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There is Life without A Solution

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Those who claim that the establishment of a Jewish state depends upon peace with the Arabs can already give up Zionism now...

Zeev Jabotinsky, from "The Iron Wall"

I. The Illusions of a Political Solution

We have no intentions to propose a solution to the struggle between Jews and Arabs over life and dominion in the Land of Israel. Proposed paper solutions were either consigned by time to oblivion while others appear today as mere caricature. Solutions, which were actually implemented, drowned in blood. A precondition for a rational approach to the subject is an understanding that this conflict is *sui generis*, a direct result of the singularity of the Jewish people's existence and fate. Never was there a dispute, where two peoples demanded that very same portion of land and regarded the same city as their capital.

If one required proof that the Jewish-Arab dispute over Palestine is insoluble, then Ehud Barak with his spurned concessions, which some people considered most generous while others termed them profligate, came along and demonstrated the thesis that there is no solution. Indeed, Barak himself, and his collaborator, Shlomo Ben-Ami, currently admit that an agreement with the Palestinians is impossible and therefore the former proposes unilateral retreat and hunkering down behind a fence, while the latter goes as far as inviting an

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international coercive force which would interpose itself between the parties in order to save them from each other.

Despite this, the know-it-alls and the prognosticators of the left continue to disseminate the empty slogan: "There is no military solution, there's only a political solution." In this manner they are more or less effacing the entirety of human history which is studded with military decisions that ultimately dictated political outcomes. With demagogic manipulation they depict the signing ceremony of a political agreement and conceal the sword which brought this agreement about. The antecedent to the "political solution" which established the Hellenistic world was Alexander the Great's military victory; the victory over Napoleon at Waterloo yielded as a political result the "restoration" of the old royal regime in France; it was only the military victory over the "Third Reich" which created the political conditions for the formation of present day Europe. The creation of the State of Israel would not have come about, save for the military victory which preceded it.

Hence, one should turn the leftist mantra on its head and state that in general, military victories determine political results.

According to this principle, what is the political outcome to which we should aspire as the result of a military victory in the War of Oslo? The answer almost suggests itself: Dismemberment of the Palestinian Authority and the expulsion of the leaders. The liquidation of the Tunis establishment needs to be Israel's preeminent military goal because this body personifies two mortal, terminal demands upon the very existence of the Jewish state: The demand for the "right of return" of all the Arab refugees and their descendants and the demand for the establishment of a Palestinian state in western *Eretz* Israel. The Palestinian Authority is both the "Palestinian state in the making" and also by its very essence, the "Arab Agency" for implementing the "right of return". It is Arafat's insistence on an unlimited "return" into the pre-1967 Israel of all 1948 refugees and their offspring which brought the Camp David and Taba negotiations to their dismal end.

The reason for that demand is ingrained in the very nature of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). All Arab leaders make it abundantly clear that in their concept, the "solution" of the refugee "problem" precedes their quest for a Palestinian state, the latter (state) serving as a tool to implement the former (refugee solution).

In the words of the Israeli Knesset Member Azmi Bishara, a Christian Arab, in a meeting in London:

The Palestinian conflict must be brought back to its roots – the 1948 refugees. The PLO was founded in 1964 in Jerusalem, then under Arab, not Zionist rule. The PLO was established for the sake of the rights of the refugees. These rights precede the right to have a state. We have no use for a state without the "Right of Return".

On this background Barak, Beilin and Ben-Ami's offer of statehood as an "Ersatz" for allowing the refugees back reveals a profound ignorance of Arafat's fundamental belief, his political agenda and actual role as a leader and symbol. It is as if Israel would have offered the captain of a huge ship the lowering of a small life boat to enter the "Promised Land", but only for himself and his close entourage, thereby abandoning his ship with 99% of the passengers. This is of course inconceivable, but on the other hand, flooding Israel with 3, 4, 5 million "refugees" is unthinkable because it means the immediate destruction of the Jewish state. For that reason, even the extreme left is not ready to compromise on this point. To fathom the enormity of the abyss which divides the positions of Israel and the PLO, imagine the Federal Republic of Germany threatening war and actually practicing terror, if not all 12

million German post World War II refugees are allowed to return to former Breslau, Stettin, Danzig and Konigsberg, East Prussia, Pomerania, Lower Silesia and the Sudetenland.

Obviously, what we have on our hands is a situation of confrontation, and as long as we choose the PLO as "partner", i.e. as the authorized representative of the Palestinians – no "solution", no compromise, are possible.

It follows that negotiations of any sort whatsoever are possible only with local bodies representing local interests as opposed to with the men from Tunis, who are the emissaries of the Palestine diaspora. Furthermore, all negotiations can only refer to the search for a *modus vivendi*, a Latin term which means "a way of living" or a mode of existence, but not to either "peace" or a "solution".

II. A Palestinian State in Western *Eretz* Israel – the Termination of the State of Israel

1. One can write volumes, with historical perspective, about the damage, in the long term, inflicted upon the national psyche, should the Jewish people forgo the Promised Land with its own hands for the benefit of another people. Despite 1,878 years of life in exile, amidst frailty and impotence, never did a community leader, rabbi or rabbinical court negotiate the Jewish right to even a single centimeter of the Land of Israel. Maimonides or the Vilna Gaon, even had they wanted to do so, would have been regarded as incompetent for suggesting that. This leads to a most absurd conclusion, namely that at the cost of 20,000 dead, the Jews had to establish a state for themselves, to be vested with the authority to forfeit the Land of Israel in their name. Had such a scenario taken place in practice, it is doubtful that the State of Israel, as the "authorized" agent for waiving the Land of Israel, would have survived for long.

