the area of agreements and alliances, Israel's predicament was accurately described by the Biblical verse as "a people that dwells alone". Israel is classed (together with South Korea and Taiwan) in the very exclusive club of "pariah states", although there is no basis for comparing the potential strategic threat against Israel with the threat that looms over her two sisters in this "club". An outstanding illustration of this state of affairs is the fundamental deception regarding the meaning of the series of strategic cooperation agreements that Israel has with the United States. On this see below.

Israel's existence does correspond to the national interest of some states or group of states, as did Czechoslovakia's existence. However, none of these nations are major powers and Israel has no treaty with any of them similar to the Franco-Czechoslovak Alliance or the NATO Pact. Cooperation with Israel is at most a transient affair, the product of temporary circumstances, such as the link with France up to the time of Algerian independence, or with the United States until the disintegration of the USSR.

We noted that Israel's strategic position gained recognition (as hesitant as it may have been) from France before 1967. This was expressed once only, during the Sinai Operation of 1956, when Israel, benefiting from the disorderly death throes of Anglo-French imperialism, struck at Egypt and eliminated the threat of war for another ten years. At the end of May 1967, Israel tasted the bitterness of American betrayal on the issue of the maritime blockade of the Gulf of Elat. May 1967 for Israel was like September 1938 for Czechoslovakia. Like its predecessor on the eve of the Munich Conference,
Israel was abandoned by the international community led by the USA. Indeed, the Jewish state was thrown onto the trash dump of history. Only Israel’s readiness to fight a preventive war, the brilliant plan of the air force to destroy the enemy’s planes on the ground, the heroism of soldiers on the battlefield and the talent of their commanders, saved Israel from extinction.

After the Six Day War Israel enjoyed the status of a regional power. It stood as a forward strong point blocking the path of Soviet imperialism to the oil wells of the Middle East. That was why, for the first time in its history, Israel’s existence corresponded to the geo-strategic interests of the United States. However, even America’s new policy retained many reservations towards Israel. Proof of this were the five memoranda and agreements for strategic cooperation between Israel and the USA that were signed between 1975 and 1987. In every accord, the basic principle underlying a military cooperation agreement was missing. The standard clause that appears in every serious mutual defense pact, such as the agreement between Czechoslovakia and France (see above) and in the opening clause of the North Atlantic (NATO) Pact states: “An armed attack on one of them...will be considered an attack on all of them.” Not only does that decisive clause not appear in any of the Israel-US accords, but the text of the Israel-US agreements actually stresses the opposite. An example of this is the Memorandum of Understanding for Strategic Cooperation of November 30, 1981. The very first article reads as follows:

United States-Israel strategic cooperation, as set forth in this memorandum, is designed against the threat to the peace and security of the region caused by the Soviet Union or by Soviet-controlled forces from outside the region introduced into the region...

I.B. [The memorandum is intended] to provide each other with military assistance for operations of their forces in the area that may be required to cope with this threat.

I.C. The strategic cooperation between the parties is not directed against any state or group of states within the region. It is intended solely for defensive purposes against the above-mentioned threat.

Thus, if the global interest of the United States is hammed in the Middle East, Israel is committed to spill the blood of its sons. However in case the Arabs go to a war against the Jewish state, the USA is exempt from extending aid to her, even in a situation of existential risk.

Even this provision became obsolete when the USSR crumbled. Israel was then transformed from a “strategic asset” into a “political liability”. As befits a liability, the Americans forced the Madrid Conference on Israel in which the principles were determined for bringing the Jewish state back to the 1967 frontiers. Logically, in consideration of “the peace process”, the Americans should have guaranteed Israel’s safety (since Israel was about to lose its capability of self-defense) by a series of military cooperation agreements. However, needless to say, the absolute opposite is occurring and the administration in Washington has not signed any accord guaranteeing the survival of Israel in boundaries that are not defensible.

**MILITARY BALANCE**

**Czechoslovakia**

In September 1938, the German army had 45 to 48 divisions. Facing this army were the 40 fully mobilized divisions of the Czechoslovak army behind the fortifications of the Sudetenland, and another 23 French divisions deployed facing the German border (15 of them manning the Maginot Line). These forces planned to attack five days after the start of hostilities.19

The French army’s mobilization potential was estimated at 85 divisions. The power of the British Empire should be added to this decisive superiority in the military balance.

Thus, when analyzing the potential strategic threat against Czechoslovakia, one ought to deal with the military balance between the two sides within three concentric circles: 1) the military balance between Germany and Czechoslovakia plus 23 French divisions; 2) the balance between Germany versus France and Czechoslovakia under
full mobilization; 3) the military balance of power between Germany versus the combined forces of Czechoslovakia, France and Britain. In any event, Germany must be seen as standing alone because in August-September of 1938 the Axis Alliance had not yet taken shape.

Likewise, one must bear in mind that the well-oiled war machine of the Wehrmacht, the Blitzkrieg doctrine, and its application on the battlefield, as they are known to us today, were mainly formed after the conquest of Poland at the end of 1939. In 1938, the Wehrmacht was still an army in the stages of consolidation, not ready for a general war, and in a position of overwhelming inferiority against the potential enemy. Most significantly, it was an army whose general staff was on the brink of mutiny because it saw Hitler as a dangerous adventurer who might bring another national catastrophe on Germany greater than that of the previous war.

a. The strength of the Czechoslovak army at full mobilization was 40 divisions, about 1.5 million men. The army was well-trained, full of fighting spirit, equipped with the best weapons of the time, and its morale is attested to by the fact that in mobilization exercises, about 90% and more of the reserve troops reported for duty.

The Wehrmacht allocated the major bulk of the army, 35 divisions, to the task of conquering the fortifications of the Sudetenland (see above). This move required that it abandon the other borders, particularly the border with France. However, even under these conditions, the German high command did not believe that it was capable of conquering the Sudetenland fortifications (see above). Yet, after the line of forts was handed over to the Germans, it became clear that even this evaluation was a gross underestimate. Hitler himself was astonished and confessed that his army would have had no chance to conquer the Sudeten fortifications.20

Opposing the 23 French divisions deployed for offensive action against industrial areas of southwest Germany five days after the outbreak of hostilities,21 the Germans could mobilize eight divisions at most, only five of them mechanized. Besides, while the Maginot Line had been ready for years, the German Siegfried Line (called the Western Wall) was in preliminary stages of development, and had no chance to withstand a French attack as long as Germany's armed forces were overwhelmingly inferior.22

b. As we know, Germany's Achilles heel was its limited access to strategic raw materials, especially oil. Hence, a naval blockade on the Reich might have been a kind of death blow in a modern war on a European scale. Germany's inferiority in this domain when faced with the joint strength of France and Britain was overwhelming.

The Ratios of Naval Forces — 1938

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With an absurd ratio of 1:7 in surface ships and with an inferior force of submarines, Germany had no chance in a war. And this conclusion does not even take into account the probability that the might of the United States would intervene in the war.

The subject of the German air force should be added to the above picture. The Luftwaffe is usually presented as possessing overwhelming superiority. Yet, in this area too the imagination has overpowered reality. As early as January 1937, the German high command made an assessment that only in the Fall of 1938 would the Luftwaffe achieve numerical equality with the Royal Air Force: 1750 first-line planes on each side. When we add the air forces of France and Czechoslovakia, Germany would be clearly inferior, both in quantity and quality.\textsuperscript{23}

The obvious conclusion is that if Benes had rejected Hitler's ultimatum and Czechoslovakia had fought a defensive war, the military balance on the ground would have been sufficient. That is, the joint strength of 40 Czech divisions and the 23 French divisions could have faced the troops of the Wehrmacht. The mighty potential strategic threat of the second and third rings would have played its part, and if Hitler had succeeded in forcing his general staff to make war, Germany would have paid the price of frightful destruction.

This was exactly as the top German army commanders had foreseen. Their assessment was proven correct, but only after 5 years of war and the tragic loss of 50 million lives.\textsuperscript{24}

All these facts and many more (such as the 270 Soviet divisions linked through military alliance to Czechoslovakia, the power of Poland and Belgium, both linked to France by defense alliances) were well known to all those involved in these affairs, starting from the Wehrmacht high command through Chamberlain and Daladier and up to the general staff of the Czechoslovak army and the president of the Republic, Eduard Benes.

\textbf{Israel}

In any comparison between Israel and Czechoslovakia, Israel's inferiority is striking. The gross asymmetry in the military balance between Israel and her enemies is totally incomparable to the Czechoslovak situation. Against a ratio of 1:1.4 in favor of the Czechoslovak forces and the 23 French divisions, Israel's armed forces in the Six Day War were at a severe disadvantage with a troop ratio of 1:3 in favor of the Arabs. Since then, the military balance has worsened by 100% at least. Israel totally lacks a power multiplier in the form of an ally on the border of one of the enemy states.\textsuperscript{25} Hence, unlike Czechoslovakia which could concentrate all its forces on the German border, (which to be sure surrounded Czechoslovakia's western end on three sides,) Israel must defend all its borders simultaneously.

Until the breakup of the Soviet Union, Israel possessed qualitative superiority in Western weaponry over the quantitative superiority in Soviet weapons in the hands of its enemies. This gap has been closed over the past decade, and today there is no weapons system acquired by Israel that the Arabs cannot purchase, and in immeasurably greater quantity. A clear example is the build up in Egyptian military power based primarily on Western weapons, mainly American.\textsuperscript{26}

\textbf{An Army Based on Reserves}

In order to overcome the structural inferiority in manpower, the Israeli army is mainly based on reserve troops which make up not only the bulk of the combat forces, but nearly 70% of the overall manpower in the army under full mobilization. This reserve system is a clear economic necessity, since the reserve forces make up 25% of the total labor force in Israel (450,000 out of a labor force of 1.8 million). A much larger percentage of Israeli citizens of military age who serve in the reserves occupies jobs on the managerial level. Without these personnel the economy would collapse in a few weeks.

The size of the IDF is estimated at 610,000 troops under full mobilization.\textsuperscript{27} That is, nearly 14% of the total Jewish population of the state. This number is double and more, relative to the size of the population, to the percentage of the population mobilized by all the nations in World War II, and it is proportionately equivalent to an army of 36 million soldiers mobilized by the USA!\textsuperscript{28}
This datum comprises a basic premise of any evaluation of the balance of military forces between Israel and her enemies. Meanwhile, the size of the Arab armies is always estimated on the basis of the regular forces alone. In this situation, a two-stage strategic doctrine was developed intended to cope with the problem of Israel’s inferiority in military manpower.

Phase 1: A holding defense phase in which the regular army confronts the enemy despite its overwhelming inferiority in numbers. According to this conception, the time required to mobilize the reserves, during which the standing army must hold its defensive positions, is 48 to 72 hours.

Phase 2: The attack phase in which the whole army attacks, including the reserves, and brings the battle to enemy territory.

In short, the Israeli army’s doctrine is contingent on two basic conditions: 1. Mobilization of reserves in a short period of time; and, 2. Total mobilization of reserves. If one of these two conditions does not materialize, Israel’s very existence is threatened.

This is not the place to analyze the validity of the above doctrine in detail. However, let it be clearly stated that in taking into consideration a variety of factors operating in the late 1990s, the IDF’s strategic doctrine is at best wishful thinking, lacking a firm basis in reality. This is due to the malfunction of the reserves system. It is well known that in order to mobilize a platoon, you have to send call up orders to a company. The head of the army’s manpower branch himself admitted to the Knesset Foreign and Defense Affairs Committee (November 21, 1996) that in fact only a third of the IDF’s reserve troops report for duty. A simple calculation shows that the real strength of the IDF is half of what is presented in various accounts. Even if we assume that during a war the rate of reporting for duty will be higher (and this assumption might also prove to be wishful thinking), the question may be asked as to what is the military value of a reserve soldier who has not served for years in his unit and kindly condescends to rally to the colors when hostilities break out. This is why, if Israel returns to the 1949 frontiers, it will survive only if it initiates a preventive war. However, in view of the dominant atmosphere of defeatism now pervading the Jewish state, along with the heavy political price that Israel will have to pay, a unilateral initiative on Israel’s part cannot even be imagined. It matters little whether we are considering a preventive strike only, or, a fortiori, a general preventive war like the Six Day War.

If all that is not enough, let us consider this: a factor has been added at the end of the century that did not exist in the late 1930s, namely the factor of weapons of mass destruction and the means to launch them. The effectiveness of these weapons, as their name implies, is in direct proportion to the degree of concentration of the population in the places at which they are aimed. Israel’s vulnerability on this point is glaring. Compared to the 30 or 35 “civilian targets” in Arab states, according to the evaluation by Shai Feldman, Israel has only one single location where its population is heavily concentrated, and that is the Dan Region (metropolitan Tel Aviv) where 70% of the total Jewish population of the State of Israel is concentrated. A lethal strike at this population center would be tantamount to destroying the Jewish state.

There is no need to elaborate on the matter. It is enough to point to four facts: a) Syria, Libya, and Egypt now have stocks of weapons of mass destruction that are among the largest in the world; b) as of the year 2000 (according to CIA estimates) the Arab states will have about 2000 ballistic missiles; c) some of these will be armed with weapons of mass destruction; d) the Tel Aviv metropolitan area will be in range of most of them.

Defense Expenditures and Preparations for War

The purpose of defense expenditures generally is to provide a suitable response to a potential strategic threat. When the threshold of potential threat rises, the state must make a parallel increase in defense expenditures. If the threat declines, a corresponding cut can be made in defense expenditures.
Czechoslovakia

In view of the escalation in the German danger, the Czechs maintained an extraordinary level of arms build up, in contrast to the two other democracies on the continent, France and Britain. While the defense budgets of France and Britain gradually dropped after the end of the 1920s, and declined in 1938 to a low of 1.75% of GNP — 350 million pounds in Britain out of a GNP of 20 billion pounds — Czechoslovakia’s military expenditures in that period were on the order of 15% of its GNP. We remarked earlier that in both relative and absolute numbers this was one of the highest levels of military expenditure in Europe and in the entire world. Czechoslovakia’s defense expenditures were estimated in 1938 at more than 500 million pounds sterling, that is, five times higher than those of Britain per capita, and nearly 50% higher than those of Britain in absolute numbers! Compared to France, the data are even more impressive. That is because the military expenditures of a small state in Central Europe almost equaled the combined defense budgets of these two major European powers. It is no wonder then that the French commander-in-chief, General Gamelin, saw Czechoslovakia as a strategic asset without which France would be endangering its very existence.

Czechoslovakia’s military industrial complex, including first and foremost the Skoda Works at Pilzen that produced a vast variety of war matériel, was in 1938 second only to that of Germany, but greater than that of France and equivalent to Britain’s entire production of weapons.

Israel

In view of the potential threat on one hand and the lack of a power multiplier in the form of military cooperation agreements on the other, Israeli reliance on military power is absolute and the percentage of GDP devoted to military expenditure, even in “times of peace”, that is, during cease fires between wars, is like that which ordinary states spend in time of war.

In the case of Israel, in addition to a desire for self-reliance, a constant fear of embargo is at work. Like Czechoslovakia, Israel has developed military manufacturing to a level that is unprecedented among democracies of similar size. Israel produces a broad variety of weapons including a main battle tank, missile boats, guided missiles, and detection and control systems that will be the hub of combat on the battlefield of the future. In several of these fields, such as intercepting ground-to-ground missiles, Israel is at the forefront of world technology and appears to be ahead even of the United States.

However, in the course of the last decade, a far-reaching erosion began in Israel’s defense expenditures in contrast to the rapid escalation in the potential strategic threat. The level of threat, calculated by weighing the quantitative and qualitative value of the arms build up of the Arab armies, first and foremost of Egypt, shows a 100% rise in the level of threat.

Not only have Israel’s defense expenditures not grown over the past decade to any degree corresponding to the arms build up of the Arab nations, but in terms of US dollars, there has been a 19% erosion (in 1990 prices) from 7.3 billion in 1985 to 5.9 billion in 1997. In the same period of time, Israel’s per capita GDP doubled. Hence, defense expenditures compared with the GDP have declined by 50%, from 17.4% in 1985 to 8.5% in 1997.31

Thus, we are witnessing a sharp decline in the Israeli response to the potential threat. This situation clearly differs from Czechoslovakia’s level of preparedness and resembles more the Anglo-French defeatism as detailed above. Nevertheless, we must mention again that there is no room for comparison between the level of threat against Israel and the threat against the two European powers at the end of the 1930s.

Israel is, therefore, not ready for the next war. Next to the potential threat that has doubled in the past decade, “the peace process” is affecting Israel negatively, to deny her a decisive power multiplier in the form of strategic assets. Adding insult to injury, Israel has doubled its GDP since 1986, and had it kept up a real level of defense expenditures, it would have been able to allocate the amount of $17 billion to defense in 1997.
Petrified Military Thinking

The moral strength of a society under siege radiates directly to the morale of the army, which in turn makes up an extremely important power multiplier on the battlefield. Here lies the chief difference between the two components of the historical comparison between Czechoslovakia and Israel. While the IDF as a whole, and the reserve forces in particular (see above) have been in a continuous process of demoralization for years, the Czechoslovak army was at the height of its military and moral strength on the eve of the Munich Conference. To this extent the Israeli army differs qualitatively from the resolute readiness for battle that characterized the Czech public and its army. Hence, the comparison with the Czech army is obviously invalid and the self-evident comparison is with the French and British armies.

The Anglo-French response to the German threat was, as we have seen, to constantly inject greater and greater cutbacks on their defense budgets, reduce the size of their military forces, limit the level of military training, and no less grave, develop a petrified mold of military thinking. One of the many examples of this phenomenon was the military doctrine about armored warfare which quickly became the central element in the Wehrmacht's Blitzkrieg. It was a young French officer named Charles de Gaulle who composed a doctrine of armored warfare in 1934. In the defeatist and nihilistic atmosphere of his country, his book, Vers l'arme de métier, did not gain attention. However, in Germany the book became obligatory reading in military schools. The result was Heinz Guderian's Blitzkrieg which was based on the breakthrough capacity of the Panzerdivision, a perfect copy of "the movement of the armored division" that de Gaulle had developed in his book. The series of harsh defeats that the Allies suffered at the beginning of the war did not derive from quantitative or qualitative inferiority of weapons, but from the fossilized and rigid nature of their military doctrine.

The very same process has overtaken the IDF which is in an ongoing process of demoralization in all areas, including military thinking. The gravest expression of this is the absence of any treatment of the critical issue now on Israel's strategic agenda: a return to the 1967 frontiers. In fact, the Israeli army hardly has any military doctrine dealing with the battlefield of the future. The intellectual wasteland among the senior officers corps is depressing. A random glance at the general staff library shows that all the publications of the present Prime Minister, formerly Lieutenant General, Ehud Barak, who has somehow acquired the reputation of being an "intellectual", amount to two short, thin articles (!) of marginal importance, and even these were published in 1985 and 1989. Lieutenant General Amnon Shahak, now a minister in Barak's government, and also a former commander-in-chief of Israel's armed forces, did not publish even one article in his life thus far. The same goes for Major General Yitzhak Mordechai, who, after leaving military service, became a minister in both the Netanyahu and Barak governments. In contrast, the publications of the senior officer corps in Syria and Egypt, which appear in German and American journals, are on a professional level, broad in outlook, and display historical knowledge. In short, they arouse envy. The one and only journal of the IDF is the veteran Ma'arakhot. Once a distinguished military journal, it has deteriorated over the years, and does not even deal with a response to the critical strategic issues facing Israel.32

The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University is the largest and most prestigious of its kind in Israel. The crowning glory of its work is the annual Middle East Military Balance that summarizes once a year the strategic developments in the Middle East.

The Balance has not discussed even once the strategic issue of withdrawal to the 1967 frontiers. The BESA Center for Strategic Studies at Bar Ilan University has published 36 "Security and Policy Studies" over the past twelve years of its existence. Needless to say, not one of these publications has discussed the issue of withdrawal to the 1967 frontiers. And so forth and so on.

★ ★ ★
PART THREE
The Nature of the Enemy

Elsewhere I have discussed in detail the similarity in values and the link between Nazism and Islam.33 Here I will limit myself to main categories only.

War, which in Nazism is at one and the same time a means and a goal, a supreme test of individual self-fulfillment and the destiny of the nation, is identical in the main to the jihad ethos in Islam. In his Mein Kampf, Hitler often spoke of “struggle which is the essence of life”. The expression that he was fond of, “War is the basis of existence,” is not essentially different from the statement in the Muslim Hadith: “Jihad is the peak of faith.” Indeed, jihad as an ethos and the German kampf as an interpretation of social Darwinism, lack a common cultural origin, but the idea of radical imperialism which draws its strength from eschatological destiny, is identical in both cases. If the kampf-jihad ethos is basically one,34 the principles associated with each of them are also alike. One may point to this list of striking parallels:

a. Between Germany’s conquests, especially the drang nach Osten, and the Dar al-Harb (House of War) that Islam must extirpate by jihad;
b. Between Lebensraum (living space) and Dar al-Islam (House of Islam);
c. Between the subjugation of conquered peoples by the Nazis and the Muslim principle of the dhimmī;
d. Between Weltanschauung, the total world outlook of Nazism, and the absolutist thought of Islam;
e. Between the Reich that will spread over the whole world when the day comes, when “the master race of mankind will rule with the favor of the Almighty,” in Hitler’s words, and the select Islamic Umma Muslimadiyya (Nation of Muhammad) that is to spread its “protection” over the whole earth;35
f. Between the Führerprinzip that gives the tyrant absolute rule over the lives of his subjects and the principle of obedience, ta’āh, that obliges the Muslim to obey the ruler blindly;
g. And finally, between the anti-Semitic pathology of Nazism and the hatred of Jews prevalent throughout the Muslim world.

However, from Israel’s point of view, what distinguishes them is greater than what is identical. Fascist totalitarianism in its radical, Nazi expression, when all is said and done, even if it was of one flesh with Western civilization was a deviation from the mainstream of the West’s flow toward democracy. Only time will tell whether the outburst of Nazism in the 1930’s was a one-time aberration, or if the Furor Teutonicus is a recurrent phenomenon. As of now, as well as in the foreseeable future, another outburst of blood thirst of the sort that flooded Europe twice in a historical blink of an eye between 1914 and 1945 is not to be imagined. Germany was subdued and is now a normal democracy for all intents and purposes. Hence, the Czechs can remain calm. As a matter of fact, real estate in the Sudetenland has been purchased by Germans from across the border at an increasing rate (including the Skoda Works in Plzen), but conquest of this kind is preferable of course to Heydrich’s Protektorat.

Needless to say, Islam is a completely different story. Islam is not a passing historical aberration, but a proud civilization, powerful and possessing a following of a billion people spread over three continents; and it is a religion, an ethos, a juridical system and a way of life all in one.

From the dawn of Muslim history, the jihad basically had one purpose: military operations aimed at expanding the sphere of the Islamic domain. Islam was bound by the universal obligation to take control of the entire world by peaceful means if possible, by war if necessary... Jihad is an obligation for all Muslims... In fact, the obligation of jihad remains in force as long as Islamic rule has not spread throughout the entire world, that is, until the end of the world, or until the resurrection. The immediate conclusion is that a state of peace with non-Muslims can only be a temporary matter, which is defined as a cease-fire, but without any obligation on the part of the Muslims not to violate such an agreement, if it is to the advantage of Islam.36

A corollary to the injunction of jihad and its manifestation in politics is the sacred principle of applying waqf [collective holy ownership of property
by the Muslim community) to conquered territory. Territory under waqf forms the Dar al-Islam (House of Islam) which spreads over territories under unchallenged Muslim ascendancy. In contrast, the rest of the world that has not yet been conquered is appropriately termed Dar al-Harb (House of War).

Fourteen million square kilometers, an area twice the size of Europe, stretching between the Atlantic Ocean and the Persian Gulf, is the Arab part of Dar al-Islam where Islam has unchallenged ascendancy in 23 states. Within this vast area that touches on two oceans and three seas, there is only one non-Muslim sovereign entity, the Jewish state. As if this were not enough of an offense against the jihad ethos, not only have the Arabs not been able until now to uproot Israel, but they have been defeated in all of their attempts to destroy the Zionist entity on the battlefield. This insult is too searing and harsh to bear for a culture that worships war as an ethos and violence as a principle.

Hence, Israel is an anomaly that refutes the jihad principle, because even though it is located in the heart of Dar al-Islam, it is at the very same time an extreme expression of Dar al-Harb. Hence, the conventional Arab labels for the Jewish state, such as “cancer in the body of the Arab nation” (Sadat) or “dagger in the heart of the Arabs” (Mubarak), may grate the Israeli ear but they are apt and accurate from the Arab point of view.

Therefore, it is not Israel’s borders that occasion Arab hostility – a manifestly groundless claim since Israel holds only about 1/500 part of the area of the Arab Dar al-Islam, but Israel’s very existence. Bassam Abu-Sharif, a PLO spokesman, stated the matter clearly: “The struggle against the Zionist enemy is not a matter of borders, rather it has to do with the very existence of the Zionist entity.”

This is why the Czechoslovak episode was temporary in character and vanished with the passing of Nazism, but the Israeli issue is permanently pending. This situation will not change as long as the Islamic ethos does not change.

A Few Words in Defense of Chamberlain

Defeatism, as indicated above, is a structural flaw in democracies that face an ideological struggle against a dictatorship. There is no more disastrous example of this than that embodied in the personality of Chamberlain. Nevertheless, those who habitually draw a comparison between Chamberlain and Israeli leaders since Camp David (and more intensely since Oslo) must remember a series of arguments that fundamentally refute such a comparison. First of all, we should not forget that no one in Britain, including Winston Churchill and his supporters, feared that the fate of their country was at stake. The rise of Germany as a continental superpower sharply contradicted the British doctrine adopted as early as the Congress of Vienna in 1815 after the bitter lesson of the Napoleonic Wars.

There are grounds to argue that the British Prime Minister deluded himself that the Munich pact would give his country two years of respite for hastened rearmament. Consequently, when Chamberlain handed over Czechoslovakia, “a faraway country” of which “we know nothing”, as he claimed with a great measure of truth, there was at least some justification for his act of treachery. Hitler was an Anglophile, and cooperation between Berlin and London was meant, among other things, to serve as a barrier against the danger of Bolshevization of Europe. As every reader of Mein Kampf knew, this was one of the keystones of Hitler’s geo-strategic conception.

That is why any comparison between the potential threat to Britain at the end of the 1930s with the present threat against Israel, is clearly unfounded. It follows that any comparison between Chamberlain and any Israeli Prime Minister since Menahem Begin is a grave insult to the memory of the British statesman.

...and in Defense of Benes

An attempt to focus the historical watershed on one isolated event should properly lead us to Hradcany Castle on September 27, 1938, the eve of the Munich Conference. The government of national unity headed by General Syrovy, in office for four days, together with the general staff, forced on Dr. Eduard Benes, president of the Republic, a stormy meeting in which they warned of the results to be expected from his defeatist policy. They categorically demanded a fight at any price “be the results as they may.”
As described above, the army’s demand to fight did not only derive from exalted patriotic feelings. It was the fruit of thorough, objective examination of the balance of forces. Furthermore, readiness to fight was the purpose for the existence of the national unity government headed by Syrov, which had replaced Hodza’s defeatist government on the 23rd of the month. Hence, Syrov was now the faithful representative of national consensus. He faced an isolated president who lacked public backing, and who served at most as a tool in the hands of Chamberlain and Daladier who were about to sacrifice Czechoslovakia to the Nazi Moloch at Munich two days later.

But Benes still succeeded in placing his historic authority on the scales, and overcame the Prime Minister and the army. He was to describe the meeting in later years and explain his motives:

Their words upset me. I hesitated, but after further consideration, I answered them decisively and firmly. It is good that you came, and you did right when you spoke as a Czechoslovak soldier should speak... It is an honor to the Czechoslovak army. You are right; our people wants what you demand... However, my situation is different from yours. I am not only the supreme commander of the army, but also the president and representative of the whole nation. As president, I must see the domestic and international situation, all the factors that are now at work, and all the results that our steps might bring about.

It would not be difficult to reject Benes’ considerations with the argument that by his deed he had sealed the fate of the Czechoslovak nation. There is no doubt that the defeatism of his government, its readiness to surrender to the Franco-British dictate, were what brought about the constant escalation in Hitler’s demands. Benes’ allies abandoned him and their hypocrisy cannot be forgiven, but it was his country that would be the first to pay the price of Franco-British treachery. Therefore, it was first of all Eduard Benes’ national duty, more than that of the British and French Prime Ministers, to resolutely draw red lines, to exploit the superior balance of forces, and to go to war as long as it was possible, on the absolutely reasonable assumption that Germany’s defeat was assured.

The end of September 1938 for Czechoslovakia was to a great extent the end of May 1967 for Israel. Egypt and Syria had openly declared a war of extermination against Israel, Jordan joined the Arab coalition under Egyptian command, and France betrayed an ally in keeping with her time-honored, sacred habit. Washington was wriggling out of a written agreement on account of which Israel had been expelled a decade earlier from Sinai, the world community was holding a funeral for the Jewish state, the government was hesitant, the Prime Minister hemmed and hawed, and the commander-in-chief (Yitzhak Rabin) collapsed. Nevertheless, when the Israel Army commanders threw their insignia of rank on Levi Eshkol’s table one after the other, the IDF initiated a preventive war, and the rest is told in the books of Israel’s history.

However, one may consider Benes’ words of September 27 from another vantage point. It is an indisputable fact that compared to other states under Nazi occupation, Czechoslovakia got off almost unharmed. The episode of the Lidice massacre, after the attempt on Heydrich’s life, was the exception that proves the rule. Prague, with all the beauties of its architecture, remained as it was, and it is sufficient to compare its fate with that of Warsaw, Stalingrad, and Rotterdam. Sixty thousand Czechs died in the war, a marginal number compared to the losses suffered by the other occupied countries. The crumbling of the Czechoslovak army, after the Munich pact, prevented it from suffering the fate of the armies that stood up against the Nazis. For that reason, the number of victims in the army (6,000) was statistically insignificant.

After the war, it was indeed Czechoslovakia’s bad luck to become part of the Communist bloc. But the national fabric of the state had not been destroyed and its borders were almost unchanged. To the contrary, the thorough expulsion of the 3,000,000 Sudeten Germans in 1946 brought about a more intense ethnic consolidation. The separation from Slovakia in 1993 was carried out by mutual agreement. The Czech Republic today is a nation at peace, living in security, with no strategic threat to menace its tranquillity.
With ghastly historical irony, Benes’ surrender to Franco-British defeatism did in fact bring the horrors of the Second World War upon the continent. But others paid the price, most of all the Jews of Europe. At this historical juncture, the history of Czechoslovakia separates from the history of the Jewish state. This is because the means for historical comparison no longer apply. Czechoslovakia is just another European nation whose fate summoned her to stand at a historical crossroads. In contrast, Israel’s fate cannot be examined, and even less can it be understood, without scrutinizing the Jewish anomaly upon which accepted standards for judging relations between states collapse like a house of cards.

The Jewish Anomaly
It was Golda Meir who understood and internalized the kernel of the Israeli dilemma:

I have never doubted for an instant that the true aim of the Arab states has always been, and still is, the total destruction of the State of Israel or that even if we had gone back far beyond the 1967 lines to some miniature enclave, they would not still have tried to eradicate it and us... It is our duty to realize the truth; it is our duty to make it clear to all men of good will who tend to ignore it. We need to realize this truth in all its gravity, so that we may continue to mobilize from ourselves and from the Jewish people all the resources necessary to overcome our enemies.\(^{35}\)

Every word of the above-quoted statement is still valid today. Even more than before. The Orwellian slogan “peace process” is no more than a device to have Israel retreat to the 1967 frontiers as an interim stage on the way to reducing Israel to the Partition Plan lines as a preparation for her final destruction.

The sacrifice of Czechoslovakia to the Nazi Moloch was an evil act of political shortsightedness, but no more than that. The sacrifice of Israel by the Christian West to the Arab Moloch corresponds to the Judeo-phobia that is a Christian principle. It is the sacrament. Hence, from an overall historical perspective, the Christian West’s readiness to see the Jewish state in ruins in the Land of Israel is a direct continuation of Christianity’s collaboration in the murder of the Jews during the Nazi epoch.

Nevertheless, anti-Semitism is only one facet of Israel’s history. The other facet, which is the kernel of the Jewish tragedy, is Jewry’s readiness to collaborate with the hangmen up to the point of internalizing Judeo-phobia, and transforming self-hatred into a powerful tool for destroying the nation’s instinct for survival. This phenomenon has no counterpart in history, even less so in the Czechoslovakia of the late 1930s. Jean Amery defined this accurately: If for 2,000 years they tell you that you have a crooked nose, then you have a crooked nose. The Exile broke the back of the Jew at the crucial point of national existence. The critical mass required for the existence of the nation withered and in its place arose peculiar mutations, the most lethal one of them being Jewish radicalism in its cosmopolitan guise, which basically consisted of destroying the national fabric on the altar of messianic utopianism tragically embodied by Shimon Peres. The Israeli Left is the offspring of the Jewish radicals, loyalists of the Internationale, loyal to the verses: “The old world to its foundations we shall destroy / Today [we are] nothing, tomorrow everything.” Now as then, they come to destroy. And at the same time they are the destroyers of the Jewish people’s instinct of self-preservation. They are the begetters of the “Palestinian state”, which is to be the funeral for the dream of Jewish sovereignty in the Land of Israel.

The Sudeten Germans identified with Nazism were a Fifth Column, an enemy. And that is how every Czech saw them, every Czech from the man in the street to the president of the Republic. Yet, the Sudeten Germans never presented a political program that contained even a hint of their desire to destroy Czechoslovakia, and when they dared to raise the demand to change Prague’s diplomatic orientation, they were outlawed and their leaders were expelled to Berlin.

We reiterate that the PLO is a terrorist organization whose entire purpose is the destruction of the Jewish state, and it is openly and avowedly committed to this through its covenant/constitution, through its symbol which is the map of
the Land of Israel west of the Jordan, and through its political program which is “The Plan of Stages”. According to this plan, the role of the “Palestinian state” is to serve as a springboard for the Arab nations in their war against Israel. This was the situation before the Oslo agreements, and it remains the situation after the agreements. The PLO has not changed its covenant by so much as one single letter. Nor has it changed the “The Plan of Stages” or its symbol. Needless to say, Israel’s leaders never consider demanding that the PLO make such changes. Arafat presents the Oslo agreements on the “Palestinian Authority’s” television station as a sophisticated stratagem of tactical deception toward the strategic goal, which was and remains the destruction of Israel. Therefore, he calls day and night, in open proclamation, for jihad against the Jewish state. But when the tape cassettes of the PLO chief’s incitement were brought before Peres, he claimed that they were fakes. It was Arafat himself who contradicted Peres and admitted that the cassettes were genuine... After the withdrawal from Hebron in January 1997, Arafat said, while conducting the rhythmic screaming of an incited mob (“In spirit and blood we will liberate you, O Filastin”), that “The liberation of Hebron paves the way to the liberation of al-Quds.” (Jerusalem in Arabic, from the Hebrew ha-Qodesh). Netanyahu responded to this open declaration of war with great satisfaction. He defined the pronouncement as “moderate remarks”, and even saw fit to add: “Arafat is speaking peace.”

In the two-year period following Oslo, the Palestinian Arab terrorist organizations murdered 160 Israelis, half of them children and teenagers, with the vociferous encouragement of Arafat. Statistically, this represents a 745% increase in the number of victims of terrorism over the yearly average of such victims in the years before Oslo. That is, not only did the agreements not bring peace, but they caused death and destruction, in short war. After all, 160 Israeli victims are equivalent to 6,400 American victims. The number of fatalities in the attack on Pearl Harbor was less than 2,400, but this number was enough to bring about a declaration of war on Japan. That is how the United States operates. In Israel, the victims of Arab murder are called “victims of peace” (Yitzhak Rabin), while Arafat himself wins the status of an Israeli “culture hero”. For example, a group of IDF officers, headed by Maj. Gen. (res.) Shlomo Lahat, visited Arafat in Gaza and went away “captivated by the charm of the Palestinian leader”.

It is true that Hitler too charmed many in his time. Gertrude Stein, an American Jewish poetess living in Paris, collected the signatures of 200 gens d’esprit on a petition calling for the Nobel Peace Prize to be given to Hitler. (Let it be said that not all 200 were Jews.) Leon Blum wrote in Le Populaire (the organ of the Socialist Party) that every man and woman in France would pay his or her just tribute of gratitude to Chamberlain and Daladier for their accomplishment at Munich. (Blum, a Jew, wrote this remark in December 1938, that is, after Kristallnacht.) Charles Lindbergh gushed with enthusiasm for Hermann Goering and the Luftwaffe, while George Bernard Shaw rejected the criticism brought against the Führer. The European Right sang songs of praise to “the great architect of the New Germany”, and even the massacre of the “Night of Long Knives” was seen as a necessary step that had brought Germany back to the path of law and order.

Adolf Hitler won the status of the greatest war criminal only from the historical perspective of Treblinka and Auschwitz. Yet at the end of the 1930s, the chancellor of Germany was still the leader of the country of Dichter und Denker, of poets and philosophers. Not Eichmann or Kaltenbrunner, nor Himmler nor Hess, was the representative of the German spirit at that time. Rather Goethe and Schiller, Kant and Hegel, Bach and Beethoven stood for German culture in the world’s mind.

But Arafat? The chieftain of a terrorist gang serves as the leader of the PLO, an organization outlawed in Israeli law where it is defined as “criminal and terrorist”. Mihai Pacepa, an official of the Romanian Securitate, recounts in his book of memoirs (Red Horizons) how, after he was forced to shake hands with Arafat, he scrubbed his hands with soap and hot water to get rid of the feeling of nausea that had overcome him. This was a Romanian security official. Compare him with Israel’s leaders who hug the hangman of their
people and constantly shower him with compliments.

This was how Arafat became the playboy of the Israeli public. Members of the Knesset make pilgrimage to him; “peace” movements of various sorts lobby his secretaries for an interview with him. A photo with Arafat is considered an enviable asset; Israel’s authors tell his praises, Jewish court journalists sing him paeans; Peres and Netanyahu embrace him and warmly shake his hand while proclaiming the stalwart friendship between them. Shimon Peres, intending to add force to his yearning for a “Palestinian state”, has been calling Arafat “Mr. President” for some time.

Likewise, this emerges among the elites and the grass roots.

An overwhelming majority of 75% among the Israeli public accepts or supports the establishment of a “Palestinian state”, a majority of 65% support withdrawal from part of the Golan Heights. The national consensus over Jerusalem, that only yesterday was seen as a place to fight for and do or die, has also unraveled. A quickly increasing minority supports a return to the 1967 lines. Not even three months had passed after the change in government in June 1996, and Netanyahu was shaking Arafat’s hand. Netanyahu, the complete opportunist, attuned to the public mood, knew what he was doing. Eighty-two percent of the Jewish public in Israel supported the handshake. The withdrawal from Hebron and the handing over of the City of the Patriarchs — the ancient symbol of Jewish possession of the Land of Israel — to the Arabs meant openly declaring a future concession on Jerusalem. Moreover, for the first time in the history of Israel, Jews have set up with their own hands a Jewish ghetto surrounded by a wall, in their own homeland. But a clear majority of 72% (an average of newspaper surveys) among the Jewish public supported this radical step by Netanyahu’s government. When Netanyahu was asked about the surprising turnabout of 180 degrees in his political-diplomatic outlook, he responded cynically: “The ideological concepts we grew up believing are not all within reach anymore.”

Thus Netanyahu has become the mouthpiece (unwittingly?) of a large constituency that is preparing for itself the “instruments of exile”. Consider Nuri Gertz who states that “the true past, and therefore the true future as well, belongs in this country to the Arab and not to the Jew.” Or MK Naomi Hazan, for whom “Jerusalem is the most important Palestinian city.” Or Assaf Hefetz, Chief Inspector of the Police, after issuing an order to drive Jews off of the Temple Mount on Tisha B’Av: “The Temple Mount is not worth fighting for.” Or MK Anat Ma’or who went to a PLO demonstration in Jericho and wrapped herself in a PLO flag. Or that same Yossi Beilin who saw Judea and Samaria, the cradle of the Hebrew nation, as follows: “The Bank [i.e., West Bank] is a curse and a superfluous burden... it is an abscess that has to be removed.” Or MK Yael Dayan who declared, while on a Knesset visit to Germany (May 22, 1995): “The Palestinians are our victims and we have an obligation to them just as you Germans have an obligation toward the Jews who were your victims.” Or Gad Ya’aqobi, who declared while he was Israeli ambassador to the UN: “There is no Jewish Land; there is only Jewish people.” Or Yitzhak Rabin, according to whom the Land of Israel was “real estate”, and the Bible was “an ancient land ownership register...”

So forth and so on. What wonder is it then that Yeshayahu Leibovitz, after calling members of the kibbutzim “Gestapo soldiers”, and after calling his country — in an unoriginal, rather unphilosophical parroting of the Soviets and other Communists — a “Judeo-Nazi state”, reached the conclusion that “Hitler was an exemplary moral personality.”

This grotesque display has no counterpart in the history of the nations of the world. It occasions very somber thoughts to the effect that perhaps the Jews are worthy of Hegel’s sarcastic remark: “The Jewish tragedy does not arouse fear and pity in me, but contempt.”

This is why the Arab and Western slogan, “territory for peace,” is a copy literally and in content of Hitler’s slogan at the “peace negotiations” that he conducted with nations that he wanted to erase from the face of the earth. This principle is actually being put into effect in the relationship between the State of Israel and those who want to destroy her, and even more intensely. This is because the one and only thing that Israel
cannot give is territory, just as the one and only thing that the Arabs are incapable of giving is peace.

Under the special conditions of the Middle East, where “either you dine or you are part of the menu,” and where “the number of signed agreements is exactly identical to the number of signed agreements that have been violated,” — as Shimon Peres said at one of the moments of grace when he returned for a fleeting second to the reality of our region, — Israel will survive only if it can radiate a combination of power and menace sufficient to root out of her enemies’ hearts the will to destroy her. Or at least to put off their schemes until the end of days. This is not especially joy-inspiring news against the background of the messianic enthusiasm of “peace in our time”, yet it is fitting to bear in mind that the history of the Jewish people never presented a choice between bad and good, but between bad and less bad. The State of Israel does not escape from this rule, and for that reason, the choice facing her is to live by the sword or not to live at all.

We are the generation of settlement in the land, and without a helmet and the mouth of a cannon, we cannot plant a tree or build a house... Let us not be deterred from seeing the rancor that consumes and fills the lives of hundreds of thousands of Arabs who live around us. Let us not turn our eyes away lest our hands grow weak. This is the decree for our generation. The vital choice for us — is to be ready and armed, strong and stubborn, or the sword will fall from our fist and our lives will be cut off.  

Despite the rhetorical phrasing, these words have not lost their validity. The truth embodied in each one of them a generation ago fits well into the reality of our lives today, with the sole exception that “hundreds of thousands of Arabs” have become millions. Because if, God forbid, “the sword will fall from our fist...our lives will be cut off.”
THE BEGINNING OF THE END?

Yosef Ben-Shlomo

Shortly before his death, Natan Alterman, poet of the Labor movement, warned against the danger that, “the State of Israel would cause us to forget the Land of Israel.”

Ten years before the establishment of the State of Israel, Berl Katznelson, conscience of the Labor movement, also spoke with foreboding: “Let us not abandon the mystique of the historic Land of Israel for the mystique of the Jewish state.”

Neither imagined that the Jewish state itself would be the agent responsible for the removal of the very basis of the Zionist enterprise which had nourished the idea of Palhood. Neither Alterman nor Katznelson could possibly have conceived that the Jewish state would, of its own free will, surrender the Land of Israel by virtue of its authority as the State of Israel.

Until the covert beginning of this process, whose terrible overt ripening is now taking place before our eyes, the whole Zionist enterprise stood on the solid basis of its claim to “the historically Jewish Land of Israel”, whether or not we actually had it in our hands. The source of the moral strength and material success of secular Zionism was in the continuity of this historical consciousness. This continuity includes the words of Simon the Hasmonaean who declared:

We have not taken a foreign land and we have not ruled over the property of foreigners, but it is the estate of our forefathers that was unjustly in the hands of our enemies at one time that has been conquered.

This continuity proceeded through to Ben-Gurion’s proclamation that “the Bible is our mandate to the Land,” an assertion not religious-metaphysical but an historical-moral claim of “the right of the Jewish people in its land”. This continuity even found expression through the younger Ezer Weizman, who concluded:

It is not within the authority of the Jewish people as a whole that is now living with us today to give up any part of the Land; this is the right of the Jewish nation over the generations, a right that cannot be confiscated under any conditions… no concession of this kind is binding, nor does it oblige the Jewish people.1

This is more than a political position which can be changed (as when Ben-Gurion himself changed), but the basic outlook of Zionism which is now being liquidated. The qualitative breakdown does not lie within one political decision of a certain government but in a change of national consciousness that has led to it, an ongoing movement of what was once on the fringe of the ideological fringes, to the political center; the delegitimization of the very supra-political dimension of Zionism as if it were the affair of “fanatics”, “enemies of peace” and “messianic madmen”. It includes the transforming of phrases like, “Our right to the Land, over the Land as a whole stands forever”2 into dirty words that even the leader of the parliamentary opposition dare not speak in the Knesset against the “peace” agreement.

This internal ideological reversal is the source of the treachery that was Oslo. This was not a crime of treason against the State of Israel (the legal punishment for which would be death if Greater Jerusalem was also handed over in Oslo) but against the Land of Israel and against the future of our
existence in the Land for years to come. If, in the distant past, the life of the Biblical people of Israel in its Land began in Jericho, then its end began in Jericho too. That willing concession at the very heart of the Land of Israel, for the first time in the history of the State, and the transfer of Jewish settlers which will come in its wake without a doubt, (reluctantly or by force) is the beginning of the liquidation of the Zionist enterprise as a whole, which will end “not with a bang but a whimper”, with the weak-willed whine of the gradually defeated in a struggle that has lost its historical justification, or the feeble spiritual atrophy of promising a “Singapore of the Middle East”, in the vision of Shimon Peres, the former Prime Minister of a Jewish government. Through whichever path we take toward this end, it will become clear that the philosopher Hermann Cohen was right when he passed sentence on Zionism as “a passing episode in the history of the Jewish people”. And perhaps Franz Rosenzweig did well to prophesy that

When the Zionists achieve their Serbia, Bulgaria, or Montenegro in the Land of Israel, and even if they succeed in bringing all the Jews to their state, no Jewish people will be left in the world 200 years later...

This terrible vision is not a warning against the military/security danger implied by a withdrawal to “The Auschwitz Lines”. After all, it may be argued, who are we to challenge the expertise of “five commanders-in-chief and the hero of the Six Day War” et al. who supported the Oslo Accords? This is not even a reference to the historical experience of a “policy of appeasement” which taught us just how immoral was the hysterical aspiration to “peace in our time”. (In Hebrew that translates as “Peace Now”.) In the words of another conscience of the Labor movement:

In this idealistic attitude toward the world, in the dreams of little girls and these beautiful souls, which have no foundation in the deepest instincts of man, there is a kind of immorality, yes, immorality... Damned are the soft and the lovers!

The fate of the Zionist enterprise and the State of Israel will be sealed, in the last analysis, by abandoning parts of the Land of Israel, because a political entity will not last long without a moral basis, (and all the more so the Jewish state). Colonialism is no longer acceptable at the end of the twentieth century, and by removing the moral basis of Zionism, we transform it into merely colonialism, and with that goes the loss of the moral right of the people of Israel, the Jewish people, to live anywhere in “Palestine” they choose.

Of course, one may deny the above moral premise and adopt a “pragmatic, Machiavellian” position, but it is precisely the proponents of the “peace” agreement who base themselves on a moral argument when trying to ensure the national right of the “Palestinian people” to its homeland, whereas they discuss the right of the Jewish people to continued existence in the part of the Land of Israel on the basis of security interests guaranteed by our physical strength alone. Consider the standard response to the question, “And what will happen if the Arabs continue to challenge the right of the Jewish state to exist?” Why, “We have the strongest army in the Middle East.” Ironically, it is the “anti-fascists” well-known for their self-righteousness who posit the authority of the state, its laws, and its decisions, as the only source validating the right of our ownership over the country solely “within the 1967 borders”. It is they who transform the right of history and values into a right for this political-factual entity of the state. This atheism is much more dangerous than a position which treats the Bible as the source of moral validity for the Jews to live anywhere in the Land of Israel. The irony becomes grotesque in the spectacle that is now emerging as if by divination, the specter of a “Territorialist Zionism”, the preservation of the area of a state as the exclusive goal of Zionism. In this view, the State is a purpose in and of itself, and not the political means to achieve the redemption of the people in its historic homeland. In this view, there is no importance to “trees and stones” in the Land of Israel, none as the “heritage of the forefathers”. The State of the Jews can exist, in principle, in Uganda, as was once suggested, or in “Palestine, it doesn’t matter”.

This Zionism without Zion and Jerusalem (Jerusalem as “occupied territory” too), transforms Jewish nationalism into colonialism. Consider a
small but typical example: At the start of the Intifada in 1987, the IDF commander-in-chief brought before the officers of the general staff, Alistair Horne’s, *Savage War for Peace*, a book describing the failure of the French army in Algeria, in order to prove that a popular uprising like this had no military solution. This may be true when foreign colonists are at issue who have a homeland from which they came and to which they can return. In this view, the Jews living in Beit El, Hebron, Anathoth and Shilo have their homeland across the “Green Line” and thus deserve to be expelled from the “occupied territories” like the French colonialists in Algeria who were expelled to France.

But moral principle has no lines, green or otherwise. Colonialism applies to every place where a foreign people rules occupied territories in a land not its own, which must include Sheyk Munis (Ramat Aviv), Katamon and in Ba’a in Jerusalem, Ashdod and Ramla — not to mention the land on which rest seventy-five HaShomer HaTza’ir kibbutzim. Why are we not colonialists in these places, if we are in places whose Jewish historical meaning is beyond doubt? This naive question, which is completely rational, has not been answered morally, only by an argument based on force. If we share the status of French settlers in Algeria anywhere in the Land of Israel, then our fate is decided for ill everywhere in the Land of Israel, and we will have to go back, not to the remainder of the “Occupied Territory” (Israel 1949-1967) but to the places where our fathers came from, to Poland and Morocco, as suggested by the mayor of Tulkarem.

It is semantic prostitution to say that territories are “occupied” only if they were conquered in war in 1967, whereas they are “liberated” if they were conquered in war in 1948. Only the Orwellian use of language emasculates the exact meaning of the word: occupied territory is every place that was taken by military force from the control of its inhabitants, all the more so when they were driven away from it, directly or indirectly, after hundreds of years of dwelling there, like Sheyk Munis, on whose ruins the professors at Tel-Aviv University write steely sharp articles “against the occupation”. Indeed, there are already those, especially young people, who understand this truth, and are not ready to accept the double standard of people (among them leaders of “Peace Now”) who live in houses from which Arab residents were driven out, like those in the Jerusalem neighborhoods like the German Colony, Ba’a and Abu-Tor, who cry out, “End the occupation!” against those who live in tiny, poured concrete houses in Kedumim, Talmon, Har Brakha (Mount Gerizim), on hills that were a barren wilderness. Out of intellectual fairness and disgust with hypocrisy, they have already arrived at the conclusion: the entire State of Israel was born in sin and will die in sin, and the previous owners of “Palestine” will come to settle in it.

This is the reason why the cession of Judea and Samaria means the cession of Zionism itself, the beginning of the end, the moral and perhaps the physical death of the State of Israel itself. This is not simply because without those territories we will be confined to the coastal strip, twelve kilometers from the sea, and that Ben-Gurion Airport at Lod would fall under enemy artillery range, etc. Rather, this is so because by our settling in these places, and only by living in them, can our right to live anywhere at all in the Land of Israel crystallize in a kind of physical process of chemical refinement. Ours is a net moral right independent of UN decisions or even the consensus of most citizens of Israel or the support of Diaspora Jewish leaders. Nor even on the basis of the agreement of the Palestinian Arabs and the Arab states achieved only through military force majeure, and by no means via the justice of our claim to a part of Land conquered from them.

The source of validity of this claim, and not of a mere given reality, is located here, in Judea and Samaria, not in Tel Aviv. Therefore, the moral justification of the Jewish people’s ownership of the Land of Israel, in part or in whole, will stand or fall in Judea and Samaria. The nations of the world know this better than we do, and only on that basis can we explain their energetic, very aggressive resistance to our settling in those places where our possession is based purely on the right of historical justification. The oh-so very uniform condemnation of “settlements” — and here no one denies that “the whole world is against us” — is not really a political position. After all, in this world, political facts have been determined by “settle-
ments”, from the Sudetenland to the Falkland Islands. Rather, the condemnations flow from an ideological objection: The Jewish people does not have the right of ownership over the Land of Israel, except to the extent and in the place that others decide.

We are told that Zionism succeeded by making concessions and compromises. True enough, but the concessions were made out of compulsion, and the compromises because of pressures. The reversal that has taken place since those concessions is not political, but a philosophical transformation. The inner attitude toward the Land of Israel has changed, and even if “peace people” do not admit it, their joy, or their silence and indifference, testify to their real feelings. Consider, once again, what Berl Katznelson said about the readiness, even if under compulsion, to agree to accept only a part of the Land of Israel, when we did not have sovereignty over any part of the Land, when he spoke here about “our actual Hebron”, not about Jaffa or the Galilee:

There are situations without a choice, perhaps there is coercion to withdraw, perhaps coercion to come to a compromise with the enemy. I am not with those who fence themselves in with rejection of any compromise in political life. Perhaps even capitulation because of lack of an alternative. But I would like first of all that we face the truth. In order for a compromise out of coercion not to become a blow that has no remedy, we must know that it is a compromise, and in order that the forced submission not become a crushing defeat, we must know that it is a submission. But if you see that a compromise is interpreted as a desirable striving upwards, and submission as a brilliant victory, then you are forced to think: Maybe there was nothing coercive in it at all; and only because of an optical illusion and magical enticement do we march towards the abyss and think that we are ascending onto a bridge. A movement that is required to give in on its most essential rights or on its deepest hopes, owes itself clear knowledge about just what it is giving up. And if its senses are healthy, it will feel the pain of the concessions, even if they were coerced; it will feel them in its depths. But if in order to make the concessions easier on ourselves, we depreciate their value, then we oppress ourselves; to the material concession we add self-deception and leave ourselves defenseless and ripe for plunder.7

This is what has happened to us today. The official, legitimate representatives of the Jewish state willingly surrender not “assets that were not actually in our possession, tracts of land that we knew from a book”, (in Berl Katznelson’s definition of “the love of our homeland over the generations”) but lands that are in our actual possession, acknowledging to the peoples of the world that our concession is from now and forever, (unless the other side spoils the deal) “and we get both shame and war,” in Churchill’s memorable phrase.

One wonders: Do those who did this deed know of Katznelson’s definition of “submission”? Is not this “self-deception through systematic brainwashing”? Do they realize that “we are marching toward the abyss” when they see submission as “a brilliant victory”? Do the “peace” makers feel pain over the concessions? The playboys of Israeli politics sat in Oslo without the Land of Israel in their hearts but with State Department business in their heads, “in a pleasant atmosphere and the good wines helped”, (quoting the Norwegian Foreign Minister on the BBC) and they sold out the country of the Jewish people without a single twinge of pain. It was enough to look at their exultant faces to realize that, and the broad, smug smiles of the ministers of Israel’s government (including the commander-in-chief) in a photograph after the decision was made, gave official approval to this joy.

The late Prime Minister spoke to the whole world and said not one word about the pain caused by giving up parts of the homeland. He expressed fear only about the security risk. The Knesset debate over Oslo ended with the cry of the prostitute who shouted at Solomon “Cut the baby!” after which Israel’s parliament returned to business as usual, to smiles between government and opposition members. Indeed, afterwards, ministers and their retinues sat down to drink and eat with their “Palestinian” counterparts, and during the dinner,
smugly sketched on paper the cut-up parts of the “West Bank”. We saw with our own eyes, and we heard, and the world saw and heard, and not one of our cities was embarrassed, as the “Palestinians” continue to sing. “In spirit and blood, we will redeem you, O Palestine... O, Ramlah,” and not Ramallah.

Whereas among us, in a flood of articles and interviews, not one leader of public opinion raised the question, over the heads of our joy, about the loss of the heart of our country. Government officials continue to lie insolently (and perhaps, foolishly, if not in their minds, then in their hearts) that Jerusalem “will remain united and our eternal capital” — what every intelligent person understands as no more than cheap talk. And once again, former fringe people now openly express what was once covert but will become reality in the not so distant future, and they speak clearly the likes of which was never spoken in the entire history of Israel, that the time has also come “to shatter the myth of Jerusalem, that it has no security value”, and in fact to begin to do that if not all at once, then with small punctures.8

Self-deception. The “joy” spreads from the government to the public. Instead of pain, there are celebrations and parties, singing and dancing, and the mirth of a beautiful-soul of someone who spoke of

the police of Palestine who will evacuate settlers who tried to conquer a trash dump next to Bethel. Let them take half of the [Western] Wall too and use it to pulverize five stones.”

In the prophetic words of another Hebrew poet:

Why will we fear death — and its angel rides on our shoulders

And his bit in our lips.

And with a fanfare of revival on lips and with playful neighing We will roam to the grave.9

I added a question mark to the title of this piece, although my intellect does not know how to deal with it, and I pray that someone will learn how, because I have not really internalized it. I wrote an article with quotations from T.S. Eliot and Haim Nahman Bialik, instead of tearing my clothes and screaming a great and bitter scream.
A PALESTINIAN STATE AND ISRAELI PUBLIC OPINION

Sarit Yalov

The most comprehensive research regarding the Israeli public’s security concerns and the diplomatic process was conducted by Professor Moshe Arian of Tel Aviv University’s Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies. Arian has, since the 1980s, reviewed these issues annually. The continuity and uniformity of his research provide him a high level of reliability as a faithful reflector of Israel’s public pulse.

The following four tables bring together public opinion regarding Jerusalem, the Golan Heights and a Palestinian state. They illustrate a clear picture of a process of ongoing defeatism gnawing away at the nation’s fortitude, a process which has even gathered momentum since the signing of the Oslo Accords on September 13, 1993.

**Table 1**

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Until the mid-1980s, the PLO was taboo in the eyes of most Israelis. Contact with this terror organization was prohibited by law and undertaken exclusively by radical leftist groups. The main objective of the Peace For Galilee campaign of 1982 was finally to eradicate the PLO, yet, ironically, the PLO achieved an even greater legitimacy in Israeli circles as a result of that war, and by 1987, despite the ban on meeting PLO members, 33% of the public now supported contacts with it. This figure doubled within 7 years. Data from various sources for 1997, not yet fully analyzed, indicate that close to 80% of the population support negotiations with the PLO.

**Table 2**

Should Israel agree, as a part of a peace agreement, that a Palestinian state be established?

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A Palestinian state, even more than the PLO itself, was deemed until recently a mortal threat to Israel’s existence. Israel’s Foreign Ministry would distribute information pamphlets that portrayed the Palestinian state as an Arab initiative for the extinction of the Jewish state and as a way-station in the PLO “doctrine of stages” ["Phased Plan"] that would serve as the location for the convening of the confrontation states in their war against Israel.

The PLO’s creeping legitimization went hand in hand with the gradual legitimacy granted to the concept of a Palestinian state. If support in 1987 was 22%, by 1996, every second Jew in Israel supported such an idea.

However, the most important piece of data is not how many “support” but the number of those who “believe” that in any case the state will be established. By 1996, the data showed 80% agreeing with this latter assumption. This faithfully reflects
the field reality. That same year only 3-5% considered that the attitude of the Palestinians towards Israel was positive. Thus, the coming to terms with a Palestinian state, in stark opposition to the national interest, is fatalistic testimony which seeps down deep within the Israeli public.

**Table 3**

 Should Israel conduct talks with the PLO on the subject of East Jerusalem?

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**Table 4**

 Should Israel return the Golan Heights to Syria in the framework of a peace agreement and the establishing of security arrangements?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The issues of Jerusalem and the Golan Heights go directly to the roots of national existence. Jerusalem is the concentration of the Jewish ethos; the Golan Heights represents the defensive dam over the north, protecting it from the Syrian threat. It is not surprising then, that in these two matters there was firm national agreement that continued for over two decades following the Six-Day War. Public opinion polls relating to these issues were not undertaken, since only the radical Left, functionally traitorous, dared to go beyond the bounds of the consensus.

Beginning in 1986, a gnawing away vis-à-vis Jerusalem began and accelerated erosion in the connection with the Golan Heights. The first sampling on the question of Jerusalem was performed in 1990. Within six years, those willing to support negotiations over East Jerusalem grew by 30%.

As for the Golan Heights, there was a doubling of those supporting the return of the Golan to Syria, from 14% to 27%, in the decade between 1986 and 1996.

A clear trend exists which characterizes these public opinion polls: a significant increase in change takes place whenever newly legitimized concepts touching on matters of fundamental disagreement are brought up for diplomatic discussions. This is reflected in Table 1. If the same pattern accompanies serious negotiations with the Syrians over the Golan Heights and with the PLO over Jerusalem, we can expect an incremental jump in public support for withdrawing from the Golan and dividing Jerusalem. If the rate of increase is similar to that in Tables 1 and 2, we can expect that by the year 2000, an overwhelming majority of Israelis will support retreat from the Golan, with half willing to hand over Jerusalem to the Arabs.

**A Note on Methodology**

The skewing of poll results by the asking of tendentious questions has been with us since polling began. It is the essence of polls commissioned by interested and ideologically committed parties. Yet even in an attempt to be objective in his questions a pollster like Arian is not able to avoid being purposeful, even if he is innocent of conscious question-skewing. His language is Israel's Orwellian narrative in that leading questions are inseparable from the country's spiritual experience.

For example, "Should Israel return the Golan Heights within the framework of a peace treaty and the establishing of security arrangements?", is one thing, and another thing, at the same time. How can Israel obtain peace after yielding up the Golan, the sole strategic asset Israel possesses in the north, which served Syria as a jumping-off place for the extinction of Israel three times in the past 25 years? Anyone who opines that it is possible to establish "security arrangements" following a retreat from the Golan is returning Israel to the reality which obtained in the early 1960s. As for "peace", this term has long lost its meaning in the Israeli reality for it has become but a brainwashing mantra in the cynical exploitation of a public weary of wars.

The slogan, "Returning the Golan", in the sense of returning a lost object to its owners, is an historic, vulgar lie, which presumes, justifiably, that the person being asked the question lacks all basic knowledge of his country and people. Imagine (to
humor ourselves) that Prof. Arian had been more faithful to Israel's interests and the actual truth, and phrased his question thus:

Would you be willing to hand over the Golan Heights in exchange for an agreement with Hafez El-Assad whose country used them three times in 23 years to try to destroy Israel?

The idea of handing over the Golan to the bloody regime in Damascus is considered diplomacy as brilliant as negotiating with the PLO. How is it possible to negotiate peace with a terror organization which is committed, like Syria, even during the negotiations, to the annihilation of the Jewish state? For this is the essence of its Covenant, its political program, its symbol and its very name; this is the question that Arian should have asked.

Regarding the results shown in Table 3, a question about talking to the PLO over "East Jerusalem" uses a term virtually delusional in its defeatism. "There is but one Jerusalem," to use the well-known phrase, whose heart is the city within the walls, the City of David, Zion, whom even cynical prime ministers call, "the eternal capital of Israel". Just to pose a question about "East Jerusalem" is another sign of Israel’s loss of faith.
THE PROMISE OF POST-OSLO PEACE AND PROSPERITY: FANTASY IN THE GUISE OF VISION

Martin Sherman

Since the time of Dr. Goebels [head of the Nazi propaganda machine] there has never been a case in which continual repetition of a lie has borne such great fruits... Of all the Palestinian lies there is no greater or more crushing lie than that which calls for the establishment of a separate Palestinian state in the West Bank...

Excerpt from “Palestinian Lies” in Ha'aretz (July 30, 1976), by former Meretz Minister of Education, Prof. Amnon Rubinstein.

Introduction

The signature of the agreements known as the “Oslo Accords” (the Declaration of Principles — the DOP or Oslo I — in September 1993, and especially the more detailed Interim Agreement — Oslo II — in September 1995) considerably increased the likelihood of the establishment of an additional Arab state in the Middle East, west of the Jordan River. The conclusion of these accords was accompanied by lavish international fanfare and ceremony, igniting the spark of hope that a new and rosy future awaited the region — a future of tranquil prosperity, of enhanced security and of accelerated economic advancement.

With regard to security, the architects of the accords claimed that the “days of anxiety, and nights of fear” were soon to be things of the past. With regard to economic advancement, these “men of vision” promised that an era of unprecedented development and progress was about to dawn in the form of a “New Middle East”. Yet in spite of the world-wide acclaim and accolade bestowed upon them, it is difficult to detect any sign of the practical realization of their prophesies or their pledges — either with the regard to the predicted tranquility or the promised prosperity.

This essay will focus mainly on the economic aspects of the “Oslo process” and argue that it is highly unlikely that the creation of an additional Arab state in the territories to be evacuated by IDF (Israel Defense Force) in Judea, Samaria and Gaza will result in the improvement in the economic well-being of its inhabitants, or in that of Israel and other Middle Eastern states. Indeed, the analysis will indicate that there is a good reason for concern that the implementation of the “process” will in fact undermine the Israeli economy and severely exacerbate the economic plight of the Palestinians.

The Economic Logic

The use of the term “additional Arab state” rather than the term “Palestinian state” is not unintended. To the contrary, it is purposefully used to express the basis for a priori pessimism regarding the prospects of such a state. For it would require extremely persuasive — and not readily forthcoming — arguments to establish any credible reason why the economic performance of one additional Arab
state, totally devoid of any petro-resources, should be significantly different from that of existing, oil-devoid Arab states — unless one assumes that it will be possible to impose on such a state characteristics which make it significantly different from these other Arab states. If not, there is no reason to suppose that the GNP per capita of such a state will differ considerably from that of any other oil-devoid Arab state, i.e. between $1,000-$1,500. Indeed the economy of Jordan, a country in which the majority of the inhabitants are Palestinian, can serve as an indicator of the performance that can be expected from the economy of another Arab state with a comparable population make-up. Rami Khouri, former editor of the Jordan Times described the economic realities prevailing in the Arab world in the following terms:

Throughout the Arab World most people’s real living standards have declined, due to imbalances between population growth and natural/economic resources during the past decade and a half. The most recent available aggregate data, The 1997 Unified Arab Economic Report, shows that the Arab population between 1980 and 1996 increased from 165 million to 257 million, or by 56 percent, while the total Arab gross domestic product (GDP) in current prices increased by 32 percent, from $437 billion to $576 billion. Therefore, per capita GDP in current prices decreased by 14 percent in the Arab World in the past seventeen years — during an era when most people around the world tended to perceive the Arabs as wealthy.

