



FACING INSURGENT ISLAM: A GRAND STRATEGY FOR THE WEST

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PART ONE: ESTIMATE OF DYNAMICS

I. Approach

One of the more significant global processes very likely to characterize the 21st century is the continuing and escalating rise of Islam. In terms of self-consciousness, energy, demography, economic power, and military capacities, Islam is “standing up,” as the usual phrase in Arabic puts it. As a civilization and belief system and as a cluster of states and non-state actors, Islam is sure to become increasingly potent and to exert increasing influence on geo-political processes and structures.¹ This potency can, from a Western and global perspective, be very benevolent or/and very malignant. Under optimistic assumptions, Islam can again become a very creative civilization making significant contributions to a peaceful global order, to humankind, and to global culture as a whole, while advancing the people of Islam to high individual and collective pluralistic qualities of life. However,

under pessimistic assumptions, rising Islam can take very aggressive forms, combining religious fanaticism with mass killing weapons,² bringing about neo-barbarism in significant parts of the world, and moving toward a post-modern form of religious and civilizational wars. In particular, resurgent Islam is likely to be aggressive toward the West, causing it much damage, while also causing much harm to the adherents to Islam themselves and possibly endangering the future of humanity as a whole.

Given this evolutionary potential of Islam, a main challenge facing the West and its partners is to influence the actual developments of Islamic states and societies so as to increase the probability of positive trajectories and reduce the probability of negative ones while containing the damage potential of the latter.

The basic position of this chapter is that, therefore, the West needs a well-considered grand strategy³ which serves as grounding both for long-term policies and for crisis improvisation in the face of the many unpredictable and also in part inconceivable⁴ situations sure to come about. This chapter is devoted to an effort to develop such a grand strategy.⁵

The concept of “grand strategy” poses serious dangers if taken in an unsophisticated way. Statecraft has to deal with unique concrete situations that resist simple categorization. Still, a well-considered grand strategy can provide principles helping policymakers to take a deeper, more comprehensive, and longer-term view of “hot” issues and to cope with specific situations in ways taking into account broader contexts and fundamental goals. Thus, improved grand strategic thinking would have led to quite different European Union policies toward Turkey and Western policies in Bosnia, avoiding grave error that cannot but strengthen the malignant potential of Islam.

II. Islam in Transformation

Different Islamic states moved through various phases of evolution according to unique timetables. Thus, Turkey followed after the First World War a very different path from Saudi Arabia and Malaysia; changes in ways having little in common with the Islamic parts of India which later became Pakistan and Bangladesh. Still, there is a historic unity to Islam and its states as belonging to a shared,

though pluralistic, civilization. This unity justified discourse on a “grand strategy” dealing with Islam as a whole. However, to try to understand the present situation and the evolutionary potential⁶ of Islam and develop an appropriate grand strategy, thinking in terms of long-term history⁷ is essential. But long-term perspectives must be combined with detailed analysis of contemporary processes within a view of history as nonlinear,⁸ systemic,⁹ and partly open-ended.¹⁰

Reducing such “thinking-in-history”¹¹ to bare essentials, four phases characterize much of the path of Islam from the past into the present and toward an uncertain and contingent.

In the first phase, Islam was an extremely successful religion and civilization, with tremendous achievements in expanding, building societies and states, and reaching peak cultural creativity. The domain of Islam extended over large parts of the then-known world, succeeded for generations to hold on to large segments of Europe, and constituted what would today be called a “super block.”

In the second phase, with the emergence of pre-modern and modern Europe, the crystallization of the Western state system, and the scientific and technological revolution, the White Christian West conquered the domain of Islam and subordinated it.¹² From the perspective of Islam, this was a period of colonization, foreign occupation, enforced subjugation, and cultural humiliation.¹³ However, the elimination of Islamic sovereignty in no way eroded adherence to Islam.

In the third phase, Islamic states regained independence and most of them tried to modernize on lines of the West. The nation-state pattern was taken over in many Islamic countries, together with Western ideas and ideologies. However, this “Westernization” was in most societies superficial and did not touch grass root adherence to Islam and its political potentials, with the partial exception of Turkey, thanks to the unique Atatürk reforms.

Following failures of modernization, weakening of the West, and discrediting of some of its main ideologies, all Islamic countries are now to some extent in a fourth phase; some more so and some less. Bewilderment and search for selfhood and individual and collective self-identity characterize this phase.¹⁴ Following the failures of Western-type nationalism and various versions of state socialism, it is increasingly characterized by re-Islamization.

Individually and collectively, Moslems and Islamic societies search for self-identity and an appropriate place in the modern world. Quasi-westernization continues to be an attractive option for some elites, but is losing ground, with growing portions of the educated and of professionals too becoming more Islamic. There is a return to “roots” with much turning to “fundamentalism,”¹⁵ with search for ways to combine Islamic traditions with modern technologies and economies, and with a very strong desire to make Islam again into a major global power. All this goes hand in hand with much resentment toward the West and a continuing feeling of humiliation,¹⁶ combined with a contradictory mixture between envy and unwillingness to accept Western *Zeitgeist* and “post-modernity.”

The present phase is loaded with contradictions, such as desire for economic prosperity and technological modernization together with clinging to traditions; a sense of power together with strong feelings of inadequacy; resentment of the West combined, as noted, with not a little envy; and more.

A number of additional “drivers” of the future¹⁷ add to instability while strengthening the likelihood of developments harmful to the West. Let me start with demography. Populations in most Islamic countries increase rapidly and become urbanized, producing explosive situations. However, some countries have a rather stable and relatively small indigenous population, including some of the oil-richest states. In some countries, demographic changes, including immigration, entry of refugees, and import of labor, disturb ethnic-political balances, as in Lebanon, Kuwait, and Jordan. All in all, demographic factors aggravate instability, by overloading governments, retarding economic and social welfare, and creating urban masses prone to fundamentalism and also fanaticism. This applies both to domestic situations and to relations between states, with large and growing populations on one hand and very rich countries with small populations on the other, such as in the Persian Gulf, producing very unstable disparities. Similarly, the growing populations of North Africa facing southern Europe, of Turkey facing east Europe and of Malaysia and Indonesia facing Australia, may well produce radical geo-strategic shifts including violent eruptions changing global civilizational and power relations.

To move on to socio-economic trends as a second main driver of the future closely related to the demographic one, widespread poverty and unemployment are unavoidable in the foreseeable future in most Islamic countries. No economic policy and no achievable international support can rapidly increase per capita real income, produce employment opportunities, and provide social services and amenities of life, satisfying growing aspirations and expectations. Therefore, extreme social frustrations and tensions are assured, with much potential for instability and Islamic fundamentalism at least in part hostile to the West.

Demographic and socio-economic processes add up to deep social traumatization, producing search for “anchors” in life¹⁸ and also for “enemies” to blame,¹⁹ including anti-Western intentions. At the same time, the action capacities of Islamic countries and non-state actors are rapidly increasing, including ability to cause grievous harm to the West. Economic and professional elites are developing, with significant investments in education, including technical training. Most governments follow a selective technological modernization policy including modernization of military capacities.