Therefore, those readers for whom the very need to give the Jews reasons why they should not establish a state in their homeland for another people is demeaning, will please excuse me. Such readers, even if you were to provide them with all the arguments and persuasions in the world, as to why the retention of their homelands would presumably not be salutary for their future, pernicious to their security and harmful to their interests, would still not care to listen, just as a normal child will not renounce his mother. We are totally unique and special in comparison with any other people, by this very phenomenon of internal haggling over our homeland regarding its price and whether it is worthwhile. But like it or not, since the debate has been launched in any case, we too will participate in it.

- 2. Those who support the establishment of a Palestinian state, even if they belong to the left, condition their agreement upon at least five restrictions:
 - a. Demilitarization and limitations on armaments.
 - b. A prohibition on signing treaties, and especially military treaties, without Israel's agreement (for example "security" agreements with Iraq, Iran, or Syria which would bring their forces to the outskirts of Tel Aviv).
 - c. Israeli supervision over the exploitation of the mountain aquifer, which provides a third of the country's water.
 - d. Israeli supervision over the border crossings, amongst other things, to prevent the entry of millions of refugees and their descendants. (Arafat toys with the idea of emulating the late King Hassan II of Morocco who marched tens of thousands of

- civilians towards the boundary with Spanish Morocco and challenged the Spanish army to fire on them. The colony fell into Moroccan hands without a single shot being fired. How would Israel respond to a similar procession towards Lydda, with women and children in the vanguard of the march?)
- e. Israeli control over the air space above the Palestinian state, because without such control the Israel Air Force would not be able to protect the country against the "eastern front". Already today there are various restrictions on flights over Judea-Samaria due to the surface to air missiles in Arafat's hands. The air force is planning to train in the United States in addition to relying on Turkish skies for this purpose.

We will leave it for the reader to judge, what the prospects are that any Palestinian government whatsoever, even if it was not headed by a criminal person such as Arafat, would maintain and honor these restrictions:

- 1. If today the "Palestine Authority", composed entirely of separate islands surrounded by areas under Israeli control and supervision, manages to equip itself with mortars, landmines, thousands of tons of explosives and anti-tank and anti-aircraft weaponry, who can fathom the military threat emanating from a Palestinian Authority enjoying statehood?
- 2. If the "Palestine Authority", while still dependent upon Israel for electricity, water, communications, money, land and air links, raw materials and fresh produce already tries to forge a pan-Arab coalition against Israel, threatening her with an all-regional war, what can prevent a Palestinian state from institutionalizing such a scheme via military alliances?
- 3. If already under the Oslo Regime, the "Palestine Authority" is running amuck in contravention of all its obligations, to the extent that in the Gaza Strip the entire water system has been destroyed, is it difficult to extrapolate what will happen to the mountain aquifer once the entire area is under its complete jurisdiction?
- 4. If under the present situation, when the border crossings with Egypt and Jordan are controlled by Israel, tens of thousands, and one can venture hundreds of thousands, have been infiltrated into Judea, Samaria and Gaza (YESHA) and even inside the "Green Line", what can we expect when the crossings come under the control of a Palestinian state?
- 5. If already today, when the "Palestine Authority" enjoys full power over 16% of the area, only Arafat in an address to the Arab countries rejected Barak's proposals because in the event of war he would not allow Israel to use his air space against "brother Arabs", is it conceivable that he will act differently when he actually heads such a state?

Binyamin Netanyahu correctly notes that there is not a state in the world that will back Israel's demands to deny a Palestinian state its sovereignty in five such fundamental and vital areas, which epitomize the very concept of sovereignty. Hence, a Palestinian state will be able merely to shrug off these limitations, and with full world support.

On the other hand, if these five threats are realized, the life of the State of Israel will become an unceasing nightmare, and Arafat will speedily witness the realization of his plan, upon which he expounded before 40 Arab representatives in a Stockholm hotel: To push masses of Jews outside the State of Israel. Actually, a million Israeli Jews if not more, young and productive, those who could easily make their way in life in any other place in the world, will

be those who hasten to abandon ship, refusing to live in the hellish "peace" and residing in a close and stifling proximity to a hostile terrorist state. These Israelis will come from precisely those circles which are constantly demanding peace at any price.

To complete the picture we must add, that even if during the first stage, the Jordan Valley is not included within a Palestinian state, sooner or later nothing will prevent that state from reaching the Jordan River and causing the fall of the Hashemite monarchy. As a result, this terrorist state will extend to the border with Iraq and almost surround the minuscule Jewish state.

The Israeli military commentator Ze'ev Schiff asked "top Jordanian officials": "In terms of Jordan's strategic interests, was it better for the Jordan Valley to be in Israeli or Palestinian hands?" "Israeli", was the answer.

Schiff adds: "The Jordanians are very concerned about Clinton's idea of transferring the Jordan Valley to the Palestinians...thereby exposing Jordan to political and demographic pressure, as well as subversive activity."

A final remark:

Under Oslo, the establishment of the Palestinian state was meant to constitute the culmination of the "Peace Process" and be accompanied by a solemn declaration on behalf of the Palestinians that this is the "end of the conflict" and that they have no further claims on Israel.

On paper at least, there is some inner logic to this concept. Not so, PM Sharon's proposal to let the Palestinians have a state in the interim stage, leaving open the most explosive issues such as Jerusalem, the refugees, the settlements, the final borders. As a result, Israel will have to face all the Palestinian belligerency as before, only backed and reinforced by the incomparable status and power of a sovereign state.

The absurdity of this concept is self-evident.

We can sum up by rejecting from the very outset the good outcome of any Palestinian sovereignty exercised west of the Jordan River.