This aggregate trend hides even harsher realities at country level, as the total figures are distorted by the relatively high incomes and small populations of the oil-producing states. Jordan for example, is typical of the lower income countries that dominate in the Middle East. Per capita GDP in Jordan in the period 1985-95 increased by 103 percent in current Jordanian dinar prices, but declined by 16 percent in constant dinar prices, and by 59 percent in constant US dollar prices (from $2,244 to $908).1

However, any attempt to turn the new Palestinian state into a “un-Arab” state would completely negate the letter and the spirit of the Palestinian demand for self-determination, as conveyed by the Palestinian Covenant in which the very first clause explicitly specifies that the “Palestinian people constitute part of the Arab nation.”

In this regard, it is striking that the only Middle Eastern state that has managed to attain the per capita GNP levels of an advanced industrial country is non-Arab Israel (see Table below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>GNP Per Capita* (constant $ 1997)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>2,490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1,220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>17,300**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>1,610***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>4,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>7,280****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>3,750*****</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* All figures refer to 1997 GNP per capita.
** Increased from $14,100 in 1987 (i.e. almost 25% in fixed dollar terms in GNP per capita over a decade in which the population increased significantly mainly due to large immigration from the former-USSR).
*** Decreased from $1,930 in 1987 (i.e. almost 20% over a decade despite the supposedly wisely benign regime of King Hussein).
**** Decreased from $8,650 in 1992 (almost 20% in last half decade)
***** Roughly constant over the last decade. This estimate of Syrian GNP per capita is uncommonly high. For example, The World Bank estimate the figure for 1997 to be significantly lower — $1,150.

Thus, unless one is willing to invoke racial inferiority as the reason for the overall economic failure of the Arab world (a view which this writer categorically rejects), one is forced to conclude that economic development does not rank very highly as a priority on the Arab national agenda. For in the absence of such inadmissible assumptions of biological inadequacy, there is no other explanation for the fact that Israel alone has been able to achieve economic performance comparable to those
of the developed world. (A more detailed analysis of the reasons for the lack of economic advancement in the Arab world is presented in later sections of this essay — see "The Vision of Regional Development").

The Increased Economic and Security Burden

One of the frequently aired claims of “Oslo” supporters is that if peace were achieved, Israel would be able to invest less in security and could therefore channel more resources into the civilian sector of the economy. However, even the most cursory examination of the facts will immediately reveal how unfounded this claim is. For even the most enthusiastic supporters of the “Oslo process” insist on maintaining Israel’s military prowess after its full implementation. In this regard, the commonly used slogan is that “the IDF must remain powerful, since only a powerful army can preserve the peace.” But, at this juncture, two simple, but searching questions arise: “Why?” and “Where?” — i.e. why should there be a continued need for maintaining a powerful army even after the implementation of the “Oslo process”; and where would such a “powerful army” deploy so as to be able to utilize its prowess?

The answer to the first question is relatively simple: Israel will continue to need a powerful army because apparently even after the implementation of the “Oslo process”, there will still remain serious threats to her security — with which only a powerful army will be able to contend.

The answer to the second question is a little more complex. A “powerful army” is not a “virtual” entity. It requires considerable physical space for its deployment. (For example the deployment of the US forces in the “Desert Storm” operation stretched over territory wider than the entire width of Israel from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea.) So where precisely do the “Oslo” advocates envisage deploying their “powerful army” after the implementation of the agreements? For after the establishment of an additional independent entity between the Jordan River and the coastal plain, Israel’s new dimensions will severely impede the operational deployment of a modern army — and indeed may render it impossible. The frontiers to which Israel would be committed to withdraw make the country virtually indefensible (should the potential threats against it materialize) and make the task of preparing for them (before they materialize) exorbitantly expensive and burdensome for the Israeli economy. In this regard, Shimon Peres issued an unequivocal warning:

The resources available to a country are finite. In the absence of a strategic border, the investment in security that a country requires comes at the expense of other needs. This difference in the level of investment in security creates in certain cases a qualitative change in the general level of a nation — in terms of its economy, its society and education... A country that has the advantage of a strategic frontier can invest less... in fortifications, maintenance of combat ready armed forces, armaments...²

Just how strategically worthless Israel’s frontiers would be — in every conceivable dimension — and just how heavy the cost of attempting to defend them would be, becomes immediately apparent from even the most superficial analysis.

1. Geographical Width

The implementation of the “Oslo process” will reduce the dimensions of Israel’s “midriff” to a narrow sliver of land along the coastal plain — about 15-20 km. wide and 100 km. long — in which almost its entire urban metropolis is situated, including approximately 80% of its population and of its economic activity. This raises the question of precisely where it would be possible to locate a defense system for protection of the inhabitants and the industries of the area, which, it will be recalled, still requires a “strong army”. For according to prevailing conventional wisdom, the minimal strategic depth required for the deployment of a strategic defense system is around 50 km., and often considerably more — as the previously cited example of the US deployment in “Desert Storm” indicates. This is not the place for detailed analysis of the vital strategic importance that control of the highlands has for Israel’s ability to defend itself — particularly in the age of long-range modern
weaponry.\textsuperscript{3} It will therefore suffice to point out, that in spite of the persistent claims of the “Oslo” adherents to the contrary, it is widely accepted that the increased range, fire-power and mobility of today’s armaments actually increase, rather than reduce, the importance of territory as a strategic asset. Indeed, it was none other than Shimon Peres himself who drew a comparison between the significance of the Sudetenland for the survival of Czechoslovakia and that of Judea and Samaria for the survival of Israel, and warned:

In the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, with the development of the rapid mobility of armies, the defensive importance of territorial expanse has increased... Without a border which affords security, a country is doomed to destruction in war.\textsuperscript{4}

In the same spirit, the late Yigal Allon, former commander of the Palmach, and deputy Prime Minister on behalf of the Israeli Labor party, observed:

...the innovation and sophistication in weaponry... [including the appearance of ground to ground missiles, supersonic fighter-bombers]... not only fail to diminish the value of strategic depth and natural barriers, but in fact enhance their importance. This is particularly true in the case of Israel’s difficult geographic position... One does not have to be a military expert to identify the critical defects of the armistice lines that existed until June 4, 1967. [For Israel] a military defeat... would mean the physical extinction of a large part of its population and the political elimination of the Jewish state... To lose a single war is to lose everything...\textsuperscript{5}

It is therefore clear that relinquishing the territories in the “West Bank” and Gaza will imply a need to acquire vast quantities of advanced technical equipment to compensate — albeit only partially — for the loss of the strategic benefits that these territories provide. Thus, even without going into the details of the operational feasibility — or lack thereof — of the various security alternatives based on assumption of an Israeli withdrawal from most of the territories in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, one thing is indisputable: The implementation of any such alternative will involve the expenditure of many billions of dollars — both for the procurement and installation of the new systems, and for the increased costs involved in their day-to-day operation. As a rough gauge of the prospective outlay, it is instructive to note that the estimated cost of withdrawal from the Golan and the establishment of alternative systems (civilian and military) is put at around $30 billion, while day-to-day running and maintenance costs would increase by an estimated $5 billion annually.\textsuperscript{6} The withdrawal and re-deployment of the IDF required to facilitate the establishment of a Palestinian state is likely to be significantly more costly.

Obviously, the allocation of such huge sums for security will mean seriously reducing the resources available for promoting economic growth in the civilian sector — quite the reverse of the economic logic of the “Oslo process”.

\section*{2. The Length of the Frontiers}

The “Oslo process” will result in the creation of a new and tortuous eastern frontier, hundreds of kilometers long, skirting the very fringes of the Israeli metropolis, no more than walking distance from major urban population centers in the coastal plain, which will be extremely vulnerable to incursions by terrorist elements belonging to the so-called “enemies of peace” in the Palestinian-held territories. There is no need for any particular military competence in order to grasp that securing such a frontier would require enormous resources — both human and physical. Likewise, there is no need for any particular economic competence in order to grasp how expensive these resources required for securing such a frontier would be. The burdens on the economy (and on society) would of course be magnified by the fact that the IDF is an army whose operational capacity is heavily dependent on reserve forces. The increased need for their services would entail more frequent and more extended call-ups for duty, which in turn would entail an increasingly onerous drain on the civilian economy’s manpower. Consequently, the efforts that will be necessary to invest in securing Israel’s eastern frontier are likely to impose a crippling
strain on the socio-economic fabric of the country. It is difficult to imagine how economic growth and prosperity could flourish in a situation in which the heart of the nation’s metropolis would be constantly threatened by dangers similar to those prevailing on the Lebanese front in the north. Indeed, the circumstances are likely to be even more severe than in the North. For, unlike the situation in Lebanon, along its new eastern front Israel would not have the benefits of any IDF controlled, trans-frontier “security zone”, nor of any pro-Israeli militia such as the SLA (South Lebanese Army), nor of any Israeli military presence deployed across the border.

It was again Shimon Peres who described in forbidding terms, the realities likely to prevail after the establishment of a Palestinian state on the eastern approaches of Israel’s urban sprawl.

The establishment of such [a Palestinian] state means the inflow of combat ready Palestinian forces (more than 25,000 men under arms) into Judea and Samaria; this force, together with the local youth, will double itself in a short time. It will not be short of weapons or other [military] equipment, and soon an infrastructure for waging war will be set up in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip. Israel will have problems in preserving day-to-day security, which may drive the country into war, or undermine the morale of its citizens. In time of war the frontiers of the Palestinian state will constitute an excellent staging point for mobile forces to mount attacks on infrastructure installations vital for Israel’s existence, to impede the freedom of action of the Israeli air force in the skies over Israel, and to cause bloodshed among the population... in areas adjacent to the frontier-line.7

It is difficult to imagine gloomier conditions for Israel’s economic future.

3. The Topographical Elevation
The establishment of an Arab state on most of the highlands of Judea and Samaria will create a situation in which almost the entire Israeli infrastructure (civilian and military) within the 1967 “Green Line” — airfields (civilian and military), seaports, overland transport system, the fresh water system, principal power stations and major portions of the electrical grid, the telecommunications system, primary command and control centers, 80% of the population and commercial activity — will totally be exposed to all forms of Arab observation, electronic surveillance and firepower, from the commanding hills of Judea and Samaria, which overlook almost the entire Israeli metropolis. In these circumstances, even light weaponry, cheap and readily available to non-governmental organizations, including extremist “enemies of peace”, could totally disrupt — indeed paralyze — the socio-economic activity in the coastal plain lying tantalizingly vulnerable below. Shimon Peres sternly warned against allowing such a situation to arise, cautioning that:

Shoulder launched anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles [in Arab hands in Judea and Samaria] will menace not only occasional by-passers, but also every aircraft and helicopter that takes off in Israeli skies, and every vehicle traveling on the major traffic arteries in the coastal plain.8

Deprived of the right (and possibility) of effective hot pursuit and preventative arrest, Israel will be helpless in face of a reality which threatens to undermine the very fabric of the nation’s society and economy. Those who believe that it would be possible to deal with such a situation by punitive Israeli action similar to the “Grapes of Wrath” operation, would do well to heed the sober words of former minister of education, Prof. AmnonRubinstein of the far-left Meretz faction. In the past, Rubinstein took some of his more radical colleagues to task for dismissing the dangers of Israeli withdrawal and for claiming that “if they [the Arabs] threaten us with artillery from Qal’Alia [an Arab town close to the ‘Green Line’], we will threaten Qal’Alia with artillery”. In response, Rubinstein retorted:

...the answer to this is very simple. The Arab world can exist, prosper, and develop not only if our artillery threatens Qal’Alia but even if it hits it. Israel, small and exposed, will neither be able to exist nor to prosper if its urban
centers, its vulnerable airport and its narrow winding roads, come under artillery bombardment. That is the fundamental difference between them and us, that is the terrible danger involved in the establishment of a third independent sovereign state between us and the Jordan River.9

Rubinstein was — and is — of course right. It is indeed difficult to understand how a climate conducive to investment and development can be created with the heart of the national economy under constant threat from bombardment from extremist “enemies of peace”.10

4. Hydrological Depth

The ground water in the subterranean geological layers (known as “aquifers”11) that extend across both sides of the “Green Line” constitute the principal source of drinking water for most of Israel's major urban areas.12 Moreover, the aquifer serves as a storage facility for Kinneret (the Sea of Galilee) flood waters in years of abundant rainfall, converting these annual surpluses into long-term reserves to be used in years of drought.13 Without such storage facilities, the Kinneret overflows would run into the lower Jordan and thence to the Dead Sea where they would be lost in the highly concentrated brine of the desert lake.14 The fate of the aquifer's ground water, both in terms of excess extraction and consequent salting of the wells, and in terms of pollution of the sources due to uncontrolled flows of sewage and industrial effluent, is determined in large measure by human activities in Judea and Samaria.15 Therefore, giving up Israeli control of such activities means not only giving up control of the country's major source of drinking water but also the ability to manage the entire national water system. Referring to this problem, a prominent American weekly cautioned that the drilling of any new Palestinian wells in the western slopes of Judea and Samaria could cut off supply [to Israeli taps] and, by lowering the water tables in the part of the aquifer that extends to the west of the Green Line, allow saline water from greater depths to seep in, permanently ruining what is left.16

With regard to pollution, several experts warn that the loss of Israeli control over the hydro-strategic areas of Judea and Samaria could expose the ground water of the aquifer to the danger of ruin by “sewage, dysentery and typhus”.17 There should therefore be little difficulty in understanding why Avraham Katz, former Labor party minister of agriculture, saw reason to send a proposal to then-incumbent premier, Yitzhak Shamir, dated May 14, 1989, and entitled “The Security of the State of Israel's Water Today and in the Future”. In it, he urged the government to “prevent any increase of the pumping operations in Judea, Samaria and Gaza” and to “prepare a legal and political basis to ensure continued Israeli control and administration of the water sources in Judea and Samaria, whatever the political situation in the future.” (Emphasis added.)

“Oslo” advocates often attempt to diminish the severity of the water issue and claim that it is possible to solve the problem by increasing water supply on the one hand, through desalination; and by reducing demand, on the other, through the drastic contraction (indeed some even counsel, elimination) of agriculture in Israel. Such proposals have several serious weaknesses and flaws on a number of levels — strategic, security, logistic and ecological. This however, is not the appropriate context in which to elaborate on them in detail. As this has been done elsewhere,18 it will suffice here to point out that a report commissioned by the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies from TAHAL (Israel’s Water Planning Authority) stipulates that

Even when desalination becomes a major factor, the importance of the Yarkon-Taninim Aquifer [i.e. the aquifer that lies below the hills of the “West Bank”] will not decline, as it will still continue to function as a seasonal and long-term storage facility.19

However, even if we ignore all other aspects, and focus solely on the economic issues, Israel would still face heavy costs as a result of withdrawal from the hydro-strategic areas in the “West Bank”. The investment in desalination plants, large enough to provide sufficient water to compensate the country for the loss of the water in the aquifers below Judea and Samaria, and to maintain the supply in dry
years when other sources (such as the Kinneret) can yield only very minor amounts of water, is liable to reach billions of dollars. This figure does not include (a) the enormous additional sums required for investments in changes in the infrastructure necessary for storage and distribution of these desalinated waters, or (b) the significant increase in costs required for the ongoing production of water relative to the present outlay. Clearly, investment of such large amounts of resources in the replacement of existing water sources and infrastructure, which will no longer be available after the implementation of the “Oslo” process, means diverting these resources away from alternative investments in other infrastructure projects.

Likewise, the proposals, which call for the drastic reduction of agriculture on the grounds that this activity constitutes a very small percentage (2-3%) of the GNP, in practice involves a far higher economic price than that usually cited. For the reduction in agriculture would hit not only the livelihood of the farmers alone, but also all those industries that supply them with “pre- and post-harvest” goods and services. These include the chemical industry (fertilizers, insecticides, etc.); packaging materials (plastic, paper, cardboard, etc.); engineering and machinery (manufacture and maintenance of equipment for cultivation and harvesting); transport (land, sea and air); and processing plants (fruit juices, vegetable extracts, puree, wineries, etc.). Reducing the scale of agriculture implies reducing the scale of these industries’ operations as well. Thus even without taking account of other considerations such as Zionist values, ecology, food security and so on, the extent of the economic damage that will result from the diminution of agriculture is far greater than the direct damage to the producers of agricultural products alone — and according to some estimates could reach 7-10% of the GNP.

Finally it should be noted that proposals for reducing Israeli agriculture (and the livelihood of the Israeli farmer) seem to suffer from considerable myopia — and indeed, hypocrisy. For they are not usually accompanied by a parallel demand for reduction in the scale of Palestinian agriculture (and in the livelihood of the Palestinian farmer) which draws on the same, ever-shrinking, common source of water. Moreover, not only does the Israeli farmer, by and large, use more water-efficient means of irrigation than his Palestinian counterparts, but it is also likely that a significant portion of the cut back in Israel’s agricultural production in areas such as the Arava, the Jordan River and the Galilee, which do not draw on the major urban water sources in the Mountain and Coastal Aquifers, will be supplied by Arab farmers across the “Green Line”, whose irrigation water is supplied from sources of domestic drinking water. Thus without control of the consumption of water by the Palestinian farmer, indiscriminate reduction of water consumption by the Israeli farmer is liable to be not only ineffectual but also detrimental.

The Increased Economic and Security Burden (continued)

Another commonly heard allegation of “Oslo” enthusiasts is that since the real danger to Israel’s security is not the Kalashnikov assault rifles of the Palestinian police, but the weapons of mass destruction in the surrounding Arab states, the establishment of a Palestinian state will: (a) reduce the foci of dissension with the Arab world and thereby also the overall threat to Israel; and (b) allow Israel to invest less in dealing with the conventional military threats from its immediate neighbors and therefore to invest more in developing capabilities to deal with non-conventional threats from “outer-ring” countries such as Iraq, Iran and Libya.

However these claims appear to rest on several far-reaching and highly questionable assumptions. For example the contention that implementing “Oslo” will in fact reduce the foci of friction with the Arab world and thus the overall threat to Israel seems to be premised on the supposition that if the Palestinians do in fact attain a mini-state on the barren ridges of the “West Bank” and Gaza, this will somehow induce the regimes in Baghdad, Teheran and Tripoli to cut back on their weapons development programs. Clearly this is a postulate that has very little foundation in reality. Moreover, it would be
reasonable to consider reducing Israel’s conventional defensive capabilities vis-à-vis its immediate neighbors (and the investment of resources therein) only if one is prepared to base the country’s long term strategic security on another far-reaching and equally dubious hypothesis. This entails accepting, in an inherently uncertain world, the assumption of the certain occurrence of a “best case scenario”, in which Israel is able to discount totally its immediate neighbors as a source of threat — despite withdrawal of the IDF to borders which Shimon Peres defined as creating “a situation...that in itself constitutes almost compulsive temptation to attack Israel from all sides”. However, if one is not prepared to accept such a wildly optimistic assumption, Israel will still need to maintain a considerable capability to contend with potential conventional threats from its traditional pre-Oslo adversaries. In fact it seems that even the post-Oslo Shimon Peres seems skeptical in this respect, asking:

Even if the Palestinians agree that their state have no army or weapons, who can guarantee that a Palestinian army would not be mustered later to encamp at the gates of Jerusalem and the approaches to the lowlands? And if the Palestinian state would be unarmed, how would it block terrorist acts perpetrated by extremists, fundamentalists or extradentists? Given the topographical inferiority and the loss of strategic assets due to the implementation of the “Oslo process”, the cost involved in creating and maintaining a credible deterrent/defensive capability (if this is at all feasible) will be inestimably higher than before. Consequently, not only will the establishment of a Palestinian state not reduce the non-conventional threat from the non-participants in the “Oslo process”, but it will also require the allocation of far greater resources to deal with a potential conventional threat from those that are participants in it — lest the desired best case scenario not materialize.

In this respect, the Israeli leadership would do well to recall the prevailing norms in the Middle East as described by Shimon Peres, who pointed out that:

...the major issue is not [attaining] an agreement, but ensuring the actual implementation of the agreement in practice. The number of agreements which the Arabs have violated is no less than the number which they have kept.

Consequently, as “[t]he resources available to a country are finite,” a greater allocation of resources devoted to dealing with conventional threats, means less resources available for establishing systems to contend with non-conventional threats — such as the development of marine- or submarine-borne second strike capabilities, ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems, and sophisticated equipment for intelligence gathering and evaluation. Alternatively, if the development of defenses against non-conventional threats is deemed essential, the inevitable result would be diversion of an ever-increasing portion of the GNP to the military — at the expense of the civilian sector.

It appears, therefore, that there is a very real probability that the implementation of the “peace process” and the establishment of an additional Arab state in the “West Bank” and Gaza would bring about quite the reverse of the intended results — namely, instead of reducing the burden of security, it will increase it; instead of increasing the resources available for developing capabilities to contend with non-conventional threats from “outer ring” adversaries, it will reduce them; instead of allowing more resources to be diverted from the military to the civilian sector of the economy, it will create a growing drain on the civilian sector as ever-spiraling defense expenditures are required to deal with the new intensified threat levels created by the very process purported to diminish them.

The Vision of Regional Prosperity.

One of the more perplexing contentions put forward in support of the establishment of a Palestinian state is that such a state will open up the economies of the region to Israel, and will usher in an era of unprecedented development, progress and prosperity. The contention is perplexing because it either (a) reflects a somewhat incongruous (and uncalled for) air of superiority and arrogance vis-à-vis the Arab
world on the part of "Oslo" enthusiasts; or (b) requires a total revision of the principles of international relations.

Indeed there appear to be only two possible interpretations for the rationale of the position which holds that the "Oslo initiative" is a precondition for Middle East prosperity. One such interpretation is that the "indigenous native" inhabitants of Arab states are incapable of comprehending that progress and economic development are in their national interest; or if they are capable of such comprehension, then they are incapable of pursuing this interest without the cooperation and "infinite wisdom" of the "Jewish genius". The alternative interpretation is that if the Arab states, as sovereign national entities, are indeed aware that economic development and progress are a vital national interest, they are nevertheless willing to sacrifice this interest, for the sake of the interests of another national entity — Palestine. In general, such alleged willingness to subordinate one's own national interests to those of others is totally inconsistent with accepted paradigms of thought in international relations. However, in the current Arab-Palestinian context it seems even more questionable, particularly when one recalls that several of these Arab states have persecuted the Palestinians far more severely than Israel, and have indeed butchered their supposed "brethren" on a scale far greater than that of which Israel is accused — even by its most severe critics.

Furthermore, it should be pointed out that anything Israel can offer towards the creation of regional economic development, can be provided by others. The Arab states can turn to many countries — Japan, Taiwan, Korea, China, India, Germany, France, Britain, Switzerland, Canada, and America — for the capital, technology, manpower and know-how needed to generate a new economic reality in the region, to build high speed motorways from Afghanistan to Algiers, to lay railroads form Kurdistan to Kuwait, to set up a regional-wide communications system, or to bring the waters of Turkey (or the Nile) to irrigate parched deserts. But they do not do so! Why? Do the Oslo proponents genuinely believe that it is because the Arabs lack the ability or intelligence to do so without Israeli instruction? Or because they are willing to inflict poverty and want on their inhabitants until a Palestinian state is established in Judea, Samaria and Gaza — a state which they could easily have established during the two decades in which these territories were under Arab rule? These seem highly unlikely reasons for the lack of economic development in the Arab world. It appears, therefore, that the real causes for it should be sought elsewhere.

The fundamental causes of the Arab economic failure should not be traced to a lack of capital, a lack of natural resources or a lack of brotherly spirit between Israel and the Palestinians, but to the structure of regimes of the region. Enormous natural wealth and unlimited access to capital did not convert the economies of Saudi Arabia, Iraq or Iran into dynamic wealth-creating units based on modern industrial capabilities. Likewise, massive economic aid to Egypt has not been successful in extricating that country from the depths of penury in which it is mired.

Regional development requires conditions that are the diametric reverse of those required to maintain the continued rule of the currently incumbent regimes. Apart from Israel, all the states of the region are a variant of a military dictatorship of one kind or another. Such regimes cannot permit freedom of movement for people, merchandise, capital, and know-how across their frontiers. They cannot allow the de-centralization of the control over resources within their borders nor of the decision-making processes regarding the manner in which these resources are utilized. They cannot consent to intellectual innovation that may result in serious challenges to the prevailing realities. In short, they cannot permit the creation of the fundamental conditions required to induce economic advancement in today's world. The survival of the incumbent rulers depends very little on the welfare of their citizens, who are essentially devoid of any substantive "ballot power". Instead, their survival is far more contingent on the power of the military, which is intended to repel (and indeed repress) domestic adversaries of the regime, just as much as it is meant to defend the country from external enemies — if not more so. Therefore the current regimes are obliged to continue with huge military expenditures.
and generous “pay-offs” to their cronies, instead of diverting resources to advance their economies. The establishment of a tiny additional state in the “West Bank” will do nothing to change the fundamental parameters of the methods of governance and administration in the Arab states of the region.

This analysis underscores why any endeavor to establish a “new economic order” on the basis of an “old political order” is doomed to failure. Even the most avid supporters of the concept of “economic peace” seem implicitly to endorse this. Thus, in his book, The New Middle East, Shimon Peres declares that “Totalitarianism has proved to be costly and inefficient. It requires a large secret police force army and constant censorship.”

This of course leaves the reader to ponder on how pouring money into such regimes might achieve anything apart from making them even more inefficient and more oppressive.

It is, therefore difficult to escape the conclusion that it is not the establishment of an additional Arab state that will be the harbinger of new economic realities in the region, but a radical change (i.e. a substantive liberalization) of the regime structure in Arab countries. It is only when regimes are accountable, polities are competitive and pluralistic, and bureaucracies are transparent that it will be possible to generate the basic conditions required for accelerated economic advancement in the region.

Conclusion — The Search for an “Alternative”.
The ostensibly most “decisive” argument of the “Oslo” advocates against their opponents is that there is “no other viable alternative” to their proposal. However the truth is quite different. The truth is that the burden of proof as to the viability of the proposed alternative rests on the shoulders of the “Oslo” advocates themselves. For Israel managed to exist, progress and develop rather well up until that fateful day in September 1993 when the “Declaration of Principles” (i.e. “Oslo I”) was signed. Indeed if, in the late 1950s, when the nation was beset by economic deprivation and grave threats to its physical survival, the average Israeli citizen was told that in little more than three decades, the reality in the country would change unrecognizably, if he were told that many of the impoverished inhabitants of the makeshift “ma’abrot” (temporary transit camps for new immigrants) would live in luxury penthouses; that instead of dirt tracks, multi-lane highways would traverse the country; that ultra-modern hi-tech industry rather than back-breaking agriculture would be the banner of the economy; that the GNP per capita would reach levels among the highest in the world; that overseas holidays would become common even among the working classes; that not only would waves of “alim”(new immigrants) from the Soviet bloc be clamoring to enter the country, but also hundreds of thousands of non-Jews would seek their livelihood in the country; if the average citizen were told that this would be the face of Israel in the early (pre-Oslo) 1990s, he would doubtless have listened with incredulous astonishment if not total disbelief. For him, such a reality would constitute an overwhelming, almost undreamed of, success for Zionism.

But, in fact, this was the pre-Oslo reality in Israel. During the last two years of the Shamir government the average growth rate was indisputably higher than that during the Rabin-Peres period — without the creation of such a formidable budget deficit.

Therefore the burden of proof does not rest on the adherents of the classic Zionist philosophy of “one more goat, one more acre” to show that theirs is a valid and feasible prescription which can bring security and prosperity to the nation. Their prescription has already proved itself. It is rather the advocates of the untried “Oslo process”, the advocates of haste, of allegedly “grand” design and “bold” policy, who are bound to demonstrate the wisdom of their ways. Given the evidence to date, there appears to be serious doubt as to whether their proposed “alternative” is in any way preferable to the tried and tested formula of patient determination and resolute commitment, which characterized the traditional (and successful) modus operandi of Zionist activism of yesteryear.

In conclusion, then, it would seem that there are grounds for wondering whether the entire Israeli
“peace camp” has not fallen prey to the continued repetition of the very falsehood against which one of its most prominent spokesmen, Prof. Amnon Rubinstein warned, when he pronounced that:

Of all the Palestinian lies there is no greater or more crushing lie than that which calls for the establishment of a separate Palestinian state in the West Bank. 

27
ISRAEL, A PALESTINIAN STATE AND THE MIDDLE EAST:
PLUS SUM POTENTIAL

Yehezkel Dror

Inevitability of a Palestinian State

The working assumption of this chapter is that the establishment of a Palestinian state in most of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip within a few years at the latest is nearly inevitable. In my estimation, this is the only realistic reading of present and foreseeable dynamics, which lead deterministically to the existence of such a state. Basing Israeli policies on any other assumption is sure to be counterproductive in failing to prevent the emergence of a Palestinian state while missing important opportunities to influence the evolutionary propensities of that state and its relations with Israel in the direction of “plus game” dynamics.

The “virtual history” question whether other Israeli policies in the past could have made a Palestinian state avoidable and whether such policies would have been justified in real political and moral terms is sure to keep contemporary politicians and future historians agitated for a long time. But this question is irrelevant once historic processes crystallized in ways sure to lead to a Palestinian state.

Full exposition of the reasons leading to this evaluation requires a book. But, let me at least mention some of the “drivers of history” operating in the direction of establishment of a Palestinian state, which together produce a deterministic momentum:

- Demographic and social processes produce a population massive enough to struggle successfully for the establishment of a state and much too large and coherent to be absorbed in Israel or be contained for long in a non-state political structure.
- The struggle against Israel reinforced intense nationalism together with a strong sense of “empowerment”, which constitute resources for struggling for the establishment of a Palestinian state adequate for overcoming any sustainable Israeli resistance.
- As dramatized by President Clinton’s official visit to the Palestinian Authority in December 1998, international actors — including some of the friendliest ones to Israel — will provide support for establishment of a Palestinian state. This support may be conditional and delayed, but only very serious mistakes by the Palestinians can undermine it for long.
- In Israel itself, most of the public has become used to the idea of the existence of a Palestinian state, subject to some conditions. Public opinion and democratic processes in Israel will not support for long the use of much force, which would be necessary to prevent establishment of a Palestinian state. Other instruments at the disposal of Israel can, if wisely used, influence the timing of the establishment of such a state and its initial operational codes, but not more than that.

The deterministic inevitability of a Palestinian state is subject to “inconceivable” mutations, which in the Middle East are far from impossible. Thus,
should a large-scale conflict or use of weapons of mass killing occur, historic processes may shift. In the Middle East there is a high probability that some very low probability “leaps” will take place, but still, the likelihood of such or another mutation preventing the emergence of a Palestinian state is very low. Therefore, such a hypothetical possibility should not serve as a basis for Israeli policies (as distinct from contingency thinking in policy planning staff units, with which I am not concerned here).

Hence my recommendation that the establishment of a Palestinian state should serve as the working assumption of Israeli policies. Accordingly, the real question is what Israel can and should do in order to reduce the probability of negative impacts of the existence of a Palestinian state, increase the probability of positive impact, and gear for outcomes that cannot be foreseen.

Between Necessity, Contingency, Chance and Choice

Exploration of alternative futures of a Palestinian state, of their implications for Israel, and of possibilities to influence those who is largely speculative and at best conjectural and on the level of “guesstimates”. But, in situations such as facing Israel with respect to the Palestinians, futureshaping “momentous” choices must be made, however much they partake of “fuzzy gambles for high stakes.”

The ambiguous nature of all assumptions on the future of a Palestinian state and its relations with Israel provides much scope for “wishful thinking” and other cogitation-spoiling forms of “motivated irrationality”. All the more so, it is necessary to explicate the “philosophy of history” on which the analysis presented in this chapter is based. In short: The future is regarded as between necessity, contingency, chance and choice. Some developments are nearly certain, being over-determined by the past and by present dynamics, such as the very establishment within a couple of years at most of a Palestinian state. There are a number of main alternative pathways into the future, which constitute open-ended, but limited, contingencies, such as alternative possible relations between the Palestinian state and Israel. “Chance” events are sure to occur and exert much impact on the future, up to mutations, such as the characteristics of the next ruler of Iraq, with effects that are, in part at least, “inconceivable”. And “choice” by Israel can make a real difference to future realities within the constraints of necessity, contingency and chance.

To demonstrate the importance for our purposes of this “model” of historic processes as seen from a policy-making perspective, let me give some historic illustrations from Israeli experience, including the consequences of fallacious thinking lacking understanding of historic processes:

- An Arab “Day of Atonement War”-like attack was a predictable contingency clearly within the evolutionary potential of the structure of the Middle East as reshaped by the Six Day War. Lack of serious Israeli consideration of such a possibility was a dramatic case of a fallacy widespread in Israeli policy making, namely static thinking in the face of rather predictable dynamic processes. The Agranat Commission of Inquiry (on the Day of Atonement War failures) called this clinging to “concepts”.

- The assumption that the status quo could be maintained for long in Judea and Samaria with the Arab population de facto accepting Israeli rule is another extreme case of serious cognitive delusion. Any high quality professional analysis based on comparative study should have predicted an uprising as very likely, especially after 10 to 15 years of occupation when a new generation becomes active.

- However, the peace initiative of Egyptian President Sadat was a “random mutation” which could not be foreseen otherwise than as a pure speculation on which main policies should not be based.

- Similarly, visions of a tranquil and peaceful Middle East emerging within less than a generation must be regarded as an inspiring vision, but not a realistic contingency within the foreseeable evolutionary poten-
tial on which critical choices can be grounded.⁸

All-in-all, the fiasco-like Israeli thinking, in all governments independent of party composition, on
the future of Judea and Samaria resulted in non
consideration of a number of real options which
could have prevented the very difficult situation in
which Israel finds itself now.

- During the Six Day War the demographic
  realities on the West Bank could have been
  changed.

- Soon after the Six Day War much more
  energetic initiatives to reach peace agree-
  ments in return for the occupied territories
  or parts of them could have been taken.

- The settlement policy in the Gaza Strip, the
  Golan Heights, Judea and Samaria could
  either have been much more massive, so as
  to change demographic realities radically, or
  much more limited, so as to permit later on
  a “peace for territories” policy not facing
  harsh political and ideological barriers.⁹

- The many years of quite tranquil Israeli rule
  over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip could
  have been used to bring about social and
  economic development, combining demo-
  cratization and modernization with increas-
  ing autonomy.¹⁰

I apologize to the reader eagerly waiting for me
to reach my main subject. But my strong impres-
ion is that present Israeli thinking on the Palestinian
state and its implications, in all parties and also
among intellectuals and most professionals, repeats
in aggravated form the errors of earlier Israeli
cogitation and discourse on non-linear situations.
Hopefully, the historic observations above may
serve to “open minds” and facilitate more complex
thinking on Israeli choices with respect to the
emerging Palestinian state. Otherwise, even more
costly errors are very likely to lead to very dangerous
situations that can be avoided by improved poli-
tical-strategic thinking.

Evolutionary Potential

Exploration of the evolutionary potential and
propensities of a Palestinian state should in the
main not be based on extrapolation of present
dynamics or on linear analysis of present intentions
and realities. Expressed or hidden attitudes of the
present leadership of the Palestinian state do not
necessarily shape their future behavior, nor do
disposition of social forces. Thus, predict-
ing the future policy of the Palestinian state on the
basis of its present efforts or non-efforts to repress
terror against Israel is largely mistaken.

Similarly, the wording of agreements and
commitments is but a weak factor in shaping future
realities and should not serve as a main basis for
predicting future behavior. For example, a contra-
tual commitment not to acquire certain types of
weapons is only a minor variable in determining
whether and when in fact a Palestinian state will try
to obtain such weapons.

The establishment of a Palestinian state is a
rupture in history. A Palestinian state constitutes in
many respects a new historic structure subjected to
quite different internal and external forces than the
Palestinians and their institutions in their pre-state
period. For sure, its dynamics will be non-linear in
many matters with significant leaps compared to
pre-state behavior.¹¹ Therefore, predictions bases on
linear assumptions are very unreliable, including the
view based on them that relations between a
Palestinian state and Israel must partake much of a
“zero sum”, or more exactly a “minus sum”
dynamics.¹² Instead, more non-linear and open-
ended analysis of the forces, which are likely to
shape the behavior of the Palestinian state, is
required, including historic factors and patterns but
without being enslaved to them. Only such thinking
can serve as a justified basis for evaluating the
future-influencing potential of alternative Israeli
decisions and action.

Crucial for the proposed approach is the
selection of appropriate time dimensions. In
choices, which can make a significant difference to
the long-term future of Israel, a long time perspec-
tive is essential as a basis for justified decisions.
Thus, in considering the future of a Palestinian state
and its interface with Israel, thinking in terms of at
least two generations is desirable. However, the
longer the time streams taken into account, the
more is the future is shrouded in uncertainty and
inconceivability. And, when uncertainty becomes
too intense to permit identification of at least
disjoint causal relations between present and
foreseeable Israeli actions and future relations with
the Palestinian state, those futures become irrele-
vant for present policy making purposes.

Hence the need for a compromise between the
long time cycles of phenomena such as unfolding of
a Palestinian state and its relations with Israel, on
one hand, and the limitations of human foresight,
on the other. For our purposes, a time horizon of
fifteen to twenty years is probably the maximum
feasible one. But less than that is too short for
responsible decision making.

The requirement to explore, consider and
"guessestimate" the evolutionary potential of a
Palestinian state within a fifteen to twenty year
time horizon stands in stark contrast to the
tendency of the Israeli political system to give
much weight to short term considerations. This is
largely the result of electoral cycles as basic to
democracies. Ad hoc shifts in public opinion
caused by what are from a long-term perspective
rather accidental variables, such as a few cases of
terrorism, further shorten time horizons. The
scarcity of professional policy planning staffs able
to consider long term complexities adds to the
factors reducing the time spans actually taken
systematically into account.13

True, senior Israeli policy makers of all parties
are very committed to the long-term future of Israel
and worry a lot about it. And many views expressed
on the Palestinian issue claim to take care of
generations to come, often bona fide so. But this
cannot compensate for the de facto preponderance of
short-term considerations. Indeed, it is very doubt-
ful if any serious work has been done on the long-
term evolutionary potential of a Palestinian state
and Israeli options for influencing it for the better.
Quite clearly, no traces of such work can be found in
the different views being expressed in public on
what Israel should do on the Palestinian issue. If
this impression is correct, then Israeli policies on
the Palestinian issue lack an essential basis and the
Israeli governmental and political systems are guilty
of gross foolhardiness sure to result in grave and
avoidable errors unless rapidly rectified.

I cannot do what is a hard assignment for a full
scale think tank, namely provide a well-grounded
exploration of the evolutionary potential of a
Palestinian state and develop effective policy
options for Israel based on that analysis. However,
based on preliminary analysis, on ideas discussed in
some of the chapters of this book, as well as on
theories and studies on the viability of states and
the rise and decline of nations, let me present three
main tentative conclusions:

Firstly, to repeat what has already been said: The
emergence of a Palestinian state is nearly inevitable
and cannot be delayed for long. This outlook should
serve as the basis for Israeli decisions, with efforts
concentrating on influencing the future dynamics of
a Palestinian state rather than trying to prevent or
unduly delay its establishment in ways sure to have
an impact for the worse on its future interface with
Israel.

Secondly, the likelihood of a Palestinian state
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip achieving
viability and being mainly inner-directed is very
small. Such a state will most probably be
irredentist with much potential for "minus-sum"
conflicts with Israel.

However, thirdly, it is not a historically pre-
determined necessity that instabilities and the
irredentism of a Palestinian state will necessarily
produce a "minus-sum" or "zero-sum" dynamics
with Israel, other contingencies being included
within its evolutionary potential. It is up to Israeli
statecraft to structure situations and channelize
dynamics so as to lead history into a more favorable
pathway.

It is the second and third tentative conclusions
and some of their policy implications that will keep
us busy for the rest of this chapter.

Irredentist Nature of a Palestinian State
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip

Any realistic evaluation of the evolutionary potential
of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip leads to negative estimations, both for its
inhabitants and for Israel. Relevant factors are fully
discussed in other chapters. To put my main
considerations into a nutshell:
• Even if Israel makes a great effort to meet Palestinian aspirations concerning borders, settlements and Jerusalem, many Palestinian “dreams” will be frustrated. No rapid “peace benefits” improving standards of living can be expected. And the overall possibility horizon will seem to be very narrow. Therefore, significant parts of the population will remain hostile to Israel.

• Population size and age structure will surpass by far employment opportunities, even given very optimistic low-probability assumptions. This is true also if no refugees migrate to the Palestinian state, which is an unrealistic assumption, and would create tensions of its own. If a significant numbers of refugees enter the state, this will further aggravate density and employment problems, while producing even more serious social cleavages, thus further aggravating hostility towards Israel.

• Economic relations with Israel will either take the form of much dependency increasing hostility, or separation producing blame of Israel for not helping enough, and probably both together.

• Many infrastructure and resources requirements cannot be met within the Palestinian state given its maximum level of development during the time span under consideration. Water is a prime example. Such scarcities are sure to serve as a constant source of friction with Israel, which will be blamed also for problems caused by faulty Palestinian governance.

One can continue with further examples of variables making a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip unstable with much potential for aggression and “explosions”. But these will not change the main prognosis.

The maximum evolutionary potential of a Palestinian state squeezed in-between Israel and the Kingdom of Jordan is dismal. The territorial, symbolic and psychological “space” of such a state is too constrained to achieve sustainability, tranquility and inner-directness. Rather, the Palestinian state and its society will be very dissatisfied and basically irredentist.

It is also possible to sketch a counter-picture: Far-reaching Israeli concessions may reduce nationalistic frustrations. Massive global, Arab and Israeli assistance may produce rapidly tangible “peace benefits”. Widespread use of advanced technologies combined with superb space planning may overcome the limitations of area and natural resources. And outstanding luck with leadership may permit relatively rapid democratization and modernization within contained tensions. Taken together, such factors may result in a “New Palestine”, in line with a “New Middle East”.

It is important to keep such a possibility in mind, so as to avoid too deterministic a pessimistic view of the future of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. As mentioned, the importance of utopian visions as sometimes self-realizing prophecies should be recognized. But visions of a “New Palestine” are of very low realization probability, depending as they do on the combined effect of a number of very optimistic assumptions each one of which is quite unlikely. The possibility of such a mutation for the better should not be ignored, and should it become more feasible, Israel should do all it can to support such a “leap”. But to base main Israeli policies on unrealistic visions and inconceivable phase jumps is sheer recklessness.

The most prudent and perhaps only realistic basis for Israeli policies is the most-likely-by-far estimation that a Palestinian state is both unavoidable and will be irredentist, loaded with “break-out” energies and dense with aggression-generating tensions and frustrations. At the same time, the Palestinian state will have significant action capacities which, while not by themselves constituting a main threat to Israel, can directly and indirectly cause a lot of harm to their targets, including Israeli inter alia by spin-over effects on the Middle East as a whole.

However, before one reaches the conclusion that Israel faces an unavoidable “minus-sum” situation, a critical link in such reasoning must be explicated and subjected to critical examination. This is the assumption that the irredentist energies of a Palestinian state must necessarily be directed
against Israel and operate to its long-term dis-

Changing Perspectives: A Non-Linear Middle Eastern View

The prediction that an irredentist Palestinian state must necessarily move into a zero-sum, or more correctly "minus sum" relation with Israel is, I think, mistaken. Such a development is possible and perhaps also likely, all the more so because of Israeli misunderstanding and mishandling of relevant dynamics. But quite a different historic pathway is within the evolutionary potential leading towards possible plus-sum interaction with Israel. Bringing about the realization of such a contingency should be a major policy goal for Israel, posing a very demanding challenge to Israeli statecraft, which must support and also engage in deliberate geo-

strategic architecture.

In order to cause history to move in the proposed direction, the evolutionary potential of the Palestinian state must be "mutated" so as to lead to a plus-sum dynamics benefiting Israel, the Palestinians and, with time, all of the Middle East. To consider such possibilities, it is necessary to adopt a larger view of the Middle East and the place of a Palestinian state within it. This is all the more essential, for trying to divert the stream of history into the desired trajectory, it is necessary to exit the rigid constraint of a Palestinian state being confined to a small and relatively poor area squeezed in between Israel and the Kingdom of Jordan.

It may well be that only a fusion between a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip with the Kingdom of Jordan can satisfy essential conditions of a plus-sum dynamics with Israel. Such a combined state will have a territorial, demo-

graphic and economic basis adequate for sustain-

ability. Its scale and internal complexity will increase inner-directness. And only such a state can solve fundamental aspects of the "Palestinian predicament", such as the refugee problem, and meet enough of Palestinian aspirations to reduce irre-

dentism.

Combining a West Bank and Gaza Strip Palesti-

nin state with the Kingdom of Jordan into an

enlarged Palestinian state is a necessary condition for arriving at a plus-sum dynamics with Israel, but not a sufficient one. To increase the probability of a plus-sum dynamics emerging, Israel should help with meeting a critical mass of Palestinian aspirations together with supporting the establishment of a West Bank and Gaza Strip Palestinian state. When the time comes, Israel should support and also help with the transformation into an enlarged Palestinian state and assist it in the face of the serious problems it is sure to face. And constant efforts to influence the evolution and policies of the enlarged Palestinian state, by mixes of positive and negative instruments, will be necessary.

Even if Israel does all that it possibly can, the proposed grand-strategy is risky. One of its outcomes can be a large scale Palestinian state which is very hostile to Israel, while having enlarged action capacities. This can result in a serious threat on the "eastern frontier", thus posing more of a danger than a West Bank and Gaza Strip Palestinian state. However, a double-track policy of deterrence and assured war winning capacities combined with firm support for an enlarged Palestinian state can reduce risks and contain them.

Still, I would hesitate with my recommendation if a stable and thriving Kingdom of Jordan would be a high-probability feature of the Middle East for the next twenty years at least. However, my analysis leads to a different conclusion: The Palestinian West Bank and Gaza state will very probably direct its irredentist energies first of all against the Kingdom of Jordan, while the latter will become increasingly unstable — all the more so with large parts of its population being Palestinians. Therefore, the winds of history most probably blow in the direction of a fusion between a Palestinian West Bank and Gaza Strip state with the Kingdom of Jordan. Thus, the suggested grand-strategy in essence proposes that Israel should "ride" on the waves of history, while trying to guide them, instead of being dragged along by them at great pain.

A few observations may serve to provide additional perspectives on the proposed grand-

strategy.14

• The most favorable development would be one of peaceful federation between a West
Bank and Gaza Strip Palestinian state and the Kingdom of Jordan, with a constitutional monarchy and rapid progress towards full democracy. Such a development may well be in the long-term shared interest of the Palestinians, Israel and the non-Palestinian population of Jordan. However, the chances of a “most reasonable” scenario being realized in the Middle East are not very high.\(^{15}\)

- More likely is a turbulent and violent transition phase, which will pose very serious choices before Israel. Only by thinking through in advance relevant grand-strategic options will Israel be able to use such crises as an opportunity, instead of falling prey to ad hoc responses conditioned by obsolete policy orthodoxy and resulting in counterproductive effects.

- A future enlarged Palestinian state is likely to bring about radical changes in the Middle East as a whole. This is all the more likely as that state will be much more developed and democratic than the neighboring Arab states (largely because of close contacts with Israel during the occupation, although not because of any deliberate Israeli effort). This may well cause a lot of turbulence and also raise anxieties in the Western countries, for example if Saudi Arabia falls under a radical change. It also carries dangers for Israel. But, in any case, the Middle East is sure to move into phases of accelerated non-linear change. And the impacts of a full scale relatively democratic Palestinian state on overall Middle East transformations may well be for the better in the longer run — all the more so as only a different Middle East can assure long term peace and prosperity for its inhabitants including Israel.

- The proposed grand-strategy requires major innovations also in Israeli security policies and war doctrines, to provide support for innovative statecraft and a safeguard against new risks. But this is a matter that requires separate treatment.

All grand-strategic analysis suffers from undue abstractness and may lead to conclusions which are too theoretical, which may well be inappropriate, and also misleading in concrete circumstances. Real choices have to be made in the light of specific circumstances at particular points in time. But the suggested approach may well help to make better choices when the hour of opportunity and danger strikes. The best way to bring out such implications of my analysis while doing justice to the intricacies of reality is to conclude this chapter with a scenario presented as a test bench “thinking experiment” to be pondered by the reader on his own.

**Concluding “Thinking Experiment”**

May I please invite the reader to take an active part in exploring the issues taken up in this chapter, by considering the following hypothetical, but in no way “impossible” scenario.\(^{16}\)

It is May 2004. A Palestinian state has been established in most of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in agreement with Israel, subject to a number of limitations on its sovereignty. A number of difficult issues, such as the standing of the Palestinian state in Jerusalem and the future of Jewish settlements in its territory, have been left open for later agreement. Parts of the West Bank continue to be under shared rule, pending agreement on their status. The Palestinian state keeps all agreements, but is in a permanent situation of crisis with mass unemployment and various irredentist movements being active, although without terrorist activities against Israel.

There are constant negotiations between the Palestinian state and the Kingdom of Jordan on relations between them, but no agreement is in sight. Information reaches Israel on Palestinian “revolutionary circles” in Jordan who want to abolish the Kingdom and unite Jordan and the Palestinian state. These circles, according to Israeli intelligence, maintain close contact with groups in the Palestinian state including in its government and security bodies.

Two weeks later, CNN shows pictures of riots in Jordan, both in Amman and in other cities and localities. Groups armed with light weapons and
carrying the Palestinian flag confront Jordan’s security forces. CNN reports that all hospitals are overflowing with Palestinian dead and wounded. Jordan’s Army is on full alert. In the Palestinian state there is a “total mass mobilization”. Both the official security forces and a variety of armed groups move towards the border with Jordan in parts of the Jordan Valley, which belong to the Palestinian state. Israeli intelligence also learned that the armies of Iraq and Syria have been put on full alert and that massive quantities of armor are moving towards their borders with Jordan.

Within three days, full-scale civil war breaks out in Jordan. Jordan’s army uses heavy weapons, armor and helicopters against refugee camps and masses in the streets. Many are killed. Diverse forces from the Palestinian state crossed into Jordan and fight against Jordan’s army, but they are not able to withstand the latter.

One day later, the Israeli government receives a message from the King of Jordan that he is determined “to finish the Palestinian reasonable behavior once and for all”. He asks from Israel:

1. To block all transit points from the Palestinian state to the Kingdom of Jordan and to prevent movement of forces. If this will not be enough, Israel is requested to enter the Palestinian state with military forces declaring a “state of emergency” and preventing any Palestinian action to help the Palestinians in Jordan.

2. To inform Iraq and Syria that any intervention on their part in events in Jordan will bring about an immediate Israeli military reaction. Israel is requested to take steps giving credibility to this warning, including mobilization of reserves, movement of armor towards the north, surveillance flights over Iraq which can cross over Jordanian territory, etc.

3. If necessary, attack in cooperation with the Jordanian army and air force Iraqi and Syrian forces moving towards and into Jordan.

In return, the government of Jordan promises to reestablish responsibility over the West Bank, moving in with Jordan’s forces. Jordan will sign “on behalf of a reconstituted Palestinian government” a new permanent agreement with Israel which will transfer to Israel all the territories under joint rule and which will recognize Israeli “overall rule” in Jerusalem with the Kingdom of Jordan taking responsibility for the places holy to Islam. Also, the Kingdom of Jordan will be ready to sign with Israel an agreement on military cooperation and, if Israel so wishes, a mutual defense covenant to go into effect immediately.

The government of Israel also receives a secret note from the President of Syria and a similar one from the President of Iraq. These notes state that “the time has come for general peace in the Middle East”, but this can be achieved only by dividing Jordan between Iraq, Syria and Saudi Arabia. If Israel will permit this “natural historic development” to take place by not intervening when they move troops into Jordan, then Syria is willing to sign a full and “warm” peace agreement with Israel leaving half of the Golan Heights under Israeli control for fifty years – when negotiations on their future will take place. Also, Syria will serve as a “bridge between Israel and Iran”. Iraq too will sign a full peace agreement with Israel. Furthermore, Syria and Iraq will support a new agreement between Israel and the Palestinian state, which will give to Israel full ownership of the areas under joint rule, with Syria and Iraq “making sure that the Palestinians agree”. They will also recognize Israeli overall rule over unified Jerusalem, on condition that Syria and Iraq are put in charge of the places holy to Islam.

The President of the Palestinian state, together with the heads of the main Palestinian organizations that continue to oppose the peace agreement with Israel, come to the Israeli Prime Minister in an unprecedented secret visit asking for help to prevent “genocide” of the Palestinian people. In return for Israeli help in transforming Jordan into a part of a Palestinian state, the Palestinians will agree to full Israeli sovereignty over the areas now under joint rule and to continuing existence and some enlargement of Israeli settlements in the Palestinian state, granting them partial extraterritorial status. The Palestinian state will agree to Israeli overall rule over Jerusalem on condition that it will be in charge of the places holy to Islam and that some Palestinian “symbolic presence” in East Jerusalem
is established. Also, the Palestinian-Jordanian state will accept all limitations now in force in the Palestinian state and sign a mutual security agreement with Israel, including military cooperation.

Israeli intelligence confirms the authenticity of all these messages and sees them as credible. Israeli intelligence adds its estimate that additional dramatic developments are to be expected, including instability in Saudi Arabia, perhaps Iranian action in unknown directions, (Iran has not made any public declaration) and more, including “unpredictable and perhaps inconceivable developments which at present cannot be foreseen”. Israeli intelligence sums up its estimation with the statement that “the Middle East will never be the same as it was before”, pointing out that its estimate is one of “both war warning and alerting to historic opportunities to advance significantly Israel’s national interests”.

This scenario is hypothetical and in part perhaps unlikely. However, Israel for sure is facing, and will for a long time face, critical future-weaving choices involving the Palestinian issue within a broad geo-strategic context. Hence the need for a grand-strategic compass to guide choice and action.

The approach proposed in this chapter can, I think, provide a relatively reliable compass, despite the serious risks involved. But all of us, whether we agree with the proposed reading of history and its potential, or disagree, or hesitate — should deepen our thinking on the Palestinian issue, getting rid of obsolete reality images and creatively designing new and better grand-strategies.
BI-NATIONAL REALITIES VERSUS NATIONAL MYTHOLOGIES: 
THE DEATH OF THE TWO-STATE SOLUTION

Ilan Pappe

This article examines the question of a Palestinian state against the background of the post-Oslo political reality. Our conclusion is that the Oslo process paradoxically succeeded in decreasing significantly the hope for a “Two-State Solution” for the Israel/Palestine question and proposes, as a substitute, the establishment of a bi-national state between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean.

The “Two-State Solution” is unfeasible due to the present balance of power between Israel and the Palestinians. Israel’s superior position within that balance allowed it to dictate the implementation of the Oslo accord in a way that prevents the establishment of a genuine and sovereign Palestinian state. The “Two-State Solution”, which may have been hinted at in the Declaration of Principles, has turned into a political structure which includes a state, Israel, and a subordinate political entity, the Palestinian autonomy.

In the second part of this article, I argue that this political structure formulated by the Oslo process, although accepted by a majority of Israelis and leading members of the Palestinian Authority, will not be able to contain the bi-national reality of Israel and Palestine, or the multi-ethnic fabric of Israeli society, or the geo-political distribution of the Palestinians. It is a structure which will not represent the aspirations of all the components of Jewish society in Israel and for that matter, all the geo-political centers of the Palestinians. The post-Oslo political structure can thus develop either into a structure that tries to respond to the aspiration of Palestinians wherever they are, and the different ethnic Jewish groups in Israel, whoever they are, or, which is more likely, remain as it is now, a political structure that violates all the promises made by the Declaration of Principles in Oslo but reflects only the present balance of power between Israel and the Palestinians within the two societies.

The Balance of Power in the Post-Oslo Reality

By now it is clear that one should distinguish between the Oslo agreement, the document, or the plan, and the Oslo accord as a reality or process. The Oslo plan was devised by Israelis belonging to the Zionist left, members of the Labor movement, who had a mandate to extend beyond that movement’s traditional positions and seek an agreement with the PLO based on a solution acceptable to the Zionist parties left of the Labor movement. These negotiators met a group of pragmatic members from the PLO’s second echelon, based at the time at Tunis. The Palestinian negotiators came to Oslo on the basis of the resolutions adopted by the Palestinian National Council’s (PNC) 18th convention accepting the principle of partition as the basis for a solution to the conflict. The acceptance recognized the inability of the PLO to force an agreement based on the establishment of a secular Arab state all over ex-Mandatory Palestine. It was nonetheless still a PLO loyal to the “right of return” of the Palestinian refugees and committed to the establishment of a Palestinian state next to Israel, free of Jewish settlements, fully independent with its capital Jerusalem. However, these points were, for
the first time in the PLO’s history, negotiable points and not just precepts of a national ideology. This new pragmatism was brought about by the disappearance of the Soviet Union as a supporting superpower of the PLO, the decrease in Saudi financial assistance in the wake of the PLO's neutral position in the Gulf war and the overall decline in the PLO’s fortunes in the Arab world at large and in “Palestine” in particular, following the eviction from Lebanon in 1982. As was the case with the Declaration of Independence in November 1988 (the 19th PNC’s resolutions), so in 1993, this move was also prompted by the success of the intifada to attract public support inside and outside Palestine on a level and intensity unattained in the past by the PLO’s guerrilla movement. But more than anything else, it was part of a long process, beginning in 1974, which turned the PLO into a pragmatic actor on the Middle Eastern stage — hoping to achieve its goals, like anyone else in this area, by a mixture of force and diplomacy. Finally, one can assume that the 1992 election in Israel of a government declaring a willingness to evacuate administered territories encouraged such negotiations as well. Thus, the Oslo document represented the meeting point between an Israeli wish to compromise territorially and a PLO readiness to begin peace negotiations, but by no means to conclude them, with such a compromise.

Despite the unfavorable background against which the PLO conducted these negotiations, and notwithstanding the superior position of Israel in the balance of power between the two sides, Oslo opened a significant window of opportunity for the leaders of the Palestinian national movement. By Oslo we mean the Declaration of Principles (the DOP) proclaimed on September 13, 1993 as a binding agreement on the White House lawn. Article 5, clause 3 of the agreement promises that three subjects would be dealt with in future negotiations, after a successful implementation of an interim agreement between the two sides: the question of Jerusalem, the fate of the Palestinian refugees, and the problem of the Jewish settlements in the administered territories. Additionally, the clause allowed each party, pending the agreement of the other, to raise any other topic it wishes for discussion.

The main PLO concession was to link the successful implementation of the interim period with the negotiations on the final status of the territories and these three issues. The document specified the nature of the interim period: an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho to be followed by a gradual transfer of certain civil functions from Israel to the PLO and an eventual Israeli evacuation of all the Palestinian towns and population centers. At the end of the period, talks on the final settlement were to commence.

This interim agreement was dictated by the Israelis and tailored according to their perception of security. Moreover, it represented the Israeli conception of the conflict’s nature and substance. The agreement dealt only with problems emanating from the 1967 war, as if that year was the formative year of the conflict and everything that preceded it had been irrelevant to a peaceful solution of the conflict. The interim phase contributed to ending the Israeli control over the lives of a large number of Palestinians. It did not include any reference to the Palestinian perception of the conflict, it did not advance solutions for the uprooted Palestinians who had lost Palestine in 1948. This Palestinian concession was buttressed by symbols of Palestinian sovereignty in every evacuated area, the most important of which, and one which went beyond symbolism, was the recognition in the PLO's authority to rule these areas.

But more than anything else the framework of the interim phase was tolerated by the Palestinians because of the promise given in clause 5, sub-clause 3 of the document. It was not only the question of refugees and Jerusalem which were important; the PLO hoped that it could also raise the issue of full statehood in future negotiations. All three subjects are related to the consequences of the 1948 war; a war which constructed in many ways the new national identity of the Palestinians and dictated their national agenda. The PLO owed its existence to the 1948 refugee community and its raison d'être has never been to bring an end to the Israeli occupation of 1967, which was a secondary task, but to rectify the evils of 1948.
Although hidden in a sub-clause, these promises included in the Oslo document represent a PLO achievement. Apart from being recognized for the first time in its history by Israel, the PLO was granted an Israeli willingness to negotiate over three issues which had been regarded by the PLO as being at the heart of the conflict: the fate of the refugees, the future of Jerusalem and the establishment of a Palestinian state. The Israelis very skilfully added to these a 1967 issue, that of the settlements, a contentious and delicate matter for the Israeli electorate, the negotiations over which they wanted to postpone as much as possible. However the document stressed the veto power Israel had over this breakthrough. Israel conditioned its participation in such negotiations on a “successful and peaceful” implementation of the interim agreement. “Peaceful” meant in a state of affairs that would satisfy the Israeli concept of security, hence the implementation of this phase was to be monitored and executed by Israeli generals.

As a process, the actual implementation of Oslo was a far cry from “Oslo, the document”. In a series of agreements,\(^3\) dictated by Israeli generals who were faced by a Palestinian team that lacked any professional expertise in legal and strategic matters, the interim objectives of “Oslo the document” seemed to become the basis for the final and permanent settlement of the conflict. A series of Israeli actions or, if one wants, of Palestinian concessions, rendered impractical and useless any future negotiations on the issues relating to a final status of the territories or on the questions of refugees and Jerusalem.

The process has annulled some of the principal promises made in the Oslo document. Article 31, clause 7 declares:

Neither side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the permanent status negotiations.

From 1994 and onwards, Israel began a construction effort, including border fences, which delineated the West Bank's partition, prior to any negotiations. In each of the various agreements signed after Oslo, the balance of power and Israeli superiority were translated into reality on the ground.

This was manifest in all spheres of life which enable the Israelis to gain influence through the employment of violent means: arrests, detention, house demolitions, etc. More than anything else, it appears in the continuation of the settlement policy. Massive land confiscation and settlement expansion marked the four years under Labor leadership. This contradicted the spirit of Oslo and an explicit pledge made by the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin to freeze settlement expansion. The Labor government invested $46 million in the Jewish settler population of about 144,000 in the administered Palestinian territories (much more that its predecessors of the Likud). By 1996, the settler population had increased by 48% in the West Bank and 62% in the Gaza Strip.\(^4\) All this has made the settlers’ eviction even more unrealistic than before.

Apart from making final talks impossible, this was an additional violation of the Oslo document. Article 31, clause 8, declared that,

The two parties view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, the integrity and status of which will be preserved during the interim report.

Nothing of all this was implemented in reality. A series of bypasses and tunnels bisected the territories creating an imagined map of a Jewish West Bank, above in more than one sense, the Palestinian one. Jews were not just living next to Palestinians but above them, or were digging tunnels below them. The small Jewish settlements are connected now to larger ones and to Israel proper by speedy highways; the Palestinians living in the area circled by blocs of settlements can only move through a series of military barriers with great difficulty, if at all. The pavement of highways, the digging of tunnels and the cantonization of the West Bank (more will be said later of Gaza) were part of the “Oslo as process”. These arrangements denied their legitimacy not from the DOP but from the various agreements signed by Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) created by the Oslo agreement. Time will tell whether the PA has replaced the PLO. In the eyes of the Israelis at least, this replacement is an irreversible fact. Israel
had obtained a confirmation for its actions by a recognized leadership of the Palestinian national movement.

Palestinians traveling from one part of the West Bank to another or from the areas under the PA’s authority to work in Israel could see better than anyone else the patterns of continuity between the pre- and post-Oslo realities. The misbehavior and callousness of Israeli soldiers and policemen on the roadblocks and within Israeli territory manifested that the West Bank had turned into a Bantustan and nothing more. The occupiers are still there on the roadblocks, able to inflict any kind of mental and physical abuses on those who are under their control for the time they spend in getting through these meeting points between Israel and Palestine. This is also a violation of The Oslo document, apart from being a continued occupation. Article 10, clause 1, sub-clause a, states that “there shall be a safe passage connecting the West Bank with the Gaza Strip for movement of persons, vehicles and goods.” Clause b declares that

Israel will ensure safe passage for persons and transportation during daylight hours (from sunrise to sunset) or as otherwise agreed by the JSC, but in any event not less than 10 hours a day.

This was not only violated in the case of the passage between Gaza and the West Bank but inside the West Bank.

It was manifested in the tension between parameters and functions. The Israelis control the parameters while Palestinians have some functions. This formula is a hybrid of two old Israeli peace plans offered by Yigal Allon and Moshe Dayan respectively. Both were presented in the 1970s. Allon sought a territorial compromise with the Jordanians, based on the demographic composition of the West Bank. Dayan suggested dividing the functions of authority between Israel and Jordan, with Israel holding mainly security functions in the West Bank, the Jordanians all the rest. These two approaches, except for the fact that the Palestinians replaced the Hashemites as partners, are the basis of the current proposals of a permanent settlement offered jointly by Labor and Likud in the post-Oslo period.

But even in terms of functions, the Oslo process did not go very far. The Palestinian functions are limited to the domestic running of daily life in the PA areas. They are decorated with symbolism substituting for real sovereignty: flags, units, names and titles such as Palestine’s Postal Service, etc. It is what the Palestinians call a lot of “Salata” (honors) without “Sulta” (authority).

But this new situation is not only continuous with past conditions, it also entails new patterns of life. These new patterns explain why, despite the obvious disadvantage for the Palestinians, quite a significant number of them living in the West Bank and Gaza were, for a long time, willing partners to the process. The advantages promised in the accord can be seen more vividly in Gaza. The strip was less bisected than the West Bank. Its separation from the West Bank was accepted as an arrangement which would exist for a long time, even if the Oslo document would be implemented verbatim or according to a pro-PLO interpretation. It was accepted at first because of Gaza’s relative territorial integrity and the relief that would be felt by the removal of the direct Israeli occupation. No more curfews, no more break-ins at night and no more harassment on the roads. The nights and evenings were retaken as public spheres. It took more than a year before the repeated closures and the heavy restrictions of movement outside the strip had driven home the message of Oslo whereby Gaza was turned into one huge prison with a Palestinian flag inside, and Israeli soldiers on the fences. As mentioned, the restrictions on movement were contrary to several articles in the Oslo document. They are also a violation of Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention “Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War” of 1949.

Why did the “Oslo process” gained such support from both sides up to until 1996? On the Palestinian side, it should be remembered that the Oslo agreement provided jobs for a large number of people within the various institutions erected to regulate life in the PA’s areas. These employees became the main body of support for the agreement on the Palestinian side. They have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo. On the Israeli side, Oslo was presented in the public discourse and
electronic media, at least until the election of Netanyahu, as a peace process. Israel invested much effort to convey this message of progress. The violent hostility of the Zionist Right to Oslo strengthened the conviction of many Israelis on the Left that they were defending a genuine peace process against its enemies. And finally, in the international, and particularly the American discourse, the Oslo accord, or “Oslo” for short, was peace.