Another factor characterizing the present phase is the growth of Islamic Diasporas and their radicalization. Large-scale migration from Islamic countries to the West, as caused mainly by economic motifs, is sure to increase despite all countermeasures. Intensifying radicalization of many of these migrants, because of clinging to roots and harsh barriers to their cultural absorption in their new countries of residence, is also to be expected. In combination, these two provide a strong basis for counter-Western Islamic actors residing in the West itself.

Significance of individual rulers in determining national policies, characterizing most Islamic countries, adds much uncertainty, with personal choices having significant consequences for better and worse. But this does not change the overall estimate of the dynamics of Islam for the next 50 years or so: Unless the West strongly intervenes with ongoing future-making processes, Islamic countries are sure to be quite unstable with much fundamentalism. Some state and non-state actors are very likely to be extremely fanatic, up to readiness to endanger their survival in order to cause grievous harm to the West by using all the means at their disposal.

All in all, Islam is “standing up.” This is sure to be a super-turbulent process,²⁰ with discontinuities and eruptions, internal conflicts and external tensions dominating the scenery during at least the next 50 years. It is this current and foreseeable phase of the evolution of Islam and its evolutionary potential that poses a fateful challenge to Western grand strategies.

III. Alternative Pathways into the Future

The domain of Islam is surprise-prone, permeated with uncertainty, and sure to be in turmoil with a high probability of low-probability contingencies occurring. But the future is only in part chaotic, with main possibilities being constrained in central features by ongoing processes as discussed above. Therefore, main alternative pathways of Islam into the future can in part be depicted from the perspective of the West in a number of scenarios and structured futures. I will first present some scenarios, beginning with what appear to be dangerous ones for the West, moving on to some *prima facie* positive ones. But it should be noted that “bad” scenarios often also constitute an “occasion,” in the sense of “opportunity” in Machiavelli’s terminology, which can be utilized to influence the future for the better. And “good” ones may prove in the longer run to be Pandora boxes, especially if mishandled.

But, first, a comment on the impacts of global contexts. It makes a lot of difference to the future of Islam if the world as a whole moves rapidly toward an “end of history,” with free markets and liberal democracy irresistibly permeating all societies.²¹ Or, instead, if the world continues in the main on a trajectory of an uneasy mix between globalization and “tribalism,” with some advancement of global regimes but a lot of “chaos.”²² My assumption is that at least till the middle of the 21st century, the first image of the future is beyond the limits of the possible, and in the second half of the 21st century it probably will not be relevant any more. Rather, the second image, with many possible variations, is the most likely future on which discussion of the evolution of Islam should be predicated. Jumps may occur and, indeed, I will present a contingent grand strategic recommendation to break the continuity of global history by instituting a “global leviathan,” as a last resort against the self-destruction of humanity if lesser measures fail. If and when such or

another mutation occurs or is brought about, this chapter will be obsolete. But until such an historic leap into a different geo-strategic and geo-civilizational cosmos takes place, the proposed working assumption is that global impacts will not be radical and forceful enough to shift Islam beyond the alternative futures inherent in its present evolutionary potential.

However, external influences can shape parts of the future of Islam within its alternative futures as, in part, discussed in the following. This, indeed, is the purpose of the proposed grand strategies for the West — which, in essence, constitute deliberative interventions with historic processes designed to influence the actual pathway into the future taken by Islam and its actors.

Moving on to the substance of alternative futures of Islam, let me start with a number of scenarios that are, initially at least, dangerous from a Western perspective:

- Sudden destabilization of some countries because of internal coup d’etat or upheavals, such as in Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt
- Outbreak of war between Iran and a combination of Arab states, between Egypt and Sudan, and more
- Violent conflict between some Arab states and Israel endangering important Western interests, whether starting in limited a way, such as on the Golan Heights, escalating from some local destabilization, such as in Jordan or Lebanon, or initiated as a major war
- Dramatic terrorism against Western high-value targets with chemical materials, massive hostage taking, etc.
- Escalating inter-civilizational conflicts, such as between Pakistan and India, between Turkey and Greece, and between Moslem and non-Moslem actors in the Balkans or the former USSR
- New types of conflict with the West, such as large scale “boat people” migration from North Africa into Spain and from there into West Europe

- Acquisition of nuclear and other mass-killing weapons by some Islamic countries and also by non-country actors, including by unstable states and jihad groups, coupled with rumors on possible surprise-use of such weapons against Western countries and their allies
- Increasing likelihood of a nuclear conflict between some Islamic and some non-Islamic countries, which however “local” may cause much damage to large areas and is likely to mutate global geo-politics as a whole
- A steep decline in oil prices, resulting from break-throughs in energy technology, producing severe economic crises and regime destabilization with propensities to engage in external aggression (Illustrating the negative side of what may in many respects be a very positive development for the West and the world as a whole)
- Alternatively, increasing dependence of the West, Russia, and Japan on Middle Eastern oil, with its availability being endangered by a mixture between internal instability in main oil-producing countries and withholding of oil as a way to blackmail the West to make very costly and, in part, impossible concessions
- Development of an Islamic bloc with “super-power” capacities, confronting the West on global values and issues and demanding from main Western ex-colonial countries compensations for “generations of enslavement and robbery”

What are initially positive scenarios include, for instance:

- Rapid economic and social development in most Islamic countries, together with democratization including some unique features, accompanied by civilizational creativity of global significance and peaceful cooperation with the West
- Increasing differentiation between Islamic countries, with many of them becoming more “Western” in main features
- Solution of main points of conflict between Islamic and Western countries, such as the Palestinian issue, integration

of Turkey in the European Union, and the Kashmir conflict

- Large oil discoveries bringing about economic and social stabilization, including in Egypt and North Africa
- Strong reversals of fundamentalism, with new ideas combining basic Islamic values with democracy, human rights, and cooperation with the West gaining the upper hand

Many additional scenarios, negative and positive, can be designed. However, the ranges of the likely and of the possible, even if unlikely, are constrained by some basic historic structures and processes shaping the future of the domains of Islam. Therefore, despite the already mentioned likelihood of surprise possibilities including inconceivable ones, coherent main alternative futures of large parts of the Islamic areas, bringing out main features of evolutionary potentials and main alternative lines of evolution into the future, can be constructed. These include four main structures of the future:

Future One: Cooperation and Development

This is the most optimistic alternative future, with a majority of Islamic states cooperating peacefully among themselves and with the West. Successfully economic and social development takes place with much domestic stability. Regimes combine Western democracy and Islamic traditions and values. Islamic religious thinking downgrades hostility toward other civilizations and abandons the idea of Holy War. And civilizational creativity leads toward an Islamic renaissance with important contributions to global cultures.

Future Two: Cohesion with Fanaticism

The second future is the most pessimistic one. Pan-Arab and Pan-Islamic forces dominate large parts of the area of Islam, including the Middle East, West Asia, and East Asia. Turkey and Egypt become increasingly fundamentalist. An Islamic block is formed, overcoming schisms and demonstrating increasing hostility toward the West. Fanaticism-prone countries engage in economic and technological advancement, building up strong action capabilities, while keeping society mobilized. Pushing back Western-Christian

global dominance, aggressively advancing Islam in Africa and Asia, confronting Hindu India, and eliminating Israel are among the main goals, consistently pursued.