III. Back to Military Government? Transfer?

Israeli society has extracted one understanding from the debris of Oslo, namely not to rule directly over the local Arabs. Even on the Radical Right you will not detect today any nostalgia for the era of military government, when a Jewish authority carried the burden of managing the lives of thousands of alien citizens. The reasons for this do not matter much now; there is likewise no purpose in dwelling upon the moral issue ("occupation") which the Left brandishes in this context. It will suffice to jot down two facts: That this form of government proved a failure and that the Israeli people do not want it any more.

The Civil Administration arm of the military government atrophied even before it was dismantled by Oslo, because a military government by its very nature is intended to be only temporary. To everyone's surprise it survived for 27 years.

Also, perhaps we are not fit for this type of rule: On one hand we were not severe enough in enforcing it, but on the other hand not gentle enough in showing understanding, concern and empathy.

In summary, direct Israeli rule over the thousands of Arabs concentrated primarily in the 16% of the "A" areas is inconceivable. If we must enter Arab cities for military purposes we will not do so with a view to remaining there.

On the other hand, another option – "transfer" – is still on the agenda in Israeli public opinion. Moreover, Arab cruelty and hostility have reinforced the strength of the proponents of this approach.

Since I am expressing a personal opinion, I could content myself by categorically rejecting the very idea of expelling a population by force, under a preconceived plan, and in a time of peace.

However, beyond this, the idea is impractical because today's world regards "ethnic cleansing" as a war crime and has established patterns of operations to prevent it by force via outside military intervention, as we have already witnessed in Kosovo. If this was the case in a territory which everybody acknowledged to be under Yugoslav sovereignty as in the Kosovo example, this attitude will apply even more so in an area such as YESHA which under international law is devoid of sovereignty.

Let it be noted further, that most of the local Arabs who vacated the area of the State of Israel during the 1948 war did so in the winds of war. In most cases it was voluntary flight rather than as a result of Israeli premeditated planning. Furthermore, psychologically the "transfer" was rendered possible only due to the terrible cost which the War of Liberation and Independence imposed: 1% of the Jewish population were fatalities (6,500 of 650,000), about 50,000 fatalities – heaven forbid – in today's figures.

It would seem, that save for a situation where the Palestinian Arabs impose a general regional war upon us, even the most enthusiastic "transfer" person would not wish to pay such a price from the outset, to achieve a parallel result. On the other hand, the idea of "voluntary transfer" as per the doctrine of the late minister Rehavam Zeevi does not seem realistic in today's national and political climate and in any foreseeable future.

IV. There is Life Without a Peace Agreement

The bitter years after Oslo, which led to peak frustration under the government of Barak and Ben-Ami after the cave-in at Camp David II and Taba, prove that the Arabs do not want and perhaps are unable to conclude a peace in the European sense of the word with the "Zionist entity", aside from "Hudaibiya"-style agreements with the infidels, which they are commanded to violate at the first opportunity. Therefore, we have to free ourselves from the false illusions that were planted in our minds by the peace-school; we must change the "diskette" and rehabilitate old thought processes regarding life without agreements and without "solutions", life in the midst of a conflict and with it. After all, such was all Zionist history, beginning with the first Zionist immigration (aliyah). This history was studded with waves of Arab uprisings, and yet we grew in population from 50,000 following the First World War to 5.3 million to date, without formal peace. During this entire period we experienced "disturbances", namely violent outbreaks every few years or so, most of which were suppressed by military action (for example the uprising of 1936 to 1939 and the 1948 war). The military victories yielded intervals of tranquility, construction and growth.

In the forty-year period following the establishment of the State of Israel and until the first intifada (1988), wars with Arab countries replaced clashes with the local Arab population within the country. In this as well, the pattern held: Israeli military victories yielded armed respite, used by Israel for building and development. Even the peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan are no more than that, because both Left and Right admit that everything is contingent on meeting the demands of the Palestinians, and that in the event of an all-out war with the Palestinians, the conflict will become "regional". Egypt will surely join the war at the

head of the "region", while Jordan will be dragged into it, even against its own will, as occurred in 1967 and partly in 1973.

Fact: Egypt has already threatened war should Israel attempt to topple the Palestinian Authority or harm Arafat personally.

In this entire period of no peace, Israel has become a military and high-tech power. It absorbed millions of immigrants, settled a quarter of a million Jews in YESHA, built an advanced civilization, and can even claim some cultural achievements, while maintaining at the same time a working democracy, the only one in the region.

The Left, which has seen all its "solutions" evaporate, continues to throw down the gauntlet at the feet of the Right, challenging: "And what is your solution?" To this, the most direct and honest answer is, simply – "more of the same", still more of what we have been doing already for 120 years: More *aliyah*, more children, more settlements, amassing greater strength, displaying more cohesion and steadfastness.

A human creature is capable of making do in complicated situations where there is no solution, and most of us experience this sometimes in our private lives. What we find difficult to cope with is frustration, loss of way, false hopes and broken dreams. It is a fact that the so-called "settlers", who are living under conditions of severe pressure and have all too frequently to bury their murdered dead, still exude optimism and *joie de vivre*, while their brethren who reside in more secure places display weakness, hesitation and even doubt regarding their future here. We are all made up of the same material, and the entire difference is that the latter harbored illusions and false hopes, which were suddenly dashed.

Furthermore, paradoxically, the internalization of the absence of peace as a fact of life may even produce psychological alleviation. If the Jewish-Israeli collectivity could have approached a collective psychiatrist or social psychologist for advice and spiritual solace, it appears that this would have been his answer: Desist from the nervous search for peace mirages, stop wringing your hands with the complaint "Shall the sword devour forever?" Learn and understand that the Jewish state was not created to spare you the need to fight, but to provide you with the capability to do so, which was denied Jews for 1,866 years, since the suppression of the Bar-Kochba rebellion. Keep in mind that despite the siege and hatred which surround you – you are a great success story and not a failure.