**Quo Vadis — Post-Oslo Palestine and Israel**

In the first part of this article we showed that Oslo as implemented as a peace process was very different from the document signed in 1993. It seems useless to ask whether this was intended or it has been a peace process which went astray. What is important is the transformation of Oslo into a form of indirect occupation, provided by an alliance between the Israeli government and sections in the Palestinian Authority. In all the agreements meant to translate Oslo from a declaration of principles into reality, Israel dictated an arrangement which would render any negotiations on a permanent solution unnecessary.

This diktat has been exercised by both the previous and present governments of Israel. It enjoys wide support among the Jewish population. In fact, as the last elections of 1996 showed, the majority of Jewish voters in Israel are willing to impose the Oslo agreement in even harsher conditions as suggested by the Likud. In fact, this is “Oslo the process” greatest attraction for Israelis, precisely because it appeals to the political center. Immediately after the 1996 Israeli elections, Yossi Beilin commented that he believed Labor and Likud could find a common ground for peacemaking.

A common platform for peace is the best way for both the Likud and Labor parties to avoid relying too heavily on fringe ideological parties. A look at the two parties’ platforms shows a considerable overlap on the question of Oslo. Labor proposed that in the final peace agreement, none of the 144 Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza be evicted, and that most of them should come under Israeli sovereignty. Labor and Likud insist that Jerusalem remain united under Israeli control. They differ on the question of statehood in the official positions, but translated into reality, what they both offer the Palestinians is far from normal statehood.

The extent of the agreement within the center of the Israeli political system can be seen in the Eitan-Beilin document which provides the basis for a future unity government in Israel. Beilin is supposedly on the Left of the Labor Party and Eitan on the Right of the Likud, yet they found it quite easy to reach an agreement that dictates to the Palestinians the lines for settling the Palestine problem. In it, almost all the settlements are to remain under Israeli control and sovereignty, and Jerusalem is to be united under Israeli rule with Israel responsible for security on the Jordan River. There is no mention of any solution to the refugee problem but there is an agreement that a semblance of statehood would be given to the Palestinians in the areas that would remain under their control.

This vision appeared first in the Abu Mazin-Beilin document. In February 1996, Mahmud Abbas, known as Abu Mazin, negotiated secretly with Beilin. The two presented Arafat and then Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres with an agreement which included recognition of a Palestinian state without an army, continued Israeli control over most of the Jewish settlers, Palestinian control over the Jordan valley beginning in the year 2007 and expansion of Israeli municipal control in Jerusalem with some boroughs, namely Abu Dis, under Palestinian authority. This agreement meant that a prominent member of the Palestinian Authority was led to accept a scheme turning Palestine into a Bantustan stretching over less then 55% of the West Bank and 60% of the Gaza Strip, with a mini-capital in Abu Dis, with no solution to the refugee problem and no dismantling of Jewish settlements.

The Beilin-Eitan document thus shows that Israelis already knew what they wanted as a permanent settlement; a desire shared by the majority of the Jews and which is seen as the only possible consequence of the Oslo peace process. Everything so far which had been achieved by the
process indicates that this is the end-result of Oslo: a Bantustan under Israeli control.

However, Eitan and Beilin shared another vision, which may not interest most Israelis but definitely serves as an explanation of the economic forces behind Oslo which cut across national boundaries. Part of this vision is the introduction of a capitalist, free market economy both in Israel and Palestine. Under the Paris agreements, which were the economic component of Oslo signed in 1994, Israel and Palestine were to be one economic unit. This can be seen in the way the customs services are connected, and the way a joint taxation policy is being exercised. This unification was ensured by the decision to postpone any substantial negotiations over the introduction of a Palestinian currency. Furthermore, the agreement grants Israel the right of veto on any development scheme put forward by the PA. This means that the monetary and developmental policies of Israel and its currency exchanges are to play a dominant role in the Palestinian economy. Other aspects of the economy are also totally dominated by the Israelis according to the agreement of the interim report, such as foreign trade and industry.

The introduction of the Israeli version of a capitalist society into the Palestinian areas can only have a disastrous effect. With the absence of a democratic structure and a very low GNP, such an introduction and integration as offered by Oslo, can only turn the areas under the Palestinian Authority into the slums of Israel. An excellent example for such a development can already be seen in Erez, the buffer zone between Israel and Gaza. There, the Israelis, with the blessing of the Americans and the EU, opened an industrial park. The term should not mislead readers. It is a production line where all the workers are Palestinians and the employers are Israelis who benefit from paying their workers very low wages. Israel has similar visions for such parks on the border with Jordan and the West Bank. This is why industrialists in Israel see themselves as belonging to the peace camp. This is only one aspect of the capitalism-ization of the peace process. Another aspect is the support given by a limited number of Palestinians who hope to benefit from such economic transactions.

While this double burden of economic misery and lack of genuine progress on the national front may lead to a Palestinian attempt to revolt against the post-Oslo conditions, it is difficult to see why Israelis should make an effort to alter the current situation. For the majority of the Jewish population in Israel, this peace is based on unbeatable logic, many times pronounced by the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. The Palestinians were in a very dismal situation before Oslo, but were subsequently offered an improvement. Not a very impressive one, but still one which can be defined as an N+1 formula; N being the previous situation, 1 being Gaza, Jericho and Ramallah covered with Palestinian flags and guarded by Palestinian policemen. 1 is a non-democratic authority, which replaced Israeli occupation with the Palestinian security services. But this is peace for most Israelis, which was even better under Netanyahu when Hamas stopped exploding bombs in Israel's urban centers. For most Israelis, peace is their daily security which the "Oslo process" has enhanced.

But not so on the Palestinian side. Already in 1995, Palestinian dissatisfaction with the progress of Oslo aroused such indignation and resistance as to endanger the whole peace process. The election of Netanyahu, despite his commitment to fulfill Oslo and his evacuation of Hebron (an act the Labor government did not dare to execute), has increased the level of disillusion and non-confidence in the peace process. In September 1996, these feelings of dismay were translated into an open uprising following the opening of a tunnel under the Haram al-Sharif. This was a limited uprising, but one possible outcome of it was the potential expansion of such a mini-Intifada into an overall uprising.

But there seems little reason and will for the PA to embark on such a policy. The more likely scenario is of a future national unity government in Israel finalizing the Israeli position as a diktat to the Palestinians based on the N+1 formula. This may or may not lead to violent eruption. We are concerned here with the wider implications of the situation as it exists now, and accept the possibility that the Palestinians do not have the power to alter it drastically.

In the final part of this article we examine the
future of this “peace” with the help of an academic exercise derived from political sociology. This is a theoretical attempt to present the possible trends of the post-Oslo conditions by pointing to long-term processes which, in our mind, will eventually undermine the current picture of stalemate in a way which contradicts the visions of those who engineered “Oslo the document” and the current partners to “Oslo the process.” This is not an apocalyptic scenario of war and violence which are of course possible developments too. Our analysis has to do more with the inadequacy of the current political structures in carrying the weight of the social and cultural fragmentation of Israeli and Palestinian societies, an inadequacy which had been planted into the lives of Jews and Palestinians long before Oslo. It was part of the political structure imposed on the eastern Mediterranean by the Mandatory powers after the First World War and one which was, in the case of Palestine, altered by the consequences of the 1948 war and again in the wake of the 1967 war.

It is an inadequacy manifested in an ever-growing tension between the formation and nature of the state on the one hand, and the social and cultural fabric of the societies on the other. These tensions were dormant and controllable until the onset of the Israeli occupation. Since Oslo does not terminate the occupation, the eruption of these tensions onto the surface has continued in greater force ever since Oslo and they are bound to do so in the foreseeable future.

Bi-National and Multiethnic Realities versus National Mythologies

The following is a possible socio-political scenario developing out of the conditions created by the Oslo agreements examined with conventional definitions of a social center and its periphery. The main argument is that the post-Oslo situation is characterized by two disintegrative processes. The first is a growing tension between the center and the periphery to a point which seriously endangers the integrity of the Jewish nation-state and with it, the embryo Palestinian autonomy. This breakdown can be averted either by adopting a looser political and pluralist structure, or, which is more likely, by a more dictatorial political structure. The second is the obfuscation of the hegemonic collective identities of Israelis and Palestinians alike, a vagueness which questions the authority of Israel, and of the PA which can lead either to more multicultural structures or, which is more likely, to a dictatorial reaction by the powers that be.

The social center is the place where the principal set of values, symbols and beliefs is being formulated for the society as a whole. The elites are an integral part of the center and are represented in the political arena, the hub of the social center. The social center is the birthplace of national ideologies and political doctrines constituting the hegemonic interpretation of reality adopted by the elites and conveyed by various means to the rest of society. This dominant interpretation has to coexist with, or force itself on, counter-interpretations.

The periphery-center analysis is quite conventional in terms of political sociology. Since the 1970s, sociologists have moved away from the functional, descriptive approach and concentrated on the control mechanism exercised by the center on the periphery and on the conflict-ridden nature of society. This interest in the mechanism reflected the rapid changes in the power of those dominating the center. They seemed to control all spheres of life, including occupation, information, finance and culture. These reservoirs of power are used to formulate identities from above for the collectivity as a whole.

A political community such as a state is in a process of disintegration when the authority of the center in all these spheres is challenged. If we adopt a Gramscian point of view, we will note that it is not only the obvious political and economic challenge which counts, but also the cultural one. A cultural challenge questions the hegemony of the elites in the center. This hegemony is legitimized by a cultural alliance between center and peripheries. The alliance is manifested in the adherence of intellectuals, professionals, powerful capitalists and religious hierarchy to a common cultural outlook on life. If this alliance is weakened, the authority and legitimacy of the center as a whole, or at least of the political center inside it, is seriously eroded.
Cultural tensions do not occur ex nihilo. They are related to economic disparities and social frustrations. A certain amount of tension is bearable of course. But one doubts how long a society can withstand a continuous struggle fed by the absence of a cultural alliance.

One of the mitigating factors in modern societies helping to bear these tensions is the dual affiliation of elites to their professional and ideological groups. They thus bring to the social game an interpretation of reality formulated by their professional experience. This interpretation is not fed just by political, ethnic and religious affiliation, but mainly by the particular reality in a given profession. This double affiliation assures balance and stability when professionals are at least torn between affiliation to their profession and their other affiliation spheres (parties, movements, religion). Professionalism and confessionalism balance each other by adherence to rules regulating the social order.

The post-Oslo reality of Israel is a case of a country losing this balance between professional and group ideologies (based on religious, ethnic or national outlooks). There is a growing gap, to the point of an absolute severance, between professional groups in the elites and ideological groups in the political center. This polarization of affiliation in Israel is eroding the authority of the social order. Inflexible ideological formations such as ethnic, cultural and religious groups are replacing vaguer professional affiliations. Each group is abiding by its own set of rules and its own interpretation of the social order. Most civil wars have broken out when such a split has taken place.14

These processes of disintegration of the social order were triggered by the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This catalytic event bred group identities, based on romantic nationalism, fanatic messianism and religious ethnicity. It began with the disassociation of the settlers' world from the social order and its rules in pre-1967 Israeli society. It continued with an accelerated pace of economic growth, based on the exploitation of cheap labor from the administered territories and resulting in a deeper polarization between the “haves” and “have-nots” in society. The correlation between ethnic background and socio-political situation strengthened group identities based on class and ethnic consciousness. This was particularly evident in the case of North African Jews. The occupation also strengthened the Palestinian identity among the Israeli Arabs and sharpened the sense of alienation felt by secular Jews from any common good (in the republican sense) that could be shared with Ultra-Orthodox, Sephardic Jews, Palestinians and settlers. Additionally, but not as a direct consequence of the occupation, three other groups developed their own group identity, adding their weight to a general challenge to the Israeli cultural alliance and the integration of center and peripheries. These are the Jews and non-Jews who immigrated from the disintegrating Soviet Union, Ethiopian Jews, non-Jews and foreign workers. The last came because of the Israeli wish to occupy territory without providing more employment for Palestinians, while at the same time maintaining an affluent society. The former two groups came for reasons not related to the occupation. But they fitted well into the disintegrating structure of what once was a more cohesive social and political arrangement.

Zionism in the past meant that there is a supra-identity which cancels all other identities, which leaves room for a normal dialectical relationship between professional groups who, first and foremost are concerned with their own status and welfare, but also with society as a whole. Zionism also meant to provide the cultural basis on which the alliance between center and periphery would be constructed. The fragmentation of this supra-identity into sub-identities is the collapse of Zionism as a hegemonizing culture.15 These sub-identities are at times counter-identities or just complementary ones. But more importantly, they dominate and regulate collective and individual conduct within the center, particularly the political center, and vis-à-vis the center in the peripheries. These counter-identities may find expression in political parties and be partly satisfied with a role in the political center, but this is not enough. The power in the political center, when not complemented by power in the social center as a whole, indicates an inability to influence the country's orientation, its distribution of resources
and nature beyond the here and now. The professional elites are inaccessible to these groups. They obtained representation in the political center, but are unable to enter the professional and civil elites. They need to enter these places since, for many of these groups, the vision of success is a total one — i.e., history has taught them that only total control can bring the coveted change in their situation as a group. Thus, if you associate the country's nature with a solution of your particular group predicament, you need more than just representation in the political center. This representation is limited and has no real impact on the continued formulation of the state according to a cultural outlook alien to yours. The alien cultural structure is the Zionist one based on Jewish Ashkenazi dominance, without allowing for different interpretations of Judaism such as those emanating from ethnic, national or cultural backgrounds.

**Conclusions: The Obfuscation of Collective Identities**

In Israel, the process of conflict between the center and the periphery in and within the center itself between political and professional elites, is a reflection of the inability of Israelis to find appropriate definitions for the national collective. The political structure of the State of Israel was formulated before the collective was defined. A similar predicament characterizes the Palestinian autonomy. The vagueness of the collective identity is a direct result of thirty years of occupation. This vagueness produces an unbearable tension between the organizational structure of the state and between the social structure. The present state (Israeli)-Autonomy (Palestinian) structure imposed on the social fabric in the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean is not elastic enough to absorb this tension.

Collective identity can be achieved by the territorial integrity of a society. The territorial definition is a factor which is constantly changing in the lives of both societies at a pace which is so fast that historians find it difficult to chart the fluctuating borders of Israel/Palestine. When the territorial collective is unstable, the center's authority weakens. The settlers' community extends the state's territory beyond its 1949 lines and the Palestinians in Israel have a complicated relationship with those of the West Bank and Gaza which challenges border formation, as does the ambivalent civil status of the Palestinians in East Jerusalem. The absurd divisions of the Palestinian areas into A, B and C, each defining the level of Palestinian autonomy vis-à-vis Israeli authority, only accentuates our argument that there is no room for collective identity based on territorial integrity.

On the Palestinian side, the vagueness of the territorial collectivity owes much to the diffusion of Palestinians after 1948 into different geo-political centers. There is no territorial center in a group that has moved its political center from one Arab capital to the other. The final movement to Gaza is not accepted by a large number of opposition groups who use Tunis, Southern Lebanon and Damascus as alternative centers. This situation enables different Palestinian groups, living in different geo-political locations, to decide at any given moment whether they are or are not part of the collective. The decision is usually the result of a particular group's satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the political line pursued by the political center. When the PLO personnel still in Tunis, headed by Faruq Qadummi, or the “rejectionist” fronts in Damascus, exclude themselves from the territorial collective they do not only prevent the Palestinian Authority from having a say in their affairs, they remind the PA of how limited its pan-Palestinian authority is (that is, as long as the PLO continues to perceive itself as the sole representative of the refugee communities). This is why the PA permits to this day a semblance of representation to every Palestinian organization in the world.

A collective can also be defined by citizenship. The Palestinian Authority can not of course grant citizenship, but it includes, by a negative route, anyone the Israelis do not accept as citizens. But there is an inner division among these citizens. There are those working for the PA and those who are living under its authority. At present, the Palestinian Authority employs 70,000 people. 40,000 of these are policy and security personnel. The former have citizen status, the rest do not. The
citizenship of the PAs employees depends also on Israel's goodwill and the overall relationship between Israel and the PA (their privileges become apparent only when they show a deferential attitude to the occupying powers). Their "citizenship" status depends also on the money flowing from the USA and the European Union. This is a particularly shaky basis for a collective identity based on citizenship. Furthermore, as long as the PLO charter is not canceled, anyone born to a Palestinian father is entitled to citizenship in a future Palestinian state. Even annulment of the charter would not diminish the strength of this Palestinian conviction.

One can argue that a collective identity based on citizenship in Israel is less vague. But in fact it is vague enough to challenge the integrity of the state. The potential Israeli citizenship granted to every Jew in the world on the one hand, and the discriminations inflicted on about one million Palestinian citizens in Israel renders collective identity at best unclear, and at worst, non-existent. A definition of citizenship is powerful as long as it is functional, i.e., it is valid if it applies to a majority of the population in a given state. But when citizenship is divided in such a polarized manner it turns from being a constructive and common basis into a major rift in the social structure of the state.

Another possible way to a collective identity is on a national basis. The national identity at least partly corresponds to the civil one.

In the Palestinian case, the present political structure cannot conceivably be construed as representing the collective national identity of the Palestinians. The challenging peripheries of Palestinian groups constitute a disintegrative power since Oslo failed to attend to the problems of about half of the Palestinian community in the world.

In Israel, Jewish nationalism is defined by an affiliation with Judaism, but secularism, sectarianism, confessionalism and the presence of non-Jewish communities render any agreed definition of "Israeli-ism" impossible.

The occupation has brought to the fore these predicaments in both the Israeli and Palestinian societies. The obvious result was the mushrooming of alternative political and social centers. On the Israeli side this is not a new phenomenon. Lissak and Horowitz described these processes in the mandatory era. However, the difference was that these alternative centers fulfilled a mediating role that helped keep the society stable. The alternative centers during the occupation have no mediating role. In fact, those centers, such as the Histadrut and Solel Boneh, have almost disappeared as centers altogether. Compared with "El Hamayyan", the Educational centers of the Islamic movement, they can be seen as centers co-opted by the state. The new centers are resistible to co-option in the long run. They cannot resist coercion. The state still employs the most efficient and powerful means for imposing its authority. The principal center is still the place where economic resources are being distributed and information is given or concealed. But it is no longer the place where collective identity is forged, where cultural tastes and orientations are being formulated. Without the ability to coerce cultural hegemony and homogeneity, there is very little hope for a democratic structure.

The institutionalization of the Jewish state was such that it left space for a dialectical relationship between professional elites but not for negotiations between different cultural or ethnic groups. Zionism by definition did not recognize the existence of such a multifarious reality. The cultural identity, Ashkenazi, of the dominating elite corresponded to the projected national identity. The failure of this projection became evident after the occupation, but not because of it. There were social and economic processes which challenged the Zionist interpretation of reality long before 1967. In many ways, the occupation is no more than a landmark rather than a cause of the disintegration of Israeli society. Still, it was a catalytic landmark at that. It triggered the political self-organization of peripheral groups and alternative centers. The occupation opened new meeting points for alliances between different peripheral groups. However, these alliances were not strong enough to replace the political center or even refresh it, but just to polarize it inside, or, failing that, to alienate it from a growing number of groups in society.

On the Palestinian side, the PA was structured in such a way that it could quite easily co-opt or destroy explicit alternative centers. But the vague-
ness of the collective identity enables strong alternative centers to operate outside the territory of the PA. However, so far, these centers have failed to present an alternative vision that could appeal to the various groups living in the PA's territory, or which could serve as a common cultural basis on which elites, professional and political, could cooperate.

In sum, if we choose to look at the post-Oslo period through the prism of conventional sociological prisms, there seem to be at work strong disintegrative trends in both societies. By preserving the occupation, the Oslo agreements accentuate the inadequacy of the political structure. The conventional means, confessional politics, co-optation, domination etc. for holding a society together seem to be futile in the face of these trends. This is a model for the disintegration of two nation-states, one already there and one in the making. It can be arrested either by loosening the political structure, quite a utopian scenario given the present balance of power, or, more likely, by tightening the structure, i.e., by making it more dictatorial. Dictatorship on both sides is a feasible option as long as dictatorships exist in the Middle East. The democratic structure, even its particular Israeli variant (be it a herrenvolk democracy or an ethnic one)\(^9\) is unfit to carry the burden of the post-Oslo, new style occupation and the multifaceted fabric of the society living between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean.
CORRIDORS/SAFE PASSAGE ROUTES:
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OUTLOOK

Arnon Soffer

Israel's geopolitical circumstances require that in any future agreement between Israel and the Palestinians several corridors connecting the Arab territories be created, and also several corridors connecting the Jewish territories.

If the best possible final arrangement from the Palestinian viewpoint is concluded, whereby they get back all the territories of Judea and Samaria, including East Jerusalem, and all the Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria are removed, then two large, long and complex corridors will be required between the Gaza Strip and Hebron, and the Gaza Strip to Samaria region.

At the other end of the range of possibilities is an arrangement that on the one hand will meet the maximal expectations of the State of Israel, and on the other will not annex the areas populated by Arabs. In such an arrangement the number of corridors will be more than ten, and in addition, access roads to isolated settlements will be necessary. Below we list the required corridors: from Gaza to Mount Hebron and Samaria, the most important corridors, corridors linking Arab enclaves (e.g., from Mount Hebron to the Bethlehem area); a corridor from the Bethlehem area to the Ramallah area (bypassing Jerusalem); a corridor from the Ramallah area to the Nablus-Jenin area; a corridor from Jericho to Ramallah (via the Jerusalem bypass).

In addition to these five, there will be three Israeli corridors from the coastal plain eastwards (Map 1).

There will be smaller corridors/bridges, e.g., one from the Ramallah area to the Beyt Iksa-Oubeyba settlements. A corridor will be necessary from the Ramallah and Bethlehem areas to the Temple Mount in Jerusalem (an extremely complex corridor). Likewise narrow corridors will be needed from the dozens of Arab villages to be linked to Judea and Samaria that will be left in territory annexed to Israel in the "narrow waist" (east of the Green Line) parallel to Qalqilya-Tulkarem. There already is an Arab corridor inside Hebron (Shuhada Street) and there are Israeli corridors in the Gaza Strip along the Sufa axis, the Kissufim axis, and also the patrol road separating the Gaza Strip region from Egypt (Map 2). There may be a need for corridors parallel to the rural settlements in west Samaria, corridors to connect Jewish settlements, or clusters of Jewish settlements in the Samaria and Ramallah mountains to the large Jewish territory in the Jordan Valley or on the coastal plain.

In all, this involves many tens of corridors, along all of which friction is to be expected over territorial or extra-territorial rights, over width, security, and permission granted to the other side to transfer any given elements. Because of the great ease with which the opponent can strike these corridors and those passing along them, much violence is liable to erupt around and along them. Endless encounters between the different security forces are to be expected. By means of these corridors there is likely to be arms or drug running on nationalist or economic grounds. There will be shooting at vehicles in the junction areas and also smuggling of agricultural produce. There will also be a Palestinian demand for transfer of permanent
infrastructure such as electricity, water, gas and oil, a railway track and also additional highways. (Stav, 1997)

How wide will the corridors be? In certain cases the width will be like that of an isolated two-lane highway (10-20 meters), but the Gaza-Mount Hebron as well as the Gaza-Samaria corridors are to contain all the infrastructure mentioned above and so will undoubtedly attain a width of about half a kilometer, and in the future may separate Israel into three parts. The Palestinian demand is that a corridor be 5 kms. wide! It is in fact Israel that is being asked to construct tunnels under, or elevated highways over, the corridors. (Stav, 1997)

Even without any other elements, and there is evidence of accumulated experience in the world regarding corridors, it is clear that here is a situation that will not be able to survive long unless neighborly relations exist similar to those between Switzerland and Germany (between which there are many corridors).

The late Yitzhak Rabin understood the problematic nature of such an intolerable state of affairs and therefore did not speak of corridors but of “safe passage routes” between Gaza and Mount Hebron, Gaza and Samaria, and the Jericho enclave (Maps 2 and 3). (Agreement, 1993) He required that three such routes be given to the Palestinians, and that from time to time they would use an alternative axis in order to prevent extra-territorial demands on a single axis (Map 2). In the Oslo B agreement Israel in fact called for two corridors (Map 3). (Israel-Palestine, 1996)

Construction of a deep-water port at Gaza, the opening of an airport at Dahaniya, and the apparent future establishment of an oil refinery at Gaza will necessitate the transfer of energy products from one side to the other. Undoubtedly there will be yet louder calls for transit of all these goods by the shortest route between the two regions, and this to be exclusively under Palestinian control (in parallel to Israeli demands for various trans-Samaria axes!).

At present it is hard to know the pattern of settlements to be developed near the corridors. Will the settlements be set up along the corridor? Or only in their entry and exist areas? Either way, this process does not bode well for Jewish-Arab relations in Eretz-Israel, but is likely to intensify the friction between the two sides.

If indeed friction does arise, it will be necessary to guard these axes along their entire length. Who will do this, and how? In terms of ongoing security, the corridors will constitute a problem no smaller than that existing along the present fences and roads beside the permanent borders.

What Has International Experience to Offer?

Throughout the world there are dozens of enclaves of one state inside its neighbor, with the resulting need for a link between them and the mother country by means of corridors. There are a number of greatly divided states, some by the sea, where the link is ships (Greece, Britain, Indonesia), and some by land (the United States and Alaska, Oman, Spain, Britain, Uzbek enclaves inside Kirgizstan, and Tadžik enclaves inside Kirgizstan, linked by corridors). When relations between the states are sound, these circumstances are of no significance (particularly when living standards on either side of the border are more or less equal), and this is the case in all the instances mentioned. There is a highway crossing Canada that joins Alaska to the rest of the United States, and similarly there is a highway in France joining the Spanish enclave of Llivia to greater Spain.

When enmity and suspicion prevail between states, the problem of enclaves and corridors becomes insupportable. A prominent instance is the agreement of the Allies to link West Berlin to West Germany across East Germany (Map 4); in this case, matters were not properly defined at the time of the signing of the agreement, and the result was that the Soviet Union put pressure on the western states for decades, on account of this awkward connection (Spier, 1961; Charles, 1959). The situation closest to the Israeli geopolitical circumstances is that of Danzig, namely the territorial passage known as the “Polish Corridor”, which existed between the time of the two world wars: decisions taken at Versailles (June 28, 1919) awarded the Poles a section of territory of the German Reich, which included a strip of the Baltic Sea coastline (Map 5).
The result was the creation of a corridor 80 km (1) wide, which separated East Prussia from the principal territory of Germany. (Glassner and DeBlij, 1980; Martinez, 1986; Splier, 1962) The situation was made more cumbersome because the German city of Danzig was located within the Polish Corridor. As Poland needed an outlet port and Danzig afforded one, it was granted the status of “free city”. The agreement signed on November 9, 1920 between Poland and the city of Danzig determined that Poland would, with certain restrictions, administer Danzig’s external affairs and be responsible for full cooperation in the operation of the port, the railroad network, the highway and the customs. Danzig was declared a “demilitarized city” and its port was prohibited from being used for military purposes.

The facts are that in August 1919, August 1920 and May-June 1921, battles were fought between Poles and Germans to expand the Polish Corridor. Germany was assured rights of passage (in its own corridor!) by means of a railroad that passed through the Polish Corridor. Thereafter, this region constituted a focus of endless clashes, of claims and counter-claims by each side against the other. In 1939 the zone provided a pretext for war to be embarked upon by Germany. Europe did not repeat the Danzig model, and at the end of World War II the German citizens of Danzig were moved to the west.

Another case, apparently different, is the corridor between Bolivia and the Pacific Ocean. (Grot, 1994) Bolivia lost its outlet to the sea in 1904 in a war against Peru and Chile, and since then it has sought, unsuccessfully, to regain an exit to the sea. Peru and Chile agreed that Bolivia had the right of exit to the sea, but each proposed that the outlet be on the territory of the other. Three proposals were put forward for a solution of the problem (Map 6):

a. The Arica corridor on the Chilean side.

b. The Tacna corridor on the Peruvian side.

c. A corridor on the border between Chile and Peru.

To date no agreement has been reached on any of the alternatives, but in the interim (starting from the year 1922), Peru agreed to give Bolivia a free trade zone in the port of Ilo in the south of Peru, and transit there is via a Peruvian Highway (a similar situation to the rights of the Kingdom of Jordan to Haifa port). International experience, then, has been problematic. The situation of Israel and the Palestinians is yet more difficult because in none of the cases mentioned (Berlin, Danzig, Bolivia) were there such wide economic gaps, such deep hostility, and the presence of such dense and complex settlement along the corridors as there are here. Here corridor formula is one that promises endless conflicts — quite apart from the other obstacles dogging the Israel-Arab conflict. It is essential to keep the number of corridors down to a minimum, and the creation of a Palestinian state would instantly make extra-territorial demands within Israel!

In any event, even if the problems of Jerusalem, the settlements, issues of Israel’s security and foreign policy, the Arabs of Israel, water, the right of return and the movement of workers, were all solved, even then the matter of the corridors would continue to hang over Israel and would not drop out of the headlines for the foreseeable future!
WHY MILITARY LIMITATIONS ON A “PALESTINIAN” STATE WILL FAIL: A LEGAL ASSESSMENT

Howard Grief

It is widely assumed that the new Barak government will make a final status agreement with the “Palestinian Authority” and that as a result of it, a new Palestinian Arab state will be proclaimed by Yasser Arafat. To contain the damage this will cause to Israel’s security, the government will attempt to impose maximum restraints on the new state’s military capabilities equivalent to demilitarization. Limitations will be imposed on the nature and accumulation of arms, on the size of the “Palestinian” armed forces and, most importantly, on the right of the new state to contract alliances with other states which are sworn enemies of Israel, particularly Iran, Iraq and Libya. No foreign army will be permitted to operate within the boundaries of the new state.

What needs to be determined is whether Israel can legally impose these limitations on a state that will assert that it has sovereign rights and which will be admitted into the United Nations. Under Israeli constitutional law, which reflects Jewish law in this matter, no foreign sovereignty can ever be legally established in the Land of Israel, but this point will be entirely ignored even by the government of Israel. The “Palestinian” Arab state that will be proclaimed will qualify as a state under international law because it will satisfy four specific conditions set out in the Montevideo Convention of December 26, 1933 for the establishment of states, namely having a permanent population, a defined territory, a government and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. The new state can be expected to be recognised by more states than recognize the Jewish state.

Once the “Palestinian” Arab state comes into existence and becomes a full-fledged member of the United Nations, it will enjoy the same rights and duties as all other states who are members. If the new state then discards all the limitations that were previously imposed by Israel under the final status agreement, which is a foregone conclusion in light of PLO non-compliance with all agreements so far concluded with Israel, there will be no method of enforcement except by Israel resorting to military action.

In examining the legal aspects of the matter, there will be a clash between Israel’s right under international law to impose military limitations on a “sovereign” state and the right of that state to enjoy self-determination and full independence and freedom. As a result of this clash, war will become inevitable unless Israel foregoes its vital security interests.

Israel’s right to place limitations on the independence of the “Palestinian” Arab state is allowed under international law, although enforcement is a separate question. The practice of placing limitations on sovereign states by means of treaty obligations is part and parcel of the modern state system. It dates back to at least the Peace Treaties of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years War, 1618-1648, that engulfed most of Europe. The new sovereign states which emerged after the peace agreements were forbidden to make any alliances directed against the ruling Hapsburg Empire, known as the Holy Roman Empire.

Military limitations on the embryonic “Palestinian” Arab state already exist in the Interim
Agreement concluded with the PLO on September 28, 1995. Under the agreement (Article 14-3), no armed forces may be established or operate in the “West Bank” apart from the “Palestinian Police” or the Israel military forces. In addition, the “Palestinian Authority” has no power and responsibility in the realm of external security (Articles 10-4 and 12-1) and cannot conduct foreign relations with other states (Article 9, paragraph 5[a]). Israel will seek to inject into the final status agreement similar limitations on “Palestinian independence” with regard to defense and security which will effectively demilitarize the state.

The questions of Israel imposing military limitations on another state which has become independent also raise the issue of sovereignty and to what extent it can be diminished without losing its meaning. In the modern world, state sovereignty can never be absolute. All states are limited in some degree in what they are allowed to do. These limitations may emanate from a treaty or international agreement, from the rules of customary international law, or by resolutions or decisions taken by international organisations, in particular the United Nations. Further limitations are now placed on states in the way they treat their own citizens or minorities, as the world has just witnessed in the case of Yugoslavia and Kosovo.

Israel’s imposition of military limitations on the nascent Arab state under Arafat’s rule therefore does not violate international law nor the norms of sovereignty as they are understood today. However, the reverse side of the coin allows any sovereign state to rid itself of onerous restrictions that unduly harm its freedom or equality. Once the “Palestinian” Arab state is established, it may seek to enlarge its territory and attack nearby Jewish settlements or engage in or permit acts of terrorism from the territory it controls. For this purpose it will first amass a large stock of weapons, even prohibited weapons such as missiles, and ask for military assistance from other Muslim states. It will also denounce the military limitations which Israel imposed on it as an infringement of its status as a sovereign independent state. Arafat will declare all these limitations to be incompatible with the Palestinian right of self-determination and the rights of the “Palestinians” as a free people in their own land, quoting the exact words of US President Clinton when he visited Gaza in December 1998. To justify his actions further, Arafat may quote from the American Declaration of Independence when the Thirteen Colonies broke away from the control of Great Britain on the ground that they were entitled to be “free and independent” with the power to contract alliances and to do all other acts and things which independent states may, of right, do.

Faced with Arafat’s open violation of his undertakings in the final status agreement, Israel will be free to act against the “Palestinian” Arab state. But then Israel will be accused of violating the territorial integrity of a UN member state, contrary to international law. If Israel still decides to stop the pending and imminent danger to its existence, it could be threatened with UN sanctions and counter-action. Israel will also be pilloried in the world media as the aggressor, even though it will be acting in self-defense. The likely outcome will be a new Israeli-Arab war.
A PALESTINIAN STATE, KATYUSHA RANGE
AND STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT

Editorial

Sources in the American Congress indicate that the Palestinian Authority has signed a military agreement with Syria for the training of terrorists and the supply of arms. According to sources in Israel itself, large quantities of arms and explosives, including anti-tank and anti-aircraft shoulder-missiles are being smuggled into the Palestinian Authority territory from Egypt and Jordan. It is most probable that the example of the campaign of attrition as practiced on Israel's Lebanese border will be transferred to the Palestinian Authority's areas. It is expected, too, that immediately upon achieving Palestinian statehood, military pacts will be signed with the Arab League countries, foremost among them Syria, Iraq and Egypt.

The campaign of attrition in the north is being accomplished by Syria through an agent: the Hizbullah and the ten rejectionist front groups from their headquarters in Damascus. The Hizbullah, the long arm of Iran, is certainly funded by Teheran but operationally speaking, it is an extension of the Syrian army. Israel knows this well, but due to a fear of halting the "peace process", the government and media prefer to hide from the public this basic information and to blame the Lebanese regime. But this is a sorry excuse, for Lebanon itself is occupied Syrian territory.

This model of a war of attrition, via an agent, is expected to take place when the one pulling the strings is Egypt and the one carrying out the instructions is the Palestinian state.

The Palestinian state, that will merit the strategic defense posture of many key Arab countries, will view itself as unencumbered and will attack Israel in low-intensity warfare. This will happen first through robbery and theft along the "seam" of the border populated by Arabs and then by the controlled launching of Katyusha missiles against population concentrations in Tel Aviv.

Israel will respond, but it is uncertain that its reaction will be more intensive than its present actions in the north. This is due to the fear of escalation as the Palestinian state will enjoy strategic defense from key Arab states.

The coastal plain, spread out as if on the palm of one's hand, at the foot of the Samarian Hills, is the fulfillment of a sharpshooter's dream. In this situation, even a primitive weapon based on World War II technology, such as the multi-headed rocket launcher of the BM-21 type, known as the Katyusha, becomes a deadly instrument.

The range of a Katyusha is 20.4 kilometers. In the absurd conditions that will evolve with the pullback to the Green Line borders, the Katyusha becomes a strategic weapon. For indeed, its effective range covers a major portion of the strategic targets of the crippled Israel after it is castrated and forced into the 1967 boundaries.

As noted above, the launching of Katyusha missiles will be tightly controlled to avoid providing Israel with an excuse to react in a manner that will become a war, at a time when the Arabs are unprepared. The main effect of the firing of Katyushas, similar to what is happening in the north, will be to cause attrition in the civilian rear by sowing fear and apprehension.
A salvo of 40 barrels from the back of one Katyusha launch vehicle is equal to 4 Iraqi El-Hussein missiles, similar to those which spread shock in the Dan region during the 1991 Gulf War. This is even without mentioning the possibility of arming the Katyusha heads with cyanide gas. Egypt is the largest producer of the Katyusha (called the Sakar-30) in the Arab world and it is reasonable to presume that immediately upon the establishment of the Palestinian state, the regular supply of this weapon will begin for the Arafat army.

However, even without the firing of but one missile, the very acknowledgment of the threat will obtain the desired effect: the strategic enforcement for the need to achieve tactical goals such as autonomy for Galilee Arabs, canceling the Law of Return or constructing an Egyptian corridor through the Negev.
SHOULDER-MISSILE CAPABILITIES WITHIN THE 1967 BORDERS — BEN-GURION AIRPORT AS AN EXAMPLE

Editorial

The American Stinger and the Soviet SA-7 (known also as the Strela-2) are shoulder-fired missiles found throughout the world. Saudi Arabia purchased large quantities of the Stinger, whereas the SA-7 is produced as the El-Sakar. The two models made their way to various factions of the PLO and they are being smuggled in growing amounts, both from Egypt and Jordan, into the area of the Palestinian Authority.

The Stinger is a guided infra-red missile. Its characteristics include:

- Length 1.52 meters
- Circumference 70 millimeters
- Launch weight 15.8 kilograms
- Warhead weight 3 kilograms
- Effective distance range 5 kilometers
- Effective height range 4.8 kilometers

The SA-7, which achieved a remarkable success rate in the Afghanistan war, bringing down over 100 Soviet planes and helicopters, is similar to the Stinger in character and dimensions. The more improved models, (such as the SA-16) are presumably laser guided.

A shoulder-missile is an incomparably effective weapon against helicopters and low-flying battle aircraft. Against a civilian plane when landing or taking off, it is most deadly. Its use requires minimal instruction, and because of its small measurements, it is easily hidden and smuggled. In the conditions that will develop with the establishment of a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders or thereabouts, the shoulder-missile will evolve from a tactical bothersome terror weapon to a lethal strategic one. This can be illustrated by using the Ben-Gurion Airport as an example.

The distance of the radius of the encircling flight-path taken by a civilian passenger plane is between 6 to 10 kilometers. In stormy weather, it can even reach 16 kilometers. In any event, a passenger plane in a landing pattern approaching from the east must pass within range or even overfly the border of the proposed Palestinian state. At this stage of landing, it is traveling at 140 knots (250 kph.) at a height of 800 meters. In this situation, it presents itself as an ideal target for a shoulder-missile. The downing of such a plane with the ensuing deaths of hundreds would be a critical blow for Israel's air transportation, too awful to contemplate.

But a severe blow to the operation of Israel's sole international airport does not necessarily demand a sabotage act of such magnitude. The ongoing existence of the very threat (such as the firing of a missile as a warning) would be enough to discourage tourists from arriving in Israel by air.

All of the above, relating to Ben-Gurion Airport, are applicable with minor changes, to scores of communities, cities, industrial plants and military installations near the border.
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MAP
FOR DEFENSIBLE ISRAELI BORDERS

Editorial

Immediately following the Six Day War, President Lyndon Johnson, on the assumption that Israel would have to yield up portions of the conquered territories, requested the opinion of the Pentagon regarding minimal defensible borders for Israel. Only the military viewpoint of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was to be presented, without any political considerations. By June 29, 1967, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle G. Wheeler, handed to Robert McNamara, the Secretary of Defense, the Pentagon's memorandum.

The document is six pages long and is accompanied by a map. What follows are its main points:

Paragraph 2 determines:

From a strictly military point of view, Israel would require the retention of some captured Arab territory in order to provide militarily defensible borders. Determination of territory to be retained should be based on accepted tactical principles such as control of commanding terrain, use of natural obstacles, elimination of enemy-held salients and provision of in-depth defense for important facilities and installations [military and civilian].

The document relates to five areas: The West Bank, the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip, Eilat and the Tiran Straits.

1. It posits that Israel must remain in Judea and Samaria but could yield the Jordan River Valley. This is in direct contradiction to the present Israeli view that we must remain in the Jordan Valley. It is unnecessary to note that from a military point of view, the Americans are correct. Whereas the Judean and Samarian Hills represent commanding territory, and are therefore required to defend the cities on the coast, the Jordan Valley is a killing field for any army spread out there.

2. The document states that "Israel must hold the commanding terrain east of the boundary of June 4, 1967 which overlooks the Galilee area." The depth of the territory needed is 25 kilometers. That is to say, this represents a wider section of land than now controlled by Israel after the withdrawal from Kuneitra in 1974.

3. It is recommended that the Gaza Strip be retained in that the Strip is a salient into Israel which served as a source of the mounting of Arab terror raids. By keeping the Strip, Israel would "trade approximately 45 miles (72 kms.) of hostile border for eight (13 kms.)".

4. It is suggested that Israel keep some 3500 square kilometers around Eilat "to provide Israel with sufficient depth to protect the port...(which) is vulnerable to interdiction from Egyptian territory (and is) Israel's chief oil port and trade link with the West African countries".

5. In order to protect its use "of the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba... Israel would feel compelled to occupy key terrain in order to control the entrance to the Straits." The area near Sharm e-Sheikh which the Penta-
gon suggests be held by Israel for this purpose is approximately 3,000 sq. kms.

The memorandum was effectively concealed immediately after its presentation to the Defense Secretary and the matter was hushed up. It became apparent that the Pentagon's recommendations were in contradiction to the political directions of the administration. The document received a Group Four secret classification which permits its contents to be withheld for 12 years, that is, until June 1979. However, it was not released for public consumption at that time because by then, Israel had agreed to withdraw from the entire Sinai Peninsula. It was finally declassified on March 30, 1983, at a time when Israel was no longer in control of any Sinai territory.

Despite this, the document served as a basis for UN Resolution 242. The plan was presented to the President on November 15th prior to the Security Council discussion on Resolution 242 which was adopted on November 22, 1967. That decision is clearly referred to in Paragraph One (A) which deals with "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict", not from all territories or from the territories, and, in Paragraph One (B) it states that it is Israel's right "to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries". This precise terminology indicates that Israel is to remain in a portion of the areas that it possessed following the 1967 defensive campaign.

The three forthright supporters of this approach included Lord Caradon, the British UN representative, Arthur Goldberg, the US representative, and Eugene Rostow, the American Deputy Secretary of State for Political Affairs who formulated the text by virtue of his expertise in international law. Which territories are to be retained by Israel? This question is answered in detail by the Pentagon map.

Israel knew of the existence of the Pentagon map from the period when the IDF assisted the team of American experts just after the Six Day War when they made their field trips. Nevertheless, Menachem Begin chose not to make use of their recommendations at the time of Camp David. It would be unnecessary to describe President Jimmy Carter's embarrassment had the American plan been presented to him at the time.

If it is possible to forgive Begin, dazzled by peace, who claimed that "Sinai is not part of the Land of Israel", for the folly of his inaction, what of Benjamin Netanyahu? Not only does Netanyahu include the Pentagon's memorandum verbatim in his book, not only does he discuss Resolution 242 and quote testimonies of Caradon, Goldberg and Rostow, but he predicates his entire strategic concept on the issues of defensive borders on the Pentagon map. He views these borders as a requisite condition for the existence of the State of Israel. In reality, he is fulfilling, step after step, the Oslo program. That is, the return to the 1949 cease-fire lines.

It is appropriate to add and point out that the Pentagon plan referred to defensible borders in the reality of the 1960s. It took into consideration the effect of contemporary war materiel in parameters of firepower, distance and exactitude. In the thirty years since, the military strength of the Arab countries has multiplied tenfold and the lethality of the war materiel increased likewise. Furthermore, a widespread escalation in the dispersal of weapons of mass-destruction has occurred along with delivery capability via land-to-land missiles. The sole element that has remained unchanged is the territory.

Today, the threat on Israel from the 1949 cease-fire borders is unqualifiably greater than in 1967, the days when Abba Eban termed the Green Line boundary as "Auschwitz borders". It is within these lines that the Rabin-Peres-Netanyahu-Barak governments are planning to squeeze the Jewish state.
“WE WILL KILL, WE WILL BE KILLED”

STATEMENTS BY ARAFAT SINCE THE “PEACE PROCESS” BEGAN

Editorial

“The greatest happiness in Islam is to kill or be killed for the sake of Allah.”

Khumayni

The Ministry of Education in Israel proclaimed that the year 1995 would be dedicated to learning the subject of peace. The focus would be on Jewish-Arab brotherhood, with the goal to erase all signs of hostility between Israel and the Arab world in general, and toward the PLO in particular. The former Foreign Minister, Shimon Peres, called the victims of terror and mass murder “sacrifices of peace”, and Yitzhak Rabin, former Prime Minister, saw a need to explain to the public that this was the price that Israel had to pay for the sake of peace, for any other alternative would prove even worse.

One can ask: have we seen any efforts on the Arab side to explain the peace process as part of the reconciliation between the Arab world and Israel? The answer to this is found in the speeches of Arafat on the television broadcasts of the Palestinian Authority which officially began at the end of 1994. The following presents a sample of Arafat’s speeches which the head of the PLO delivered in June and July of 1995 (with the exception of the first excerpt from January 1995).

We will kill, we will be killed; we will kill, we will be killed; we will kill, we will be killed... Our brothers, the valiant warriors of the Islamic Jihad...  

...generation after generation we have battled for a hundred years, not a day, nor a year, nor two years, but 100 years...a hard and long war...you are blessed, the war is blessed, the Jihad over the land is blessed...long and hard is the battle over Jerusalem, the capital of Palestine...we have sworn to continue the Jihad...in the path of the suicide bombers, ...in the path of those who have sacrificed, in the path of victory and glory, until a Palestinian child will raise the flag of Palestine over the walls of Jerusalem...this is the intifada which began 30 years ago, her fighters are the sons and grandchildren of Az a-din el-Kassam,3 Abdal Kadar Husseini, and the other leaders of the holy Jihad.4

...here I say to the suicide bombers who have already died and to the suicide bombers still living, we say to them that we are loyal to our oath to persevere...we are all suicide bombers...we all desire to die as suicide bombers in the cause of truth...in Jerusalem, in Jerusalem, in El-Aksa, we will all meet...may Abu-lyyad be blessed,5 blessed be Abu-Jihad, the prince of the battle against the enemy, blessed be Delal Mahrivi, the esteemed commander, the valiant star who landed on the beach and proclaimed the first Palestine republic inside the enemy bus.7

...blessed be our brothers of the Islamic Jihad who kill and are killed, who kill and are killed... You have a complaint about Oslo? On every complaint that you have, I have a hundred, but don’t worry my brothers, remember the “peace of Hudaibiya”,8 the peace of Hudaibiya which was called “the disgraced peace”,9...remember it — someone who does not learn from history, I say to him that he should drink the sea water of Gaza...
WE HAVE MADE A COVENANT WITH DEATH
AND A CONTRACT WITH HELL

Isaiah 28:15

Editorial

The PLO

The Covenant

The Plan of Stages

The Symbol

The Name

The PLO

The PLO, the Palestine Liberation Organization, is, as its name indicates, the sole and historical example of a group which assumes the mantle of national liberation whereas its true purpose for existence is the destruction of a state—policide.¹

The PLO is committed to this goal both by its constitution, called the PLO National Covenant, its political program which is the “plan of stages”, its symbols, and the initials of its name.

The Covenant

The main subject matter of the Covenant’s 33 articles is one: the extinction of the State of Israel in the Land of Israel. Consider the following four articles:

Article 15: The liberation of Palestine is a national duty to repulse the Zionist, imperialistic invasion from the great Arab homeland and to purge the Zionist presence from Palestine.

Article 19: The partitioning of Palestine in 1947 and the establishment of Israel is fundamentally null and void.

Article 20: The Balfour Declaration, the Mandate for Palestine, and everything that has been based upon them, are deemed null and void. Claims of historical or religious ties of Jews with Palestine are incompatible with the facts of history...

Article 21: The Palestinian Arab people, in expressing itself through the armed Palestinian revolution, rejects every solution that is a substitute for a complete liberation of Palestine.

And so on and so forth.

The PLO was set up by Nasser in 1964 and it serves until today as an instrument of the Arab world in general, and Egypt in particular, to destroy Israel from within through delegitimization of the Jewish state and by deadly acts of terror. Its Covenant was adopted at the founding assembly in Cairo in 1964 at a time when Israel did not possess any of the territories of Judea, Samaria and Gaza (Yesha). Thus, the intention of the document was the area of the 1949 cease-fire lines. Since then, the Covenant has been ratified several times. In 1968, it was amended and more severe terminology was incorporated. All Arab states, with Egypt in the
forefront, have acknowledged the Covenant and are obligated to its application.

The Plan of Stages

What follows are the key elements from the "Ten Point Political Program" (The Plan of Stages).²

1. Predicated on the Palestine National Covenant...and in the belief that a just and lasting peace in the region is not possible without the full restoration of the national rights of the Palestinian people, foremost among them the right of return...the Assembly decides:

2. The PLO will struggle with all means, primarily through armed struggle, to liberate Palestinian soil and to establish an independent fighting national authority in all areas of the Palestinian land that will be freed...

4. Every stage of liberation that will be accomplished will be a link in the strategic achievement of the PLO for the establishment of a state of Palestine as was fixed by the decisions of previous national assemblies.

8. The independent Palestinian authority will struggle after its establishment for the unifying of the confrontation states for the purpose of completing the liberation of all Palestinian land and as a step towards general Arab unity.

10. On the basis of this plan, the revolutionary leadership will set out its tactics that will enable the realization of these goals.

The PLO's program of stages, which openly portrays the "Palestinian state" as the staging-ground for the "confrontation states" toward the "liberation of all the Palestinian lands", in other words, Israel's destruction, was ratified at the All-Arab Conference in Rabat in September 1974.

The symbols of all the PLO groups and its affiliated organizations as well as the ten rejectionist groups in Damascus include all of Western Eretz Israel. This is the official emblem of the Palestinian Authority as it appears in Arafat's Gaza and Ramallah offices and in the PA's television broadcasts. It is not removed, even when Arafat is photographed with foreign guests such as the White House Middle East special negotiator, Dennis Ross, who shakes Arafat's hand in front of the background of a map of the area without the State of Israel.

The Israeli Left claims that, in Hebrew, the initials PLO represent the Palestine Liberation Organization rather than the Organization for the Liberating of Palestine. However, the Arabic, "Mu'azmat Tahrir Falastin", means the Organization for the Liberation of Palestine. Moreover, the symbol, the Covenant and the plan of stages leave no doubt as to which "Palestine" is to be liberated.

And so, at the ceremony of the signing of the Oslo Accords, the PLO was committed to the destruction of the Jewish state, within the Green Line borders, as set out by its constitution, its political program, its symbols and its name.

Whereas the Accords themselves do not include any sense of an Israeli demand for a change in this situation, Arafat handed over to Yitzhak Rabin a letter in which he obligated himself to alter articles of the Covenant. In the meantime, seven years have gone by in which Israel has fulfilled its obligations, yet neither the late Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, Benjamin Netanyahu or Ehud Barak have demanded a full commitment, as the text of the letter indicates, as a condition for the Israeli fulfillment. As every student beginning to study law knows, this is a one-sided yielding of the right of demand. Thus, through Israel's behavior and silent agreement to the existence of the Covenant, its applicability and all that it contains, Israel is surrendering.

It is in this spirit that Shimon Peres, while Prime Minister, directed his government ministers and Israel's negotiators not to discuss issues that may "embarrass the PLO". But the person who granted final legitimization to the PLO Covenant was Benjamin Netanyahu. In addressing the members of the U.S. Congress Foreign Affairs Committee in Washington, he said: "The annulment of the Covenant is no longer our primary consideration."³

Israel has thus sealed its fate in signing the Oslo Accords. This is a correct interpretation of the verse in Isaiah:

"We have made a covenant with death and a contract with hell."
UNITED NATIONS
A General Assembly Distr.
GENERAL A/RES/181(II)(A-B)
November 29, 1947

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
Resolution 181 (II). Future government of Palestine

A

The General Assembly,
Having met in special session at the request of the mandatory Power to constitute and instruct a special committee to prepare for the consideration of the question of the future government of Palestine at the second regular session;

Having constituted a Special Committee and instructed it to investigate all questions and issues relevant to the problem of Palestine, and to prepare proposals for the solution of the problem, and

Having received and examined the report of the Special Committee (document A/364)1/ including a number of unanimous recommendations and a plan of partition with economic union approved by the majority of the Special Committee,

Considers that the present situation in Palestine is one which is likely to impair the general welfare and friendly relations among nations;

Takes note of the declaration by the mandatory Power that it plans to complete its evacuation of Palestine by 1 August 1948;

Recommends to the United Kingdom, as the mandatory Power for Palestine, and to all other Members of the United Nations the adoption and implementation, with regard to the future government of Palestine, of the Plan of Partition with Economic Union set out below;

Requests that
(a) The Security Council take the necessary measures as provided for in the plan for its implementation;
(b) The Security Council consider, if circumstances during the transitional period require such consideration, whether the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace. If it decides that such a threat exists, and in order to maintain international peace and security, the Security Council should supplement the authorization of the General Assembly by taking measures, under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter, to empower the United Nations Commission, as provided in this resolution, to exercise in Palestine the functions which are assigned to it by this resolution;
(c) The Security Council determine as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, in

1/ Document A/364 was the report of the Special Committee on Palestine.
accordance with Article 39 of the Charter, any attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged by this resolution;
(d) The Trusteeship Council be informed of the responsibilities envisaged for it in this plan;
Calls upon the inhabitants of Palestine to take such steps as may be necessary on their part to put this plan into effect;
Appeals to all Governments and all peoples to refrain from taking action which might hamper or delay the carrying out of these recommendations, and
Authorizes the Secretary-General to reimburse travel and subsistence expenses of the members of the Commission referred to in Part I, Section B, paragraph 1 below, on such basis and in such form as he may determine most appropriate in the circumstances, and to provide the Commission with the necessary staff to assist in carrying out the functions assigned to the Commission by the General Assembly.

B 2/

The General Assembly
Authorizes the Secretary-General to draw from the Working Capital Fund a sum not to exceed $2,000,000 for the purposes set forth in the last paragraph of the resolution on the future government of Palestine.

Hundred and twenty-eighth plenary meeting 29 November 1947

At its hundred and twenty-eighth plenary meeting on 29 November 1947 the General Assembly, in accordance with the terms of the above resolution [181 A], elected the following members of the United Nations Commission on Palestine: Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Panama and Philippines.

PLAN OF PARTITION
WITH ECONOMIC UNION

PART I

Future constitution and government of Palestine

A. TERMINATION OF MANDATE, PARTITION AND INDEPENDENCE

1. The Mandate for Palestine shall terminate as soon as possible but in any case not later than 1 August 1948.
2. The armed forces of the mandatory Power shall be progressively withdrawn from Palestine, the withdrawal to be completed as soon as possible but in any case not later than 1 August 1948. The mandatory Power shall advise the Commission, as far in advance as possible, of its intention to terminate the Mandate and to evacuate each area. The mandatory Power shall use its best endeavors to ensure that an area situated in the territory of the Jewish state, including a seaport and hinterland adequate to provide facilities for a substantial immigration, shall be evacuated at the earliest possible date and in any event not later than 1 February 1948.
3. Independent Arab and Jewish states and the Special International Regime for the City of Jerusalem, set forth in part III of this plan, shall come into existence in Palestine two months after the evacuation of the armed forces of the mandatory Power has been completed but in any case not later than 1 October 1948. The boundaries of the Arab State, the Jewish state, and the City of Jerusalem shall be as described in parts II and III below.
4. The period between the adoption by the General Assembly of its recommendation on the
question of Palestine and the establishment of the independence of the Arab and Jewish states shall be a transitional period.

B. STEPS PREPARATORY TO INDEPENDENCE

1. A Commission shall be set up consisting of one representative of each of five Member States. The Members represented on the Commission shall be elected by the General Assembly on as broad a basis, geographically and otherwise, as possible.

2. The administration of Palestine shall, as the mandatory Power withdraws its armed forces, be progressively turned over to the Commission; which shall act in conformity with the recommendations of the General Assembly, under the guidance of the Security Council. The mandatory Power shall to the fullest possible extent co-ordinate its plans for withdrawal with the plans of the Commission to take over and administer areas which have been evacuated. In the discharge of this administrative responsibility the Commission shall have authority to issue necessary regulations and take other measures as required. The mandatory Power shall not take any action to prevent, obstruct or delay the implementation by the Commission of the measures recommended by the General Assembly.

3. On its arrival in Palestine the Commission shall proceed to carry out measures for the establishment of the frontiers of the Arab and Jewish states and the City of Jerusalem in accordance with the general lines of the recommendations of the General Assembly on the partition of Palestine. Nevertheless, the boundaries as described in part II of this plan are to be modified in such a way that village areas as a rule will not be divided by state boundaries unless pressing reasons make that necessary.

4. The Commission, after consultation with the democratic parties and other public organizations of The Arab and Jewish states, shall select and establish in each State as rapidly as possible a Provisional Council of Government. The activities of both the Arab and Jewish Provisional Councils of Government shall be carried out under the general direction of the Commission. If by 1 April 1948 a Provisional Council of Government cannot be selected for either of the States, or, if selected, cannot carry out its functions, the Commission shall communicate that fact to the Security Council for such action with respect to that State as the Security Council may deem proper, and to the Secretary-General for communication to the Members of the United Nations.

5. Subject to the provisions of these recommendations, during the transitional period the Provisional Councils of Government, acting under the Commission, shall have full authority in the areas under their control, including authority over matters of immigration and land regulation.

6. The Provisional Council of Government of each State acting under the Commission, shall progressively receive from the Commission full responsibility for the administration of that State in the period between the termination of the Mandate and the establishment of the State's independence.

7. The Commission shall instruct the Provisional Councils of Government of both the Arab and Jewish states, after their formation, to proceed to the establishment of administrative organs of government, central and local.

8. The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall, within the shortest time possible, recruit an armed militia from the residents of that State, sufficient in number to maintain internal order and to prevent frontier clashes. This armed militia in each State shall, for operational purposes, be under the command of Jewish or Arab officers resident in that State, but general political and military control, including the choice of the militia's High Command, shall be exercised by the Commission.
9. The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall, not later than two months after the withdrawal of the armed forces of the mandatory Power, hold elections to the Constituent Assembly which shall be conducted on democratic lines.

   The election regulations in each State shall be drawn up by the Provisional Council of Government and approved by the Commission. Qualified voters for each State for this election shall be persons over eighteen years of age who are:

   (a) Palestinian citizens residing in that State and

   (b) Arabs and Jews residing in the State, although not Palestinian citizens, who, before voting, have signed a notice of intention to become citizens of such State.

   Arabs and Jews residing in the City of Jerusalem who have signed a notice of intention to become citizens, the Arabs of the Arab State and the Jews of the Jewish state, shall be entitled to vote in the Arab and Jewish states respectively.

   Women may vote and be elected to the Constituent Assemblies.

   During the transitional period no Jew shall be permitted to establish residence in the area of the proposed Arab State, and no Arab shall be permitted to establish residence in the area of the proposed Jewish state, except by special leave of the Commission.

10. The Constituent Assembly of each State shall draft a democratic constitution for its State and choose a provisional government to succeed the Provisional Council of Government appointed by the Commission. The constitutions of the States shall embody chapters 1 and 2 of the Declaration provided for in section C below and include inter alia provisions for:

   (a) Establishing in each State a legislative body elected by universal suffrage and by secret ballot on the basis of proportional representation, and an executive body responsible to the legislature;

   (b) Settling all international disputes in which the State may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered;

   (c) Accepting the obligation of the State to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations;

   (d) Guaranteeing to all persons equal and non-discriminatory rights in civil, political, economic and religious matters and the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of religion, language, speech and publication, education, assembly and association;

   (e) Preserving freedom of transit and visit for all residents and citizens of the other State in Palestine and the City of Jerusalem, subject to considerations of national security, provided that each State shall control residence within its borders.

11. The Commission shall appoint a preparatory economic commission of three members to make whatever arrangements are possible for economic co-operation, with a view to establishing, as soon as practicable, the Economic Union and the Joint Economic Board, as provided in section D below.

12. During the period between the adoption of the recommendations on the question of Palestine by the General Assembly and the termination of the Mandate, the mandatory Power in Palestine shall maintain full responsibility for administration in areas from which it has not withdrawn its armed forces. The Commission shall assist the mandatory Power in the carrying out of these functions. Similarly the mandatory Power shall co-operate with the Commission in the execution of its functions.

13. With a view to ensuring that there shall be continuity in the functioning of administrative services and that, on the withdrawal of the armed forces of the mandatory Power, the whole
administration shall be in the charge of the Provisional Councils and the Joint Economic Board, respectively, acting under the Commission, there shall be a progressive transfer from the mandatory Power to the Commission, of responsibility for all the functions of government, including that of maintaining law and order in the areas from which the forces of the mandatory Power have been withdrawn.

14. The Commission shall be guided in its activities by the recommendations of the General Assembly and by such instructions as the Security Council may consider necessary to issue.

The measures taken by the Commission, within the recommendations of the General Assembly, shall become immediately effective unless the Commission has previously received contrary instructions from the Security Council.

The Commission shall render periodic monthly progress reports, or more frequently if desirable, to the Security Council.

15. The Commission shall make its final report to the next regular session of the General Assembly and to the Security Council simultaneously.

C. DECLARATION

A declaration shall be made to the United Nations by the provisional government of each proposed State before independence. It shall contain inter alia the following clauses:

General Provision

The stipulations contained in the declaration are recognized as fundamental laws of the State and no law, regulation or official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation or official action prevail over them.

Chapter 1

Holy Places, religious buildings and sites

1. Existing rights in respect of Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall not be denied or impaired.

2. In so far as Holy Places are concerned, the liberty of access, visit and transit shall be guaranteed, in conformity with existing rights, to all residents and citizens of the other State and of the City of Jerusalem, as well as to aliens, without distinction as to nationality, subject to requirements of national security, public order and decorum.

Similarly, freedom of worship shall be guaranteed in conformity with existing rights, subject to the maintenance of public order and decorum.

3. Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall be preserved. No act shall be permitted which may in any way impair their sacred character. If at any time it appears to the Government that any particular Holy Place, religious building or site is in need of urgent repair, the Government may call upon the community or communities concerned to carry out such repair. The Government may carry it out itself at the expense of the community or communities concerned if no action is taken within a reasonable time.

4. No taxation shall be levied in respect of any Holy Place, religious building or site which was exempt from taxation on the date of the creation of the State.

No change in the incidence of such taxation shall be made which would either discriminate between the owners or occupiers of Holy Places, religious buildings or sites, or would place such owners or occupiers in a position less favourable in relation to the general incidence of taxation than existed at the time of the adoption of the Assembly’s recommendations.
5. The Governor of the City of Jerusalem shall have the right to determine whether the provisions of the Constitution of the State in relation to Holy Places, religious buildings and sites within the borders of the State and the religious rights appertaining thereto, are being properly applied and respected, and to make decisions on the basis of existing rights in cases of disputes which may arise between the different religious communities or the rites of a religious community with respect to such places, buildings and sites. He shall receive full co-operation and such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of his functions in the State.

Chapter 2
Religious and Minority Rights
1. Freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, shall be ensured to all.
2. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants on the ground of race, religion, language or sex.
3. All persons within the jurisdiction of the State shall be entitled to equal protection of the laws.
4. The family law and personal status of the various minorities and their religious interests, including endowments, shall be respected.
5. Except as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government, no measure shall be taken to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of religious or charitable bodies of all faiths or to discriminate against any representative or member of these bodies on the ground of his religion or nationality.
6. The State shall ensure adequate primary and secondary education for the Arab and Jewish minority, respectively, in its own language and its cultural traditions.
The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the State may impose, shall not be denied or impaired.
Foreign educational establishments shall continue their activity on the basis of their existing rights.
7. No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any citizen of the State of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the Press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings.
8. No expropriation of land owned by an Arab in the Jewish state (by a Jew in the Arab State) shall be allowed except for public purposes. In all cases of expropriation full compensation as fixed by the Supreme Court shall be paid previous to dispossession.

Chapter 3
Citizenship, international conventions and financial obligations
1. Citizenship. Palestinian citizens residing in Palestine outside the City of Jerusalem, as well as Arabs and Jews who, not holding Palestinian citizenship, reside in Palestine outside the City of Jerusalem shall, upon the recognition of independence, become citizens of the State in which they are resident and enjoy full civil and political rights. Persons over the age of eighteen years may opt, within one year from the date of recognition of independence of the State in which they reside, for citizenship of the other State, providing that no Arab residing in the area of the proposed Arab State shall have the right to opt for citizenship in the proposed Jewish state and no Jew residing in the proposed Jewish state shall have the right to opt for citizenship in the proposed Arab State. The exercise of this right of option will be taken to include the wives and children under eighteen years of age of persons so opting.
Arabs residing in the area of the proposed Jewish state and Jews residing in the area of the proposed Arab State who have signed a notice of intention to opt for citizenship of the other State shall be eligible to vote in the elections to the Constituent Assembly of that State, but not in the elections to the Constituent Assembly of the State in which they reside.

2. International conventions.
(a) The State shall be bound by all the international agreements and conventions, both general and special, to which Palestine has become a party. Subject to any right of denunciation provided for therein, such agreements and conventions shall be respected by the State throughout the period for which they were concluded.
(b) Any dispute about the applicability and continued validity of international conventions or treaties signed or adhered to by the mandatory Power on behalf of Palestine shall be referred to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.

3. Financial obligations.
(a) The State shall respect and fulfil all financial obligations of whatever nature assumed on behalf of Palestine by the mandatory Power during the exercise of the Mandate and recognized by the State. This provision includes the right of public servants to pensions, compensation or gratuities.
(b) These obligations shall be fulfilled through participation in the Joint Economic Board in respect of those obligations applicable to Palestine as a whole, and individually in respect of those applicable to, and fairly apportionable between, the States.
(c) A Court of Claims, affiliated with the Joint Economic Board, and composed of one member appointed by the United Nations, one representative of the United Kingdom and one representative of the State concerned, should be established. Any dispute between the United Kingdom and the State respecting claims not recognized by the latter should be referred to that Court.
(d) Commercial concessions granted in respect of any part of Palestine prior to the adoption of the resolution by the General Assembly shall continue to be valid according to their terms, unless modified by agreement between the concession-holder and the State.

Chapter 4
Miscellaneous provisions
1. The provisions of chapters 1 and 2 of the declaration shall be under the guarantee of the United Nations, and no modifications shall be made in them without the assent of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Any Member of the United Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the General Assembly any infraction or danger of infraction of any of these stipulations, and the General Assembly may thereupon make such recommendations as it may deem proper in the circumstances.

