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Israel – Arabia: Eye to Eye with the Future

*Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto*¹

“History, gentlemen, is the story of missed opportunities.”

Gen. Rondot, École Supérieure
de Guerre Aérienne,
Paris, 1961

Foreword

Present public discussion is mostly governed by acceptance or non-acceptance of past political deeds that are mainly water under the bridge, by personal criticism of leadership and by public malaise. The paper hereby presented is an attempt to draw a picture of foreign policy problems related to various threats that we are facing, their interdependence and interaction, while pointing at potential solutions whose probability of success seems to be higher than others. Although Zionism, in general, has proven to be an incredible success, the horizon looks heavy with stormy clouds for want of Zionist perseverance:

- By the end of World War II and the horrors of the holocaust, in 1945, there were about 500,000 Jews in British Palestine, scraping a living off the bottom of the barrel of the Middle East (ME) British War economy. That was after 50 years of Zionism under Ottoman and British rule.
- By the end of the century, year 2000, there are about 5,000,000 Jews in independent Israel, with a per capita income of about \$19,000 (US) per year, which is approximately that of Britain, in spite of war, embargoes, boycotts, terror, western mercantilism, bias, a UN hijacked by 22 Arab plus Islamic plus “independent” votes, Arab virulent hatred and a Jewish bureaucratic, East European type of mismanagement.

Immigration continues. The 21st century is that of brainpower, a raw material that Jews seem to have in abundance.

¹ **Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto, Col. (RES)** was a member of the 12th Knesset and of the Madrid 1991 Peace Mission, as well as a member of the Israel Society of Astronautics and Aeronautics. He is a Member of the Society of Experimental Test Pilots, Lancaster, CA, USA and served as the Chief of Planning and Operational Requirements, Israel Air Force, prior to the Six Day War. He was a Member of RAFAEL (Armament Development Board) from 1992 to 1995. **Mr. Tsiddon-Chatto** publishes extensively on security issues in Israel and abroad and is a founding member of the Ariel Center for Policy Research.

However, it seems that the Jews suffer from a “national/genetic mutation” developed during 2000 years of Diaspora, which is manifest through the loss of the practical instinct of tribal self-rule and even through the loss of the healthy, animal, survival instinct of the species.

It is about this “mutation” that this paper is written.

Important remarks:

- This paper is neither attempted prophecy nor pretentious foresight or political promotion. It is, rather, an attempt to point, extrapolating from past and present, to a path whose probability of leading to a fair, stable, **non-warring** Israeli-Arab relationship may be higher than that of others.

- Dear Reader,

If the following pages induce pessimism, which is not the purpose of this paper, please turn back to this Foreword for a better perspective.

“The question,” said an old veteran, “is not whether Israel will survive. We’re beyond the point of no return on that issue. The question is, rather, whether reaching a modus vivendi with the Arabs will cost the lives of 300 Jews and 3,000 Arabs, or 3,000 Jews and 30,000 Arabs, or more.”

This paper is an attempt to present the logic of minimizing these figures.



Discussion: No Major War Right Now, But How is the Future Assured?

Introspection: Chaos¹

Whether 5761 as the Old Testament says, or billions of years ago as science estimates, chaos reigned supreme, to be tamed by God or Nature to the extent that made life possible. Then there were light and life. But chaos continues, on a tolerable scale. Volcanoes erupt, hurricanes and typhoons play havoc, floods drown homes and crops, draught stretches desert and Man, that being created in the image of God, does his best to molest nature and disobey the Ten Commandments that he wrote, in God’s name, when trying to make tribal life moral, orderly, secure and more efficient.

Mathematicians, the wardens of order, admit now that a measure of chaos is an intrinsic part of order.

Israel, reinstated after a long period of national hibernation in the Diaspora, is still in a state of Genesis, where others were centuries ago. 52 years are but a glimpse in history.

Its borders are yet undefined, its acceptance in the Middle East is far from completed, its legal system with no written constitution, has not yet acquired the patina of tradition. Its relationship with its Arab minority is not yet satisfactory and even the Jewish ingathering of the Exiles has not yet crystallized into one homogenous nation.

Yet, during these 52 years of renewed existence, Israel has overcome terrible hardships and achieved more than would have been believed possible. Life has its hardships and its adventures, not unlike the conquest of the American West. Pitfalls are as plentiful as there are challenges, but life, if the Jews do not ruin it, it is worth living.

In case the reader did not notice: this writer is an optimist, his optimism resulting from an overdose of experience in British Palestine and Israel.

Jews

Being irreversible, **time**, much more so than capital, is cruelly insistent on heavy interest to be paid by those who squander it.

2000 years ago, having been written off history's chronicles as a nation, the Jewish people, unlike others, have excelled in preserving their identity, belief/culture and customs while spread widely over a traditionally antagonistic Diaspora.

In order to survive, they decided that they have to “give Caesar what's Caesar's and to the Lord what's the Lord's”, surrendering into gentile rulers' hands their physical preservation,² decision making, the upkeep of law and order, the structure and running of government and other attributes of independence.

Over the centuries the surrender has been so complete, that the majority of Jews found a certain “*heimisch*” (homey) comfort in the dispensation from “mundane” tasks, which freed them to sink deeper in their spiritual world that kept them apart as a people. The results of this “dispensation” are well documented; hence the reader will be spared the repetition of details.

When facts of Diaspora life converted the esoteric, spiritual yearning for Jerusalem into Zionism and Zionism was accepted by the World Community,³ the Jews, as a people, were not a nation anymore. They had lost their assertive collectivity; that aggressive, animal instinct of tribal survival and readiness to inflict harm upon others when that survival is challenged.

Although Jews were among the anti Tsar activists in imperial Russia and Disraeli, the Jewish Prime Minister, crowned Queen Victoria with Britain's Imperial Crown, the Zionist Jewish leaders were hard put to “square the circle”, i.e. build a “Jewish National Home”, whatever that meant, on reclaimed land bought from absentee landlords while disregarding the fact that the local farming and urban Arab population, sensing the danger of being overwhelmed, could not be placated by the payment made.

The Arabs of Palestine, propped up by the British policy of “divide and rule” and by the multitude of Arab states emerging in the Middle East, reacted violently, i.e. naturally. Their tribal, cultural and religious instinct of preservation remained intact under the approximately three centuries of Turkish rule. The Jews carried on with their colonization while attempting to coexist peacefully with the Arabs, which, although interspersed with occasional violence, was not too bad a policy until decision time came.

When Europe fell under the Nazi jackboots, the Zionist idea of a National Home, that “twist” of the few, became the only lifeline, the only potential shelter for the persecuted Jews whose majority were denied a safe haven in Western countries, as elsewhere.

The Jewish National Home was the only home. Fighting for it, when necessary, was justified by the legitimate right of national survival.

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Death of British Mandate - Birth of Israel

Fighting did break out.

The Arabs of Western Palestine intensified their armed struggle against the Jewish settlements until they collided with British mandatory forces in the mutiny of 1936-39, named by the understating British “The Troubles” and by the Jews “The Events” (Me'oraoth).

Although British armed forces cooperated, to a certain extent, with the Jews, Colonial Office policy veered one way and sided with the Arabs.

In anticipation of war in Europe, Britain issued the much-criticized White Paper of 1939, betraying its obligation to the mandate in order to buy peace and quiet in the Middle East.

The White Paper imposed severe limitations on Jewish immigration to Palestine just when the flood of refugees from Nazi Europe was about to start, the flood that, contained in Europe by the British, fed two to three years later, the crematories of Auschwitz and elsewhere. The Jews were forbidden to purchase land almost everywhere in Palestine and were even denied the right to travel in some areas. Within a number of years, Palestine was to become an Arab country where Jews were to be allowed to live as a recognized ethnic minority. So much for the Jewish National Home.

When war broke out, the Jewish leadership declared that the Jews of Palestine would help the British fight the Nazis as if there were no White Paper and fight the White Paper independently.

The Arabs seized World War II as an opportunity.

The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem,⁴ Haj Amin al-Husseini, the leader of the anti-Jewish, anti-British uprising of 1936-39, fled to join Hitler and helped him mobilize Bosnian Moslem units to join the Waffen SS.

In Iraq, the Empire's main oil source,⁵ the Rashid Ali El Killany revolt of 1941 almost succeeded in handing the country over to the Germans who were in control of Vichy-French held Syria and Lebanon, and had reached El Almein in Egypt. The Germans were approaching the Caucasus on the Soviet front and courted Turkey to join the war on their side, so as to form a giant pincer movement to sever the ME from Britain.