Future Three: Mixed Conflict and Cooperation, with Limited Upheavals

This future continues more or less present processes, *raison d'etat* being the main motive of Islamic state behavior, inter-state relations moving between cooperation and conflict, and domestic upheavals being limited. In this future, fundamentalism does not grow significantly and Iran becomes less extreme. Relations with the West continue as now, with ups and downs and limited conflicts combined with selective cooperation, without Islam forming a coherent civilizational geo-political block.

Future Four: Mixed Conflict and Cooperation, with Many Upheavals

This future illustrates situations in between the second and third structures presented above, with a potential for further development into either directions. Such a future can last for quite some time, but is basically unstable because of non-sustainability of a structure including antinomies actively conflicting one with another.

Various combinations are likely and additional variations are possible. But these four alternative future structures, together with the scenarios outlined earlier, do add up to a sketch of the evolutionary potentials of Islam. Thus, they pose the main challenge posed by insurgent Islam to the West.

Before taking up the daunting task of indicating some principles for a Western grand strategy for coping with insurgent Islam, three widespread delusions must be deconstructed, namely clinging to the status quo, relying on westernization and trust in separation.

IV. Hollowness of Status Quo, Doubtfulness of Westernization, Impossibility of Separation

Three policy orthodoxies preventing development and application of an effective grand strategy of the West in respect to Islam include 1) clinging to the status quo and hoping it is sustainable, with some improvements such as settling the Arab-Israeli, Indian-Pakistan, and Turkey-Greece conflicts and prevention of escalation of

Islamic terrorism, 2) westernization of the main countries of Islam, and 3) separation of the world into zones of peace and zones of turbulence that can be kept apart, with the latter including turbulent and anti-Western Islamic states and non-state actors.

These are serious misperceptions caused by lack of understanding of ongoing socio-civilizational dynamics, of the uniqueness of Islam, and of the processes shaping regional and global futures. They are based on and aggravated by “motivated irrationalities,” “end of history” phantasmagoria, Western parochialism, a-historical thinking, and many additional causes of distorted images of reality and its trends as prevalent in governments, elites, societies, and civilizations.

True, maintaining the status quo in large parts of the Moslem world, with some obviously needed improvements and subject to socio-economic progress and movement toward Western political values, is desirable from a Western perspective, especially when compared with some of the alternatives. But this is a vain hope, with efforts to realize it likely to be more counter-productive than helpful.

In view of the strength of change drivers, such as globalization, science, and technology, no status quo is maintainable, certainly not in the domain of Islam as shaped also by internal very turbulent processes, as already discussed. Therefore, instead of striving for the impossible, efforts should concentrate on trying to channelize cascading transformations in desired directions and, at least, at avoiding the worst. However, this can be done only if inherent instability of the status quo is recognized, main change factors are diagnosed, and robust policies focus on efforts to influence main trajectories of change, including revolutionary ones, without any ambitions of “fine tuning.” Alternatively, if maintaining of some main features of the status quo is regarded as essential, large-scale interventions are necessary to dampen change forces, and such efforts too are sure to fail after some time unless alternative channels for radical change fitting Islam and its potentials are provided.

To clarify this crucial point, let me mention two examples, however much they may contradict status quo-oriented policy dreams:

- The kingdom of Jordan is basically unstable and becoming hyper-unstable with the establishment of a Palestinian state. Therefore, Western policies based on an assumption of long-range stability of Jordan as a Hashemite kingdom are mistaken and should be changed. Thus, if after careful consideration priority is given to maintaining Jordan and its regime, this has far-going implications. These include, for instance, not letting the Palestinian state acquire action capabilities that can endanger Jordan and deterring it from action against Jordan; encouraging Israel to keep most of the Jordan valley so as to minimize borders between Jordan and the Palestinian state; supporting effective law-and-order policies in Jordan; providing massive help to Jordan to significantly improve its socio-economic situation; and gearing for effectively helping Jordan, directly and indirectly, if its stability is endangered. An alternative policy is to assist in a smooth transformation of Jordan into a part of a Palestinian state. Waiting for events to happen in the hope that the status quo is likely to prevail is the worst posture of all, sure to fail, with bad consequences that are avoidable.
- Turkey poses a pivotal problem with a status quo that cannot continue for long and with a critical crossroad likely to lead either to westernization or to Islamization. The case of Turkey illustrated strikingly the lack of grand strategic thinking in the West, as demonstrated by the absurd policies of the European Union on Turkish membership and by actions of some Western states on the Armenian issue and its history. Instead, needed is a determined effort by the West to strengthen the westernization of Turkey while preserving and developing its unique culture. This may be possible, thanks to the radical cultural engineering of Atatürk and may help to pose a model for some other Islamic states that can help to prevent and also to reverse Islamization. But this requires a determined high-quality policy by the West. Lack of such a policy is very likely to be evaluated by future historians as a very grave error, contributing significantly to the decline of the West by its own fault.

These examples serve to introduce the second delusion of much of present Western thinking and feelings on Islamic states, namely trust in westernization as a main grand policy. Efforts to protect human rights and prevent atrocities are a moral imperative not to be judged too much in terms of realpolitical interests. But the situation is different in respect to efforts to export to Islamic countries Western forms of liberal democracy and free markets. Even much more dangerous as bases for policies are images of Islamic countries becoming rapidly similar in main features to the West, such as the Middle East somehow leaping into a quasi-European-Union pattern of cooperation.²³

Doing so may well be unjustified morally in terms of global ethics of pluralism. Worse, it is realpolitically not only in vain but positively dangerous. This is the case for a number of reasons.

The economic policies proposed by the West are sure to increase unemployment and thus to accelerate destabilization and encourage anti-Western fundamentalism. The argument that in the long run Western types of free markets and globalization are sure to bring about economic prosperity to the countries of Islam is doubtful, unrealistic, and irrelevant. It is doubtful because main aspects of Western economic structures do not fit the social conditions and values of most of the Islamic countries. It is unrealistic because many Islamic rulers do not want to accept crucial aspects of Western economic systems because of their power implications and political consequences. And it is irrelevant, because if in the shorter run transition crises produce Islamic fundamentalist states, then the longer-run benefits of Western-type economies will not be reached.

Even more of a delusion is involved in efforts to push Islamic countries toward Western-type democracy. It is quite clear that democratic elections, given the present socio-economic and political situation in most of the countries of Islam, will bring to power parties and rulers supporting deeper Islamization of their countries, often coupled with fanaticism and hostility toward the West. Also, in the view of many Western experts, there are serious contradictions between Islamic cultures and political theology on one side and democracy on the other,²⁴ making the latter into a wrong model for good regimes in Islamic states. In this respect, it is interesting to note that Iran has the most democratic elections

of any Islamic country, while seeming to move in the direction of a unique mixed democratic-religious regime. The nature of such a regime, if it achieves a long-term balance, is hard to comprehend to Western minds and its future is unknown — but most likely is very different from Western liberal democracy.

