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## Information Policy and National Identity: Israel's Ideological War

*Joel Fishman<sup>1</sup>*



On the door is written the word “Justice”<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Dr. **Joel S. Fishman** is an Associate of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs and Associate Editor of its new series, *Post-Holocaust and Anti-Semitism*. He received his doctorate in modern European history from Columbia University and was a Fulbright Scholar at the Institute for History of the State University of Utrecht and a post-doctoral scholar at the Netherlands State Institute for War Documentation in Amsterdam. **Dr. Fishman** served as Chairman of the Foundation of the Institute for Research on Dutch Jewry in Jerusalem. He is currently conducting research on information policy, ideology, and perception, particularly in the context of the contemporary situation in Israel.

This paper is dedicated to the memory of  
**Ruth Waterman** of Calgary  
born: January 12, 1925  
died: December 5, 1998

## Statement of the Problem


### National Identity and Information Policy: The Original Sin: How Did David Become Goliath?

Israel, a democracy at war, is facing a major ideological assault, particularly in the form of hostile propaganda whose objective is to undermine the legitimacy of the State. Essential to the understanding of this contest are two dimensions: the ideas which one or both sides project and the reality behind them. It follows that in order to understand the problem and form a valid policy, it is necessary to identify the “first causes”, as found in reality and in collective perception. The present confrontation results from two basic elements: an enemy whose objective is to bring about the politicide of the Jewish state and Israel which, for reasons of confused national identity and misperception, has been unable to formulate a clear policy.

For decades, the Palestine Liberation Organization (later, the Palestinian Authority) and the neighboring Arab states have been committed to the destruction of Israel as a matter of faith and ideology.<sup>1</sup> In addition, the Palestinian Authority, which has become an authoritarian Arab regime with distinct totalitarian characteristics, has a structural and ideological need for propaganda, lies, anti-Semitism, and terror, both for domestic and external purposes.<sup>2</sup> Certainly, such imports as European anti-Semitism and the falsehoods that are a necessary part of totalitarian system have fitted in well with traditional Islamic attitudes toward Jews and Judaism and an “elastic attitude toward the truth”.<sup>3</sup>

Official Israeli attitudes, long before Oslo, and subsequently, display an inability to accept the enemy’s words at full value and to face up to the challenge of anti-Semitism, the significance of the Palestine Covenant, and the existential threat of the Strategy of Stages.<sup>4</sup> The basic Israeli attitude may be explained on several levels: the long-standing belief that public opinion was not especially important and an unwillingness to come to terms with hatred of the Jews. This refusal (or inability) is a symptom of a greater malady – a deep crisis of national identity resulting in denial of the Jewish meaning of Israel.

The “Original Sin” of Israel’s information policy was committed between 1967 and 1973 when the policymakers of the time permitted the State to be portrayed as Goliath, the aggressor.



<sup>2</sup> The caricatures which appear in this paper were created by Kariel Gardosh (Dosh), ז"ל, and appeared in the book, *Hasbara by the Foreign Ministry*, Moshe Yegar (ed.), Jerusalem: Foreign Ministry, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, 1984. Used here with the generous permission of Michael Gordosh.

A failure of statesmanship of the first order belonging to the period following the Six Day War, with its legacy of arrogance and misguided beliefs in invincibility, it was probably Israel's greatest setback in the war of ideas and perception. It happened so long ago that many do not know how it happened. Policymakers of the present are dogged by it every day, and many ask in wonder – as if it were a great mystery – how it came about. The portrayal of the victim as an aggressor may be explained by the fact that Israel was careless with its good name and that it had real enemies. There has been a general tendency to seek short-term solutions and a reluctance to analyze problems on the political level to their ultimate conclusion. In 1977, Yehoshafat Harkabi clearly described how David permitted himself to be typecast as Goliath:

Israeli policy oscillated, stumbling on its ambivalences. Consciousness of the Arab threat impelled territorial demands. Ogling for peace prompted downgrading the vehemence of Arab rejection. Israeli leadership, political and cultural, was inept in managing Israel's existential contradictions. This lack of coherence played into the Arab hands in their attempts to pose as moderate and to present Israel as intransigent, expansionist, covetous, egotistic, and callous to the sufferings and grievances of others. The Arabs maneuvered themselves into the position of plaintiff, and Israel was reduced to the role of defendant. In world public opinion, the Arabs won a victory, ironically with the aid and collaboration of the Israelis, who erred both by omission – failing to present the extremeness of Arab positions – and by commission – pointing to Arab moderateness.<sup>5</sup>

The resulting situation has had far-reaching consequences with regard to current government policy, both domestic and foreign. In short, the damage caused by being stigmatized as an aggressor has placed the Jewish state almost permanently on the defensive and limited its freedom to formulate political and defense policy. Today, one may definitely identify elements of historical continuity with the situation Harkabi described, such as the deleterious influence of Israel's internal situation, a lack of clear thinking, and efforts to improve the image of the enemy. Normally, this type of discussion would not be included in a study such as this, but under the circumstances, it is essential because this essay is not only about public relations and propaganda which are tools of implementation, but about policy.

For Israel's secular elite of the early 1990s, the dream of "The Peace" assumed nearly messianic proportions because it meant the prospect of being accepted among the nations, a solution to security demands and an escape from Jewish roots. So seductive was this vision, that for nearly a decade, it blinded Israel's leaders to the inconvenient reality of terror, incitement, propaganda, and racist hatred.

The Oslo package contained a number of seemingly unrelated components, some of which were stated and others, not. It is more than likely that the architects of "The Peace" devised their own "strategy of stages" and introduced piecemeal the components of what was really a comprehensive social, cultural, and political program for the "transformation" of Israel whose full implications would not be understood immediately.<sup>6</sup> Nevertheless, one may try to fit some of the pieces together and propose the thesis that "The Peace" contained many of the following components:

1. A new beginning in history which would mean that the lessons of historical experience, particularly of the Arab-Israel wars, would be swept aside<sup>7</sup>;
2. By giving up territory, Israel would achieve peace with the Palestinians and, in turn, with the Arab world;

3. The Arabs would adopt the traditional liberal western concept of self-interest, and in cooperation with Israel, bring the material benefits of prosperity to both sides;
4. Arab acceptance of Israel would solve the problems of anti-Semitism and national security;
5. Dispersion and dispossession of the settlers would follow, not as an incidental consequence of withdrawal from Judea and Samaria, but expressly and intentionally to neutralize their influence as a group, thus altering the Israeli political balance;
6. The abolition of the Law of Return and a radical downgrading of the links between Jews in the Diaspora and Israel; [See Appendix I.]
7. Deconstruction of Israel's identity as a Jewish state,<sup>8</sup> the establishment of a post-Zionist, post-modern "State of all its citizens", combined with a "Secular Revolution";
8. A large-scale immigration of foreign Palestinian Arabs which would establish a precedent for more such transfers;
9. Discrediting of the Zionist enterprise and cultivating a readiness to give up the dream of the "Land of Israel" and large parts of Jerusalem;
10. Fabrication of a new reality by rewriting the history of the Israel, changing the educational curriculum, thus establishing a secular, post-Zionist hegemony of ideas (and power)<sup>9</sup>;
11. To the extent that elections could be financed, public opinion manipulated to accept concessions which had previously been unconscionable, and influence bought, large-scale financing and patronage would come from interested parties abroad, such as the European Union, specific countries, and NGOs.<sup>10</sup>

This program became associated with the idea of "process", and came to be known as the "The Peace Process". When the two components, idea and process, are combined, it usually indicates the presence of an ideology, that is, the process of peacemaking assumed the characteristics of a coherent ideological program. Hannah Arendt has described the relationship between the idea and the process:

An ideology is quite literally what its name implies: it is the logic of an idea. Its subject matter is history, to which the "idea" is applied; the result of this application is not a body of statements about something that is, but the unfolding of a process which is in constant change. The ideology treats the course of events as though it followed the same "law" as the logical exposition of its "idea". Ideologies pretend to know the mysteries of the whole historical process – the secrets of the past, the intricacies of the present, the uncertainties of the future – because of the logic inherent in their respective ideas.<sup>11</sup>

Here, the "idea" was "The Peace". The logic derived from this idea implied a complete political program within and without, including a redistribution of power and resources within the body politic of Israel. This program related only partially to Israel's Arab neighbors and to the Palestinians. It may be argued that the whole package of "The Peace" represented the agenda of an activist elite minority in decline, which hastened to establish secular hegemony domestically. Therefore, few demands for compliance were made of the Palestinians and the debate on the Left was highly internalized. One might demand gestures and actions only of Israel, but not necessarily reciprocal relations of dignity and respect from its partner in "The Peace Process".

A few elite activists actually implemented parts of this radical, partisan agenda through the use of non-democratic means. They worked through a compliant prime minister and took control of key ministries and their bureaucracies, particularly Foreign Affairs and Education, in order to pursue policy initiatives. Several architects of “The Peace” described with pride how they manipulated and humored the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin during the Oslo negotiations. In contrast, members of this group in recent public statements openly accused Ehud Barak of being Israel's worst prime minister, bearing heavy responsibility for irreparable damage to the process.<sup>12</sup> His inexperience, bad judgment, and stubbornness resulted in failure to maintain the coalition. He disappointed them. Evidently, they expected the type of relationship with Ehud Barak which they shared with Rabin. Noteworthy is an analogous case in our history where Prime Minister Menachem Begin allowed himself to be led into the war in Lebanon in 1982.<sup>13</sup> From the point of view of Israeli constitutional relationships, there seems to be a weak point in the executive decision-making process, if within a generation two prime ministers could be led to adopt, or authorize after the fact, major policy initiatives not previously subjected to thorough scrutiny. According to a post-modern school of thought, particularly in the EU, democratic government is dated and inefficient, and it is preferable for the bureaucracy to assume the legislative function.<sup>14</sup> The question must be asked if it is in the interest of democracy in Israel that a well-organized activist elite should be able to preempt power in this manner.

Despite repeated “indicating signs” and verified violations, love for the Oslo dream-package, combined with the considerable rewards in prospect, blinded Israel's secular elite to the reality that matters were not working to plan. It is clear that, with frightful consequences, ideological thinking impaired the empirical-analysis of reality, the basis of sound policymaking. Hannah Arendt's explanation of how ideological thinking divorces one from reality offers some understanding of what happened with the ideology of “The Peace”:

Since the ideologies have no power to transform reality, they achieve this emancipation of thought from experience through certain methods of demonstration. Ideological thinking orders facts into an axiomatically accepted premise, deducing everything else from it; that is, it proceeds with a consistency that exists nowhere in the realm of reality...<sup>15,16</sup>

The “Peace Process” has made it necessary for Israel to come to grips with reality and, particularly, its problem of national identity. Hopefully, this may be achieved without excessive bad feeling. It will not be an easy task, but only when Israelis decide, for once, who and what they are, will it be possible to formulate a coherent political policy with regard to the country's place in the world and to build a decent information policy to support it.