2. Any dispute relating to the application or the interpretation of this declaration shall be referred, at the request of either party, to the International Court of Justice, unless the parties agree to another mode of settlement.

D. ECONOMIC UNION AND TRANSIT
1. The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall enter into an undertaking with respect to economic union and transit. This undertaking shall be drafted by the commission provided for in section B, paragraph 1, utilizing to the greatest possible extent the advice and co-operation of representative organizations and bodies from each of the proposed States. It shall contain
provisions to establish the Economic Union of Palestine and provide for other matters of common interest. If by 1 April 1948 the Provisional Councils of Government have not entered into the undertaking, the undertaking shall be put into force by the Commission.

The Economic Union of Palestine

2. The objectives of the Economic Union of Palestine shall be:

(a) A customs union;
(b) A joint currency system providing for a single foreign exchange rate;
(c) Operation in the common interest on a non-discriminatory basis of railways, inter-State highways, postal, telephone and telegraphic services, and port and airports involved in international trade and commerce;
(d) Joint economic development, especially in respect of irrigation, land reclamation and soil conservation;
(e) Access for both States and for the City of Jerusalem on a non-discriminatory basis to water and power facilities.

3. There shall be established a Joint Economic Board, which shall consist of three representatives of each of the two States and three foreign members appointed by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. The foreign members shall be appointed in the first instance for a term of three years; they shall serve as individuals and not as representatives of States.

4. The functions of the Joint Economic Board shall be to implement either directly or by delegation the measures necessary to realize the objectives of the Economic Union. It shall have all powers of organization and administration necessary to fulfil its functions.

5. The States shall bind themselves to put into effect the decisions of the Joint Economic Board. The Board's decisions shall be taken by a majority vote.

6. In the event of failure of a State to take the necessary action the Board may, by a vote of six members, decide to withhold an appropriate portion of that part of the customs revenue to which the State in question is entitled under the Economic Union. Should the State persist in its failure to co-operate, the Board may decide by a simple majority vote upon such further sanctions, including disposition of funds which it has withheld, as it may deem appropriate.

7. In relation to economic development, the functions of the Board shall be the planning, investigation and encouragement of joint development projects, but it shall not undertake such projects except with the consent of both States and the City of Jerusalem, in the event that Jerusalem is directly involved in the development project.

8. In regard to the joint currency system the currencies circulating in the two States and the City of Jerusalem shall be issued under the authority of the Joint Economic Board, which shall be the sole issuing authority and which shall determine the reserves to be held against such currencies.

9. So far as is consistent with paragraph 2 (b) above, each State may operate its own central bank, control its own fiscal and credit policy, its foreign exchange receipts and expenditures, the grant of import licenses, and may conduct international financial operations on its own faith and credit. During the first two years after the termination of the Mandate, the Joint Economic Board shall have the authority to take such measures as may be necessary to ensure that--to the extent that the total foreign exchange revenues of the two States from the export of goods and services permit, and provided that each State takes appropriate measures to conserve its own foreign exchange resources--each State shall have available, in any twelve months' period, foreign exchange sufficient to assure the supply of quantities of imported goods and services for consumption in its territory equivalent to the quantities of such goods and services consumed in that territory in the twelve months' period ending 31 December 1947.
10. All economic authority not specifically vested in the Joint Economic Board is reserved to each State.

11. There shall be a common customs tariff with complete freedom of trade between the States, and between the States and the City of Jerusalem.

12. The tariff schedules shall be drawn up by a Tariff Commission, consisting of representatives of each of the States in equal numbers, and shall be submitted to the Joint Economic Board for approval by a majority vote. In case of disagreement in the Tariff Commission, the Joint Economic Board shall arbitrate the points of difference. In the event that the Tariff Commission fails to draw up any schedule by a date to be fixed, the Joint Economic Board shall determine the tariff schedule.

13. The following items shall be a first charge on the customs and other common revenue of the Joint Economic Board:
   (a) The expenses of the customs service and of the operation of the joint services;
   (b) The administrative expenses of the Joint Economic Board;
   (c) The financial obligations of the Administration of Palestine consisting of:
      (i) The service of the outstanding public debt;
      (ii) The cost of superannuation benefits, now being paid or falling due in the future, in accordance with the rules and to the extent established by paragraph 3 of chapter 3 above.

14. After these obligations have been met in full, the surplus revenue from the customs and other common services shall be divided in the following manner: not less than 5 percent and not more than 10 percent to the City of Jerusalem; the residue shall be allocated to each State by the Joint Economic Board equitably, with the objective of maintaining a sufficient and suitable level of government and social services in each State, except that the share of either State shall not exceed the amount of that State’s contribution to the revenues of the Economic Union by more than approximately four million pounds in any year. The amount granted may be adjusted by the Board according to the price level in relation to the prices prevailing at the time of the establishment of the Union. After five years, the principles of the distribution of the joint revenues may be revised by the Joint Economic Board on a basis of equity.

15. All international conventions and treaties affecting customs tariff rates, and those communications services under the jurisdiction of the Joint Economic Board, shall be entered into by both States. In these matters, the two States shall be bound to act in accordance with the majority vote of the Joint Economic Board.

16. The Joint Economic Board shall endeavour to secure for Palestine’s export fair and equal access to world markets.

17. All enterprises operated by the Joint Economic Board shall pay fair wages on a uniform basis.

**Freedom of transit and visit**

18. The undertaking shall contain provisions preserving freedom of transit and visit for all residents or citizens of both States and of the City of Jerusalem, subject to security considerations; provided that each state and the City shall control residence within its borders.

**Termination, modification and interpretation of the undertaking**

19. The undertaking and any treaty issuing therefrom shall remain in force for a period of ten years. It shall continue in force until notice of termination, to take effect two years thereafter, is given by either of the parties.
20. During the initial ten-year period, the undertaking and any treaty issuing therefrom may not be modified except by consent of both parties and with the approval of the General Assembly.

21. Any dispute relating to the application or the interpretation of the undertaking and any treaty issuing therefrom shall be referred, at the request of either party, to the international Court of Justice, unless the parties agree to another mode of settlement.

E. ASSETS

1. The movable assets of the Administration of Palestine shall be allocated to the Arab and Jewish states and the City of Jerusalem on an equitable basis. Allocations should be made by the United Nations Commission referred to in section B, paragraph 1, above. Immovable assets shall become the property of the government of the territory in which they are situated.

2. During the period between the appointment of the United Nations Commission and the termination of the Mandate, the mandatory Power shall, except in respect of ordinary operations, consult with the Commission on any measure which it may contemplate involving the liquidation, disposal or encumbering of the assets of the Palestine Government, such as the accumulated treasury surplus, the proceeds of Government bond issues, State lands or any other asset.

F. ADMISSION TO MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS

When the independence of either the Arab or the Jewish state as envisaged in this plan has become effective and the declaration and undertaking, as envisaged in this plan, have been signed by either of them, sympathetic consideration should be given to its application for admission to membership in the United Nations in accordance with Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations.

PART II

Boundaries 5/

A. THE ARAB STATE

The area of the Arab State in Western Galilee is bounded on the west by the Mediterranean and on the north by the frontier of the Lebanon from Ras en Naqura to a point north of Saliha. From there the boundary proceeds southwards, leaving the built-up area of Saliha in the Arab State, to join the southernmost point of this village. Thence it follows the western boundary line of the villages of 'Alma, Rihan and Teitarba, thence following the northern boundary line of Meiron village to join the Acre-Safed sub-district boundary line. It follows this line to a point west of Es Samou'i village and joins it again at the northernmost point of Faradiya. Thence it follows the sub-district boundary line to the Acre-Safed main road. From here it follows the western boundary of Kafir 'Inan village until it reaches the Tiberias-Acre sub-district boundary line, passing to the west of the junction of the Acre-Safed and Lubiya-Kafir 'Inan roads. From south-west corner of Kafir 'Inan village the boundary line follows the western boundary of the Tiberias sub-district to a point close to the boundary line between the villages of Maghar and Eilabun, thence bulging out to the west to include as much of the eastern part of the plain of Battif as is necessary for the reservoir proposed by the Jewish Agency for the irrigation of lands to the south and east.

The boundary rejoins the Tiberias sub-district boundary at a point on the Nazareth-Tiberias road south-east of the built-up area of Tur'an; thence it runs southwards, at first following the sub-district boundary and then passing between the Kadoorie Agricultural School and Mount Tabor, to a point
due south at the base of Mount Tabor. From here it runs due west, parallel to the horizontal grid line 230, to the north-east corner of the village lands of Tel Adashim. It then runs to the north-west corner of these lands, whence it turns south and west so as to include in the Arab State the sources of the Nazareth water supply in Yafa village.

On reaching Ginneiger it follows the eastern, northern and western boundaries of the lands of this village to their south-west corner, whence it proceeds in a straight line to a point on the Haifa-Afula railway on the boundary between the villages of Sarid and El Mujeidil. This is the point of intersection.

The south-western boundary of the area of the Arab State in Galilee takes a line from this point, passing northwards along the eastern boundaries of Sarid and Gevat to the north-eastern corner of Nahalal, proceeding thence across the land of Kefar ha Horesh to a central point on the southern boundary of the village of Ilut, thence westwards along that village boundary to the eastern boundary of Beit Lahm, thence northwards and north-eastwards along its western boundary to the north-eastern corner of Waldheim and thence north-westwards across the village lands of Shafa 'Amr to the south-eastern corner of Ramat Yohanan. From here it runs due north-north-east to a point on the Shafa 'Amr-Haifa road, west of its junction with the road to l'Billin. From there it proceeds north-east to a point on the southern boundary of l'Billin situated to the west of the l'Billin-Birwa road. Thence along that boundary to its westernmost point, whence it turns to the north, follows across the village land of Tamra to the north-westernmost corner and along the western boundary of Julis until it reaches the Acre-Safed road. It then runs westwards along the southern side of the Safed-Acre road to the Galilee-Haifa District boundary, from which point it follows that boundary to the sea.

The boundary of the hill country of Samaria and Judea starts on the Jordan River at the Wadi Malih south-east of Beisan and runs due west to meet the Beisan-Jericho road and then follows the western side of that road in a north-westerly direction to the junction of the boundaries of the sub-districts of Beisan, Nablus, and Jenin. From that point it follows the Nablus-Jenin sub-district boundary westwards for a distance of about three kilometres and then turns north-westwards, passing to the east of the built-up areas of the villages of Jabun and Faqqua, to the boundary of the sub-districts of Jenin and Beisan at a point north-east of Nurus.

Thence it proceeds first north-westwards to a point due north of the built-up area of Zir'in and then westwards to the Afula-Jenin railway, thence north-westwards along the district boundary line to the point of intersection on the Hejaz railway.

From here the boundary runs south-westwards, including the built-up area and some of the land of the village of Kh. Lid in the Arab State to cross the Haifa-Jenin road at a point on the district boundary between Haifa and Samaria west of El Mansi. It follows this boundary to the southernmost point of the village of El Buteimat. From here it follows the northern and eastern boundaries of the village of Ar'ara, rejoining the Haifa-Samaria district boundary at Wadi'Ara, and thence proceeding south-south-westwards in an approximately straight line joining up with the western boundary of Oaqun to a point east of the railway line on the eastern boundary of Oaqun village. From here it runs along the railway line some distance to the east of it to a point just east of the Tulkarem railway station. Thence the boundary follows a line half-way between the railway and the Tulkarem-Qalqiliya-Jaljuliya and Ras el Ein road to a point just east of Ras el Ein station, whence it proceeds along the railway some distance to the east of it to the point on the railway line south of the junction of the Haifa-Lydda and Beit Nabal lines, whence it proceeds along the southern border of Lydda airport to its south-west corner, thence in a south-westerly direction to a point just west of the built-up area of Sarafand el'Amar, whence it turns south, passing just to the west of the built-up area of Abu el Fadil to the north-east corner of the lands of Beer Ya'Aqov. (The boundary line should be so demarcated as to allow direct access from the Arab State to the airport.) Thence the boundary line follows the western
and southern boundaries of Ramle village, to the north-east corner of El Na‘ana village, thence in a straight line to the southernmost point of El Barriya, along the eastern boundary of that village and the southern boundary of ‘Innaba village. Thence it turns north to follow the southern side of the Jaffa-Jerusalem road until El Qubah, whence it follows the road to the boundary of Abu Shusha. It runs along the eastern boundaries of Abu Shusha, Seidun, Hulda to the southernmost point of Hulda, thence westwards in a straight line to the north-eastern corner of Umm Kalkha, thence following the northern boundaries of Umm Kalkha, Qazaza and the northern and western boundaries of Mukhezin to the Gaza District boundary and thence runs across the village lands of El Mismiya, El Kabira, and Yasur to the southern point of intersection, which is midway between the built-up areas of Yasur and Batani Sharqi.

From the southern point of intersection the boundary lines run north-westwards between the villages of Gan Yavne and Barqa to the sea at a point half way between Nabi Yunis and Minat el Oila, and south-eastwards to a point west of Qastina, whence it proceeds in a south-westerly direction, passing to the east of the built-up areas of Es Sawafir, Es Sharqiya and Ibdis. From the south-east corner of Ibdis village it runs to a point south-west of the built-up area of Beit ‘Affa, crossing the Hebron-El Majdal road just to the west of the built-up area of Iraq Suweidan.

Thence it proceeds southwards along the western village boundary of El Faluja to the Beersheba sub-district boundary. It then runs across the tribal lands of ‘Arab el Jubara to a point on the boundary between the sub-districts of Beersheba and Hebron north of Kh. Khuweilifa, whence it proceeds in a south-westerly direction to a point on the Beersheba-Gaza main road two kilometres to the north-west of the town. It then turns south-eastwards to reach Wadi Sab‘ at a point situated one kilometre to the west of it. From here it turns north-eastwards and proceeds along Wadi Sab‘ and along the Beersheba-Hebron road for a distance of one kilometre, whence it turns eastwards and runs in a straight line to Kh. Kuseifa to join the Beersheba-Hebron sub-district boundary. It then follows the Beersheba-Hebron boundary eastwards to a point north of Ras Ez Zuweira, only departing from it so as to cut across the base of the indentation between vertical grid lines 150 and 160.

About five kilometres north-east of Ras ez Zuweira it turns north, excluding from the Arab State a strip along the coast of the Dead Sea not more than seven kilometres in depth, as far as Ein Geddi, whence it turns due east to join the Transjordan frontier in the Dead Sea.

The northern boundary of the Arab section of the coastal plain runs from a point between Minat el Oila and Nabi Yunis, passing between the built-up areas of Gan Yavne and Barqa to the point of intersection. From here it turns south-westwards, running across the lands of Batani Sharqi, along the eastern boundary of the lands of Beit Daras and across the lands of Julis, leaving the built-up areas of Batani Sharqi and Julis to the westwards, as far as the north-west corner of the lands of Beit Tima. Thence it runs east of El Iyja across the village lands of El Barbara along the eastern boundaries of the villages of Beit Jirja, Deir Suneid and Dimra.

From the south-east corner of Dimra the boundary passes across the lands of Beit Hanun, leaving the Jewish lands of Nir-Am to the eastwards. From the south-east corner of Dimra the boundary passes across the lands of Beit Hanun, leaving the Jewish lands of Nir-Am to the eastwards. From the south-east corner of Beit Hanun the line runs south-west to a point south of the parallel grid line 100, then turns north-west for two kilometres, turning again in a south-westerly direction and continuing in an almost straight line to the north-west corner of the village lands of Kirbet Ikhza‘a. From there it follows the boundary line of this village to its southernmost point. It then runs in a southerly direction along the vertical grid line 90 to its junction with the horizontal grid line 70. It then turns south-eastwards to Kh. el Ruheiba and then proceeds in a southerly direction to a point known as El Baha, beyond which it crosses the Beersheba-El ‘Auja main road to the west of Kh. el Mushrifa. From there it joins Wadi El Zaiyatina just to the west of El Subeita. From there it turns to the north-east and
then to the south-east following this Wadi and passes to the east of 'Abda to join Wadi Nafkh. It then bulges to the south-west along Wadi Nafkh. It then bulges to the south-west along Wadi Nafkh, Wadi Ajrim and Wadi Lassan to the point where Wadi Lassan crosses the Egyptian frontier. The area of the Arab enclave of Jaffa consists of that part of the town-planning area of Jaffa which lies to the west of the Jewish quarters lying south of Tel-Aviv, to the west of the continuation of Herzl Street up to its junction with the Jaffa-Jerusalem road, to the south-west of the section of the Jaffa-Jerusalem road lying south-east of that junction, to the west of Miquei Israel lands, to the north-west of Holon local council area, to the north of the line linking up the north-west corner of Holon with the north-east corner of Bat Yam local council area and to the north of Bat Yam local council area. The question of Kaston quarter will be decided by the Boundary Commission, bearing in mind among other considerations the desirability of including the smallest possible number of its Arab inhabitants and the largest possible number of its Jewish inhabitants in the Jewish state.

B. THE JEWISH STATE
The north-eastern sector of the Jewish state (Eastern Galilee) is bounded on the north and west by the Lebanese frontier and on the east by the frontiers of Syria and Transjordan. It includes the whole of the Hula Basin, Lake Tiberias, the whole of the Beisan sub-district, the boundary line being extended to the crest of the Gilboa mountains and the Wadi Malih. From there the Jewish state extends north-west, following the boundary described in respect of the Arab State. The Jewish Section of the coastal plain extends from a point between Minat et Qila and Nabi Yunis in the Gaza sub-district and includes the towns of Haifa and Tel-Aviv, leaving Jaffa as an enclave of the Arab State. The eastern frontier of the Jewish state follows the boundary described in respect of the Arab State.

The Beersheba area comprises the whole of the Beersheba sub-district, including the Negeb and the eastern part of the Gaza sub-district, but excluding the town of Beersheba and those areas described in respect of the Arab State. It includes also a strip of land along the Dead Sea stretching from the Beersheba-Hebron sub-district boundary line to Ein Geddi, as described in respect of the Arab State.

C. THE CITY OF JERUSALEM
The boundaries of the City of Jerusalem are as defined in the recommendations on the City of Jerusalem. (See Part III, Section B, below).

PART III

City of Jerusalem

A. SPECIAL REGIME
The City of Jerusalem shall be established as a corpus separatum under a special international regime and shall be administered by the United Nations. The Trusteeship Council shall be designated to discharge the responsibilities of the Administering Authority on behalf of the United Nations.

B. BOUNDARIES OF THE CITY
The City of Jerusalem shall include the present municipality of Jerusalem plus the surrounding villages and towns, the most eastern of which shall be Abu Dis; the most southern, Bethlehem; the
most western, Ein Karim (including also the built-up area of Moza); and the most northern Shu‘fat, as indicated on the attached sketch-map (annex B).

C. STATUTE OF THE CITY

The Trusteeship Council shall, within five months of the approval of the present plan, elaborate and approve a detailed Statute of the City which shall contain inter alia the substance of the following provisions:

1. Government machinery; special objectives. The Administering Authority in discharging its administrative obligations shall pursue the following special objectives:

(a) To protect and to preserve the unique spiritual and religious interests located in the city of the three great monotheistic faiths throughout the world, Christian, Jewish and Moslem; to this end to ensure that order and peace, and especially religious peace, reign in Jerusalem;

(b) To foster co-operation among all the inhabitants of the city in their own interests as well as in order to encourage and support the peaceful development of the mutual relations between the two Palestinian peoples throughout the Holy Land; to promote the security, well-being and any constructive measures of development of the residents, having regard to the special circumstances and customs of the various peoples and communities.

2. Governor and administrative staff. A Governor of the City of Jerusalem shall be appointed by the Trusteeship Council and shall be responsible to it. He shall be selected on the basis of special qualifications and without regard to nationality. He shall not, however, be a citizen of either State in Palestine. The Governor shall represent the United Nations in the city and shall exercise on their behalf all powers of administration, including the conduct of external affairs. He shall be assisted by an administrative staff classed as international officers in the meaning of Article 100 of the Charter and chosen whenever practicable from the residents of the city and of the rest of Palestine on a non-discriminatory basis. A detailed plan for the organization of the administration of the city shall be submitted by the Governor to the Trusteeship Council and duly approved by it.

3. Local autonomy.

(a) The existing local autonomous units in the territory of the city (villages, townships and municipalities) shall enjoy wide powers of local government and administration.

(b) The Governor shall study and submit for the consideration and decision of the Trusteeship Council a plan for the establishment of a special town units consisting respectively, of the Jewish and Arab sections of new Jerusalem. The new town units shall continue to form part of the present municipality of Jerusalem.


(a) The City of Jerusalem shall be demilitarized; its neutrality shall be declared and preserved, and no para-military formations, exercises or activities shall be permitted within its borders.

(b) Should the administration of the City of Jerusalem be seriously obstructed or prevented by the non-co-operation or interference of one or more sections of the population, the Governor shall have authority to take such measures as may be necessary to restore the effective functioning of the administration.

(c) To assist in the maintenance of internal law and order and especially for the protection of the Holy Places and religious buildings and sites in the city, the Governor shall organize a special police force of adequate strength, the members of which shall be recruited outside of Palestine. The Governor shall be empowered to direct such budgetary provision as may be necessary for the maintenance of this force.
5. Legislative organization. A Legislative Council, elected by adult residents of the city irrespective of nationality on the basis of universal and secret suffrage and proportional representation, shall have powers of legislation and taxation. No legislative measures shall, however, conflict or interfere with the provisions which will be set forth in the Statute of the City, nor shall any law, regulation, or official action prevail over them. The Statute shall grant to the Governor a right of vetoing bills inconsistent with the provisions referred to in the preceding sentence. It shall also empower him to promulgate temporary ordinances in case the council fails to adopt in time a bill deemed essential to the normal functioning of the administration.

6. Administration of justice. The Statute shall provide for the establishment of an independent judiciary system, including a court of appeal. All the inhabitants of the City shall be subject to it.

7. Economic union and economic regime. The City of Jerusalem shall be included in the Economic Union of Palestine and be bound by all stipulations of the undertaking and of any treaties issued therefrom, as well as by the decision of the Joint Economic Board. The headquarters of the Economic Board shall be established in the territory of the City.

The Statute shall provide for the regulation of economic matters not falling within the regime of the Economic Union, on the basis of equal treatment and non-discrimination for all members of the United Nations and their nationals.

8. Freedom of transit and visit; control of residents. Subject to considerations of security, and of economic welfare as determined by the Governor under the directions of the Trusteeship Council, freedom of entry into, and residence within, the borders of the City shall be guaranteed for the residents or citizens of the Arab and Jewish states. Immigration into, and residence within, the borders of the city for nationals of other States shall be controlled by the Governor under the directions of the Trusteeship Council.

9. Relations with the Arab and Jewish states. Representatives of the Arab and Jewish states shall be accredited to the Governor of the City and charged with the protection of the interests of their States and nationals in connection with the international administration of the City.

10. Official languages. Arabic and Hebrew shall be the official languages of the city. This will not preclude the adoption of one or more additional working languages, as may be required.

11. Citizenship. All the residents shall become ipso facto citizens of the City of Jerusalem unless they opt for citizenship of the State of which they have been citizens or, if Arabs or Jews, have filed notice of intention to become citizens of the Arab or Jewish state respectively, according to part I, section B, paragraph 9, of this plan.

The Trusteeship Council shall make arrangements for consular protection of the citizens of the City outside its territory.

(a) Subject only to the requirements of public order and morals, the inhabitants of the City shall be ensured the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of conscience, religion and worship, language, education, speech and press, assembly and association, and petition.

(b) No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants on the grounds of race, religion, language or sex.

(c) All persons within the City shall be entitled to equal protection of the laws.

(d) The family law and personal status of the various persons and communities and their religious interests, including endowments, shall be respected.

(e) Except as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government, no measure shall be taken to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of religious or charitable
bodies of all faiths or to discriminate against any representative or member of these bodies on the ground of his religion or nationality.

(f) The City shall ensure adequate primary and secondary education for the Arab and Jewish communities respectively, in their own languages and in accordance with their cultural traditions. The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the City may impose, shall not be denied or impaired. Foreign educational establishments shall continue their activity on the basis of their existing rights.

(g) No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any inhabitant of the City of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the Press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings.


(a) Existing rights in respect of Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall not be denied or impaired.

(b) Free access to the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites and the free exercise of worship shall be secured in conformity with existing rights and subject to the requirements of public order and decorum.

(c) Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall be preserved. No act shall be permitted which may in any way impair their sacred character. If at any time it appears to the Governor that any particular Holy Place, religious building or site is in need of urgent repair, the Governor may call upon the community or communities concerned to carry out such repair. The Governor may carry it out himself at the expense of the community or communities concerned if no action is taken within a reasonable time.

(d) No taxation shall be levied in respect of any Holy Place, religious building or site which was exempt from taxation on the date of the creation of the City. No change in the incidence of such taxation shall be made which would either discriminate between the owners or occupiers of Holy Places, religious buildings or sites, or would place such owners or occupiers in a position less favourable in relation to the general incidence of taxation than existed at the time of the adoption of the Assembly's recommendations.

14. Special powers of the Governor in respect of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in the City and in any part of Palestine.

(a) The protection of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites located in the City of Jerusalem shall be a special concern of the Governor.

(b) With relation to such places, buildings and sites in Palestine outside the city, the Governor shall determine, on the ground of powers granted to him by the Constitutions of both States, whether the provisions of the Constitutions of the Arab and Jewish states in Palestine dealing therewith and the religious rights appertaining thereto are being properly applied and respected.

(c) The Governor shall also be empowered to make decisions on the basis of existing rights in cases of disputes which may arise between the different religious communities or the rites of a religious community in respect of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in any part of Palestine. In this task he may be assisted by a consultative council of representatives of different denominations acting in an advisory capacity.
D. DURATION OF THE SPECIAL REGIME
The Statute elaborated by the Trusteeship Council on the aforementioned principles shall come into force not later than 1 October 1948. It shall remain in force in the first instance for a period of ten years, unless the Trusteeship Council finds it necessary to undertake a re-examination of these provisions at an earlier date.
After the expiration of this period the whole scheme shall be subject to re-examination by the Trusteeship Council in the light of the experience acquired with its functioning. The residents of the City shall be then free to express by means of a referendum their wishes as to possible modifications of the regime of the City.

PART IV

CAPITULATIONS
States whose nationals have in the past enjoyed in Palestine the privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection, as formerly enjoyed by capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, are invited to renounce any right pertaining to them to the re-establishment of such privileges and immunities in the proposed Arab and Jewish states and the City of Jerusalem.

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1/ See Official Records of the second session of the General Assembly, Supplement No. 11, Volumes I-IV.
2/ This resolution was adopted without reference to a Committee.
3/ The following stipulation shall be added to the declaration concerning the Jewish state: “In the Jewish state adequate facilities shall be given to Arab-speaking citizens for the use of their language, either orally or in writing, in the legislature, before the Courts and in the administration.”
4/ In the declaration concerning the Arab State, the words “by an Arab in the Jewish state” should be replaced by the words “by a Jew in the Arab State”.
5/ The boundary lines described in part II are indicated in Annex A. The base map used in marking and describing this boundary is “Palestine 1:250000” published by the Survey of Palestine, 1946.

Annex A
Annex B

CITY OF JERUSALEM

BOUNDARIES PROPOSED BY THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION Map No. 104 (b) United Nations UN Presentation 600 (b)

November 1947
UNITED NATIONS
A General Assembly Distr. GENERAL
A/RES/194(III)
11 December 1948

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

The General Assembly, Having considered further the situation in Palestine,

1. Expresses its deep appreciation of the progress achieved through the good offices of the late United Nations Mediator in promoting a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine, for which cause he sacrificed his life; and extends its thanks to the Acting Mediator and his staff for their continued efforts and devotion to duty in Palestine;

2. Establishes a Conciliation Commission consisting of three States members of the United Nations which shall have the following functions:
   A. To assume, in so far as it considers necessary in existing circumstances, the functions given to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine by resolution 186 (S-2) of the General Assembly of 14 May 1948;
   B. To carry out the specific functions and directives given to it by the present resolution and such additional functions and directives as may be given to it by the General Assembly or by the Security Council;
   C. To undertake, upon the request of the Security Council, any of the functions now assigned to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine or to the United Nations Truce Commission by resolutions of the Security Council; upon such request to the Conciliation Commission by the Security Council with respect to all the remaining functions of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine under Security Council resolutions, the office of the Mediator shall be terminated;

3. Decides that a Committee of the Assembly, consisting of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, shall present, before the end of the first part of the present session of the General Assembly, for the approval of the Assembly, a proposal concerning the names of the three States which will constitute the Conciliation Commission;

4. Requests the Commission to begin its functions at once, with a view to the establishment of contact between the parties themselves and the Commission at the earliest possible date;

5. Calls upon the Governments and authorities concerned to extend the scope of the negotiations provided for in the Security Council’s resolution of 16 November 1948 1/ and to seek agreement by negotiations conducted either with the Conciliation Commission or directly, with a view to the final settlement of all questions outstanding between them;

6. Instructs the Conciliation Commission to take steps to assist the Governments and authorities concerned to achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them;

7. Resolves that the Holy Places — including Nazareth — religious buildings and sites in Palestine
should be protected and free access to them assured, in accordance with existing rights and historical practice; that arrangements to this end should be under effective United Nations supervision; that the United Nations Conciliation Commission, in presenting to the fourth regular session of the General Assembly its detailed proposals for a permanent international regime for the territory of Jerusalem, should include recommendations concerning the Holy Places in that territory; that with regard to the Holy Places in the rest of Palestine the Commission should call upon the political authorities of the areas concerned to give appropriate formal guarantees as to the protection of the Holy Places and access to them; and that these undertakings should be presented to the General Assembly for approval;

8. Resolves that, in view of its association with three world religions, the Jerusalem area, including the present municipality of Jerusalem plus the surrounding villages and towns, the most eastern of which shall be Abu Dis; the most southern, Bethlehem; the most western, Ein Karim (including also the built-up area of Moza); and the most northern, Shufat, should be accorded special and separate treatment from the rest of Palestine and should be placed under effective United Nations control; Requests the Security Council to take further steps to ensure the demilitarization of Jerusalem at the earliest possible date;

Instructs the Conciliation Commission to present to the fourth regular session of the General Assembly detailed proposals for a permanent international regime for the Jerusalem area which will provide for the maximum local autonomy for distinctive groups consistent with the special international status of the Jerusalem area;

The Conciliation Commission is authorized to appoint a United Nations representative, who shall cooperate with the local authorities with respect to the interim administration of the Jerusalem area;

9. Resolves that, pending agreement on more detailed arrangements among the Governments and authorities concerned, the freest possible access to Jerusalem by road, rail or air should be accorded to all inhabitants of Palestine;

Instructs the Conciliation Commission to report immediately to the Security Council, for appropriate action by that organ, any attempt by any party to impede such access;

10. Instructs the Conciliation Commission to seek arrangements among the Governments and authorities concerned which will facilitate the economic development of the area, including arrangements for access to ports and airfields and the use of transportation and communication facilities;

11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;

Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations;

12. Authorizes the Conciliation Commission to appoint such subsidiary bodies and to employ such technical experts, acting under its authority, as it may find necessary for the effective discharge of its functions and responsibilities under the present resolution;

The Conciliation Commission will have its official headquarters at Jerusalem. The authorities responsible for maintaining order in Jerusalem will be responsible for taking all measures necessary to ensure the security of the Commission. The Secretary-General will provide a limited number of guards to the protection of the staff and premises of the Commission;
13. Instructs the Conciliation Commission to render progress reports periodically to the Secretary-General for transmission to the Security Council and to the Members of the United Nations;
14. Calls upon all Governments and authorities concerned to co-operate with the Conciliation Commission and to take all possible steps to assist in the implementation of the present resolution;
15. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the necessary staff and facilities and to make appropriate arrangements to provide the necessary funds required in carrying out the terms of the present resolution.

* * *

At the 186th plenary meeting on 11 December 1948, a committee of the Assembly consisting of the five States designated in paragraph 3 of the above resolution proposed that the following three States should constitute the Conciliation Commission:

France, Turkey, United States of America.

The proposal of the Committee having been adopted by the General Assembly at the same meeting, the Conciliation Commission is therefore composed of the above-mentioned three States.

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THE PLO CHARTER

Below is the Palestinian National Covenant, the official charter of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The text is the English version published officially by the PLO, unabridged and unedited.

Note, however, that the PLO's translation sometimes deviates from the original Arabic so as to be more palatable to Western readers. For example, in Article 15, the Arabic is translated as "the elimination of Zionism", whereas the correct translation is "the liquidation of the Zionist presence".

"The Zionist presence" is a common Arabic euphemism for the State of Israel, so this clause in fact calls for the destruction of Israel, not just the end of Zionism.

Where subtleties in the original Arabic are important, the Arabic word has been inserted in parentheses.

THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL CHARTER:

Resolutions of the Palestine National Council, July 1-17, 1968

Text of the Charter:

Article 1: Palestine is the homeland of the Arab Palestinian people; it is an indivisible part of the Arab homeland, and the Palestinian people are an integral part of the Arab nation.

Article 2: Palestine, with the boundaries it had during the British Mandate, is an indivisible territorial unit.

Article 3: The Palestinian Arab people possess the legal right to their homeland and have the right to determine their destiny after achieving the liberation of their country in accordance with their wishes and entirely of their own accord and will.

Article 4: The Palestinian identity is a genuine, essential, and inherent characteristic; it is transmitted from parents to children. The Zionist occupation and the dispersal of the Palestinian Arab people, through the disasters which befell them, do not make them lose their Palestinian identity and their membership in the Palestinian community, nor do they negate them.

Article 5: The Palestinians are those Arab nationals who, until 1947, normally resided in Palestine regardless of whether they were evicted from it or have stayed there. Anyone born, after that date, of a Palestinian father — whether inside Palestine or outside it — is also a Palestinian.

Article 6: The Jews who had normally resided in Palestine until the beginning of the Zionist invasion will be considered Palestinians.

Article 7: That there is a Palestinian community and that it has material, spiritual, and historical connection with Palestine are indisputable facts. It is a national duty to bring up individual Palestinians in an Arab revolutionary manner. All means of information and education must be adopted in order to acquaint the Palestinian with his country in the most profound manner, both spiritual and material, that is possible. He must be prepared for the armed struggle and ready to sacrifice his wealth and his life in order to win back his homeland and bring about its liberation.

Article 8: The phase in their history, through which the Palestinian people are now living, is that of
national (Watani) struggle for the liberation of Palestine. Thus the conflicts among
the Palestinian national forces are secondary, and should be ended for the sake of the basic conflict
that exists between the forces of Zionism and of imperialism on the one hand, and the
Palestinian Arab people on the other. On this basis the Palestinian masses, regardless of
whether they are residing in the national homeland or in diaspora (Muhajir) constitute — both
their organizations and the individuals — one national front working for the retrieval of
Palestine and its liberation through armed struggle.

Article 9: Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine. Thus it is the overall strategy, not merely a
tactical phase. The Palestinian Arab people assert their absolute determination and firm
resolution to continue their armed struggle and to work for an armed popular revolution for the
liberation of their country and their return to it. They also assert their right to normal life in
Palestine and to exercise their right to self-determination and sovereignty over it.

Article 10: Commando action constitutes the nucleus of the Palestinian popular liberation war. This
requires its escalation, comprehensiveness, and the mobilization of all the Palestinian popular
and educational efforts and their organization and involvement in the armed Palestinian
revolution. It also requires the achieving of unity for the national (Watani) struggle among the
different groupings of the Palestinian people, and between the Palestinian people and the Arab
masses, so as to secure the continuation of the revolution, its escalation, and victory.

Article 11: The Palestinians will have three mottoes: national (Wataniyya) unity, national (Qawmiyya)
mobilization, and liberation.

Article 12: The Palestinian people believe in Arab unity. In order to contribute their share toward the
attainment of that objective, however, they must, at the present stage of their struggle,
safeguard their Palestinian identity and develop their consciousness of that identity, and
oppose any plan that may dissolve or impair it.

Article 13: Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine are two complementary objectives, the attainment of
either of which facilitates the attainment of the other. Thus, Arab unity leads to the liberation of
Palestine, the liberation of Palestine leads to Arab unity, and work toward the realization of one
objective proceeds side by side with work toward the realization of the other.

Article 14: The destiny of the Arab nation, and indeed Arab existence itself, depend upon the destiny of
the Palestine cause. From this interdependence springs the Arab nation's pursuit of, and
striving for, the liberation of Palestine. The people of Palestine play the role of the vanguard in
the realization of this sacred national (Qawmi) goal.

Article 15: The liberation of Palestine, from an Arab viewpoint, is a national (Qawmi) duty and it attempts to
repel the Zionist and imperialist aggression against the Arab homeland, and aims at the
elimination of Zionism in Palestine. Absolute responsibility for this falls upon the Arab nation
— peoples and governments — with the Arab people of Palestine in the vanguard. Accordingly,
the Arab nation must mobilize all its military, human, moral, and spiritual capabilities to
participate actively with the Palestinian people in the liberation of Palestine. It must,
particularly in the phase of the armed Palestinian revolution, offer and furnish the Palestinian
people with all possible help, and material and human support, and make available to them
the means and opportunities that will enable them to continue to carry out their leading role in
the armed revolution, until they liberate their homeland.

Article 16: The liberation of Palestine, from a spiritual point of view, will provide the Holy Land with an
atmosphere of safety and tranquility, which in turn will safeguard the country's religious
sanctuaries and guarantee freedom of worship and of visit to all, without discrimination of race,
color, language, or religion. Accordingly, the people of Palestine look to all spiritual forces in
the world for support.
Article 17: The liberation of Palestine, from a human point of view, will restore to the Palestinian individual his dignity, pride, and freedom. Accordingly, the Palestinian Arab people look forward to the support of all those who believe in the dignity of man and his freedom in the world.

Article 18: The liberation of Palestine, from an international point of view, is a defensive action necessitated by the demands of self-defense. Accordingly, the Palestinian people, desirous as they are of the friendship of all people, look to freedom-loving, and peace-loving states for support in order to restore their legitimate rights in Palestine, to re-establish peace and security in the country, and to enable its people to exercise national sovereignty and freedom.

Article 19: The partition of Palestine in 1947 and the establishment of the State of Israel are entirely illegal, regardless of the passage of time, because they were contrary to the will of the Palestinian people and to their natural right in their homeland, and inconsistent with the principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, particularly the right to self-determination.

Article 20: The Balfour Declaration, the Mandate for Palestine, and everything that has been based upon them are deemed null and void. Claims of historical or religious ties of Jews with Palestine are incompatible with the facts of history and the true conception of what constitutes statehood. Judaism, being a religion, is not an independent nationality. Nor do Jews constitute a single nation with an identity of its own; they are citizens of the states to which they belong.

Article 21: The Arab Palestinian people, expressing themselves by the armed Palestinian revolution, reject all solutions which are substitutes for the total liberation of Palestine and reject all proposals aiming at the liquidation of the Palestinian problem, or its internationalization.

Article 22: Zionism is a political movement organically associated with international imperialism and antagonistic to all action for liberation and to progressive movements in the world. It is racist and fanatic in its nature, aggressive, expansionist, and colonial in its aims, and fascist in its methods. Israel is the instrument of the Zionist movement, and geographical base for world imperialism placed strategically in the midst of the Arab homeland to combat the hopes of the Arab nation for liberation, unity, and progress. Israel is a constant source of threat vis-à-vis peace in the Middle East and the whole world. Since the liberation of Palestine will destroy the Zionist and imperialist presence and will contribute to the establishment of peace in the Middle East, the Palestinian people look for the support of all the progressive and peaceful forces and urge them all, irrespective of their affiliations and beliefs, to offer the Palestinian people all aid and support in their just struggle for the liberation of their homeland.

Article 23: The demand of security and peace, as well as the demand of right and justice, require all states to consider Zionism an illegitimate movement, to outlaw its existence, and to ban its operations, in order that friendly relations among peoples may be preserved, and the loyalty of citizens to their respective homelands safeguarded.

Article 24: The Palestinian people believe in the principles of justice, freedom, sovereignty, self-determination, human dignity, and in the right of all peoples to exercise them.

Article 25: For the realization of the goals of this Charter and its principles, the Palestine Liberation Organization will perform its role in the liberation of Palestine in accordance with the Constitution of this Organization.

Article 26: The Palestine Liberation Organization, representative of the Palestinian revolutionary forces, is responsible for the Palestinian Arab people's movement in its struggle — to retrieve its homeland, liberate and return to it and exercise the right to self-determination in it — in all military, political, and financial fields and also for whatever may be required by the Palestine case on the inter-Arab and international levels.
Article 27: The Palestine Liberation Organization shall cooperate with all Arab states, each according to its potentialities, and will adopt a neutral policy among them in the light of the requirements of the war of liberation; and on this basis it shall not interfere in the internal affairs of any Arab state.

Article 28: The Palestinian Arab people assert the genuineness and independence of their national (wataniyya) revolution and reject all forms of intervention, trusteeship, and subordination.

Article 29: The Palestinian people possess the fundamental and genuine legal right to liberate and retrieve their homeland. The Palestinian people determine their attitude toward all states and forces on the basis of the stands they adopt vis-à-vis to the Palestinian revolution to fulfill the aims of the Palestinian people.

Article 30: Fighters and carriers of arms in the war of liberation are the nucleus of the popular army which will be the protective force for the gains of the Palestinian Arab people.

Article 31: The Organization shall have a flag, an oath of allegiance, and an anthem. All this shall be decided upon in accordance with a special regulation.

Article 32: Regulations, which shall be known as the Constitution of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, shall be annexed to this Charter. It will lay down the manner in which the Organization, and its organs and institutions, shall be constituted; the respective competence of each; and the requirements of its obligation under the Charter.

Article 33: This Charter shall not be amended save by [vote of] a majority of two-thirds of the total membership of the National Congress of the Palestine Liberation Organization [taken] at a special session convened for that purpose.
THE PLO'S "PHASED PLAN"

In the October 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Arab states launched a surprise attack against Israel on the holiest day of the Jewish calendar. Once again they tried to eliminate Israel, further motivated this time by the desire to redeem their honor after their major defeat in the 1967 Six Day War.

Though Israel was initially caught off guard, it then regrouped and repelled the Arab attack, but not before incurring heavy casualties.

The war convinced the Arabs that they would not be able to destroy Israel militarily within its post-1967 boundaries. Thus they embarked upon a new three-stage strategy for Israel's destruction, embodied in the PLO's 1974 decision commonly known as the Phased Plan (the text of which is below).

The Plan in Brief:
1. Through the "armed struggle" (i.e., terrorism), to establish an "independent combatant national authority" over any territory that is "liberated" from Israeli rule. (Article 2)
2. To continue the struggle against Israel, using the territory of the national authority as a base of operations. (Article 4)
3. To provoke an all-out war in which Israel's Arab neighbors destroy it entirely ("liberate all Palestinian territory"). (Article 8)

Today, the Phased Plan remains relevant. Speaking just after the 1993 revelation of the Israel-PLO accord, PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat announced that the historic agreement will be a basis for an independent Palestinian state in accordance with the Palestine National Council resolution issued in 1974.... The PNC resolution issued in 1974 calls for the establishment of a national authority on any part of Palestinian soil from which Israel withdraws or which is liberated. (Radio Monte Carlo, 1 September 1993)

It is worth noting that the PLO's term for the self-rule council now in place in Gaza and the West Bank is the "Palestinian National Authority", echoing the language of the Phased Plan.

Also note that Articles 5-6 call for a revolution in Jordan to establish a new Jordanian regime which will ally itself with the Palestinian National Authority. Historically, Jordan comprised the bulk of the Palestine territory, and a majority of its residents are of Palestinian origin. The PLO has never recognized the legitimacy of Kingdom of Jordan as a state independent of Palestine.

THE PLO'S PHASED PLAN
Political Program Adopted at the 12th Session of the Palestinian National Council Cairo, June 9, 1974

Text of the Phased Plan Resolution:

The Palestinian National Council:

On the basis of the Palestinian National Charter and the Political Program drawn up at the eleventh session, held from January 6-12, 1973; and from its belief that it is impossible for a permanent and just peace to be
established in the area unless our Palestinian people recover all their national rights and, first and foremost, their rights to return and to self-determination on the whole of the soil of their homeland; and in the light of a study of the new political circumstances that have come into existence in the period between the Council's last and present sessions, resolves the following:

1. To reaffirm the Palestine Liberation Organization's previous attitude to Resolution 242, which obliterates the national right of our people and deals with the cause of our people as a problem of refugees. The Council therefore refuses to have anything to do with this resolution at any level, Arab or international, including the Geneva Conference.

2. The Liberation Organization will employ all means, and first and foremost an armed struggle, to liberate Palestinian territory and to establish the independent combatant national authority for the people over every part of Palestinian territory that is liberated. This will require further changes being effected in the balance of power in favor of our people and their struggle.

3. The Liberation Organization will struggle against any proposal for a Palestinian entity the price of which is recognition, peace, secure frontiers, renunciation of national rights and the deprival of our people of their right to return and their right to self-determination on the soil of their homeland.

4. Any step taken towards liberation is a step towards the realization of the Liberation Organization's strategy of establishing the democratic Palestinian state specified in the resolutions of previous Palestinian National Councils.

5. Struggle along with the Jordanian national forces to establish a Jordanian-Palestinian national front whose aim will be to set up in Jordan a democratic national authority in close contact with the Palestinian entity that is established through the struggle.

6. The Liberation Organization will struggle to establish unity in struggle between the two peoples and between all the forces of the Arab liberation movement that are in agreement on this program.

7. In the light of this program, the Liberation Organization will struggle to strengthen national unity and to raise it to the level where it will be able to perform its national duties and tasks.

8. Once it is established, the Palestinian national authority will strive to achieve a union of the confrontation countries, with the aim of completing the liberation of all Palestinian territory, and as a step along the road to comprehensive Arab unity.

9. The Liberation Organization will strive to strengthen its solidarity with the socialist countries, and with forces of liberation and progress throughout the world, with the aim of frustrating all the schemes of Zionism, including reaction and imperialism.

10. In light of this program, the leadership of the revolution will determine the tactics which will serve and make possible the realization of these objectives.

The Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization will make every effort to implement this program, and should a situation arise affecting the destiny and the future of the Palestinian people, the National Assembly will be convened in extraordinary session.
THE CHARter OF THE Hamas

THE CHARter OF ALLAH:

THE PLATFORM OF THE ISLAMIC RESISTANCE MOVEMENT (HAMAS)

In the Name of Allah, the Merciful, the Compassionate...

You are the best community that has been raised up for mankind.

Ye enjoin right conduct and forbid indecency, and ye believe in Allah. And if the People of the Scripture had believed, it had been better for them. Some of them are believers, but most of them are evil-doers.

They will not harm you save a trifling hurt, and if they fight against you they will turn and flee. And afterward they will not be helped.

Ignominy shall be their portion wheresoever they are found save [where they grasp] a rope from Allah and a rope from man. They have incurred anger from their Lord, and wretchedness is laid upon them. That is because they used to disbelieve the revelations of Allah, and slew the Prophets wrongfully. That is because they were rebellious and used to transgress. Surat Al-Imran (III), verses 109-111.

Israel will rise and will remain erect until Islam eliminates it as it had eliminated its predecessors.

The Islamic World is burning. It is incumbent upon each one of us to pour some water, little as it may be, with a view of extinguishing as much of the fire as he can, without awaiting action by the others.

INTRODUCTION

Grace to Allah, whose help we seek, whose forgiveness we beseech, whose guidance we implore and on whom we rely. We pray and bid peace upon the Messenger of Allah, his family, his companions, his followers and those who spread his message and followed his tradition; they will last as long as there exist Heaven and Earth.

O, people! In the midst of misadventure, from the depth of suffering, from the believing hearts and purified arms; aware of our duty and in response to the decree of Allah, we direct our call, we rally together and join each other. We educate in the path of Allah and we make our firm determination prevail so as to take its proper role in life, to overcome all difficulties and to cross all hurdles. Hence our permanent state of preparedness and our readiness to sacrifice our souls and dearest [possessions] in the path of Allah.

Thus, our nucleus has formed which chartered its way in the tempestuous ocean of creeds and hopes, desires and wishes, dangers and difficulties, setbacks and challenges, both internal and external.

When the thought matured, the seed grew and the plant took root in the land of reality, detached from temporary emotion and unwelcome haste, the Islamic Resistance Movement erupted in order to play its role in the path of its Lord. In so doing, it joined its hands with those of all Jihad fighters for the purpose of liberating Palestine. The souls of its Jihad fighters will encounter those of all Jihad fighters who have sacrificed their lives in the land of Palestine since it was conquered by the Companion of the Prophet, be Allah's prayer and peace upon him, and until this very day. This is the Charter of the Islamic Resistance (Hamas) which will reveal its face, unveil its identity, state its position, clarify its purpose, discuss its hopes, call for support to its cause and reinforcement, and for joining its ranks. For our struggle against the Jews is extremely wide-ranging and grave, so much so that it will need all the loyal efforts we can wield, to be
followed by further steps and reinforced by successive battalions from the multifarious Arab and Islamic world, until the enemies are defeated and Allah’s victory prevails. Thus we shall perceive them approaching in the horizon, and this will be known before long:

“Allah has decreed: Lo! I very shall conquer, I and my messenger, lo! Allah is strong, almighty...”

PART I — KNOWING THE MOVEMENT

The Ideological Aspects

Article One
The Islamic Resistance Movement draws its guidelines from Islam; derives from it its thinking, interpretations and views about existence, life and humanity; refers back to it for its conduct; and is inspired by it in whatever step it takes.

The Link between Hamas and the Association of Muslim Brothers

Article Two
The Islamic Resistance Movement is one of the wings of the Muslim Brothers in Palestine. The Muslim Brotherhood Movement is a world organization, the largest Islamic Movement in the modern era. It is characterized by a profound understanding, by precise notions and by a complete comprehensiveness of all concepts of Islam in all domains of life: views and beliefs, politics and economics, education and society, jurisprudence and rule, indoctrination and teaching, the arts and publications, the hidden and the evident, and all the other domains of life.

Structure and Essence

Article Three
The basic structure of the Islamic Resistance Movement consists of Muslims who are devoted to Allah and worship Him verily [as it is written]: “I have created Man and Devil for the purpose of their worship” [of Allah]. Those Muslims are cognizant of their duty towards themselves, their families and country and they have been relying on Allah for all that. They have raised the banner of Jihad in the face of the oppressors in order to extricate the country and the people from the [oppressors’] desecration, filth and evil.

Article Four
The Movement welcomes all Muslims who share its beliefs and thinking, commit themselves to its course of action, keep its secrets and aspire to join its ranks in order to carry out their duty.

Allah will reward them.

Dimensions of Time and Space of the Hamas

Article Five
As the Movement adopts Islam as its way of life, its time dimension extends back as far as the birth of the Islamic Message and of the Righteous Ancestor. Its ultimate goal is Islam, the Prophet its model, the Qur’an its Constitution. Its special dimension extends wherever on earth there are Muslims, who adopt Islam as their way of life; thus, it penetrates to the deepest reaches of the land and to the highest spheres of Heavens.
Peculiarity and Independence

Article Six
The Islamic Resistance Movement is a distinct Palestinian Movement which owes its loyalty to Allah, derives from Islam its way of life and strives to raise the banner of Allah over every inch of Palestine. Only under the shadow of Islam could the members of all regions coexist in safety and security for their lives, properties and rights. In the absence of Islam, conflict arises, oppression reigns, corruption is rampant and struggles and wars prevail. Allah had inspired the Muslim poet, Muhammad Iqbal, when he said:

When the Faith wanes, there is no security There is no this-worldliness for those who have no faith. Those who wish to live their life without religion Have made annihilation the equivalent of life.

The Universality of Hamas

Article Seven
By virtue of the distribution of Muslims, who pursue the cause of the Hamas, all over the globe, and strive for its victory, for the reinforcement of its positions and for the encouragement of its Jihad, the Movement is a universal one. It is apt to be that due to the clarity of its thinking, the nobility of its purpose and the loftiness of its objectives.

It is in this light that the Movement has to be regarded, evaluated and acknowledged. Whoever denigrates its worth, or avoids supporting it, or is so blind as to dismiss its role, is challenging Fate itself. Whoever closes his eyes from seeing the facts, whether intentionally or not, will wake up to find himself overtaken by events, and will find no excuses to justify his position. Priority is reserved to the early comers.

Oppressing those who are closest to you, is more of an agony to the soul than the impact of an Indian sword.

And unto thee have we revealed the Scripture with the truth, confirming whatever scripture was before it, and a watcher over it. So judge between them by that which Allah hath revealed, and follow not their desires away from the truth which has come unto thee. For each we have appointed a divine law and a traced-out way. Had Allah willed, He could have made you one community. But that He may try you by that which He has given you [He has made you as you are]. So vie with one another in good works. Unto Allah, you will all return. He will then inform you of that wherein you differ.

Hamas is one of the links in the Chain of Jihad in the confrontation with the Zionist invasion. It links up with the setting out of the Martyr Izz a-din al-Qassam and his brothers in the Muslim Brotherhood who fought the Holy War in 1936; it further relates to another link of the Palestinian Jihad and the Jihad and efforts of the Muslim Brothers during the 1948 War, and to the Jihad operations of the Muslim Brothers in 1968 and thereafter.

But even if the links have become distant from each other, and even if the obstacles erected by those who revolve in the Zionist orbit, aiming at obstructing the road before the Jihad fighters, have rendered the pursuance of Jihad impossible; nevertheless, the Hamas has been looking forward to implement Allah’s promise whatever time it might take. The prophet, prayer and peace be upon him, said:

The time will not come until Muslims will fight the Jews (and kill them); until the Jews hide behind rocks and trees, which will cry: O Muslim! there is a Jew hiding behind me, come on and kill him! This will not apply to the Gharqad, which is a Jewish tree (cited by Bukhari and Muslim).

The Slogan of the Hamas

Article Eight
Allah is its goal, the Prophet its model, the Qur’an its Constitution, Jihad its path and death for the case of Allah its most sublime belief.
PART II — OBJECTIVES

Motives and Objectives

Article Nine
Hamas finds itself at a period of time when Islam has waned away from the reality of life. For this reason, the checks and balances have been upset, concepts have become confused, and values have been transformed; evil has prevailed, oppression and obscurity have reigned; cowards have turned to tigers, homelands have been usurped, people have been uprooted and are wandering all over the globe. The state of truth has disappeared and was replaced by the state of evil. Nothing has remained in its right place, for when Islam is removed from the scene, everything changes. These are the motives.

As to the objectives: discarding the evil, crushing it and defeating it, so that truth may prevail, homelands revert [to their owners], calls for prayer be heard from their mosques, announcing the reinstitution of the Muslim state. Thus, people and things will revert to their true place.

Article Ten
The Islamic Resistance Movement, while breaking its own path, will do its utmost to constitute at the same time a support to the weak, a defense to all the oppressed. It will spare no effort to implement the truth and abolish evil, in speech and in fact, both here and in any other location where it can reach out and exert influence.

PART III — STRATEGIES AND METHODS

The Strategy of Hamas: Palestine is an Islamic Waqf

Article Eleven
The Islamic Resistance Movement believes that the land of Palestine has been an Islamic Waqf throughout the generations and until the Day of Resurrection, no one can renounce it or part of it, or abandon it or part of it. No Arab country nor the aggregate of all Arab countries, and no Arab King or President nor all of them in the aggregate, have that right, nor has that right any organization or the aggregate of all organizations, be they Palestinian or Arab, because Palestine is an Islamic Waqf throughout all generations and to the Day of Resurrection. Who can presume to speak for all Islamic Generations to the Day of Resurrection? This is the status [of the land] in Islamic Shari'a, and it is similar to all lands conquered by Islam by force, and made thereby Waqf lands upon their conquest, for all generations of Muslims until the Day of Resurrection. This [norm] has prevailed since the commanders of the Muslim armies completed the conquest of Syria and Iraq, and they asked the Caliph of Muslims, 'Umar Ibn al-Khattab, for his view of the conquered land, whether it should be partitioned between the troops or left in the possession of its population, or otherwise. Following discussions and consultations between the Caliph of Islam, 'Umar Ibn al-Khattab, and the Companions of the Messenger of Allah, be peace and prayer upon him, they decided that the land should remain in the hands of its owners to benefit from it and from its wealth; but the control of the land and the land itself ought to be endowed as a Waqf [in perpetuity] for all generations of Muslims until the Day of Resurrection. The ownership of the land by its owners is only one of usufruct, and this Waqf will endure as long as Heaven and earth last. Any demarche in violation of this law of Islam, with regard to Palestine, is baseless and reflects on its perpetrators.

Hamas in Palestine: Its Views on Homeland and Nationalism

Article Twelve
Hamas regards Nationalism (Wataniyya) as part and parcel of the religious faith. Nothing is loftier or deeper in Nationalism than waging Jihad against the enemy and confronting him when he sets foot on the land of
the Muslims. And this becomes an individual duty binding on every Muslim man and woman; a woman must go out and fight the enemy even without her husband's authorization, and a slave without his masters' permission.

This [principle] does not exist under any other regime, and it is a truth not to be questioned. While other nationalisms consist of material, human and territorial considerations, the nationality of Hamas also carries, in addition to all those, the all important divine factors which lend to it its spirit and life; so much so that it connects with the origin of the spirit and the source of life and raises in the skies of the Homeland, the Banner of the Lord, thus inexorably connecting earth with Heaven.

When Moses came and threw his baton, sorcery and sorcerers became futile.

**Peaceful Solutions, [Peace] Initiatives and International Conferences**

**Article Thirteen**

[Peace] initiatives, the so-called peaceful solutions, and the international conferences to resolve the Palestinian problem, are all contrary to the beliefs of the Islamic Resistance Movement. For renouncing any part of Palestine means renouncing part of the religion; the nationalism of the Islamic Resistance Movement is part of its faith, the movement educates its members to adhere to its principles and to raise the banner of Allah over their homeland as they fight their jihad: "Allah is the all-powerful, but most people are not aware."

From time to time a clamoring is voiced, to hold an International Conference in search for a solution to the problem. Some accept the idea, others reject it, for one reason or another, demanding the implementation of this or that condition, as a prerequisite for agreeing to convene the Conference or for participating in it. But the Islamic Resistance Movement, which is aware of the [prospective] parties to this conference, and of their past and present positions towards the problems of the Muslims, does not believe that those conferences are capable of responding to demands, or of restoring rights or doing justice to the oppressed.

Those conferences are no more than a means to appoint the nonbelievers as arbitrators in the lands of Islam. Since when did the Unbelievers do justice to the Believers?

And the Jews will not be pleased with thee, nor will the Christians, till thou follow their creed. Say: Lo! the guidance of Allah [himself] is the Guidance. And if you should follow their desires after the knowledge which has come unto thee, then you would have from Allah no protecting friend nor helper.

**Sura 2 (the Cow), verse 120.**

There is no solution to the Palestinian problem except by Jihad. The initiatives, proposals and International Conferences are but a waste of time, an exercise in futility. The Palestinian people are too noble to have their future, their right and their destiny submitted to a vain game. As the hadith has it:

The people of Syria are Allah’s whip on this land. He takes revenge by their intermediary from whoever he wished among his worshipers. The Hypocrites among them are forbidden from vanquishing the true believers, and they will die in anxiety and sorrow. (Told by Tabarani, who is traceable in ascending order of traditionaries to Muhammad, and by Ahmed whose chain of transmission is incomplete. But it is bound to be a true hadith, for both storytellers are reliable. Allah knows best.)

**The Three Circles**

**Article Fourteen**

The problem of the liberation of Palestine relates to three circles: the Palestinian, the Arab and the Islamic. Each one of these circles has a role to play in the struggle against Zionism and it has duties to fulfill. It would be an enormous mistake and an abysmal act of ignorance to disregard anyone of these circles.

For Palestine is an Islamic land where the First Qibla and the third holiest site are located. That is also the place whence the Prophet, be Allah's prayer and peace upon him, ascended to heavens.
Glorified be He who carried His servant by night from the Inviolable Place of Worship to the Far Distant Place of Worship, the neighborhood whereof we have blessed, that we might show him of our tokens! Lo! He, only He, is the Hearer, the Seer. Sura XVII (al-Isra’), verse 1.

In consequence of this state of affairs, the liberation of that land is an individual duty binding on all Muslims everywhere. This is the base on which all Muslims have to regard the problem; this has to be understood by all Muslims. When the problem is dealt with on this basis, where the full potential of the three circles is mobilized, then the current circumstances will change and the day of liberation will come closer.

You are more awful as a fear in their bosoms than Allah. That is because they are a folk who understand not. Sura LIX, (Al-Hashr, the Exile), verse 13.

**The Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine is an Individual Obligation**

**Article Fifteen**

When our enemies usurp some Islamic lands, Jihad becomes a duty binding on all Muslims. In order to face the usurpation of Palestine by the Jews, we have no escape from raising the banner of Jihad. This would require the propagation of Islamic consciousness among the masses on all local, Arab and Islamic levels. We must spread the spirit of Jihad among the [Islamic] Umma, clash with the enemies and join the ranks of the Jihad fighters.

The ‘ulama as well as educators and teachers, publicity and media men as well as the masses of the educated, and especially the youth and the elders of the Islamic Movements, must participate in this raising of consciousness. There is no escape from introducing fundamental changes in educational curricula in order to cleanse them from all vestiges of the ideological invasion which has been brought about by orientalists and missionaries.

That invasion had begun overtaking this area following the defeat of the Crusader armies by Saladin el Ayyubi. The Crusaders had understood that they had no way to vanquish the Muslims unless they prepared the grounds for that with an ideological invasion which would confuse the thinking of Muslims, revile their heritage, discredit their ideals, to be followed by a military invasion. That was to be in preparation for the Imperialist invasion, as in fact [General] Allenby acknowledged it upon his entry to Jerusalem: “Now, the Crusades are over.” General Gouraud stood on the tomb of Saladin and declared: “We have returned, O Saladin!” Imperialism has been instrumental in boosting the ideological invasion and deepening its roots, and it is still pursuing this goal. All this had paved the way to the loss of Palestine. We must imprint on the minds of generations of Muslims that the Palestinian problem is a religious one, to be dealt with on this premise. It includes Islamic holy sites such as the Aqsa Mosque, which is inextricably linked to the Holy Mosque as long as the Heaven and earth will exist, to the journey of the Messenger of Allah, be Allah’s peace and blessing upon him, to it, and to his ascension from it.

Dwelling one day in the Path of Allah is better than the entire world and everything that exists in it. The place of the whip of one among you in Paradise is better than the entire world and everything that exists in it. [God’s] worshiper’s going and coming in the Path of Allah is better than the entire world and everything that exists in it. (Told by Bukhari, Muslim Tirmidhi and Ibn Maja.)

I swear by that who holds in His Hands the Soul of Muhammad! I indeed wish to go to war for the sake of Allah! I will assault and kill, assault and kill, assault and kill. (Told by Bukhari and Muslim.)

**Article Sixteen**

We must accord the Islamic [young] generations in our area, an Islamic education based on the implementation of religious precepts, on the conscientious study of the Book of Allah, on the Study of the
Prophetic Tradition, on the study of Islamic history and heritage from its reliable sources, under the guidance of experts and scientists, and on singling out the paths which constitute for the Muslims sound concepts of thinking and faith. It is also necessary to study conscientiously the enemy and its material and human potential, to detect its weak and strong spots, and to recognize the powers that support it and stand by it. At the same time, we must be aware of current events, follow the news and study the analyses and commentaries on it, together with drawing plans for the present and the future and examining every phenomenon, so that every Muslim, fighting jihad, could live out his era aware of his objective, his goals, his way and the things happening round him.

O my dear son! Lo! though it be but the weight of a grain of mustard-seed, and though it be in a rock, or in the heavens, or in the earth, Allah will bring it forth. Lo! Allah is subtle. Aware. O my dear son! Establish worship and enjoin kindness and forbid inequity, and persevere, whatever may befall thee. Lo! That is of the steadfast heart of things. Turn not thy cheek in scorn toward folk, nor walk with pertness in the land. Lo! Allah loves not braggarts and boasters. Sura XXXI (Luqman), verses 16-18.

The Role of Muslim Women

Article Seventeen
The Muslim women have a no lesser role than that of men in the war of liberation; they manufacture men and play a great role in guiding and educating the [new] generation. The enemies have understood that role, therefore they realize that if they can guide and educate [the Muslim women] in a way that would distance them from Islam, they would have won that war. Therefore, you can see them making consistent efforts [in that direction] by way of publicity and movies, curricula of education and culture, using as their intermediaries their craftsmen who are part of the various Zionist Organizations which take on all sorts of names and shapes such as: the Freemasons, Rotary Clubs, gangs of spies and the like. All of them are nests of saboteurs and sabotage.

Those Zionist organizations control vast material resources, which enable them to fulfill their mission amidst societies, with a view of implementing Zionist goals and sowing the concepts that can be of use to the enemy. Those organizations operate [in a situation] where Islam is absent from the arena and alienated from its people. Thus, the Muslims must fulfill their duty in confronting the schemes of those saboteurs. When Islam will retake possession of [the means to] guide the life [of the Muslims], it will wipe out those organizations which are the enemy of humanity and Islam.

Article Eighteen
The women in the house and the family of jihad fighters, whether they are mothers or sisters, carry out the most important duty of caring for the home and raising the children upon the moral concepts and values which derive from Islam; and of educating their sons to observe the religious injunctions in preparation for the duty of jihad awaiting them. Therefore, we must pay attention to the schools and curricula upon which Muslim girls are educated, so as to make them righteous mothers, who are conscious of their duties in the war of liberation. They must be fully capable of being aware and of grasping the ways to manage their households. Economy and avoiding waste in household expenditures are prerequisites to our ability to pursue our cause in the difficult circumstances surrounding us. Therefore let them remember at all times that money saved is equivalent to blood, which must be made to run in the veins in order to ensure the continuity of life of our young and old.

Lo, men who surrender unto Allah, and women who surrender and men who believe and women who obey and women who obey, and men who speak the truth and women who speak the truth and men who persevere (in righteousness) and women who persevere and men who
are humble and women who are humble, and men who give alms and women who give alms, and men who fast and women who fast, and men who guard their modesty and women who guard [their modesty], and men who remember Allah much and women who remember. Allah has prepared for them forgiveness and a vast reward. Sura 33 (Al-Ahzab, the Clans), verse 35.

The Role of Islamic Art in the War of Liberation

Article Nineteen

Art has rules and criteria by which one can know whether it is Islamic or Jahiliyya art. The problems of Islamic liberation underlie the need for Islamic art which could lift the spirit, and instead of making one party triumph over the other, would lift up all parties in harmony and balance.