In Egypt, senior Egyptian army officers⁶ plotted against the beleaguered British to rid the country of occupation and join the victorious Germans. This created an acute security problem for the defense of the Suez Canal and Britain's hold on the ME.

The British did away with the last vestiges of Egyptian independence and used force to hold the Egyptian leadership hostage in its own country which became de-facto a British occupied territory.

The only secure allied base in the Middle East remained Palestine, including Trans-Jordan.⁷

About 6.5 percent of the total Palestinian Jewish population joined the British armed forces. The Hagannah, the foremost Jewish militia, by far, cooperated with the British in securing Palestine as a safe base.

Jewish industry, the only industry in the country, and Jewish agriculture, were fully harnessed to the war effort.

...But Britain remained faithful to its White Paper.

By 1944, the North African campaign over, the Arab countries tamed, the Germans beaten on the Soviet front and the Western Allies securing their foothold in Europe, first in Italy (1943) and then in France (1944), the horrible fate of European Jewry became evident to all. The Jews of Palestine became restive, demanding the cancellation of the White Paper to save the emaciated, few survivors of the Holocaust. Britain refused. Its Iraqi oil, colonial worries in India and South East Asia, etc. prevailed over the fate of European Jewry, whose impact upon the British government was in the best Chamberlain/Munich/1938 tradition.

On September 27, 1938 Neville Chamberlain, British Prime Minister said, commenting on the sacrifice of Czechoslovakia: *"How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas masks here because of a quarrel in a far away country between people of whom we know nothing."*

The first post-war clashes were between the Jews and the British, with the Jews forcing the gates of Palestine and creating a grave security problem for the mandatory government.

By 1946, 100,000 British military, including paratroops and other elite units, were stationed in Palestine to check the 550,000 “strong” Jewish population (children, aged and women included).

By 1947, the British gave in and returned the mandate to the United Nations, the international body replacing the pre-war League of Nations that ratified the British Mandate created to establish a Jewish National Home in Palestine.

Between the post-World War I and post-World War II years, the British left the borders of Palestine with Arab countries practically unguarded. The Jewish economy created jobs. Arabs migrated in to provide labor. Then war came and tens of thousands of Arab hands were brought by the British to substitute for insufficient logistic facilities.

Haifa, the only secure British port in the ME, heavily overcrowded at the time, was flooded with homeless Kurds and Horanis who worked like slaves to replace the missing harbor cranes, tractors and the like.

With the British preventing Jewish immigration⁸ by blockading the Eastern Mediterranean and tolerating, at times encouraging, a free migration of neighboring Arabs to Palestine, any Jewish hopes for a demographic balance were thwarted. Note should be taken of the fact that not all Palestinian Arabs had been domiciled there “for centuries”. The number of Jewish and Arab immigrants to Palestine during the first half of the 20th century may not differ much.

On November 29, 1947, the UN voted for the partition of (Western) Palestine, with the British planning to evacuate the country by May 15, 1948.

War between the Jews and the Arabs of Palestine became imminent.

Two famous generals, the US General George Marshall and the British Field Marshall Montgomery, stated openly that the Jews stood no chance.

When the fighting broke out, on November 30, 1947, the British opened Palestine’s borders to incoming non-Palestinian Arab and other armed volunteers, officered the Trans-Jordanian Arab Legion stationed by then in Palestine and participating in the battle, and tilted the balance here and there in the Arabs’ favor.

It may be assumed that they tried to precipitate the Jewish community’s downfall that would have brought an emergency Jewish appeal for British protection, which would have legalized the renewal of the British hold on Palestine, this time under totally new terms.

But the Jews gained, at a horrible cost, instead of losing, and on May 15, 1948, when Britain withdrew from Palestine, a coalition of Arab states’ armies invaded Palestine to crush the Jewish upstart state and save their brethren.

Rather than create one more Arab state, the generally accepted idea was that each army would annex the share of the Jewish state that it conquered.⁹

But the pan-Arab coalition, the expeditionary forces sent by the Arab nation, lost the war to the Jewish state and an Armistice Agreement was signed in Rhodes in 1949 between Israel and each of the belligerents except Iraq, stating that hostilities were over and the gate was open to peace.

Before the ink dried on the documents, the Arab states started a terror campaign, the “Fedayoun”.

The five and a half months between December 1, 1947 and May 15, 1948 was the only period of open warfare between the Jews of Palestine or Israel and the Arabs of Palestine as such.

From May, 15, 1948 onwards, all Israel’s wars were fought with a variety of Arab states’ coalitions.¹⁰

* * *

Conclusions

- a. The Jews of Israel have learned the hard way, almost at the cost of their lives, that their most dangerous antagonists are not the Arabs of Western Palestine (Cis-Jordan), but the Arab Nation or Arab World at large, supported as it is by Islam,¹⁰ as a civilization.
- b. Where Israel is concerned, the objective of any Middle Eastern accommodations is to achieve peace or non-belligerence with the Arab Nation and the Islamic civilization, not only with the Samarian, Judean and Gazan segment of that Arab nation.
- c. When peace or non-belligerence is negotiated between Israel and any particular member/entity of the Arab Nation, any positive outcome is conditional upon that particular agreement not rendering the understanding with the Arab Nation (or Islam) more difficult than before, the Pan-Arabian/Islamic peace being, as said, the main, final objective.



Year 2000

Zionism

Zionism was born out of the secular, emancipated Jews' realization that anti-Semitism was not a matter of religious persecution, but a deep rooted psychotic phobia, inexplicable yet prevailing in liberal, lay Christendom as well and aimed at all Jews, even at those who shed their traditions and integrated successfully in their respective communities or countries. The Zionist ideology of self-determination and statehood was first formulated by Dr. Benjamin Zeev Herzl in his publication *The Jewish State* of 1896, written after he witnessed the gross, ignoble anti-Semitism in Republican, democratic, liberal France, as it was demonstrated during and after the rigged trials of Capt. Alfred Dreyfus that ended in an evidently biased verdict of degradation and exile to the accompaniment of an ecstatic public outburst of joy.

When Emile Zola, the famous French writer of world repute wrote his article "*J'accuse*" (I accuse) in Dreyfus' defense in 1898, he had to flee France and find refuge in Britain to escape the public wrath.¹²

If the cultural and civil assimilation of the Jews in their respective countries does not do away with anti-Semitism then, concluded Herzl, the Jews should unite, leave their respective countries, and rebuild their own in the prevailing spirit of ethnic self-determination of the end of the 19th century. His book, *Altneuland* (Old-New-Country) became a blueprint of the Jewish state to be reestablished in what was to become Palestine.

The World War I Allies adopted the principle of ethnic self-determination. At the end of the 1914-1918 World War, countries like Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, those comprising the Baltic States, Finland and Poland, were either created or recreated. With the break up by the Allies of the Turkish Empire, countries like Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, etc., emerged as candidates for independence, to be coached by a mandatory power, either British or French, until they ripened for it. Their frontiers were arbitrarily drawn according to the imperial or economic interests of their benefactors.

A minor part of the dismembered Turkish Empire that more or less overlapped the Holy Land, was renamed Palestine¹³ and earmarked, with the approval of the League of Nations, for the establishment, under British rule, of a Jewish National Home which was to be structured so as to avoid friction with the sparse local Arab population. How to perform that stunt was not specified.

* * *

The Jewish National Home

Whether the League of Nations' decision to support Zionism was a bold, visionary political masterpiece that brought about the redemption, after almost two millennia, of the people of the Bible, the people of the monotheist ethos that laid the moral cornerstone of the foundation for Western Civilization, or whether it was a gross mistake, drawing a wedge in the heart of the Arab Middle East, is irrelevant by now.

Presently there are now, year 2000, five million Jews in the Jewish state of Israel. 50,000 immigrate per year. There are more Jews in Israel than there are Norwegians in Norway or Irish in Ireland, about as many as Danes in Denmark or Finns in Finland,¹⁴ certainly a "critical mass" for statehood, self-sufficiency and security.

This is an irreversible situation that has to be accepted as such.

As to Israel's performance, it can hardly be surpassed.

At the end of World War II, in 1945, the 500,000 Jews of Palestine, who made a living by scraping the bottom of the barrel of the British ME war economy, checked Arab animosity and were in conflict with Britain over its preventing the free immigration of the Holocaust survivors.

Presently, 55 years later, having fought a succession of wars, housed millions of new immigrants (refugees), having been subjected to terror, to the Arab boycott,¹⁵ arms embargoes,¹⁶ UN (and world) discriminatory practices resulting from the capitulation to the demands of 22 Arab states, supported by the Soviets, etc., Israel's Gross National Product is larger than that of all its neighbors combined, including Egypt's and Syria's oil exports.