For the sake of historical perspective, one would do well to consider Ben-Gurion's first premise, the title deeds of the Jews to this land, which he presented on January 7, 1937 to the Peel Commission:

I say on behalf of the Jews that the Bible is our Mandate, the Bible which was written by us, in our own language, in Hebrew in this very country. That is our Mandate. It was only *recognition* of this right which was expressed in the Balfour Declaration.<sup>17</sup>

Israel's public diplomacy could project a positive image of a mature, humane Jewish state, a democracy ruled by law, which aspires to an honorable place among the nations but is prepared to defend itself, if necessary. To seek peace with one's neighbors is honorable, provided that Israel can retain its Jewish identity and guarantee the State's continuity and sovereignty, without being humiliated or committing politicide. But Israel, aspiring to peace with its neighbors, must first make peace with itself.

Unfortunately, Israel does have an enemy. Propaganda and incitement are a fundamental need of the type of political regime that the Palestinian Authority has become. Some call it a terrorist regime, but terror is only part of its reality. On the basis of function and structure, one may classify the Palestinian Authority as a totalitarian regime, not as a despotism or tyranny, as some have described it. While the importance of political culture of the region should not be minimized, the two dimensions mentioned above, may explain how propaganda, terror, anti-Semitism, and falsehood find their expression as part of a system. Further, in this type of regime, the top man is not the central cause, but structure and ideology are.<sup>18</sup> Therefore, while personality and “personal chemistry” may be part of the problem, hopes of getting business done by speaking with the leader of such a regime probably are misguided. [See Appendix II, “The Totalitarian Leader”.] Accordingly, a remedy must be found at the structural level. In this light, taking Orient House (August 2001), seizing the *Santorini* (May 2001) and the *Karin-A* (January 2002), and the trashing of the *Muqat`ah* (March 2002), represent steps of considerable importance.

If Israel is to stand up to the ideological challenge, the priority of method and tactics should be to bring the enemy into total discredit, shatter its reality, break its myths, and destroy any sense of its “historical struggle” having the slightest hint of historical inevitability. The dismantling of the PA could be termed an ideal goal. It would certainly be the most preferable, because deconstruction is logically the most effective means of dealing with a totalitarian regime. The time may come when a situation of “no war, no peace” may become intolerable, and Israel should not automatically rule out the option of achieving the decisive advantage.<sup>19</sup> The precondition of such a measure, however, would be to reassert publicly its moral advantage and to make Israel’s case convincingly and continuously before the world, which explains why **certain strategic options are feasible only if a decent information policy is in place.**

One of the most valuable insights of Hannah Arendt is that the destruction of its myths and fictions is closely associated with the defeat of a totalitarian regime:

It is in the moment of defeat that the inherent weakness of totalitarian propaganda becomes visible... The moment the movement, that is, the fictitious world which sheltered them, is destroyed, the masses revert to their old status of isolated individuals who either happily accept a new function in a changed world or sink back into their old desperate superfluosity. The members of totalitarian movements, utterly fanatical as long as their movement exists, will not follow the example of religious fanatics and die the death of martyrs (even though they were only too willing to die the death of robots). Rather, they will quietly give up the movement as a bad bet and look around for another promising fiction...<sup>20</sup>

If one of the direct benefits of removing a totalitarian regime, as Arendt writes, is that people would be reluctant to die the death of martyrs, that would certainly be a welcome accomplishment. Breaking their reality, an endeavor which is only partially associated with military effort, may be of great importance in achieving the essence of victory. Another benefit would be that Israel could again define its identity and project its own reality based on what it really is, rather than allowing its enemies to box it in with lies.

## Chapter I

### Strategy and Cultural Environment: Totalitarian Government and Propaganda

“War...is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will.”<sup>21</sup> Ideological warfare is an extension of hot war that makes use of ideas and information for the same

purpose, to compel the opponent to fulfill one's will by altering his cognition and perception of reality, or by applying this method to other parties, such as neutrals, allies, and our own population.

One of the tactical tools of ideological warfare is propaganda, which has been defined simply "as an attempt to influence the attitudes of a specific audience through the use of facts, fiction, argument or suggestion – often supported by the suppression of inconsistent material – with the calculated purpose of instilling in the recipient a certain belief, values or convictions which will serve the interests of the source, by producing a desired line of action."<sup>22</sup>

Modern ideological war dates from the First World War, when the British successfully combined the existing methods with newly available communications technologies.<sup>23</sup> [See Appendix III.] Although we are not consciously aware of the fact, many aspects of ideological warfare date from this era, which several historians have considered to be the real turning point of the modern contemporary history.<sup>24</sup> One legacy of that era is the ideological challenge to liberal democracies resulting from the victory of the Bolsheviks in the Russian Revolution and their new system of political and social organization. According to Carl J. Friedrich, during the interwar period, it was the Bolsheviks who made the totalitarian breakthrough:

The Communists sought to catch up within one generation, and therefore a much more radical deployment of autocratic power was required. This totalitarian breakthrough occurred in 1926-27, when the First Five-Year Plan was adopted. It was this plan that undertook to force the pace and to bring about almost immediately a radical transformation of the economy. Thus, the masters of the Soviet Union were the true originators, the innovators who invented and perfected, in its various details, totalitarian dictatorship – the secret police techniques, the mass communications controls, and more especially, the centrally planned and dictated economy.<sup>25</sup>

Furthermore, in the realm of ideological warfare, authoritarian and totalitarian regimes have an initial advantage over democracies. Falsification of the truth is one of the methods of holding power in totalitarian regimes. Conversely, democracies need the truth in order to function effectively, and in ideological warfare they frequently must wait for the truth to come out, although tremendous damage can be done in the meantime. Therefore, the conduct of ideological warfare is different for totalitarian regimes than democracies. [See Appendix IV.]

Within a broader perspective, the cultural environment in which ideas are conveyed is not necessarily neutral and should not be taken for granted. Ideas must find their resonance within the existing environment of knowledge and attitudes. A democratic state must devote particular attention to the world environment of ideas and knowledge in order to maintain a congenial climate that will enable it to project its ideas and live in harmony with other states that share its principles. In 1961, the American political analyst, W.W. Rostow, explained that the United States had such an interest:

...There is much in our tradition and our way of life which requires that we be the defender and promoter of the democratic cause on the world scene... The American interest is to preserve an environment for our free, open, and humanistic society which will permit it to continue to develop in terms of [its] fundamental values [political, social, and economic]...<sup>26</sup>

Similarly, David Ben-Gurion was acutely aware of the threat of the expanding domination of the totalitarian Soviet Union and the danger which an environment of physical and cultural repression meant for the continuation of Jewish life in Europe. In his survey, delivered to the Zionist Conference in London in August 1945, he clearly stated his concern:

But there are additional dynamic factors which, unless counteracted, must have an insidious effect on the course of Jewish history and may even lead to the complete decay of world Jewry. One of these dynamic factors which may interrupt the existence of the Jewish nation is the increased power of the State over the individual. The current tendency is for states to secure complete control over the lives of their people, intellectually and morally, as well as economically, and such trends are likely to have disastrous consequences on a weakened and reduced Jewry. The Jewish people had struggled and suffered throughout the ages and had resisted being swallowed up, but in the recent time of closely organized states, the Jewish people...may not be able to continue resistance. This absorption of the individual by the State, whether it be good or bad for the peoples of their respective countries living in their own land, may lead ultimately to the complete extinction of the Jewish people outside Palestine.<sup>27</sup>

According to Ben-Gurion, cultural battles against the State could no longer be fought with free intellectual forces. He concluded that the impending danger in Europe made the founding of the Jewish state urgently necessary as well as the “speedy transfer of the remnants of European Jewry, headed by Jewish youth” to what was then Mandatory Palestine:

Blind faith in Jewish survival was not enough. A determined Jewish will to exist accompanied by action was essential... Nations did not think about the Jewish people; they were only concerned with their own state interests, and Jews therefore could not rely on the benevolence of nations but had to hammer out their own national destiny. Zionism was based on the belief that the continued existence of the Jewish people in the Diaspora was impossible. It had been so even before a third of the Jewish people had been extinguished and it was more so under present conditions. Jews could not rely on the benevolence of nations but had to forge their own national destiny.<sup>28</sup>

His political program envisaged that Palestine be established as a Jewish Commonwealth integrated into the structure of the democratic world. For Ben-Gurion, environment and context were crucial factors. Although this decision was taken more than half-century ago, his foresight must be appreciated. Now the situation has changed to the extent that Israel, the Jewish state, must lead the battle for the destiny of the Jewish people, ideological and otherwise, not only in Israel, but from Israel – everywhere and all at once.

Recently, the State Comptroller (*Mevaker Ha-Medina*) published a report criticizing the absence of systematic coordination between government bodies regarding propaganda, or “Public Diplomacy”, the new American term for the same thing.<sup>29</sup> Most of the report was devoted to organizational failures of the various governmental bodies concerned, such as the Foreign Ministry, the Army Spokesman’s Office, the Prime Minister’s Spokesman, and the Government Press Office. While the Comptroller briefly noted the absence of a policy, from the amount of attention devoted to other subjects, one would surmise that the essence of the problem was organizational. Evidently, the occasion for the report was the considerable setback in world opinion which Israel has been facing, as a result of its failures in the propaganda war waged by the Palestinians which have left it isolated politically and maligned as an aggressor. It could be argued that the Comptroller did not give a complete picture. Israel actually may have had several conflicting policies, some of which were designed to benefit the enemy. (The State Comptroller’s recent report [an excerpt of which may be found in Appendix VI of this essay] objectively documents the shortcomings of the government’s information policy, particularly at the Foreign Ministry.)



## The Palestinian Authority as Totalitarian Regime

What the PA has become explains the place of propaganda, its anti-Semitic themes, terror, politicization of the private sphere, use of the mob, denial of the universality of human rights, and propagation of lies. The Oslo Agreement and the tendency to think for the short term have obscured some major facts. Despite occasional rhetorical variations, there is a definite continuity of PLO strategy from the 1970s to the PA today. What the PLO was, is, and has become determines its political method and use of tactics. It is functionally a totalitarian movement, and uses propaganda according to the methods and purposes of such regimes. [See Appendix V.]

In all fairness, it has taken some time to understand the methods of the Palestinian Authority, and with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, one may profitably read studies such as Yehoshafat Harkabi's, *Arab Strategies and Israel's Response*,<sup>30</sup> Bernard Lewis', "The Palestinians and the PLO, A Historical Approach",<sup>31</sup> or Thomas Kiernan's popular biography of Yasser Arafat.<sup>32</sup> Both Harkabi and Lewis observed that the PLO adopted the tactic of making seemingly moderate statements to the world public, while its actual program was the politicide of Israel. They pointed out that the PLO's demands were open-ended, a fact which it endeavored to conceal.<sup>33</sup> Because the Palestinians could not hope to beat Israel in a direct confrontation, they adopted the gradualist strategy of stages. In the international sphere, the PLO broadcast messages of moderation, while it spoke to its own constituents in Arabic with brutal frankness. Not much has changed.