The emerging recommendation is to be very careful and selective about urging Islamic countries to adopt Western-type liberal democracy. Less ambitious attempts to upgrade the consent-basis and welfare-orientation of regimes, together with respect for basic human rights, have a much higher probability of beneficial results, both for the people of the area and for the West.

This recommendation in no way implies any moral or political “judgment” on those countries as “unripe” for the “higher” values of the West. Rather, the recommended posture recognizes the right of other cultures to live by their values, as long as those are not aggressive.

The third delusion of the possibility of “separation” is less expressed explicitly, but tacitly underlies quite some Western security thinking²⁵ with sure-to-follow bad results. It is most pronounced in respect to Africa, with major upheavals, warfare, and all genocide there being assumed to have no costs for the West and, consequently, being left to burn out with very little efforts at effective intervention. This is a mistake not only in humanitarian but also in realpolitical terms because of growing probability that earlier or somewhat later some of the protagonists will take action against the West, up to direct threats with mass killing weapons.

This is all the more true with Islamic states and non-state actors, where conflicts which at first are local in scope being often likely to broaden and involve Western interests and states. True, the West is more prone to intervene, as illustrated by the Gulf War, because of very visible dangers posed by local conflicts to its interests. But hopes to “isolate” local warfare in less obviously sensitive areas than the Middle East linger in the background, as illustrated by “do nothing” strategies in conflicts involving Islamic former parts of the Soviet Union and diminishing interest in such conflicts in the Balkan.

This is much more of an error than neglect of conflicts in Africa, with broad Islamization sure to undermine any efforts to separate local conflicts involving Islamic actors from the West.

The deconstruction of main stream Western policy orthodoxies regarding Islam does not imply that all Western policies toward Islamic countries are wrong. Many Western strategies and actions are well taken. These include, for instance, maintaining close contact with leaders of non-aggressive Islamic countries and sharing with them some decision making; economic assistance; efforts to slow proliferation of mass killing weapons; trying to calm local conflicts; confronting Iraqi aggression; and more. But, driven by often wrong assumptions and lacking a well-considered grand-strategic base, policies are inadequate and also counterproductive. Hence, the need for a reconceptualized grand strategy for the West that fits the realities and prospects of insurgent Islam.

PART TWO: GRAND STRATEGY RECOMMENDATION

V. Intermezo: On Building the Grand Strategy

Building a grand strategy requires outstanding cognitive and moral capacities and is a task for high-quality interdisciplinary policy research, development, and creativity organizations (“think tanks”).²⁶ Obviously, I cannot do so on my own. However, to indicate some directions and illustrate a few of principles, I will present and explain eight main suggested dimensions for building a grand strategy for the West toward Islam: (1) relating respectfully to Islam, (2) selective accommodation, with red lines, (3) helping socio-economic development, (4) curbing aggressive actors, (5) reducing aggressive capacities, (6) holding states and rulers strictly accountable, (7) damage limitation, and (8) if all fails, moving toward a global leviathan.

But first, the main hyper-goals of such a grand strategy must be explored.

VI. Hyper-Goals: Avoiding the Worst and Advancing the Good

Grand strategies of the West should serve two partly overlapping hyper-goals:²⁷ namely “bad-reducing” and “good-advancing.” The first aims at containing dangers and threats, including prevention of their development and realization and decreasing their damage if they do occur. The second aims at advancing a “good world” as positively defined by Western values as changing with time.

Preventing fanatic states from having nuclear weapons and reducing Western sensitivity to a breakdown of oil supplies from

the Middle East, illustrate the containment of bad possibilities. And helping the Arab Middle East to prosper through peaceful cooperation illustrates the achievement of desirable futures. These examples also indicate the overlap between the two hyper-goals as well as their distinct nature.

The means to be used for reducing bad situations and their consequences and/or for advancing good ones are multifarious and not dictated by the “negative” or “positive” nature of the goal. Thus, threats of sanctions can be used to advance desirable situations, such as respect for human rights; and economic assistance is sometimes effective for preventing bad situations, such as societies becoming more fanatic. The preferable mix of measures to be used in order to contain the bad or/and advance the good depends on the particularities of sub-goals and situations and on availability of policy instruments. Still, the distinction between danger-containment and “good”-advancement is very significant and serves as a main compass for the recommended grand strategies.

Given Western values, classifying situations as “bad” is often not difficult, but there are many exceptions with processes being ambiguous and containing both bad and good aspects. The distinction also serves to bring out a main problem, namely different conceptions of what constitutes a “good” future. Cultural differences can here easily result in shallow judgments. Thus, Western *Zeitgeist* embraces human rights, individualism, and liberal democracy, while most of Islam has quite different values based on religious norms — but this does not justify evaluating the latter as “bad” and to be counter-acted. Instead, I propose to base the Western grand strategy primarily on a distinction between Islamic values and processes which are inner-directed and those that are aggressive toward the West and its associated. Thus, when Islamic countries reject the equality of women this is anathema to Western values, but poses no danger to the West. But when Islamic countries and groups engage in terrorism against the West this poses a clear threat.

From the perspective of the West, a grand strategy toward Islam should first of all aim at reducing the dangers built into fanatic and aggressive Islam, especially when equipped with effective damage-causing instruments of both “low intensity” and mass killing

potential. This includes, for instance, reducing the probability and limiting the damage of negative developments, such as:

- New types of quasi religious wars, with large confrontations having an ideological or cultural basis, such as between an emerging Islamic block of “true believer” nations and Western countries
- Regional conflicts that endanger the West, by jeopardizing the flow of essential materials such as oil; or by inaugurating a new epoch of atrocities with increasingly lethal weapons
- Action which is dangerous from a global perspective, even though non-violent and within what has traditionally been regarded as “domestic matters,” such as destruction of natural resources on a scale endangering important global ecological assets
- Non-violent action which can destabilize Western societies, such as illegal mass movement of population from Islamic countries; or drug production and diffusion on a scale having serious social consequences
- Neo-barbaric behavior that, though initially not directly endangering Western security transgresses against basic values which must morally be protected to preserve the viability and integrity of the West

Containment of such dangers is a first grand strategic imperative, leading to a number of specific policies, some well known and some in need of much innovation. Thus, prevention of proliferation of mass killing weapons and their delivery instruments and of diffusion of dangerous knowledge belong to the expanding family of arms control, though requiring much more determined measures. However, prevention of fanaticism armed with mass killing weapons and reducing its damage potentials requires radically novel approaches. As further discussed within the proposed grand strategic dimensions, these range from suitably targeted intelligence collection up to neutralization of dangerous “prophets of holy wars” and surgical operations against their centers and

facilities, coupled with painful action against countries providing them with safe havens.