On a per capita basis, at about \$19,000 (US) per year,¹⁷ Israel is a Western country, on a par with Britain. Its neighbors' GNP per capita runs (depending which rate of exchange is accepted) at about \$1,000 per year or less.

Conclusions

Israel is the living proof that a tiny, arid sliver of Middle Eastern land can reach Western well-being¹⁸ and economic standards in spite of all adversities.

Theoretically, it should be set as an example for emulation by its neighbors. Why is it not?

The answer to this question is rendered more complex by the fact that Islam, although it considered the Jews and Christians to be inferior as subjects and conferred upon them the semi-vassal status of "*dhimmi*", was infinitely more tolerant towards the Jews over the centuries of its explosive upswing, the Arab Golden Age and the Turkish Ottoman Empire, in sharp contrast with the Crusaders or European Christianity.

There are a number of reasons for Israel's rejection. The most important are:

- a. The further remote a civilization is from modern Western norms and practices, the more acute is its xenophobia, even among co-religionists like Sunni and Shiite Moslems or compatriots like Arab Iraqis and Kurds.

A Jewish National Home that would enjoy equal rights with Moslems under the same rule, in the same country that has been torn off a Moslem (be it Ottoman) entity, was/is simply unacceptable by Arab civilization unless imposed by political or military circumstances.¹⁹

- b. The nebulous, ambiguous formulation of the Balfour Declaration that was endorsed by the League of Nations: "A Jewish National Home in Palestine". What is a "National Home"? An

independent state? A protectorate? A country club? A synagogue? What is “in Palestine”? The whole of Palestine whose borders were ill-defined or part thereof? If a part; which part?

Although Henry Kissinger is very proud of the diplomatic achievements through “constructive ambiguity”, this writer believes that “constructive ambiguity” has very few successes, if any, to show in achieving stability over a reasonable period of time.

- c. The incompatibility of societal structures. Arab countries are governed, as a rule, by totalitarian regimes, from benevolent patriarchal to medieval, vicious despotism which is more often the case.

Despots own society. Democrats are part thereof.²⁰ As communism formally claimed, the middle class are the enemies of dictatorship.

Arab despots rule with an iron fist, whether in the name of Islam or that of political Darwinism.

They have to keep the masses as subject (and abject) as possible in order to rule unchallenged, surrounded by their close circle. An egalitarian, successful, democracy thrust in their midst is anathema, representing a mortal danger to them by the very fact of serving as an example of individual freedom and well-being.

The antidote to democracy is, as custom goes, the demonization of “the other side” and the mobilization of the hatred planted in the ignorant, often analphabetic masses to “prevent the sacrilege, dishonor, conquest, bloodshed, etc.” it practices.

- d. Mercantilism/democracies, especially the economically strong ones, preach, of course, democratic values. But, as the old German proverb says, they “Preach water and drink wine.” It is greed.

When it comes to economic gain, democratic values are thrown out of the window and competition heats up to gain the despots’ hearts and their gold. Arab and Islamic fundamentalist despots have a lot to offer.

Richer than Ali Baba, sitting on about two thirds of the world’s known oil reserves and possessing over 20 votes in the UN,²¹ Arab despots are courted and welcome at the table of the most illustrious and powerful democratic leaders, which enhances their iron grip on their own subjects, preventing democratization, thus enhancing their posture when facing Israel.

In the circumstances, the Jewish National Home is forced to seek peace or accommodation with the despots ruling the Arab countries or entities, the very ones whose enmity to Israel is evident, and not with the people themselves who may certainly benefit from it.

- e. Economic gap, as mentioned. The wider it gets, and no one may ask the Jewish state to retain an Arab GNP per capita, the wider the political, cultural and normative gaps. When Shimon Peres, the archetype “peacenik” of Israel, a Nobel Peace Prize winner, offered Israeli development know how to Arab countries in conferences held in Casablanca and Amman, the majority of the Arab political milieu and politically owned media cried out loud that here comes the economic attempt to conquer the Middle East. The offer was, of course, rejected.



Israel – The Downside

If all’s well, why isn’t it?

The Jews of Palestine, supported by the incredible élan of the Holocaust survivors' yearning for a home country, and enjoying the political, material and moral assistance of Western Jewry, achieved the quasi-impossible in the circumstances: Independent Israel.

With independence came wavering, misrule and manipulative jockeying for power, a display of lack of national willpower and sense of purpose. The Israeli ship of state veered off the course charted for it by the Declaration of Independence, entering the narrows it navigates, striving to extricate itself and rejoin the freedom of the high seas. (Are gentiles irreplaceable in running a Jewish state, the way Peter the Great needed Swedes, Germans and French to stabilize Russia?)

In flagrant breach of the Declaration of Independence, the Constituent Assembly, whose task was to write a constitution by October 1948, betrayed its mission and declared itself "The First Knesset", **unelected**, adopting the British system whose jurisprudence is based on judicial precedents, traditions and understandings, with no written constitution.

For an ingathering of exiles coming mainly from Eastern Europe, Africa or Asia with no democratic traditions, that spelled disruption through becoming sectorial.

While the suicidal, mercurial, divergent nature of democracy is checked in Britain by the British electoral system, the State of Israel adopted the proportional representation electoral system, democratic *ad absurdum*, analogous to that of the French Third and Fourth Republics whose fate it decided.

Keen to retain quasi-absolute power in socialist Israel, Ben-Gurion outflanked his Mapam rivals by closing agreements with anti-Zionist ultra-religious groups, which practically institutionalized the "rent-a-vote" parliamentary system, with sectors being bribed to tow the line...the present anarchic situation being the logical outcome.

About 70 percent of Israel's population, Jewish Zionists or pseudo-Zionists, serve their country and earn more than the EU average.

The Druze, Circassians and Bedouins earn less than the Jews, yet serve in the armed forces as well. The Arab sector earns less than the Jews and does not serve in the armed forces, which during one's lifetime means a 5-year head start!

The worst-off are the anti-Zionist (in general) ultra-religious Jews who do not serve in the armed forces or anywhere else, **nor do they earn a living**, leading a life of perpetual poverty with large families, totally secluded from modern life, fed by social security, children's allowances, etc. that are paid by the state, courtesy of Israel's religious Zionists or secular taxpayers.

These aberrations, where the Knesset legislated inequality of duty and benefits, where a whole Jewish sector has been condemned to perpetual poverty and estrangement (while its leaders lead a leisurely life), cannot go on forever. The tensions created were sectorial, religious, ethnic and economic.

The present anarchic state cannot be straightened out without returning to the articles of the Declaration of Independence and structuring a detailed, unambiguous, authoritative and difficult to amend (by ad-hoc political manipulators) constitution that will earn the kind of respect that the American constitution has.

A byproduct of the political hodgepodge and Eastern European traditions is the cancer-like bureaucracy that struck root in Israel's public administration. Not unlike that of the Soviet Union or Third World countries, Israel's bureaucracy's hold on the still over-centralized (socialist hangover) government structure delays decision-making and execution, as a rule, way beyond the point of irrelevance.

No decision-making equals no planning.

No planning equals more bureaucracy, favoritism, nepotism, corruption and obstructionism.

Conclusions

The State of Israel is Ill:

- It is mismanaged by governments that lack basic professionalism, culture, norms, ethics and, therefore, the authority and credibility required in a democracy.
- It has a legislative body, the Knesset, paralyzed by sectorial ultimatums, by manipulations, with no real, planned national agenda, with Diaspora “*Shtetl*-like” give and take haggling and no foresight.
- Real-time decision-making is non-existent except in emergency, when “management by catastrophe” is imposed.
- National master-planning and execution of infrastructure projects (water, transportation, sewage, etc.) are delayed for years on end –lagging badly and delaying economic progress.
- The “*laissez-faire*” mood created by the points listed above results in lack of confidence in political leadership, lack of sense of purpose, demoralization, lack of national cohesion, reign of mediocrity and populism; a vote of no-confidence to Zionism. **Unless Israel tends to its self-inflicted wounds, it is doubtful whether it will be able to face the challenges listed in the following pages.**

Putting its house in order is, by far, the first priority – overlooked by glory hunting populist leaderships.

Note: Some exaggeration was used, above to underline the truth.



The Nature of Peace and Threats

The Nature of Peace

Having been in charge of the Israeli Air Force Planning and Operational Requirements prior to the Six Day War (1967), this writer, privy to military planning, was surprised to find out at the end of the hostilities that the government had no political-strategic plan to cover the case of...overwhelming victory, which happened to be the outcome of battle. Israel paid very dearly for it.