In his biography of Arafat, written in 1976, the popular writer, Thomas Kiernan, predicted that the PLO would continue its policy of terror. Although a year after Arafat's address to the UN, some hoped that he might become a statesman. Kiernan's observation is still of basic interest:

By his very nature, Arafat is not a statesman. On his desk, wherever it might be located on any given day, lies an Arabic translation of *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, that famous counterfeit tract manufactured by the secret police of nineteenth-century Czarist Russia to justify their anti-Jewish pogroms. It is a volume he opens frequently and earnestly quotes from to visitors, and if for no other reason than that he is not a statesman.<sup>34</sup>

During the 1990s, there were reports of large-scale corruption in the Palestinian Authority, which indicated that, instead of becoming a nascent democracy, power and patronage increasingly became concentrated in the hands of one man, the *Rais*.<sup>35</sup> It has been noted that the Second Armed Uprising of September 2000 brought a radicalization of the situation, which reinforced the existing trends.<sup>36</sup> Recently Dan Polisar published a well-documented but shocking article, "Yasser Arafat and the Myth of Legitimacy",<sup>37</sup> where he explained how the Palestinian leader built a police state and crushed all hope for democracy in the West Bank and Gaza. Through a combination of violence, intimidation, and terror against his own people, Arafat undermined the rule of law and politicized civil society. Of particular importance is the erosion of the principle of predictability which characterizes human relations where there is recourse to law. Although Polisar's account ends in 1996, it is difficult to hope for peaceful development within the PA or to imagine that it could be governed sensibly by middle-class self interest. In understanding its propaganda, it is noteworthy that in the first instance, the PLO directs violence and terror against its own population. Once again, Hannah Arendt offers a valuable insight:

Terror becomes total when it becomes independent of all opposition; it rules supreme when nobody any longer stands in its way. If lawfulness is the essence of non-tyrannical government and lawlessness is the essence of tyranny, then terror is the essence.<sup>38</sup>

From the outset, MK Natan Sharansky declared that the late Prime Minister Rabin committed a major blunder and acted in an ethically shortsighted manner when he placed his hopes in a peace with a totalitarian regime, the Palestinian Authority.

Prime Minister Rabin coined the phrase that chillingly summed up the government's entire approach: Arafat would deal with terrorists, he said, "without a Supreme Court, without 'Betselem' [a human rights organization] and without all kinds of bleeding heart liberals." In short, the undemocratic nature of Arafat's regime, far from being an obstacle to furthering peace, was considered a crucial asset in the fight against terror.

Knowing full well the implications of these words on Israel's future security, I warned then Prime Minister Rabin that "the society that would be created as a result – a society with no Supreme Court, no human rights organizations and no bleeding heart liberals – would be based on fear and unlimited authority." Such a regime, I wrote in numerous articles critical of this approach to peace, would inevitably need external enemies to justify internal repression and maintain its power. Though nothing would have enhanced Israel's security more than promoting a Palestinian society founded on democratic principles and institutions, Israel ushered in a "peace" process that subsidized tyranny.<sup>39</sup>

Should one accept the diagnosis that the PA is either completely or partially based on the totalitarian principle, it then becomes possible to identify the link between structure and political methods. Hannah Arendt devoted careful study to the phenomenon of totalitarianism and analyzed its manifestations, particularly the Soviet and Nazi models. Among her contributions is the explanation of the place of anti-Semitism in the Nazi model, particularly the use of the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, which is constantly reprinted and even televised throughout the Arab world,<sup>40</sup> and, as noted above, is one of Arafat's favorite books:

In another curious and roundabout way, however, the Nazis gave a propaganda answer to the question of what their future rule would be, and that was in their use of *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* as a model for the future organization of the German masses for "world empire"... In terms of mere propaganda, the discovery of the Nazis was that the masses were not so much frightened by Jewish world rule as they were interested in how it could be done, that the popularity of the Protocols was based on admiration and eagerness to learn rather than on hatred...<sup>41</sup> Thus, *The Protocols* presented world conquest as a practical possibility, implied that the whole affair was only a question of inspired or shrewd know-how, and that nobody stood in the way of a German victory over the entire world but a patently small people, the Jews, who ruled it without possessing instruments of violence – an easy opponent, therefore, once their secret was discovered and their method emulated on a larger scale.<sup>42</sup>

Arendt's interpretation of the place of anti-Semitism is but one component of this reality. In the context of the region, the Arab world has enthusiastically embraced this European import and has accepted it with roughly the same purpose and intention: namely, that world Jewry, and particularly Israel, are an obstruction on the route to world domination: in their terminology, the Caliphate. For some Arabs, the Protocols mean much more than an anti-Semitic document for the propagation of blind hate. They represent a program, which predicates both politicide and genocide.

Hannah Arendt identified the use of propaganda as a method of organization in the movement itself and also as an important method of communication with the outside world. Propaganda frequently was combined with terror and became an instrument for creating a new reality based on falsehood and lies:

Totalitarian propaganda is fully developed before the movements seize power, and its services are retained only insofar as totalitarian regimes continue to have dealings with the external non-totalitarian world where totalitarian movements either exist or are being created... As far as possible, this distinction between the doctrine for the initiated and propaganda for the outside world is already realized in the prewar existence of the movements...<sup>43</sup>

Arendt's subsequent innovation was to show how propaganda and terror are linked and how both represent essential elements of the system:

Propaganda is indeed part and parcel of "psychological warfare"; but terror is more. Terror continues to be used by totalitarian regimes even when its psychological aims are achieved; its real horror is that it reigns over a completely subdued population... Propaganda, in other words, is one and possibly the most important instrument of totalitarianism for dealing with the non-totalitarian world; terror, on the contrary, is the very essence of its form of government...<sup>44</sup>

Hannah Arendt also explained the place of lying and falsehood under this form of government. Its purpose was to give the population a sense of consistency and a different reality. This process takes place even before such a government has come to power:

Before they seize power and establish a world according to their doctrines, totalitarian movements conjure up a lying world of consistency which is more adequate to the needs of the human mind than reality itself; in which, through sheer imagination, uprooted masses can feel at home and are spared the never-ending shocks which real life and real experiences deal to human beings and their expectations...<sup>45</sup>

The use of front organizations and fellow travelers as a means of dealing with the outside world is closely related to the purpose of propaganda:

...The sympathizers, who are to all appearances still innocuous fellow citizens in a non-totalitarian society, can hardly be called single-minded fanatics; through them, the movements make their fantastic lies more generally acceptable, can spread their propaganda in milder, more respectable forms, until the whole atmosphere is poisoned with totalitarian elements which are hardly recognizable as such but appear to be normal opinions. The fellow traveler organizations surround the totalitarian movement with a mist of respectability that fools the membership about the true character of the outside world as much as it does the outside world about the true character of the movement.<sup>46</sup>

When, for example, the intellectuals of a free non-totalitarian country spread the ideas of a totalitarian regime in their own society, they become the medium of conveying such ideas. While this approaches the area of method and tactics, it is noteworthy nonetheless. Through fellow travelers it is possible to disseminate ideas without disclosing their sources. And, of course, if one is making use of intellectuals, their helpful enthusiasm may be fully exploited. The dissemination of ideas and its consequences is an important issue in the discussion of propaganda. In fact, the influence of totalitarian ideas on intellectuals is a recurrent theme in the fiction and non-fiction of George Orwell. In his essay, "The Prevention of Literature", Orwell noted its harmful consequences in a free society. He stated that one did not need physically to live under a totalitarian regime in order to experience its detrimental effects on creativity:

...But to be corrupted by totalitarianism, one does not have to live in a totalitarian country. The mere prevalence of certain ideas can spread a kind of poison that makes one subject after another impossible for literary purposes. Whenever there is an enforced orthodoxy – or even two orthodoxies, as often happens – good writing stops...<sup>47</sup>

Orwell described the unique workings of totalitarian thought in distorting a society's collective consciousness of reality. His description of the phenomenon itself and its indirect effects is remarkably similar to that of Hannah Arendt (who wrote on the same subject several years later):

...Totalitarianism demands, in fact, the continuous alteration of the past, and in the long run, probably demands a disbelief in the very existence of the objective truth. The friends of totalitarianism in this country [Great Britain] tend to argue that since absolute truth is not attainable, a big lie is no worse than a little lie. It is pointed out that all historical records are biased and inaccurate, or, on the other hand, that modern physics has proved that what seems to us the real world is an illusion, so that to believe in the evidence of one's senses is simply vulgar philistinism. A totalitarian society which succeeded in perpetuating itself would probably set up a schizophrenic system of thought, in which the laws of common sense held good in everyday life and in certain exact sciences, but could be disregarded by the politician, the historian, and the sociologist. Already there are countless people who would think it scandalous to falsify a scientific textbook, but would see nothing wrong in falsifying an historical fact...<sup>48</sup>

Imagine that this essay was published in England in January 1946! Although Orwell was describing the situation in Great Britain, he could just as well have been writing about Israel's New Historians, who by deconstructing and reinventing national history endeavored to change the country's self-image, erode its self-esteem, and influence the attitudes of a new generation. It is possible here to detect the origin of Orwell's great axiom: "Who controls the past controls the future: who controls the present controls the past."<sup>49</sup>

Similarly, Hannah Arendt wrote, for example, "It takes power, not propaganda skill, to circulate a revised history of the Russian Revolution in which no man by the name of Trotsky was commander-in-chief of the Red Army."<sup>50</sup> (How much less effort was required in our time by the eager builders of "The Peace" to concoct a history of Israel with barely a mention of David Ben-Gurion, the *Mufti*, or the Warsaw Ghetto uprising.<sup>51</sup>) Propaganda is thus employed to spread a totalitarian view of reality compatible with its ideology. Further, ideological rigidity combined with the use of propaganda prevents the possibility of civil discussion or any real form of dialogue or negotiation with the enemy, or between ourselves.

## Chapter II

### Israeli Attitudes and Policy with Regard to Public Diplomacy

Traditionally, "Public Diplomacy", to use the modern expression, has not been a matter of high priority in Israel, a few notable exceptions notwithstanding.<sup>52</sup> This shortcoming may be understood as the consequence of a mistaken premise: that putting Israel's case coherently before the world and defending it was not a security matter. From the beginning, David Ben-Gurion rejected public opinion as a factor in policymaking. He took the position that "the very exercise of seeking the support of world opinion imposes restraints of reason in the development of national policies."<sup>53</sup>

It is true that Moshe Sharett and Abba Eban held dissenting views, but over time, Ben-Gurion's position prevailed.

The conventional wisdom has been to consider issues immediately related to national security and the acquisition of arms to be of the highest priority and foreign policy – which includes information policy – to be of secondary importance. Moshe Dayan succinctly summed things up when he declared, "Israel does not have a foreign policy. It has only a defense policy."<sup>54</sup> Despite such expressions, during its early years, the State occasionally did quite well in

putting its case before the world, perhaps because of the talent available and a climate of good will. During the Six Day War (June 1967), Abba Eban's speech before the UN was a high point and Chaim Herzog's military briefings in English contributed at the time to building Israel's reputation for credibility. Such accomplishments, however, were the exception. Israel's policymakers were unable to foresee a situation when they would have to face an ideological challenge as the world changed.