V. A Virtual Model

1. And yet, the human mind will continue to search for answers, if only theoretical ones. Therefore, even after having realized that the conflict has no "solution" (a term borrowed from mathematics) and that the concept "process" (borrowed from chemistry) is inapplicable, we shall try, as in the Platonic world of ideas, to draw a model of a *modus vivendi*, for the time being a virtual one, between them and us who are fated to remain neighbors. To say the least, such a model can be useful in arguments, in the perpetual debate between us and the "world". It will also satisfy a psychological need to tell ourselves – here is what could have been done if we had had a partner truly willing to make peace with the idea that the Jews have returned to their homeland for good. Also, who knows? Germany_ and Japan underwent a democratic mutation, after they were destroyed in war.

Post World War I Germany, not unlike the Arabs, harbored inferiority complexes, coupled with deep feelings of resentment at having been wronged – in the Versailles (peace) Treaty and before – by the whole world. At the same time, they felt they had

not "deserved" their defeat, supposedly being in all respects better than their enemies and superior to them. This conviction reached clinical dimensions in the Nazi "Herrenrasse"-doctrine, which most of the Germans enthusiastically embraced. This whole syndrome of Nazi fanaticism is very similar to today's Islamic fundamentalism. Both cultivate dictatorships, worship power and use violence, or the threat of violence, as their almost exclusive political tool. Last but not least – both strive for world domination.

Germany emerged from World War I relatively unscathed. She lost very little home territory, suffered almost no military occupation, and yet, despite an enormous loss of blood, waited for only 21 years – the span of time necessary to raise a new generation of soldiers – to resume the war. Only, this time her cities were bombed into ruins, she was subjected to military occupation, starved out for years, her leadership condemned and sentenced, some of it hanged, she lost vast territories (Eastern Prussia, Pomerania and Silesia), 15 million of her people became refugees. And yet, it was exactly this treatment which cured Germany – by now for some 50 years – from the cult of power and superiority firmly implanted in it. Maybe for the first time in its history, it is a democracy both genuine and viable.

If it could happen there, and similarly in Japan, perhaps a resounding Israeli military victory, for once carried out to the finish and not immediately vitiated at the negotiating table, could one day bring about that forced reconciliation of the Arabs with the presence of a Jewish state in their midst, advocated by Jabotinsky in his famous article "The Iron Wall".

The sole possible model, should such a "miracle" happen, is autonomy.

2. Let us preface that a Palestinian autonomy will not arise under an agreement and it is doubtful whether this is at all desirable. For such a program to succeed we should flee negotiations, agreements or signatures as from a fire, because by their very existence they strew obstacles on the path towards reaching any practical outcome whatsoever. Further, if something is signed, the document itself becomes the target for attacks and its chances of being realized will suffer the same fate as all the agreements which we signed with the Arabs from time immemorial. Autonomy must be established "de facto", on the ground, in practice, as much as possible without any "de jure" agreements and without calling by names the facts that will be created, or affixing tags to them.

Furthermore, a *fait accompli* established after a military decision will shield from personal attacks those who would make peace with these facts and take part in their implementation. According to the experience of the 20 years of Israeli rule in YESHA which preceded the first intifada, the manning of the jobs and posts in the Autonomy by local Arabs should not constitute a problem, subject to the condition that, at least in the first stage, we do not demand from them formal recognition and agreement, or the assumption of political responsibility. If the Autonomy will manage to function successfully for a number of years, internal social and political factors will arise spontaneously in the work process, which, in conjunction with the Israeli mother state, will formulate and shape the Autonomy and its institutions. Thus, the Autonomy as a *modus vivendi* will be established gradually in a modular fashion, on a trial and error basis, rather than being a hard and fixed model, transported from the planning table on a take it or leave it basis.

3. In the previous chapter we expressed opposition to direct Israeli rule over the majority of the Arabs in YESHA. But this does not mean that we can leave the Autonomy suspended in the air after the fashion of the Camp David Agreement between Begin and Sadat. The very concept of autonomy carries the implicit assumption regarding the existence of an overall framework under which the Autonomy is to be subsumed, with this framework delegating autonomous powers in specified spheres. An autonomy which is not defined within the system of a mother country will perforce slide into the status of a sovereign and free state. It will leave the harbor for the open sea, no rope mooring it to the quay. This is how Begin's autonomy meandered via Madrid and Oslo until it reached the edge of a state, a terrorist state.

Hence, from the aspect of international law the areas of YESHA must be incorporated into the State of Israel and it is the Israeli Knesset that will legislate autonomy for the Arab residents.

4. There is no point in going into minute details regarding the division of authority between the mother country and the Autonomy. The guiding line will be turning over the maximum number of functions, so the Palestinians can conduct their life without Israeli intervention.

Israel will retain in her hands, at the very least – security (aside from internal policing), foreign affairs, basic infrastructure and supervision over entry and departure at international boundaries.

The residents of the Autonomy will have an Authority with a democratically elected administration and they will not vote for the Israeli Knesset. If in the future a Palestinian state will arise across the Jordan River, as the original British intention had been, the Arabs of the Autonomy will be citizens of that country. There they can express their national personality, while in the Autonomy they will implement their home rule.

The boundaries of the Autonomy will not be fixed in accordance with the Armistice Agreements of Rhodes ("the Green Line"), and definitely not in accordance with the Oslo Agreements (areas A-C). They will be delineated with a view towards encompassing the overwhelming majority of the YESHA Arab population together with the requisite expanse to provide for their development. It is a plausible assumption that Israel will detach from the Autonomy areas such as the Jordan Valley and the surroundings of Jerusalem. On the other hand, it cannot be precluded that areas within the Green Line, such as the city of Um el Fahm and other concentrations of Arab Israelis preferring Arab home rule, will be adjoined to the Autonomy. Residents of such areas will no longer vote for the Knesset. The very existence of such an option would serve as an excellent tranquilizer for many elements within the Arab Israeli population who today constitute sources of ferment and rebellion. Arabs who live in the regions of YESHA that will be detached from the Autonomy will have the option of receiving Israeli citizenship, according to the East Jerusalem model.