By the same token, this writer was surprised when, as a Member of Knesset invited to participate in the proceedings of the Madrid Peace Conference of 1991, he found out that there was no definition of the term “Peace” which was the issue on the conference’s agenda.

The *Collins New English Dictionary* provided much needed help through two basic definitions of peace:

- a. A state of harmony between people or groups.
- b. A state of “no war”.

A “**state of harmony**” is, of course, the relationship between the US and Canada or the relationship among the Western European states. Its characteristics are:

- Similar (democratic²²) political regimes.
- Similar structure of economies.

- Similar ethos and notions of right and wrong.
- Similar social structures and aspirations.
- Similar norms of behavior and common culture.
- Total freedom of across the border transit of people, goods and ideas **in both directions**.
- No relevant conflict of interests.
- No aggressive motivation (of course).

A “**state of no war**” is, obviously, the relationship between the US and the now extinct Soviet Union.

Its characteristics are those of a war prone situation:

- All the above “similarities” are contrasts, extreme to one degree or another.
- No freedom of across the border transit both ways.
- Acute conflicts of interests.
- The aggressive motivation of communist expansionism.

In a “state of no war”, the outbreak of war is averted by the introduction of a new factor that offsets all the war inducing characteristics, namely **the factor of deterrence**.

Important Note: While a “Peace of harmony” is inherently stable, requiring no other safeguards than harmony itself, not even agreements and, certainly no “strong (Israeli) military to safeguard the peace” and/or third party guarantees, etc., a “Peace of no war” is inherently unstable, its fragile balance depending on the efficiency of deterrence which is bound to vary with time and circumstances.

Careful, meticulous wording of agreements, a strong military and as many collaterals (third party or not) as available support, as explained in the next passage, deterrence.

The writer asks the reader’s forgiveness for using, further down, military terms associated with war when discussing peace. Peace of “no war” and the military are Siamese twins, linked by deterrence.

Deterrence is a combination of:

- Military force sufficient to inflict intolerable punishment upon a potential enemy that attempts violent actions.
- National will to use the military force if/when required.
- Economy to sustain the levels of force and will.
- Leadership to husband the above three factors.
- Certainty that the party to be deterred has properly interpreted the message, as planned by the deterring party.²³

To complete the picture: A **military force** is not the count of armaments, soldiers, training, command, etc.

One thousand well-manned and commanded tanks in Tel Aviv are a display, parade or a target.

One thousand tanks deployed properly in a potentially operational area are one mighty force.

A military force should, rather, be thought of in terms of an efficient, well-informed and properly supplied combination of:

- Firepower.
- Mobility.

- Terrain, i.e. expanse and topography.

There exists a positive form of peace that does not conform with the above-mentioned characteristics of “peace of harmony”, yet it is a stable, equitable and friendly peace. Let’s name it a “friendly peace”.

This is a peace cemented by one or more overwhelmingly important common interest(s), like the peace between the US and Mexico where dis-similarities may be set aside, outshined by major common economic and other interests.

Peace between Israel and Jordan may become friendly peace where major strategic and economic common interests prevail, if/when Jordan will be strong enough to resist third party pressures.

The Israeli team that came to Oslo had no instructions. It was acting under academic cover, without the blessing of Rabin. Its members, amateurs in “horse trading” left their ivory tower to explore, covertly, hence with no cross feed, uncharted territory.

Facing a well-polished team of old hands, their excess of zeal resulted in a virtual Declaration of Principles (DOP), preaching a virtual peace agreement that has been reinforced many a time since, only to fail whenever exposed to reality.

By now, Oslo is water under the bridge, replaced by an entirely new, irreversible conflict situation that demands an entirely new approach.

Oslo’s failure is, mainly, resulting from the lack of a clear definition of the mission – **Peace**.

Two illuminating examples:

1. The Jerusalem-Etzion county road is an expensive feat of engineering with two full-fledged tunnels connected by an elongated bridge spanning a deep valley beneath. It has been constructed to bypass the Palestinian Authority’s Bethlehem. The cost has probably been in nine figures. Since the road was supposed to separate the traffic flows of the two entities in a state of harmony, no one cared that it had been built within effective small arms fire and “Molotov cocktails” range, acts of violence being **an inconceivable occurrence in a harmonious relationship**. But reality being different, that majestic road is presently closed by the Arabs at will, and a bypass to the bypass has to be used because no one considered the consequence of the lack of deterrence if a “no war” situation were to be substituted for one of harmony.
2. All Israeli peace negotiators and their peers insist on the fact that **“Israel needs strong armed forces to safeguard the peace,” i.e. deterrence**.

If a peace is as harmonious as to build an Israeli road within range of Molotov cocktails, why does one need a strong military, a contradiction in terms? Do Canada and the US deploy large forces on their borders? Grotesque. If one needs a strong military, i.e. defense, *à la* US-USSR., then harmony based investments like industrial parks at border seams, Israeli roads with Palestinian shoulders, etc, are superfluous and complicate deterrence’s problem by creating an impossible, i.e. war prone situation, like the one Israel experiences at present.

* * *

Peace and the Threat to It, Two Sides of the Same Coin in a “No War” Situation

Any examination of the normative, psychological, geopolitical, economic, etc. conditions prevailing in the Middle East, leads to the conclusion that, for the foreseeable future, peace between Israel and its Arab/Islamic Middle Eastern neighbors can only be a “peace of no war”, like the peace with Egypt. One notable exception to this statement is the above-mentioned peace with Jordan which may, with time, become the cornerstone of Israeli-Arab relationship.²⁴

It appears that since the Begin-Sadat Camp David negotiations of the Israel-Egyptian peace, through the Oslo accords²⁵ and on to this very day, Israeli negotiators have failed to consider the nature of the peace they were negotiating because they had no clear definition of it in mind.

This default induces grave mistakes. For instance:

- Middle Eastern totalitarian rulers are bound to switch from peace or non-belligerence to war at a whim. Examples, like the Yom Kippur War 1973, Iraq-Kuwait 1990, etc. abound. What provisions did the Oslo, etc. teams make to cater for this possibility? Overheated romanticism, the dream of harmonious peace where no harmony exists (in the whole Middle East) as well as the raising of exaggerated expectations is not error or naiveté. It is a sin.
- It is worth looking at least at one example, an issue that has emerged during Camp David II (Barak's) negotiations with Arafat:

In order to induce Arafat to accept the Clinton (or "Clinton") paper presented, it was mentioned that the sovereignty over the Jordan Valley "may be open for consideration".²⁶

The (Western) Jordan Valley is a hot desert, below sea level, fertile if properly groomed and irrigated, for which reason it has been only very sparsely populated by Arabs, with the exception of the Jericho area which draws water from Wadi Kelt.

Since the Allon (Labor) plan of 1968, it has been considered as absolutely vital for Israel's defense/deterrence, an armor deployment area between the mountain slopes of Samaria in the West and the "anti-tank ditch" – the River Jordan – in the East. A "box" less than 50 miles long and about 10 miles wide on average.

Where Arafat's Palestinians are concerned, this box is a wedge separating the Palestinian Authority (PA) from Jordan with the purpose of preventing arms smuggling, general contraband and the influx of immigrants²⁷ as agreed (at this stage). Not much in the way of deterrence.

But if an agreement transferring the Valley to the PA is projected upon the entire geopolitical region, the picture is totally different. In the best of circumstances, an Arafat controlled Palestinian entity would consist of an archipelago of a few minuscule Palestinian "islands" thrust almost at random in a small pond called Israel. It would be contained by Israel and Jordan.

The less than half century relationship between the Arabs of Judea and Samaria (i.e. Palestinians) and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, since the annexation of the West Bank by King Abdullah I in 1951, through "Black September" of 1970²⁸ and the final shedding by Jordan of its authority over the West Bank in 1988, has been a rough rodeo and a tug of war rather than a brotherly embrace.

Given the circumstances, there is a high probability that the PA would look west to Israel for economic salvation and for that reason, would be insistent but careful in its anti-Israeli irredentist activities that would certainly persist.

Yet, were the Jordan Valley to come under Arafat's rule, a unique opportunity, impossible to reject, would emerge for Arafat to become a real, full fledged ruler of a real state instead of a semi-vassal, shackled ruler of a micro-state. Having acquired a seamless contact with anti-Hashemite elements in Jordan and converting his long term friendship with Saddam Hussein²⁹ into an alliance, Arafat could exercise a pincer pressure or external military intervention to "protect the rights of the Palestinians in Jordan" and usurp the Hashemite throne, becoming the uncontested King or President of the Palestinians.

This would certainly permit the emancipation of the Samaritan Judean and Gazan Palestinian Arabs.