In January 1975, Bernard Lewis described a change in policy on the part of the PLO: to seek the advantages resulting from adopting a public image of moderation, while remaining true to the strategic goal of politicicide, which could be attained only by violent means:

...They [the PLO] have, however, adopted a change of tactics, and put it into effect with superb use of the techniques of public relations. Without in any way compromising their basic positions, they have managed, to many observers, to convey an impression of moderation and reasonableness. While on the one hand appearing, where appropriate, as liberal patriots of somewhat conservative disposition, they have on the other hand contrived to maintain close links with the international; guerilla and terrorist movements...<sup>55</sup>

In June 1974, the Palestine National Council, which met in Cairo, adopted the "Strategy of Stages".

They make it clear that the PLO was not prepared to renounce any of its maximalist positions, that it would regard any such state [a Palestinian state on the West Bank] as a first step toward its ultimate aim of an all-Palestine State, and that the struggle to attain this end would continue.<sup>56</sup>

Lewis described the formation of a long-term military policy combined with and camouflaged by a political policy of moderation. One could make the case that the Palestinian adversary has been amazingly consistent over the years. While remaining faithful to the goal of politicicide, it has achieved remarkably significant political and territorial gains.

Conversely, Israel continued to regard public diplomacy in nearly the same terms expressed by Moshe Dayan. If there were a policy, it was rather one of slogans and wishful thinking. By not having a coherent approach, we have paid a high price. Principally in the area of tactics and especially in public relations, Israel has experienced a number of stinging defeats – particularly regarding its policies and deeds in Lebanon.

Basically, Israel lacked and still lacks a comprehensive political strategy in the broadest sense. Apparently guided by wishful thinking and eventually adopting the false premise that public statements were not to be taken at face value, Israel assumed that it was possible to make peace with the PLO. If this could be done, it was thought, all other related problems would fall into place. Other Arab countries would accept Israel and, in turn, the nations of the world would follow, and the dream of Zionism would be fulfilled. *Ergo*, peace would be the best form of security. These premises were highly attractive, if not seductive. For their advocates who considered that intention took precedence over consequences, such ideas made sense. As part of this program, the makers of Israel's policy endeavored to create a new reality by changing the image of the PLO to conform to their hopes and to suppress information contrary to this vision.

To act upon these assumptions represented a departure from established policy. According to some, it required a "leap of faith". Others maintained that it was a reckless gamble. In addition to the rejection of known facts in policymaking, there was a cover-up of the inconvenient reality. This entailed two processes: a denial of external reality and renouncing "the application of reason to the human situation". The rejection of historical experience

resulted in immoderate optimism, which happens particularly when policy is divorced from reality. One could argue that with time, the policy of pursuit of “The Peace” involved the creation of an imaginary world comprised of ideology and sentimental intentions.

Israel’s information policy was adapted to conform to a pre-conception. It denied the need for public diplomacy in order to set forward Israel’s positions. It covered up incongruent information and actively pursued a program of public relations in order to polish up the image of the PLO.

As one of his first acts in office, Shimon Peres ordered the closure of the Foreign Ministry’s Information Department, unilaterally suspending the century-old battle to win the sympathy of the world for the Jewish national cause.<sup>57</sup>

In May 1993, Peres exclaimed: “If you have a good policy, you do not need public relations, and if you have a bad policy, public relations will not help,”<sup>58</sup> which meant that Israel’s deeds and policies would have to speak for themselves. But what would happen if a policy were sound, but world opinion did not agree? Would a policy now be considered sound only if accepted by others?

The divorce of policy from reality resulted in a disability, and to the extent that some kind of rationalization was put forward, it was advanced in the form of slogans, such as:

1. If things do not work out, we can always return to the *status quo ante* (something which never happens in real life);
2. Israel would pursue peace as if there were no terrorism, and fight terrorism as if there were no peace process;<sup>59</sup>
3. Arafat is the only political leader with whom we can make peace;
4. There is no military solution, only a political one, etc.

Halford J. MacKinder, the British geographer, explained at the beginning of the last century how “catch phrases” have the effect of putting the mind to sleep:

The catch phrase and oft-repeated metaphor produce a certain kind of pleasure in the reader, the pleasure of recognition by the mind’s ear. It is a musical pleasure in its essence, but it is fatal to original thought... Now, owing to repetition, they have the effect of a lullaby...<sup>60</sup>

Indeed, the effect of such “catch words” was to kill original thought, not only on their intended audience but also on the policymakers themselves. One could argue that twice within a generation Israel’s strategic policymakers have entered into a state of perception failure (*tauth be-conceptsia*).<sup>61</sup>

Even before Oslo, in 1986, several basic themes could be identified in Israel’s information policy. Foreign Minister Peres and his deputy, Yossi Beilin, revised the way in which the government would relate to the PLO. “They asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to cease distribution of the PLO Covenant... They asked that the ministry stop defining the PLO as an enemy.” According to media expert David Bedein, “the 1986 Peres/Beilin policy change paved the way two years later for the US government to recognize the PLO.”<sup>62</sup> Bedein, television commentator Ehud Yaari, and Yoram Hazony have expressed the view that, from 1993-2000, Israel has given the Palestinians a “free ride”, helping to polish up their image and to suppress the inconvenient reality of Palestinian incitement and violence. Yaari described the situation as follows:

We have been, for the past seven or eight years, acting as if we were the PR agency for Chairman Arafat. We went around the world asking for donations for him. We brought Arafat

the Nobel Prize. We marketed the notion of the golden beaches of a New Middle East within sight! It was our production, not Arafat's. The whole Oslo process has been very costly for us.<sup>63</sup>

This policy was combined with what David Bedein has called the “don't tell” policy which consisted of downplaying terrorist attacks and turning a blind eye to the double game of the Palestinians' professing peace in their English communications and calling for war in Arabic. Noteworthy is Bedein's report that the “don't tell” policy continued consistently under Benjamin Netanyahu. At Wye, in October 1998, Bedein asked the Israel embassy in Washington why it did not distribute material on the subject of Palestinian incitement and received this reply: “The Israeli government downplays the reality of Arafat's PA in order not to alienate the US government.”<sup>64</sup> Even during Netanyahu's tenure, there was not a hint of such problems in a slick brochure printed on heavy chromo-stock by the Information Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in mid-December 1998.<sup>65</sup>

This pattern points to two very interesting issues: self-censorship and the role of the United States. As part of any information policy, information held back is balanced against information distributed. One must ask: Who benefited from the policy of self-censorship? Likewise, the American contribution to the suppression of relevant information must be addressed. In November 2000, the Barak government financed and published a “White Book” documenting Palestinian violations of the Oslo Accords.<sup>66</sup> Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben Ami dissociated his ministry from it.<sup>67</sup> It was reported that the US State Department forcefully expressed its displeasure and that some heavy-handed bullying ensued. The IMRA news service reported that the reason for this displeasure was that the book was potentially damaging to the US State Department, which had provided a series of false reports to the Senate regarding Palestinian compliance.<sup>68</sup> It is reported that in April 2001, Foreign Minister Peres managed to suppress a second “White Book”.<sup>69</sup>

Similarly, it seems that the State Department showed some consistency in obstructing the truth and covering for the PA. Muhammad Dahlan, formerly Chairman Arafat's National Security Advisor, explained in an interview published on October 16, 2002 in the London-based Arabic daily *Al-Hayat* how Secretary of State Colin Powell plotted with the PA to suppress information concerning the mission of the illegal weapons' ship, the *Karin-A*.

Dahlan revealed that Palestinian leaders agreed with the Americans that Secretary of State Colin Powell would declare that the *Karin-A* ship was heading to *Hizbullah* and not to the PA. The Americans wanted a senior Palestinian to declare that if it is proven that anyone from the PA was involved in the operation, we would settle the account with him. But because we are so smart, we said: “Powell cleared us from the ship affair.” The Americans realized that they are facing a gang or a mafia, and this was what caused the explosion of the crisis with the Americans and created a big diplomatic scandal.<sup>70</sup>

Through the choice of the information published and censored, the Foreign Ministry functionally managed an information policy for the benefit of others, particularly the PA.<sup>71</sup> The consistency of this pattern indicates that more was going on than a rejection of public relations, as Shimon Peres disingenuously stated. While the State was doing PR for the enemy, the real question was: Who was standing up for the *Medina*? It was not the government, but a number of independent providers who conveyed a completely different type of information to the public. Such bodies dealt with the disharmony between what the Palestinians, particularly Arafat, fed the world in English and what they told their own public in Arabic. Those who recognized the importance of this disharmony and spoke out came from outside the defense establishment and the government. For example, Brigadier General (res.) Yigal Carmon, currently President of the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI)

furnished MK Benny Begin with a recording of Yasser Arafat's speech in a Johannesburg mosque in May 1994. There,

Arafat likened the Oslo Accord to the prophet Muhammad's *Hudaibiya* truce accord with the Qureish tribe – Muhammad, the PA leader reminded his audience, signed the agreement with the intention of violating it once his power was consolidated.<sup>72</sup>

This speech was one of the earliest and certainly the most dramatic pieces of evidence that Arafat did not enter into an agreement with Israel in good faith. Others followed.

From this modest beginning, there emerged several new information agencies directed to elite opinion. They began on private initiative in the margins and moved into the mainstream, informing the public and policymakers. Bodies such as MEMRI, IMRA (Israel Independent Media Review and Analysis), PMW (Palestine Media Watch), CMIP (Center for Monitoring the Impact of Peace), The Israel Resource News Agency, The Middle East News Line, and the *Daily Alert* of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs have brought high quality information to the public in Israel and abroad on a timely basis and have influenced the public debate. Such non-governmental media sources filled a need that government ministries had failed to address. Even had it wished, the government of Israel could never have succeeded in launching operations of this quality and mobilizing outstanding talent from Israel and abroad. It is noteworthy that such information agencies have become first-class platforms for reaching and persuading elite opinion abroad, using the "strategy of the truth". These organizations have the potential advantage that they can enter into areas that the government might not want to touch. Perhaps, over time, the qualitative advantage of Israel's healthy civil society which makes it possible for its citizens to undertake such initiatives and parliamentarians to ask painful questions, will tip the balance of the ideological war in its favor.

## Chapter III

### War Propaganda

The world has changed since the early days of the State, and the time has come to rethink the entire issue of public information.<sup>73</sup> Propaganda is a tool of war, and our enemies are using it against us. Its traditional objective is to persuade one's nation of the justice of its cause, to make the necessary personal sacrifices for a sustained struggle,<sup>74</sup> to demoralize the enemy, and to win the sympathy of the uncommitted. Not the least, it may also be used to project a favorable national image and promote the sale of local products. Two outstanding examples of the use of war propaganda in the twentieth century were Great Britain during the First World War and Nazi Germany before and during the Second World War.