The acquisition of citizenship in the country across the Jordan River by the residents of the Autonomy is not necessarily conditioned upon the establishment of a Palestinian state in Trans-Jordan. The State of Israel should not intervene in developments within the Hashemite Kingdom. Therefore, it cannot be precluded that the residents of the Autonomy will become citizens of the Jordanian Kingdom and vote for the parliament there.

In any event, for the sake of our model it must be assumed that the state to our east will maintain friendly relations with us. Furthermore, this state, which in any case possesses a Palestinian majority, can be awarded in a bilateral agreement a status that will allow it to provide support and protection to its citizens who reside in the Autonomy.

5. The success of the Autonomy is contingent to a large extent on Israel's ability to understand and internalize that the welfare of its inhabitants – in terms of economy, health, progress and modern government – is in its clear interest. Under the military government this was not always self-evident and this mistake wrought a severe payback upon us. Experts say that if Israel had invested in the Civil Administration even a small percentage of the money which it poured after Oslo into Arafat's coffers, the first *intifada* (1988) would not have erupted.

The case of Jerusalem furnishes proof. Our sworn enemy, the late Faisal Husseini, made untiring efforts to set Jerusalem ablaze and did not succeed. If Jerusalem is relatively tranquil, this tranquility persists despite vast efforts expended by the Palestinian establishment to incite and goad the Arab residents of east Jerusalem into rebellion, because there is no place in the country as important to them as Jerusalem for displaying resistance and rebellion against Jewish rule.

The reason for Arafat's failure is not the transformation of Jerusalem's Arabs into Zionists, but advantages in the economy, health services and welfare on the one hand and the aversion to the tyrannical and oppressive Palestinian rule on the other hand, with a clear preference for a democratic Rule of Law. This has persisted despite many claims, some of them undoubtedly justified, regarding a certain unequal treatment of the Arab sector in Jerusalem.

An example from life: The Israeli police were requested to provide, if possible, an opinion that the construction of a Jewish neighborhood in Ma'aleh Ha'Zeitim (Ras el Amud – which overlooks the Temple Mount) endangers security, since that would touch off severe rioting on the part of the Arab residents. In this manner, it was sought to find a pretext to prohibit the project altogether. However, the police were forced to disappoint those who invited the opinion. It emerged that on the contrary, the Arabs in the vicinity welcomed the establishment of the neighborhood, on the assumption that it would raise the level of development and observance of the law in the entire quarter. The construction of Har Homah (to the south of Jerusalem, bordering on Bethlehem), also created a greater furor amongst the Jewish "Peace Bloc" than amongst Jerusalem Arabs. What has occurred in Jerusalem, and precisely what has not occurred, serves as a most valuable guide to the future, because it constitutes a rebuttal of prevalent thought patterns, accepted by Right and Left, which ascribe to the local Arabs the mechanical imitation of European nationalist concepts from the previous century.

6. A note of caution. All these arrangements or similar ones will not solve two fundamental problems: The problem of the Arab refugees in Israel and abroad and the problem of the increasing population density, primarily in the Gaza Strip. On the narrow area of western *Eretz* Israel, 6.5 million residents of Israel and perhaps 3 million YESHA Arabs are crammed, and this number is about to increase in a dramatic fashion, thus creating – in addition to the political threat – an unbearable burden on water and land reserves, on the ecology and on the economy. These problems can be solved only via resources in land and finance located outside the area of western *Eretz* Israel. It is solely due to narrow nationalist political considerations that the Gaza Strip is crowded to bursting point, whereas the areas of northern Sinai are empty. This

applies all the more to the empty expanses of Jordan, which organically belong to the political and economic context of the Palestinians and represent the only solution to the Palestinian impasse. It was after all for this very purpose that in 1922 the British separated the two parts of mandatory Palestine and received the assent of the League of Nations to close off the eastern portion, constituting 3/4 of the total area, to Jewish immigration and settlement, including the right to purchase lands, and even precluding Jewish residence there. All this occurred despite the fact that this spacious region had been originally earmarked by the League of Nations to form part of the Jewish people's national home, to which it belonged in past history.

VI. The Hoax of Two Palestinian States

At this stage it might be useful to take a closer look at the historical and political occurrences which gave birth to today's Jordanian Hashemite Kingdom.

In a letter, written by Lord Balfour, the British Foreign Minister, on November 2, 1917 to Lord Rothschild, who would bring it "to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation", he stated: "His Majesty's Government views with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people."

The letter is known as the Balfour Declaration. Its text was incorporated in the "Mandate for Palestine", by which the League of Nations entrusted to Britain "the administration of the territory of Palestine". The Mandate (confirmed on July 24, 1922) made Britain "responsible for putting into effect the declaration made in November 1917 in favor of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people...", adding: "...recognition has thereby been given to the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country..."

The Mandate further instructed the Administration of Palestine: "To facilitate Jewish immigration and encourage, in cooperation with the Jewish Agency...close settlement by Jews on the lands, including State lands and waste lands..."