Pro-Arafat Israelis, the like of the ones that “dispensed” with the Jordan Valley in the first place, may be delighted, seeing all the Arab Palestinians united under one rule and trusting the signed Arafat-Israeli agreement (that has no collateral) to maintain Judean-Samaritan-Gazan demilitarization.

The write-off of the one natural ally that Israel may have, Jordan, does not worry them: they trust Arafat.

However, **Iraq would move west**, first to the Jordan River, and then in “trickles”. A “friendly visit” by officers, followed by a “token” joint exercise at company level, then one at brigade level, etc., which would end with Iraq back where it was in 1948 – 10 miles from the Israeli seashore. After all, Iraq’s access to the Persian Gulf is strangled (threatened) by Iran and “thankless” Kuwait. If Iraq can reach the Mediterranean unimpaired, cutting the length of its Syrian or Turkey controlled oil pipelines in half, it’s worth the by now tempting effort.

Then, Israel, conscious of the fact that Iraq is in possession of ballistic missiles with biological or even only chemical warheads will have to face a terrible problem of survival: challenging a ballistic missiles equipped Iraq/Greater Palestine alliance that has topographical and visual control over 80 percent of Israel’s population and production facilities, or *a priori* invade Arafat’s PA state to prevent him from moving on the Hashemite throne, thereby infringing agreements by being the first one to open fire, and risk being branded aggressor by the world community with all that it implies.³⁰

The above presented scenario of possible results of handing over the Jordan Valley to Arafat may change for the worse if Syria and/or Saudi Arabia, or further down the line, Iran are also getting involved.

Exalted and mesmerized by the prospects of “peace around the corner” with our next door neighbors, “peacenik” Israeli activists were so totally oblivious of the true nature/definition of peace that they either forgot it, never knew about it, or wanted it out of the way, hoping that they or their followers would somehow “muddle through”.

This, in the writer’s opinion, is a reckless gamble, a “Russian roulette” resulting from a shortsighted narrow vision of the situation and contempt for history’s teachings.³¹

Conclusions

Reducing the deterrence level aimed at a major, high intensity threat in order to accelerate a solution and/or improve a position *vis-à-vis* a minor threat that is being negotiated about at a given time, may result in buying a temporary respite (a term?) at the price of a substantial, dangerous increase in the probability of war with the high intensity threat. This would be, rather, the work of petty politicians.



The Threat

General Notes

Once it is agreed (how can it be challenged?) that the Israeli-Arab peace can only be a “peace of no war” which depends entirely upon the level of Israel’s³² deterrence, the mechanics and level of deterrence constantly have to be assessed as have the factors of threat intensity.

Israel is, most probably, facing the highest level of threats of any democracy:

- It has a large (20%), highly volatile insurgent population intertwined with its own, which means that it is an easy target for sabotage, terror and other criminal acts, resulting from resentment of lost wars and economic and culture gaps.

- The pan-Arab aims (of war) intensity have never abated. The total elimination of Israel is still **the aim**, the openly spoken and advertised objective of Arabia.
- It is facing the largest volume of fire-power per km./mile of frontier the world has ever known, and it has no depth in normally accepted military terms.
- It is threatened by the highest number of ballistic missiles per square km/mile of territory the world has ever seen, that may be launched from short ranges, i.e. short warning time, by trigger happy, medieval despots.
- If/when a nuclear threat were activated, Israel's position would worsen:
 - * Two-three nuclear devices would suffice to destroy about 80 percent of Israel's population and capabilities located in metropolitan Tel Aviv (Hadera-Gedera). Any nuclear attack would certainly be followed by a pan-Arab invasion, a "catch as catch can" maneuver of conquest of (radiation free) remaining Israeli territory.
 - * The small, arid surface of the country will not provide for sufficiently safe, concealed sites to be hardened to assume an undisputed second-strike capability. (See further down).
 - * A nuclear exchange will, most probably, not remain a one-on-one affair.

Once a nuclear strike against Israel has been launched, the country's deterrence level will collapse and, most certainly, a renewed pan-Arab invasion may be expected. Once an Arab nuclear threat emerges, Israel has to declare the whole of pan-Arabia as a target for a second strike.

This may create a better deterrence posture, where Arab countries will restrain an Arab/Islamic possessor of nuclear arms in their use against Israel. Another reason would be retaining Israeli deterrence to forestall a pan-Arab invasion after having been subjected to a nuclear blast.

The capability of second strike launching against all relevant Pan-Arabian targets requires an about 50:1 ratio in Israel's favor of nuclear warheads and their vehicles.³³

- Israel's antagonists (50:1 ratio) hold onto a territory that is 800 times that of Israel, have political clout (22:1 ratio in the UN plus other Islamic countries in addition), have an extremely high economic appeal, controlling about two thirds of the world's known oil reserves and are the darlings of Western ways of doing business, free as they are from democratic or boards' debates, tenders, lawyers etc. One man, one vote – the **vote**.

As mentioned, their anti-Israeli motivation (i.e. hatred) has never abated over the 52 years of Israeli existence. In cases like Egypt, while the hatred is there and constantly perpetrated, economic and geopolitical conditions have changed and brought about a change in attitude. A Cold War type peace of no war has been signed, permitting Egypt to retrieve Sinai from Israel, open the Suez Canal and qualify for US assistance. Israel is now Egypt's third largest customer (oil), more than any Arab country, yet open hatred prevails, fired by a government controlled propaganda.

The Rejection of the Jewish National Home has never lost its intensity.

- The Arabs enjoy the moral and at times material support of the 1.2 billion Moslems in the world and some of the unaligned or renegade countries which see Israel as an extension of the US.

* * *

The Media Threat

As these lines are written (Nov. 22, 2000 at 08:15-08:30), the writer listens to the Israeli Radio, channel “B”, reporting on two interviews, one with a person in Jordan and another one about Egypt (regarding Arafat’s new move of unrest):

Jordan:

People don’t, as a rule, believe the local press, hence they turn to **foreign media which is non-aligned**. This is where we learn that the situation in Palestine worsens because of incessant Jewish attacks and the reaction here is one of a daily increase in frustration and popular fury, the mood worsening as the days go by.

Egypt, re the Egyptian Ambassador’s recall: “*Weizman met Mubarakh four days ago in Bassiuni’s (Egyptian Ambassador to Israel) company. Bassiuni told him that Mubarakh’s most trusted source of information is CNN.*”

Media is here to stay as a biased, money – hence rating – hence scoop-orientated, subjective, unaccountable, yet efficient communicator to the point of perfection when covering a conflict.

The influence media has upon world opinion at large, world governments and leaders as well as upon the combatants’, public’s and leadership’s morale and decision making is overwhelming.

Handling media is at least as important, may be more, than, say, Foreign Policy.

Since winning the Six Day War, Israel has been decisively beaten and humiliated by Arab or Arab supporting media. It has done nothing to prevent its becoming the stereotype ugly, hated Goliath as against the Arab little David (1:800 area ratio, 1:50 population ratio, 1:22 and Islam UN votes ratio, 1:∞ natural resources ratio, etc.).

Example: In the present conflict, Israel has used attack helicopters to hit empty houses (the tenants being warned to leave, for humane considerations – who cares?), has shot tank cannon rounds against Christian empty houses to warn Moslem infiltrators not to fire at Gilo (!?) and, worse, it has neglected preempting “that kid’s murder” by pre-projecting the miles of TV footage it has of children being trained by the PLO for war at ages lower than 10 and cautioning the world that this may happen. It reacted late and clumsily, reinforcing its “ugly Goliath” image, which did an enormous political, national and long lasting international damage, with Arafat gaining the kudos.

Be the intelligence available to governments or armed forces as ample as it may, the data common denominator the ruler has with his masses, and that counts for both dictators and democrats alike, is the media. This is why the totalitarian regimes make efforts to muzzle, censor, join or do away with an undesirable media message by drowning it in a torrent of irrelevance, efforts which, with present technology, are pathetic at best.

Dictators, like democrats, have to intertwine media in their operational plans. There could be no military reprisal act (considered a security “must”) more humane than that attempted by Israel when, having a priori warned the enemy to clear the specific area of people so that no human losses be incurred, IDF smashes headquarters, etc., and empty buildings using attack helicopters so as to minimize its own losses. There cannot be a more naive (to the point of being plain dumb) act where the media is concerned. A few empty houses, which have been cleared of their sensitive stuff following the warning received, have been destroyed. As the planners saw it, this was a warning for all to see (the umpteenth).