Great Britain was the pioneer in the development of wartime propaganda, directed both to mass and elite audiences. The major accomplishment of its elite propaganda was bringing about the intervention of the United States in the First World War. Domestically, it was able to encourage the British public to support the war effort and to attract recruits to its armed forces. More important was the fact that it was able to shorten the war by hastening the dissolution of the Habsburg Empire by sowing discord among its peoples. One great success was to bring about the desertion of Imperial German troops on the Western front. Roughly a generation later, Nazi Germany adopted the British approach, particularly with regard to the use of mass propaganda. Mass propaganda made use of the basic principles of advertising, particularly repetition. This method served as the basis of the "Big Lie". Arab and Palestinian propaganda have used this method to prepare the ground for the destruction of the State of



Israel. It is used on all levels, not only in the media, but also in school textbooks, sermons in mosques, and in contacts with other governments and international bodies.

One may find the basic principles of the Nazi approach in the chapter entitled "War Propaganda",<sup>75</sup> of *Mein Kampf*, where Hitler openly states that he emulated the model of World War I British propaganda.<sup>76</sup> For Hitler, the guiding principle was that the message should never be ambiguous; it should be directed to the masses; it should be constantly repeated according to the principles of advertising; that the end justifies the means; and it is not particularly important that the message be true. The message may actually be outrageous, but with sufficient repetition people will begin to believe most everything.<sup>77</sup>

Borrowing a lesson from the enemy, he made the British approach his own:

All advertising, whether in the field of business or politics, achieves success through the continuity and sustained uniformity of its application.

Here too, the example of enemy war propaganda [Great Britain's] was typical: limited to a few points, devised exclusively for the masses, carried on with indefatigable persistence. Once the basic ideas and methods of execution were recognized as correct, they were applied throughout the whole war without the slightest change. At first the claims of the propaganda were so impudent that people thought it insane; later, it got on people's nerves; and in the end, it was believed. After four and a half years, a revolution broke out in Germany; and its slogans originated in the enemy's propaganda.<sup>78</sup>

Emulating Nazi Germany's war propaganda methods, Israel's enemies have disseminated numerous lies with considerable success.<sup>79</sup> It is noteworthy that our Arab enemies, particularly the Palestinians, have also found Nazi Germany's anti-Semitic themes congenial. The lies with which we must contend include, among others, those which present "historic" claims, such as fabricated Palestinian claims to nationhood and to the land. During the campaign in Lebanon (1982), a forgery that caused serious damage was a doctored photograph of a Lebanese girl who was maimed allegedly by Israeli bombing. When President Reagan saw the photo, he angrily picked up the phone to Prime Minister Begin and demanded an immediate end to the bombing of West Beirut, and Begin did what he was told.<sup>80</sup> (President Reagan also kept this picture on his desk.<sup>81</sup>) In 1983, a modern blood libel accused Israel of poisoning schoolgirls in Judea and Samaria.<sup>82</sup> When the hoax was exposed, neither the international press nor the UN retracted these accusations or set the record straight. Similarly, a German television documentary investigation (*ARD-Das Rote Quatrat*) recently threw into question the commonly accepted accusation that on September 30, 2000, Muhammad al-Dura, a Palestinian boy, was killed by Israeli gunfire at the Netzarim junction in Gaza.<sup>83</sup> Furthermore, the Palestinians recently made great efforts to launch a new lie: namely, that a massacre took place in Jenin (April 2002).<sup>84</sup>


In addition to lies disseminated about specific events, far-reaching falsifications of history have been circulated. This sort of rubbish may be found in the claim that the Canaanites were an Arab people and that the Palestinians are their descendents<sup>85</sup>; that Jesus was not a Jew; that the Temple was built in Shechem, not in Jerusalem; and that Jews today have no historical claim either to the Temple Mount or to Jerusalem. This represents an attack on the essence of Israel's claim to this land, because if there is no claim to Jerusalem and the Temple Mount, there is no claim to the rest of the country. Under our noses, we are witnessing the elaboration of the greatest lie in this contest: the fabrication of a counterfeit history for people who did not exist two generations ago. Here, particularly, the battle for the past truly has become a battle for the present and the future.<sup>86</sup>

Zuhair Muhsein, who was once a leader of the pro-Syrian *Al Saika* faction, a terrorist organization, and head of the military section and member of the Executive Council of the PLO, disclosed in a March 1977 interview in Cairo that there was no such thing as a Palestinian people. It should be noted that he expressed himself in these words at the end of Rabin's first term, which, in retrospect, indicates the formulation of a long-term strategy:

There are no differences between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. We are part of one people, the Arab nation... Only for political reasons do we carefully emphasize our Palestinian identity. The fact is that it is in the national interest to encourage the existence of the Palestinians against Zionism. Indeed, the existence of a separate Palestinian identity is only for tactical reasons. The establishment of a Palestinian state is a new means of carrying on the struggle against Israel and for Arab unity... After we have gained our rights to all of Palestine, we must not for a moment postpone the reunification of Jordan and Palestine.<sup>87</sup>

In this context, a citation from Arthur M. Schlesinger is appropriate:

History is a weapon. Perhaps their vicissitudes as a nation – from democracy to Nazism to communism back to democracy in half a century – have made Czechs particularly sensitive to the manipulations of history. “The first step in liquidating a people,” a historian observes in Milan Kundera's *The Book of Laughter and Forgetting*, “is to erase its memory. Destroy its books, its culture, its history. Then have somebody write new books, manufacture a new culture, invent a new history. Before long the nation will begin to forget what it is and what it was.”<sup>88</sup>



\*Facts

\*\*Israeli *Hasbara*

\*\*\*The Hostile Media

\*\*\*\*Oil

\*\*\*\*\*Anti-Semitism

Disguised untruth may be found in the terminology and slogans that the Palestinians and others have disseminated by means of “semantic infiltration”, such as the term, “occupied territories”, evoking a false comparison with the horrors of the German occupation of Europe during the Second World War.<sup>89</sup> Not to be neglected is the fact that within Israel, many slogans that originated in the enemy’s war propaganda have gained currency. Israel Army Radio, for examples, refers to the “West Bank” or “Territories” instead of Judea and Samaria, which are the correct Hebrew geographic terms, like the Galilee or the Negev. According to Terrence Prittie, a well-known British journalist of the time, it was the British Foreign Office that in 1980 launched the concept of the centrality of the Palestinian Question:

This new policy is based on a precept which is also a blatant fallacy – that the settlement of the “Palestinian Question”, which is the principle bone of contention between Arabs and Israelis, would enable all the other pieces of the Middle East jigsaw to fall neatly into place, resulting in peace, progress and prosperity for all.<sup>90</sup>

One of the most dangerous consequences of war propaganda is the possibility that individuals may actually act on such untruths; particularly the unproven proposition, now in fashion, that unreciprocated concessions will bring peace. A concrete example of this hope, which was not realized, was Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon [June 2000] whose example helped bring on the Second Armed Uprising (known as the *Aqsa Intifada*). Recently, there have been calls for a similar concession, namely, a unilateral withdrawal from Judea and Samaria. This type of agitation may not be a spontaneous expression of idealism, but is rooted in the traditions of European pacifism. The French political commentator, Jean François Revel, pointed out that during the Cold War, the Communist Bloc repeatedly encouraged the parties of the Left to press for unreciprocated concessions in their respective countries, particularly unilateral disarmament.

The original purpose of this old stratagem was to destabilize western democracies.<sup>91</sup> It dates back to 1922 when Lenin instructed Georghy V. Chicherin, the head of the Bolshevik delegation to the International Conference in Genoa, to present the conference with “a vast pacifist program”. When Chicherin was shocked by what he understood was reversal of policy, he asked for clarifications, Lenin cynically replied,

Comrade Chicherin, you are too nervous... In the name of our revolutionary proletarian party’s program, you and I have fought against pacifism. But tell me, then, where and when the Party has refused *to use pacifism to break up the enemy...*[?]<sup>92</sup>

The same principle of “breaking up the enemy”, used against Israel, may be identified in the case of reservists who refuse to serve in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. The issue of the “*sarvanei giyus*” is particularly sensitive in a society whose citizen army requires widespread public support in order to function effectively. While the status of conscientious objector is generally accepted, the manner in which this issue has played in the media and the court system makes it difficult to rule out the possibility of an organized effort to erode the public consensus behind the IDF. At the very least, this potential danger to Israel’s democracy demands careful observation.

## Chapter IV

### Some Proposed Objectives for Israel's Information Policy


Once the government of Israel makes the basic decision to fight the war of ideas, it may then identify a number of strategic goals. This step will imply some significant, but attainable changes of policy. The main issue is one of content, of supporting government policy with public diplomacy. A clear policy is needed for a successful information program. National identity and leadership are closely related to the information efforts derived from them. Here, an example of firm leadership logically constitutes the most effective component of an information policy. One of the central figures responsible for the success of British information during the First and Second World Wars was Lt. Col. Sir Campbell Stuart, who summed up the guiding principles of Britain's war propaganda efforts, as follows: "In order to be successful, propaganda must be related to a defined policy, such as war aims; it must be rigorously truthful and must never be self-contradictory."<sup>93</sup>

If there is a clear and unambiguous policy, then practical aspects of implementation will quickly become evident. Israel can build an effective information policy directed toward three strategic goals, the first being the most important:

1. Israel, a democracy, must be seen to be waging a just war of defense by fair means against an evil regime.<sup>94</sup> It must speak with one voice. The Prime Minister must speak to Israel's citizens and to the world, to explain the situation in clear and simple language. This would help maintain public morale and support for the government's policies. (At the same time, Israel should continuously endeavor to develop a positive image in order to help sell its products, attract tourism, and nurture international ties of commerce and good understanding.)
2. Israel must aggressively refute Arab propaganda and keep the record straight. It must expose lies and give true facts in their place. Such lies cannot be allowed by default to gain currency. Israel must have a message for the Arab states. The Palestine issue must be downgraded, and the world's attention should be focused on higher priority issues, namely Iraq and Iran.<sup>95</sup>
3. Israel must safeguard a world ideological environment that will reinforce established traditions of the Judeo-Hellenic heritage. This is a critical area where Jews and Christians share a common interest.

In the matter of national identity and defense policy, there can be no such thing as publicly "agreeing to disagree". This vice is not tolerated in other Western democracies, and certainly has no place here. After the cabinet has made decisions, ministers are not entitled to air their personal views, except to explain and support policies that have been adopted. It is a matter of utmost importance that coalition discipline be maintained. Probably the most sensitive area where political activity can undermine a country's policy is a public display of disunity. A novel example of this was Foreign Minister Peres' speech in the UN on November 16, 2001, expressing his personal views on a substantive issue of state. Despite all disclaimers, it represents a refusal to accept responsibility for one's own government's policy. The fact that such an act was tolerated may be understood to be the price of a national unity government. It is an extremely high price because its net effect is to weaken Israel's posture. Any other country, regardless of the issue would not tolerate such an act. From the point of view of simple common sense and the widely accepted traditions of parliamentary democracy, such an act has no logic or justification.