Man is a strange and miraculous being, made out of a handful of clay and a breath of soul; Islamic art is to address man on this basis, while Jahili art addresses the body and makes the element of clay paramount. So, books, articles, publications, religious exhortations, epistles, songs, poems, hymns, plays, and the like, if they possess the characteristics of Islamic art, have the requisites of ideological mobilization, of a continuous nurturing in the pursuance of the journey, and of relaxing the soul. The road is long and the suffering is great and the spirits are weary; it is Islamic art which renews the activity, revives the movement and arouses lofty concepts and sound planning. The soul cannot thrive, unless it knows how to contrive, unless it can transit from one situation to another. All this is a serious matter, no jesting. For the umma fighting its jihad knows no jesting.

Social Solidarity

Article Twenty

Islamic society is one of solidarity. The Messenger of Allah, be Allah's prayer and peace upon him, said:

What a wonderful tribe were the Ash'aris! When they were overtaxed, either in their location or during their journeys, they would collect all their possessions, and then would divide them equally among themselves.

This is the Islamic spirit which ought to prevail in any Muslim society. A society which confronts a vicious, Nazi-like enemy, who does not differentiate between man and woman, elder and young ought to be the first to adorn itself with this Islamic spirit. Our enemy pursues the style of collective punishment of usurping people's countries and properties, of pursuing them into their exiles and places of assembly. It has resorted to breaking bones, opening fire on women and children and the old, with or without reason, and to setting up detention camps where thousands upon thousands are interned in inhuman conditions. In addition, it destroys houses, renders children orphans and issues oppressive judgements against thousands of young people who spend the best years of their youth in the darkness of prisons. The Nazism of the Jews does not skip women and children, it scares everyone. They make war against people's livelihood, plunder their moneys and threaten their honor. In their horrible actions they mistreat people like the most horrendous war criminals.

Exiling people from their country is another way of killing them. As we face this misconduct, we have no escape from establishing social solidarity among the people, from confronting the enemy as one solid body, so that if one organ is hurt the rest of the body will respond with alertness and fervor.

Article Twenty-One

Social solidarity consists of extending help to all the needy, both materially and morally, or assisting in the execution of certain actions. It is incumbent upon the members of the Hamas to look after the interests of
the masses the way they would look after their own interests. They must spare no effort in the implementation and maintenance of those interests, and they must avoid playing with anything that might affect the future generations or cause damage to their society. For the masses are of them and for them, their strength is [ultimately] theirs and their future is theirs. The members of Hamas must share with the people its joys and sorrows, and adopt the demands of the people and anything likely to fulfill its interests and theirs. When this spirit reigns, congeniality will deepen, cooperation and compassion will prevail, unity will firm up, and the ranks will be strengthened in the confrontation with the enemy.

The Powers which Support the Enemy

Article Twenty-Two

The enemies have been scheming for a long time, and they have consolidated their schemes, in order to achieve what they have achieved. They took advantage of key elements in unfolding events, and accumulated a huge and influential material wealth which they put to the service of implementing their dream. This wealth permitted them to take over control of the world media such as news agencies, the press, publication houses, broadcasting and the like. They also used this wealth to stir revolutions in various parts of the globe in order to fulfill their interests and pick the fruits. They stood behind the French and the Communist Revolutions and behind most of the revolutions we hear about here and there. They also used the money to establish clandestine organizations which are spreading around the world, in order to destroy societies and carry out Zionist interests. Such organizations are: the Freemasons, Rotary Clubs, Lions Clubs, B’nai Brith and the like. All of them are destructive spying organizations. They also used the money to take over control of the Imperialist states and made them colonize many countries in order to exploit the wealth of those countries and spread their corruption therein.

As regards local and world wars, it has come to pass and no one objects, that they stood behind World War I, so as to wipe out the Islamic Caliphate. They collected material gains and took control of many sources of wealth. They obtained the Balfour Declaration and established the League of Nations in order to rule the world by means of that organization. They also stood behind World War II, where they collected immense benefits from trading with war materials and prepared for the establishment of their state. They inspired the establishment of the United Nations and the Security Council to replace the League of Nations, in order to rule the world by their intermediary. There was no war that broke out anywhere without their fingerprints on it:

...As often as they light a fire for war, Allah extinguishes it. Their efforts are for corruption in the land and Allah loves not corrupters. Sura V (Al-Ma’ida — the Tablespread), verse 64.

The forces of Imperialism in both the Capitalist West and the Communist East support the enemy with all their might, in material and human terms, taking turns between themselves. When Islam appears, all the forces of Unbelief unite to confront it, because the Community of Unbelief is one.

Oh ye who believe! Take not for intimates others than your own folk, who would spare no pain to ruin you. Hatred is revealed by [the utterance of] their mouth, but that which their breasts hide is greater.

We have made plain for you the revelations if you will understand. Sura III, (Al-Imran), verse 118.

It is not in vain that the verse ends with God’s saying: “If you will understand.”
PART IV

Our Position Vis-à-Vis the Islamic Movements

Article Twenty-Three
The Hamas views the other Islamic movements with respect and appreciation. Even when it differs from them in one aspect or another or on one concept or another, it agrees with them in other aspects and concepts. It reads those movements as included in the framework of striving [for the sake of Allah], as long as they hold sound intentions and abide by their devotion to Allah, and as along as their conduct remains within the perimeter of the Islamic circle. All the fighters of Jihād have their reward.

The Hamas regards those movements as its stock holders and asks Allah for guidance and integrity of conduct for all. It shall not fail to continue to raise the banner of unity and to exert efforts in order to implement it, [based] upon the [Holy] Book and the [Prophet's] Tradition.

And hold fast, all of you together, to the cable of Allah, do not separate. And remember Allah's favor unto you how ye were enemies and He made friendship between your hearts so that ye became as brothers by His grace; and (how) ye were upon the brink of an abyss of fire, and He did save you from it. Thus Allah makes clear His revelations unto you, that happily ye may be guided. Sura III (Al-'Imran), verse 102.

Article Twenty-Four
Hamas will not permit the slandering and defamation of individuals and groups, for the Believers are not slanderers and curser. However, despite the need to differentiate between that and the positions and modes of conduct adopted by individuals and groups whenever the Hamas detects faulty positions and modes of conduct, it has the right to point to the mistake, to denigrate it, to act for spelling out the truth and for adopting it realistically in the context of a given problem. Wisdom is roaming around, and the Believer ought to grasp it wherever he can find it.

Allah loves not the utterance of harsh speech save by one who has been wronged. Allah is ever Hearer, Knower. If you do good openly or keep it secret, or give evil, lo! Allah is forgiving, powerful. Sura IV (Women), verses 147-148.

The National (wataniyya) Movements in the Palestinian Arena

Article Twenty-Five
[Hamas] reciprocated its respect to them, appreciates their condition and the factors surrounding them and influencing them, and supports them firmly as long as they do not owe their loyalty to the Communist East or to the Crusader West. We reiterate to every one who is part of them or sympathizes with them that the Hamas is a movement of Jihād, or morality and consciousness in its concept of life. It moves forward with the others, abhors opportunism, and only wishes well to individuals and groups. It does not aspire to material gains, or to personal fame, nor does it solicit remuneration from the people. It sets out relying on its own material resources, and what is available to it, [as it is said] “afford them the power you can avail yourself of”. [All that] in order to carry out its duty, to gain Allah's favor; it has no ambition other than that.

All the nationalist streams, operating in the Palestinian arena for the sake of the liberation of Palestine, may rest assured that they will definitely and resolutely get support and assistance, in speech and in action, at the present and in the future, [because Hamas aspires] to unite, not to divide; to safeguard, not to squander; to bring together, not to fragment. It values every kind word, every devoted effort and every commendable endeavor. It closes the door before marginal quarrels, it does not heed rumors and biased statements, and it is aware of the right of self-defense.
Anything that runs counter or contradicts this orientation is trumped up by the enemies or by those who run in their orbit in order to create confusion, to divide our ranks or to divert to marginal things.

O ye who believe! If an evil-liver bring you tidings, verify it, lest ye smite some folk in ignorance and afterward repent of what ye did. Sura XLIX (al-Hujurat, the Private Apartments), verse 6.

Article Twenty-Six
The Hamas, while it views positively the Palestinian National Movements which do not owe their loyalty to the East or to the West, does not refrain from debating unfolding events regarding the Palestinian problem, on the local and international scenes.

These debates are realistic and expose the extent to which [these developments] go along with, or contradict, national interests as viewed from the Islamic vantage point.

The Palestine Liberation Organization

Article Twenty Seven
The PLO is among the closest to the Hamas, for it constitutes a father, a brother, a relative, a friend. Can a Muslim turn away from his father, his brother, his relative or his friend? Our homeland is one, our calamity is one, our destiny is one and our enemy is common to both of us. Under the influence of the circumstances which surrounded the founding of the PLO, and the ideological invasion which has swept the Arab world since the rout of the Crusades, and which has been reinforced by Orientalism and the Christian Mission, the PLO has adopted the idea of a Secular State, and so we think of it. Secular thought is diametrically opposed to religious thought. Thought is the basis for positions, for modes of conduct and for resolutions. Therefore, in spite of our appreciation for the PLO and its possible transformation in the future, and despite the fact that we do not denigrate its role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, we cannot substitute it for the Islamic nature of Palestine by adopting secular thought. For the Islamic nature of Palestine is part of our religion, and anyone who neglects his religion is bound to lose.

And who forsakes the religion of Abraham, save him who befools himself? Sura II (Al-Baqra — the Co), verse 130.

When the PLO adopts Islam as the guideline for life, then we shall become its soldiers, the fuel of its fire which will burn the enemies. And until that happens, and we pray to Allah that it will happen soon, the position of the Hamas towards the PLO is one of a son towards his father, a brother towards his brother, and a relative towards his relative who suffers the other's pain when a thorn hits him, who supports the other in the confrontation with the enemies and who wishes him divine guidance and integrity of conduct.

Your brother, your brother! Whoever has no brother, is like a fighter who runs to the battle without weapons. A cousin for man is like the best wing, and no falcon can take off without wings.

Article Twenty-Eight
The Zionist invasion is a mischievous one. It does not hesitate to take any road, or to pursue all despicable and repulsive means to fulfill its desires. It relies to a great extent, for its meddling and spying activities, on the clandestine organizations which it has established, such as the Freemasons, Rotary Clubs, Lions, and other spying associations. All those secret organizations, some which are overt, act for the interests of Zionism and under its directions, strive to demolish societies, to destroy values, to wreck answerableness, to totter virtues and to wipe out Islam. It stands behind the diffusion of drugs and toxins of all kinds in order to facilitate its control and expansion.

The Arab states surrounding Israel are required to open their borders to the jihad fighters, the sons of the Arab and Islamic peoples, to enable them to play their role and to join their efforts to those of their brothers among the Muslim Brothers in Palestine.
The other Arab and Islamic states are required, at the very least, to facilitate the movement of the jihad fighters from and to them. We cannot fail to remind every Muslim that when the Jews occupied Holy Jerusalem in 1967 and stood at the doorstep of the Blessed Aqsa Mosque, they shouted with joy:

Muhammad is dead, he left daughters behind.

Israel, by virtue of its being Jewish and of having a Jewish population, defies Islam and the Muslims. Let the eyes of the cowards not fall asleep.

National and Religious Associations, Institutions, the Intelligentsia, and the Arab and Islamic Worlds

Article Twenty-Nine

Hamas hopes that those Associations will stand by it on all levels, will support it, adopt its positions, boost its activities and moves and encourage support for it, so as to render the Islamic peoples its backers and helpers, and its strategic depth in all human and material domains as well as in information, in time and space. Among other things, they hold solidarity meetings, issue explanatory publications, supportive articles and tendentious leaflets to make the masses aware of the Palestinian issue, the problems it faces and of the plans to resolve them; and to mobilize the Islamic peoples ideologically, educationally and culturally in order to fulfill their role in the crucial war of liberation, as they had played their role in the defeat of the Crusades and in the rout of the Tartars and had saved human civilization. How all that is dear to Allah!

Allah has decreed: Lo! I verily shall conquer, I and my messengers. Lo! Allah is strong, Almighty. Sura LVIII (Al-Mujadilah), verse 21.

Article Thirty

Men of letters, members of the intelligentsia, media people, preachers, teachers and educators and all different sectors in the Arab and Islamic world, are all called upon to play their role and to carry out their duty in view of the wickedness of the Zionist invasion, of its penetration into many countries, and its control over material means and the media, with all the ramifications thereof in most countries of the world.

Jihad means not only carrying arms and denigrating the enemies. Uttering positive words, writing good articles and useful books, and lending support and assistance, all that too is jihad in the path of Allah, as long as intentions are sincere to make Allah's banner supreme.

Those who prepare for a raid in the path of Allah are considered as if they participated themselves in the raid. Those who successfully rear a raider in their home, are considered as if they participated themselves in the raid. (Told by Bukhari, Muslim, Abu Dawud and Timidhi.)

The Members of Other Religions

The Hamas is a Humane Movement

Article Thirty-One

Hamas is a humane movement, which cares for human rights and is committed to the tolerance inherent in Islam as regards attitudes towards other religions. It is only hostile to those who are hostile towards it, or stand in its way in order to disturb its moves or to frustrate its efforts.

Under the shadow of Islam it is possible for the members of the three religions: Islam, Christianity and Judaism to coexist in safety and security. Safety and security can only prevail under the shadow of Islam, and recent and ancient history is the best witness to that effect. The members of other religions must desist from struggling against Islam over sovereignty in this region. For if they were to gain the upper hand, fighting,
torture and uprooting would follow; they would be fed up with each other, to say nothing of members of other religions. The past and the present are full of evidence to that effect.

They will not fight you in body, safe in fortified villages or from behind wells. Their adversity among themselves is very great. Ye think of them as a whole whereas their hearts are diverse. That is because they are a folk who have no sense. Sura 59 (al-Hashr, the Exile), verse 14.

Islam accords his rights to everyone who has rights and averts aggression against the rights of others. The Nazi Zionist practices against our people will not last the lifetime of their invasion, for “states built upon oppression last only one hour, states based upon justice will last until the hour of Resurrection.”

Allah forbids you not those who warred not against you on account of religion and drove you not out from your houses, that you should show them kindness and deal justly with them. Lo! Allah loves the just dealers. Sura 60 (Al-Mumtahana), verse 8.

The Attempts to Isolate the Palestinian People

Article Thirty-Two

World Zionism and Imperialist forces have been attempting, with smart moves and considered planning, to push the Arab countries, one after another, out of the circle of conflict with Zionism, in order, ultimately, to isolate the Palestinian People.

Egypt has already been cast out of the conflict, to a very great extent through the treacherous Camp David Accords, and she has been trying to drag other countries into similar agreements in order to push them out of the circle of conflict.

Hamas is calling upon the Arab and Islamic peoples to act seriously and tirelessly in order to frustrate that dreadful scheme and to make the masses aware of the danger of coping out of the circle of struggle with Zionism. Today it is Palestine and tomorrow it may be another country or other countries. For Zionist scheming has no end, and after Palestine they will covet expansion from the Nile to the Euphrates. Only when they have completed digesting the area on which they will have laid their hand, they will look forward to more expansion, etc. Their scheme has been laid out in The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, and their present [conduct] is the best proof of what is said there.

Leaving the circle of conflict with Israel is a major act of treason and it will bring curse on its perpetrators.

Who so on that day turns his back to them, unless maneuvering for battle or intent to join a company, he truly has incurred wrath from Allah, and his habitation will be hell, a hapless journey’s end. Sura 8 (al-Anfal — Spoils of War), verse 16.

We have no escape from pooling together all the forces and energies to face this despicable Nazi-Tatar invasion. Otherwise we shall witness the loss of [our] countries, the uprooting of their inhabitants, the spreading of corruption on earth and the destruction of all religious values. Let everyone realize that he is accountable to Allah.

Whoever does a speck of good will bear [the consequences] and whoever does a speck of evil will see [the consequences].

Within the circle of the conflict with world Zionism, the Hamas regards itself the spearhead and the avant-garde. It joins its efforts to all those who are active on the Palestinian scene, but more steps need to be taken by the Arab and Islamic peoples and Islamic associations throughout the Arab and Islamic world in order to make possible the next round with the Jews, the merchants of war.

We have cast among them enmity and hatred till the day of Resurrection. As often as they light a fire for war, Allah extinguishes it. Their effort is for corruption in the land, and Allah loves not corrupters. Sura V (Al-Ma’idah — the Table spread), verse 64.
Article Thirty-Three
The Hamas sets out from these general concepts which are consistent and in accordance with the rules of the universe, and rushes forth in the river of Fate in its confrontation and jihad waging against the enemies, in defense of the Muslim human being, of Islamic Civilization and of the Islamic Holy Places, primarily the Blessed Aqsa Mosque. This, for the purpose of calling upon the Arab and Islamic peoples as well as their governments, popular and official associations, to fear Allah in their attitude towards and dealings with Hamas, and to be, in accordance with Allah's will, its supporters and partisans who extend assistance to it and provide it with reinforcement after reinforcement, until the Decree of Allah is fulfilled, the ranks are over-swollen, jihad fighters join other jihad fighters, and all this accumulation sets out from everywhere in the Islamic world, obeying the call of duty, and intoning "Come on, join Jihad!" This call will tear apart the clouds in the skies and it will continue to ring until liberation is completed, the invaders are vanquished and Allah's victory sets in.

Verily Allah helps one who helps Him. Lo! Allah is strong, Almighty. Sura XXII (Pilgrimage), verse 40.

PART V — THE TESTIMONY OF HISTORY

Confronting Aggressors Throughout History

Article Thirty-Four
Palestine is the navel of earth, the convergence of continents, the object of greed for the greedy, since the dawn of history. The Prophet, may Allah's prayer and peace be upon him, points out to that fact in his noble hadith in which he implored his venerable Companion, Ma'adh ibn Jabal, saying:

O Ma'adh, Allah is going to grant you victory over Syria after me, from Al-Arish to the Euphrates, while its men, women, and female slaves will be dwelling there until the Day of Resurrection. Those of you who chose to dwell in one of the plains of Syria or Palestine) will be in a state of Jihad to the Day of Resurrection.

The greedy have coveted Palestine more than once and they raided it with armies in order to fulfill their covetousness.

Multitudes of Crusades descended on it, carrying their faith with them and waving their Cross. They were able to defeat the Muslims for a long time, and the Muslims were not able to redeem it until they sought the protection of their religious banner; then, they unified their forces, sang the praise of their God and set out for jihad under the Command of Saladin al-Ayyubi, for the duration of nearly two decades, and then the obvious conquest took place when the Crusaders were defeated and Palestine was liberated.

Say (O Muhammad) unto those who disbelieve: ye shall be overcome and gathered unto Hell, an evil resting place. Sura III (Al-Imran), verse 12.

This is the only way to liberation, there is no doubt in the testimony of history. That is one of the rules of the universe and one of the laws of existence. Only iron can blunt iron, only the true faith of Islam can vanquish their false and falsified faith. Faith can only be fought by faith. Ultimately, victory is reserved to the truth, and truth is victorious.

And verily Our word went forth of old unto Our Bordmen sent [to warn]. That they verily would be helped. And that Our host, they verily would be the victors. Sura 38 (Al-saffat), verses 171-3.

Article Thirty-Five
Hamas takes a serious look at the defeat of the Crusades at the hand of Saladin the Ayyubid and the rescue of Palestine from their domination: at the defeat of the Tatars at Ein Jalut where their spine was broken by Qutuz and Al-Dahir Baibars, and the Arab world was rescued from the sweep of the Tatars which ruined all aspects of human civilization. Hamas has learned from these lessons and examples, that the current Zionist
invasion had been preceded by a Crusader invasion from the West, and another one, the Tatars, from the East. And exactly as the Muslims had faced those invasions and planned their removal and defeat, they are able to face the Zionist invasion and defeat it. This will not be difficult for Allah if our intentions are pure and our determination is sincere; if the Muslims draw useful lessons from the experiences of the past, and extricate themselves for the vestiges of the [western] ideological onslaught, and if they follow the traditions of Islam.

EPILOGUE

The Hamas are Soldiers

Article Thirty-Six
The Hamas, while breaking its path, reiterates time and again to all members of our people and the Arab and Islamic peoples, that it does not seek fame for itself nor material gains, or social status.

Nor is it directed against any one member of our people in order to compete with him or replace him. There is nothing of that at all.

It will never set out against any Muslims or against the non-Muslims who make peace with it, here or anywhere else. It will only be of help to all associations and organizations which act against the Zionist enemy and those who revolve in its orbit.

Hamas posits Islam as a way of life, it is its faith and its yardstick for judging. Whoever posits Islam as a way of life, anywhere, and regardless of whether it is an organization, a state, or any other group, Hamas are its soldiers, nothing else.

We implore Allah to guide us, to guide through us and to decide between us and our folk with truth. Our Lord! Decide with truth between us and our folk, for Thou are the best of those who make decisions. Sura VII (Al-Araf — the Heights), verse 89.

Our last call is: Thanks to Allah, the Lord of the Universe.
THE FATEH CONSTITUTION

Introduction to the Constitution
The Essential Principles of the Constitution

CHAPTER ONE
The Movement’s Essential Principles
Goals
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Dear brother, comrade of the struggle:

This movement is a patriotic and historical responsibility which we all must shoulder honestly... And let's inspire all those who are faithful to Palestine with this concerted, patriotic deed... We all must confront critical times, and tolerate mishaps patiently... We all must sacrifice ourselves, our effort and time; these are the weapons of honest patriots.

Don't, therefore, dear brother bring your march to a halt!

Proceed in your march, armed with the patriots' resolution, the true believers' determination, and the fighters' patience... Our people are in need of every second after our case has taken that long... Let's not forget for a while that our enemy is strong, and that the fight is fierceful and long... Consequently, determination, patience, confidentiality, commitment, and abiding by the revolution's goals and principles keep our march unremittingly steady and makes our road to victory much shorter.

Proceed, then my brother, forward... to the revolution. Long live Palestine, a free Arab state.
"FATEH"

Introduction to the Constitution
The significance of this constitution stems from its being an application of the principles of our struggle, the pedestal of the Movement. It is also an expression of the Movement’s conception of its relationships with other movements and organizations, as it is the disciplinary framework which dictates and organizes the relationships among its members in a way that maintains its path and the revolution’s future.

This constitution revolves around the following principles:
1. The armed revolution we are waging has been set into orbit by the principle that it is a public revolution, and not one of a distinguished class, and that the public is capable of practicing struggle efficiently and conscientiously. The public is also the true protector of the revolutionary organization. This organization has satisfied the intimate relationship between the revolution and the public via the hierarchical structure of the Movement in which the public constitutes its solid, wide base. With this view of the public’s role in mind, the role of the organized base in the Movement is crystallized. The Movement is in close contact with the public, sharing their cares and worries and inspired by their aspirations. The public is, therefore, the sole source of authorities and the sole, honest guardian of the Movement. It is also the only party authorized to take decisive decisions, and to elect the leadership at all levels. This takes place through direct election at varying levels due to maintaining secrecy, and because of the state of geographical dispersion suffered by our Palestinian people.

2. The elected leadership assumes its responsibilities on the basis of the democratic centrality principle which warrants commitment of the lower ranks to the higher ranks’ decisions. The leadership is, in turn, held accountable to its conferences and councils. Higher leaderships assume a pivotal responsibility which embodies the utter unity of the organization in different districts and institutions.

3. The Movement encourages freedom of expression and criticism within the disciplinary frameworks. This is a sacred right for all members, and no authority can deny them it. Any view or criticism within the disciplinary principles should not be taken as an indictment against a member afterwards. Free expression is the only guarantee to prevent the leaderships from committing mistakes or going astray, and it is the only effective method to convey the public opinion via the different bases to the Movement’s leaderships.

4. The Movement firmly believes in self-criticism by all members in general and by those in authority in particular. This is important in order to attain the goal of free criticism and expression, to put an end to continual enmity, and to spell out readiness to benefit from public and self criticism. By so doing, the Movement’s experience will be very much developed and its path will be made much clearer.

5. In its determination on liberation and bringing about historical social changes, the Movement attempts to launch the revolutionary moral values which are on a bar with our struggle, and to create the feeling of human dignity. To this effect, the Movement tries to liberate the individual from all social ills, especially the discrimination women face, the thing that hinders their potentials and effective contributions at all disciplinary levels. This entails that the relationships among members be objective and based on the Movement’s principles and constitutions. Relationships based on
personal interests have no place whatsoever. The Movement, consequently, treats all members on equal footing as far as their essential obligations are concerned, and it offers equal opportunity to all faithful and active members to occupy leading positions. And while it is keen on maintaining its path, it is keen as well to get an utmost benefit from its experiences to enrich its ideology and develop its infrastructure.

6. Through its struggle, the Movement endeavors to mobilize the public in order to gain the necessary support. This task should be handled by its members. It, therefore, spares no effort to make its members set examples for others to attract the public and consolidate their faith in and loyalty to the revolutionary organization. As a result, the member has to lead a revolutionary and exemplary life which is based on loyalty, discipline, credibility, modesty, self-denial and altruism. At the same time, he must demonstrate the highest degree of pride, rejection of reality and conformity to the Movement’s principles.

The Essential Principles of the Constitution

1. “FATEH” is a national, revolutionary movement and its membership is top confidential.
2. The Revolution is for all the people who actively participate in it, and the Movement is its leading revolutionary organization, and hence it is the organizational force and its sole proprietor which has the right to direct its orientation.
3. The Movement constitutes one unified body which has one leadership. The rights, obligations and responsibilities are equally distributed among its members according to the Movement’s principles and laws.
4. Collective leadership is the sole method of the Movement. This implies the following:
   a. Democracy is the basis of discussion, investigation and decision-taking at all organizational levels.
   b. Democratic centrality is the basis of handling responsibilities, and this involves concerted work, thinking and political participation in the Movement.
   c. Criticism and self-criticism are the basis of rectification, and punishment is not an end in itself but a means for assessment and development.
   d. The minority must conform to the majority’s view, and those in lower ranks have to abide by the decisions of those in higher ranks in order to achieve discipline and unified organization which should have a unified vision, ideology and practice.
   e. The Movement firmly believes in sacred membership and freedom of the individual, and rejects vengeance, as it firmly believes in the right of any citizen to participate in the Revolution and totally rejects nullifying this right unless it can be a hazard that threatens the Movement’s process and security.

CHAPTER ONE

Principles... Goals.... Methods

The Movement’s Essential Principles

Article (1) Palestine is part of the Arab World, and the Palestinian people are part of the Arab Nation, and their struggle is part of its struggle.

Article (2) The Palestinian people have an independent identity. They are the sole authority that decides their own destiny, and they have complete sovereignty on all their lands.

Article (3) The Palestinian Revolution plays a leading role in liberating Palestine.
Article (4) The Palestinian struggle is part and parcel of the world-wide struggle against Zionism, colonialism and international imperialism.

Article (5) Liberating Palestine is a national obligation which necessities the materialistic and human support of the Arab Nation.

Article (6) UN projects, accords and reso, or those of any individual cowhich undermine the Palestinian people's right in their homeland are illegal and rejected.

Article (7) The Zionist Movement is racial, colonial and aggressive in ideology, goals, organization and method.

Article (8) The Israeli existence in Palestine is a Zionist invasion with a colonial expansive base, and it is a natural ally to colonialism and international imperialism.

Article (9) Liberating Palestine and protecting its holy places is an Arab, religious and human obligation.

Article (10) Palestinian National Liberation Movement, "FATEH", is an independent national revolutionary movement representing the revolutionary vanguard of the Palestinian people.

Article (11) The crowds which participate in the revolution and liberation are the proprietors of the Palestinian land.

Goals

Article (12) Complete liberation of Palestine, and eradication of Zionist economic, political, military and cultural existence.

Article (13) Establishing an independent democratic state with complete sovereignty on all Palestinian lands, and Jerusalem is its capital city, and protecting the citizens' legal and equal rights without any racial or religious discrimination.

Article (14) Setting up a progressive society that warrants people's rights and their public freedom.

Article (15) Active participation in achieving the Arab Nation's goals in liberation and building an independent, progressive and united Arab society.

Article (16) Backing up all oppressed people in their struggle for liberation and self-determination in order to build a just, international peace.

Method

Article (17) Armed public revolution is the inevitable method to liberating Palestine.

Article (18) Entire dependence on the Palestinian people which is the pedestal forefront and on the Arab Nation as a partner in the fight, and realizing actual interaction between the Arab Nation and the Palestinian people by involving the Arab people in the fight through a united Arab front.

Article (19) Armed struggle is a strategy and not a tactic, and the Palestinian Arab People's armed revolution is a decisive factor in the liberation fight and in uprooting the Zionist existence, and this struggle will not cease unless the Zionist state is demolished and Palestine is completely liberated.

Article (20) Achieving mutual understanding with all the national forces participating in the armed struggle to attain the national unity.

Article (21) Revealing the revolutionary nature of the Palestinian identity at the international level, and this does not contradict the everlasting unity between the Arab Nation and the Palestinian people.

Article (22) Opposing any political solution offered as an alternative to demolishing the Zionist occupation in Palestine, as well as any project intended to liquidate the Palestinian case or impose any international mandate on its people.

Article (23) Maintaining relations with Arab countries with the objective of developing the positive aspects in their attitudes with the proviso that the armed struggle is not negatively affected.
Article (24) Maintaining relations with all liberal forces supporting our just struggle in order to resist
together Zionism and imperialism.

Article (25) Convincing concerned countries in the world to prevent Jewish immigration to Palestine as a
method of solving the problem.

Article (26) Avoiding attempts to exploit the Palestinian case in any Arab or international problems and
considering the case above all contentions.

Article (27) “FATEH” does not interfere with local Arab affairs and hence, does not tolerate such
interference or obstructing its struggle by any party.

CHAPTER TWO

Organizational Rules and Principles

Commitment ... Discipline ... Centrality... Democracy...

Public and Self-Criticism

In its organizational work, the Movement depends on the following rules and principles:

First: Commitment. This means:
Article (28)
  a. Firm belief in the case and the Movement’s objectives and utter readiness to sacrifice for its sake till
     victory,
  b. Complete adherence to the Movement’s political line,
  c. Complete conformity to the Movement’s political program and to the decisions of its conferences and
     constitutions, and
  d. Complete commitment to the Movement’s decisions and defending its attitudes.

Second: Discipline. This means:
Article (29)
  a. Abiding by the terms of the essential constitution and its organizational regulations,
  b. Conforming to the organizational decisions of the leading committees,
  c. Carrying out the orders meticulously and enthusiastically, and adherence of lower ranking members
     to the decisions, orders and guidance of higher ranking members,
  d. Abstaining from negotiating internal issues outside organizational sessions and the Movement
     frameworks,
  e. Abstaining from making individual decisions or taking temperamental attitudes, and
  f. Adherence to organizational hierarchy.

Third: Central Democracy. This means:
Article (30)
  a. Central planning, leadership and surveillance, but not central execution, freedom of discussion and
     the right of participating in making decisions and recommendations within the organizational
     frameworks.
  b. Realizing democratic centrality by adopting the following organizational methods:
1. Electing leaderships through the conferences outlined in article: 42, items: d and e; article: 52; article: 65, item: e; article: 83, item: d,
2. Practicing collective leadership,
3. Adherence of the minority to the majority’s view,
4. Adherence of lower ranking members to the higher ranking members’ decisions,
5. Freedom of discussion and right of participation within the organizational frameworks,
6. Submitting reports to the electors about the leaderships’ activities at every session, and
7. Periodic reporting to higher units about all the activities carried out by lower units.

Fourth: Public and Self-Criticism:
Article (31) This is one of the cornerstones according to which the revolutionary practices are evaluated in order to emphasize their positive results and circumvent their negative effects. This equally warrants the Movement’s faultless process and the practice of public and self-criticism by all members and leaderships within the organizational frameworks.

Fifth: Organizational Rules and Principles are realized by the following methods:

Article (32)

1. When convened, the Movement’s conferences (General Conference, District Conference, Region Conference) are the highest leading authority, each according to its speciality and jurisdictions outlined in the constitution. And they have the sole authority to elect the leading committees, plan their activities, and observe and question their practices.

2. Practicing collective leadership via the committees’ work, for each committee from top to bottom has to undertake its tasks on the basis of its being a complementary unit collaborating with other units in assuming its responsibilities, and that all issues must be rationally discussed through the committees and units and that all decisions must be taken in light of the legal majority.

3. The leaderships should conform to the conferences and the lower ranks to the higher ranks.

4. Achieving equality among members by their adherence to the Movement’s essential constitution, regulations and decisions, and considering competence, faithfulness and sacrifice as the criteria for judging members and climbing the organizational ladder.

CHAPTER THREE

Membership

Types... Requirements... Obtaining... Rights... Continuity

Article (33)

a. The Movement’s membership is a right for every Palestinian or Arab who possesses the necessary requirements, firmly believes in liberating Palestine, and demonstrates utter commitment to the Movement’s essential constitution, political program, regulations and its political and organizational decisions.

b. Membership can be granted to a friend who has decided to be committed to the Movement according to a decision by the Central Committee.
Types of Membership
Article (34) There are three categories of membership:

1. Full member:
   a. This is the member who has successfully completed the trial period, and is accordingly assigned as a supporter. His membership as an active member is confirmed by a decision of the Regional Committee or upon nomination by the leading organizational frameworks in the central authorities and upon consent of the Mobilization and Organization office.

2. Military member: is one who has a revolutionary record. This is a member of the special organizational wing (Asifa) according to a special regulation offered by the Central Committee and verified by the Revolutionary Council.
   b. Organizer: is one who obtains membership by a direct decree of the Central Committee, and he does not climb the organizational ladder. Once he is converted into an active member, his membership should not exceed the District Committee.
   c. Supporter: is one who is nominated to join the Movement and his membership is subject to the following conditions:
      i. He should meet the membership requirements outlined in Article (35) except item (g) concerning the oath,
      ii. He should be recommended by two members who have joined the Movement for at least two years,
      iii. He should successfully pass a six-month trial and preparatory period during which he has to grasp the theoretical principles of the Movement and should enthusiastically perform his assignments. This equally applies to serving in the “Asifa” forces.

Requirements of Membership
Article (35) A member in the Movement should meet the following requirements:
   a. He must not be below 17 years of age; cadets, flowers and youth have special membership regulations,
   b. He must have good reputation and national credibility,
   c. He must respect the people and their traditions, serve them and protect their interests and security,
   d. He must be independent, not committed to any other organization or party,
   e. He must have leading qualifications and demonstrate a reasonable amount of awareness and ability to assume responsibility, and have an amicable personality,
   f. He must have sufficient readiness to sacrifice, self-denial and altruism,
   g. He must take the following oath:
      (By Allah, the almighty and by my honor and beliefs I swear to remain faithful to Palestine, and to spare no effort to liberate it; I swear not to disclose any of the Movement’s (FATEH) secrets and affairs; this is a free oath, to which God bears witness.)

Obtaining Membership
Article (36) Members are accepted in the Movement on an individual basis according to their competence and readiness to work and sacrifice.

Rights of Membership
Article (37) The Movement’s member has the following rights:
a. To enjoy all the rights cited in this constitution,
b. To have the same and equal rights and obligations as all other members,
c. To climb the organizational ladder according to the terms of this constitution and on the basis of competence, efficiency and faithfulness,
d. To have complete freedom of criticism, objection, protest, discussion, negotiation and inquiry only within the organizational sessions,
e. To criticize and cross-question any leading member within the organizational hierarchy,
f. If accused or cross-questioned, to defend himself in front of the leading committees and authorities, as well as surveillance and investigation committees,
g. To get a written reply for his queries in a month’s time at the latest,
h. To enjoy protection, viz. he should not be fired, neglected or frozen unless he is tried and convicted by one of the Movement’s courts,
i. To have the right to meet high leaderships including the Central Committee if the need arises, and
j. To have an organizational rank unless serving an organizational punishment, and his organizational ranks should appear in his record since his admission into the Movement as an active member.

Obligations of Membership

Article (38) The Movement’s member has to undertake the following obligations:

a. Constant and unrelenting struggle to achieve the Movement’s principles and goals,
b. Complete commitment to and application of the Movement's political line and program,
c. Application of the political constitution and carrying out all decisions conscientiously and meticulously,
d. Maintaining the Movement’s organizational and ideological unity, and opposing all factions,
e. Constant and studious work to theoretically and practically elevate his education and experience,
f. Attending all meetings and paying subscriptions regularly,
g. Setting an example in altruism, courage, faithfulness, sacrifice, patience, perseverance and self-denial,
h. Continual work to maintain strong relationships with the public and to win their respect and confidence, and to constantly disseminate the Movement’s principles and to consolidate the public’s relationships with them,
i. Practicing public and self-criticism, and playing an active role in the organizational sessions and in the public and organizational work,
j. Constant alertness concerning the enemy’s activities and the Revolution’s opposing forces,
k. Keeping the Movement’s secrets at the individual, committee and formation levels, and utilizing appropriate confidential methods in his work,
l. Maintaining a uniform method in work, and renouncing all individual and temperamental ones,
m. Adhering to the organizational hierarchy, and respecting the decisions of higher committees,
n. Fighting personal deceit, laziness, and temperamental relaxation as well as all harmful practices,
o. Serving the public conscientiously and faithfully, and
p. Being ready to carry out the Movement’s orders to fulfil his revolutionary obligations as required.

**Continuity, Suspension and Cancellation of Membership**

**Article (39)**

a. Membership continues as long as the member continues to fulfil his tasks and obligations,

b. Membership is suspended if the member stops to fulfil his tasks for three consecutive months without reasonable any excuse, or if the member requests that. Membership cannot be resumed without a decision by the District Committee for district members or by the Central Committee for others,

c. Membership is cancelled if a decision to this effect is taken by the concerned committee as a result of some behavioral, political or organizational violation which entails this and determines the authority entitled to cancel the membership according to the penalty system.

**The General Conference**

**Article (40)** The Movement’s general conference is made up of:

a. Members of the Revolutionary Council.

b. 11 district representatives elected in the district conferences according to the number of areas meeting the requirements cited in this constitution and endorsed by the Mobilization and Organization Office.

c. 11 representatives of the districts whose conferences cannot be convened for security purposes or failing to have quorum; such conditions are decided by the Central Committee. Those representatives are selected upon recommendation by the Mobilization and Organization Office to the Central Committee according to the organizational population.

d. District commissioners whose membership has lasted for at least ten years, and who have been appointed by a decree from the Central Committee.

e. Members of the General Military Council in the Palestinian National Liberation Army, especially “Asifa” forces, whose set-up is outlined in the regulation appended to this constitution, and according to the decisions of the third and fourth conferences. In addition, at most 20 distinguished persons from those military forces should be nominated by the General Leadership and endorsed by the Central Committee, with the proviso that they in all should not exceed 514 of the entire population of the conference.

f. 75 “FATEH” members who are assigned duties in various departments in the independent State of Palestine and Palestine Liberation Organization and other national and international organizations. Their membership should be through their organizational units and upon nomination by the Mobilization and Organization Office and ratified by the Central Committee. Their membership should not be below a district committee member.

g. 50 Members public organizations recommended by the Movement central offices and confirmed by the Mobilization and Organization Office and by a decree from the Central Committee. Their membership should not be below a district committee member.

h. 75 members of the leading bodies of central panels according to their regulations attached to this constitution. Their membership should not be below a district committee member.

i. 30 representatives of the Movement’s members with the proviso that their membership is not below a district committee member.

**Article (41)** Requirements of the Conference Membership:

a. Membership in the General Conference has a representative nature as spelled out in article (40).
b. A member in the conference should have a five-year active membership in the Movement.

c. He should have a clean record.

Article (42) Conference Jurisdictions

When convened, the conference is the highest authority, and it is entitled to perform the following tasks:

a. Discussing the reports, decisions and duties of the Central Committee, and the activities of the Movement departments and institutions,

b. Endorsing the essential constitution and making any necessary modifications upon recommendation by two thirds of the present members,

c. Confirming the Movement constitutional regulations, and the political and military programs and plans,

d. Electing the members of the Central Committee by secret voting,

e. Vote of no confidence for all or some members of the Central Committee upon recommendation by two thirds of the present members,

f. Electing the Head of the Financial Supervision Committee and the Head of the Movement Supervision Committee, and protecting membership with the proviso they meet the requirements of the Revolutionary Council membership, and

g. Electing the required number for the Revolutionary Council by secret voting.

Article (43) Holding the Conference

a. The Central Committee calls for a regular session once every five years, and the meeting can however be put off for exceptional circumstances by a Revolutionary Council decision.

b. Upon receiving the invitation, the conference holds an unusual session within two weeks at the latest if more than two thirds of the Revolutionary Council members deem it necessary or upon request by the Central Committee. The agenda should include the topics that necessitated the session.

c. Sessions are deemed legal if two thirds of the members are present, provided that all members have been informed in writing two weeks prior to the meeting. If quorum is not maintained, the meeting will be put off two days, and then convened if more than half of the members are present.

The General Council

Article (44) The General Council is made up of no more than 250 members of the General Conference according to the following:

a. Members of the Central Committee and the Revolutionary Council,

b. A number of district commissioners and organizational leaderships,

c. A number of military leaderships,

d. A number of the Movement’s members,

e. A number of the Movement’s members working in the Organization department,

f. A number of public leaderships, and

g. A number of the Movement’s efficient members.

Article (45) The number of members in the previous article is determined by a Central Committee’s decision which has to be endorsed by the Revolutionary Council.

Article (46) The General Council has the jurisdictions of an exceptional general conference according to a special system suggested by the Revolutionary Council.

Article (47) The General Council is held upon a decision of the Central Committee and approval of the Revolutionary Council which prepares the agenda.

The Revolutionary Council

Article (48) The Revolutionary Council constitutes the following:

a. Members of the Central Committee,
b. Head of the Financial Supervision Committee and Head of the Movement Supervision and Membership Protection Committee,

c. 50 members elected by the General Conference from its members provided that each member has 30% of the electors' votes,

d. At most 20 members representing the Military Council of “FATEH” according to the special charter of “Asifa”,

e. At most 15 highly competent persons selected by two thirds of the Central Committee members,

f. A number of the leaderships in the occupied territories, not part of the quorum, and nominated by the Revolutionary Council,

g. 5 members from other territories who are part of the quorum when attending the meetings, nominated by two thirds of the Central Committee members, and

h. At most 15 controllers from the Movement's competent members, nominated by the Central Committee and endorsed by the Revolutionary Council.

Article (49)  A nominee for the Revolutionary Council has to have been a district committee member or a member of other equivalent forces and institutions for at least 10 consecutive years.

Article (50)  Jurisdictions:

When convened between two sessions of the General Conference, the Revolutionary Council is the highest authority in the Movement. Its jurisdictions are:

a. Following up and executing of the General Conference decisions,

b. Monitoring the operation of the central departments and the Movement's conditions in different districts,

c. Monitoring the Movement military affairs which do not run counter to top confidentiality,

d. Discussing the Central Committee's decisions, operations and reports, and taking appropriate decisions accordingly,

e. Adequately interpreting the terms and regulations of the essential charter in case a dispute in this respect arises,

f. Electing members of the Financial Supervision Committee and those of the Movement Supervision Committee via secret voting within six months at the latest, and

g. Discussing the reports of the committees emanating from the General Conference and taking appropriate decisions in this respect.

Article (51)  At the beginning of its session, the Revolutionary Council elects from among its members a secretariat consisting of a secretary and two deputies via secret voting. The secretary should be a full-timer and should not be a member of the Central Committee.

Article (52)  The Revolutionary Council devises its bylaw which is approved by the majority of members.

Article (53)  In case quorum is not maintained in the Central Committee, the Revolutionary Council is called to meet within two weeks to elect two thirds of its members by secret voting in order to maintain quorum.

Article (54)  If vacancies in the Central Committee are not occupied within three months, the Revolutionary Council is called to an emergency session during which vacancies are occupied by its members through secret voting, provided that each candidate should be elected by absolute majority.

Article (55)  Vacancies in the Revolutionary Council are occupied by competent members who meet the requirements of the Revolutionary Council membership.

Article (56)  The Revolutionary Council is entitled to fire or freeze one or more offending members of the Central Committee, and this is decided by two thirds of the members provided that the number of fired or frozen members does not exceed one third.
Article (57) The Revolutionary Council is entitled to fire or freeze one or more of its members if an offence is committed, and this is decided by the majority of two thirds of its members.

Article (58) The Revolutionary Council holds regular sessions once every three months upon an invitation by its secretary, and it can hold exceptional sessions upon a decision by the Central Committee or a written request addressed to its secretary by two thirds of its members.

Article (59) Quorum is maintained if two thirds of the Revolutionary Council members are present provided that they have been officially notified three days prior to the meeting, and if quorum is not maintained the Council will convene by absolute majority 24 hours after the set date.

Article (60) Decisions of the Council are made by the absolute majority of the present members except in cases otherwise stated, and voting is by raising hands unless the Council decides otherwise.

The Financial Supervision Committee and the Movement
Supervision and Membership Protection Committee
Article (61) Heads of these committees are elected directly by the Conference upon nominating some of the candidates by the Central Committee.

Article (62) A special charter for each committee is devised and is endorsed by the Revolutionary Council in its first session after submitting it.

The Central Committee
Article (63)

a. The Central Committee is made up of 21 members as follows:
   1. 18 members from the Conference elected by secret voting.
   2. 3 members appointed by the Central Committee provided that they get two thirds of the votes.
   3. An additional number of the occupied territories leaderships, not part of the quorum, nominated determined by the Revolutionary Council.

b. The Central Committee selects a political office from its members with the proviso that they do not exceed 11 members.

c. The Central Committee determines the jurisdictions of the political office in its internal charter.

d. All members of the Central Committee have equal rights, obligations and responsibilities.

e. The Commander-in-Chief chairs the Central Committee meetings and runs its sessions in accordance with the regulations of its internal charter.

Article (64) The Central Committee selects a secretary and two deputies from its members.

Article (65) A candidate to the Central Committee should have been a member in the Movement for at least 15 consecutive years, and he should have served as a secretary of a district committee or any equivalent job in the departments and forces, and he should obtain 49% of the votes.

Article (66) The Central Committee convenes at least once a month to discuss the performance of all Movement departments and issue the necessary decisions and recommendations. Each of its members should be responsible for what he has been practicing during the period between meetings. Exceptional sessions can be convened when the need arises.

Article (67) The Central Committee is unanimously in charge of all the Movement's activities.

Article (68) Quorum is maintained if two thirds of the members are present, and once this is impossible, the meeting holds if half + one of the members attend 24 hours after the assigned date.

Article (69) Decisions of the Central Committee are taken by absolute majority unless otherwise stated in the essential constitution.

Article (70) Vacancies in the Central Committee are occupied for death, dismissal, resignation or handicap purposes by members of the Revolutionary Council provided that they obtain two thirds of the votes. The elected member should be performing his duties during the period from the conference to the time of employment.
Responsibilities of the Central Committee

Article (71) The Central Committee assumes its responsibilities as the executive body of the General Conference. These responsibilities are as follows:

a. Carrying out the decisions and the political, organizational, military and financial plans of the General Conference and the Revolutionary Council as well as executing the political program endorsed by the General Conference,

b. Discussing the disciplinary violations and misapplication of the essential constitution and taking the appropriate procedures,

c. Undertaking daily operations and directing the internal, external, political, military and financial policies of the Movement as well as practising leadership responsibilities in all aspects,

d. Leading the Movement in all public and official Palestinian, Arab and international affairs,

e. Maintaining solidarity within the Movement and applying the essential constitution,

f. Calling the General Conference to convene, preparing its agenda and submitting detailed written reports about all its activities,

ґ. Supervising issuance of the Movement data, newsletters and studies,

h. Setting up the Movement security court, devising its internal charter and endorsing and verifying its terms. In case of a death penalty, verification is maintained by two thirds of the votes,

i. Endorsing appointment of the Military Council members who are nominated by the Commander-in-Chief by two thirds of the votes. Re-voting is handled ones a year,

j. Endorsing appointment of members of leading bodies of the central and administrative departments and the Movement central offices by two thirds of the votes. Re-voting is carried out once a year,

 diligence qualified members and controllers as cited in the constitution by two thirds of the votes, and


Article (72) The Central Committee devises a special internal charter to organize its operations within three months at the latest.

Article (73) During its meeting after the General Conference, the Central Committee distributes tasks on its members according to the specific specialisations determined in the internal charter which includes all activities and responsibilities.

CHAPTER FOUR

Areas

Article (93) The term “area” is given to the base organization which consists of at least four branches. An area maintains this capacity according to a decision by the Mobilization and Organization Office and upon a recommendation of the district committee.

First: The Area Conference

Formation:

Article (94) The area conference is set up as follows:

a. The area committee members,

b. Members of the branches committees,

c. Members of the area committee during the previous conference,

d. Five active members nominated by the area and endorsed by the district committee if it deems necessary, and

e. A representative of each of the public organizations in the area.
Jurisdictions:

Article (95) The area conference assumes the following jurisdictions:

a. Discussing the decisions and operations of the area committee, and calling its members to account,
b. Discussing the circumstances of the organization in the area,
c. Discussing general issues in the Movement and the district, and submitting the necessary recommendations, and
d. Electing five of the area conference members by direct secret voting provided that their membership has lasted for at least three years. The district committee is entitled to add two other members when necessary.

Article (96) The district committee selects the secretary of the area committee from the elected members.

Article (97)

a. The area conference convenes once biannually, and it should meet before the district conference.
b. It can hold emergency sessions upon a decision by the area committee and the approval of the district committee.

Article (98) In areas where elections are impossible for security circumstances or failure to meet the organizational requirements, the district committee nominates a list of the area committee members which will be endorsed by the Mobilization and Organization Office.

Requirements of the Area Conference

Article (99)

a. Membership in the area conference is contingent upon the representational quality cited in article (94).
b. The member should have a clean record.

Second: The Area Committee

Article (100) The area committee holds weekly meetings, chaired by the area secretary.

According to circumstances, emergency sessions can be held, and they follow the terms cited in the meetings of the district committee as regards quorum and voting.

Jurisdictions

Article (101) The area committee assumes its jurisdictions in its capacity as the executive leadership in the area. Such jurisdictions are similar to those of the district committee within the area boundary.

Article (102) After a legal investigation, the district committee is entitled to freeze or revoke the membership of at most two of the area committee members. And if there is a need to freeze or revoke the membership of more than two members, the district conference is called to an emergency meeting to elect a new area committee.

Article (103) If an organizational necessity arises, the area committee can make any change in the committees of wings, chains and cells.

Article (104) The area committee appoints secretaries of cells, chains and wings, but secretaries of branches are appointed by the district committee upon nomination by the area committee.
CHAPTER FIVE

The Movement Leading Organizations

Part Two

District Conference... District Committee...

Area Conference

Area Committee

Article (74)

a. The term district is given to any branch of the organization within the boundary of a country. A district includes three organizational areas or more which meet the requirements cited in this constitution.

b. A district consists of organizational areas which have a hierarchical structure including branches, wings, chains and cells.

c. The organizational unit which exists in unfavorable conditions does not have to follow this hierarchy after having approval from the Mobilization and Organization Office.

d. The leading committee of any organizational unit has the appropriate leading rank according to the number of its members in the district. It directly follows the Mobilization and Organization Office, and it has the responsibilities of a district committee.

e. An organizational rank can be gradually promoted to a leading committee or any of the base organizations in districts where the sufficient number necessary to constitute an area is not available in order to set up an area with all its branches. This takes place in view of seniority, efficiency and activity and upon a decision by the Mobilization and Organization Office.

f. The cell is the basic organizational unit in the Movement.

Article (75) New cells are set up upon the approval of the district committee and the nomination of the area committee. In case there is not a district committee, a cell can be formed according to a decision by the concerned leading committee in the respective district.

Article (76)

a. Militia is the armed organization within the base framework as outlined in article (91).

b. Militia forces are formed in the districts which have favourable conditions.

c. The leadership and formation of militia is subject to the military laws of “Asifa”.

d. The General Leadership of “Asifa” forces devises the charter of militia, and this must be confirmed by the Revolutionary Council.

District Conference

First: Formation:

Article (77) A district conference is formed as follows:

a. Members of district committee,

b. Members of areas committees,

c. One member representing a public organization in the district which has a movement office. This member is chosen by the concerned office,

d. Former members of the district committee during the previous conference with the proviso that it carries out its assigned tasks,

e. A number of active members of the Movement selected by the district committee provided that the number does not exceed 10%, and

f. One member from each central office in the district working through the district committee.
**Second: Responsibilities:**

Article (78) The district conference assumes the following responsibilities:

a. Discussing the report, decisions and operations of the district committee, and calling its members to account,

b. Discussing the area conditions, decisions and operations,

c. Devising the organizational and political plans of different tasks and the external relations with other political authorities, public organizations, thinkers, politicians and journalists within the strategy endorsed by the General Conference and the Central Committee’s decisions, and

d. Discussing the general issues of the Movement and making the necessary recommendations.

e. The district committee also elects four thirds of the required number from whom the Central Committee selects the members of the district committee while the rest remains as stand-by. In case of a vacancy, the Central Committee selects the required number form the stand-by members.

**Requirements of District Conference Membership**

Article (79)

a. Membership in the district conference committee is contingent upon the representational quality cited in article (77).

b. A member in the district conference should have spent three years at least as a Movement member.

c. He should maintain a clean record.

Article (80)

a. A district conference convenes once biannually.

b. A district conference can be called to hold an exceptional session upon decision by the district committee and approval of the Mobilization and Organization Office.

Article (81) In districts, where elections are impossible to conduct for security purposes or failure to meet the organizational requirements, the Central Committee can appoint a district committee and its secretary.

**Second: District Committee**

Formation:

Article (82) A district committee consists of at least five and no more than eleven members elected from the district conference according to item (1), Article (78). The member should have spent five years as a Movement member.

**Meetings:**

Article (83)

a. A district committee convenes once every two weeks, and is chaired by the secretary. When the need arises, exceptional sessions can be held.

b. Quorum is maintained if two thirds of the members are present, and the meeting can be put off for 24 hours if otherwise, and quorum would be maintained if half of the members could attend.

c. Decisions of the committee are based on approval of the absolute majority of the present members.

**Jurisdictions:**

Article (84) Being the organizational leadership in the district, a district committee assumes the following jurisdictions:

a. Executing the decisions of higher leaderships,

b. Supervising all institutions and departments in the district,

c. Devising appropriate plans for all activities in the district,

d. Recommending to the Mobilization and Organization Office the freezing or revocation of the membership of at most two of its members provided that the reasons are spelled out,
e. Leading the district daily affairs,
f. Taking care of the integrity and solidarity of the Movement and coordinating operations among different areas,
g. Calling the district conference to convene, preparing its agenda, and submitting detailed written reports about all activities in the district to it, and
h. Preparing the members organizational map, and reporting any emergency developments to the Mobilization and Organization Office once every six months.

Article (85) After legal investigation, the Central Committee is entitled to freeze or revoke the membership of one or more of the district committee members provided that the number does not exceed one third. And if there is a need to revoke the membership of more than one third, the district conference should be called to an emergency session.

Article (86) The district committee should report to the Mobilization and Organization Office about a member’s moving to another district after agreeing with him on the means of communication. The report should include some information about the member and his organizational rank.

Article (87) Offices of the central departments undertake their activities in the district through the district committee and in virtue of their being part of its jurisdictions. Direct expansion of the central departments offices in the district is banned.

Article (88) Tasks are distributed over the district committee members in a way that warrants controlling the operations in the district.

The District Commissioner
Article (89) 
   a. The Central Committee nominates a commissioner in the districts as it deems necessary. The nominee’s rank should not be lower than a district committee member with a seniority period of three years.
   b. The commissioner assumes the tasks assigned to him by the Central Committee, and his relationship with the district committee by an internal regulation issued by the Mobilization and Organization Office.

The District Secretary
Article (90) The Central Committee nominates the secretary from the list elected by the district conference. And he assumes the following jurisdictions:
   a. Calling the district committee to convene and chairing its sessions,
   b. Submitting monthly or instant reports to the Mobilization and Organization Office,
   c. Following up and executing the decisions, recommendations and responsibilities of the district committee,
   d. Unless it runs counter to the constitution regulations, calling district conferences to convene,
   e. Signing the letters, decisions and orders issued by the district committee, and
   f. Signing paying orders according to the financial regulations.

The District Budget
Article (91) The district budget consists of the following:
   a. Subscriptions,
   b. Unconditional donations,
   c. Investments and local resources,
   d. The budget accredited by the Movement financial office.

Article (92) 
   a. The district budget is determined in a project submitted by the district committee.
   b. The Mobilization and Organization Office is entitled to verify it as stated or modify it as necessary.
CHAPTER SIX

The Movement Base Organizations

Article (105) The Movement base organizations include the following:
   a. The Cell. It consists of three two five members including the secretary.
   b. The Chain. It consists of two five cells.
   c. The Wing. It consists of two to five chains.
   d. The Branch. It consists of two to five wings.
   e. The Area. It consists of at least four branches.

Article (106) In districts where security conditions are unfavorable, the district committee or the one assuming this role can overlook this hierarchy and devise an appropriate means of communication with the district committee. Likewise, the number of cell members can be lowered to two as the individual method can be followed provided that the Mobilization and Organization Office approves that.

Obligations of Base Organizations

Article (107)
   a. Providing members with a revolutionary education, consolidating their commitment and discipline, developing their awareness and experiences, and enhancing their active participation according to the programs set by the Mobilization and Organization Office,
   b. Carrying out their tasks enthusiastically, and sparing no effort to achieve the Movement’s objectives and embodying its principles,
   c. Exerting strenuous efforts to enhance interaction with the public and winning their respect and confidence,
   d. Striving continually within public organizations and maintaining commitment to their memberships, and
   e. Trying hard to protect the Movement and develop its efficiency to confront and conquer its enemies.

Article (108) The area committee, the branch committee, the wing committee and the cell committee assume the responsibilities of leadership, each in its organizational capacity in the following matters:
   a. Leading its members according to the Movement’s political program and constitution,
   b. Embodying the Movement’s attitudes and executing its decisions enthusiastically and fervently,
   c. Upgrading its members’ awareness and adherence to the Movement, enhancing their active participation and developing their experiences and potentials,
   d. Developing their military and educational competence,
   e. Enhancing their interaction with the public and their readiness to sacrifice for their sake,
   f. Maintaining strong relationships with the public bases and winning their respect and confidence,
   g. Holding brotherly relationships between bases and higher units and vice versa,
   h. Observing paying subscriptions, and monitoring its members’ behavioural and organizational conduct, and ensuring execution of these tasks,
   i. Setting an example in sacrifice, active participation, faithfulness and team work,
   j. Ensuring speed and adequacy in conveying reports, information, leaflets and others,
   k. Paying adequate attention to the members’ problems and taking appropriate initiatives to ensure rapid and revolutionary solutions,
1. Examining the members' work fields and identifying positive and negative aspects and taking the necessary measures.

m. Calling members to account and criticizing them for individualism or lack of seriousness, and

n. Submitting regular reports about their activities to the higher committee.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Penalties

Article (109) The organizational penalties aim at:
   a. Upgrading the members’ morals, and
   b. Securing the Movement’s integrity and getting rid of corruption.

Article (110) The organizational penalties are:
   a. Drawing attention,
   b. Rebuke,
   c. Warning,
   d. Freezing,
   e. Rank demotion,
   f. Firing,
   g. Firing with slander.

Article (111) The organizational violations are four types:

First: Firing or firing with slander and this applies to:
   1. Violation of Unit One of the constitution,
   2. Delinquency, and
   3. Illegal co-operation with any other non-adversary movement and disclosing the Movement secrets to it.

Second: Freezing or Demoting Rank, and this applies to:
   1. Violating commitment, and this is realized by:
      a. Violating the Movement political line,
      b. Violating the Movement political program, and
      c. Reluctance to adhere to the Movement’s decisions.
   2. Violating the membership protection rule,
   3. Violating the members’ equality rule,
   4. Violating the freedom of expression rule, and
   5. Violating discipline and this is applicable to:
      a. Violating the constitution,
      b. Disrespect of leading authorities’ decisions,
      c. Rejection of orders execution,
      d. Discussing organizational issues outside the units,
      e. Disrespect of hierarchy, and
      f. Offending the public.
   7. Offending other members.
   10. False rumors.
Third: Rebut or Warning, and this applies to:
1. Ceasing to participate in organizational activities without an acceptable excuse for at most two regular meetings and this period extends for one month, and
2. Refusal to practice self-criticism when deemed necessary by the respective unit.

Fourth: Drawing Attention or Rebut, and this applies to:
1. Coming late to a meeting without an excuse,
2. Inadequate practice of self-education, and
3. Demonstrating signs of deceit and laziness.

Article (112) Repetition of violations is a reason for imposing a stricter penalty. And if the same violations are repeated, the strictest penalty is imposed. A severer penalty is inflicted if newly violations are repeated.

Article (113)
   a. Firing and firing with slander penalties are imposed by the Central Committee.
   b. Rank demotion and freezing penalties are inflicted on area committee members and secretaries of branches by the Central Committee, the Mobilization and Organization Office and the District Committee. Such penalties are imposed on branch members or lower ranks by the area committee.
   c. A warning penalty is inflicted by the higher organizational rank.
   d. Drawing attention and Rebut penalties are imposed by all concerned organizational ranks according to the unit the member belongs to.

Article (114) When considering violations, all concerned organizational ranks constitute investigation committees prior to passing a judgment except in case of drawing attention and rebut penalties.

Article (115) Each penalty can be revised by the rank immediately higher than the one which has signed it in front of the Central Committee and it cannot be overruled without a decision by the Revolutionary Council.

Article (116) It is possible that each penalty is passed separately or together with other penalties issued by the Movement Court.

Article (117) A sentence for two organizational penalties due to one violation is impossible.

Article (118) No sentence can be passed without calling the concerned member to a hearing where he has the right to defend himself and prove innocent.

Article (119) If the member abstains from showing up in front of the official committee which investigates the violation, he is called a second time in a week's time, after that the session takes place whether or not he attends provided that if he has been informed.

Article (120) Penalized crimes are the concern of the Movement Revolutionary Judicial Authority, and examined by the Revolutionary Courts formed by the Central Committee according to article (71) of the constitution.

CHAPTER EIGHT

General Stipulations

Article (121) The appended regulations, and those endorsed by the Revolutionary Council and transferred to it by the General Conference have the same power as the essential constitution with the proviso that they not contradict it.

Article (122) Membership in the Movement is a sacred right which can be acquired only by whoever belongs to one of the Movement leading or base units.
Article (123) Working in the Movement departments is an added task to the member, which does not entail membership, nor is it a replacement of an organizational job in any of the organizational ranks. Similarly, deputising a member to do any task outside the Movement departments is not a substitute for the Movement organizational framework.

Article (124) During an organizational meeting, any member has the right to debate before a decision is made. Debate may be allowed after issuing the decision, and a member has the right to object to the decision after execution.

Article (125) Each member has to do some minimal military training and to be completely qualified to undertake his tasks.

Article (126) A member has to be informed in accordance with requirements of his membership, organizational rank and the job undertaken.

Article (127) A member who is sacked or is subjected to some arbitrary act without a decision by a Movement court has the right to appeal to the Member Protection Committee.

Article (128) Equality among organizational ranks in committees, offices or executive departments must be taken into account so that they enjoy equal responsibilities, rights and obligations.

Article (129) Communication with a district committee member is entrusted to the district committee secretary or one of its members. A district committee member has to handle any task assigned by the district committee, and this equally applies to an area committee member in the respective area boundary.

Article (130) A member of the Central Committee who has failed in the General Conference elections has the right to maintain his membership in the Conference and perform any tasks assigned to him by the Central Committee, and this equally applies to the member of the Revolutionary Council.
CAMP DAVID ACCORDS

September 17, 1978

THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS: The Framework for Peace in the Middle East
Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel, met with Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America, at Camp David from September 5 to September 17, 1978, and have agreed on the following framework for peace in the Middle East. They invite other parties to the Arab-Israel conflict to adhere to it.

Preamble
The search for peace in the Middle East must be guided by the following:

- The agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel and its neighbors is United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, in all its parts.

- After four wars during 30 years, despite intensive human efforts, the Middle East, which is the cradle of civilization and the birthplace of three great religions, does not enjoy the blessings of peace. The people of the Middle East yearn for peace so that the vast human and natural resources of the region can be turned to the pursuits of peace and so that this area can become a model for coexistence and cooperation among nations.

- The historic initiative of President Sadat in visiting Jerusalem and the reception accorded to him by the parliament, government and people of Israel, and the reciprocal visit of Prime Minister Begin to Ismailia, the peace proposals made by both leaders, as well as the warm reception of these missions by the peoples of both countries, have created an unprecedented opportunity for peace which must not be lost if this generation and future generations are to be spared the tragedies of war.

- The provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the other accepted norms of international law and legitimacy now provide accepted standards for the conduct of relations among all states.

- To achieve a relationship of peace, in the spirit of Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, future negotiations between Israel and any neighbor prepared to negotiate peace and security with it are necessary for the purpose of carrying out all the provisions and principles of Resolutions 242 and 338.

- Peace requires respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. Progress toward that goal can accelerate movement toward a new era of reconciliation in the Middle East marked by cooperation in promoting economic development, in maintaining stability and in assuring security.

- Security is enhanced by a relationship of peace and by cooperation between nations which enjoy normal relations. In addition, under the terms of peace treaties, the parties can, on the basis of reciprocity, agree to special security arrangements such as demilitarized zones, limited armaments
areas, early warning stations, the presence of international forces, liaison, agreed measures for monitoring and other arrangements that they agree are useful.

Framework
Taking these factors into account, the parties are determined to reach a just, comprehensive, and durable settlement of the Middle East conflict through the conclusion of peace treaties based on Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 in all their parts. Their purpose is to achieve peace and good neighborly relations. They recognize that for peace to endure, it must involve all those who have been most deeply affected by the conflict. They therefore agree that this framework, as appropriate, is intended by them to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel, but also between Israel and each of its other neighbors which is prepared to negotiate peace with Israel on this basis. With that objective in mind, they have agreed to proceed as follows:

West Bank and Gaza
- Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people should participate in negotiations on the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. To achieve that objective, negotiations relating to the West Bank and Gaza should proceed in three stages:
- Egypt and Israel agree that, in order to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority, and taking into account the security concerns of all the parties, there should be transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza for a period not exceeding five years. In order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants, under these arrangements the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as a self-governing authority has been freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing military government. To negotiate the details of a transitional arrangement, Jordan will be invited to join the negotiations on the basis of this framework. These new arrangements should give due consideration both to the principle of self-government by the inhabitants of these territories and to the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved.
- Egypt, Israel, and Jordan will agree on the modalities for establishing elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. The delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza or other Palestinians as mutually agreed. The parties will negotiate an agreement which will define the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority to be exercised in the West Bank and Gaza. A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations. The agreement will also include arrangements for assuring internal and external security and public order. A strong local police force will be established, which may include Jordanian citizens. In addition, Israeli and Jordanian forces will participate in joint patrols and in the manning of control posts to assure the security of the borders.