But there was a byproduct: Transmitting the photogenic, dramatic, sensational, touching images, the media conveys the message that Israel is using all its might **unsuccessfully** (they stick to body count) and that it applies undue force for the low intensity war it wages – Goliath, against David, again.

Obviously, military-policy directives have to be mindful of the media impact, this being the main tool of influencing, positively or negatively, each party's motivation, morale and confidence and the whole world's gut reaction.

The use of attack helicopters, that “monstrous and photogenic power” against empty buildings, causing no casualties, will be remembered as a useless abuse for years to come, long after the original humane considerations have been forgotten.

That thickens the anti-Israeli sedimentation in people's consciences.

The media, that fourth, unelected, uncontrolled, free of plain mortals' norms and ethics, by now a most powerful arm of democracy, is global, instant, penetrating and here to stay.

It is also extremely efficient. It is never objective. It worships the God Mammon, i.e. ratings, i.e. it is boisterous and sensational, scoop orientated. Its reporting is more often than not superficial and narrow-minded. Wisdom and depth have lost the battle with the length of clip, the width limitation of the camera lens or the length of the article. A valid argument is thrown into the trash bin if a “good”, bloody photograph can be substituted for it.

Biased reporters' raw material is edited by biased editors turning beef into beefsteak.

Biased reporting is a matter of the reporter's subjective seeing or hearing and, as the Italian TV has proven in the case of the Ramallah beastly lynch of two Israeli soldiers, subject to threats or bribes.

If this, then, is the “truth” that creates unrest in Jordan, is the base of judgment of the Egyptian president, creates public opinion in the US that steers president, congress, military, academia and bureaucrats, erodes support in the UN and cracks morale at home - then media is a major threat to be reckoned with. It may, in different circumstances, be a friend. When?

When the media threat is properly assessed and properly dealt with.

Israel has lost the media war ever since the Six Day War of 1967. It regained some terrain during the Madrid Peace Conference of 1991 when the world was surprised to find out that Israel was one and the Arabs 20, plus an incredible number of “non-aligned”, Moslem, Eastern European and even Israeli-Jewish leftist supporters. Since people do, naturally, side with the underdog, the question, as it is simply and inaccurately presented, is “who is the underdog?”, who is David and who is Goliath?”

Following their crushing defeat in 1967, pan-Arabia succeeded in projecting a “Little David” image as against the Israeli “Goliath”, in spite of the quoted population, area, UN voting and natural resources ratios.

During June-July 1967, the world, including the US and the West, which expected, with arms crossed (few with fingers crossed in hopes for its survival), the demise of Israel in that war initiated by Egypt and Syria with Soviet backing, looked for a way to expiate their sin of being indifferent, ready to tolerate inactively a second Holocaust.

Later, adopting the image of the ugly Israeli Goliath fighting little Arab David, was one way of ridding oneself of a guilt complex. Plus oil and 22 UN votes. With Israel totally inert and passive, it became an accepted stereotype, in spite of the adverse ratios (mentioned at the beginning of this chapter) that establish a different truth.

In Madrid (1991), the Israeli Goliath turned out to be rather diminutive, undersized and the Arab Little David pretty well built, large and heavily supported. But the conference was short and the Israeli government of the time returned to its taciturn indifference *vis-à-vis* the media.

As a Member of Israel's Peace Mission to Madrid charged, mainly, with information, this writer reached a conclusion that the media is a front like any other, as important as, say, foreign policy which now depends on it.

The terms of reference recently presented by Prime Minister Barak to Ron Ben Yishai whom he appointed to conduct the government-media relationship, namely “a flow of abundant, true information in real time” are, in this writer’s opinion, defensive and insufficient, anachronistic. That picture of the Palestinian boy killed by crossfire in the hands of his father has done irreparable damage to Israel, that may have immense political repercussions resulting in damages worth billions. Nobody cares **now** whether the child has been hit by Palestinian or Israeli bullets, nor is anybody asking why, for God’s sake, was he there in the first place, where no one with peaceful intentions had any business of being. He was a Palestinian child, killed. The heavy onus is on Israel.

Yet, the Palestinian TV obliged for years and provided long footage of films that proudly displayed the training of 6-10 year olds with firearms and field exercises to prepare them for “*Jihad*”.

Israel possesses, unfortunately, very large albums of photographs and TV clips of Israeli children murdered, maimed, burned and molested by Palestinians over the years, including those of the present conflict.

Why did Israel project these Palestinian and Israeli TV clips **after** the unfortunate Gaza occurrence? Were an enlightenment team to anticipate what was bound to happen and preempt instead of reacting, it could have prevented the devastating damage, causing either the withdrawal of the Palestinian kids from the “stone line” that covers the “firing line” – which happened partially after the delayed information campaign -- or legitimize the horrible fact of losing children if they are used as shields, the way the loss of civilians has been accepted by the Allies during the bombing of Germany, Japan, Vietnam, Iraq and, more recently, Yugoslavia.

Israelis should be able to convince the world that they, a minuscule beachhead in Arabia, cannot and should not be “more Catholic than the Pope”.

If/when Israel will consider Enlightenment as a battlefield like any other and do something about it, then the trend can and must be reversed.

Conclusions

1. As a rule:

- An underdog (David) who wins against incredible odds – is the king of the media – like Israel in the 1967 Six Day War, which is how Arafat attempts to be seen during this uprising.
- A sloppy giant (Goliath) is the very embodiment of evil, disgusting, repelling and failed humanity in media eyes, which is the image Arafat wishes Israel to project.
- A winning “Giant” will be excused, his image redeemed, if he strikes fast, decisively, and makes proof of magnanimity at the end.³⁴

2. Disregarding media in the 21st century is a sin.

3. A comprehensive media victory is worth many a division.

4. Switch from information to enlightenment. Enlightenment, as against information, propaganda or just P.R., is the detailed, in depth, presentation of Israel’s case as if it were in front of a court of justice, aiming to win the case with accurate, abundant, on time information, synchronized, interlaced, dosed and timed to achieve a maximum effect.

Enlightenment is a battlefield of major importance that, like any battlefield, requires statesmanship, professionalism, imagination, wit, luck, means and accurate definition of objectives.

Whether anyone likes it or not, media is there, is penetrating and most powerful, hence it should be catered to.

The alternative thickens the anti-Israeli sedimentation in people's consciences.



The Palestinian Threat

October 2000; A Reminder

The October-November 2000 (2001?) Arafat uprising should, it is hoped, teach Israel and other democracies that **despots may switch from peaceful intercourse to hostilities at the throw of a switch.**³⁵

This fact should be well understood, digested and taken into consideration in any peace negotiations concerning deterrence measures that are to safeguard a “peace of no war”.

“Should, it is hoped, teach Israel” is said because Israel has tenaciously resisted, to this day, learning this lesson. This is an important barrier to be crossed.

For example, during a meeting of a group of senior reserve officers with Prime Minister Netanyahu some two years ago, one mentioned, on the basis of his War of Independence experience when running convoys to besieged Jerusalem, that even under low intensity war conditions, like those of December 1947, roads may be blocked, useless, unless wide fringes, out of effective small arms range and dominating hills are secured.

Netanyahu dismissed the idea and suggested that where necessary, bypass roads are being built.

Again, that monumental engineering feat, the Jerusalem-Etzion Settlements area, a Bethlehem bypass³⁶ that displays the grace of a long, elevated bridge stretched between two tunnels, took hundreds of millions to build, yet proves now to be worthless, subjected to accurate, enfilade small arms fire from Arafat's close positions that dominate the bridge and the tunnels' openings.

The fate of the majority of the other bypass roads is the same, because they were built with administrative not strategic or tactical separation in mind. Billions have been spent on such halfhearted efforts by all Israel's governments since Oslo. **Their false assumption was that one will reach “local harmony” in a “peace of no war” situation. Wrong.**

These roads link, or should link, settlements that have been established by Israeli governments which, 33 years after the fateful Six Day War, still do not have a conclusive idea of what are Israel's defense or other (water or pollution preventing) ultimate territorial requirements.

Like the bypass roads and well-intentioned building of industrial complexes on the seam lines to provide work for Palestinians, settlements were built with only peace in mind. Why only peace? Arafat reminds Israel that, Oslo or not, he has alternatives. Only negligent overconfidence could disregard his clear messages since Oslo; certainly not political wisdom.

Here too, the grave error lies in the lack of peace definition and its specific prerequisites.

The threat of the Palestinian Authority or state that has to be deterred in order to achieve a peace situation (of “no war”) is of a particular character.

1. As a stand-alone threat it is, militarily speaking, of a mere nuisance value. A persistent, insistent, destabilizing, costly nuisance whose answer, in a (non-realistic) stand-alone situation, is renewed occupation and all-out anti-terrorist actions.