Despite some overlaps, quite different in nature are policies aiming at advancement of positively desired situations, such as respect of human rights, democracy, socio-economic development, regional economic cooperation, peaceful settlement of disputes, promotion of global equity in a meaningful sense, and so on. However, as already discussed, priority should be given to the advancement of inner-directed instead of aggressive Islam. This may or may not involve advancement of some of the enumerated Western values. But this is secondary to the main aim of reducing dangers to the West, all the more so as “pushing” of the Western values may often be counter-productive and is also in part doubtful in terms of a pluralistic global morality.

Opinions may differ on this point, with a counter-argument claiming that only by adopting some main Western values can the benign future of Islam be assured. Available empiric data and reliable theories are inadequate for supporting or disproving this conjecture. But this very uncertainty accentuates the importance of danger-containment as the primary foundation of a Western grand strategy on Islam, in combination with advancement of desired positive situations as far as possible and not carrying serious risks of boomerang effects.

When the proposed hyper-goals are contrasted with the dynamics of Islam, as discussed earlier, the net assessment is one of a large and increasing security deficit likely to pose serious direct and indirect dangers to the West. Reducing the growing security deficit and turning it into a security surplus — this is the challenge facing construction of grand strategy for the West, to the eight main dimensions of which I now turn.

VII. Main Dimensions of Proposed Grand Strategy

(1) Relating Respectfully to Islam

The first recommended dimension is to respect the integrity of Islam and help it to “stand up” and develop in light of its own values and traditions as a main civilization and global factor. Any and all anti-Islamic elements and impressions should be strictly avoided.

It is essential to differentiate between “fundamentalism” and “fanaticism.” Fundamentalism, as noted, is a phenomenon belonging to modernity while reacting against it, can be inner-directed, and strives to transform society. As put by Anthony Giddens:

Fundamentalism is not the same as either fanaticism or authoritarianism. Fundamentalists call for a return to basic scriptures or texts, supposed to be read in a literal manner, and they propose that the doctrines derived from such a reading be applied to social, economic, or political life.²⁸

In Islam, fundamentalism often leads to fanaticism, but this is not always or necessarily the case. Also to be taken into account in rejecting any automatic correlating of fundamentalism with aggression is the fact that non-fundamentalist Islamic regimes can be very aggressive, as illustrated throughout the modern history of the Middle East. Therefore, respect of fundamentalism as long as not accompanied by aggressive intentions, coupled with efforts to encourage and support its non-aggressive forms, though not meeting Western values in other respects, is a main requirement of the proposed grand strategy.

The essence of the proposed posture is respect toward Islam, sincerely felt and convincingly demonstrated, together with support for unique styles of life which Islamic societies prefer. Thus, the West disparages Islamic legal norms, such as punishments regarded as “inhuman” and differential gender roles, and to regard them as regressive and contradicting human progress. However natural, such reactions are counter-productive realpolitically.

Many such expressions of Western disapproval of Moslem values are a matter of public opinion, mass media, and other channels which cannot and should not serve in the West as strategic policy instruments. Western leaders should demonstrate respect for Islamic norms and for the right of Islamic countries to live according to whatever values they prefer, within the limits of a minimum set of compelling global norms and as long as aggression toward others is avoided. But care must be exercised not to camouflage feelings. What is needed is bona fide respect for Islam and for the right of other cultures to live according to their values, as long as some basic norms regarded as obligatory for all societies are complied with.

Concomitantly, space should be provided for Islamic states to play an increasing role in global affairs, such as giving Islam a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, without veto rights, to be rotated between core states. Strict care should be taken to avoid actions or omissions which may be interpreted as reflecting negative attitudes toward Islam and Moslems, or lack of concern for them. Absence of rapid and effective help to Moslems in Bosnia and failure to adequately punish those who are responsible for barbarities committed against them, including senior politicians, is therefore as already stated a very serious blunder contradicting the required posture of the West toward Islam.

(2) Selective Accommodation, with Red Lines

To reduce friction and agitation, as well as for moral reasons, ambitions and desires of Islam should be accommodated as long as they are non-aggressive and do not impair important values and interests of the West. At the same time, red lines should be maintained and, at appropriate opportunities, explicated and explained, beyond which Islamic demands and actions will be rejected and counter-acted.

Obviously, there is a large gray area between those two policy principles. Also, often the positive or negative implications for the West of various actions of Islamic countries and non-state actors are uncertain. A guide for such situations is provided by the first grand strategic dimension discussed above, which leads to the recommendations to give to Islamic actors the benefit of doubt. However, governments tend to ignore dangers and over-accommodate aggression so as to avoid taking controversial and risky actions. Therefore, a Western “red line” in respect to Islam should be strictly enforced, including select demonstration actions so as to maintain deterrence and aggression while providing support for non-aggressive Islamic interests and values.

Thus, conflicts between Islamic and non-Islamic actors, such as in the Balkan and the Middle East, should be settled in a fair way, meeting legitimate interests of all parties, while avoiding giving in to extortion, threats, and violence and making sure that agreements are fully kept. Also, as indicated, specific issues should be handled in ways taking into account also their impact on the

future relations between the West and Islam as a whole, such as in reducing tensions while maintaining credible images of strength and determination.

Three examples may help to clarify the importance of credible and enforced red lines:

- a. Iraq’s action against Kuwait was clearly an act of “state aggression,” justifying and requiring counter-action.
- b. Oil boycotts endangering supplies essential to the West are, according to the proposed yardsticks, a clear instance of grave aggression. Therefore, forceful counter-action to stop them is recommended.
- c. The offering of a prize by an Iranian body enjoying governmental support for the assassination of Salman Rushdie. Expressions of understanding for Islamic reactions to writings regarded as defaming the faith, with explanation as to why such writings cannot be repressed in the West, were in order as part of the proposed posture of respect toward Islam. However, sympathetic understanding should have gone together with a clear declaration that any support for hurting the author is not only abhorrent to Western values regarded as having global significance, but that encouragement of action to hurt a person residing in the West is a gross act of aggression which will be met with serious sanctions. If this, together with helping Iran to find a way to “climb down from the tree,” had not worked, then escalating counter-measures against Iran should have been taken till they withdraw from this act of aggression.

(3) Helping Socio-Economic Development

Attractive are policies helping peaceful progress of Islam and its societies. However, as noted, care should be taken to avoid defining “progress” in terms of Western value. As long as Islamic states are peaceful and meet some minimum of universal values, the West should help with socio-economic development.

Special attention should be given to measures that strengthen non-aggressive social development and counteract fanaticism. But to

be avoided is wishful thinking, such as assuming that democratization will for sure produce “nice” governments after a relatively short learning period, and that free market economies will produce employment and raise standards of living for most of the populations. Also misleading is the widespread belief that economic progress necessarily reduces fundamentalism, ethnic tensions, fanaticism, and aggression.

Despite such problems and risks, helping socio-economic and political development can be of much help, in addition to being ethically mandatory and serving as a step toward a global grand strategy. But to seriously implement this grand strategic dimension, much more is needed than giving some money, providing advice based on Western experiences (and often serving Western economic interests), and helping with conflict resolution.