When the self-governing authority (administrative council) in the West Bank and Gaza is established and inaugurated, the transitional period of five years will begin. As soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period, negotiations will take place to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its neighbors and to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan by the end of the transitional period. These negotiations will be conducted among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. Two separate but related committees will be convened, one committee, consisting of representatives of the four parties which will negotiate and agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, and its relationship with its neighbors, and the second committee, consisting of representatives of Israel and representatives of Jordan to be joined by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, to negotiate the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, taking into account the agreement reached in the final status of the West
Bank and Gaza. The negotiations shall be based on all the provisions and principles of UN Security Council Resolution 242. The negotiations will resolve, among other matters, the location of the boundaries and the nature of the security arrangements. The solution from the negotiations must also recognize the legitimate right of the Palestinian peoples and their just requirements. In this way, the Palestinians will participate in the determination of their own future through:

- The negotiations among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and other outstanding issues by the end of the transitional period.
- Submitting their agreements to a vote by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza.
- Providing for the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to decide how they shall govern themselves consistent with the provisions of their agreement.
- Participating as stated above in the work of the committee negotiating the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan.
- All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure the security of Israel and its neighbors during the transitional period and beyond. To assist in providing such security, a strong local police force will be constituted by the self-governing authority. It will be composed of inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. The police will maintain liaison on internal security matters with the designated Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian officers.
- During the transitional period, representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the self-governing authority will constitute a continuing committee to decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern may also be dealt with by this committee.
- Egypt and Israel will work with each other and with other interested parties to establish agreed procedures for a prompt, just and permanent implementation of the resolution of the refugee problem.

**Egypt-Israel**

- Egypt-Israel undertake not to resort to the threat or the use of force to settle disputes. Any disputes shall be settled by peaceful means in accordance with the provisions of Article 33 of the UN Charter.
- In order to achieve peace between them, the parties agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three months from the signing of the Framework, a peace treaty between them while inviting the other parties to the conflict to proceed simultaneously to negotiate and conclude similar peace treaties with a view of achieving a comprehensive peace in the area. The Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel will govern the peace negotiations between them. The parties will agree on the modalities and the timetable for the implementation of their obligations under the treaty.

**Associated Principles**

- Egypt and Israel state that the principles and provisions described below should apply to peace treaties between Israel and each of its neighbors — Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.
- Signatories shall establish among themselves relationships normal to states at peace with one another. To this end, they should undertake to abide by all the provisions of the UN Charter. Steps to be taken in this respect include: full recognition; abolishing economic boycotts; guaranteeing that under their jurisdiction, the citizens of the other parties shall enjoy the protection of the due process of law.
- Signatories should explore possibilities for economic development in the context of final peace treaties, with the objective of contributing to the atmosphere of peace, cooperation and friendship which is their common goal.
- Claims commissions may be established for the mutual settlement of all financial claims.
- The United States shall be invited to participate in the talks on matters related to the modalities of the implementation of the agreements and working out the timetable for the carrying out of the obligations of the parties.
- The United Nations Security Council shall be requested to endorse the peace treaties and ensure that their provisions shall not be violated. The permanent members of the Security Council shall be requested to underwrite the peace treaties and ensure respect for the provisions. They shall be requested to conform their policies and actions with the undertaking contained in this Framework.

*For the Government of Israel: Menachem Begin*

*For the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt: Muhammed Anwar al-Sadat*

*Witnessed by: Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America*

**FRAMEWORK FOR THE CONCLUSION OF A PEACE TREATY BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL**

In order to achieve peace between them, Israel and Egypt agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three months of the signing of this framework a peace treaty between them.

It is agreed that:

- The site of the negotiations will be under a United Nations flag at a location or locations to be mutually agreed.
- All of the principles of UN Resolution 242 will apply in this resolution of the dispute between Israel and Egypt.
- Unless otherwise mutually agreed, terms of the peace treaty will be implemented between two and three years after the peace treaty is signed.

The following matters are agreed between the parties:

- The full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty up to the internationally recognized border between Egypt and mandated Palestine;
- The withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the Sinai;
- The use of airfields left by the Israelis near al-Arish, Rafah, Ras en-Naqb, and Sharm e-Sheikh for civilian purposes only, including possible commercial use only by all nations;
- The right of free passage by ships of Israel through the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal on the basis of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 applying to all nations;
- The Strait of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba are international waterways to be open to all nations for unimpeded and nonsuspendable freedom of navigation and overflight;
- The construction of a highway between the Sinai and Jordan near Eilat with guaranteed free and peaceful passage by Egypt and Jordan; and the stationing of military forces listed below.

**Stationing of Forces**

- No more than one division (mechanized or infantry) of Egyptian armed forces will be stationed within an area lying approximately 50 km. (30 miles) east of the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal.
- Only United Nations forces and civil police equipped with light weapons to perform normal police functions will be stationed within an area lying west of the international border and the Gulf of Aqaba, varying in width from 20 km. (12 miles) to 40 km. (24 miles).
• In the area within 3 km. (1.8 miles) east of the international border there will be Israeli limited military forces not to exceed four infantry battalions and United Nations observers.
• Border patrol units not to exceed three battalions will supplement the civil police in maintaining order in the area not included above.
• The exact demarcation of the above areas will be as decided during the peace negotiations.
• Early warning stations may exist to insure compliance with the terms of the agreement. United Nations forces will be stationed:
  • in part of the area in the Sinai lying within about 20 km. of the Mediterranean Sea and adjacent to the international border, and
  • in the Sharm e-Sheikh area to insure freedom of passage through the Strait of Tiran; and these forces will not be removed unless such removal is approved by the Security Council of the United Nations with a unanimous vote of the five permanent members.
• After a peace treaty is signed, and after the interim withdrawal is complete, normal relations will be established between Egypt and Israel, including full recognition, including diplomatic, economic and cultural relations; termination of economic boycotts and barriers to the free movement of goods and people; and mutual protection of citizens by the due process of law.

Interim Withdrawal
• Between three months and nine months after the signing of the peace treaty, all Israeli forces will withdraw east of a line extending from a point east of El-Arish to Ras Muhammad, the exact location of this line to be determined by mutual agreement.

For the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt: Muhammed Anwar al-Sadat
For the Government of Israel: Menachem Begin
Witnessed by: Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES ON INTERIM SELF-GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENTS (OSLO I)

September 13, 1993

The Government of the State of Israel and the PLO team (in the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the Middle East Peace Conference) (the "Palestinian Delegation"), representing the Palestinian people, agree that it is time to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security and achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process. Accordingly, the two sides agree to the following principles:

Article I
Aim of the Negotiations:

The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, the elected Council (the "Council"), for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole peace process and that the negotiations on the permanent status will lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

Article II
Framework for the Interim Period:

The agreed framework for the interim period is set forth in this Declaration of Principles.

Article III
Elections:

1. In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip may govern themselves according to democratic principles, direct, free and general political elections will be held for the Council under agreed supervision and international observation, while the Palestinian police will ensure public order.

2. An agreement will be concluded on the exact mode and conditions of the elections in accordance with the protocol attached as Annex I, with the goal of holding the elections not later than nine months after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles.

3. These elections will constitute a significant interim preparatory step toward the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.
Article IV

Jurisdiction:

Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations. The two sides view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period.

Article V

Transitional Period and Permanent Status Negotiations:

1. The five-year transitional period will begin upon the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.
2. Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period, between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian people representatives.
3. It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest.
4. The two parties agree that the outcome of the permanent status negotiations should not be prejudiced or preempted by agreements reached for the interim period.

Article VI

Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities:

1. Upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area, a transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the authorized Palestinians for this task, as detailed herein, will commence. This transfer of authority will be of a preparatory nature until the inauguration of the Council.
2. Immediately after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, with the view to promoting economic development in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, authority will be transferred to the Palestinians on the following spheres: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism. The Palestinian side will commence in building the Palestinian police force, as agreed upon. Pending the inauguration of the Council, the two parties may negotiate the transfer of additional powers and responsibilities, as agreed upon.

Article VII

Interim Arrangement:

1. The Israeli and Palestinian delegations will negotiate an agreement on the interim period (the “Interim Agreement”).
2. The Interim Agreement shall specify, among other things, the structure of the Council, the number of its members, and the transfer of powers and responsibilities from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Council. The Interim Agreement shall also specify the Council’s executive authority, legislative authority in accordance with Article IX below, and the independent Palestinian judicial organs.
3. The Interim Agreement shall include arrangements, to be implemented upon the inauguration of the Council, for the assumption by the Council of all of the powers and responsibilities transferred previously in accordance with Article VI above.
4. In order to enable the Council to promote economic growth, upon its inauguration, the Council will establish, among other things, a Palestinian Electricity Authority, a Gaza Sea Port Authority, a Palestinian Development Bank, a Palestinian Export Promotion Board, a Palestinian Environmental Authority, a Palestinian Land Authority and a Palestinian Water Administration Authority, and any
other Authorities agreed upon, in accordance with the Interim Agreement that will specify their powers and responsibilities.

5. After the inauguration of the Council, the Civil Administration will be dissolved, and the Israeli military government will be withdrawn.

Article VIII
Public Order and Security:

In order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Council will establish a strong police force, while Israel will continue to carry the responsibility for defending against external threats, as well as the responsibility for overall security of Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order.

Article IX
Laws and Military Orders:

1. The Council will be empowered to legislate, in accordance with the Interim Agreement, within all authorities transferred to it.

2. Both parties will review jointly, laws and military orders presently in force in remaining spheres.

Article X
Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee:

In order to provide for a smooth implementation of this Declaration of Principles and any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, a Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee will be established in order to deal with issues requiring coordination, other issues of common interest, and disputes.

Article XI
Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation in Economic Fields:

Recognizing the mutual benefit of cooperation in promoting the development of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Israel, upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, an Israeli-Palestinian Economic Cooperation Committee will be established in order to develop and implement in a cooperative manner the programs identified in the protocols attached as Annex III and Annex IV.

Article XII
Liaison and Cooperation with Jordan and Egypt:

The two parties will invite the Governments of Jordan and Egypt to participate in establishing further liaison and cooperation arrangements between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian representatives, on the one hand, and the Governments of Jordan and Egypt, on the other hand, to promote cooperation between them. These arrangements will include the constitution of a Continuing Committee that will decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern will be dealt with by this Committee.

Article XIII
Redeployment of Israeli Forces:

1. After the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, and not later than the eve of elections for the Council, a redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will take place, in addition to withdrawal of Israeli forces carried out in accordance with Article XIV.
2. In redeploying its military forces, Israel will be guided by the principle that its military forces should be redeployed outside populated areas.
3. Further redeployments to specified locations will be gradually implemented commensurate with the assumption of responsibility for public order and internal security by the Palestinian police force pursuant to Article VIII above.

Article XIV
Israeli Withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area:
Israel will withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, as detailed in the protocol attached as Annex II.

Article XV
Resolution of Disputes:
1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Declaration of Principles, or any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, shall be resolved by negotiations through the Joint Liaison Committee to be established pursuant to Article X above.
2. Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations may be resolved by a mechanism of conciliation to be agreed upon by the parties.
3. The parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes relating to the interim period, which cannot be settled through conciliation. To this end, upon the agreement of both parties, the parties will establish an Arbitration Committee.

Article XVI
Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation Concerning Regional Programs:
Both parties view the multilateral working groups as an appropriate instrument for promoting a “Marshall Plan”, the regional programs and other programs, including special programs for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as indicated in the protocol attached as Annex IV.

Article XVII
Miscellaneous Provisions:
1. This Declaration of Principles will enter into force one month after its signing.
2. All protocols annexed to this Declaration of Principles and Agreed Minutes pertaining thereto shall be regarded as an integral part hereof.

Done at Washington, DC, this thirteenth day of September 1993.
For the Government of Israel
For the PLO
Witnessed By:
The United States of America
The Russian Federation

Annex I
Protocol on the Mode and Conditions of Elections
1. Palestinians of Jerusalem who live there will have the right to participate in the election process, according to an agreement between the two sides.
2. In addition, the election agreement should cover, among other things, the following issues:
   a. the system of elections;
b. the mode of the agreed supervision and international observation and their personal composition; and

c. rules and regulations regarding election campaign, including agreed arrangements for the organizing of mass media, and the possibility of licensing a broadcasting and TV station.

3. The future status of displaced Palestinians who were registered on 4th June 1967 will not be prejudiced because they are unable to participate in the election process due to practical reasons.

Annex II

Protocol on Withdrawal of Israeli Forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area.

1. The two sides will conclude and sign within two months from the date of entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, an agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. This agreement will include comprehensive arrangements to apply in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal.

2. Israel will implement an accelerated and scheduled withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, beginning immediately with the signing of the agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho area and to be completed within a period not exceeding four months after the signing of this agreement.

3. The above agreement will include, among other things:

   a. Arrangements for a smooth and peaceful transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Palestinian representatives.

   b. Structure, powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian authority in these areas, except external security, settlements, Israelis, foreign relations, and other mutually agreed matters.

   c. Arrangements for the assumption of internal security and public order by the Palestinian police force consisting of police officers recruited locally and from abroad holding Jordanian passports and Palestinian documents issued by Egypt. Those who will participate in the Palestinian police force coming from abroad should be trained as police and police officers.

   d. A temporary international or foreign presence, as agreed upon.

   e. Establishment of a joint Palestinian-Israeli Coordination and Cooperation Committee for mutual security purposes.

   f. An economic development and stabilization program, including the establishment of an Emergency Fund, to encourage foreign investment, and financial and economic support. Both sides will coordinate and cooperate jointly and unilaterally with regional and international parties to support these aims.

   g. Arrangements for a safe passage for persons and transportation between the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.

   The above agreement will include arrangements for coordination between both parties regarding passages:

   a. Gaza — Egypt; and


   The offices responsible for carrying out the powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian authority under this Annex II and Article VI of the Declaration of Principles will be located in the Gaza Strip and in the Jericho area pending the inauguration of the Council.

   Other than these agreed arrangements, the status of the Gaza Strip and Jericho area will continue to be an integral part of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and will not be changed in the interim period.
Annex III

Protocol on Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation in Economic and Development Programs

The two sides agree to establish an Israeli-Palestinian continuing Committee for Economic Cooperation, focusing, among other things, on the following:

1. Cooperation in the field of water, including a Water Development Program prepared by experts from both sides, which will also specify the mode of cooperation in the management of water resources in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and will include proposals for studies and plans on water rights of each party, as well as on the equitable utilization of joint water resources for implementation in and beyond the interim period.

2. Cooperation in the field of electricity, including an Electricity Development Program, which will also specify the mode of cooperation for the production, maintenance, purchase and sale of electricity resources.

3. Cooperation in the field of energy, including an Energy Development Program, which will provide for the exploitation of oil and gas for industrial purposes, particularly in the Gaza Strip and in the Negev, and will encourage further joint exploitation of other energy resources. This Program may also provide for the construction of a Petrochemical industrial complex in the Gaza Strip and the construction of oil and gas pipelines.

4. Cooperation in the field of finance, including a Financial Development and Action Program for the encouragement of international investment in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and in Israel, as well as the establishment of a Palestinian Development Bank.

5. Cooperation in the field of transport and communications, including a Program, which will define guidelines for the establishment of a Gaza Seaport Area, and will provide for the establishing of transport and communications lines to and from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to Israel and to other countries. In addition, this Program will provide for carrying out the necessary construction of roads, railways, communications lines, etc.

6. Cooperation in the field of trade, including studies, and Trade Promotion Programs, which will encourage local, regional and inter-regional trade, as well as a feasibility study of creating free trade zones in the Gaza Strip and in Israel, mutual access to these zones, and cooperation in other areas related to trade and commerce.

7. Cooperation in the field of industry, including Industrial Development Programs, which will provide for the establishment of joint Israeli-Palestinian Industrial Research and Development Centers, will promote Palestinian-Israeli joint ventures, and provide guidelines for cooperation in the textile, food, pharmaceutical, electronics, diamonds, computer and science-based industries.

8. A program for cooperation in, and regulation of, labor relations and cooperation in social welfare issues.

9. A Human Resources Development and Cooperation Plan, providing for joint Israeli-Palestinian workshops and seminars, and for the establishment of joint vocational training centers, research institutes and data banks.

10. An Environmental Protection Plan, providing for joint and/or coordinated measures in this sphere.

11. A program for developing coordination and cooperation in the field of communication and media.

12. Any other programs of mutual interest.

Annex IV

Protocol on Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation concerning Regional Development Programs

1. The two sides will cooperate in the context of the multilateral peace efforts in promoting a Development Program for the region, including the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, to be initiated by
the G-7. The parties will request the G-7 to seek the participation in this program of other interested states, such as members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, regional Arab states and institutions, as well as members of the private sector.
2. The Development Program will consist of two elements:
   a. an Economic Development Program for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
   b. a Regional Economic Development Program.
3. The Economic Development Program for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will consist of the following elements:
   a. A Social Rehabilitation Program, including a Housing and Construction Program.
   c. An Infrastructure Development Program (water, electricity, transportation and communications, etc.).
5. Other programs.
6. The Regional Economic Development Program may consist of the following elements:
   a. The establishment of a Middle East Development Fund, as a first step, and a Middle East Development Bank, as a second step.
   b. The development of a joint Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian Plan for coordinated exploitation of the Dead Sea area.
   c. The Mediterranean Sea (Gaza) — Dead Sea Canal.
   d. Regional Desalination and other water development projects.
   e. A regional plan for agricultural development, including a coordinated regional effort for the prevention of desertification.
   f. Interconnection of electricity grids.
   g. Regional cooperation for the transfer, distribution and industrial exploitation of gas, oil and other energy resources.
   h. A Regional Tourism, Transportation and Telecommunications Development Plan.
   i. Regional cooperation in other spheres.
7. The two sides will encourage the multilateral working groups, and will coordinate towards their success. The two parties will encourage intersessional activities, as well as pre-feasibility and feasibility studies, within the various multilateral working groups.

AGREED MINUTES TO THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES ON INTERIM SELF-GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENTS

General Understanding and Agreements:
Any powers and responsibilities transferred to the Palestinians pursuant to the Declaration of Principles prior to the inauguration of the Council will be subject to the same principles pertaining to Article IV, as set out in these Agreed Minutes below.

Specific Understandings and Agreements:

Article IV
It is understood that:
1. Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations: Jerusalem, settlements, military locations, and Israelis.
2. The Council's jurisdiction will apply with regard to the agreed powers, responsibilities, spheres and authorities transferred to it.

Article VI (2)
It is agreed that the transfer of authority will be as follows:

1. The Palestinian side will inform the Israeli side of the names of the authorized Palestinians who will assume the powers, authorities and responsibilities that will be transferred to the Palestinians according to the Declaration of Principles in the following fields: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, tourism, and any other authorities agreed upon.
2. It is understood that the rights and obligations of these offices will not be affected.
3. Each of the spheres described above will continue to enjoy existing budgetary allocations in accordance with arrangements to be mutually agreed upon. These arrangements also will provide for the necessary adjustments required in order to take into account the taxes collected by the direct taxation office.
4. Upon the execution of the Declaration of Principles, the Israeli and Palestinian delegations will immediately commence negotiations on a detailed plan for the transfer of authority on the above offices in accordance with the above understandings.

Article VII (2)
The Interim Agreement will also include arrangements for coordination and cooperation.

Article VII (5)
The withdrawal of the military government will not prevent Israel from exercising the powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Council.

Article VIII
It is understood that the Interim Agreement will include arrangements for cooperation and coordination between the two parties in this regard. It is also agreed that the transfer of powers and responsibilities to the Palestinian police will be accomplished in a phased manner, as agreed in the Interim Agreement.

Article X
It is agreed that, upon the entry into force of the Declaration of Principles, the Israeli and Palestinian delegations will exchange the names of the individuals designated by them as members of the Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee.

It is further agreed that each side will have an equal number of members in the Joint Committee. The Joint Committee will reach decisions by agreement. The Joint Committee may add other technicians and experts, as necessary. The Joint Committee will decide on the frequency and place or places of its meetings.

Annex II
It is understood that, subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal, Israel will continue to be responsible for external security, and for internal security and public order of settlements and Israelis. Israeli military forces and civilians may continue to use roads freely within the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area.

Done at Washington, DC, this thirteenth day of September 1993.

For the Government of Israel
For the PLO
Witnessed By:
The United States of America
The Russian Federation
THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN INTERIM AGREEMENT (OSLO II)

ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN INTERIM AGREEMENT ON THE WEST BANK
AND THE GAZA STRIP

Washington, DC, September 28, 1995

The Government of the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (hereinafter “the PLO”), the representative of the Palestinian people;

PREAMBLE
WITHIN the framework of the Middle East peace process initiated at Madrid in October 1991;
REAFFIRMING their determination to put an end to decades of confrontation and to live in peaceful coexistence, mutual dignity and security, while recognizing their mutual legitimate and political rights;
REAFFIRMING their desire to achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process;
RECOGNIZING that the peace process and the new era that it has created, as well as the new relationship established between the two Parties as described above, are irreversible, and the determination of the two Parties to maintain, sustain and continue the peace process;
RECOGNIZING that the aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, i.e. the elected Council (hereinafter “the Council” or “the Palestinian Council”), and the elected Ra’ees of the Executive Authority, for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years from the date of signing the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area (hereinafter “the Gaza-Jericho Agreement”) on May 4, 1994, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338;
REAFFIRMING their understanding that the interim self-government arrangements contained in this Agreement are an integral part of the whole peace process, that the negotiations on the permanent status, that will start as soon as possible but not later than May 4, 1996, will lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and that the Interim Agreement shall settle all the issues of the interim period and that no such issues will be deferred to the agenda of the permanent status negotiations;
REAFFIRMING their adherence to the mutual recognition and commitments expressed in the letters dated September 9, 1993, signed by and exchanged between the Prime Minister of Israel and the Chairman of the PLO;
DESIROUS of putting into effect the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements signed at Washington, D.C. on September 13, 1993, and the Agreed Minutes thereto (hereinafter “the DOP”) and in particular Article III and Annex I concerning the holding of direct, free and general political elections for the Council and the Ra’ees of the Executive Authority in order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip may democratically elect accountable representatives;

RECOGNIZING that these elections will constitute a significant interim preparatory step toward the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements and will provide a democratic basis for the establishment of Palestinian institutions;

REAFFIRMING their mutual commitment to act, in accordance with this Agreement, immediately, efficiently and effectively against acts or threats of terrorism, violence or incitement, whether committed by Palestinians or Israelis;

FOLLOWING the Gaza-Jericho Agreement; the Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities signed at Erez on August 29, 1994 (hereinafter “the Preparatory Transfer Agreement”); and the Protocol on Further Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities signed at Cairo on August 27, 1995 (hereinafter “the Further Transfer Protocol”); which three agreements will be superseded by this Agreement;

HEREBY AGREE as follows:

CHAPTER I — THE COUNCIL

ARTICLE I

Transfer of Authority

1. Israel shall transfer powers and responsibilities as specified in this Agreement from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Council in accordance with this Agreement. Israel shall continue to exercise powers and responsibilities not so transferred.

2. Pending the inauguration of the Council, the powers and responsibilities transferred to the Council shall be exercised by the Palestinian Authority established in accordance with the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, which shall also have all the rights, liabilities and obligations to be assumed by the Council in this regard. Accordingly, the term “Council” throughout this Agreement shall, pending the inauguration of the Council, be construed as meaning the Palestinian Authority.

3. The transfer of powers and responsibilities to the police force established by the Palestinian Council in accordance with Article XIV below (hereinafter “the Palestinian Police”) shall be accomplished in a phased manner, as detailed in this Agreement and in the Protocol concerning Redeployment and Security Arrangements attached as Annex I to this Agreement (hereinafter “Annex I”).

4. As regards the transfer and assumption of authority in civil spheres, powers and responsibilities shall be transferred and assumed as set out in the Protocol Concerning Civil Affairs attached as Annex III to this Agreement (hereinafter “Annex III”).

5. After the inauguration of the Council, the Civil Administration in the West Bank will be dissolved, and the Israeli military government shall be withdrawn. The withdrawal of the military government shall not prevent it from exercising the powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Council.

6. A Joint Civil Affairs Coordination and Cooperation Committee (hereinafter “the CAC”), Joint Regional Civil Affairs Subcommittees, one for the Gaza Strip and the other for the West Bank, and District Civil Liaison Offices in the West Bank shall be established in order to provide for coordination and cooperation in civil affairs between the Council and Israel, as detailed in Annex III.
7. The offices of the Council, and the offices of its Ra’ees and its Executive Authority and other committees, shall be located in areas under Palestinian territorial jurisdiction in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

ARTICLE II

Elections

1. In order that the Palestinian people of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip may govern themselves according to democratic principles, direct, free and general political elections will be held for the Council and the Ra’ees of the Executive Authority of the Council in accordance with the provisions set out in the Protocol concerning Elections attached as Annex II to this Agreement (hereinafter “Annex II”).

2. These elections will constitute a significant interim preparatory step towards the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements and will provide a democratic basis for the establishment of Palestinian institutions.

3. Palestinians of Jerusalem who live there may participate in the election process in accordance with the provisions contained in this Article and in Article VI of Annex II (Election Arrangements concerning Jerusalem).

4. The elections shall be called by the Chairman of the Palestinian Authority immediately following the signing of this Agreement to take place at the earliest practicable date following the redeployment of Israeli forces in accordance with Annex I, and consistent with the requirements of the election timetable as provided in Annex II, the Election Law and the Election Regulations, as defined in Article I of Annex II.

ARTICLE III

Structure of the Palestinian Council

1. The Palestinian Council and the Ra’ees of the Executive Authority of the Council constitute the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, which will be elected by the Palestinian people of the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip for the transitional period agreed in Article I of the DOP.

2. The Council shall possess both legislative power and executive power, in accordance with Articles VII and IX of the DOP. The Council shall carry out and be responsible for all the legislative and executive powers and responsibilities transferred to it under this Agreement. The exercise of legislative powers shall be in accordance with Article XVII of this Agreement (Legislative Powers of the Council).

3. The Council and the Ra’ees of the Executive Authority of the Council shall be directly and simultaneously elected by the Palestinian people of the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement and the Election Law and Regulations, which shall not be contrary to the provisions of this Agreement.


5. Immediately upon its inauguration, the Council will elect from among its members a Speaker. The Speaker will preside over the meetings of the Council, administer the Council and its committees, decide on the agenda of each meeting, and lay before the Council proposals for voting and declare their results.

6. The jurisdiction of the Council shall be as determined in Article XVII of this Agreement (Jurisdiction).

7. The organization, structure and functioning of the Council shall be in accordance with this Agreement and the Basic Law for the Palestinian Interim Self-government Authority, which Law shall be adopted
by the Council. The Basic Law and any regulations made under it shall not be contrary to the provisions of this Agreement.

8. The Council shall be responsible under its executive powers for the offices, services and departments transferred to it and may establish, within its jurisdiction, ministries and subordinate bodies, as necessary for the fulfillment of its responsibilities.

9. The Speaker will present for the Council's approval proposed internal procedures that will regulate, among other things, the decision-making processes of the Council.

ARTICLE IV

Size of the Council
The Palestinian Council shall be composed of 82 representatives and the Ra‘ees of the Executive Authority, who will be directly and simultaneously elected by the Palestinian people of the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip.

ARTICLE V

The Executive Authority of the Council
1. The Council will have a committee that will exercise the executive authority of the Council, formed in accordance with paragraph 4 below (hereinafter "the Executive Authority").

2. The Executive Authority shall be bestowed with the executive authority of the Council and will exercise it on behalf of the Council. It shall determine its own internal procedures and decision making processes.

3. The Council will publish the names of the members of the Executive Authority immediately upon their initial appointment and subsequent to any changes.

4. a. The Ra‘ees of the Executive Authority shall be an ex officio member of the Executive Authority.

b. All of the other members of the Executive Authority, except as provided in subparagraph c. below, shall be members of the Council, chosen and proposed to the Council by the Ra‘ees of the Executive Authority and approved by the Council.

c. The Ra‘ees of the Executive Authority shall have the right to appoint some persons, in number not exceeding twenty percent of the total membership of the Executive Authority, who are not members of the Council, to exercise executive authority and participate in government tasks. Such appointed members may not vote in meetings of the Council.

d. Non-elected members of the Executive Authority must have a valid address in an area under the jurisdiction of the Council.

ARTICLE VI

Other Committees of the Council
1. The Council may form small committees to simplify the proceedings of the Council and to assist in controlling the activity of its Executive Authority.

2. Each committee shall establish its own decision-making processes within the general framework of the organization and structure of the Council.

ARTICLE VII

Open Government
1. All meetings of the Council and of its committees, other than the Executive Authority, shall be open to the public, except upon a resolution of the Council or the relevant committee on the grounds of security, or commercial or personal confidentiality.
2. Participation in the deliberations of the Council, its committees and the Executive Authority shall be limited to their respective members only. Experts may be invited to such meetings to address specific issues on an ad hoc basis.

ARTICLE VIII

Judicial Review
Any person or organization affected by any act or decision of the Ra’ees of the Executive Authority of the Council or of any member of the Executive Authority, who believes that such an act or decision exceeds the authority of the Ra’ees or of such member, or is otherwise incorrect in law or procedure, may apply to the relevant Palestinian Court of Justice for a review of such activity or decision.

ARTICLE IX

Powers and Responsibilities of the Council
1. Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, the Council will, within its jurisdiction, have legislative powers as set out in Article XVIII of this Agreement, as well as executive powers.

2. The executive power of the Palestinian Council shall extend to all matters within its jurisdiction under this Agreement or any future agreement that may be reached between the two Parties during the interim period. It shall include the power to formulate and conduct Palestinian policies and to supervise their implementation, to issue any rule or regulation under powers given in approved legislation and administrative decisions necessary for the realization of Palestinian self-government, the power to employ staff, sue and be sued and conclude contracts, and the power to keep and administer registers and records of the population, and issue certificates, licenses and documents.

3. The Palestinian Council’s executive decisions and acts shall be consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.

4. The Palestinian Council may adopt all necessary measures in order to enforce the law and any of its decisions, and bring proceedings before the Palestinian courts and tribunals.

5. a. In accordance with the DOP, the Council will not have powers and responsibilities in the sphere of foreign relations, which sphere includes the establishment abroad of embassies, consulates or other types of foreign missions and posts or permitting their establishment in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip, the appointment of or admission of diplomatic and consular staff, and the exercise of diplomatic functions.

b. Notwithstanding the provisions of this paragraph, the PLO may conduct negotiations and sign agreements with states or international organizations for the benefit of the Council in the following cases only:

(1) economic agreements, as specifically provided in Annex V of this Agreement;

(2) agreements with donor countries for the purpose of implementing arrangements for the provision of assistance to the Council,

(3) agreements for the purpose of implementing the regional development plans detailed in Annex IV of the DOP or in agreements entered into in the framework of the multilateral negotiations, and

(4) cultural, scientific and educational agreements. Dealings between the Council and representatives of foreign states and international organizations, as well as the establishment in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip of representative offices other than those described in subparagraph 5a above, for the purpose of implementing the agreements referred to in subparagraph 5b above, shall not be considered foreign relations.
6. Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, the Council shall, within its jurisdiction, have an independent judicial system composed of independent Palestinian courts and tribunals.

CHAPTER 2 — REDEPLOYMENT AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

ARTICLE X

Redeployment of Israeli Military Forces

1. The first phase of the Israeli military forces redeployment will cover populated areas in the West Bank — cities, towns, villages, refugee camps and hamlets — as set out in Annex I, and will be completed prior to the eve of the Palestinian elections, i.e., 22 days before the day of the elections.

2. Further redeployments of Israeli military forces to specified military locations will commence after the inauguration of the Council and will be gradually implemented commensurate with the assumption of responsibility for public order and internal security by the Palestinian Police, to be completed within 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Council as detailed in Articles XI (Land) and XIII (Security) below, and in Annex I.

3. The Palestinian Police shall be deployed and shall assume responsibility for public order and internal security for Palestinians in a phased manner in accordance with XIII (Security) below and Annex I.

4. Israel shall continue to carry the responsibility for external security, as well as the responsibility for overall security of Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order.

5. For the purpose of this Agreement, “Israeli military forces” includes Israel Police and other Israeli security forces.

ARTICLE XI

Land

1. The two sides view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, the integrity and status of which will be preserved during the interim period.

2. The two sides agree that West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, will come under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Council in a phased manner, to be completed within 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Council, as specified below:
   a. Land in populated areas (Areas A and B), including government and Al Waqf land, will come under the jurisdiction of the Council during the first phase of redeployment.
   b. All civil powers and responsibilities, including planning and zoning, in Areas A and B, set out in Annex III, will be transferred to and assumed by the Council during the first phase of redeployment.
   c. In Area C, during the first phase of redeployment, Israel will transfer to the Council civil powers and responsibilities not relating to territory, as set out in Annex III.
   d. The further redeployments of Israeli military forces to specified military locations will be gradually implemented in accordance with the DOP in three phases, each to take place after an interval of six months, after the inauguration of the Council, to be completed within 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Council.
   e. During the further redeployment phases to be completed within 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Council, powers and responsibilities relating to territory will be transferred gradually to Palestinian jurisdiction that will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for the issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations.
f. The specified military locations referred to in Article X, paragraph 2 above will be determined in
the further redeployment phases, within the specified time-frame ending not later than 18
months from the date of the inauguration of the Council, and will be negotiated in the permanent
status negotiations.

3. For the purpose of this Agreement and until the completion of the first phase of the further
redeployments:
   a. “Area A” means the populated areas delineated by a red line and shaded in brown on attached
      map No. 1,
   b. “Area B” means the populated areas delineated by a red line and shaded in yellow on attached
      map No. 1, and the built-up area of the hamlets listed in Appendix 6 to Annex I, and
   c. “Area C” means areas of the West Bank outside Areas A and B, which, except for the issues that
      will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, will be gradually transferred to
      Palestinian jurisdiction in accordance with this Agreement.

ARTICLE XII

Arrangements for Security and Public Order

1. In order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip, the Council shall establish a strong police force as set out in Article XIV below. Israel shall
continue to carry the responsibility for defense against external threats, including the responsibility
for protecting the Egyptian and Jordanian borders, and for defense against external threats from the
sea and from the air, as well as the responsibility for overall security of Israelis and Settlements, for
the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order, and will have all the powers to
take the steps necessary to meet this responsibility.

2. Agreed security arrangements and coordination mechanisms are specified in Annex I.

3. A Joint Coordination and Cooperation Committee for Mutual Security Purposes (hereinafter “the
JSC”), as well as Joint Regional Security Committees (hereinafter “RSCs”) and Joint District
Coordination Offices (hereinafter “DCOs”), are hereby established as provided for in Annex I.

4. The security arrangements provided for in this Agreement and in Annex I may be reviewed at the
request of either Party and may be amended by mutual agreement of the Parties. Specific review
arrangements are included in Annex I.

5. For the purpose of this Agreement, “the Settlements” means, in the West Bank the settlements in
Area C; and in the Gaza Strip — the Gush Katif and Erez settlement areas, as well as the other
settlements in the Gaza Strip, as shown on attached map No. 2.

ARTICLE XIII

Security

1. The Council will, upon completion of the redeployment of Israeli military forces in each district, as set
out in Appendix I to Annex I, assume the powers and responsibilities for internal security and public
order in Area A in that district.

2. a. There will be a complete redeployment of Israeli military forces from Area B. Israel will transfer to
the Council and the Council will assume responsibility for public order for Palestinians. Israel
shall have the overriding responsibility for security for the purpose of protecting Israelis and
confronting the threat of terrorism.

   b. In Area B, the Palestinian Police shall assume the responsibility for public order for Palestinians
and shall be deployed in order to accommodate the Palestinian needs and requirements in the
following manner:
(1) The Palestinian Police shall establish 25 police stations and posts in towns, villages, and other places listed in Appendix 2 to Annex I and as delineated on map No. 3. The West Bank RSC may agree on the establishment of additional police stations and posts, if required.

(2) The Palestinian Police shall be responsible for handling public order incidents in which only Palestinians are involved.

(3) The Palestinian Police shall operate freely in populated places where police stations and posts are located, as set out in paragraph b(1) above.

(4) While the movement of uniformed Palestinian policemen in Area B outside places where there is a Palestinian police station or post will be carried out after coordination and confirmation through the relevant DCO, three months after the completion of redeployment from Area B, the DCOs may decide that movement of Palestinian policemen from the police stations in Area B to Palestinian towns and villages in Area B on roads that are used only by Palestinian traffic will take place after notifying the DCO.

(5) The coordination of such planned movement prior to confirmation through the relevant DCO shall include a scheduled plan, including the number of policemen, as well as the type and number of weapons and vehicles intended to take part. It shall also include details of arrangements for ensuring continued coordination through appropriate communication links, the exact schedule of movement to the area of the planned operation, including the destination and routes thereto, its proposed duration and the schedule for returning to the police station or post.

The Israeli side of the DCO will provide the Palestinian side with its response, following a request for movement of policemen in accordance with this paragraph, in normal or routine cases within one day and in emergency cases no later than 2 hours.

(6) The Palestinian Police and the Israeli military forces will conduct joint security activities on the main roads as set out in Annex I.

(7) The Palestinian Police will notify the West Bank RSC of the names of the policemen, number plates of police vehicles and serial numbers of weapons, with respect to each police station and post in Area B.

(8) Further redeployments from Area C and transfer of internal security responsibility to the Palestinian Police in Areas B and C will be carried out in three phases, each to take place after an interval of six months, to be completed 18 months after the inauguration of the Council, except for the issues of permanent status negotiations and of Israel's overall responsibility for Israelis and borders.

(9) The procedures detailed in this paragraph will be reviewed within six months of the completion of the first phase of redeployment.

ARTICLE XIV

The Palestinian Police

1. The Council shall establish a strong police force. The duties, functions, structure, deployment and composition of the Palestinian Police, together with provisions regarding its equipment and operation, as well as rules of conduct, are set out in Annex I.

2. The Palestinian police force established under the Gaza-Jericho Agreement will be fully integrated into the Palestinian Police and will be subject to the provisions of this Agreement.

3. Except for the Palestinian Police and the Israeli military forces, no other armed forces shall be established or operate in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

4. Except for the arms, ammunition and equipment of the Palestinian Police described in Annex I, and
those of the Israeli military forces, no organization, group or individual in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip shall manufacture, sell, acquire, possess, import or otherwise introduce into the West Bank or the Gaza Strip any firearms, ammunition, weapons, explosives, gunpowder or any related equipment, unless otherwise provided for in Annex I.

ARTICLE XV

Prevention of Hostile Acts

1. Both sides shall take all measures necessary in order to prevent acts of terrorism, crime and hostilities directed against each other, against individuals falling under the other's authority and against their property and shall take legal measures against offenders.

2. Specific provisions for the implementation of this Article are set out in Annex I.

ARTICLE XVI

Confidence Building Measures

With a view to fostering a positive and supportive public atmosphere to accompany the implementation of this Agreement, to establish a solid basis of mutual trust and good faith, and in order to facilitate the anticipated cooperation and new relations between the two peoples, both Parties agree to carry out confidence building measures as detailed herewith:

1. Israel will release or turn over to the Palestinian side, Palestinian detainees and prisoners, residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The first stage of release of these prisoners and detainees will take place on the signing of this Agreement and the second stage will take place prior to the date of the elections. There will be a third stage of release of detainees and prisoners. Detainees and prisoners will be released from among categories detailed in Annex VII (Release of Palestinian Prisoners and Detainees). Those released will be free to return to their homes in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

2. Palestinians who have maintained contact with the Israeli authorities will not be subjected to acts of harassment, violence, retribution or prosecution. Appropriate ongoing measures will be taken, in coordination with Israel, in order to ensure their protection.

3. Palestinians from abroad whose entry into the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is approved pursuant to this Agreement, and to whom the provisions of this Article are applicable, will not be prosecuted for offenses committed prior to September 13, 1993.

CHAPTER 3 — LEGAL AFFAIRS

ARTICLE XVII

Jurisdiction

1. In accordance with the DOP, the jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory as a single territorial unit, except for:

   a. issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations: Jerusalem, settlements, specified military locations, Palestinian refugees, borders, foreign relations and Israelis; and
   b. powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Council.

2. Accordingly, the authority of the Council encompasses all matters that fall within its territorial, functional and personal jurisdiction, as follows:

   a. The territorial jurisdiction of the Council shall encompass Gaza Strip territory, except for the Settlements and the Military Installation Area shown on map No. 2, and West Bank territory,
except for Area C which, except for the issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, will be gradually transferred to Palestinian jurisdiction in three phases, each to take place after an interval of six months, to be completed 18 months after the inauguration of the Council. At this time, the jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for the issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations. Territorial jurisdiction includes land, subsoil and territorial waters, in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement.

b. The functional jurisdiction of the Council extends to all powers and responsibilities transferred to the Council, as specified in this Agreement or in any future agreements that may be reached between the Parties during the interim period.

c. The territorial and functional jurisdiction of the Council will apply to all persons, except for Israelis, unless otherwise provided in this Agreement.

d. Notwithstanding subparagraph a. above, the Council shall have functional jurisdiction in Area C, as detailed in Article IV of Annex III.

3. The Council has, within its authority, legislative, executive and judicial powers and responsibilities, as provided for in this Agreement.

4. a. Israel, through its military government, has the authority over areas that are not under the territorial jurisdiction of the Council, powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Council and Israelis.

b. To this end, the Israeli military government shall retain the necessary legislative, judicial and executive powers and responsibilities, in accordance with international law. This provision shall not derogate from Israel's applicable legislation over Israelis in personam.

5. The exercise of authority with regard to the electromagnetic sphere and air space shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement.

6. Without derogating from the provisions of this Article, legal arrangements detailed in the Protocol Concerning Legal Matters attached as Annex IV to this Agreement (hereinafter “Annex IV”) shall be observed. Israel and the Council may negotiate further legal arrangements.

7. Israel and the Council shall cooperate on matters of legal assistance in criminal and civil matters through a legal committee (hereinafter “the Legal Committee”), hereby established.

8. The Council's jurisdiction will extend gradually to cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for the issues to be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, through a series of redeployments of the Israeli military forces. The first phase of the redeployment of Israeli military forces will cover populated areas in the West Bank — cities, towns, refugee camps and hamlets, as set out in Annex I — and will be completed prior to the eve of the Palestinian elections, i.e. 22 days before the day of the elections. Further redeployments of Israeli military forces to specified military locations will commence immediately upon the inauguration of the Council and will be effected in three phases, each to take place after an interval of six months, to be concluded no later than eighteen months from the date of the inauguration of the Council.

ARTICLE XVIII

Legislative Powers of the Council

1. For the purposes of this Article, legislation shall mean any primary and secondary legislation, including basic laws, laws, regulations and other legislative acts.

2. The Council has the power, within its jurisdiction as defined in Article XVII of this Agreement, to adopt legislation.
3. While the primary legislative power shall lie in the hands of the Council as a whole, the Ra'ees of the Executive Authority of the Council shall have the following legislative powers:
   a. the power to initiate legislation or to present proposed legislation to the Council;
   b. the power to promulgate legislation adopted by the Council; and
   c. the power to issue secondary legislation, including regulations, relating to any matters specified and within the scope laid down in any primary legislation adopted by the Council.

4. a. Legislation, including legislation which amends or abrogates existing laws or military orders, which exceeds the jurisdiction of the Council or which is otherwise inconsistent with the provisions of the DOP, this Agreement, or of any other agreement that may be reached between the two sides during the interim period, shall have no effect and shall be void ab initio.
   b. The Ra'ees of the Executive Authority of the Council shall not promulgate legislation adopted by the Council if such legislation falls under the provisions of this paragraph.

5. All legislation shall be communicated to the Israeli side of the Legal Committee.

6. Without derogating from the provisions of paragraph 4 above, the Israeli side of the Legal Committee may refer for the attention of the Committee any legislation regarding which Israel considers the provisions of paragraph 4 apply, in order to discuss issues arising from such legislation. The Legal Committee will consider the legislation referred to it at the earliest opportunity.

ARTICLE XIX

Human Rights and the Rule of Law

Israel and the Council shall exercise their powers and responsibilities pursuant to this Agreement with due regard to internationally-accepted norms and principles of human rights and the rule of law.

ARTICLE XX

Rights, Liabilities and Obligations

1. a. The transfer of powers and responsibilities from the Israeli military government and its civil administration to the Council, as detailed in Annex III, includes all related rights, liabilities and obligations arising with regard to acts or omissions which occurred prior to such transfer. Israel will cease to bear any financial responsibility regarding such acts or omissions and the Council will bear all financial responsibility for these and for its own functioning.
   b. Any financial claim made in this regard against Israel will be referred to the Council.
   c. Israel shall provide the Council with the information it has regarding pending and anticipated claims brought before any court or tribunal against Israel in this regard.
   d. Where legal proceedings are brought in respect of such a claim, Israel will notify the Council and enable it to participate in defending the claim and raise any arguments on its behalf.
   e. In the event that an award is made against Israel by any court or tribunal in respect of such a claim, the Council shall immediately reimburse Israel the full amount of the award.
   f. Without prejudice to the above, where a court or tribunal hearing such a claim finds that liability rests solely with an employee or agent who acted beyond the scope of the powers assigned to him or her, unlawfully or with willful malfeasance, the Council shall not bear financial responsibility.

2. a. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1.d through 1.f above, each side may take the necessary measures, including promulgation of legislation, in order to ensure that such claims by Palestinians including pending claims in which the hearing of evidence has not yet begun, are
b. Where a new claim has been brought before a Palestinian court or tribunal subsequent to the dismissal of the claim pursuant to subparagraph a. above, the Council shall defend it and, in accordance with subparagraph 1.a above, in the event that an award is made for the plaintiff, shall pay the amount of the award.

c. The Legal Committee shall agree on arrangements for the transfer of all materials and information needed to enable the Palestinian courts or tribunals to hear such claims as referred to in subparagraph b. above, and, when necessary, for the provision of legal assistance by Israel to the Council in defending such claims.

3. The transfer of authority in itself shall not affect rights, liabilities and obligations of any person or legal entity, in existence at the date of signing of this Agreement.

4. The Council, upon its inauguration, will assume all the rights, liabilities and obligations of the Palestinian Authority.

5. For the purpose of this Agreement, “Israelis” also includes Israeli statutory agencies and corporations registered in Israel.

ARTICLE XXI

Settlement of Differences and Disputes

Any difference relating to the application of this Agreement shall be referred to the appropriate coordination and cooperation mechanism established under this Agreement. The provisions of Article XV of the DOP shall apply to any such difference which is not settled through the appropriate coordination and cooperation mechanism, namely:

1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Agreement or any related agreements pertaining to the interim period shall be settled through the Liaison Committee.

2. Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations may be settled by a mechanism of conciliation to be agreed between the Parties.

3. The Parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes relating to the interim period, which cannot be settled through conciliation. To this end, upon the agreement of both Parties, the Parties will establish an Arbitration Committee.

CHAPTER 4 — COOPERATION

ARTICLE XXII

Relations between Israel and the Council

1. Israel and the Council shall seek to foster mutual understanding and tolerance and shall accordingly abstain from incitement, including hostile propaganda, against each other and, without derogating from the principle of freedom of expression, shall take legal measures to prevent such incitement by any organizations, groups or individuals within their jurisdiction.

2. Israel and the Council will ensure that their respective educational systems contribute to the peace between the Israeli and Palestinian peoples and to peace in the entire region, and will refrain from the introduction of any motifs that could adversely affect the process of reconciliation.

3. Without derogating from the other provisions of this Agreement, Israel and the Council shall cooperate in combating criminal activity which may affect both sides, including offenses related to
trafficking in illegal drugs and psychotropic substances, smuggling, and offenses against property, including offenses related to vehicles.

ARTICLE XXIII

Cooperation with Regard to Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities
In order to ensure a smooth, peaceful and orderly transfer of powers and responsibilities, the two sides will cooperate with regard to the transfer of security powers and responsibilities in accordance with the provisions of Annex I, and the transfer of civil powers and responsibilities in accordance with the provisions of Annex III.

ARTICLE XXIV

Economic Relations
The economic relations between the two sides are set out in the Protocol on Economic Relations signed in Paris on April 29, 1994, and the Appendices thereto, and the Supplement to the Protocol on Economic Relations all attached as Annex V, and will be governed by the relevant provisions of this Agreement and its Annexes.

ARTICLE XXV

Cooperation Programs
1. The Parties agree to establish a mechanism to develop programs of cooperation between them. Details of such cooperation are set out in Annex VI.
2. A Standing Cooperation Committee to deal with issues arising in the context of this cooperation is hereby established as provided for in Annex VI.

ARTICLE XXVI

The Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee
1. The Liaison Committee established pursuant to Article X of the DOP shall ensure the smooth implementation of this Agreement. It shall deal with issues requiring coordination, other issues of common interest and disputes.
2. The Liaison Committee shall be composed of an equal number of members from each Party. It may add other technicians and experts as necessary.
3. The Liaison Committee shall adopt its rules of procedures, including the frequency and place or places of its meetings.
4. The Liaison Committee shall reach its decisions by agreement.
5. The Liaison Committee shall establish a subcommittee that will monitor and steer the implementation of this Agreement (hereinafter “the Monitoring and Steering Committee”). It will function as follows:
   a. The Monitoring and Steering Committee will, on an ongoing basis, monitor the implementation of this Agreement, with a view to enhancing the cooperation and fostering the peaceful relations between the two sides.
   b. The Monitoring and Steering Committee will steer the activities of the various joint committees established in this Agreement (the JSC, the CAC, the Legal Committee, the Joint Economic Committee and the Standing Cooperation Committee) concerning the ongoing implementation of the Agreement, and will report to the Liaison Committee.
c. The Monitoring and Steering Committee will be composed of the heads of the various committees mentioned above.

d. The two heads of the Monitoring and Steering Committee will establish its rules of procedures, including the frequency and places of its meetings.

ARTICLE XXVII

Liaison and Cooperation with Jordan and Egypt

1. Pursuant to Article XII of the DOP, the two Parties have invited the Governments of Jordan and Egypt to participate in establishing further liaison and cooperation arrangements between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian representatives on the one hand, and the Governments of Jordan and Egypt on the other hand, to promote cooperation between them. As part of these arrangements, a Continuing Committee has been constituted and has commenced its deliberations.

2. The Continuing Committee shall decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder.

3. The Continuing Committee shall also deal with other matters of common concern.

ARTICLE XXVIII

Missing Persons

1. Israel and the Council shall cooperate by providing each other with all necessary assistance in the conduct of searches for missing persons and bodies of persons which have not been recovered, as well as by providing information about missing persons.

2. The PLO undertakes to cooperate with Israel and to assist it in its efforts to locate and to return to Israel Israeli soldiers who are missing in action and the bodies of soldiers which have not been recovered.

CHAPTER 5 — MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

ARTICLE XXIX

Safe Passage between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip

Arrangements for safe passage of persons and transportation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are set out in Annex I.

ARTICLE XXX

Passages

Arrangements for coordination between Israel and the Council regarding passage to and from Egypt and Jordan, as well as any other agreed international crossings, are set out in Annex I.

ARTICLE XXXI

Final Clauses

1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signing.

2. The Gaza-Jericho Agreement, except for Article XX (Confidence-Building Measures), the Preparatory Transfer Agreement and the Further Transfer Protocol will be superseded by this Agreement.

3. The Council, upon its inauguration, shall replace the Palestinian Authority and shall assume all the undertakings and obligations of the Palestinian Authority under the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, the Preparatory Transfer Agreement, and the Further Transfer Protocol.
4. The two sides shall pass all necessary legislation to implement this Agreement.

5. Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later than May 4, 1996, between the Parties. It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest.

6. Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice or preempt the outcome of the negotiations on the permanent status to be conducted pursuant to the DOP. Neither Party shall be deemed, by virtue of having entered into this Agreement, to have renounced or waived any of its existing rights, claims or positions.

7. Neither side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the permanent status negotiations.

8. The two Parties view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, the integrity and status of which will be preserved during the interim period.

9. The PLO undertakes that, within two months of the date of the inauguration of the Council, the Palestinian National Council will convene and formally approve the necessary changes in regard to the Palestinian Covenant, as undertaken in the letters signed by the Chairman of the PLO and addressed to the Prime Minister of Israel, dated September 9, 1993 and May 4, 1994.

10. Pursuant to Annex I, Article IX of this Agreement, Israel confirms that the permanent checkpoints on the roads leading to and from the Jericho Area (except those related to the access road leading from Mousa Alami to the Allenby Bridge) will be removed upon the completion of the first phase of redeployment.

11. Prisoners who, pursuant to the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, were turned over to the Palestinian Authority on the condition that they remain in the Jericho Area for the remainder of their sentence, will be free to return to their homes in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip upon the completion of the first phase of redeployment.

12. As regards relations between Israel and the PLO, and without derogating from the commitments contained in the letters signed by and exchanged between the Prime Minister of Israel and the Chairman of the PLO, dated September 9, 1993 and May 4, 1994, the two sides will apply between them the provisions contained in Article XXII, paragraph 1, with the necessary changes.

13. a. The Preamble to this Agreement, and all Annexes, Appendices and maps attached hereto, shall constitute an integral part hereof.

   b. The Parties agree that the maps attached to the Gaza-Jericho Agreement as:

      (1) map No. 1 (The Gaza Strip), an exact copy of which is attached to this Agreement as map No. (in this Agreement "map No. 2");

      (2) map No. 4 (Deployment of Palestinian Police in the Gaza Strip), an exact copy of which is attached to this Agreement as map No. 5 (in this Agreement "map No. 5"); and

      (3) map No. 6 (Maritime Activity Zones), an exact copy of which is attached to this Agreement as map No. 8 (in this Agreement "map No. 8"); are an integral part hereof and will remain in effect for the duration of this Agreement.

14. While the Liftlik area will come under the functional and personal jurisdiction of the Council in the first phase of redeployment, the area's transfer to the territorial jurisdiction of the Council will be considered by the Israeli side in the first phase of the further redeployment phases.

Done at Washington DC, this 28th day of September, 1995.
For the Government of the State of Israel: ____________________________
For the PLO: ____________________________
Witnessed by:
The United States of America
The Russian Federation
The Arab Republic of Egypt
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
The Kingdom of Norway
The European Union
Annex 1 — Redeployment and Security Arrangements
Annex 2 — Elections Protocol
Annex 3 — Civil Affairs
Annex 4 — Legal Matters
Annex 5 — Economic Relations
Annex 6 — Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation
Annex 7 — Release of Palestinian Prisoners
Map No. 1 — First Phase of Redeployment (A & B)
Map No. 2 — Security Arrangements in the Gaza Strip
Map No. 5 — Palestinian Police Deployment — Gaza
Map No. 6 — Safe Passage Routes
Map No. 8 — Maritime Activity Zones
Map No. 9 — Hebron
TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN
THE STATE OF ISRAEL AND
THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN

October 26, 1994

PREAMBLE
The Government of the State of Israel and the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan:

- Bearing in mind the Washington Declaration, signed by them on 25th July, 1994, and which they are both committed to honor;
- Aiming at the achievement of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East based on Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 in all their aspects;
- Bearing in mind the importance of maintaining and strengthening peace based on freedom, equality, justice and respect for fundamental human rights, thereby overcoming psychological barriers and promoting human dignity;
- Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and recognizing their right and obligation to live in peace with each other as well as with all states, within secure and recognized boundaries;
- Desiring to develop friendly relations and co-operation between them in accordance with the principles of international law governing international relations in time of peace;
- Desiring as well to ensure lasting security for both their States and in particular to avoid threats and the use of force between them;
- Bearing in mind that in their Washington Declaration of 25th July, 1994, they declared the termination of the state of belligerency between them;
- Deciding to establish peace between them in accordance with this Treaty of Peace;

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1
ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE
Peace is hereby established between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (the “Parties”) effective from the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

ARTICLE 2
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
The Parties will apply between them the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law governing relations among states in times of peace. In particular:

They recognize and will respect each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence;
They recognize and will respect each other's right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries;

They will develop good neighborly relations of cooperation between them to ensure lasting security, will refrain from the threat or use of force against each other and will settle all disputes between them by peaceful means;

They respect and recognize the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the region;

They respect and recognize the pivotal role of human development and dignity in regional and bilateral relationships;

They further believe that within their control, involuntary movements of persons in such a way as to adversely prejudice the security of either Party should not be permitted.

ARTICLE 3
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY
The international boundary between Israel and Jordan is delimited with reference to the boundary definition under the Mandate as is shown in Annex I (a), on the mapping materials attached thereto and co-ordinates specified therein.

The boundary, as set out in Annex I (a), is the permanent, secure and recognized international boundary between Israel and Jordan, without prejudice to the status of any territories that came under Israeli military government control in 1967.

The parties recognize the international boundary, as well as each other's territory, territorial waters and airspace, as inviolable, and will respect and comply with them.

The demarcation of the boundary will take place as set forth in Appendix (I) to Annex I and will be concluded not later than nine months after the signing of the Treaty.

It is agreed that where the boundary follows a river, in the event of natural changes in the course of the flow of the river as described in Annex I (a), the boundary shall follow the new course of the flow. In the event of any other changes, the boundary shall not be affected unless otherwise agreed.

Immediately upon the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty, each Party will deploy on its side of the international boundary as defined in Annex I (a).

The Parties shall, upon the signature of the Treaty, enter into negotiations to conclude, within 9 months, an agreement on the delimitation of their maritime boundary in the Gulf of Aqaba.

Taking into account the special circumstances of the Naharayim/Baqura area, which is under Jordanian sovereignty, with Israeli private ownership rights, the Parties agreed to apply the provisions set out in Annex I (b).

With respect to the Zofar/Al-Ghamr area, the provisions set out in Annex I (c) will apply.

ARTICLE 4
SECURITY
Both Parties, acknowledging that mutual understanding and co-operation in security-related matters will form a significant part of their relations and will further enhance the security of the region, take upon themselves to base their security relations on mutual trust, advancement of joint interests and cooperation, and to aim towards a regional framework of partnership in peace.

Towards that goal, the Parties recognize the achievements of the European Community and European Union in the development of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and commit themselves to the creation, in the Middle East, of a CSCME (Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Middle East).
This commitment entails the adoption of regional models of security successfully implemented in the post World War era (along the lines of the Helsinki process) culminating in a regional zone of security and stability.

The obligations referred to in this Article are without prejudice to the inherent right of self-defense in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

The Parties undertake, in accordance with the provisions of this Article, the following:

- to refrain from the threat or use of force or weapons, conventional, non-conventional or of any other kind, against each other, or of other actions or activities that adversely affect the security of the other Party;
- to refrain from organizing, instigating, inciting, assisting or participating in acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, subversion or violence against the other Party;
- to take necessary and effective measures to ensure that acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, subversion or violence against the other Party do not originate from, and are not committed within, through or over their territory (hereinafter the term “territory” includes the airspace and territorial waters).

Consistent with the era of peace and with the efforts to build regional security and to avoid and prevent aggression and violence, the Parties further agree to refrain from the following:

- joining or in any way assisting, promoting or co-operating with any coalition, organisation or alliance with a military or security character with a third party, the objectives or activities of which include launching aggression or other acts of military hostility against the other Party, in contravention of the provisions of the present Treaty.
- allowing the entry, stationing and operating on their territory, or through it, of military forces, personnel or materiel of a third party, in circumstances which may adversely prejudice the security of the other Party.

Both Parties will take necessary and effective measures, and will co-operate in combating terrorism of all kinds. The Parties undertake:

- to take necessary and effective measures to prevent acts of terrorism, subversion or violence from being carried out from their territory or through it and to take necessary and effective measures to combat such activities and all their perpetrators.
- without prejudice to the basic rights of freedom of expression and association, to take necessary and effective measures to prevent the entry, presence and co-operation in their territory of any group or organisation, and their infrastructure, which threatens the security of the other Party by the use of, or incitement to the use of, violent means.
- to co-operate in preventing and combating cross-boundary infiltrations.

Any question as to the implementation of this Article will be dealt with through a mechanism of consultations which will include a liaison system, verification, supervision, and where necessary, other mechanisms, and higher level consultation.

The details of the mechanism of consultations will be contained in an agreement to be concluded by the Parties within 3 months of the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

The Parties undertake to work as a matter of priority, and as soon as possible in the context of the Multilateral Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security, and jointly, towards the following:

- the creation in the Middle East of a region free from hostile alliances and coalitions;
- the creation of a Middle East free from weapons of mass destruction, both conventional and non-conventional, in the context of a comprehensive, lasting and stable peace, characterized by the renunciation of the use of force, reconciliation and goodwill.
ARTICLE 5

DIPLOMATIC AND OTHER BILATERAL RELATIONS
The Parties agree to establish full diplomatic and consular relations and to exchange resident ambassadors within one month of the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

The Parties agree that the normal relationship between them will further include economic and cultural relations.

ARTICLE 6

WATER
With the view to achieving a comprehensive and lasting settlement of all the water problems between them:

The Parties agree mutually to recognize the rightful allocations of both of them in Jordan River and Yarmouk River waters and Araba/Arava ground water in accordance with the agreed acceptable principles, quantities and quality as set out in Annex II, which shall be fully respected and complied with.

The Parties, recognizing the necessity to find a practical, just and agreed solution to their water problems and with the view that the subject of water can form the basis for the advancement of cooperation between them, jointly undertake to ensure that the management and development of their water resources do not, in any way, harm the water resources of the other Party.

The Parties recognize that their water resources are not sufficient to meet their needs. More water should be supplied for their use through various methods, including projects of regional and international cooperation.

In light of paragraph 3 of this Article, with the understanding that co-operation in water-related subjects would be to the benefit of both Parties, and will help alleviate their water shortages, and that water issues along their entire boundary must be dealt with in their totality, including the possibility of trans-boundary water transfers, the Parties agree to search for ways to alleviate water shortage and to cooperate in the following fields:

- development of existing and new water resources, increasing the water availability including cooperation on a regional basis as appropriate, and minimizing wastage of water resources through the chain of their uses;
- prevention of contamination of water resources;
- mutual assistance in the alleviation of water shortages;
- transfer of information and joint research and development in water-related subjects, and review of the potentials for enhancement of water resources development and use.

The implementation of both Parties’ undertakings under this Article is detailed in Annex II.

ARTICLE 7

ECONOMIC RELATIONS
Viewing economic development and prosperity as pillars of peace, security and harmonious relations between states, peoples and individual human beings, the Parties, taking note of understandings reached between them, affirm their mutual desire to promote economic co-operation between them, as well as within the framework of wider regional economic co-operation.

In order to accomplish this goal, the Parties agree to the following:

- to remove all discriminatory barriers to normal economic relations, to terminate economic boycotts directed at each other, and to co-operate in terminating boycotts against either Party by third parties;
- recognizing that the principle of free and unimpeded flow of goods and services should guide their relations, the Parties will enter into negotiations with a view to concluding agreements on economic co-operation, including trade and the establishment of a free trade area, investment, banking,
industrial cooperation and labour, for the purpose of promoting beneficial economic relations, based on principles to be agreed upon, as well as on human development considerations on a regional basis. These negotiations will be concluded no later than 6 months from the exchange the instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

- to co-operate bilaterally, as well as in multilateral forums, towards the promotion of their respective economies and of their neighborly economic relations with other regional parties.

ARTICLE 8

REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

Recognizing the massive human problems caused to both Parties by the conflict in the Middle East, as well as the contribution made by them towards the alleviation of human suffering, the Parties will seek to further alleviate those problems arising on a bilateral level.

Recognizing that the above human problems caused by the conflict in the Middle East cannot be fully resolved on the bilateral level, the Parties will seek to resolve them in appropriate forums, in accordance with international law, including the following:

- in the case of displaced persons, in a quardripartite committee together with Egypt and the Palestinians:
  1. in the case of refugees,
  2. in the framework of the Multilateral Working Group on Refugees;
- in negotiations, in a framework to be agreed, bilateral or otherwise, in conjunction with and at the same time as the permanent status negotiations pertaining to the territories referred to in Article 3 of this Treaty;
- through the implementation of agreed United Nations programs and other agreed international economic programs concerning refugees and displaced persons, including assistance to their settlement.

ARTICLE 9

PLACES OF HISTORICAL AND RELIGIOUS SIGNIFICANCE

Each party will provide freedom of access to places of religious and historical significance.

In this regard, in accordance with the Washington Declaration, Israel respects the present special role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in Muslim Holy shrines in Jerusalem. When negotiations on the permanent status will take place, Israel will give high priority to the Jordanian historic role in these shrines.

The Parties will act together to promote interfaith relations among the three monotheistic religions, with the aim of working towards religious understanding, moral commitment, freedom of religious worship, and tolerance and peace.

ARTICLE 10

CULTURAL AND SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGES

The Parties, wishing to remove biases developed through periods of conflict, recognize the desirability of cultural and scientific exchanges in all fields, and agree to establish normal cultural relations between them. Thus, they shall, as soon as possible and not later than 9 months from the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty, conclude the negotiations on cultural and scientific agreements.
ARTICLE 11

MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND GOOD NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS
The Parties will seek to foster mutual understanding and tolerance based on shared historic values, and accordingly undertake:

- to abstain from hostile or discriminatory propaganda against each other, and to take all possible legal and administrative measures to prevent the dissemination of such propaganda by any organization or individual present in the territory of either Party;
- as soon as possible, and not later than 3 months from the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty, to repeal all adverse or discriminatory references and expressions of hostility in their respective legislation;
- to refrain in all government publications from any such references or expressions;
- to ensure mutual enjoyment by each other's citizens of due process of law within their respective legal systems and before their courts.

Paragraph 1 (a) of this Article is without prejudice to the right to freedom of expression as contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

A joint committee shall be formed to examine incidents where one Party claims there has been a violation of this Article.

ARTICLE 12

COMBATING CRIME AND DRUGS
The Parties will co-operate in combating crime, with an emphasis on smuggling, and will take all necessary measures to combat and prevent such activities as the production of, as well as the trafficking in illicit drugs, and will bring to trial perpetrators of such acts. In this regard, they take note of the understandings reached between them in the above spheres, in accordance with Annex III and undertake to conclude all relevant agreements not later than 9 months from the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

ARTICLE 13

TRANSPORTATION AND ROADS
Taking note of the progress already made in the area of transportation, the Parties recognize the mutuality of interest in good neighborly relations in the area of transportation and agree to the following means to promote relations between them in this sphere:

Each party will permit the free movement of nationals and vehicles of the other into and within its territory according to the general rules applicable to nationals and vehicles of other states. Neither party will impose discriminatory taxes or restrictions on the free movement of persons and vehicles from its territory to the territory of the other.

The Parties will open and maintain roads and border-crossings between their countries and will consider further road and rail links between them.