But, combined with media effects and (resulting) international reactions, the PA's threat may have a cumulative effect and require a deterrence where sophisticated political, economic, enlightenment factors are combined with as low key an application of power as the situation allows.

While being a serious millstone around Israel's development as a society and economy, this threat is not a matter of life and death to it. It is typical of the various governments' enlightenment deficiencies, that they do not consecrate the required efforts to convey their message of bare truth to the public and foreign parties involved. **Panic results and this encourages Arafat to continue and increase his efforts.**

- 2 A separate Palestinian independent state may pose an existential threat to Israel when associated with other Arab states:
 - If a Palestinian state's sovereignty includes the Jordan Valley, which enables it to join Iraq in usurping the Jordanian throne (a repeat of the September 1970 feat), Jordan may cave in and turn from a peaceful neighbor into an enemy's springboard, which means that the Iraqi-Arafatian force will be deployed along the Green Line (1967 border), backed by Iraq's ballistic missiles deployed East of the Jordan.
 - In case of a pan-Arab coalition war on Israel, with the supposedly demilitarized Palestinian state pitching in with synchronized guerrilla support.

Although capable "only" of guerrilla attacks, the Palestinian State may in this case, pose an extreme threat because of its capability of delaying the mobilization and deployment of the reserves and of tying down relatively large forces.

One cannot conclude this part of the Palestinian threat without mentioning a number of questions that the present state of revolt poses. Following are three of them:

1. Why did Arafat feel that he had to launch the present wave of hostilities just when he has received the most generous offers since Oslo in 1993 and the atmosphere was conducive to conclusion?

The answer, it seems, is to be found in the twilight zone of reality and oriental sense of honor, ego, pride and history which, in the ME is not less real than reality.

Arafat who, contrary to Israeli leaders, instilled among his public a feeling of being able to fulfill the highest expectations, will risk his political and, most probably, his very life when agreeing to sign a document "ending all conflicts and claims" after receiving much less than the expectations he created.

Moreover, Arafat is convinced, like so many Israelis, that, in the present circumstances, his Palestinian state will be just a vassal of the Israeli economy, the Israeli defense imperatives, etc., practically cut off from his Arab peers and denied by geopolitical reality a future of national emancipation.

If, instead of signing, he puts up a fight, achieving at its end more or less the same results, that is the conditions offered previously, he may claim that this is the best that he could achieve in battle and blame his Arab peers for not having joined his war (the writer assumes this to be the case). **This will transform him from a "betrayed" of the Arab/Moslem cause, into an Arab Ben Gurion who won his state in battle, albeit not the whole of it.**

2. How realistic are Arafat's chances of forcing the Arab nation at large to join in a full-fledged ME war with Israel? (See further, the Pan-Arab/Islamic threat in the near future.) Not a high probability, at present.

3. What are the lessons to be drawn by Israel from the present violence?

They are, obviously, too many to enumerate, however here are some:

- Retain firm control of the Jordan Valley.
- Retain firm control of the access roads to it, with proper fringes and dominating terrain.
- Consider the probability of hostilities erupting again, under any pretext, as high and plan to prevent that from happening by maintaining deterrence. Build industrial parks, bypass roads, buffer areas, with that probability in mind.

This probability of reengaging in hostilities will be lowered only if Arafat is made to pay dearly for the present conflict in terms of territory, facilities, economy and cooperation.

Returning to Camp David II (Barak's), is synonymous with encouraging him to try again.

- Launch a comprehensive, aggressive, long-term enlightenment campaign to have the world, including Israelis, understand that, as said, the Arabs of Judea, Samaria and Gaza are hostages not of Israel, but of the pan-Arab threat to Israel that requires proper Israeli deterrence provisions. Without that threat some form of agreement will facilitate their moral, national, economic and equitable emancipation.

Israel's armed forces, mainly its reserves, are keyed to fight at a high pitch and impose its will upon the enemy over a very limited period of time. Lacking any maneuvering depth, its tactics include the shifting of the battle to enemy territory, where these forces will impose Israel's will upon the enemy. This is a logical outcome of consequences. Israel has a "short breath", the mainstay of its armed forces are reservists, civilians that run the economy and feed homes.

Israel's population, influenced by the country's defense policy's past successes and the practically 52 years of tiring emergency, measures success by the duration required to achieve military decision (impose the will) and, of course, by comparison of body count. This being the case, Israel, despite its long history of being subjected to terror and guerrilla attack, is not properly prepared to fight a low intensity war, which requires different force composition, time, patience and civil population unity of purpose and tenacity. While Israel's conventional war deterrence is well established, an intelligent enemy has no problem in assessing Israeli deterrence against his low intensity war tactics, by just witnessing policy decisions, armed forces politically reined in, tactics and, most important, the symptoms of the population's demoralization, absence of sense of purpose and willpower, social "cracks", etc., which are, in fact, his main objectives.

The level of Palestinian threat depends upon the enlightenment that forges public and governments' opinions. By September 2000 it favored Israel. By now, November 2000, it is definitely on Arafat's side after Israel has used photogenic arms like attack helicopters and tanks against targets of no relevance, not in order to win the battle, but, in fact, to buy more Israeli public patience for a politically induced restrained military response that was supposed to convey the message of "open door". But, translated from its Hebrew-Western meaning into Arabic, the message conveyed "weakness and indecision", i.e. the opposite of deterrence, i.e. encouragement to carry on with the fight.

"Safeguarding" the US interests in Arab countries while free at the end of his second Presidency from political influence, President Clinton weighs now heavier on Israel to make more concessions, over and above the far-fetched ones Barak made at Camp David II, which means to let Arafat know that violence pays, again, which will influence future Palestinian decisions. Vicious circle.

As part of a pan-Arab coalition's war, the Palestinian threat may assume extreme importance, combining and synchronizing its close quarters guerrilla potential with ballistic missiles to disrupt an Israeli build up of reserves, thus easing a massive conventional attack.

Conclusion

The probability of Oslo's success is extremely low, irrespective of Israeli governments' policies. If, in spite of the low probability, a (Western) Palestinian state does emerge, the probability of its providing for the full emancipation of the Arabs of Judea, Samaria and Gaza is also very low due, mainly, to the state's size and segmentation, Israeli stringent defense requirements, the total dependence on the Israeli economy and infrastructure, the contractual limitations on foreign relations, etc. The logic of the above is that, sooner or later, the Oslo experiment will have run its course and other ways should be explored.

One opinion³⁷ is that a major international effort should be invested, provided Jordan is willing, to expedite the following:

1. The upgrade of the Jordanian Kingdom, bringing its per capita GNP to a substantially superior level of that of the (West) Palestinian Arabs (it's the opposite at present).
2. Conditional upon the satisfactory upgrading and the thereby created Jordanian national willingness – the reacceptance of the Arabs of Samaria and Judea and acceptance of the Gazans under the Jordanian political fold (no relocation).
3. Israeli and Jordanian common defense denominator being what it is and relations having reached a fair level, Israel and Jordan have a joint interest to avoid an east orientated (September 1970 type) Palestinian drive of usurpation attempt by a bitter Palestinian entity west of Jordan. The two states, Israel and Jordan, will cultivate the desire of the (West) Palestinians to become full citizens of a fully independent, **prospering Arab (mainly Palestinian) entity**.
4. Having experienced the failure of Oslo and/or that of the independent (West) Palestinian state and mellowed, under probably different leadership, (West) Palestinians may agree to re-assume (prospering) Jordanian citizenship with Jordan providing them the national hinterland, an organized state structure, and real independence. Culturally and ethnically, this is not unlike the reunification of Germany which had been dismembered by war in 1945.
5. The international community will be “enlightened” to reaccept the pre-1988 “Jordan is Palestine” notion as “politically correct”.
6. Jordanian municipal enclaves, home to the vast majority of (West) Palestinians, that enjoy free movement to Jordan, will substitute for (West) Palestinian confined rule in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. They will be established within an area of Israeli authority that provides for pan-Arabian deterrence, which is an Israeli and, no less, a Jordanian prerequisite for the stability of peace.

This is a long shot that may require years to mature, yet it's worth trying once Oslo fails, promising, in fact, a better individual and communal solution for the emancipation of the (West) Palestinian population while, it has to be recognized, it backtracks where Arafat's dictatorship is concerned. Yet, peace is a matter of whole populations not necessarily of securing Arafat a “throne”, or is it?