A relevant issue is more equitable distribution of windfall profits among Islamic countries. Thus, the oil incomes of very rich countries with small populations should be used to help development of oil-poor and population-rich countries. This implies that Saudi Arabia, Libya, and the Persian Gulf countries should be persuaded and obliged to share a lot of their wealth with other Islamic countries. But convincing them to do so may require quite some arm twisting, will hurt relations with the oil rich countries, and may also bring about their destabilization. However, such steps are in the interest of Islamic countries and civilization as a whole and may be of much help in assuring benign development.

(4) Curbing Aggressive Actors

However difficult it may be to classify a concrete actor as belonging to one of the categories, crucial to the proposed grand strategy is the distinction between non-aggressive on one hand and aggressive and fanatic actors on the other.

“Fanatic” or “crazy states” or non-state actors²⁹ present an extreme case of both immorality and danger. Such Islamic states³⁰ or non-state actors are committed to an ideology favoring and urging aggressive action, are willing to take high risks and pay high prices for engaging in such action up to risking destruction, and are building up action capacities devoted to realizing their “holy war” beliefs.

Global values converge with realpolitical imperatives and require either eradication of such actors or making them completely ineffective. This is becoming more and more essential because of the increasing ease with which such states and, in the foreseeable future, also non-state actors, can acquire mass killing weapons with which they will be able to blackmail and harm the West. Doomsday-weapons for holding the world at ransom are also likely to become a possibility in the not far off future. Therefore, radical countermeasures become necessary when milder treatments do not work.

A first line of counter-action is persuasion, economic incentives and disincentives, international pressures, isolation, prevention of acquisition of dangerous weapons, “coercive diplomacy,” etc. But, if such steps fail, direct intervention before a fanatic state acquires significant action capacity may constitute the most humane and cheapest strategy, as well as often the only effective one. Such intervention should change the regime and, if essential, impose an “educational interim government” (as done in Germany and Japan after World War II).

As discussed in the next dimensions, as minimum, disarmament of countries with fanatic-aggressive tendencies is essential. However, fanatic states and actors can cause a lot of damage also with easily available means, are always suspect of acquiring mass killing weapons in clandestine ways, and serve as an encouragement to fanaticization of additional states and non-state actors. Therefore, making them non-fanatic is often the only reliable countermeasure, to be achieved by changing their leadership into a more benign one. If this cannot be done by conventional means (support of internal opposition, etc.), then direct action against the fanatic leaders is morally and realpolitically justified, as long as there is a high probability that less fanatic ones will take their place.

These examples raise issues of cost-benefit thinking and of maintaining reasonable proportions between the threats against the West and counteraction. No automatic program-solving equations can be provided; each case needs discretion fitting specific circumstances. But as a recommended guideline, the proposed grand strategy allocates much weight to long-range impacts, proposing a readiness to pay now a higher price in order to improve trajectories into the future.

(5) Reducing Aggressive Capacities

Limiting the action capacities of aggressive or potentially aggressive Islamic actors is in many respects a more attractive option than taking action to change their nature to become non-aggressive. Arms control regimes are an increasingly important feature of emerging global governance and are on high moral grounds. However, they suffer from major weaknesses.

It is desirable to apply arms control regimes with discrimination, supporting armament of inherently non-aggressive countries, especially Western democracies threatened by aggressive Islamic states. This applies, in special cases, also to letting them maintain mass killing weapon systems. However, global arms control regimes cannot sanction such differentiation, however morally and realpolitically justified. Indeed, the opposite is true: It is easier to cause non-aggressive and especially Western democratic countries to join disarmament agreements and they are more trustworthy to comply with such agreements than aggressive countries. Thus, the net effect may be to let aggressive countries gain a net advantage. The ease with which countries, and in some respects even more so non-state actors, can acquire and hide weapons, including mass killing ones, further makes reduction of aggressive capacities less reliable than transforming aggressors into non-aggressors in intention.

Another difficulty is being able to identify in advance the transformation of non-aggressive into aggressive countries. Denying weapons to all is quite impossible, all the more so because defense cooperation is an integral part of maintaining friendly relations and also reducing motives to become hostile. But benign countries acquiring advanced weapons can rapidly become aggressive ones, as illustrated by the mutation of Iran.

Given all these difficulties, reducing the attack capacities of aggressive and potentially aggressive countries is a main grand strategic dimension.

The proposed robust principle is to prevent any and all potentially aggressive, and especially fanatic states and non-state actors, from possessing mass killing weapons. This requires determined action to prevent flow of such weapons, and of the materials and knowledge to make them, to such countries, enforced inspection of

suspect sites in such countries, and destruction of dangerous tools and weapons — if necessary, by surgical strikes. But these are very difficult endeavors, because of “dual uses” of many types of materials and knowledge, multiplication of potential suppliers with diverse interests, domestic political and economic considerations in the West, and accepted norms of “sovereignty.” Therefore, given present realities, proliferation of mass killing weapons to aggressive Islamic states and non-state actors cannot be prevented.

This is the justification for active defense measures, such as anti-missile systems. However, these cannot be relied upon because of the variety of ways to deliver mass killing weapons, in addition to the errors inherent in technologically very complex systems. Also to be taken into account are the high costs of anti-missile systems and their global geo-strategic problematic. Therefore, annihilation of attack capacities should have priority, if feasible.

Any success, however partial, in limiting aggressive action capacities is well worth the effort. But such policies cannot be relied upon. Therefore, it is necessary to combine efforts to reduce the capacities of dangerous actors with changing their motivation, parallel with preparing for failures of both lines of action. Ultimately, moving toward a global leviathan may be essential for preserving the West and humanity as a whole. But let me leave this dimension of last resort to the end, after considering additional less radical and costly grand strategic possibilities.

(6) Holding States and Rulers Strictly Accountable

An especially troublesome case is posed by fanatic non-state actors who in fact are supported or at least granted safe havens by states, as illustrated by a number of Islamic terrorist and guerilla organizations. Coping with the increasingly serious threats posed by such actors requires holding states and rulers strictly accountable for terrorist and guerilla activities supported by them, never mind disclaimers of responsibility.

In terms of international law, all states are duty-bound to take all feasible measures to prevent their territory being used as a basis for aggression against other countries. All the more so, direct or indirect support of aggressive groups is itself an act of “state aggression” which, if serious in scale and consequences, is an act of

war. Therefore, an effective grand strategy against Islamic (and other) fanaticism requires states and their rulers to be held strictly accountable for supporting aggressive non-state actors in whatever way. Active sanctions against such states and rulers, including military operations if lesser measures prove inadequate, are therefore in principle recommended — again, subject to adjustment to specific situations.

(7) **Damage Limitation**

Whatever is done, failures are unavoidable and serious threats and attacks by fanatic Islamic states and non-state actors are likely, including with mass killing weapons. Instability in Islamic countries and state failures increase the probability of partial failure and also counterproductive effects of even the best grand strategy, with dangerous situations likely to come about. Therefore, preparing for failure is an essential dimension of the proposed grand strategy.

Coping with failure involves two lines of action: reducing the sensitivity of the West to bad developments, and preparing capacities to intervene and reverse negative events and trends. Reducing dependency on oil from the Middle East and hardening essential facilities sensitive to fanatic attack illustrates the first approach. Preparing planning-wise and operationally to engage in surgical operations against revealed mass killing capacities in the hand of fanatic countries illustrates the second.