Those, who since 1967 implement this provision in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, are known as "settlers". The term could have been taken in direct quotation from this Mandatory provision, which – according to Eugene Rostow and Julius Stone, both distinguished professors in the field of international law, is still in power and will remain so, as long as the final status of this territory has not been determined.²

Howard Grief³ points out that the Mandate (including of course the provision for "close settlement by Jews on the lands...") is part of American domestic law by force of the Anglo-American Convention on Palestine, a treaty signed in 1924 with Britain, ratified by the US Senate in 1925, formally signed and proclaimed by President Coolidge. The Convention preamble quotes the Mandate and further states: "...the US consents to the administration of Palestine by His Britannic Majesty, pursuant to the mandate recited above."

The US is therefore bound by its own domestic law "to facilitate" Jewish settlement in YESHA, even though the Mandate has ceased to exist. This is the opinion given by the International Court of Justice on South West Africa⁴ in the matter of the South African Mandate over the territory known today as Namibia. The court rejected South Africa's claim to be free of the provisions included in the Mandate, ruling that the substantive obligations of the mandate continued in force despite the dissolution of the League of Nations, being the essence of a "sacred trust of civilization". They were the *raison d'être* and original objective

of the whole mandatory arrangement and did not depend on the continued existence of the League of Nations, nor did they come to an end merely because the League's supervisory organs ceased to exist.

This precedent clearly applies to YESHA, until this territory acquires sovereign status under international law, either by independence or by annexation to another sovereign state.

It follows, that announcements made by various American administrations, denigrating Jewish settlement in YESHA by describing it as "obstacles to peace", or even defining it as "illegal" – directly contradict American law.

An important point of departure: Mandatory "Palestine", and in other words the "Jewish national home", included both banks of the river Jordan, up to the border of Iraq in the east. The Zionist Organization had already invested considerable sums and acquired large tracts of land in eastern Palestine, Jewish settlers were poised to set up kibbutzim. But it was not to be.

Less than two months after the confirmation of the Mandate, on September 16, 1922, the League of Nations approved a British Memorandum, entitling Britain "to postpone or withhold application in the territory known as Trans-Jordan" – of all provisions relating to the Jewish national home. Britain bestowed upon Abdullah ibn Hussein of Arabia the title "Emir of Trans-Jordan", at the same time interdicting Jewish immigration, settlement and land acquisition in the whole vast area east of the river Jordan, leaving the Jewish national home with only 23% of its original area (Judea, Samaria, Gaza included).

Two reasons prompted Winston Churchill, the Colonial Secretary, to effect this *de facto* partition of Palestine, although *de jure* Tans-Jordan still constituted part of the Mandate until 1946, when Trans-Jordan was transformed into the "Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan" with Emir Abdullah as its king. The immediate constraint upon Churchill was the ouster of Feisal, Abdullah's elder brother, by the French from Damascus, whereupon Britain installed him as King of Iraq. Abdullah, marooned in Amman, then a village (all of the inhabitants of Trans-Jordan only numbered 200,000), became restive and threatened to attack French Syria with his riflemen. To solve the problem of Syria having been promised by Britain to its Hashemite war allies against the Turks, Churchill tore three quarters of the land from the Jewish national home to create yet another colonial fiefdom.

But there was a second, more significant reason. As early as 1920, and then again in 1921, the local Arabs in western Palestine staged murderous riots, targeting Jewish immigration and settlement. True, in the short period of Feisal's reign in Damascus they called themselves "Southern Syrians", a concept well rooted in the past, also the official doctrine in Syria even today, but now that the Mandate of Palestine had become a *fait accompli*, they engineered a new Palestinian national identity and demanded the country exclusively for themselves. On the basis of this background, the British decided to reserve the far larger part of Palestine for the local Arabs. Trans-Jordan was meant to come under Hashemite rule ("Palestinian"), in much the same way as Iraq was thoroughly "Iraqi" under another Hashemite king.

Today, 70% of King Abdullah II of Jordan's subjects are Palestinians. The remainder, Bedouins, do not constitute a nation of their own. In other words, if indeed – in reaction to Zionism – the local Arabs managed to create a nation of their own, a "negative" of the Jewish picture, as it were, then this is today the only nation which inhabits the Kingdom of Jordan.

But this raises a logical dilemma: If the Hashemite Kingdom is the legitimate expression of the Palestinian national identity, then the Palestinians already have a state of their own, and their claim for a state in the so-called "occupied territories" in western *Eretz* Israel is, in fact, for a second Palestinian state. On the other hand, if the Kingdom is not the nation-state of the

Palestinians, then where is their elementary right for self-determination? Why is self-determination valid only *vis-à-vis* the Jewish state?

Consider the absurdity: An Arab mother gave birth in Jerusalem to two children. Does it stand to reason, that the one who lives in Amman should belong to the "Jordanian nation", while his brother, in Jerusalem, is a "Palestinian"? Do not both of them live in the same ancient Land of Israel or – former Mandatory Palestine?

But the two Palestinian states – "Jordan" and "Palestine" – would not co-exist, side by side, for long. A PLO-state in YESHA will immediately strive to annex Jordan, claiming for itself by pan-Arab consensus the status of "the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people". Then the Israeli Arabs, already numbering over a million, will demand autonomy, "Anschluss" to Greater Palestine to come next.

One must admit that the Palestinian cause has made fabulous headway, while the Jewish national home is constantly shrinking, both in ideology and national motivation.

This is particularly spectacular if one takes a glance at some hard facts, which even the most ardent "Arabist" will not be able to erase from history:

No encyclopedia preceding 1917 – the year of the Balfour Declaration, when the Zionist claim began to cast its Palestinian shadow – mentions the "Palestinian people" in any way.

The *Encyclopedia Britannica* (1910-1911) says: "Palestine...the territory which in the Old Testament is claimed as the inheritance of the pre-exilic Hebrews... The river Jordan...marks a line of delimitation between western and eastern Palestine..."