As a sovereign state, Israel has the right to defend itself against its enemies from within and without. In a democracy, there is customarily a balance between individual liberties and responsibility. Freedom of speech and legal political activity must be distinguished from “aiding and comforting the enemy”, providing the enemy with information, acting as the agent of a foreign country and receiving payment for political action.<sup>96</sup> The line between legal political activity and subversion must be clearly defined. The government must enforce, and be seen to enforce, existing legislation governing acceptable behavior in a democratic society.



In this cartoon, “Srulik” is balancing “Freedom” on one side and “Security” on the other.

*Vis à vis* the Arab world, it is necessary to fight the ideological war vigorously. Every lie must be exposed, simply because the cost of not doing so has already been painfully high. Israel must look to the long term and think big. To the extent that the Arab states try to make Israel a pariah state in the region and in the international community, Israel must endeavor to discredit its enemies – they are enemies – in the eyes of the civilized world. There is a great choice of means and methods. There is, for example, a need for more official white books and a website, perhaps from the Israel State Archives, to publish a series of captured PA documents in the original and in translation which link this body with terrorist acts, for example the “Aqsa Martyrs’ Invoice”, and show documented evidence of the support it receives from neighboring Arab countries for the purpose of terror. World opinion must always be reminded of their infinite hatred, corruption and mistreatment of women, proclivities toward terrorism and violence, financial support of terror, religious fanaticism,

inability to admit their own shortcomings and to accept responsibility of their mistakes, and the danger they represent to democratic societies.

One of Yasser Arafat's objectives was to force the Palestinian cause to the top of the world's agenda.<sup>97</sup> Conversely, Israel, by means of public diplomacy, should do its utmost to minimize the urgency of the Palestinian case and consistently define the issue in a more favorable way to its own cause. There should be an absolute end to the policy of "free rides" (and free lunches). To achieve this end, more should be done to target enemies that have enjoyed some type of immunity, such as the Palestinian Authority, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UNWRA and others and to discredit them. For the Palestinians, public propaganda – like terror – belongs to the poor man's war. It entails minimal risks and brings great returns. Israel must recover the advantage it lost due to arrogance, laziness, ignorance, and shortsightedness. A good name is a type of asset. Israel must protect and safeguard this important asset.

Further, Israel must have a message for the Palestinian Arabs: Israelis really wanted peace but were done out of it at Oslo. Yehudah Amichai once said, "It **does** matter who fired the first shot."<sup>98</sup> (And it does matter who blew up the first bus.) If there is to be a real peace, Israel should not have to make all the sacrifices. Because of the PA's bad faith, both sides lost the benefits of peace. They should also be reminded constantly of Israel's historical claim to this land: that there has been nearly continuous Jewish settlement here (and not just after the Holocaust), and that from the nineteenth century, Jerusalem has had a Jewish majority. It must be emphasized to the Palestinians and to others that certain defensive measures Israel has taken were not intended to cause pain and inconvenience. They became necessary because the PA failed to honor its obligations. The Palestinians know the truth and must be reminded of it constantly. Not the least, it should be emphasized, that psychological warfare is most effective at a time when an enemy is weakened. Efforts should be made to encourage those Arabs who would like to put their arms down and live on terms of equality and friendship with Jews and with Israel.

Within the broadest perspective, the purpose of Israel's information policy should be to create and preserve a congenial world cultural environment in which it can thrive and Jews can live in peace. This type of cultural environment provides the context which gives meaning and relevance to such ideas as freedom, democracy, and fair play. There is an advantage when policies find their place within such a context. If such a context exists, it may thus be possible to come forward with a policy that would be good for the State but not necessarily popular. Such was the case with the position that there is no such thing as "good terror" and "bad terror". Israel's Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, advanced this principle in his "Czechoslovakia Speech" of October 4, 2001. It was challenged at first but ultimately prevailed because of the presence of an underlying belief in man's equality before law, a Biblical principle at the foundation of modern western culture. It was possible to evoke this principle because of its wide acceptance. It would not have been possible if the opposite were the case.

The fabric of the basic morality of Judeo-Hellenic civilization, democracy, and the rule of law is very important to Israel, and for this reason its enemies, particularly the anti-Semites, endeavor to destroy it. Israel must safeguard a positive cultural environment, just as a country must protect its own airspace. The alternative is a world of relativism and *anomie*,<sup>99</sup> where "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter," of double-standards, moral equivalence, defining evil down, the elevation of immaturity over experience, and the falsification of history. Israel has allies in this struggle, particularly the Christians. It should accept their help and encourage them, because of a shared interest in safeguarding a world where peaceful democracies, governed by law, may flourish. If Israel can preserve a positive cultural environment, it will have an improved advantage in the implementation of one of its

long-term strategic objectives: to establish “a Jewish Commonwealth integrated in the structure of the democratic world.”

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## Appendix I

### On Diaspora Jewry:

The Almighty placed massive oil deposits under Arab soil, and the Arab States have exploited this good fortune for political ends during the past half-century. It is our good fortune that God placed five million Jews in America. And we have no less of a right to benefit from their influence with the US Government to help us survive and prosper.

Assistant Director-General of the Foreign Ministry, Gershon Avner, to a visiting State Department official (1960), as quoted by Michael Brecher, *The Foreign Policy System of Israel: Setting, Images, Process*, Oxford: OUP, 1972, p. 503.

## Appendix II

### The Futility of Speaking with the Totalitarian Leader

This total responsibility for everything done by the movement and this total identification with every one of its functionaries have the very practical consequence that nobody ever experiences a situation in which he has to be responsible for his own actions or can explain the reasons for them. Since the Leader has monopolized the right and possibility of explanation, he appears to the outside world as the only person who knows what he is doing *i.e.*, the only representative of the movement with whom one may still talk in nontotalitarian terms and who, if reproached or opposed, cannot say: Don't ask me, ask the Leader. Being in the center of the movement, the Leader can act as though he were above it. It is therefore perfectly understandable (and perfectly futile) for outsiders to set their hopes time and again on a personal talk with the Leader himself when they have to deal with totalitarian movements or governments. **The real mystery of the totalitarian Leader resides in an organization which makes it possible for him to assume the total responsibility for all crimes committed by the elite formations of the movement and to claim at the same time, the honest, innocent respectability of its most naïve fellow traveler.**

Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., p. 375.

### The Essence of Chamberlain's futile hopes of reasoning with Totalitarian Leaders

...Mr. Chamberlain had taken into his own hands the steering wheel of foreign policy. Instead of the middle course which had been followed by previous statesmen, he struck off on a new line, veering well to starboard, and avoiding the cranks, the experts, and the sentimentalists on the port side. He was, he explained, a "realist" in foreign affairs. The constant opposition to the Dictators could only end in trouble; the line was to talk to the Dictators as man to man, to try to understand their point of view, to try to satisfy their reasonable aspirations; and meanwhile not to annoy or irritate them by any outspokenness, by any Press or parliamentary indiscretions, by any too overt sympathy with provocative things such as collective security, the League of Nations, the independence of small countries, the Spanish republicans, or the USSR... Mr. Anthony Eden ventured to doubt whether Signor Mussolini was keeping the agreement not to intervene in the Spanish civil war; he was obliged to resign his post as Foreign Secretary. Mr. Duff Cooper ventured to doubt whether Herr Hitler would keep to the pledges which he had given at Munich; he also retired from the Cabinet. Mr. Chamberlain merely gripped the steering



wheel more firmly and continued upon the course that he had chosen. He might well have succeeded. Had he been dealing with men of even average reason or good faith it might have been that under his firm guidance the ship of State would have reached the blessed isles of peace... No sane person can doubt the purity of the Prime Minister's intentions. The only thing that was lacking was an understanding of the true nature of the Nazi movement... He and his advisor, Sir Horace Wilson, stepped into diplomacy with the bright faithfulness of two curates entering a pub for the first time; they did not observe the difference between a social gathering and a rough house; not did they realise that the tough guys therein assembled did not either speak or understand their language. They imagined that they were as decent and as honorable as themselves.

Harold Nicolson, *Why Britain is at War*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, April 1940 reprint, pp. 83-84.

### Appendix III

#### On Propaganda:

...that branch of the art of lying which consists in very nearly deceiving your friends, without quite deceiving your enemies.

F.M. Cornford, 1922 cited by W.K.C. Guthrie, "Foreword", *Microcosmographia Academica*, Cambridge: Bowes & Bowes, 9<sup>th</sup> impression, 1973.

#### General Erich Ludendorff [1865-1937], on the Effectiveness of British Propaganda:

...We were hypnotized by the enemy propaganda as a rabbit is by a snake. It was exceptionally clever and conceived on a great scale. It worked by strong mass suggestion, kept in touch with the military situation and was unscrupulous as to the means it used...

As quoted by Philip M. Taylor, *British Propaganda in the Twentieth Century*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh Press, 1999, p. 49.

### Appendix IV

#### The Superiority of Totalitarian Propaganda

The fundamental reason for the superiority of totalitarian propaganda over the propaganda of other parties and movements is that its content, for the members of the movement at any rate, is no longer an objective issue about which people may have opinions, but has become as real and untouchable an element in their lives as the rules of arithmetic. The organization of the entire texture of life according to an ideology can be fully carried out only under a totalitarian regime...

The advantages of a propaganda that constantly "adds the power of organization" to the feeble an unreliable voice of argument, and thereby realizes, so to speak, on the spur of the moment, whatever it says, are obvious beyond demonstration. Foolproof against arguments based on a reality which the movements promised to change, against a counterpropaganda disqualified by

the mere fact that it belongs to or defends a world which the shiftless masses cannot and will not accept, it can be disproved only by another, a stronger or better, reality.

*The Origins of Totalitarianism*, p. 363.

## Appendix V

### The Distinctive Features of Modernity and the Modern Historical Method

...The Middle Ages, which possessed good writers of contemporary narrative, were careless and impatient of older fact. They became content to be deceived, to live in twilight of fiction, under clouds of false witness, inventing according to convenience, and glad to welcome the forger and the cheat. As time went on, the atmosphere of accredited mendacity thickened, until, in the Renaissance, the art of exposing falsehood dawned upon keen Italian minds. It was then that History as we understand it began to be understood, and the illustrious dynasty of scholars arose to whom we still look both for method and material. Unlike the dreaming prehistoric world, ours knows the need and the duty to make itself master of the earlier times, and to forfeit nothing of their wisdom or their earlier warnings, and has devoted its best energy and treasure to the sovereign purpose of detecting error and vindicating entrusted truth.

John Edward Emerich Acton, *Lectures on Modern History*, eds. John Neville Figgis and Reginald Vere Laurence, London: Macmillan, 1906, pp. 4-5.