(8) **If All Fails: Moving Toward a Global Leviathan**

It is quite likely that only some parts of the proposed grand strategy will be adopted and implemented. Furthermore, even if an optimal Western grand strategy against Islamic fanaticism armed with mass killing weapons is effectively applied, adequate success cannot be assured. This is all the more likely because even if only a small number of fanatic states and non-state actors possessing new types of mass killing weapons, such as biological ones, successfully evade countermeasures, this is enough to pose an intolerable threat to the West, and to humanity as a whole.

In other words, when fanaticism armed with mass killing weapons is at stake, then 90 percent success in neutralizing this threat is not enough. And to achieve 100 percent success is impossible within given global regimes. Therefore, if and when the threat of use of

mass killing weapons by fanatic actors passes a certain threshold, radical changes in global regimes become a necessity. What may become essential for the survival of civilization as a whole in the face of the specter of a new barbarism is a global leviathan, that is a global authoritarian security regime lead by the West which effectively controls all mass killing weapons and stops fanaticism in the making.

This is the ultimate grand strategic option, the time for which, regretfully, may come. If so, it is preferable to gear for such a possible need in advance in order to be ready if and when the hour strikes, such as after a “minor” nuclear attack by a fanatic actor.

VIII. Democratic Morality Versus “Evil”

The contingent recommendation to establish a global leviathan poses in full measure tragic moral dilemmas raised by the proposed grand strategy, which recommends harsh measures such as surgical operations against fanaticism-suspect states and their rulers. Thus, the grand strategy would have clearly supported an assassination in 1938 of Hitler organized by France, Poland, Czechoslovakia, a Jewish underground, or the Zionist movement — but this surely would have been harshly condemned by Amnesty International,³¹ had it existed at that time.

If the main assumption on the future of humanity is that it is sure to thrive despite some minor interim “accidents,”³² then indeed the proposed grand strategy should be rejected as “immoral” and as “undermining the values of the West.” However, if fanaticism armed with mass killing weapons is regarded as being a dangerous form of “evil” having the potent to bring about a new form of barbarism, then we are in a situation of “bad moral luck”³³ where the tragic necessity is to pay with very important values for even more important ones.³⁴

This is the moral justification for the proposed grand strategy and for the changes required by it in some of the thinking and practices of Western states and their legal systems. True, the required moral balance between preserving the integrity of the Western moral canon and meeting the requirements of protecting the security of the West and of humanity as a whole is a difficult and delicate one and requires much care. But such difficulties must not be permitted

to avoid the issue till grave harm is done, with likely overreaction to follow.

IX. Epilogue: Counting on Statesmanship — or on Catastrophe?

Throughout this chapter I have used the term “the West.” Implied is the need for much cooperation between Western countries and its allies, together with other countries, civilizations, and global institutions, with maximum participation of non-fanatic Islamic states and non-state actors. The USA has to take the lead, together with the European Union, in facing the dangers of Islamic aggression and fanaticism, as integral to its role of leader of the West and the only global hyper-power.

Implementation of the proposed grand strategy requires new types of intelligence capable to estimate reliably fanaticism potential. Also needed is development and readying of novel action instruments, doctrines, and units, such as lethal but temporarily very disabling weapons for surgical operations against fanatic rulers. Even more difficult is integration of the various dimensions into a coherent grand strategy and its measured application to shifting situations. Most difficult of all to achieve are the moral and cognitive capacities to govern and the crystallization of political will essential for facing the evil of fanaticism equipped with mass killing weapons.

This is the task of statesmanship and stateswomanship, supported by high quality policy professionalism. The realities of contemporary politics, with single exceptions, provide little ground for hope that the West will be equal to the task. If so, the much worse second best is rapid learning from limited crises before real disasters strike. However, whether Western statecraft on insurgent Islam will improve before much damage is caused or not, strategic thinkers and planners should follow a “supply side” approach and prepare grand strategies to be ready when “demand” realizes, out of understanding or pain.

To prepare some elements of such a grand strategy and, hopefully, stimulate more and better grand strategic thinking and planning on crucial issues, including grand strategies for the West on insurgent Islam — these are the ambitions, intentions, and hopes underlying this chapter.

Endnotes

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- 1 The single most important book putting forth this proposition is Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996). But readers should be careful not to be overwhelmed by this outstanding analysis, which suffers from trying to understand and predict very complex and heterogeneous processes within one paradigm. Also relevant is John L. Esposito **NEED TITLE** (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
- 2 The commonly used term “weapons of mass destruction” (WMD) is inadequate. What really is at stake are “mass killing weapons.”
- 3 On the concept of “grand strategy,” see Paul Kennedy, editor, *Grand Strategies in War and Peace* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), and Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein, editors, *The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994). But the best book I know which clarifies the idea of grand strategy by applying it to a historic case is Edward N. Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century A.D. to the Third* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976) (to be followed by a study of the grand strategy of the Ottoman Empire).
- 4 On the distinction between uncertainty and inconceivability, see Yehezkel Dror, “Beyond Uncertainty: Facing the Inconceivable.” *Technological Forecasting and Social Change*, vol. 62, no. 1 & 2 (August/September 1999): p. 151–153.
- 5 Literature abounds with suggestions on how to deal with particular pressing issues, such as Iran. But efforts to develop grand strategies for the West for dealing with Islam as a whole are sorely lacking. Huntington (see endnote 1) takes some steps in this direction, but much more is needed. This is but one expression of the overall scarcity of grand strategic thinking after the end of the Cold War.
- 6 The concept of “evolutionary potential” as fundamental to the frames of thinking of this chapter, is developed in C.R. Hallpike, *The Principles of Social Evolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).
- 7 Very relevant is the approach of Fernand Braudel. A convenient collection of relevant writings of his is *On History* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980). Especially salient for our subject is his work on the Mediterranean, as conveniently abridged in Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* (New York: HarperCollins, 1972).

- 8 For interesting treatment see Courtney Brown, *Serpents in the Sand: Essays on the Nonlinear Nature of Politics and Human Destiny* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1995).
- 9 As discussed in Robert Jervis, *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).
- 10 My analysis and recommendations are based on a view of the future as shaped by a dynamic mix between “necessity, contingency, mutations, chance, and choice,” that is partly open and partly constrained by the past. Very relevant is Geoffrey Hawthorn, *Plausible Worlds: Possibility and Understanding in History and the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991). For an underlying model of reality as a whole as partly open and partly determined by the past, see McCall Storrs, *A Model of the Universe: Space-Time, Probability, and Decision* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).
- 11 Two studies that well present the sweep of evolution of Islam are Ira Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988), and Bernard Lewis, *The Middle East: 2000 Years of History from the Rise of Christianity to the Present Day* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1995). To be added is at least an introductory text to Islam as a religion, such as David Waines, *An Introduction to Islam* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
- 12 This is concisely discussed in William H. McNeill, *Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1963).
- 13 Illumination are Amin Maalouf, *The Crusades Through Arab Eyes* (New York: Schocken, 1987), and, differently, Karen Armstrong, *Holy War: The Crusades and Their Impact on Today's World* (London: Macmillan, 1988).
- 14 Revealing are literary expressions, as discussed in M. M. Badawi, *A Short History of Modern Arab Literature* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993). Also relevant, though focusing on intellectuals who do not necessarily reflect most of reality, are two books by Fouad Ajami, *The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice Since 1967* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1981), and *The Dream Palace of the Arabs: A Generation's Odyssey* (New York: Pantheon, 1998). Providing a different impressionistic view is Robert D. Kaplan, *Eastward to Tartary: Travels in the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Caucasus* (New York: Random House, 2000).
- 15 Many insightful chapters on fundamentalism in the domain of Islam are included in the publications of the Fundamentalism Project at the University of Chicago, such as the volumes edited by Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby published by the University of Chicago Press: *Fundamentalism Observed*, 1991; *Fundamentalisms and Society: Reclaiming the Sciences, the Family, and Education*, 1993; and *Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Politics, Economies, and Militance*, 1993.

