Ariel Center for Policy Research (ACPR) |
Information Policy and National
Identity: Joel Fishman Policy Paper No. 142, 2002
From the time of Ben-Gurion, Israel’s
leaders have viewed defense policy as the utmost priority of the State, while
overlooking the strategic importance of information policy. During the period
from 1967-1973, Israeli leaders, through arrogance, indifference, and
passivity, allowed its enemies to represent the country as an aggressor, as
Goliath. Israel, which was not prepared for such a challenge, now faces an
aggressive ideological assault whose objective is to delegitimize the State as
a first step toward its physical destruction. Ideological warfare, as opposed
to public relations and marketing, represents a compelling danger requiring a
vigorous and focused response.
If Israel is to make its case before
world public opinion, its policymakers must have a clear idea of its history
and national identity. Israel’s enemies have endeavored to attack its
legitimacy by falsifying both the history of the State and the history of the
Jewish people. When combined with current post-Zionist thinking, this has
created a situation harmful to a positive information policy. Because the
present derives from the past, the importance of history as the foundation of
information policy is basic.
Although totalitarianism is a European
import to the region, and due consideration must be given to the prevailing
traditions of political culture, there is sufficient evidence to advance the
new interpretation that totalitarian principles define the structure and
function of the Palestinian Authority. The PA uses propaganda, terror,
anti-Semitism, and falsehood, together, in the manner which Hannah Arendt
originally described in her study, The Origins of Totalitarianism.
Myths, ideology and a sense of historical inevitability drive this regime.
From the point of view of ideological warfare, deconstruction of the PA is the
ideal solution as well as shattering the false reality of its creation.
Several methods of ideological warfare
are identified. One is the “Big Lie”, which English propagandists introduced
during the First World War and German Nazi leaders adopted and refined. A
second tactic, the combination of propaganda with political agitation, may be
identified in Israeli domestic politics. Lenin developed this method in the
early 1920s, as a means of destabilizing his adversaries through an appeal to
pacifistic sentiments. Such tactics, perfected by the foremost totalitarian
states of the twentieth century, now represent a threat to Israel, a democracy
at war.
Israel has a strategic interest in
responding proactively and vigorously to the very considerable danger of
ideological warfare. The government must speak clearly with one voice. It must
challenge misrepresentations and lies and discredit those who spread them, be
they individuals, the press, governments, international bodies, and NGOs
(non-governmental organizations). In the broadest possible perspective, Israel
has a strong interest in maintaining, at home and abroad, an ideological
environment compatible with its own moral principles and the defense of its
democracy founded upon the rule of law and equal standards for individuals and
governments. Israel, a democracy, must be seen to be waging a just war of
defense by fair means against an evil regime.*
* This
is a reformulation of the objective of the Coalition in the Gulf War. Philip
M. Taylor, War and the Media; Propaganda and Persuasion in the Gulf War,
Manchester: Manchester U. Press, 1992, p. 29.
The caricatures which appear in this paper
were created by Kariel Gardosh (Dosh), z”l, and appeared in the book, Hasbara by the Foreign Ministry, Moshe Yegar (ed.), Jerusalem: Foreign
Ministry, 3rd edition, 1984. Used with the generous permission
of Michael Gordosh.
For the complete text of this article, click
here. |