The Parties will continue their negotiations concerning mutual transportation agreements in the above and other areas, such as joint projects, traffic safety, transport standards and norms, licensing of vehicles, land passages, shipment of goods and cargo, and meteorology, to be concluded not later than 6 months from the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

The Parties agree to continue their negotiations for a highway to be constructed and maintained between Egypt, Israel and Jordan near Eilat.
ARTICLE 14

FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND ACCESS TO PORTS
Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 3, each Party recognizes the right of the vessels of the other Party to innocent passage through its territorial waters in accordance with the rules of international law.

Each Party will grant normal access to its ports for vessels and cargoes of the other, as well as vessels and cargoes destined for or coming from the other Party. Such access will be granted on the same conditions as generally applicable to vessels and cargoes of other nations.

The Parties consider the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba to be international waterways open to all nations for unimpeded and non-suspendable freedom of navigation and overflight. The Parties will respect each other’s right to navigation and overflight for access to either Party through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba.

ARTICLE 15

CIVIL AVIATION
The Parties recognize as applicable to each other the rights, privileges and obligations provided for by the multilateral aviation agreements to which they are both party, particularly by the 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation (The Chicago Convention) and the 1944 International Air Services Transit Agreement.

Any declaration of national emergency by a Party under Article 89 of the Chicago Convention will not be applied to the other Party on a discriminatory basis.

The Parties take note of the negotiations on the international air corridor to be opened between them in accordance with the Washington Declaration. In addition, the Parties shall, upon ratification of this Treaty, enter into negotiations for the purpose of concluding a Civil Aviation Agreement. All the above negotiations are to be concluded not later than 6 months from the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

ARTICLE 16

POSTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS
The Parties take note of the opening between them, in accordance with the Washington Declaration, of direct telephone and facsimile lines. Postal links, the negotiations on which having been concluded, will be activated upon the signature of this Treaty. The Parties further agree that normal wireless and cable communications and television relay services by cable, radio and satellite, will be established between them, in accordance with all relevant international conventions and regulations. The negotiations on these subjects will be concluded not later than 9 months from the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

ARTICLE 17

TOURISM
The Parties affirm their mutual desire to promote co-operation between them in the field of tourism. In order to accomplish this goal, the Parties – taking note of the understandings reached between them concerning tourism – agree to negotiate, as soon as possible, and to conclude not later than three months from the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty, an agreement to facilitate and encourage mutual tourism and tourism from third countries.
ARTICLE 18

ENVIRONMENT
The Parties will co-operate in matters relating to the environment, a sphere to which they attach great importance, including conservation of nature and prevention of pollution, as set forth in Annex IV. They will negotiate an agreement on the above, to be concluded not later than 6 months from the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

ARTICLE 19

ENERGY
The Parties will co-operate in the development of energy resources, including the development of energy-related projects such as the utilisation of solar energy.

The Parties, having concluded their negotiations on the interconnecting of their electric grids in the Eilat-Aqaba area, will implement the interconnecting upon the signature of this Treaty. The Parties view this step as a part of a wider binational and regional concept. They agree to continue their negotiations as soon as possible to widen the scope of their interconnected grids.

The Parties will conclude the relevant agreements in the field of energy within 6 months from the date of exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

ARTICLE 20

RIFT VALLEY DEVELOPMENT
The Parties attach great importance to the integrated development of the Jordan Rift Valley area, including joint projects in the economic, environmental, energy-related and tourism fields. Taking note of the Terms of Reference developed in the framework of the Trilateral Israel-Jordan-US Economic Committee towards the Jordan Rift Valley Development Master Plan, they will vigorously continue their efforts towards the completion of planning and towards implementation.

ARTICLE 21

HEALTH
The Parties will co-operate in the area of health and shall negotiate with a view to the conclusion of an agreement within 9 months of the exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

ARTICLE 22

AGRICULTURE
The Parties will co-operate in the areas of agriculture, including veterinary services, plant protection, biotechnology and marketing, and shall negotiate with a view to the conclusion of an agreement within 6 months from the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

ARTICLE 23

AQABA AND EILAT
The Parties agree to enter into negotiations, as soon as possible, and not later than one month from the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty, on arrangements that would enable the joint development of the towns of Aqaba and Eilat with regard to such matters, inter alia, as joint tourism development, joint customs, free trade zone, co-operation in aviation, prevention of pollution, maritime
matters, police, customs and health co-operation. The Parties will conclude all relevant agreements within 9 months from the exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty.

ARTICLE 24

CLAIMS
The Parties agree to establish a claims commission for the mutual settlement of all financial claims.

ARTICLE 25

RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS
This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way, the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations.

The Parties undertake to fulfil in good faith their obligations under this Treaty, without regard to action or inaction of any other party and independently of any instrument inconsistent with this Treaty. For the purposes of this paragraph, each Party represents to the other that in its opinion and interpretation there is no inconsistency between their existing treaty obligations and this Treaty.

They further undertake to take all the necessary measures for the application in their relations of the provisions of the multilateral conventions to which they are parties, including the submission of appropriate notification to the Secretary General of the United Nations and other depositories of such conventions.

Both Parties will also take all the necessary steps to abolish all pejorative references to the other Party, in multilateral conventions to which they are parties, to the extent that such references exist.

The Parties undertake not to enter into any obligation in conflict with this Treaty.

Subject to Article 103 of the United Nations Charter, in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Parties under the present Treaty and any of their other obligations, the obligations under this Treaty will be binding and implemented.

ARTICLE 26

LEGISLATION
Within 3 months of the exchange of ratifications of this Treaty the Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary in order to implement the Treaty, and to terminate any international commitments and to repeal any legislation that is inconsistent with the Treaty.

ARTICLE 27

RATIFICATION
This Treaty shall be ratified by both Parties in conformity with their respective national procedures. It shall enter into force on the exchange of instruments of ratification.

The Annexes, Appendices, and other attachments to this Treaty shall be considered integral parts thereof.

ARTICLE 28

INTERIM MEASURES
The Parties will apply, in certain spheres, to be agreed upon, interim measures pending the conclusion of the relevant agreements in accordance with this Treaty, as stipulated in Annex V.
ARTICLE 29

SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Treaty shall be resolved by negotiations.

Any such disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations shall be resolved by conciliation or submitted to arbitration.

ARTICLE 30

REGISTRATION
This Treaty shall be transmitted to the Secretary General of the United Nations for registration in accordance with the provisions of Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Done at the Arava/Araba Crossing Point this day Heshvan 21st, 5775, Jumada Al-Ula 21st, 1415 which corresponds to 26th October, 1994 in the Hebrew, English and Arabic languages, all texts being equally authentic. In case of divergence of interpretation the English text shall prevail.

For the State of Israel: Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister

For the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan: Abdul Salam Majali, Prime Minister

Witnessed by: William J. Clinton, President of the United States of America

ANNEXES
Annex I:
International Boundary
Naharayim/Baqura Area
Zofar Area
Annex II: Water
Annex III: Crime and Drugs
Annex IV: Environment
Annex V: Interim Measures
Agreed Minutes
THE WYE MEMORANDUM:
Text of The Wye Memorandum

The Memorandum was signed before Shabbat on October 23, 1998
in the East Room of the White House.

The following are steps to facilitate implementation of the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip of September 28, 1995, and other related agreements including the Note for the Record of January 17, 1997 (hereinafter referred to as “the prior agreements”), so that the Israeli and Palestinian sides can more effectively carry out their reciprocal responsibilities, including those relating to further redeployments and security, respectively. These steps are to be carried out in a parallel phased approach in accordance with the Memorandum and the attached time line. They are subject to the relevant terms and conditions of the prior agreements and do not supersede their other requirements.

I. FURTHER REDEPLOYMENTS
   A. Phase One and Two Further Redeployments
      1. Pursuant to the Interim Agreement and subsequent agreements, the Israeli side’s implementation of the first and second F.R.D. will consist of the transfer to the Palestinian side of 13 percent from Area C as follows: — 1% to Area (A) — 12% to Area (B).

The Palestinian side has informed that it will allocate an area/areas amounting to 3% from the above area (B) to be designated as the Green Areas and/or Nature Reserves. The Palestinian side has further informed that they will act according to the established scientific standards, and that therefore there will be no changes to the status of these areas, without prejudice to the rights of existing inhabitants in these areas including Beduin, while these standards do not allow new construction in these areas; existing roads and buildings may be maintained.

The Israeli side will retain in these Green Areas/Nature Reserves the overriding security responsibility for the purpose of protecting Israelis and confronting the threat of terrorism.

Activities and movements of the Palestinian Police forces may be carried out after coordination and confirmation; the Israeli side will respond to such requests expeditiously.

2. As part of the foregoing implementation of the first and second F.R.D., 14.2% from Area (B) will become Area (A).

B. Third Phase of Further Redeployments.

With regard to the terms of the Interim Agreement and of Secretary Christopher’s letters to the two sides of January 17, 1997, relating to the further redeployment process, there will be a committee to address this question. The United States will be briefed regularly.
II. SECURITY

In the provisions on security arrangements of the Interim Agreement, the Palestinian side agreed to take all measures necessary in order to prevent acts of terrorism, crime and hostilities directed against the Israeli side, against individuals falling under the Israeli side's authority and against their property, just as the Israeli side agreed to take all measures necessary in order to prevent acts of terrorism, crime and hostilities and against their property. The two sides also agreed to take legal measures within their jurisdiction and to prevent incitement against each other by any organizations, groups or individuals within their jurisdiction.

Both sides recognize that it is in their vital interests to combat terrorism and fight violence in accord with Annex I of the Interim Agreement and the Note for the Record. They also recognize that the struggle against terror and violence must be comprehensive in that it deals with terrorists, the terror support structure and the environment conducive to the support of terror.

It must be continuous and constant over a long-term, in that there can be no pauses in the work against terrorists and their structure. It must be cooperative in that no effort can be fully effective without Israeli-Palestinian cooperation and the continuous exchange of information, concepts and actions.

Pursuant to the prior agreements, the Palestinian side's implementation of its responsibilities for security, security cooperation, and other issues will be as detailed below during the time periods specified in the attached time line.

A. Security Actions

1. Outlawing and Combatting Terrorist Organizations
   a. The Palestinian side will make known its policy for zero tolerance for terror and violence against both sides.
   b. A work plan developed by the Palestinian side will be shared with the US and hereafter implementation will begin immediately to ensure the systematic and effective combat of terrorist organizations and their infrastructure.
   c. In addition to the bilateral Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation, a US-Palestinian committee will meet biweekly to review the steps being taken to eliminate terrorist cells and the support structure that plans, finances, supplies and abets terror.
   In these meetings, the Palestinian side will inform the US fully of the actions it has taken to outlaw all organizations (or wings of organizations, as appropriate) of a military, terrorist or violent character and their support structure and to prevent them from operating in areas under its jurisdiction.
   d. The Palestinian side will apprehend the specific individuals suspected of perpetrating acts of violence and terror for the purpose of further investigation, and prosecution and punishment of all persons involved in acts of violence and terror.
   e. A US-Palestinian committee will meet to review and evaluate information pertinent to the decisions on prosecution, punishment or other legal measures which affect the status of individuals suspected of abetting or perpetrating acts of violence or terror.

2. Prohibiting Illegal Weapons
   a. The Palestinian side will ensure an effective legal framework is in place to criminalize, in conformity with the prior agreements, any importation, manufacturing or unlicensed sale, acquisition or possession of firearms, ammunition or weapons in areas under Palestinian jurisdiction.
   b. In addition, the Palestinian side will establish and vigorously and continuously implement a systematic program for the collection and appropriate handling of all such illegal items in accordance with the prior agreements. The US has agreed to assist in carrying out this program.
c. A US-Palestinian-Israeli committee will be established to assist and enhance cooperation in preventing the smuggling or other unauthorized introduction of weapons or explosive materials into areas under Palestinian jurisdiction.

3. Preventing Incitement
   a. Drawing on relevant international practice and pursuant to Article XXII (1) of the Interim Agreement and Note for the Record, the Palestinian side will issue a decree prohibiting all forms of incitement to violence or terror. This decree will be comparable to the existing Israeli legislation which deals with the same subject.
   b. A US-Palestinian-Israeli committee will meet on a regular basis to monitor cases of possible incitement to violence or terror, and to make recommendations and reports on how to prevent such incitement. The Israeli, Palestinian and US sides will each appoint a media specialist, a law enforcement representative, an educational specialist and a current or former elected official to the committee.

B. Security Cooperation
   The two sides agree that their security cooperation will be based on a spirit of partnership and will include, among other things, the following steps:
   1. Bilateral Cooperation: There will be full bilateral cooperation between the two sides which will be continuous, intensive and comprehensive.
   2. Forensic Cooperation: There will be an exchange of forensic expertise, training and other assistance.
   3. Trilateral Committee: In addition to the bilateral Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation, a high-ranking US-Palestinian-Israeli committee will meet as required and not less than biweekly to assess current threats, deal with any impediments to effective security cooperation and coordination and address the steps being taken to combat terror and terrorist organizations. The committee will also serve as a forum to address the issue of external support for terror. In these meetings, the Palestinian side will fully inform the members of the committee of the results of its investigations concerning terrorist suspects already in custody and the participants will exchange addition relevant information. The committee will report regularly to the leaders of the two sides on the status of cooperation, the results of the meetings and its recommendations.

C. Other Issues
   1. Palestinian Police Force
      a. The Palestinian side will provide a list of its policemen to the Israeli side in conformity with the prior agreements.
      b. Should the Palestinian side request technical assistance, the US has indicated its willingness to help meet these needs in cooperation with other donors.
      c. The Monitoring and Steering Committee will, as part of its functions, monitor the implementation of this provision and brief the US
   2. PLO Charter
      The Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Central Council will reaffirm the letter of 22 January 1998 from PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat to President Clinton concerning the nullification of the Palestinian National Charter provisions that are inconsistent with the letters exchanged between the PLO and the Government of Israel on 9/10 September 1993. PLO Chairman Arafat, the Speaker of the Palestine National Council, and the Speaker of the Palestinian Council will invite the members of the PNC, as well as the members of the Central Council, the Council, and the Palestinian Heads of Ministries to a meeting to be addressed by President Clinton to reaffirm their support for the peace process and the aforementioned decisions of the Executive Committee and the Central Council.
3. Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters
   Among other forms of legal assistance in criminal matters, the requests for arrest and transfer of
   suspects and defendants pursuant to Article II (7) of Annex IV of the Interim Agreement will be
   submitted (or resubmitted) through the mechanism of the Joint Israeli-Palestinian Legal
   Committee and will be responded to in conformity with Article II (7) (f) of Annex IV of the Interim
   Agreement within the twelve week period. Requests submitted after the eighth week will be
   responded to in conformity with Article II (7) (f) within four weeks of their submission. The US has
   been requested by the sides to report on a regular basis on the steps being taken to respond to
   the above requests.

4. Human Rights and the Rule of Law
   Pursuant of Article XI (1) of Annex I of the Interim Agreement, and without derogating from the
   above, the Palestinian Police will exercise powers and responsibilities to implement this
   Memorandum with due regard to internationally accepted norms of human rights and the rule of
   law, and will be guided by the need to protect the public, respect human dignity, and avoid
   harassment.

III. INTERIM COMMITTEES AND ECONOMIC ISSUES

   A. The Israeli and Palestinian sides reaffirm their commitment to enhancing their relationship and agree
      on the need actively to promote economic development in the West Bank and Gaza. In this regard,
      the parties agree to continue or to reactivate all standing committees established by the Interim
      Agreement, including the Monitoring and Steering Committee, the Joint Economic Committee (JEC),
      the Civil Affairs Committee (CAC), the Legal Committee and the Standing Cooperation Committee.

   B. The Israeli and Palestinian sides have agreed on arrangements which will permit the timely opening
      of the Gaza Industrial Estate. They also have concluded a “Protocol Regarding the Establishment and
      Operation of the International Airport in the Gaza Strip During the Interim Period”.

   C. Both sides will renew negotiations on the Safe Passage immediately. As regards the southern route,
      the sides will make best efforts to conclude the agreement within a week of the entry into force of this
      Memorandum. Operation of the southern route will start as soon as possible thereafter. As regards
      the northern route, negotiations will continue with the goal of reaching agreement as soon as
      possible. Implementation will take place expeditiously thereafter.

   D. The Israeli and Palestinian sides acknowledge the great importance of the Port of Gaza for the
      development of the Palestinian economy, and the expansion of Palestinian trade. They commit
      themselves to proceeding without delay to conclude an agreement to allow the construction and
      operation of the port in accordance with the prior agreements. The Israeli-Palestinian Committee will
      reactivate its work immediately with a goal of concluding the protocol within sixty days, which will
      allow commencement of the construction of the port.

   E. The two sides recognize that unresolved legal issues adversely affect the relationship between the
      two peoples. They therefore will accelerate efforts through the Legal Committee to address
      outstanding legal issues and to implement solutions to those issues in the shortest possible period.
      The Palestinian side will provide to the Israeli side copies of all of its laws in effect.

   F. The Israeli and Palestinian sides also will launch a strategic economic dialogue to enhance their
      economic relationship. They will establish within the framework of the JEC an Ad Hoc Committee for
      this purpose. The committee will review the following four issues: (1) Israeli purchase taxes; (2)
      cooperation in combating vehicle theft; (3) dealing with unpaid Palestinian debts; and (4) the impact
      of Israeli standards as barriers to trade and the expansion of A1 and A2 lists.
The committee will submit an interim report within three weeks of entry into force of this Memorandum, and within six weeks will submit its conclusions and recommendations to be implemented.

G. The two sides agree on the importance of continued international donor assistance to facilitate implementation by both sides of agreements reached.
They also recognize the need for enhanced donor support for economic development in the West Bank and Gaza.
They agree to jointly approach the donor community to organize a Ministerial Conference before the end of 1998 to seek pledges of enhanced levels of assistance.
THE SHARM E-SHEIKH MEMORANDUM

on Implementation Timeline of Outstanding Commitments of Agreements Signed and the Resumption of Permanent Status Negotiations

The Government of the State of Israel ("GOI") and the Palestine Liberation Organization ("PLO") commit themselves to full and mutual implementation of the Interim Agreement and all other agreements concluded between them since September 1993 (hereinafter "the prior agreements"), and all outstanding commitments emanating from the prior agreements. Without derogating from the other requirements of the prior agreements, the two Sides have agreed as follows:

1. Permanent Status negotiations:
   a. In the context of the implementation of the prior agreements, the two Sides will resume the Permanent Status negotiations in an accelerated manner and will make a determined effort to achieve their mutual goal of reaching a Permanent Status Agreement based on the agreed agenda i.e. the specific issues reserved for Permanent Status negotiators and other issues of common interest;
   b. The two Sides reaffirm their understanding that the negotiations on the Permanent Status will lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338;
   c. The two Sides will make a determined effort to conclude a Framework Agreement on all Permanent Status issues in five months from the resumption of the Permanent Status negotiations;
   d. The two Sides will conclude a comprehensive agreement on all Permanent Status issues within one year from the resumption of the Permanent Status negotiations;
   e. Permanent Status negotiations will resume after the implementation of the first stage of release of prisoners and the second stage of the First and Second Further Redeployments and not later than September 13, 1999. In the Wye River Memorandum, the United States has expressed its willingness to facilitate these negotiations.

2. Phase One and Phase Two of the Further Redeployments
   The Israeli Side undertakes the following with regard to Phase One and Phase Two of the Further Redeployments:
   a. On September 5, 1999, to transfer 7% from Area C to Area B;
   b. On November 15, 1999, to transfer 2% from Area B to Area A and 3% from Area C to Area B;
   c. On January 20, 2000, to transfer 1% from Area C to Area A, and 5.1% from Area B to Area A.

3. Release of Prisoners
   a. The two Sides shall establish a joint committee that shall follow-up on matters related to release of Palestinian prisoners;
   b. The Government of Israel shall release Palestinian and other prisoners who committed their
offences prior to September 13, 1993, and were arrested prior to May 4, 1994. The Joint Committee shall agree on the names of those who will be released in the first two stages. Those lists shall be recommended to the relevant Authorities through the Monitoring and Steering Committee;

c. The first stage of release of prisoners shall be carried out on September 5, 1999 and shall consist of 200 prisoners. The second stage of release of prisoners shall be carried out on October 8, 1999 and shall consist of 150 prisoners;

d. The joint committee shall recommend further lists of names to be released to the relevant Authorities through the Monitoring and Steering Committee;

e. The Israeli side will aim to release Palestinian prisoners before next Ramadan.

4. Committees
a. The Third Further Redeployment Committee shall commence its activities not later than September 13, 1999;

b. The Monitoring and Steering Committee, all Interim Committees (i.e. CAC, IEC, JSC, legal committee, people to people), as well as Wye River Memorandum committees shall resume and/or continue their activity, as the case may be, not later than September 13, 1999. The Monitoring and Steering Committee will have on its agenda, inter alia, the Year 2000, Donor/PA projects in Area C, and the issue of industrial estates;

c. The Continuing Committee on displaced persons shall resume its activity on October 1, 1999 (Article XXVII, Interim Agreement);

d. Not later than October 30, 1999, the two Sides will implement the recommendations of the Ad-hoc Economic Committee (article III-6, WRM).

5. Safe Passage
a. The operation of the Southern Route of the Safe Passage for the movement of persons, vehicles, and goods will start on October 1, 1999 (Annex I, Article X, Interim Agreement) in accordance with the details of operation, which will be provided for in the Safe Passage Protocol that will be concluded by the two Sides not later than September 30, 1999;

b. The two Sides will agree on the specific location of the crossing point of the Northern Route of the Safe Passage as specified in Annex I, Article X, provision c-4, in the Interim Agreement not later than October 5, 1999;

c. The Safe Passage Protocol applied to the Southern Route of the Safe Passage shall apply to the Northern Route of the Safe Passage with relevant agreed modifications;

d. Upon the agreement on the location of the crossing point of the Northern Route of the Safe Passage, construction of the needed facilities and related procedures shall commence and shall be ongoing. At the same time, temporary facilities will be established for the operation of the Northern Route not later than four months from the agreement on the specific location of the crossing-point;

e. In between the operation of the Southern crossing point of the Safe Passage and the Northern crossing point of the Safe Passage, Israel will facilitate arrangements for the movement between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, using non-Safe Passage routes other than the Southern Route of the Safe Passage;

f. The location of the crossing points shall be without prejudice to the Permanent Status negotiations (Annex I, Article X, provision e, Interim Agreement).

6. Gaza Sea Port
The two Sides have agreed on the following principles to facilitate and enable the construction works of the Gaza Sea Port. The principles shall not prejudice or preempt the outcome of negotiations on the Permanent Status:
a. The Israeli Side agrees that the Palestinian Side shall commence construction works in and related to the Gaza Sea Port on October 1, 1999;

b. The two Sides agree that the Gaza Sea Port will not be operated in any way before reaching a joint Sea Port protocol on all aspects of operating the Port, including security;

c. The Gaza Sea Port is a special case, like the Gaza Airport, being situated in an area under the responsibility of the Palestinian Side and serving as an international passage. Therefore, until the conclusion of a joint Sea Port Protocol, all activities and arrangements relating to the construction of the Port shall be in accordance with the provisions of the Interim Agreement, especially those relating to international passages, as adapted in the Gaza Airport Protocol;

d. The construction shall ensure adequate provision for effective security and customs inspection of people and goods, as well as the establishment of a designated checking area in the Port;

e. In this context, the Israeli Side will facilitate on an on-going basis the works related to the construction of the Gaza Sea Port, including the movement in and out of the Port of vessels, equipment, resources, and material required for the construction of the Port;

f. The two Sides will coordinate such works, including the designs and movement, through a joint mechanism.

7. Hebron Issues

a. The Shuhada Road in Hebron shall be opened for the movement of Palestinian vehicles in two phases. The first phase has been carried out, and the second phase shall be carried out not later than October 30, 1999;

b. The wholesale market-Hasbahe will be opened not later than November 1, 1999, in accordance with arrangements which will be agreed upon by the two Sides;

c. A high level Joint Liaison Committee will convene not later than September 13, 1999 to review the situation in the Tomb of the Patriarchs / Al Haram Al Ibrahim (Annex I, Article VII, Interim Agreement and as per the January 15, 1998 US Minute of Discussion).

8. Security

a. The two Sides will, in accordance with the prior agreements, act to ensure the immediate, efficient and effective handling of any incident involving a threat or act of terrorism, violence or incitement, whether committed by Palestinians or Israelis. To this end, they will cooperate in the exchange of information and coordinate policies and activities. Each side shall immediately and effectively respond to the occurrence or anticipated occurrence of an act of terrorism, violence or incitement and shall take all necessary measures to prevent such an occurrence;

b. Pursuant to the prior agreements, the Palestinian side undertakes to implement its responsibilities for security, security cooperation, on-going obligations and other issues emanating from the prior agreements, including, in particular, the following obligations emanating from the Wye River Memorandum:

i. continuation of the program for the collection of the illegal weapons, including reports;

ii. apprehension of suspects, including reports;

iii. forwarding of the list of Palestinian policemen to the Israeli Side not later than September 13, 1999;

iv. beginning of the review of the list by the Monitoring and Steering Committee not later than October 15, 1999.

9. The two Sides call upon the international donor community to enhance its commitment and financial support to the Palestinian economic development and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

10. Recognizing the necessity to create a positive environment for the negotiations, neither side shall
initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in accordance with the Interim Agreement.

11. Obligations pertaining to dates, which occur on holidays or Saturdays, shall be carried out on the first subsequent working day.

This memorandum will enter into force one week from the date of its signature.

Made and signed in Sharm e-Sheikh, this fourth day of September 1999.¹

For the Government of the State of Israel ........................................

For the PLO .................................................................

Witnessed by

For the Arab Republic of Egypt ...................................................

For the United States of America ..................................................

For the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan ...........................................

¹ It is understood that, for technical reasons, implementation of Article 2-a and the first stage mentioned in Article 3-c will be carried out within a week from the signing of this Memorandum.
ENDNOTES

“Palestine Will Rise Upon the Ruins of the State of Israel”: Yitzhak Rabin


4. Eretz-Israel, in this context, refers to the territory between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea.

5. In an interview with Dow Goldstein, Ma’ariv, March 18, 1977.

6. The remarks were published in an interview with Hagai Eshed, Davar, June 27, 1975.


11. Binyamin Netanyahu in his speech to the Knesset marking the agreement with Jordan, October 26, 1994.


19. The Hadith is a collection of traditions, opinions, sayings, and deeds attributed to the Prophet Muhammad and his companions, compiled and published in the ninth century.


26. As characterized by Bernard Lewis in his article “Yishmael’s War with the Jews”, Nativ, March 1989.


30. See the 1997 Middle East Military Balance, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies.


32. History Department of the IDF, Arab and Islamic Terror, Jerusalem, 1995. The statistics are for the second half of 1995, courtesy of the IDF spokesman.
According to the “accepted” definition, Jerusalem is divided into 2 sections, the “Eastern” (for the Arabs) and the “Western” (for the Jews). However, this definition is misleading. There is only one Jerusalem, The Eternal Capital of Israel, the Cradle of the Jewish People and the raison d’être of Judaism, which is commonly called “the Old City”. This is the site of the Temple Mount, Zion and the City of David. All the rest of what is referred to as Jerusalem, constructed since the 19th century, are, in fact, suburbs of Jerusalem. In their request for sovereignty in Jerusalem, the Arabs are trying to cut off the Jewish state from its historical heart.

Both Clinton’s statement and the UN resolution in Geneva had full support on the media level. An article in the New York Times on July 16, 1999, discussing the President’s statement, remarked: “The President’s comment aroused a wave of criticism in Israel, in which hundreds of thousands of Palestinians scattered throughout the Middle East seek territory now occupied by Israel.”

In his speech before the 22nd Zionist Congress in Basle, 1946.


See Shai Feldman, Nuclear Deterrence in Israel (Hebrew), Tel Aviv, 1984.

For other examples of American betrayal of allies in need, see Irving Moskowitz, “The Built-In Failures of American Guarantees of Israel’s Safety”, Nativ, November 1993.


See the 1997 Middle East Military Balance, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies.

A different basis for figuring the sum of reparations, also approximately $100 billion, involves calculations made regarding the Golan Heights. The sum required for evacuating thirteen thousand inhabitants of the Golan was estimated at $10 billion; see Prof. Nuri Klayot, “Golan Heights — The Cost of Evacuation”, Haifa University, Summer 1996.

Egypt is an example of this. Despite its huge area and unlimited water supply from the Nile, Egypt imports 60% of its food.

Ma’ariv, November 21, 1999.

For details, see Yad Tabenkin Research Center, “Economic Study of the Arabs of Judea, Samaria and Gaza for 1987”. It should be noted that the above is a Laborist research center and therefore Left-oriented.


See publications of the War against Terrorism Section of British Intelligence, as appearing in the Wall Street Journal, December 2, 1993.

When Interior Minister Natan Sharansky raised the issue in a Cabinet meeting on November 10, 1999, he was quickly chased by his colleagues. See the stir it created in the Israeli mass media at that time.

Peres’ book, The New Middle East, with its recommendations in the economic realm, was translated into Arabic in Egypt. On the book’s back cover, the publishing house explains that the book was printed as a service to the Egyptian reader in order to present before him the Jewish plot to control the Arab economy, and to prove the validity of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion.


Signed by Ezra Sohar, Yosef Ben-Shlomo, Arieh Stav, and Eliav Shochetman.

In his speech to the Republican Party Convention, October 1962.

A Disaster Foretold: The Strategic Dangers of a Palestinian State

All emphasis in the text is that of the author.

In the Oslo I agreement it states “Mutual recognition of the political rights only” without the word “legitimate”.

Oslo II Agreement, Article IV.

Article V (4c).

Article XVIII.

Article IX (2).

Article IX (5a).

Article IX (5b).

Article IX (c).

Article I (7) and Article XVII (2), etc.
Article XVII (2a).
Appendix III, Article 40 (1).
Article XVII (1a).
Preamble, Article III (3), etc.
Article VI to the Protocol of Elections.
Under Ottoman rule in Palestine, especially during the nineteenth century, residents of Western and European extraction were permitted to retain citizenship of their various countries of origin, enabling them to remain under the protection of their national consul, rather than under the rule of Ottoman Empire. In fact, the decaying Ottoman rule and law did not apply to them at all.
Article V to the Protocol of Elections.
Article IX (1b) to the Protocol of Redeployment and Security Arrangements.
Appendix III, The Civil Protocol, Article XV.
Article XIII (13) to the Protocol of Deployment.
The Civil Protocol, Article XIV (2).
Appendix III, Article XXXVI (b).
Appendix III, Article II (10).
The Protocol, Article VIII (1d).
Appendix III, Article VII (2b).
Appendix III, Article X (9).
Appendix III, Article XXIX (2) and Article 36.
Appendix III, Article XXXVI (5).
The Economic Protocol, Article IV (10b).
And Arafat is well aware of this as he declared to his audience:
It is forbidden to descend from the mountain top until we pass on our flag to our children who are the new generals, who carried the intifada on their shoulders for seven years and defeated the most powerful army in the region, with your struggle, your jihad we will together build this state.
Farouk Kadoumi’s statement is indicative (from August 8, 1994, that is one year after Oslo I). “It is impossible that we will concede even one grain of our land. We know that there is a state which will be established by the force of history which must eventually arrive. They stole our land. The refugees must return to their land.”
Arafat’s interview to A-Dastur, September 19, 1995, and the addition in the Jerusalem Post from November 18, 1994 where Arafat said among other things: “And only a Palestinian state can continue the struggle to remove the enemy from all Palestinian lands.”
Hudaibiya Pact — In the year 629 Muhammad attempted to conquer Mecca together with his Bedouins. On the way, most of the Bedouins abandoned him, and realizing that he did not have the manpower to subjugate the Quraysh tribe of Mecca, he entered into a ten year non-belligerence pact with them, known as the Hudaibiya Pact. Ten months later, after Muhammad had managed to rally sufficient forces, he violated the pact, attacking and conquering Mecca. Muhammad’s behavior has since become a model for how to treat the enemies of Islam when found in a position of weakness. Agreements are to be breached when expedient.
See the statement of the former head of military intelligence, General Bogi Ya’alon, in the Knesset Committee of Foreign and Security Affairs, Ma’ariv, November 15, 1995 and Arafat’s statement at Harvard: “I would be lying if I told you that I will abrogate it. No one can do that.”
Arafat’s lack of intention to sustain true peace was reiterated (in September 1995) when he said: “Be blessed Gaza, your sons are returning, Jaffa, Lod, Haifa, Jerusalem — you are returning.”, Ma’ariv, September 7, 1995. These statements and those concerning the jihad do not indicate that his intention is true peace with Israel or that he intends to honor agreements with it. As Arafat explicitly said on the “Voice of Palestine”, November 11, 1995: “The battle will not end until all of Palestine is liberated.”
In Article XXVIII (11) of Appendix III of the Oslo II agreement it states: “In order to reflect the spirit of the peace process, the Palestinian side is permitted, with the prior approval of Israel, to grant permanent resident status in Judea, Samaria and Gaza to the spouses and children of Palestinian residents and to other people on humanitarian grounds in order to facilitate and improve the reunification of families.” Later — in Article XXVIII (13) it continued: “The Palestinian side is permitted to issue, after Israeli approval, visitation visas for purposes of study and work for a period of one year, which can be extended with Israeli agreement.”
The area of Judea, Samaria and Gaza is 5,850 square kilometers (approx. 2340 square miles). If we assume that the Rabin-Peres government strove to maintain at least some territory in Israeli possession, the Palestinians will be left with only 4,000-5,000 square kilometers (approx. 1,600-2,000 square miles), and this is for 4 million people (about two million today plus the "returnees").


MK Darawshe to A-Dastur June 30, 1995: "Do not refer to us as Israeli Arabs. They tried to obscure our Palestinian identity. Since 1948 we have been guarding the purity of our identity as Arabs and Palestinians. It should be noted that the motto of 'Land Day' in 1995 was - 'return the displaced persons of 1948 to their villages.'" Ma'ariv, February 1, 1995.

Peace is not made with enemies but rather with former enemies.

When Rabin pressured Arafat on the issue of the excessive number of police officers beyond the agreed-upon limit, Arafat excused the phenomenon by claiming: "so that they will have something to eat". Yediot Aharonot, February 5, 1995.

Ma'ariv, August 19, 1994.

And Israel also was not pressuring Arafat on this issue, in order, among other reasons, not to weaken the position of the "new partner". Ma'ariv, July 4, 1995.

Yediot Aharonot, October 8, 1995.

After all, 2,000 years of exile are not a light matter and exile-like genes must still be running in our veins. We were evidencing it in the last Gulf War and ever since, in all Saddam's confrontations with the US. In the Palestinian context this has been reflected in constant fear from Palestinian violence, terrorist bombings and even threats. Instead of taking on the challenge and confronting the Palestinians, the Israelis are prepared to pay "protection money" in order to gain some temporary, pitiful peace.

Rabin addressed this issue in order to justify his policy when he said: "Once Israel had staying power, but today — no longer." He just overlooked that the national strength emanated from our sense of purpose and the belief of the justice of our cause. A society is strong when it adheres to a just cause, but when the justness of the cause erodes — it weakens considerably.

"The map in Peres' head is one of overhauling the order of priorities from the military to the economy with all of the ramifications inherent in that change." From an interview with Uri Savir in Ma'ariv, November 17, 1995. He adds there: "In this era of missiles and nuclear arms, the concept of national security must be redefined", and his intentions in downgrading it are clear. Peres' own statement that "ten hotels on the Kinneret supercede ten army outposts there" — speaks for itself.

See for example A. Levran, "The Arabs Are Not to be Trusted", Ha'aretz supplement, February 18, 1994, in response to an article by Professor Y. Harkabi.

Yediot Aharonot, October 8, 1995.

Arafat and his "Legal Committee" can be clever and "revoke" one or two paragraphs of the covenant, in which Israel is mentioned, and leave the rest (altogether 33), which negate Zionism and exhort strongly to continue "the armed struggle for the liberation of Palestine" intact. In any case, any similarity between what will be amended, if anything will be amended, and the genuine abrogation of the covenant is extremely slight.

Ma'ariv, January 24, 1995.

Ma'ariv, April 11, 1995.

Ma'ariv, December 31, 1995.

As of late, then Foreign Minister Sharon reported to the Knesset as well as in an official meeting with the PA and the US (at the Erez installation) that the PA has even accumulated anti-aircraft guns, anti-tank launchers, hand grenades, mines, mortars and explosive, and has even started to manufacture weapons! All these are strictly forbidden.

In Yediot Aharonot, March 6, 1991 (right after the Gulf war) Yossi Sarid wrote, for example, that "If after the Palestinian state is established it will dare to endanger Israel, it will be conquered by us within 24 hours and will remain Judea and Samaria forever". Not to mention that during the Gulf War he published an article in Ha'aretz entitled: "Let Them Look for Me", expressing his deep disappointment with the behavior of the Palestinians who were openly rejoicing at the landing of Scud missiles in Israel.

Arafat's Independent Palestine: Defense/Military Impact on Israel

"Palestine" not Palestine, because this will be the third Palestinian State, Israel and Jordan being the first two — a matter of geography. PLO in Palestine — may hint at the whole area of the British Mandate of Palestine, Arafat's objective.
See:


A term coined by Haim Assa, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's National Security Adviser. It means a "stable state of instability", with negotiations interlaced with terror or maybe even war, without a discernible way out.


Yasser Arafat, speech at the tenth anniversary of Abu Jihad's slaying. Official Palestine Authority newspaper Al Hayat Al Jadeeda, April 16, 1998 — four and a half years after Rabin's above-mentioned speech.

Yasser Arafat to Egyptian "Orbit" TV, April 18, 1998. Year 628 — Muhammad, relieved by the non-belligerence pact signed with powerful Jewish tribes at Hudaiybiya (near Mecca), attacks and subdues another powerful Jewish tribe at Khaiyar, 140 km. from Mecca. With the threat eliminated at Khaiyar, strengthened, he reneges on his non-belligerence pact, surprises and slaughters the Jewish tribes that signed the Treaty of Hudaiybiya. He thus establishes the principle that lies and/or cynical disregard of signed agreements are a legitimate act, if committed for the "Glory of the Islam". The slogan is "The Land belongs to Allah and his Emissary" — The Dhimmi, Jews and Christians under Islam by Bat Yer (pseudonym). English edition, Cranbury, 1985. Abbreviations made from Hebrew edition, Kaveh, Jerusalem, 1986, pp. 41-42. Saladin adopted the same principle in his war with the Crusaders. (By coincidence, so did Hitler at Munich in 1938-9, throughout the Ribentrop-Molotov pact.)

Note that in a previous speech, in South Africa, Arafat was more specific, mentioning the Jewish tribes of Hudaiybiya when referring to his "respect for agreements" with the Jews.

Arafat's candid expression of policy is commendable. Israeli, US and the whole world's reading of Arafat is not.

Published by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem, September 1993.

Contrary to the accepted notion that Resolution 242 calls for an Israeli withdrawal from all territories won in the defensive Six Day War of June 1967, knowledgeable people have different views. For example:


The notable omissions in regard to withdrawal are the words "the" or "all" and "the June 5, 1967 lines..." the resolution speaks of withdrawal from occupied territories without defining the extent of withdrawal.

Lord Caradon, (An Author of UN Resolution 242), UK Ambassador to the UN (1964-1970); "MacNeil/Lehrer Report" — March 30, 1978:

We didn't say there should be a withdrawal to the 1967 lines, we did not put the "the" in, we did not say all the territories, deliberately. We all know that the boundaries of 67 were not drawn as permanent frontiers, they were a cease-fire line of a couple of decades earlier...We did not say that the '67 boundaries must be forever.


Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338...rest on two principles. Israel may administer the territory until its Arab neighbors [plural!...YTC] make peace and when peace is made, Israel withdraw, to "secure and recognized borders", which need not be the same as the Armistice Demarcation Lines of 1949" —


We are not the ones to say where other nations should draw lines between them that will assure each the greatest security. It is clear, however, that a return to the situation of June 4, 1967 will not bring peace.

The other organizations are: 'Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine', headed by George Habash, the "Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine" (Naef Hawatme), the 'Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command' (Ahmed Iubril), the "Sa'iqa" (Al Quadi), the "Palestine Liberation Front" (Abd El Rahim Ahmed), the "Popular Struggle Front" (Ghousha), the "Palestine Liberation Front" (Muhammad Abbas) and "Palestine Communist Party" (Bashir Barghuti).

The detailed list of names, dates and locations are available (in Hebrew).

Netanyahu's overall margin was less than 1 percent. However, the writer's yardstick is the Jewish vote, the fate of the Jews being played. The Israeli Arabs, as a political body, favor Arafat who, they feel, bolsters their own standing. (See the writer's article "The Dreams of the Israeli Arabs", Jerusalem Post, November 16, 1994). Far from adopting a racist attitude, the writer believes that both, the Jews and the Arabs of Israel, had their own legitimate reasons for voting the way they did.

Like the undertaking not to propose/impose any US solutions; like respecting the Christopher letter's undertakings
parallel to the Hebron agreement, like openly encouraging Israeli opposition parties to "soften" the Israeli government, i.e. meddling in Israeli internal politics, like threatening "not with punishment but with repercussions", like making its "non-existent" positions known worldwide, encouraging the European Union in its "not so pro-US" mercantilistic pro-Arab stand and, most important, like totally and cynically disregarding the territorial **existential imperatives** of Israel, **clearly outlined** (and promptly classified by State) **by its own Pentagon missions**. A gamble with the life and death of a people a mere 50 years after the Holocaust? It is difficult, in these circumstances, to shrug off the May 8, 1998 New York Post editorial reporting that Hillary Clinton gave $15,000 to the PLO in the early 1980's, while it was still branded by the US as a rogue terrorist organization. It looks like maintaining the "peacenik" anti-Vietnam War posture in a situation where "Vietnam is but 10 miles from Washington, DC" and the "Viet Cong", better armed, well oiled, outnumber the "US" at a ratio of 50 to 1. When the 1967 US reneging on its guarantees of Sinai demilitarization and Red Sea freedom of Israeli shipping, which brought the Six Day War, is added to the above, Israelis will have to accept the fact that US Administration guarantees are not necessarily reliable and that the US is a great friend with diverse interests, hence it cannot be relied upon to constitute a building block of a permanent Israeli-Arab peace, which is only too logical. An Israel alone is a far more intransigent Israel.

13 Turning the refugees into pawns of Arabia's political designs — a typical Middle Eastern example of brotherly concern. Contrary to the perpetuation by the Arabs, of the Palestinian Arabs' refugee status, Israel absorbed and resettled a larger number of Jewish refugees from Arab countries, who fled their homes empty handed due to the same war circumstances created by the same war imposed upon Israel. This has been, in fact, an exchange of populations — nothing new as a product of wars — except that those who lost the war refused to bear the consequences, dumping their brethren for over 50 years in atrocious refugee camp conditions.

14 Nor any other state in the whole world, with the exception of Britain (Jordan's creator) and Pakistan (Britain's creation).

15 Turning the Western Palestinian Arab refugees into pawns of Arabia's political designs — "comfortably" fed by the UN (i.e. the world) — to weigh heavily on the world's conscience.


18 In spite of the 1949 Rhodes Armistice Agreements, the Arabian formally expressed Aim of War is still the total eradication of the "Zionist invaders" and the "full recovery of Palestine"]](). Even Egypt, which signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979, assumes an indiscriminate anti-Israel stand in international forums and unleashes an anti-Jewish and anti-Israeli internal campaign which is not unlike the German delegitimation and smear campaign of the 1930s and early 1940s. It all amounts to a "warming up", a rear guard diplomatic action aimed at projecting Egypt's threat, in tune with its rearrangement. A typical peace of "no war" at its worst.


21 In Rabin's own words: "A Palestinian state will be a time bomb that will drag the Arab World to war. Those who get disoriented and support Palestinian self-determination are actively supporting terror, the PLO, and are a security risk to Israel". Ma'ariv, February 10, 1989.

22 It seems that Begin had in mind the conferring of Israeli citizenship upon the Arabs of Judea, Gaza and Samaria. The "technicalities" have, however, been left out of the Israel-Egypt peace treaty.

23 The overwhelming vast majority consisting of the major Israeli political parties: Likud, Labor, Zionist Religious, Ultra-Religious etc., the notable exception being the Arab parties, the Communist party and Meretz (Aloni, Sarid, et al.) on the left and Moledet on the right.

24 'Entity' from this point on will be replaced by State, unless otherwise specified.

25 Already surpassed. There are some 30-40,000 "policemen" and a similar number of irregular militia. Arms are smuggled in.

26 Published, by strange coincidence, just before the elections in Israel and the Labor take-over with a parliamentary majority totally depending upon the extra-governmental support of the Israeli Arab parties.

The phone numbers have since been changed.

Not entirely factual. Dorot and Nir-Am were there from the time of the British Mandate.

Mr. Hall's statements are perfectly in tune with everything that has been stated in or said by competent PLO quarters, only not to be listened to by non-Arab parties, including the US and Israel.

After refusing to accept the UN partition plan of November 1947 (which the Jews accepted) and launching the Middle East into 50 years of painful wars, terror and other costly confrontations ever since. Imagine Germany of 1998 returning to its 1939 borders as if there were no World War II in between. Note that the price in lives and property paid by the Jews of Israel during the 50 years of war has been relatively higher than anybody's during World War II.

Following the PLO interpretation of international law, victors in wars of aggression that have been waged against them have no rights to assets or compensation by the aggressor and the aggressor's acts carry no liability, no responsibility for the war they started. In view of historical realities, this interpretation is far-fetched. According to it, the US should ask the Russians, Poles, etc. to return the spoils to Germany, the US to return the spoils to Mexico and have the Middle East itself returned to Turkey. A quick look at Map 1 helps.

According to Professor Amnon Soffer, “Geography and National Defense”, in Quality and Quantity in Military Buildup, Zvi Ofer and Maj. Avi Kober, (eds.), Tel Aviv: Maarachot, Ministry of Defense, 1985, pp. 323, one of the comparative measurements among borders of various states is the area per kilometer of border. (Another is the number of inhabitants per km. of frontier.) Here are some examples of area per km. of frontier in a number of states, exclusive of coastlines:

- Egypt: 282 sq. km. per km. frontier.
- Chile: 168 sq. km. (Chile's length 4,200 km. (1), average width 180 km.);
- Iraq: 126 sq. km.
- Syria: 90 sq. km.
- Nepal: 71 sq. km. (elongated shape);
- Czech Rep.: 36. sq. km. (elongated shape);
- Lebanon: 23 sq. km.
- Israel: 22 sq. km. (pre-June 1967 lines);


In his 1978 book, Mr. Peres uses the Hebrew spelling for Palestinians like that of the British Mandate, a derivative of Philistines פליסטים). En vogue, in keeping with the trend of the ‘new Palestinian Nation’, Mr. Peres has now changed his Hebrew spelling פליסטים for “Palestinians”, according to that of the PLO.

In spite of Arafat’s “caduc” of 1988. Incidentally, “Caduc or Cadoue”, is translated in English by the prestigious Larousse as: Declining (age), ruinous, dilapidated (building), insecure, precarious, transitory (wealth), shattered, frail (health), null and void (contract), unclaimed barred by limitation (debt) obsolete, lapsed (insurance), statute barred (testament), ‘mal caduc’ — epilepsy (medicine). Speaking English, the “world renowned French linguist” Arafat, chose this particular word to describe exactly what he meant. Why? Your guess.


Israeli veterans cannot but be reminded of the 20 year nefarious exploitation of democratic freedoms by the German Sudetendeutsche of Czechoslovakia from 1918-1938. Will democracy ever learn?

Obviously, when a man fought on foot, space requirements were smaller. They grew when he mounted the horse and, again, grew enormously when he got motorized, airborne and used stand off weaponry.

Substituting the air or space borne intelligence sources for high ground is a suitable topic for a separate position paper. The rough assessment is that about 60 percent of the high ground intelligence job may be done by exorbitantly expensive, ephemeral in nature (like computers), remote systems. The remaining 40 percent and anti-aircraft missile sites, indispensable in war must remain on high ground.

Practically all vision, sensing enhancing systems, be they binoculars, infrared, radar, TV magnifying, VHF or UHF communications, laser designating, etc. can see or sense only as far as the horizon, requiring a line of sight. The higher the observer is located, the further he can see, the more remote his horizon. A rough, “rule of thumb”, approximation of the range to the horizon (which changes slightly with electromagnetic frequencies beyond VHF) is: \( R = 1.2h \), where \( R \) is the horizon (or perception) range in nautical miles and \( h \) is the combined (observer and target) hilltop(s) and/or antenna or aircraft height above ground, measured in feet.
Take the most probable scenario of a (pan-)Arab aggression, opening with a few days of ballistic missiles launching at urban concentrations and large military targets like airfields, resulting in a mobilization slowdown and disorganization and some reduction of Air Force capacity. Add “Palestinian” guerrilla and terror activities harassing of reserve units, their organization and deployment, as well as front bound logistics.

Consider that the classic Israeli defense doctrine calls for the standing army (totally inferior to attacking forces) to hold its positions, counting heavily on Air Force cover, fire support, supplies and medevac, for some 48 — 72 hours, until the mobilized reservists arrive and join the battle. Under the new, above-mentioned conditions, the reservists may take twice as much time to arrive. Logistics will be slow in coming and a major part of the air-worthy Air Force will be diverted to antiballistic missiles strikes or retaliation. Without a favorable terrain factor, i.e. topography that provides the above mentioned force multipliers, the standing forces’ capability to blunt the first onslaught is questionable which, in Israel’s zero-tactical-depth reality, may spell collapse.

Without the cover of efficient anti-aircraft ground to air missiles batteries sited on high ground, the (be it temporary) isolated standing forces will find themselves in an impossible situation.

During a discussion between Dr. Martin Sherman and the political officer of the Tel Aviv US Embassy in 1990, Sherman asked the officer whether, in the hypothetical scenario of a Syrian or Iraqi take-over of Jordan, the Israeli armed forces will have a legitimate reason to occupy a State of Palestine, were it to emerge, in order to consolidate the lines on the short, hardly passable Jordan River. Thinking, the officer said: “Well, of course there is no choice.” “Well”, said Sherman, “look at the situation you want to create, where if a fourth state occupies a third state, we are allowed to take a second state in order to defend ourselves.” Typically Middle Eastern conditions.

Of carrying the war over the Israeli border, in enemy territory.

This is not meant to be pejorative but, rather, to state a fact derived from Islamic culture, namely the sanctification of the fallen in war.


A Worst Case Scenario

1 The following discussion will be primarily restricted to the conventional dimension, relying on Israel’s traditional policy of ignoring nuclear potential in planning its military power (for example, Shai Feldman, Ha’aretz, September 20, 1998.)

2 I was exposed to an extreme version of this assumption during a public debate in “Tzavta” in Tel Aviv with Dr. Ron Pundak, Shimon Peres’ representative in the Oslo negotiations, who made the following claim: “Considering Israel’s massive strength, the distinction between a single Palestinian fighter armed with a rifle, two kilometers from Tel-Aviv, in the center of Israel, and five hundred or fifty thousand of them, is entirely insignificant.”

3 Tomorrow is Now, 1978, Chapter 8. It is widely held that in the late 1980s, Peres changed his view of the existential dangers latent in the Palestinian forces; however, perusal of his writings shows that he maintained his previous assessment even subsequent to the Oslo agreements. “The situation [will be] strategically fraught with catastrophe: the [country’s] narrow “waist” will be susceptible to collapse by a well-organized surprise attack. Israeli opposition to the establishment of a Palestinian state stems directly from this concern. Even if the Palestinians agree to demobilize their state from both army and weapons, who can guarantee Israel that after a certain amount of time an army will not be formed, despite the agreement, which will camp at the gates of Jerusalem and the approaches of the coastal plain, and pose a substantive threat to Israel’s security?” A New Middle East, 1993, pp. 145-146 (in Hebrew).

4 See: Yisrael Tal, National Security, pp. 183 and 156 respectively (in Hebrew).

5 Kamal Hassan Ali, who served as the Egyptian Defense Minister and as Sadat’s emissary to the negotiations with Israel, explained that the primary benefit of the Egyptian-Israeli peace is that it leads to a Palestinian state with international borders which are “intolerable” as far as Israel’s security needs are concerned: “The meaning of peace for Israelthe existence of a Palestinian state on Israel’s border, is something which causes one to shudder, regardless of any guarantees which Israel will receive.” See his book, Warriors and Peacemakers, pp. 70-71, translated into Hebrew by A. Robinson, 1986.

6 To Israel’s good fortune, the War of Independence was waged in two separate stages: Until May 15, 1948, only against local Arab militias; from May 15 on, against five Arab armies which received negligible assistance from the remaining local forces.


8 There is no lack of historical examples of the strategic significance, latent at times, in the infiltration of light forces to the enemy’s rear. One such was the penetration of lightly armed Viet Cong guerrillas into South Vietnam’s rear which played a significant role in undermining the staying power of both South Vietnam and the United States.
As the Agronat Commission of Inquiry commented at the time, had the Israeli security establishment been accustomed to dealing with the enemies' maximum capabilities purely, that is, separate from an "assessment of intentions" based on intelligence, we would not have come close to Defense Minister Dayan's anxious declaration, "There goes the Third Temple."

The reference is to a scenario of "get in — go shoot", while at the same time the preparations for the infusion of supplies, advancing helicopters, calling up soldiers on leave, mobilizing the reserves, deploying surface-to-surface missiles and the air force will be completed, or, alternatively, opening fire after a brief preparation of an hour or two, that is, a timetable which will not allow the information to reach the decision makers in the Israeli security establishment in a timely fashion enabling its analysis.

See, on this matter, Zichronot. Maarachot, Tel Aviv, 1960 (Hebrew), the fascinating book by Abdallah al-Tal, who served as commander of the Jordanian Legion forces in Jerusalem during the War of Independence, who accused the Legion's high command of systematically disapproving of every significant offensive initiative against Israel.

In his book, A State With Its Back to the Sea (Chapter 3), Yigal Allon warned against the severe danger concealed in the possibility of a lightning war which began with the quick introduction of light, diffuse ground forces to the Israeli rear (including the possibility of landing commandos from the sea), whose goal would be to cause chaos and disrupt Israel's internal transportation system. For a similar, more up-to-date analysis, see the relevant chapters in Netanyahu's book, A Place Among the Nations, 1994. Ariel Sharon's response to this point was that a much more limited operation would be enough.

See, for example, Ha'aretz, October 11, 1997.

It is relevant to point out that even though we know of no local Arabs' training in 1948, their light forces placed us in a difficult situation in March 1948, before the invasion of the regular Arab armies.

Logic dictates that in implementing a surface-to-surface conventional missile attack, it would not be aimed to block the flow of reservists on the traffic arteries but rather to delay their reporting for duty due to the need to bring their families to a safe place and/or to shelter. For a detailed analysis, see Yoash Shidlon-Chatto's articles, "Israel 2000 — How Will It Fare if Shrunk to its Pre-Six Day War Borders?", in Israel at the Crossroads, Ariel Center for Policy Research Publishers, 1997.


Although we limited ourselves in this article to the conventional issue, it is appropriate to remark that one of the most enticing missions will be overrunning or attacking those locales from which Israel's strategic ability is controlled.

ibid., p. 375.

Since most kibbutz members still work close to the kibbutzim and are relatively familiar with their nearby surroundings, and since the unique structure which still exemplifies the kibbutz society enables the assembly of the majority of them in the time of need, it is possible to establish regional units in a manner which will allow them to see action within an hour or less, assuming that their arms are properly in the settlement under the supervision of a responsible officer. The "cost" to the IDF is minimal: the reserve alignment, infantry and armored, will set aside 3,000 soldiers and approximately 100 officers ranging in age from 21 to 40 (100 kibbutzim x 30 soldiers per squad) for these purposes.

These trained soldiers will be required to devote a few days annually to weapons training in an IDF facility and be annually called up for 5-7 days of patrol and instruction in their region, for the purposes of learning the area and familiarizing themselves with the unit framework.

"Israel must, therefore, concentrate on developing its offensive capabilities while passing passive defense over to a well-armed regional defense system which will be reinforced by soldiers past the age of service," Yigal Allon, in the pamphlet "First Think Then Act." (My emphasis — Y.S.)

In addition to these two primary responses, it is appropriate to consider a series of auxiliary steps, for example: c. significant increase in the arming of citizens who are reserve combat soldiers, d. furthering the existing trend of distributing manpower to reserve brigades on a regional basis, e. constructing land obstacles between Israel and the Palestinians, and f. turning the Israeli police into a light fighting force.


In a 1998 interview in Yediot Aharonot, General Yisrael Tal admitted that he was mistaken in that instead of recommending to the Israeli government that the territories handed over to the Palestinians be totally demilitarized, he agreed that the police force be armed with machine guns.

This point more or less corresponds with the sober line of thought suggested by my mentor, Prof. Yeshayahu Leibowitz, of blessed memory, in the early 1980s: "Based on the political reality today, we can assume that there is no chance for Israeli-Arab peace in the foreseeable future, and not because of the territories. Therefore, we have no choice but to withdraw from those territories which have a dense Arab population which we cannot transform into Jewish territories and

26 Thanks to the following individuals, with whom I participated in a weekly discussion group, for their comments on the earlier and more detailed version of this article: Mr. Haim Asa, former Security Advisor to the late Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin; Mr. Motti Ashkenazi; Prof. Yoav Gelbar; Dr. Eli Zemora; Prof. Arnon Soffer; Dr. Maoz Azaryahu; Col. (Res.) Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto; Dr. Dan Shifman; and Dr. Martin Sherman. I would also like to thank those whose comments were helpful to me: Gen. (Res.) Amram Mitniz; M.K. Dr. Uzi Landau; (then) Chairman of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee; and the members of the committee plenum before whom a detailed version of this article was presented; M.K. Gideon Ezra, former Deputy Head of the GSS; M.K. Maj. Gen. (Res.) Ariel Sharon, former Minister of Defense and senior officers on active duty.

Palestinian Expectancy in the Image of Zionism


2 See also Aharon Ben-Ami, “Israel and the Fertile Crescent”, Nativ, September 1995.

The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict in International Law

1 On the special conditions of European history, in comparison to the history of the Middle East and the Far East, see Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (Vintage Books, 1989), Ch. 1.

2 See Bernard Lewis, Islam and the West (Oxford University Press, 1993).

3 Ibid.

4 See the discussion on “The Doctrine of Just War” in Yoram Dinstein, Dinei Milhamah [Laws of War] (Schocken, 1983), pp. 43-46 (Hebrew) (hereinafter Laws of War). Jihad is in a certain sense a kind of just war in that it confers justification on war only insofar as it is aimed at imposing Islam on the whole world, but not in other cases. War may thus become unjust, and even illegal, only when the whole world lives under Islam. Hence, so long as this aspiration has not been fulfilled, “jihad... may be stated as a doctrine of a permanent state of war”, in the words of the Arab Orientalist Majid Khadduri in War and Peace in the Law of Islam, cited in Arieh Stav, Hashalom: Karikatura Aravit [Peace: An Arabian Caricature] (Zmora-Bitan, 1996), p. 67 (Hebrew).

5 Precisely on its central point, the distinction between aggression and self-defense, the Charter remains vague and obscure, so that it difficult to make practical use of it. The first attempt to define what constitutes aggression on the international plane was made in 1933, in a series of treaties between the Soviet Union and its neighbors that are named after the Soviet foreign minister Litvinoff. See Dinstein’s discussion of this subject in Laws of War, pp. 81-82, and also in the book by Natan Feinberg, Eretz Yisrael Bitkufat Hamandat v’Medinat Yisrael: Ba’ayot Bamishpat Habenleumi [The Land of Israel in the Mandate Period and the State of Israel: Problems in International Law] (Magness, 1963) pp. 270-282 (Hebrew) (hereinafter Problems in International Law).

6 Feinberg, Problems in International Law, pp. 242-245, 265. The Israeli approach was based not only on the situation that was created by the armistice agreements but also on the legal situation, which derived from the revolutionary nature of the UN Charter. If in the past, wars constituted the normative status, in the light of the Charter, peace constitutes the normative status. Peace is a permanent situation, from time to time violated by hostile activities, then resuming with their termination. Thus in modern international law there is no longer a place for the traditional term “intermediate condition”, of nonpeace and nonwar. From a sociological standpoint, an intermediate condition is possible, but not from a legal standpoint. See Feinberg, Problems in International Law, pp. 230-269.

7 Ibid., pp. 240-242.

8 Harold Fisch, Tzionut shel Tzion [Zionism of Zion; its original English version was The Zionist Revolution] (Zmora Bitan, 1982), p. 131 (Hebrew) (hereinafter Zionism of Quality).

9 Cited by Arieh Stav in “Haradicalism Hayehudi” [“Jewish Radicalism”], Nativ, 2/2000, p. 73.

10 See Fisch, Zionism of Quality, p. 142.


12 See Dinstein, Laws of War, p. 35.

13 The principle of “The sinner must not be rewarded” is indeed time-honored, but only with the criminalization of war did it
become the most important principle of modern international law, which does much to close the gap between it and domestic law. For a discussion of the implications of this principle, see Dinstein, *Laws of War*, pp. 58-65. See also his books, *Amanot Benleumiot [International Treaties]* (Schocken, 1974), p. 61 (Hebrew) (hereinafter *International Treaties*), and *Hamishpat Habenleumi Vhamedina [International Law and the State]* (Schocken, 1971), pp. 122-123 (Hebrew) (hereinafter *International Law and the State*). Before the Law of Treaties came into force, the notion that an aggressor may not benefit from his aggression could be found in a series of international documents and treaties, beginning with the letters sent by the US government to China and Japan in January 1932, which became the Stimson Doctrine, named after the US Secretary of State. See *International Law and the State*, pp. 126-127.


The question discussed in Israel as to whether, in its resolutions since the Oslo agreements, the PLO indeed intended to cancel the Palestinian Covenant was secondary to the question of these agreements' validity in light of Article 52 of the Law of Treaties. For a discussion of the question of the cancellation of the Covenant, see Eliav Schochetman, *Nativ*, 3/94 (Hebrew).

On the political nature of UN resolutions, see Yehuda Tzvi Blum, "Tzion Bamishpat Habenleumi Nifdata", ['Zion Has Been Redeemed in International Law', hereinafter 'Zion Has Been Redeemed'], *Hapraklit, [The Attorney]*, vol. 27 (1971), p. 315. On p. 317 he notes:

One should recall that considerations of international law are not the decisive considerations that guide the Assembly and the Security Council in their decision-making; these are two organs on which the UN Charter has conferred the status of political organs, as distinct from the International Court, which is the main judicial organ of the UN.

On the advisory, noncompulsory nature of 242, see Dinstein, 'Middle East', p. 477.


In the past, international law recognized two main forms of acquisition of territory by force. The main form was by means of peace treaties, in whose framework the defeated state transferred territories to the victorious state. The second form was by means of a unilateral step by the victorious state, at a time when the government of the defeated state was collapsing so that this state had actually ceased to exist. Acquisition of territory by means of a peace treaty was defined as "cession", and acquisition of territory by means of a unilateral act was defined as "annexation". However, with the criminalization of the use of force, these two traditional forms no longer have any validity. See Dinstein, *International Law and the State*, pp. 122-128.

For a discussion of territorial rights in the era of the UN Charter, see Dinstein, *Nonstate International Law*, pp. 148-149.


See Yoram Dinstein, "Tzion Bamishpat Habenleumi Tefadeh" ['Zion Will Be Redeemed in International Law'] *Hapraklit*, vol. 27 (1971), p. 5.

Op cit., Blum, 'Zion Has Been Redeemed', pp. 318-322.

It has indeed been argued in the legal literature that peace treaties that result from a defensive war are not invalid insofar as they are the result of a legal use of force. According to this conception, peace treaties are invalid only if they provide advantages to the aggressor state. However, if they provide advantages to the state that was the victim of aggression, they are not invalid and may be legitimate, and may even serve as a legitimate means for the transfer of territories from one party to the other. This is, for example, Dinstein’s stance in *International Law and the State*, p. 123, and also in *Laws of War*, pp. 40-41. This stance may be correct from a logical standpoint, but it is immaterial from a practical standpoint. True, there is no legal obstacle to the victim's adding the right of sovereignty to his right of possession by means of an agreement, but practically speaking this does not make sense since, in political actuality, no aggressor will willingly relinquish a territory that was taken from him. To make the transfer of sovereignty conditional on the aggressor's willingness is to give the aggressor the right of refusal, which contradicts the principle that the sinner may not benefit from his sin. The main flaw in this conception is that it does not take account of the revolution that the UN Charter has brought about in international law, which made the right to peace absolute and unconditional. Any attempt to set preconditions on the right to peace derogates from this basic right, with no legal justification, in that it gives the other side the right of refusal of peace. In practice, any right of refusal becomes a bargaining chip for the other side, as may be demonstrated from the behavior of the Arab states, especially since the Six Day War. The Arab formulation of 'territories for peace' shows that the provision of the right of refusal of peace to any side, and especially the aggressor, will likely lead to the imposition of an agreement, even if it is ostensibly voluntary on the victim. From this one may conclude that today it is impossible to settle a sharp border dispute by means of an agreement, but only by means of transferring the
controversy to the litigation of international justice. In the absence, however, of an obligation to resort to such litigation, it is doubtful that there is any way to compel the victim of aggression to participate in it, since only he stands to lose from it. The moment Israel’s absolute and unconditional right to peace is recognized, it has no further political motivation for litigation on the issue of the territories taken in the Six Day War. Note that with the signing of the peace treaty with Jordan, the debate as well ended at least with respect to Israel’s eastern border, as the international Israeli-Jordanian border was determined in accordance with the Mandate’s definition of the international border, as stated in Article 3(1) of the treaty. The treaty with Jordan indeed states, in Article 3(2), that the fixing of this border is done ‘without prejudice to the status of any territories that came under Israeli military government control in 1967’; yet it is doubtful that there was any need for this article in light of the fact, as explained above, that peace agreements are no longer a means for the transfer of territories. Note also that the legal controversy between Prof. Dinstein and Prof. Blum turned on the question of how sovereignty could be applied to eastern Jerusalem, and one may not simply extrapolate from it to the application of Israeli sovereignty to the Golan, which is not included in the Mandatory Land of Israel. From the standpoint of international law, Israel’s status in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza rests on two foundations: prior sovereignty on the basis of the Land of Israel Mandate, as well as the acquisition of a right through a defensive war, whereas the claim of sovereignty over the Golan rests on but one foundation: the acquisition of a right through a defensive war.