A broad perspective is supplied in Gillis Kepel, *The Revenge of God: The Resurgence of Islam, Christianity and Judaism in the Modern World* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1994). The theological bases of Islamic fundamentalism are examined in Emmanuel Sivan, *Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern*

- Politics* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985). On fundamentalism as paradoxically an expression of modernity however opposed to some parts of it, see Shmuel. N. Eisenstadt, *Fundamentalism, Sectarianism, and Revolution: The Jacobin Dimension of Modernity* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
- 16 It is interesting to consider in this context the impacts on the world of Islam of the establishment of Israel and its victories over Arab countries. Arab reactions to the Gulf War and continuing sanctions against Iraq are also significant in this context.
 - 17 High-quality uses of this concept to map alternative futures are illustrated by CIA, “Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future with Nongovernment Experts” (IC 2000-02, December 2000, <www.cia.gov>).
 - 18 More enlightening on ongoing processes in Islam than most of the modern literature is Karl Jaspers, *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen*, second edition (Berlin: Springer, 1960), first published in 1922. Only parts of this book have been translated into English.
 - 19 Some of the ideas and concepts of Carl Schmitt are very useful for analyzing the politics of contemporary Islam. Especially salient are Carl Schmitt, *Der Begriff des Politischen* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1963), shorter version first published 1927; as well as his writings on political theology and political romantics: *Politische Theologie II: Die Legende von der Erledigung jeder Politischen Theologie* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1970), and *Politische Romantik* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1982), reprint of second edition, 1925. Studies of Carl Schmitt's works showing the way for an exploration of their relevance to an understanding of the politics of Islamic states (which is quite ignored in writings in English on Islam), include Friedrich Balke, *Der Staat nach seinem Ende: Die Versuchung Carl Schmitts* (München: Wilhelm Fink, 1996), and John P. McCormick, *Carl Schmitt's Critique of Liberalism: Against Politics as Technology* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
 - 20 As discussed in James N. Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).
 - 21 As forcefully, but wrongly, argued by Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: The Free Press, 1992).
 - 22 Important, but too short-term in part are CIA, “Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future With Nongovernment Experts” (see endnote 17), and Zalmay Khalilzad and Ian O. Lesser, editors, *Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century: Regional Futures and U.S. Strategy* (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1988). Pertinent is Robert D. Kaplan, *The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War* (New York: Random House, 2000).
 - 23 A striking illustration is provided by a well-known and widely discussed book by one of the most outstanding Israeli statesmen, namely Shimon Peres, *The New Middle East* (New York: Henry Holt, 1993). This book is very important as a utopia — which may well exert positive influence on long-term thinking and

also have impacts on reality beyond the time horizons of this chapter. However, I am sorry to say, if main Israeli policies were to be based in the foreseeable future on its images, before a mutation occurs in the Arab Middle East, the results would be dismal.

- 24 The difficulties and perhaps impossibility within the foreseeable future of combining democracy with Islam are considered in Bernard Lewis, *The Political Language of Islam* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1988); Elie Kedourie, *Politics in the Middle East* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); and Daniel Pipes, *In the Path of God: Islam and Political Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1983).
- 25 As illustrated, in a well hedged and sophisticated way, by Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, *The Real World Order: Zones of Peace / Zones of Turmoil*, revised edition (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1996).

An interesting small-scale case of the problems of separation as a strategy is posed by proposals in Israel to “disconnect” from the Palestinians, as discussed, for instance, in Dan Schueftan, *Disengagement: Israeli and the Palestinian Entity* (Tel Aviv: Zmora-Bitan, 1999), in Hebrew.

- 26 For some of the requirements of grand strategic thinking see Yehezkel Dror, *Grand-Strategic Thinking for Israel* (Shaarei Tikva: Ariel Center for Policy Research, Policy Paper 23, 1998).
- 27 Following Charles Taylor’s definition of “hypergoods,” I use the term “hyper-goals” in a somewhat weaker sense of goals that provide the standpoint from which other goals must, in part, be weighted, judged, decided about. See Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 63.
- 28 Anthony Giddens, *Runaway World: How Globalization Is Reshaping our Lives* (New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 66.
- 29 The widely used concept of “rogue” states is inadequate for presenting the rue nature of the problem, which is better reflected in the terms “fanatic” or “crazy” actors. See Yehezkel Dror, *Crazy States: A Counterconventional Strategic Problem* (Millwood, NY: Kraus Reprints, 1980), updated edition. On “rogue states,” see Robert S. Litwak, *Rogue States and US Foreign Policy: Containment After the Cold War* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2000), and Raymond Tanter, *Rogue Regimes: Terrorism and Proliferation* (London: Macmillan Press, 1999), updated edition.
- 30 It should be emphasized that Islam has no monopoly on fanatic states, though in its present phase it is more prone to produce such entities than other civilizations. The most dangerous fanatic state in modern history has been Nazi Germany.
- 31 If Hitler had been assassinated in 1938, most of the history books, too, would have condemned this act as “murder,” not knowing what would have happened had he not been killed, with genocide for instance never being considered as a conceivable act of his. Therefore, historic evaluation of events and acts is often, though not always, very doubtful, lacking knowledge of what would have happened if. . . . Thus, we cannot even be sure what would

have become history if Churchill would have reached an accommodation with Hitler in 1940, as might have been possible. See John Lukacs, *Five Days in London: May 1940* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999).

- 32 For such a recent philosophy, or biology, of human evolution regarded as reliably bringing about a “good” future, see Robert Wright, *Non Zero: The Logic of Human Destiny* (New York: Pantheon, 2000).
- 33 For this concept in modern moral philosophy, see Daniel Statman, editor, *Moral Luck* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1993). I use the term somewhat differently as referring to situations where we have no choice but to make a “tragic choice,” as conceptualized in Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbit, *Tragic Choice* (New York: Norton, 1979).
- 34 There is nothing new about the need for “dirty hands” in statecraft, but post-modern liberal-democratic discourse tends to repress this unpleasant necessity and thus gets out of tune with global realities in the foreseeable future.