Palestine, or Filastin, as homeland of Arab Palestinians –what a thought! Yet the reason for that is obvious.

The Palestinian claim sounds particularly hollow on the background of authentic Arab voices. In his testimony before the Anglo-American Committee (1946), the eminent Arab historian, Professor Philip Hitti, had this to say:

The Sunday schools have done a great deal of harm to us, because by smearing the walls of the rooms with maps of Palestine they are associating it in the mind of the average American – and I may say perhaps the Englishman too – with Jews. Sir, there is no such thing as Palestine in history, absolutely not.⁵

Another Arab professor, John Hazam, declared in his testimony before the same committee: "Before 1917, when Balfour made his declaration, there was never any Palestine question, or even any Palestine as a political or geographical entity..."

In a similar manner, publications preceding 1950 knew of no "West Bank". Few would believe today that even the UN 1947 Partition Plan (Resolution 181) uses terms such as "...the mountainous country of Judea", "the Samaria District".

The "West Bank" was invented following the invasion of Western Palestine by "Trans-Jordan" in 1948 and after the annexation of Judea-Samaria to the newly formed "Hashemite Kingdom". The apparently neutral term "West Bank" was of course chosen to cleanse the Jewish connotation of Judea-Samaria.

A Jordanian tourist guide from the year 1959 carries a geographical map showing the "East and West Banks", while pre-1967 Israel is designated as "Occupied area of Palestine". It seems that only a Jewish presence casts the Palestinian shadow!

Prince Hassan of Jordan, addressing the Jordanian National Assembly (February 2, 1970), declared: "Palestine is Jordan and Jordan is Palestine. There is one people and one land with one history and one destiny."

One can expect with certainty to hear a similar statement from Arafat, immediately after proclaiming a Palestinian state.

Actually, Farouk Kaddoumi, then as now the PLO's "Foreign Minister", expressed the same idea: There must be a connection, because the PLO regards Jordanians and Palestinians as one people."

King Hussein had the same message: "The two peoples are actually one – this is a fact."

The naked truth came out in detail in an interview for the Dutch newspaper, **Trouw** (March 31, 1977), given by Zohair Mohsin, head of the Za'ika terror group and member of the PLO Executive Council, as follows:

It is only for tactical reasons that we carefully stress our Palestinian identity, for it is in the national interest of the Arabs to encourage a separate Palestinian identity to counter Zionism: The founding of a Palestinian state is a new tool in the ongoing battle against Israel...After we will have attained all our rights in the whole of Palestine, we must not postpone, even for a single moment, the reunification of Jordan and Palestine.

We also have this revealing dialogue, on the highest level, between the late King Hussein and the late President Assad of Syria, held during the Amman convention, November 1987:

Assad: "Palestine is mine, part of Syria. An independent state called Palestine never existed."

Hussein: "The appearance of the Palestinian national personality comes as an answer to Israel's claim that Palestine is Jewish. But in truth, deviation from the national Arab framework is not to be permitted."

Arafat, who was also there, threatened to leave the convention.⁹

The facts and dicta relating to the defining moments of the territories to the west and to the east of the river Jordan are anything but past, irrelevant history. On the contrary, in creating Trans-Jordan, Britain had been quite far-sighted regarding future developments between the two conflicting and warring peoples. Nevertheless, all those concerned – the Palestinians, the Israelis and the Jordanians – take great care to circumvent this subject, each for his own reasons. Israel, in whose clear interest it should have been to refute the Palestinian complaint of having been denied a national home, finds itself restrained from raising the issue for fear of vexing Jordan, with whom its relations have always been a little better than with the other Arab states.

Two decisive developments, turned the 1922 partition of Palestine, retrospectively, into an irrevocable necessity: The Holocaust, which wiped out the Jewish masses for whose "close settlement on the land", eastern Palestine had been allocated. On the other hand, the Palestinian 1948 refugees, who are now the majority of the Jordanians, do in fact live in one and the same country, both east and west of the Jordan River-*Eretz* Israel, or former mandatory Palestine.

At the time, the Jewish Agency sharply protested against the amputation of 77% of the Jewish national home. But today there is no irredentist movement in Israel in favor of bringing Trans-Jordan under Israeli rule. And yet, there is one thing Israel cannot, should not, tolerate: The removal of Jordan from the Israeli-Palestinian equation.

Israel is entitled to reject the cynical rules of a game, according to which the areas in Trans-Jordan, which were cut off from the Jewish national home for the purpose of creating a land reserve for the Palestinians, should be closed to the latter, so as to turn all the pressure inward, into the minuscule Jewish state, in order to create a population explosion there. If we have already contributed to them, *nolens volens*, 3/4 of our national home, then this contribution should at least be utilized to fulfill functions vital to their "national home".

Of course, a vast project which would embrace Israel and the Autonomy, Egypt and Jordan, will require regional and international cooperation and the mobilization of resources on a gigantic scale. This would be a veritable New Middle East, the very antithesis of the "New Middle East" of Oslo vintage ushered in by Shimon Peres, which is feasible only upon the ruins of the Jewish state.

VII. Back to Reality

Through the prism of actuality the aforementioned model is indeed only virtual and totally detached from Arab-Jewish reality – today and in the foreseeable future.

Therefore, a realistic response to the question "What is your solution?" is not the simulation game which we call autonomy, but the continuation of Zionist praxis and even its manifold intensification. Without it, the Zionist state will not only suffer stagnation, but our very existence will be in danger. For the State of Israel standing still is poison. Israel's situation resembles a performer in a high wire act, where all physical forces attract him downward, and only the dynamic movement forward saves him from falling and crashing. The Arabs have all the material advantages, including the unconditional support of most of the "world" due to anti-Semitism, love of petroleum, the Arab market and the strategic weight of their vast expanses and huge masses. And the Arabs are aware of their strength. Therefore, merely to survive we must strengthen ourselves all the time spiritually and physically, and in this order.