[Shimon Peres' view of history:] I am totally uninterested in the past. If you wouldn't ask me I wouldn't talk about it. The past bores me. Listen, it bores me for two reasons: it never repeats itself and secondly it is unchangeable. So why should I concern myself with it?

Michael Kapel, "Shimon's Vision: An Interview with Shimon Peres", *Australia/Israel Review*, Vol. 22, No. 8, June 6-26, 1997), p 6, <[www.aijac.org.au/review/1997/228](http://www.aijac.org.au/review/1997/228)>.

## Appendix VI

*Mevaker HaMedina. Doch Shenati 53 Aleph* [Annual Report 53 A], Jerusalem: State of Israel 2002, p. 10. The report is also available on the following website: <[mevaker.gov.il](http://mevaker.gov.il)>.

The apparatus of *Hasbarah* of the Foreign Ministry was not prepared on time for the possibility of an armed confrontation with the Palestinians, and preparation of plans of action for *Hasbarah* abroad were totally lacking, particularly addressing the needs which would be urgently required for sensitive fronts of confrontation. A major part of various work processes held in common in the area of foreign *Hasbarah*, which were concentrated in the Foreign Ministry, such as the procedure of coordinating foreign *Hasbarah* were not carried out. The Foreign Ministry was not even designated as the leading professional coordinator for the field of *Hasbarah* abroad. As a result, the professional aspect of the work of *Hasbarah* was not dealt with comprehensively: a center of professional knowledge designated for foreign *Hasbarah* was not developed, and, in any case, there was no professional guidance for *Hasbarah* abroad for all of the government parties dealing with it in the State of Israel.

## Endnotes

- <sup>1</sup> During the 1970s Yehoshafat Harkabi who advanced this thesis, particularly in *Arab Strategies and Israel's Response*, New York: The Free Press, 1977. Later in life, he advocated the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in his book, *Israel's Fateful Hour*, New York: Harper, 1989.
- <sup>2</sup> In this case, there may be some validity to Hannah Arendt's thesis that totalitarian regimes govern by terror, and require propaganda and falsehood in order to impose their reality upon their own people and others.
- <sup>3</sup> See particularly Y. Harkabi, *Arab Attitudes to Israel*, Jerusalem: Keter, 1972. With regard to "falsehood and distortions", see pp. 347-352.
- <sup>4</sup> Op. cit., *Arab Strategies and Israel's Response*, pp. 41-77. He also wrote:
 

Historically, the methodology advocated by this school of thought is a refined version of Habib Bourguiba's proposal in 1965 to achieve the Arab objective in a step by step political fashion, which he called the "phases method" (*Uslūb al-Marāhil*), advocating that Arabs give up the all-out-war idea and demand rather that Israel withdraw to the 1947 Partition Resolution boundaries and thus make UN resolutions a primary weapon against Israel.
- <sup>5</sup> Ibid., p. 99. Emphasis mine.
- <sup>6</sup> Probably the finest and most comprehensive examination of post-Zionist thought, its foreign and domestic implications may be found in Yoram Hazony's chapter, "The Political Struggle for a Post-Jewish State", in *The Jewish State*, New York: Basic Books, 2000, pp. 39-73.
- <sup>7</sup> Natan Sharansky "From Helsinki to Oslo", *Journal of International Security Affairs*, (JINSA) No. 1, Summer 2001, p. 28:
 

First, as Shimon Peres had asserted on numerous occasions, the premise of Oslo was that the abyss we faced with the Palestinians would have to be traversed in one giant leap of faith. According to this view, the mutual recognition called for in the accord would trigger an irreversible political and economic chain reaction that would rapidly transform our relationship with the Palestinians and quickly usher in a "New Middle East". While any agreement with the Palestinians would have required crossing a psychological Rubicon, I believed that the way to overcome our mutual distrust was by seeing concrete changes in the present, not by being told simply to forget the past.
- <sup>8</sup> John Fonte, "Liberal Democracy vs. Transnational Progressivism: The Future of Ideological Civil War Within the West", *Orbis*, Summer 2002, p. 5.
- <sup>9</sup> Ibid.; "Why There is a Culture War: Gramsci and Tocqueville in America", *Policy Review*, December 2000-January 2001. According to Fonte, elite activists in America followed the Marxist doctrine of Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937), according to whom
 

Power...is exercised by privileged groups or classes in two ways: through domination, force, or coercion, and through something called "hegemony", which means the ideological supremacy of a system of values that supports the class or group interests of the predominant classes or groups...Gramsci believed that it was necessary first to deligitimize the dominant belief systems of the predominant groups and create a "counter-hegemony" (i.e. a new system of values for the subordinate groups) before the marginalized could be empowered.
- <sup>10</sup> There is considerable literature on this subject but mostly in the form of newspaper articles. See particularly: Judy Lash Balint, "Not Help, But Interference", *Jerusalem Report*, August 27, 2001, p. 54 and by the same author, "Europeans in the ME: Assistance or Interference?", *Emunah*, Spring/Summer 2002, pp. 12-15.
- <sup>11</sup> Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., New York: Meridian, 1958, p. 469.

- <sup>12</sup> E.g. Ari Shavit, “Mr. Peace Now”, *Ha’aretz Magazine*, November 8, 2002, p. 15.
- <sup>13</sup> Commenting on Begin being drawn into Lebanon, Harkabi cited the Talmud: “A person proceeds on the path he wishes to be led.”, *Israel’s Fateful Hour*, p. 101.
- <sup>14</sup> The behavior of bureaucracies is a subject in its own right. American political theorist Kenneth Weinstein described the current development of “European political thought based on the idea of an objective popular will that is better and more altruistic than that of the individual citizen.” According to S.T. Karnick,
- The European Union’s governance style reflects these ideas splendidly. It is designed to get things done and is therefore expert-oriented, bureaucratic, unyielding, and centralized. It cannot allow much room for disagreement, because to dissent against the government is to undermine what it embodies: the objective public will.
- S.T. Karnick, “As Europe Marches On...”, NRO, April 18, 2001, <<http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-karnickprint041701.html>>.
- <sup>15</sup> Op. cit., *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., p. 471.
- <sup>16</sup> George Orwell, *The Collected Essays, Vol. 4, In Front of Your Nose, 1945-1950*, eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970, p. 153. As George Orwell has reminded us:
- ...we are all capable of believing things which we know to be untrue, and then, when we are finally proved wrong, impudently twisting the facts to show that we were right. Intellectually, it is possible to carry on this process for an indefinite time: the only check on it is sooner or later a false belief bumps up against solid reality, usually on a battlefield.
- <sup>17</sup> Coner Cruise O’Brien, *The Siege*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986, p. 225. Similarly, in his famous speech at the UN against the proposition: Zionism equals Racism, Chaim Herzog read the passages from the Bible recounting how Abraham purchased the *Ma’arat HaMachpelah* in Hebron.
- <sup>18</sup> According to Jean-François Revel, “What must continue, what must not change, are the system’s two pillars: its ideology and structure. What does change? Men. Sooner or later the men in power must be replaced...”, *How Democracies Perish*, tr. William Byron, Garden City: Doubleday, 1983, p. 282.
- <sup>19</sup> Recognition must be given to Natan Sharansky who consistently took the position that Palestinians should have the benefits of democracy. See also: J.S. Fishman, “The Broken Promise of the Democratic Peace: Israel and the Palestinian Authority”, *Jerusalem Viewpoints*, No. 477, May 1, 2002.
- <sup>20</sup> Op. cit., *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, p. 353.
- <sup>21</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. Anatol Rapoport, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968.
- <sup>22</sup> Philip M. Taylor, “Propaganda from Thucydides to Thatcher: Some Problems, Perspectives & Pitfalls”, Lecture to Social History Society of Great Britain, 1992, <[www.leeds.ac.uk](http://www.leeds.ac.uk)>.
- <sup>23</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>24</sup> Jack J. Roth, *World War I: A Turning Point in Modern History*, New York: Knopf, 1967, p. 132.
- <sup>25</sup> Carl J. Friedrich, “The Rise of Totalitarian Dictatorship”, in *ibid.*, pp. 56-57.
- <sup>26</sup> W.W. Rostow, “International Prospects Under the New President”, *Massachusetts Review*, No. II, 1961, pp. 202-203, as quoted by Charles Hirschfeld, “The Transformation of American Life”, in *ibid.*, p. 66.
- <sup>27</sup> “Ben-Gurion’s Survey”, *The New Judaea*, Vol. 21, No. 11/12, August-September 1945, p. 173.
- <sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 173-174.

- <sup>29</sup> *Mevaker HaMedina*, (State Comptroller), *Doch Shenati 53 Aleph* (Annual Report 53 A), Jerusalem: State of Israel, 2002, pp. 9-39. The report is also available on the following website: <mevaker.gov.il>.
- <sup>30</sup> New York: Free Press, 1977.
- <sup>31</sup> *Commentary*, No. 59, January 1975, pp. 32-48.
- <sup>32</sup> *Yasir Arafat*, London: Sphere Books, 1976.
- <sup>33</sup> *Op. cit.*, *Arab Strategies and Israel's Response*, p. 101.
- <sup>34</sup> *Op. cit.*, *Yasir Arafat*, pp. 222-223.
- <sup>35</sup> See Martin Kramer, *Ivory Towers on Sand*, Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2001 and Khalil Shikaki, "Democracy and the Palestinian Authority: Is Good Governance Essential for Peace?" in Washington Institute for Near East Policy, *Peace Watch: Scattered Pieces, Scattered Peace*, Washington DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2001, p. 29.
- <sup>36</sup> Joel S. Fishman, "The Broken Promise of the Democratic Peace: Israel and the Palestinian Authority", *Jerusalem Viewpoints*, No. 477, May 1, 2002, <www.jcpa.org>.
- <sup>37</sup> *Azure*, Summer 5762/2002, No. 13, pp. 29-87.
- <sup>38</sup> Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., New York: Meridian, 1958, p. 464.
- <sup>39</sup> *Op. cit.*, Natan Sharansky, JINSA, p. 29.
- <sup>40</sup> Ehud Ya'ari, "Not Just Anti-Semitic Lies", *Jerusalem Report* online, December 16, 2002, <<http://www.jrep.com/Columnists/Article-2.html>>.
- <sup>41</sup> *Op. cit.*, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, p. 358.
- <sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 360.
- <sup>43</sup> Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1951, 1<sup>st</sup> Edition.
- <sup>44</sup> *Op. cit.*, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, p. 344.
- <sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 353.
- <sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 366. Also, Raphael Israeli, "Bolshevism in Academia", *Jerusalem Post*, February 22, 2002, p. A8, and Gerald Steinberg, "Israel's Academic Eccentrics Not So Harmless", *Jerusalem Post*, October 4, 2002, p. A7.
- <sup>47</sup> George Orwell, "The Prevention of Literature", *op. cit.*, *The Collected Essays, Vol. 4, In Front of Your Nose, 1945-1950*, p. 90.
- <sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 86.
- <sup>49</sup> George Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1949, reprint 1964, p. 199.
- <sup>50</sup> *Op. cit.*, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, p. 353.
- <sup>51</sup> *Op. cit.*, *The Jewish State: The Struggle for Israel's Soul*, pp. 40-46.
- <sup>52</sup> For the historical background to Israel's propaganda policy, see: Moshe Yegar, *LeToldoteha Shel Ma'archet Hasbarat Hahutz Shel Yisrael*, Herzlyia: Lahav, 1986 (Hebrew); Joel Fishman, "Israeli Propaganda: A Non-Existent Phenomenon; Information Policy at a Time of Ideological War", (Hebrew), *Nativ*, No. 89 (6), November 2002, pp. 58-64. See also: Dan Diker, "Why Are Israel's Public Relations So Poor?", *Jerusalem Viewpoints*, No. 487, October 15-November 1, 2002, (actual date of publication: December 5, 2002), <www.jcpa.org>.
- <sup>53</sup> Michael Brecher, *The Foreign Policy System of Israel: Setting, Images, Process*, Oxford: OUP, 1972, p. 333.
- <sup>54</sup> Conor Cruise O'Brien, *The Siege*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986, p. 508.