24 Op cit., Feinberg, Problems of International Law, pp. 3-10.
25 Especially interesting is the fact that at the time the Land of Israel Mandate was awarded to Britain for the benefit of the Jewish people, its national identity was not at all a matter of controversy. The United States saw Zionism as the paragon of national movements, having begun as far back as the Jews’ expulsion by Rome. Britain stated not only that Zionism is the most ancient national movement in history, but that it had indeed originated in the exodus from Egypt. See Feinberg, Problems of International Law, p. 18.
26 Ibid., pp. 69-72.
27 Ibid., pp. 118-124.
28 Article 80(1) of the UN Charter stipulates the continuity of the international obligations that the League of Nations took upon itself, and states, among other things, that “nothing in this Chapter shall be construed in or of itself to alter in any manner the rights whatsoever of any states or any peoples.” This article is intended, among other things, to ensure the continuity of the Jewish people’s international rights in the Mandatory Land of Israel, as set forth in the Mandate. Thus the article expressly uses the term ‘people’ and not just state.
30 On the legal situation that was obtained in Judea and Samaria in the period 1949-1967, see Blum, Zion Has Been Redeemed, pp. 318-320. To be fair, one should note that the situation in the Gaza Strip is different; an attempt was even made there to establish an independent state, along the lines of ‘Gaza first’. This attempt, however, was quickly aborted because of the sharp opposition of Jordan and Egypt. However, the aspiration to independence in the Gaza Strip is at least partially explainable by the fact that it was not annexed by Egypt and its citizens were not granted Egyptian citizenship; instead, Egypt held Gaza as a tool in the struggle against Israel, and most of the terrorist actions in this period were staged from there.
32 Op cit., Stone, “Jordan is Palestine.”
33 Cited in Fisch, Zionism of Quality, p. 145.
34 See Paul Johnson, The History of the Modern World from 1919 to the 1990s (Dvir, 1993), Ch. 1. It is worth noting that none of the European powers such as Britain or France, whose basis was national, were nation-states but rather multinational empires. True, in terms of their regimes, Britain and France were substantially different from the traditional monarchical empires, (such as the Hapsburgs or the Caesars), and also from the non-European monarchical empires (such as the Ottomans in the Middle East or the Ching Dynasty) — but in one regard they were identical to these: in being multinational empires rather than nation-states in the modern sense of the concept. That is why Britain and France were not the initiators of modern international law but rather the United States, under the government of Woodrow Wilson (Johnson, Ch. 1). Here it is instructive that Wilson’s policy did not stem from idealism alone but also from the competition that was then beginning with the Soviet Union, which was newly established and championed the liberation of all peoples as part of its struggle against the Western powers (Johnson, Ch. 1).
Religious, Cultural, and Rhetorical Aspects in Palestinian Strategy
6 The mass murder of the Jews at Khaybar is well known. The connection between the agreement with the Medine at Hudaybiya and the subsequent massacre of the Jews at Khaybar is analyzed in Michael Lecker, *The Banu Sulaym: A Contribution to the Study of Early Islam*, Jerusalem: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1989, ch. 6, esp. p. 126.
8 There is an explicit use of the term al-Yahud al-Arab, which denies the idea of integral and distinct Jewish peoplehood, in Kamil Mansour from an article in *Majallat al-Dirassat al-Filistinyyah*, (Arabic), 14, Spring 1993, p. 40.

29 Israeli journalist Nadav Shragai surveyed PA television broadcasting concerning Israel in an article in *Ha'aretz* (Hebrew), Tel-Aviv, September 3, 1998.


33 Al-Husseini interview in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, no. 72, Summer 1989, p. 12.


35 Cited in the *Middle East Digest*, March 7, 1996.

36 Habash interview in the *Journal of Palestine Studies*, XXVIII, 1, Autumn 1998, p. 100.


Educating Palestinian Children in the Post-Oslo Era

1 See the important treatise by Haim Gerber, "Palestine and Other Territorial Concepts in the 17th Century", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 30, 1998, pp. 563-572, where the author discusses the term Palestine as a socio-cultural concept.

2 *National Palestinian Education for 5th Grade*, #550, p. 19.

3 *Islamic Culture for Eighth Grade*, #576, p. 50.

4 *Palestinian National Education for Third Grade*, #529, p. 12.

5 A report on PA Television of May 19, 1998, of a conference where these themes were discussed.

6 *Palestinian National Education for Second Grade*, #519, p. 21.

7 *Modern Arab History and Contemporary Problems, Part II, for Tenth Grade*, #613, p. 66.

8 E.g. *Social and National Education for Fifth Grade*, #549, pp. 81, 84, 88, 89, 103, 107, 109, 110, 120, 124.

9 *Our Arabic Language for Fifth Grade*, # 542, p. 64.

10 *National Palestinian Education for First Grade*, # 509, p. 11.

11 *Geography of the Arab Homeland for Sixth Grade*, #557, pp. 12, 20, 23, 36, 48, 50, 53, 55, 61, 66, 72, 73, 75, 80, 81, 88, 90, 115, 124.

12 *Geography of Arab Lands for Twelfth Grade*, #650, pp. 49, 55.

13 *Composition and Summarizing for Eighth Grade*, #581, pp. 13, 20.

14 *Modern Arab History and Contemporary Problems Part II, for Tenth Grade*, #613, pp. 70, 91, 95.

15 *Geography of the Arab Lands for Twelfth Grade*, #650, p. 186.


17 Ibid.

18 Outstanding Examples of our Civilization for 11th Grade.

19 *Islamic Education for Ninth Grade*, p. 79.

20 *Islamic Education for Eighth Grade*, p. 95.

21 *The New History of the Arabs and the World*, p. 123


23 *The New History of the Arabs and the World*, p. 120

24 Mīrāj is the ascension of the Prophet to Heaven from the Temple Mount in Jerusalem.

25 The *nom de guerre* of Arafat, borrowed from an illustrious general in early Islam.

26 PA Television, January 1, 1995.

27 See *Ishad*, The *New Encyclopaedia of Islam*.


Israel and the Jews in the Schoolbooks of the Palestinian Authority

References


**The Hydro-Political Implications of the Oslo Agreements: An Israeli Perspective**


6. The term ‘aquifer’ refers to a subterranean water-bearing geological stratum in which supplies of ground water collect and are stored (derived from the Latin *aqua* — water and *ferre* — to bear).


9. In this regard the potential supply from the Sea of Galilee has been especially volatile, fluctuating over a period of a few years from critically low levels necessitating the cessation of pumping, to levels necessitating the opening of the flood gates to prevent the inundation of the lake’s shores, allowing the excess waters to flow south to the Dead Sea.


11. See the special report on the Israeli water system issued by the State Comptroller in December 1990, which stresses the perilous state of the sources and the minimal reserves available above the respective “red lines”, “State Comptroller Report”, pp. 7-9, 22-23; see also pp. 30-31. See also “The Statistical Abstract of Israel — 1995”, Jerusalem: Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics. The annual potential of the coastal aquifer is estimated at 240-280 mill. c³/m, the Yarkon-Taninim 300-340 mill. c³/m. (See Z. Grinwald, *Water in Israel 1962-1989*, Tel Aviv: Water Allocation Dept. Israel Water Commission, 1989, pp. 25 & p. 27 and M. Kantor, “Water in Israel: A View Towards the Beginning of 2000”, Research Paper No. 9504, The Center for Agricultural Economic Research, Rehovot, 1995, p. 4). The remainder is supplied from the Kinneret via the National Water Carrier. Although the average capacity of the Carrier is 350-420 mill. c³/m, this is very volatile. In dry years, the Kinneret receives only 100-200 mill c³/m, forcing extraction to be reduced accordingly. For example, in the four year period between 1990-1993, the average amount of water that passed through the National Carrier was about 260 mill c³/m, reaching a low of 117 mill c³/m in 1991. A. Sofer, *Rivers of Fire: The Conflict of Water in the Middle East*, Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1993, p. 135, (Hebrew); N. Kliot, *Water Resources and Conflict in the Middle East*, New York: Routledge, 1994, p. 237 and “The Statistical Abstract of Israel — 1995”, op cit.

12. Municipal consumption in the 1990s has been in the 450-550 mill. c³/m range, and has increased by 30% over the last decade and by nearly 19% over the last three years. Industrial consumption is 100-135 mill. c³/m. “The Statistical Abstract of Israel — 1996”, Jerusalem: Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics.


15. For example, the oft-maligned cotton growing industry, frequently cited by Israel’s critics as a glaring instance of her imprudent and wasteful use of water resources, uses virtually no drinking quality water for irrigation. Recycled water is utilized for almost 90% of the area under cultivation, which itself has been reduced dramatically from a peak of over 620,000 dunams at the beginning of the last decade, to just over 160,000 dunams in 1994. “The Statistical Abstract of Israel — 1995”, op. cit.

16. Kantor, pp. 4-5.


Estimated to be 1,300-1,600 mill. cfm — excluding recycled sewerage. Kliot, op cit., pp. 234-235. For a more pessimistic forecast, see Kantor, op cit., p. 4.

Arlosoroff, op cit., p. 240.


Kliot, op cit., p. 237.

“State Comptroller’s Report”, p. 28.


See ARTICLE XI (1) and (2) of the 1995 Interim Agreement (Oslo II) ; also ARTICLE IV of the September 1993 “Declaration of Principles” (DOP of Oslo I).


The term “karstic” refers to a geological structure made up of porous limestone (rock composed of calcium carbonate) and/or dolomite (a rock composed of calcium-magnesium carbonate), characterized by deep fissures and sinkholes, irregular surface features and underground caverns and subterranean water flows.

Anderson, op cit., p. 8.

M. Hagai, Water Management in Israel: Views on National Planning, Tel Aviv University, 1989. (Hebrew).


ANNEX 3, ARTICLE IV, APPENDIX 1, Article 40(3).

Ha'aretz, December 21, 1995.

Ma'ariv, January 7, 1996.

Yediot Aharonot, December 1, 1996.

For example, such as Israel Television morning news, December 4, 1996.

ANNEX 3, ARTICLE IV, APPENDIX 1, Article 40(11-15).


Kliot, op cit., pp. 246 & 254.

Quoted in Hillel, op cit., p. 207.

For a more detailed discussion of how such inconsistencies and contradictions are likely to impede reaching and maintaining a viable agreement, see M. Sherman, The Politics of Water in the Middle East, London: Macmillan, 1999, Ch. 7.


Emphasis added.


Y. Schwartz and A. Zohar, Water in the Middle East: Solutions to Water Problems in the Context of Arrangements between Israel and the Arabs, Tel Aviv: Iaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1991 (Hebrew.)


For a more detailed discussion of the hazards likely to confront the Israeli water system pursuant to an IDF (Israel Defense Forces) withdrawal from the Golan, see M. Sherman, The Politics of Water in the Middle East, op cit., Ch. 5.

In this regard it should be noted that the minimalist TAHAL proposal also leaves open the question of how, or indeed if, the hydrologically vital territory to be retained by Israel could be adequately secured militarily. Thus, although this is admittedly an aspect that exceeds the bounds of the specific water-related issues, it clearly leaves open the weighty question of how, indeed if, the durability of the arrangement could be ensured.


Schwartz and Zohar, op cit.

The report specifies that territories (a) north of the Jenin-Zebabda-Bardale line, (b) west of the Mei Ami-Dir Sharaf lensaphot-Beit Likiya-Sorif-Adana line, and (c) in an area of approximately 10-20 km. around Jerusalem reaching Bedu-Muhmas-Ayn Fara-Abu Dis-Herodian-Beit Fajt-Gilo, should remain under Israeli control. Schwartz and Zohar, op cit., p. 122.


Jerusalem Post, September 1, 1995.

ANNEX 3, ARTICLE IV, APPENDIX I, Article 40(1).

Yediot Aharonot, September 18, 1995.

H. Shuval, op cit., pp. 228-229.

The 1975 Algiers Agreement and the subsequent Treaty of Baghdad on International Boundaries and Good Neighborliness between Iran and Iraq, abrogated by Saddam Hussein barely five years after their signature, or the Syrians’ disregard of the Tall Agreement in Lebanon, to name but some of the more blatant instances. Mutual recriminations on infringement of the Oslo Agreement by both parties as well as Jordanian complaints as to Israel’s failure to honor her promise to provide the quantities of water stipulated in the agreement between the two countries hardly constitute heartening developments.

Iraqi’s 1990 invasion of her erstwhile benefactor, Kuwait, vividly illustrates the point.

Military coups over the last four decades in Egypt, Iraq, Yemen, Libya. Islamic revolution in Iran, Islamic rebellion in Algeria and Egypt, together with many unsuccessful attempts in other countries such as Jordan and Syria, serve to illustrate the point.


Yediot Aharonot, August 10, 1994.


Hillel, op cit., p. 246.

Kliot, op cit., p. 133.


S. Kantor, personal communication, December 18, 1997.

Soffer, op cit., p. 221.

There are two major methods of desalination. The first one is by distillation of the salt water, the other is by a process known as reverse osmosis in which the salt water is forced through membranes to “strain out” the salt. The membranes thus separate the salt water into a fresh component, which passes through them, and a highly concentrated brine which collects at the outer face of the membranes.

Jerusalem Post, September 1, 1995.

Hillel, op cit., p. 252.

Soffer, op cit., p. 221. Soffer does however point out that other types of water installations and power plants are also vulnerable to similar damage.

Hillel, op cit., p. 255.

Hillel, op cit.
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3 For a more comprehensive account of the anti-Semitic legislation, and the damage, in life and property inflicted upon the Jews in Arab countries, see Maurice M. Roumani, The Case of the Jews From Arab Countries: A Neglected Issue, World Organization of Jews from Arab Countries (WOIAC), Tel-Aviv, Israel, 1983, p. 29-36.
6 Prime Minister’s Office, Background Papers: The Refugee issue. [more details required]
9 Middle Eastern Studies, January 1986.
10 See also: New York Times, April 23, 1948 and March 4, 1949; The Times, May 3, 1948; The Economist, October 2, 1948; Monsignor George Hakim, a Greek Orthodox Catholic Bishop of Galilee in the Beirut newspaper, Sada al-Janub, August 16, 1948; the Near East Broadcasting Station (Cyprus), April 3, 1949; Habib Issa in the New York Lebanese paper, Al Hoda, June 8, 1951; Ad Difa’a, September 6, 1954; Filastin, February 19, 1949.
13 Ibid., p. 150.
14 Shlomo Gazit, The Palestinian Refugee Problem, Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1995 (Hebrew) p. 11.

Cited by Steinboim, ibid., p. 36.


Approximation.

El Salvador — 5,839,079; Guatemala — 12,335,580; Nicaragua — 4,717,132.


Palestinian Bureau of Statistics.

Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics.


Cited by Lapidoth, p. 111.

Ibid., p. 115.

Ibid., p. 115.


**Why Demilitarization is not the Remedy: Israel, Palestine and International Law**

1 In an interview with Independent Media Review & Analysis (IMRA) on May 28, 1997, Jerusalem Pateh leader Ahmad Oriea (Abu Ala), Speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), expressed the following: “The last date in the Interim Agreement is May 4, 1999, and both sides agree that the interim period should not exceed that. Since one cannot exceed that day, everything should be finalized by then. Otherwise nothing is to stop us from declaring a Palestinian state. I am confident that the international community will recognize us and support us.” See: Aaron Lerner, “We Will Declare State after Interim Period”, IMRA, May 28, 1997; imra@netvision.net.il. On November 14, 1998, Yasser Arafat again called for a unilateral declaration of statehood for “Palestine.” Addressing a rally in Nablus, Arafat said: “We will declare our independent state on May 4, 1999, with Jerusalem as its capital, yes Jerusalem, the eternal capital of our state, whether they like it or not. Now we are on our land and we are regaining this Holy Land inch by inch until we set up our state in 1999.” The Oslo 2 Agreement states: “Neither side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the permanent status negotiations.” This article prohibits unilateral measures that would alter the legal status of the areas, such as declaration of statehood.


4 See Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, supra, at 20. See also Klingenhofer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 739 F. Supp. 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). Here, in seeking favorable classification for litigation, the PLO requested the court to accept its self-description as a state. Id. at 857. More precisely, the PLO characterized itself as “the nationhood and sovereignty of the Palestinian people...” Id. The court, however, found the PLO to be an “unincorporated association.” Id. at 858. It determined that the PLO lacked the key elements of statehood as articulated by long-settled norms of international law.


See Vienna Convention, supra, at art. 53. Even a treaty is subordinate to peremptory expectations: "A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law." (ibid.)

This right extends to both the customary right of anticipatory self-defense and to the codified right of post-attack self-defense. Regarding the right of anticipatory self-defense, states do not always have to wait until after an attack has been absorbed before embarking upon self-defense. Rather, where the threat is sufficiently imminent in point of time, they can choose to strike first, providing, of course, that the strike is within the parameters of discrimination, proportionality and military necessity. Regarding the codified right of post-attack self-defense, see: Charter of the United Nations. Done at San Francisco, June 26, 1945. Entered into force, October 24, 1945; for the United States, October 24, 1945. 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, 1976 Y.B.U.N. 1043; at art. 51.


See supra, p. 115.

The Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 and relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I) contains detailed provisions on demilitarized zones.

Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice describes international custom as ‘evidence of a general practice accepted as law’. Statute of the International Court of Justice, July 26, 1945, art. 38(1)(b), 59 Stat. 1055, 1060. Norms of customary international law bind all states regardless of whether or not a state has ratified pertinent codifying instruments or conventions. International law compartmentalizes apparently identical rights and obligations arising both out of customary law and of treaty law.

Even if two norms belonging to two sources of international law appear identical in content, and even if the states in question are bound by these rules both on the level of treaty-law and that of customary international law, these norms retain a separate existence.

Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. US), 1986, I.C.J. 14, 95 (June 27).


Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, international law forms part of the law of the United States. (US Constitution, art. VI). This incorporation is reaffirmed and broadened by various US Supreme Court decisions. See: the Paquete Habana, 175 US 677, 700 (1900). See also: Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 1726 F. 2d, 774, 781, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1984).


The documentation of PLO violations of the Oslo Accords is now extensive and exhaustive. An especially egregious violation concerns persistent PLO/PA refusal to comply with Israeli Government requests for transfer of terror suspects (many of whom are now serving in the Palestinian Security Forces). The interim Agreement (Oslo II) states that Israel may request from the Palestinian Authority (PA) the transfer (“extradition”) of any individual located in the autonomous areas who is suspected of an offense that falls under Israeli criminal jurisdiction (Annex IV, Art. 2, Par. 7b). The PA is obligated to comply with all formal requests and to arrest and transfer the suspect to Israel (Annex IV, Art. 2., par. 7(f)). On March 31, 1997, Israel submitted a total of 31 formal requests to the PA for the transfer of terror suspects, including eleven new requests and twenty requests that had been submitted previously. The PA did not respond to a single Israeli request, except for two cases in December 1994, when the PA explicitly rejected Israel’s requests. See: Communication by the Israel Government Press Office, May 13, 1997; in imra@netvision.net.il. For more informed and authoritative inventories of PLO/PA violations, see: “Incitement to Violence Against Israel by Palestinian Officials”, Israeli Foreign Ministry, reprinted in The Maccabean, Vol. 5, No. 5, pp. 27-29; “Palestinian Violations of the ‘Interim Agreement’”, The Maccabean, Vol. 4, No. 12, pp. 12-15; and Dan Nimrod, “Arafat’s Non-Compliance with the Oslo Accords”, The Maccabean, Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 25-32.

A related demilitarization issue concerns the disposition of the Golan. Israel could decide to return the strategically important heights on condition of Syrian demilitarization. Here the legal meaning of “demilitarization” would be more
traditional than in its use regarding concessions by a still non-existent state (Palestine), but the consequences of a Golan demilitarization could be no less injurious to Israel.


19 Regarding the one-sided acceptance of a “Two-State Solution”, the Palestinian Minister of Justice, Freh Abu Medejn, in a May 1997 televised statement, spoke in support of killing Israeli Arabs who sell land to Jews. What this reveals, prima facie, is that the PLO/PA openly considers Israel as part of “Palestine”.

Here it is relevant to note that the Palestinian National Covenant was adopted in 1964, three years before the Six Day War. Hence, the PLO’s guiding document was first published, with all of its references to the annihilation of Israel, three years before Israel even came into possession of the so-called “occupied territories”. This means that the Israel the PLO seeks to destroy was and still remains “Green Line Israel”.

The PLO is obligated under Oslo to cancel the articles in its Covenant calling for the annihilation of Israel. Yet, at its meeting on April 24, 1996, the only resolutions passed were about “amending the National Covenant by canceling the articles that contradict the exchange of letters between the PLO and the Israeli Government on 9 and 10 September 1993.” What the resolutions accomplished is as follows: “The Palestinian National Council charges the legal committee with redrafting the National Covenant and bringing the new text to the central council at its first meeting.” No redrafting has ever taken place, and no text delivered to the central council. See: Yehoshua Porat, “The Covenant Was Not Canceled”, Ma‘arat, May 7, 1997, B7. Moreover, what the PLO Covenant says in words the official PLO map of “Palestine” says in symbols. This map — which includes the area of the entire State of Israel — is not only an explicit rejection of Oslo expectations, but also an implicit incitement to genocide. According to the map and description taken from the Welcome to Palestine Home Page on the World Wide Web: “Palestine, currently under occupation, is located on the East coast of the Mediterranean Sea, West of Jordan and to the South of Lebanon.” <http://www.palestine-net.com/geography/gifs/palmap.gif>.

22 Poem read on the Voice of Palestine, official radio station of the Palestinian Authority, on May 22, 1997, during the morning news program “A New Day”. It was read as part of a series of “Songs of the Homeland”. The same poem was read on the Voice of Palestine during the September 1996 riots, in which 85 Israelis and Palestinian Arabs were killed.


24 PA Minister for Jerusalem Affairs Faisal Husseini, in a newspaper interview (Al-Ittihad) on May 18, 1997.

25 Imad Mazen Izz al-Din, the PA’s Political Instructor for National Guidance (Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda, April 30, 1997).

26 PA Planning Minister Nabil Sha‘ath, at a forum in Khan Yusif (Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda, April 30, 1997).


28 Yusuf Abu Sneineh, preacher at the Al-Aqsa Mosque, Friday prayer sermon; Voice of Palestine, May 23, 1997.

29 From the statement issued by the PA cabinet in Nablus on May 16, 1997 (Voice of Palestine, May 17, 1997). All of the above quotations are also cited by a May 29, 1997 communication from the Israel Government Press Office, “Senior Palestinian Officials Continue to Incite Against Israel in Violation of Oslo”. <imra@netvision.net.il>.


31 See Lewis, supra, pp. 218-219.

32 Ibid.

33 See Lewis, supra, pp. 231-232.

34 See: Yoram Ettinger, “The PLO-Hamas Connection”, The Jewish Political Chronicle, March/April 1996, p. 17. See also October 14, 1998 interview with Farouq Qadomi, Head of the PLO’s Political Bureau (and frequently mentioned possible successor to Arafat) in the PA daily, Al-Hayat. Here, Qadomi commented on Hamas/PLO relations, saying that the Hamas Movement was a part of the Palestinian National Movement, and that its differences with the PLO were of a “tactical rather than a strategic nature”. See: MEMRI, The Middle East Media and Research Institute, “Special Dispatch”, October 16, 1998, No. 8., Washington, DC.

35 Ikhād, or holy war, is discussed authoritatively by Robert S. Wistrich, Anti-Semitism: The Longest Hatred (New York: Pantheon Books, 1991), especially Chapter 16 ("Conspiracies and Holy Wars"). For fundamentalist Muslims, says Wistrich, “...peace with Israel was and still remains nothing less than a poison threatening the life-blood of Islam, a symptom of its profound malaise, weakness and decadence.” (p. 227) According to Islamic orthodoxy, the Prophet is said to have predicted a final war to annihilate the Jews. (See: D.F. Green, ed., ‘Arab Theologians on Jews and Israel: Extracts from the Proceedings of the Fourth Conference of the Academy of Islamic Research’, Geneva. 1976, p 9; cited in Wistrich, Anti-Semitism, p. 230) Muhammad, it is reported, had stated: “The hour (i.e., salvation) will not come until you fight against
the Jews; and the stone would say, `O Muslim! There is a Jew behind me: come and kill him.” (Green, p. 51; Wistrich, p. 230)


Ibid., p. 287.
Ibid., p. 288.


See: <www.fateh.org>.

**A Palestinian State in American Policy**


2. A map ordered by President Johnson from the American general staff and delivered to him by General Wheeler at the end of June 1967.

3. On November 8, 1995 (a few days after Rabin’s assassination), Congress attempted to legislate a Law for a United Jerusalem under Israeli Rule. The Israeli government, in cooperation with the President, torpedoed the law. On June 10, 1997, the law was passed — marking the 30th anniversary of the liberation of Jerusalem — establishing that united Jerusalem is the eternal capital of the Jewish nation and that by the end of May, 1999, the American embassy in Israel must be transferred to Jerusalem (the Jerusalem Embassy Act — Public Law 45-1040).


9. Ibid. p. 152.


18. Ibid.


27. Ibid. May 7, 1998.


32. Ibid. pp. 141-147.
One example of many is the Arrow Project. The cost of this project to the United States as of March 1999 is about 400 million dollars. The cost of the THAAD Project is currently $2 billion dollars. From a purely technological standpoint, the Arrow is an impressive success. The THAAD is a complete failure (see Ballistic Missiles — The Threat and the Response, Arieh Stav editor, Yedioth Aharonot Press, 1998, Foreword, p. 25).


The Labor Party included in its platform on April 25, 1996 a plank calling for a Palestinian state, New York Times, April 26, 1996.

Ha’aretz, June 18, 1993.


Ha’aretz, October 30, 1998.

The EU View of a Palestinian State


In May 1996, Stan Goodenough drew the author’s attention to a report in the Norwegian Daily, Dagen of May 4, 1996, exposing a 25 year-old commitment by leading figures in Norway’s then ruling Labor Party to support and facilitate the demise of a sovereign Jewish Israeli, and to establish in its place a secular, liberal Palestinian state. The report is based on revelations contained in Slık Jeg Ser Det (As I See It) a book by Haakon Lie, a former secretary-general of Norway’s Labor Party and reveals a history of grievous intent that has affected Norway’s Labor Party and its Foreign Ministers where Israel is concerned.


Susanna Agnelli, Italy’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, “Dall’italia all’europana” (“From Italy to Europe”), La Repubblica, October 29, 1995. Italics are the present author’s. Italy was holding the EC Presidency at the time of the Venice Declaration and maintained attitudes different to those of the USA over the Tehran hostages and the Achille Lauro. See Ghassan Salame, “Torn Between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean Europe and the Middle East in the Post-Cold War Era” in B. A. Roberson (Ed.), The Middle East and Europe — The Power Deficit, 1998, p. 35.

The recent European Union statement at the Amsterdam summit referred to the right of self-determination for the Palestinians, without excluding that of statehood.” Speech by Derek Fatchett, Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to the British Society for Middle East Studies, Oxford, July 8, 1997.


Many of these points are made in the article just cited, pp. 1-17, passim.

Ibid., p. 12.

Helena Cobban, The Superpowers and the Syrian-Israeli Conflict Beyond Crisis Management?, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC and Praeger, New York, The Washington Papers, 149, 1991, suggests, pp. 110-111, that the turning point was real enough, contrasting attitudes to Israel under President Reagan and changes coming thereafter which were apparent even early in the Bush-Baker period.

It has been pointed out, for example, that really only Presidents Reagan and Truman were emotionally committed to Israel. This analysis was presented by former Deputy Under-Secretary for Defense Dr Dov Zakheim, in his denial of President Bush’s anti-Semitism: Yosef Goell, “Reagan Administration Official: Bush is No Anti-Semite”, The Jerusalem Post, November 3, 1991, p.10.

The lack of realism and insight concerning the “Oslo Process” has been highlighted by the thorough exposure by Ramon Bennett in his Philistine: The Great Deception, Arm of Salvation, Jerusalem, 1995. (Chapter 11 is called “Peace: the Road that Leads to War.”)


Ibid. p.387.

For a thorough discussion and expose of all this, see Rachel Ehrenfeld, “Arafat, the World’s ‘Blind Spot’”, Ariel Center for Policy Research, Policy Paper No. 17, 1997. As much as 50% of what is given to the PA is taken by Arafat and 15% is spent on the acquisition of illegal weapons. See especially p. 7.


In the past four years, wage rates in Gaza have fallen 50 percent and unemployment has risen to highs of 50 percent; currently, it hovers at around 30 percent. The gross national product per Palestinian has declined by 35 percent. The number of Gazans legally working in Israel (where the jobs are) has fallen from a pre-Arafat figure of 116,000 to as low as 23,000. The percentage of goods manufactured in Gaza and marketed in the West Bank (where the consumers are) declined from about 50 percent to 2 percent by 1996. In the first two years of Arafat’s rule, one-third of Gazan businesses closed. Foreign commercial investment in Gaza declined from $520 million in 1993 to below $300 million in 1997. The number of Palestinians living in poverty soared; one out of every four now lives below the poverty line.” Michael Kelly, “Investing in Yasser Arafat”, The Washington Post, Wednesday, December 2, 1998, p. A29.

For example, Annex IV Declaration by the European Council on the Middle East peace process, Bulletin EU 12-1996, Luxembourg, “6. Palestinian social and economic development require the immediate lifting of the blockade. The European Council urges the Israeli authorities to remove all restrictions except where Israel’s legitimate security interests are manifestly engaged, as in the case of acts of terrorism. The dire economic consequences — with their effect of breeding discontent and violence — have dissipated the optimism generated by the establishment of Palestinian self-rule. The Council has instructed the Special Envoy to promote concrete and immediate measures to address these issues.”

The Palestinian Authority has yet to draft a criminal and civil code. What passes for law is brute and capricious force, imposed by 41,000 members of seven separate police forces — police forces that may arrest without warrant and detain without due process. The 41,000 are the muscle in an obesity of a bureaucracy: the Palestinian Authority boasts no fewer than 80,451 employees, spread among 24 different ministries. Salaries for these employees consume more than half of the entire Palestinian national budget, which ran to $814 million in 1997.

Where does the rest of the money go? Almost all of it is stolen or dribbled away.” Michael Kelly, Op cit.


Abba Eban suggested somewhat opaquely “Shamir had no alternative but to accept the precise pattern of an international conference that he had denounced as subversive when Peres and Shultz had proposed it in easier circumstances two years previously.” Abba Eban, Personal Witness, Jonathan Cape, London, 1993, pp. 638-639.


Yohanan Ramati, Director of the Jerusalem Institute for Western Defense, Letter to the author, October 25, 1996.

This seems to be the case among a number of MPs in the British House of Commons: Bernard Josephs, “MPs Anger at ‘Scapegoating’ of Israel in Commons Debates”, Jewish Chronicle, [London], November 13, 1998, p.16 reported that the MP for Liverpool Riverside told a Poale Zion conference of “venomous” anti-Israel attitudes in the House of Commons which involved MPs from both major parties blaming Israel for the Gulf situation in a debate on Iraq. She commented that she had the “uneasy feeling that some Members have a venomous attitude on Israel.”

These two instances are cited by Sir Martin Gilbert in Britain and Israel: A Century of Hope, Anglo-Israel Association, 1991, p. 12.


The remarks misinterpreting Israel’s stance in the Gulf War were made by William Waldgrave, off the cuff, in the House of Commons. and he was regarded as one of the deeper thinking ministers. The account is in David Kimche, The Last Option, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1991, pp. 235-236.

“Clinton’s announcement that the Palestinians now have the opportunity to ‘determine their own destiny on their own land takes a dimension close to a realistic US recognition of the Palestinian state”, London, AlSharq alAwsat in Arabic,


Susanna Agnelli, Op cit. Italics are the present authors. The quotation reads in full:

Europe must be conferred with the means to function internationally no longer as merely an aggregate of sovereignties so that it need not feign having control over something... Italy is advocating, a voice for Europe in a European Minister of Foreign Affairs who can: make decisions, by majority rule, also in foreign policy issues; draw on resources belonging to the EU, not only to individual member states; and has at its disposal an armed branch, the Western European Union (WEU), which should converge into the EU... only a European defense that is complementary rather than alternative to the Atlantic one will endow Europe with solidarity while at the same time unmistakably confirm its identity. This will enable Europe to take assertive action toward governments that are often hanging in the balance between war and peace, and offer prospects for reconstruction, both material and moral, drawing on its strength and also on its lengthy experience as an agent of peace and stability.

Joel Peters, Op cit.

The phrase, perhaps well-worn, is used by George Ioffe, Deputy Director of the Royal Institute for International Affairs in London, in his “Relations between the Middle East and the West: The View from the South” in B. A. Roberson (Ed.), The Middle East and Europe: The Power Deficit, Routledge, London, 1998, p. 47.


Ibid. p.69.


This is exactly what has happened. Arutz 7 reported on December 1, 1998, that MK Abdel Wahab Darawshe (Arab Democratic Party) called publicly for a Palestinian state on both sides of the Green Line. Speaking on Palestinian Television in honor of the dedication of the new Palestinian airport, Darawshe said that he hopes to participate in the declaration ceremony of a Palestinian state that will be established on “all of the Palestinian land”. Speaking for the Palestinian nation that is within Israel”, he said, “I hope that we will all live as brothers in one Palestinian state.”

Asher Susser, The PLO and The Palestinian Entity, Anglo-Israel Association, 1989, pp. 8-10. Dr. Susser was speaking at the House of Commons on June 12, 1989, to, among others, members of both Houses of Parliament. There can be no doubt, therefore, that British politicians had opportunity to hear the warnings given by Dr. Susser.

It is highly improbable that the reference to “freedom of access” is a reference to the strictures of the Jordanian era of control over parts of the city.

“We believe that the status of Jerusalem remains to be determined in the final status negotiations: we acknowledge Israel’s de facto control over West Jerusalem but consider Israel to be occupying East Jerusalem. We are strongly opposed to any action which predetermines the final status negotiations on the future of Jerusalem.” Speech by Foreign and Commonwealth Office Minister of State, Mr. Derek Fatchett, to the British Society for Middle East Studies, Oxford, July 8, 1997.

The extraordinary campaign against the State of Israel in the General Assembly since the oil weapon was drawn from its scabbard in 1973 involves subversion both of basic international law principles, and of rights and obligations vested in states under them. It has also entailed rather grotesque reversals of the United Nations’ own positions of the preceding quarter century, as part of a wide and illicit rewriting of history...this campaign is a kind of pilot operation in a remarkable venture in the détournement de pouvoir — an assault with covert as well as overt elements, on the international legal order. It would follow that what is at stake are not only the range of state interests that lie within the lawful concern of the organs of the United Nations, but all interests of states that the General Assembly can by the ipse dixit of automatic majorities reach out to control, truncate, or destroy.


Cf. Professor William V. O’Brien’s exploration in Law and Morality in Israel’s War With the PLO, Routledge, London, 1991 where reasons for Israel’s actions, and their context, are emphasized, producing a far more realistic — and favorable — view of Israel’s legal position.

‘In pursuing the reputation of an objective judge, a man may show so much understanding that he may lean over backwards and justify unjustifiable manifestations. I would rather give a true description of the lamentable truth than try to be forgiving and congenial.’ Y. Harkabi, Arab Attitudes To Israel, London, 1972, p. 467. He added: ‘Sometimes the desire to form a balanced judgement of the conflict, and not to attribute responsibility for the conflict largely to one side, a generally positive aspiration may prove a pitfall and distort the picture’, cited on p. 468 and comes from the same author’s Nuclear War and Nuclear Peace, Israel Program for Scientific Translations, 1966, p. 270.


Asked whether President Carter requested her to seek from her European opposite numbers withdrawal or change “of the lamentable, misguided, cynical and immoral policy towards the PLO — which will ultimately lead to bestowing de facto recognition on it” Mrs. Thatcher replied that that had not occurred but that she and President Carter were entirely in agreement in “totally and utterly” condemning “terrorism as a political weapon wherever it occurs”. Ibid., Column 244 (Mr. Gorst).

Ibid., Column 242 (Mr. Walters).

Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, Harper Collins, London, 1993, pp. 90-91. She added that it therefore pleased no one.


This kind of thing had a past history. For example, on April 15, 1974, US President Nixon attacked the European Community, especially its collective stand against US policy. Before that, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger attacked the ECs Middle East peace policy, warning that the search for a separate European foreign policy identity would lead to a confrontation with the US. Othman Othman, Professor of Political Science, An-Najah University, Nablus, Seminar VII. “The EU, the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli Conflict up to the 1980s”, The Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, July 1998.


‘The disparity between the gestures being proposed by Netanyahu and the essential minimum that the Palestinians need is far too wide’ according to a French Foreign Office spokeswoman, as reported by Nitzan Horowitz, “France urges ‘meaningful’ offer by Israel”, Ha’aretz, December 10, 1997.

This paragraph stems from Bernard Josephs, “Israelis Fear EU Will Back Palestinian state”, Jewish Chronicle, [London], August 21, 1998, p. 1. Italics are the present authors.

On the legal legitimacy of Israel’s pre-emptive attack in 1967 see Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 2nd Edition, 1992, pp. 80-85. ‘There are threats with which no nation can be expected to live.’ (p. 85)

Although an American, Geoffrey Aronson’s article, in French, in Le Monde diplomatique, “La Palestine rongée par la Colonisation”, November 1998, p. 12, has much of this flavor concerning the colonizing threat to Palestinian sovereignty of Israeli communities. Plainly it was written for a Francophone readership.

Ignacio Ramonet, “Ou va Israël?”, Le Monde diplomatique, August, 1998, p. 1. Although this may not represent directly EU policy it does reveal ideas current in Europe.


These comments cast a baleful light on the EU policies and come from Ehud Barak, “Palestine Will Not Be Pareve”, The Jerusalem Post, December 14, 1998.

Robert Schuman’s comments as declared to Abba Eban (at the UN) who cites Jean Monnet to similar effect: Abba Eban, Diplomacy for the Next Century, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1998, pp. 137-138.


The ambiguity is well charted by Kenneth Stein in “Europe vs. America”, Middle East Quarterly, Volume IV, Number 1, March 1997, pp. 39-45.

BBC World Service News, 1:00 AM, June 17, 1997.


The ships, the first since 1950 to visit Syria from Britain, were to host several receptions for Syrian officials and be open to the public. The Syrian naval commander was to present medals to crewmembers.


In Paris, Assad was allowed to hold a press conference exclusively in Arabic and open only to Arab journalists, thereby protecting him from difficult questions. As a result of this visit, Assad comes away with enhanced prestige and acceptance, both in Europe and in the Middle East. At the end of the visit, Syrian Foreign Minister Shara cited the “strategic partnership between Syria and France” that served the interests of both countries. The Syrians gave up nothing, and other than tweaking the US, the French also achieved little that will advance the Middle East peace process and help to prevent attacks against Israel. While the Americans continue to demand that Syria change its behavior before normalizing relations, Paris provides an opening to the West, without the need to change policies.


Derek Patchett addressing the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, Tuesday, February 24, 1998, Examination of Witnesses (Questions 29 — 39), Point 33. The italics are the present authors.


Leader headline, July 31, 1997, p. 15.

Conclusions to the Presidency 1996, Annex IV, Declaration by the European Council on the Middle East peace process, Document dated May 7, 1997, Luxembourg. The italics are the present authors.

“Solana also stressed that the European position on Jerusalem is well known and has not changed.” Israel Foreign Ministry, Summary of a meeting between Foreign Minister Peres and a delegation of the European Union Presidency, October 27, 1995.


Chairman’s statement: “Toward greater security and stability in a more cooperative world”, Twenty-second Western

Part of Statement 84, Presidency Conclusions, Cardiff European Council, June 15 and 16, 1998, Middle East Peace Process. The italics are the present authors.

The Middle East Peace Process based on the principles already accepted by all parties under the Madrid and Oslo frameworks, is the only path to security and peace for Israel, the Palestinians and the neighboring States...

We call upon the Israeli Government not to pursue the extension of settlements. Continued expansion of settlements does more than any other issue to erode Palestinian confidence in the peace process. It undermines the ability of both the Palestinian Authority and society at large to deter extremists and troublemakers. As the largest donor, the Union remains committed to providing assistance to the Palestinian people and urges all parties concerned to contribute to the economic revival of the West Bank and Gaza. This endeavor will hopefully be rendered more effective by the recent relaxation of the border closures and we hope that this encouraging trend will continue.

Speech by Mr. Dick Spring, then Ireland’s deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister and President of the Council of the European Union, to the General Assembly of the United Nations on September 24, 1996. The italics are the present authors.

Britain and the Arab-Israel Conflict, researched and written by Reference Services, Central Office of Information, Crown Copyright, 1993, pp. 48-49.

According to the report of the Center for Palestine Research and Studies on Mr. Beelaerts’ lecture, these changes were “caused by the October War of 1973, and the following Oil-boycott, [sic] which functioned as a shock-therapy; the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and the beginning of the Intifada, [sic] It became very clear, even to the strongest supporters of Israel, that this occupation policy of ruling over another people by force was not sustainable. In addition to this, Holland...” [sic] Willem Beelaerts, “Dutch-Palestinian Relations”, July 1997. found on the Center for Palestine Research and Studies web page: <http://www.cprps-palestine.org/activity/lecture/97/beelaerts.html>.

“Europe Must Act Firmly Toward Israel”, Le Soir, (Brussels), May 12, 1998, p. 8 reporting on an appeal from the APCEA [Parliamentary Association for European-Arab Cooperation], which gathers together MPs from national parliaments and the European Parliament, calling for “firmer action to save the peace process” which would entail “recourse to the suspension of Israeli participation in the European-Mediterranean Partnership” (Broadcast by Professor Murray Kahl, May 13, 1998).


Ibid. p. 260.

As Dr. Kimche suggested, ibid. p. 266.


These dangers are real enough. For example, Efraim Inbar and Shmuel Sandler, “The Risks of Palestinian Statehood”, Survival, Volume 37, Number 2, (Summer 1997), pp. 32-41 and Mideast Security and Policy Studies, Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, Number 33, June 1997.

See in this book, Yuval Steinitz, “A Worst Case Scenario: A Palestinian Guerilla Offensive on the Outskirts of Tel Aviv”.

Mr. Moratinos’s CV shows that he has been a diplomat to the Arab world (as well as briefly to Israel). The ratio is something like 10 years to 1: Political adviser at the Spanish Embassy to Rabat (1984/87), Deputy Director General for Northern Africa (1987/91), Director General of the Institute for Cooperation with the Arab World (1991/93), Director General of Foreign Policy for Africa and the Middle East (since September 1993), Ambassador of Spain in Israel from June 28 to December 4, 1996, EU Special Envoy for the Middle East Peace Process since December 1996.

At the time of the Hebron withdrawal issue, the EU sent a letter of assurance to Yasser Arafat in which the EU pledged to "use all its political and moral weight" to ensure that the provisions of the Hebron agreement were "fully implemented". See Peacewatch, February 12, 1997, Special Policy Forum Report, "The Role Of The European Union In The Middle East Peace Process", by Ambassador Miguel A. Moratinos, Washington Institute for Near East Policy.


"Europe and the Middle East: New Tracks to Peace?", September 14-15, 1997, the Iaffee Center for Strategic Studies and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (proceedings to have been published in 1998).


Agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on November 7-8, 1991: Part I — The Strategic Context, The new strategic environment, Paragraph 11: "The stability and peace of the countries on the southern periphery of Europe are important for the security of the Alliance, as the 1991 Gulf war has shown. This is all the more so because of the build-up of military power and the proliferation of weapons technologies in the area, including weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles capable of reaching the territory of some members states of the Alliance. The concern is the degree of appeasement at Israel’s expense necessary to keep Arab North African and Eastern Mediterranean countries satisfied.


Under the heading "Crisis Management and Peacekeeping", the above document cites, with clear enough significance for Israel: "Cooperation in peacekeeping, crisis management and peace support activities should also be increased, building on the participation of Egypt, Jordan and Morocco in SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina".

For this paragraph, as two notes above, under the heading 'Underlying Factors of Mediterranean Security'. The details are telling. "Much of Europe's energy supplies are imported from the region: 65 percent of its oil and natural gas imports pass through the Mediterranean on approximately 3,000 ships daily; 30 percent of Italy’s oil is imported from Libya and 32 percent of its natural gas from Algeria, France, Germany, Greece, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom all import oil from Libya, while Algerian natural gas is exported to Belgium, France, Portugal and Spain; 74 percent of Spain's natural gas needs, 50 percent of Italy's and 29 percent of France's were imported from the Maghreb states in 1996. Trade in the other direction amounted to USS86 billion in European exports to Algeria in 1996, or 67 percent of its imports, with 69 percent of Tunisia's imports, 66 percent of Libya's and 57 percent of Morocco's also coming from Europe in 1996."


This is argued by David Smith in "Does the Flag Follow Trade? Politicization and the Emergence of a European Foreign Policy", in Peterson and Sjursen, A Common Foreign Policy for Europe?, Routledge, London, pp. 77-94.


Considering the economic relationship between European Union members and Israel, the influence Europe could bring to bear upon Israel is formidable. It should therefore exert some of its influence and exercise real power pressure upon the Likud government. The pressure would be to convince Likud that if it continues to stall the peace process, it will have to face not only the Palestinians and Arafat but also a highly disgruntled international community." Asim Hamdan, senior columnist, "A Role for Europe in the Middle East", Arab News, January 2, 1997, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, web site: <http://www.arab.net/arabview/articles/hamdan7.html>.
The first time the new West European Union flag was flown was on ships patrolling the Adriatic, enforcing the UN sanctions against Serbia. Ghassan Salame, "Torn Between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean Europe and the Middle East in the post-Cold War Era" in B. A. Roberson (Ed.) The Middle East and Europe: The Power Deficit, Routledge, London, 1998, Note 10, p.42.

"Keeping Hope Alive", Speech by The British Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, to a dinner hosted by Medical Aid for Palestinians, Inter-Continental Hotel, London, July 9, 1998. He went on to refer to Nabil Shaat as the equal of any of the foreign ministers present at Palermo (June 1998) and to comment, “As Tony Blair has said, even in Israel there is growing acceptance that a Palestinian state may be an inevitable outcome of final status talks.” Italics are the present authors.

Remarks by Mr. Pierre Schori, Sweden’s Minister for International Development Co-operation, Deputy Foreign Minister, at the Palestinian Legislative Council, Ramallah, January 27, 1998. Italics are the present authors.

For example by Michael Widlanski (Editor and Project Coordinator), Can Israel Survive a Palestinian state?, Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, Jerusalem, 1990.

The Israel that would result if ever that much-advertised ‘European initiative’ is to succeed, would be devoid not only of the means with which to defend and fend for itself but would no longer have the will to do so. The only way such European schemes will get to first base is if the United States lends a hand to them.” Shlomo Argov, “Britain, America and Israel”, Speech to the New York United Jewish Appeal, London, September 12, 1981, reprinted in An Ambassador Speaks Out, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, pp. 246-247.

See Yohanan Ramati, “Islam and the U.S. State Department”, Midstream, June/July, 1995, pp. 48-51 (reprinted in The Maccabean, Volume 3, Number 8, August 1995). In this he cites a conversation which clearly shows that the surrender of the Golan and Judea and Samaria was a direct result of the desire of the Rabin government to please the USA (p.49).

Yohanan Ramati, “A Virus Called Defeatism”, The Jerusalem Post, November 19, 1996. “To win a war we need a General Staff that regards the Arabs as enemies, not as friends or partners. Once that is the case, our youth’s motivation will take care of itself.”

Cf. E. B. Samuel (pseudonym), “Israel’s Demoralization”, Middle East Quarterly, Volume 5, Number 3, September 1998, pp. 3-12. The article concludes with a call to the US administration to put pressure on the Arabs, particularly the Palestinians, rather than on Israel.


The following are the [selected] insights of Yotam Feldner, “Changes in the EU’s Positions on Jerusalem and the Palestinian state”, Middle East Media and Research Institute (MEMRI), Inquiry & Analysis No. 17, April 12, 1999. “The EU’s legalistic and rigid position [on Jerusalem] is uncommon and has not been presented by Western officials for decades.” And “the Berlin Declaration” [March 26, 1999] opens the possibility of European recognition [of] an independent Palestinian state, even if this state is declared unilaterally, following a failure in the bilateral negotiations.”

Furthermore, “The EU’s new positions strengthen the status of the Partition Resolution [181] over that of the Oslo Accord as the legal authority for the peace process.”

“Indeed, the chances that the Palestinians would create an aggressive, revisionist state are very high. There are already clear indications that Palestinian appetites will not be satisfied with the concessions Israel is willing to make.” Elfaim Inbar, “Palestine will not be Parese”, The Jerusalem Post, December 14, 1998.

Yaacov Hasdai, Truth in the Shadow of War, translated by Moshe Kohn, Zmora, Bitan, Modan — Publishers, Tel Aviv, 1979, p. 103.

Should America Guarantee Israel’s Safety?

1 Jerusalem Post, June 16, 1993.
2 Hearings of the Senate Armed Services Committee, April 1, 1993.
3 Jerusalem Post, June 11, 1993.
5 George McTearman Kahin and John Wilson Lewis, eds. The United States in Vietnam, New York. Dial Press, 1967. SEATO was also signed by the Philippines, Pakistan, England, France, Australia, and New Zealand, but it was initiated by the US and in the end only the US acted upon it.


Ibid., p. 16.

Ibid., p. 339.


A Harris poll in September 1978 found 64% of Americans opposed to abandonment of Taiwan, 19% in favor; ibid., Tierney, p. 327.

Ibid., Tierney, p. 425.


Jerusalem Post, May 24, 1967.

Ibid., pp. 328-329.

Ibid., pp. 355-358.

Ibid., p. 397.

Jerusalem Post, August 18, 1970.

Op cit., Eban, p. 469.

Jerusalem Post, August 17, 1970.

Jerusalem Post, August 18, 1970.

Op cit., Eban, p. 469.

Jerusalem Post, August 19, 1970.

Jerusalem Post, August 18, 1970.

Jerusalem Post, August 20, 1970.

Jerusalem Post, August 31, 1970.


Jerusalem Post, April 1, 1988.


Jerusalem Post, April 9, 1978.

Ibid.

Jerusalem Post. October 25, 1981.
Jerusalem Post. October 25, 1981.
Hadassah. February 27, 1985.
Jerusalem Post. February 20, 1956.

Czechoslovakia 1938 — Israel Today

1 The Runciman Report, see British White Paper. Cmd. 5847, No. 1.
5 Both of them said this while on trial at Nuremberg.
8 Ibid., coll. 48, October 3, 1938; quoted in part in Bennett, p. 188.
9 For Daladier's speech in full, see Le Temps, October 5, 1938.
10 According to the German statistics, see Hubert Ripka, Munich: Before and After (London, 1939), p 492.
12 An interview with Haggai Eshed, Davar, June 27, 1975.
13 Peres, op cit.
14 For data on the scope of Sudeten German autonomy, see Jurgen Serke, Bohemische Dorfer (1987), pp. 2-13.
15 This facilitated a predatory, exploitative attitude toward Jews (and Christians) which led Muslim officials and local Arab notables to exact and extort all sorts of irregular taxes, levies, fines, and bribes. In Jerusalem, they did this both before and after the Crusades. See Moshe Gil, “The authorities and the local population”, in Prawer & Ben-Shamrai, eds., The History of Jerusalem (Jerusalem: Ben Zvi, 1996), pp. 103-111, inc. footnotes; and Jacob Barmai, “The Jerusalem Jewish community, Ottoman authorities, and Arab population in the second half of the eighteenth century”, Jewish Political Studies Review (Fall 1994).
Peres, op cit.

Israel’s existence seems to benefit Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, and other non-Arab or non-Muslim states in the Middle East or its periphery, such as Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ethiopia, etc. (not to mention non-Arab or non-Muslim peoples like Lebanese Christians, Kurds, Copts, Black Sudanese). But not one of them has made a formal treaty of alliance with Israel. The Europeans are seemingly unperturbed over the build up of Arab military power, since they themselves participate in strengthening the Arabs.


Bennett, op cit., p. 333.


See above, the assessment of General Wilhelm Adam, commander of the front.

The Spitfire was as good as the Messerschmidt 109. The German Fokke Wolf 190 indeed tilted the balance in favor of the Luftwaffe for some time, but it appeared in the skies only toward the end of 1941.

Even the memorandum of Sir Thomas Inskip, the Minister for Coordination of Defense, of 1937, which deliberately exaggerated Germany’s strength — in order to increase the defense budget, denied any possibility of German victory in view of the military balance. For details, see Colvin, op cit., Chap. 2, pp. 23-24.

Despite Turkey’s obvious common interest with Israel to curb Syria, it is unthinkable that Turkey would sign a formal military pact with Israel.

See appendix.

As estimated by the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University for the year 1993-94. The data of other research centers, such as IISS or SIPRI indicate similar numbers.

It is equivalent to the army of 9.5 million soldiers that Germany had mobilized at the peak of its mobilization in 1944, out of a population of 70,000,000.

See his book, Nuclear Deterrence for Israel (Tel Aviv: HaKibbutz HaMeuhad, 1984).

At this stage, Israel will not yet have a suitable response for shooting down ground-to-ground missiles. Israel’s active defense system, focused on the Arrow missile will still be five years from operational capability. (See the article by Reuven Pedhatzur in this book.)


In response to a question from the undersigned on this matter, the chief editor of Ma’arikh, Lieutenant Colonel Dr. Rahel Roskansky, answered: “There is no political tendency here. It is simply that no articles on this subject have been received...”


In fact, a Muslim theologian, Mohammad Inayat Allah Khan, reported that Hitler “discussed Islamic Ikhwan with me in details... I found him very congenial”, in Berlin, 1926. See, I.M.S. Baljon, Modern Muslim Koran Interpretation (Leiden: Brill, 1961), pp. 11-12.

The principle of Arab unity within the framework of the umma specifically underlies the constitutions of Syria, Iraq, Kuwait, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Yemen, as well as the PLO Covenant.


The data represent fatalities of civilians as well as soldiers. They do not include victims on the Lebanon border or abroad. The drastic escalation in attacks on the Lebanon border since the beginning of the “peace process” and the mass slaughter on July 18, 1994 in Buenos Aires, when 102 human beings were killed, bring the number of Jewish victims of terrorism to 331! The number of fatalities in all the terrorist attacks — soldiers, civilians, and those killed abroad — in all the years of Israel’s existence from April 1949 to September 13, 1993, is 1,029 persons. Hence, the two years of the “peace process” produced 32% of all the victims of terrorism against Israel in 43 years. Source: the Historical Department of the IDF, as published in “Arab and Islamic Terrorism” (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense Publishing House, August 1994). The data from April 1994 till September 1995 are through the courtesy of the IDF Spokesman.


A poll in Yedioth Aharonot, September 8, 1996.

Interview in Jerusalem Post, January 24, 1997.
The Beginning of the End?

Ezer Weizman, as Air Force commander prior to the Six Day War, showing his pupils Judea and Samaria from the air and warning them not to forget areas of the homeland that would yet return to our control.

3. T.S. Eliot, The Hollow Men, although the destruction of our Zionist world will not wait until the end of days.

Metaphor coined by the pure white dove of peace, Abba Eban.

5. The response of Joseph Hayyim Brenner to the proposal of a "Peace Now" type of his time, R. Benjamin, to build a "Peace Temple" to Arab-Jewish brotherhood.

This may also be the repressed explanation for the savage, profound hatred of the "beautiful souls" and the "exponents of tolerance" in every other matter, towards the "settlers", which is entirely out of logical proportion to their crime. This astonishing hatred reaches the point of truly murderous anger (I have heard this with my own ears, from truly gentle intellectuals and writers) which is never directed against the cruelest murderers of Jews and Arabs alike.

Speech at the 20th Zionist Congress, during a discussion on the Peel Commission's partition proposal.

Words broadcast on Israel's national radio.

Haim Nahman Bialik.

The Promise of Post-Oslo Peace and Prosperity: Fantasy in the Guise of Vision


Shimon Peres, Tomorrow is Now, Jerusalem: Keter, 1978, p. 235.

See for example, Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto, "Israel 2000- How Will It Fare if Shrank to its 1967 Borders?" in Israel at the Crossroads, Arieh Stav, ed. (ACPR, 1997), pp. 147-179. (This paper was presented as part of a hearing before the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress on various defense and economic trends in the Middle East held on October 21, 1997.)

S. Peres, Op cit., p. 235.


S. Peres, Op cit., p. 232.

S. Peres, Interview in the now defunct Davar, June 27, 1975.

Amnon Rubinstein, "Pitfall of a Third State", Ha'aretz, August 8, 1976.

The severity of the threat from light mobile weapon systems in the hands of irregular non-governmental forces is not diminished by the fact that there exist greater threats from long-range ballistic missiles in the hands of regular governmental forces. Thus the danger of the Hizbullah Katyushas is no less severe because of the existence of Syrian Scud missiles. In fact, the potential threat of the long range missiles in the possession of a patron-state is likely to afford greater freedom of action to irregular forces, whose operations are not perceived to justify massive military retaliation, as would be in the case of the use of ballistic missiles on the part of a sovereign government. See in this book, Yuval Steinitz, "A Worst Case Scenario: A Palestinian Guerilla Offensive on the Outskirts of Tel Aviv".

Derived from the Latin aqua — water and ferre — to bear.


Yehoshua Schwartz, and Aharon Zohar, Water in the Middle East: Solutions to Water Problems in the Context of Arrangements between Israel and the Arabs, Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1991 (Hebrew).


Jerusalem Post, September 18, 1996.

M. Sherman, Op cit., Ch. 10.


S. Peres, Op cit., p. 255.


S. Peres (1978), Op cit., p. 255. Subsequent developments can hardly have enhanced confidence in the reliability of contractual obligations in the region. Since this pronouncement, numerous breaches of Middle East treaties have occurred. In this regard Henry Kissinger commented, in a somewhat derisory fashion, on Israeli leaders’ apparent misunderstanding of international relations, particularly on their insistence on “binding peace [agreements]”. “For what”, asks Kissinger, “is a binding peace [agreement] among sovereign nations when one of the attributes of sovereignty is the right to change one’s mind?” Henry Kissinger, White House Years, Boston: Little Brown, 1979, p. 346.


For a detailed analysis of the diverse effects of economic wealth on the one hand, and democratic reforms on the other, on peace making in the Middle East see Martin Sherman, “What Brings Peace: Wealth or Democracy?”, Middle East Quarterly, 5(3), pp. 13-22, 1998.

“Palestinian Lies” in Ha'aretz, July 30, 1976.

Israel, Palestinian State and the Middle East: Plus Sum Potential

1 On “virtual history”, in the sense of speculative thought experiments on what would have happened if history had taken a different path, See Niall Ferguson, Editor, Virtual History: Alternatives and Counterfactuals, London: Picador, 1997. On thought experiments, which serve as a main methodology for exploring issues such as those discussed in this chapter, see Roy A Sorensen, Thought Experiments, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.

2 I prefer the term “weapons of mass killing” instead of the usual term “weapons of mass destruction”, as it better expresses the real significance of such weapons.


4 On this important concept see David Pears, Motivated Irrationality, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984.


6 About five years before the outbreak of the intifada, graduate students of mine in strategic planning at the Hebrew University included in an exercise on “harsh likely scenarios for Israel within the next ten years” a civil uprising on the West Bank. Not foreseeing and gearing for such a possibility clearly shows how the Israeli establishments was captivated by policy thinking “concepts”.


8 However, the potential importance of utopias in shaping future realities must not be ignored, all the more so as such impact was important in Zionism. See Rachel Elboim-Dror, Yesterday's Tomorrow (Hebrew), Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 1993 (English version in preparation).

9 See Reuven Pedatzur, The Triumph of Embarrassment — Israel and the Territories After the Six Day War (Hebrew), Tel-Aviv: Bitan, 1996.

10 As a matter of fact, a high level governmental working group did prepare far reaching proposals on autonomy for the Palestinians, in accord with the Camp David agreement. But nothing was done with these recommendations. Thus, an opportunity, which may well have delayed and perhaps prevented establishment of a Palestinian state, or at least advanced a “plus game” relation with it, was missed.

I am using this terminology metaphorically, as is done in this book as a whole. “Zero sum” refers to a structure in which losses and gains of one side necessarily go with equal gains and losses of the other. This clearly is not the case in relations between Israel and a future Palestinian state, with the exception of territorial control if viewed single-dimensionally. But, when used metaphorically, no quantitative relationship is implied, outcomes being often incommensurate. I am grateful to Dr Izak Ravid for this clarification.

“Minus sum” refers to a dynamics in which both (or more) sides lose, though not necessarily equally so or in any fixed proportion. I think that most of the discussions of relations between Israel and a Palestinian state using the zero sum metaphor should use instead the minus sum concept, while trying to clarify who would lose more under what conditions. This is very important, because often the side with a higher expected loss is more interested in preventing such a minus sum dynamics. A Palestinian state is sure to lose more in most conceivable minus-sum relations with Israel. This might serve as a basis for Israeli policies directed at motivating the Palestinian state to try and move together to a different dynamics. However, this assumes that state behavior is at least partly rational and based on adequate and shared information — which is far from very realistic an assumption.

Albeit, substituting the minus sum concept for the zero sum “frame of thinking” will lead to quite different and more correct analyses and conclusions, including policy implications for Israel. But this remains to be worked out in details, including application to the various chapters in this book.

On March 7, 1999, the Israeli cabinet approved the establishment of a National Security Council (which, in essence, is a “national security staff”, rather different from the USA National Security Council which also includes the political echelon). Among its tasks is to plan within a long-term perspective the components of Israeli national security. Thus, one of the serious failures of Israeli policy formation may be overcome, although it is too early to know what the actual impact of the National Security Council on policies towards the Palestinian state will be. This is all the more so the case as the current negotiations with the Palestinians have, at this stage, been excluded from the mandate of the Council.


Recent proposals to move towards a federation between a Palestinian state and the Kingdom of Jordan presented in public by the Chairman of the Palestinian Authority and some senior Israeli politicians have been met by, what are in effect negative responses, from Jordan. This is understandable, but does not augur well for the future.

This scenario is based on a multi-phase exercise developed for use with graduate students and practicing policy planners and decision-makers in workshops on policy planning.

**Bi-National Realities Versus National Mythologies: The Death of the Two-State Solution**

The 18th Convention was on April 28, 1987 in Algiers, followed by the Declaration of Independence on November 15, 1988.


These were, in chronological order, the agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area signed on May 4, 1994. It was followed by the Agreement on the Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities (Israel-PLO) signed on August 29, 1994. Then came Oslo B: Interim Agreement between Israel and the Palestinians signed on September 28, 1995. This agreement has 7 annexes dealing among other things with redeployment, Palestinian elections, economic relations and cooperation on security matters. It has 9 maps attached to it dividing the areas of the West Bank to areas A, B and C according to which the level of Israeli presence under the redeployment is fixed. The last map defines the Israeli withdrawal from Hebron. This Agreement was signed only on January 17, 1997 under the title “Protocol Concurring the Redeployment in Hebron”.

Settlement Watch Report no. 8 (Peace Now, Jerusalem, July 31, 1996).

They were usually justified due to Hamas terrorist attacks inside Israel, but not always. They were taken as a precaution before Jewish holidays.

After Rabin's assassination the “peace index”, which measures general support for the peace process reached its zenith, 73.1%, but after a wave of terrorist attacks in Israel's urban centers, it declined to its lowest rating of 58.1% and fluctuated to 62%. This index has been followed by all the daily press ever since 1994.

*Ha'aretz*, June 4, 1996.

The agreement was pronounced on January 25, 1997.
9 Ha'aretz, January 28, 1996.
10 The Economic Agreement between Israel and the PLO, The Israel Chamber of Commerce, Tel-Aviv, 1994.
17 Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lissak, Me-Yishuv Le-Medina: Yehudi Eretz Israel be-Tekufat Ha-Mandat Ke-Kehila Politit (From Yishuv to a State: The Jews in Palestine as a Political Community during the Mandatory Era), Tel Aviv, 1977.
18 El-Hamayyan is the main fund behind the educational system of Shas.
19 These two terms were proposed by Sami Smooha. The first was a more critical view of Israeli democracy which Smooha substituted for the more positive typification — ethnic democracy. See Sammy Smooha, Israel: Pluralism and Conflict, London, 1978, p. 6 and “Minority Status in an Ethnic Democracy: The Status of the Arab Minority in Israel”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 13/3, July, 1990, pp. 389-413.

Corridors/Safe Passage Routes: Past, Present, and Future Outlook

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We Will Kill, We Will Be Killed: Statements by Arafat Since the Peace Process Began

1 These words were said the day after the massacre at the Beit Lid junction (January 1995) in which 20 soldiers were killed.
2 In the beginning, Arafat blamed Israel for blowing up the bus as an anti-Arab provocation. After the Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the assault, the head of the PLO came out with a song of praise for the gang of murderers. In the special session for the 50th anniversary of the United Nations (October 24, 1995) Arafat repeated this and blamed the right wing in Israel with working in cooperation with radical Islamic in the Beit Lid massacre.
3 In Arabic: ‘Musta’ Shahedim” means the death of holy martyrs, the highest title in the ranks of Islamic martyrdom. These martyrs merit after their death a permanent place in Paradise with an endless supply of virgins and wine. The most honored of the martyrs, he who Arafat saw fit to eulogize personally, and after whom are named plazas in Shechem, Ramallah, and streets of Gaza, is the “engineer”, a mass murderer who claimed 65 Jewish victims, amongst them 35 children.
4 The gangs of Hamas murderers are named Az a-din el-Kassam.
5 Abdal Kadar el Housseni, from the Mufti’s family, and his close helper. Abdal Kadar stood at the head of the holy lihad, one of the cruelest terror gangs in the beginning of the 1930s which was active in the Hebron and Jerusalem areas. Together with the Mufti, he cooperated with the Nazis. In the pantheon of the PLO, he is second only to Haj Amin el Housseni himself.
6 The head of the group “Black September”, glorified by the PLO for their murder of 11 Jewish athletes in Munich.
Abu Jihad was the commander of the terror acts of the Fateh, like the massacre in the Savoy Hotel, and the Israel bus attack on the coastline.

Mahriwi was in the terror unit which carried out the massacre on the Israeli coast (March 1978) in which 35 Israeli bus employees and their families were killed.

"Hudaibiya Peace" which is taken in the Arab world as the prototype of brilliant strategic deceit, was the peace agreement of ten years that Muhammad signed in the year 628 with the Qureish tribe, who were the rulers of Mecca. While the Qureish tribe was duped under the cover of this agreement, Muhammad built a strong army. After two years, in the wake of an argument between two Bedouins, one from each camp, Muhammad blamed the Qureish tribe for breaking the agreement. He marched on Mecca, captured it, and slaughtered the Qureish people. Since this "Hudaibiya speech" in Johannesburg (May 3, 1994), Arafat repeated this historical precedent in order to promise to his listeners that this will be the fate of the agreement with Israel.

Arafat is quoting the Khalif Omar who, according to the tradition, refused to accept the Hudaibiya accord and labeled it the "disgraced peace".

We Have Made a Covenant With Death and a Contract With Hell

For further detail and a discussion on the link between the PLO and Nazism, see Benjamin Netanyahu's book, A Place Among the Nations, Israel and the World. Bantam, 1995, pp. 194-195.


Newspaper reports from March 14, 1997.
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Arieh Stav, Director of the ACPR is the editor of this book.