Our *leitmotiv* is unilateral action, free of any agreement or pact with the Arabs. Following the failure of the Oslo Agreements, even the Israeli Left has now reached the conclusion that an agreed upon "solution" with the Arabs of YESHA is not possible, and therefore nothing is left but unilateral action. Only because this camp is possessed, as by a *dybbuk*, with the obsession of relinquishing YESHA, it has hastily fabricated a new artificial "political horizon", dubbed "unilateral withdrawal". Israel is to abandon, without any agreement, most of the YESHA areas and uproot perhaps a hundred settlements including their 150,000 Jewish inhabitants, and - "apré moi deluge": Flames of internecine civil war, kindled within the Jewish people, and rising flames of enthusiasm and motivation amongst the Arabs, following the flight of the Israeli Defense Forces and the collapse of the Jewish settlements. Also, the outside world will slowly arrive at the conclusion that the state of the Jews in its entirety was but a passing episode. The Palestinians, free even of the Oslo Agreement stipulations, will immediately proclaim a state and this state will conclude military agreements with countries such as Iran, Iraq and Syria. Their armored forces and guns will swiftly threaten Jerusalem, Petach Tikva and Beersheba. The Palestinian state will be flooded by returning refugees, who will press upon the Green Line. The waters of the mountain aguifer will be exploited to exhaustion and the air space will be closed off.

These are the starting conditions, under which Israel will then be compelled to fight an all out regional war, to the very bitter end, over Jerusalem and the Jordan Valley. Alternatively, should these areas also be included in the unilateral withdrawal, then the war will break out over the boundaries of the 1947 UN resolution and the Arab claim for the "right of return".

Even assuming that such a war would have erupted in any case as a direct and necessary consequence of the Oslo Agreement, just as the Second World War was born out of the Munich Agreement of 1938, let the readers judge our prospects for winning and our foreseeable casualty total under each one of these two scenarios: The present status quo as a starting line for war, or the situation following unilateral withdrawal from most areas of YESHA.

Note should be taken that the question that is now posed in Israel by right and left no longer concerns this or that agreement with the Arabs, but our own agenda, unilateral in any case: Are we to retreat and discard everything we own beyond the Green Line, or, on the contrary – go forward in building Zionism in the original "Zion", which is Jerusalem and YESHA?

In this context, listen to an echo from 68 years ago, the voice of Zeev Jabotinsky in his famous article "The Iron Wall", which could have been written today:

One cannot dream of a voluntary agreement between us and the Arabs over the Land of Israel, neither today nor in the foreseeable future...

Any native people is going to fight settlers as long as it has a shred of hope to rid itself from the danger of alien settlement. This is how the Arabs of Eretz Israel are acting and this is how they will act as long as they have a spark of hope that they can succeed in preventing the transformation of Palestine into the Land of Israel...

We have no way of promising something in exchange to the Arabs of Eretz Israel.... A voluntary agreement is ruled out... and therefore settlement can proceed apace only under the protection of a force which is not dependent upon the local population, an iron wall which the local population will be unable to breach.

We are damaging our cause with our own hands if we keep prattling about an agreement and din into the minds of the leaders of the Mandatory Power that an iron wall is not the essential, but incessant negotiations.

I do not intend to maintain that any agreement whatsoever is impossible with the Arabs of the Land of Israel. What stays impossible is a voluntary agreement.

When every crack in the iron wall will be sealed, only then will the extreme groups lose their influence...and only then will influence pass to more moderate groups... in other words the only way to attain an agreement in the future is to totally abandon any attempt to reach an agreement in the present.

Endnotes

- ¹ *Ha'aretz*, January 12, 2001.
- Julius Stone, *Israel and Palestine Assault on the Law of Nations*, The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London 1981, pp. 121-2.
- ³ Howard Grief, "The Illegality of the Sharm e-Sheikh Memorandum Under Israeli Law", Ariel Center for Policy Research, Policy Paper No. 91, 1999.
- ⁴ 1950 I.C.J. Reports, 128, 131 ff.
- ⁵ Hearing before the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine, State Department Building, January 11, 1946, Ward and Paul official reporters, p. 5.
- ⁶ Ibid, p. 46. For a complete picture, it might be useful to add Ben Gurion's reaction to Prof. Hitti's statement, in his testimony before the very same committee:

I agree with him entirely; there is no such thing in history as Palestine, absolutely, but when Dr. Hitti speaks of history he means Arab history, he is a specialist in Arab history and he knows his business. In Arab history there is no such thing as Palestine. Arab history was made in Arabia, in Persia, in Spain and North Africa. You will not find Palestine in that history, nor was Arab history made in Palestine. There is not, however, only Arab history; there is world history and Jewish history and in that history there is a country by the name of Judea, or as we call it, *Eretz* Israel, the land of Israel. We have called it Israel since the days of Joshua the son of Nun. There was such a country in history, there was and it is still there. It is a little country, a very little country, but that little country made a very deep impression on world history and on our history. This country made us a people; our people made this country. No other people in the world made this country; this country made not other people in the world. Now again we are beginning to make this country and again this country is beginning to make us.

The Jewish Case before the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine as presented by the Jewish Agency for Palestine, Statements and Memoranda (Jerusalem, The Jewish Agency for Palestine, 1947, pp. 61-2), Cited from: Arthur Kahn and Thomas R. Murray, *The Palestinians – A Political Masquerade*, A.F.S.I.

- ⁷ Newsweek, March 1977.
- ⁸ Broadcast on Egyptian TV, October 10, 1977.
- ⁹ *Ma'ariv*, November 30, 1987.

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