- <sup>55</sup> Bernard Lewis, "Palestinians and the PLO", *Commentary*, No. 59, January 1975, p. 45.
- <sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>57</sup> *Op. cit.*, *The Jewish State: The Struggle for Israel's Soul*, p. 85.
- <sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>59</sup> David Makovsky, *Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to Oslo*, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996.
- <sup>60</sup> H.J. MacKinder, *The Teaching of Geography and History: A Study in Method*, London: Philip, 1914, as quoted by Anthony J. Pearce ed., "Introduction", Halford J. MacKinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, New York: W.W. Norton, 1962, p. xxiii.
- <sup>61</sup> See J.S. Fishman, "Perception Failure and Self-Deception: Israel's Quest for Peace in the Context of Related Historical Cases", Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs: *Jerusalem Viewpoints*, No. 450, March 15, 2001, <[www.jcpa.org](http://www.jcpa.org)>.
- <sup>62</sup> "Why the Palestinians are Winning the Media War; An Interview with David Bedein", *Reform Judaism*, No. 51, Fall 2002, p. 56.
- <sup>63</sup> Ehud Yaari, "Why Does the Media Get it Wrong?", *Justice*, No. 31, March 2002, p. 13.
- <sup>64</sup> *Op. cit.*, *Reform Judaism*, p. 56.
- <sup>65</sup> Information Division Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "The Middle East Peace Process: An Overview", Jerusalem: Information Division Ministry of Foreign Affairs, mid-December 1998.
- <sup>66</sup> "Palestinian Authority and PLO; Non-Compliance with Signed Agreements and Commitments; A Record of Bad Faith and Misconduct", Jerusalem: Government Press Office, 2000.
- <sup>67</sup> Aluf Benn, "White Paper Tiger Unleashed", *Ha'aretz*, November 24, 2000.
- <sup>68</sup> Aluf Benn and IMRA (<[www.imra.org.il/](http://www.imra.org.il/)>) on the White Paper and its distribution: "US Slams 'White Paper' Against PA", *Ha'aretz*, November 22, 2000.
- <sup>69</sup> Aluf Benn, "IDF 'White Paper' Slams PA Officials – Not Clear If and When it Will be Released", *Ha'aretz*, April 18, 2001. This article contains a very interesting disclosure: "The revelation of personal corruption within the PA, in particular, raises a problem, since many PA officials have business links in Israel."
- <sup>70</sup> "Interview with Palestinian Security Chief Dahlan", MEMRI Special Dispatch Series, No. 430, October 18, 2002, <[www.memri.org](http://www.memri.org)>.
- <sup>71</sup> *Op. cit.*, *The Jewish State: The Struggle for Israel's Soul*, p. 66.
- <sup>72</sup> Yossi Melman, "Don't Confuse Us with the Facts", *Ha'aretz*, August 16, 2002, p. 6.
- <sup>73</sup> Recently, a major Israeli daily ran a report that experts had recommended that the Foreign Ministry employ blond women in order to put its case before the public, but this is cosmetic. While this would do no harm, it would also be a tremendous improvement if it used spokespersons who at least had a decent command of foreign languages, particularly English, and met the world standard, but really such a discussion is a matter of secondary importance. "*Le-Misrad ha-Hutz Drushot Blondiniot*" ("Blond Women Wanted for the Foreign Ministry"), *Yediot Aharonot*, May 31, 2002.
- <sup>74</sup> Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, with an introduction by D.C. Watt, tr. Ralph Manheim, London: Pimlico, 1992, p. 162.
- <sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 161-169.
- <sup>76</sup> Alan Bullock's observations on Hitler's use of propaganda in general and combined with terrorism are still valuable. See Alan Bullock, *Hitler: A Study in Tyranny*, London: Oldhams, 1959: 4<sup>th</sup> impression, pp. 39, 49, 61-62, 347.

- <sup>77</sup> Ibid., p. 166.
- <sup>78</sup> Ibid., p. 169.
- <sup>79</sup> For background see: "Why the Palestinians are Winning the Media War: An Interview with David Bedein", *Reform Judaism*, Fall 2002, pp. 51-57.
- <sup>80</sup> Benjamin Netanyahu, *A Durable Peace*, New York: Warner Books, 2000, p. 382.
- <sup>81</sup> Thomas L. Friedman, *From Beirut to Jerusalem*, New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1989, p. 144.
- <sup>82</sup> Raphael Israeli, "Poison: The Use of Blood Libel in the War Against Israel", *Jerusalem Viewpoints*, No. 476, April 15, 2002.
- <sup>83</sup> ARD documentary by Esther Schapira, "Das Rote Quadrat", April 24, 2002, <www.hr-online.de>. Also *ICEJ Deutschland*, March 20, 2002, "Fernseh-Dokumentation laesst Al-Dura-Mythos Platzen". The forensic evidence showed that Dura had been shot either from in front or above, the direction from which the Palestinian gunmen had been firing. "According to our findings, it is much more likely that it was a Palestinian bullet, not an Israeli bullet, that killed him," Schapira said.
- <sup>84</sup> See: ADL, "Anatomy of Anti-Israel Incitement: Jenin, World Opinion and the Massacre that Wasn't", May 29, 2002, <www.adl.org/Israel/jenin/>.
- <sup>85</sup> See endnote number 40; also Yohanan Manor, "Anti-Semitism and Anti-Israel Incitement in Palestinian Schoolbooks", paper presented at the seminar on "Delegitimization and Moral Compensation: The Holocaust and Today", Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, July 10, 2002.
- <sup>86</sup> Op. cit., George Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, p. 199: "Who controls the past controls the future; who controls the present controls the past..."
- <sup>87</sup> James Dorsey, "Zoehair Mohsen vertrouwt alleen op Syrie; 'Wij zijn alleen Palestijn om politieke reden'", *Trouw*, March 31, 1977, p. 7.
- <sup>88</sup> Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., *The Disuniting of America*, Knoxville, TN: Whittle Direct Books, 1991, p. 23.
- <sup>89</sup> See also Netanyahu, op. cit., p. 228.
- <sup>90</sup> Terence Prittie, "The British Media and the Arab-Israeli Dispute", *Middle East Review*, Summer/Fall 1980, p. 67. So widespread did this misconception become, that when in October 2002, President Bush went to the UN in the matter of Iraq, Secretary General Kofi Anan told him that the key problem was the Palestine Question which first had to be resolved. British Prime Minister Blair (October 1, 2002) advanced the same position at the Labour Party gathering in Blackpool, identifying the Israel-Palestine conflict as having a higher priority than Iraq, and calling for an immediate initiative on this issue. The British government for its own reasons highlights the centrality of the Israel-Palestine confrontation (which may explain the consistently hostile news reporting policy of the BBC). The American administration opposed this position, and the matter was set aside.
- <sup>91</sup> Jean-François Revel, *How Democracies Perish*, tr. William Byron, Garden City: Doubleday, 1984, p. 149:
- In propaganda and agitation at destabilizing the democracies, however, their...adversaries' desire for peace is used as a lever to promote the belief that renouncing self-defense is the best way to avoid war. A pacifist is someone who ultimately sees himself as the only potential aggressor and concludes from this that by ostentatiously laying down his own arms, he will avoid all danger of war in the world.
- <sup>92</sup> Ibid., p. 150.
- <sup>93</sup> Lee Richards, "A Message from Great Britain – British Propaganda to Germany, 1939-1940", <psywar.psyborg.co.uk/eh.shtml>.

- <sup>94</sup> This is a reformulation of the objective of the Coalition in the Gulf War. Philip M. Taylor, *War and the Media; Propaganda and Persuasion in the Gulf War*, Manchester: Manchester U. Press, 1992, p. 29.
- <sup>95</sup> Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto, “Non-Classified Realities Affecting Israel’s Air Force: 2005-2010”, ACPR Policy Paper No. 136, March 2002; Amir Oren, “Mossad Chief: Israel Must Foil Regional Nuclear Arms Plans”, *Ha’aretz*, June 27, 2002.
- <sup>96</sup> A case in point is that of Teddy Katz, a master’s candidate at the University of Haifa. The title of his thesis was, “The Departure of Arabs from Villages in the Southern Carmel in 1948”. Katz claimed that in May 1948 a force from the Alexandroni Brigade with a force from the Carmeli Brigade attacked the Arab village of Tantura and carried out a massacre of about 200. Subsequently, the survivors of the Alexandroni Brigade sued him and won in court. The contest ended in a settlement, and the matter has not yet been concluded, because Katz retracted. Katz confirmed the fact that in the summer of 2000, during his trial he asked the late Feisal Hussein (the PA’s man in Jerusalem) for financial help with his legal defense, and he received \$8,000 – in cash. Prof. Yoav Gelber, Head of the School for Historical Studies at Haifa University said:
- ...the matter of money adds a new dimension to this affair; it is not an innocent matter. They [the PA] do not give away money gratuitously. It is part of the campaign being waged against the State of Israel within the framework of the *Intifada*.
- “The PA Aided an Israeli Researcher Who Claimed that Zahal [IDF] Carried Out a Massacre in 1948”, (Hebrew) September 1, 2002, <[www.a7.org/news.php3?id=33509](http://www.a7.org/news.php3?id=33509)>.
- <sup>97</sup> Tom Friedman’s interpretation of the subject is noteworthy,
- ...Arafat’s great achievement was that he led the Palestinians out of the deserts of obscurity into the land of ‘prime time’, and, at the same time, created an institutional framework to keep them there. To put it another way, Arafat did for the Palestinians what the Zionists did for the Jews: brought them from oblivion back into politics.
- Op. cit., *From Beirut to Jerusalem*, pp. 107-108.
- <sup>98</sup> Personal communication, April 13, 1988.
- <sup>99</sup> Carl J. Friedrich, Op. cit, p. 53n. “The term was first introduced by the French sociologist Émile Durkheim in a celebrated study of suicide and defined as a social condition in which the hierarchy of values disintegrates and ‘all regulation is lacking.’”

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