It is a major reorientation of Palestinian Arab, Jewish and world notions of the “politically correct” way of handling the issue, born in the twilight of Reagan's Presidency when, in late 1988, he accepted Arafat as the legitimate representative of (West) Palestinians, having received from Arafat the promise of “CADUQ”,³⁸ a French fairly ambiguous way to declare, in English, that he agreed thereby to part

with terror as a way of achieving political aims. That was 12 years ago. So much for the US reading of the ME map.

* * *

The Pan-Arab/Islamic Non-Nuclear Threat

Ever since the June 1967 Six Day War that broke out following the incapability of the UN and the US to respect their obligations undertaken in 1957 (to compensate Israel for its withdrawal from the Sinai through guaranteeing the full demilitarization of that area and the free passage of Israeli and Israel bound shipping to the port of Eilat), the US has been promoting the Rogers Plan.

William Rogers was the US State Secretary at the time. Ignoring the trauma of the US and UN renegeing on their pre Six Day War pledges, Rogers proposed in 1969 a plan that called for an Israeli withdrawal back to the pre-June 1967, (Six Day War) demarcation lines, “with minor modifications”. The plan included some form of renewed US/UN guaranties.

When calling on Labor Prime Minister Golda Meir to present his plan, Rogers was received by a furious old lady: “*Mr. Rogers, by the time you’ll be here, we won’t be here anymore*”, she said, rejecting Rogers’ offer.

This statement of Golda’s was put in evidence when six months passed between the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the full projection of US force in the area.

Were the Kuwaitis Jews...

The reason for Golda’s fury was that she realized that Israel’s crushing victory of 1967 was less than a hairsbreadth away from total disaster and demise, the difference being made by Israel’s preempting by tactical surprise.

Preempting by surprise when acts of war have already been committed by the other side, like the re-militarization of the Sinai and the blockading of Eilat bound shipping in May 1967, is a gamble more dangerous than Russian roulette.

Deny surprise and the case is lost.

Israel’s defense policy was well defined in February 22, 1967,³⁹ by the then Deputy Prime Minister (Labor) and the most outstanding general of the War of Independence, Yigal Allon. It stated that:

Israel may live in peace within its (pre June 1967) Green Line boundaries if:

The Sinai stays demilitarized and the southbound shipping through the Red Sea remains unhindered, as agreed at the conclusion of the Sinai campaign in 1957 in the US brokered Cease Fire agreement.

The US will honor the obligation it undertook to guarantee the said passage and demilitarization, backed by UN troops stationed in the Sinai for as long as Israel deemed necessary.

The neighboring Arab countries will accept Israel’s existence and refrain from warlike acts like terror, shelling, incursions, etc..

(All preconditions were broken by Nasser in May, 1967.)

Yigal Allon went on, saying that in order to win a war imposed upon it, preempting by surprise is... “*the most important factor to win and, in certain circumstances, the only means of securing its (Israel’s) survival.*”

Six “Red Line” scenarios were described by Allon as compelling Israel to go to war:

1. *In case offensive troop concentrations endanger Israel.*
2. *When it becomes certain that the enemy is preparing a surprise air strike against Israeli air bases.*

3. *If our nuclear facilities and research centers are subjected to a pinpoint air strike.*
4. *If the guerrilla, mining and terror shelling reaches such proportions that render our passive defense and retaliatory raids inadequate.*
5. *If Jordan concludes a military pact with another Arab country and permits the concentration of foreign forces within its borders – especially west of the Jordan River (Jordan was, at the time sovereign over Judea and Samaria).*
6. *If Egypt blockades the Tiran (Sharm-e-Sheikh) Red Sea passage.*

30 years later, when the Oslo “peace” negotiations were proceeding with the US as the honest broker, the State Department’s policy was still the Rogers Plan or a slight variation thereof, and the Israeli Governments, Rabin-Peres and Netanyahu (Labor and Likud) agreed to establish a “Palestinian entity” in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. Given the fact that simultaneous talks were held with Syria regarding the future of the Golan Heights, the obvious question that came to one’s mind was:

“How will Israel fare at the beginning of the new century if it redeploys within its May 1967 borders?”

To be able to provide an answer, this writer searched out whether the 1997 circumstances created new conditions that could enable Israel, redeployed within its pre-1967 borders, to dispose of the Allon policy of “preemption by surprise” as a condition *sine qua non* for winning a war (or, in some cases, survive and create new conditions which will become peacekeeping deterrence prerequisites that will enable Israel to maintain deterrence keeping a more defensive posture).

Since no valid substitute was found for Allon’s preempting by surprise, the next question was whether conditions prevailing in 1997 permit, improve or deny a preemption by surprise?

The answer is not encouraging. In a paper published as part of the book *Israel at the Crossroads* (ACPR, 1997), entitled “Israel 2000: How Will it Fare if Shrunk to Its Pre-Six Day War (1967) Borders?” this writer examined:

1. The changes between 1967 and 1997 in the pan-Arab aim of war against Israel (no change – same hatred, state and religion promoted).
2. The change in the order of battle of pan-Arabia between 1967 and 1997 (huge).
3. The weapons’ technological revolution between 1967 and 1997. (An incredible revolution).⁴⁰
4. The lessons of wars since 1967, including the lesson to be drawn from Israel’s experience with Tel Aviv and Haifa under Scud ballistic missiles bombardment during the US (& others) – Iraqi war (panicky exodus).
5. The changes in the geopolitical situation between 1967 and 1997. (Soviet collapse and its positive and negative points, “no war” peace with Egypt, Iran’s joining Arabia, etc.).

Note that:

1. Substituting nuclear for lost conventional deterrence level is absolutely undesirable (see further – 4.5)
2. Technology does not provide independent deterrence.
3. US, UN or other guarantees have proven, in Israel’s case and the world over that they become obsolete and null when one of the parties or the guarantor desire it. (Kissinger: “*The privilege of independence is that a government may change its mind.*”) They may be used as temporary “pain relievers” but not as healing medicine.

Similar to normal business practice, international agreements that are not backed by tangible, **irreversible** collateral are worthless, especially when the business is concluded with a party whose credit rating is particularly low.

4. The costs of partial compensation of lost deterrence by substituting fire power and mobility for terrain are staggering, as revealed at Shepherdstown,⁴¹ to the point of becoming a threat to Israel's survival as an economy and/or a very heavy burden to the US.

Conclusion

The conclusion of the said examination is that in the circumstances prevailing in year 2000, Israel is incapable for all intents and purposes, to preempt by surprise, hence incapable of winning a war imposed upon it, or, in some cases, survive an imposed war. Being unable to win a war means: no deterrence to keep the peace.

Some of the reasons are:

- Given the present intelligence (satellites, electronic, infrared et al) and communications' new technologies, minuscule Israel is an open book in real time where manpower and logistics pre-deployments are concerned. No move goes unnoticed.
- Like in 1967, no ground offensive may be launched without previous acquisition of total air superiority over the battle zone and its logistic approaches. Yet in year 2000, two days or more have to be consecrated exclusively to the air force "cleaning" the battle zone of anti-aircraft missile defenses. That opening prevents ground forces surprise, revealing time and location of preemption.
- All Israel's enemies and potential enemies are now in possession of ground-to-ground ballistic missiles armed with conventional (HE), chemical and (some) biological warheads. Their erratic CEP obviate exclusive tactical use.⁴² The "trickle" of a missile bombardment of 39 missiles over 14 days on Haifa and Tel Aviv almost emptied these cities. Syria alone is assumed to be now capable of sustaining a rate of launch of about 40 missiles per day for about one month.

As Israel learned from the Iraqi "live practice", life and material damages may be tolerable but, surely for the first few days, the mobilization of reserves will become next to impossible with the population dispersion and the reluctance to leaving families on the firing line.

Add to it a lively Palestinian guerrilla and sabotage activity and everyone has more delays, plus different force allocation requirements.

Assuming that potential enemies are privy to that new reality, professing Yigal Allon's policy of "preemption by surprise" is not a valid deterrence anymore, hence other parameters are required if a peace of no war is to be maintained. **What are they if US-UN guaranties or troops have proven, almost everywhere, to be of a temporary nature unless the two parties are willing to keep the status quo?**

Until the valid substitute to Allon's policy is defined and "advertised" as in 1967, no withdrawal can be attempted.

- a. There seems to exist no substitute for the territories that are in Israeli hands and provide an acceptable strategic replacement for the policy of "preempting by surprise" now rendered obsolete.
- b. In order to face the Pan-Arab/Islamic threat, which is a matter of life and death, Israel is legally and morally entitled to impose certain limitations on a minor section (0.2%?) of the Arab nation's communities, while providing the individuals of these communities with better

material, personal freedom and security conditions than those they enjoy under any Arab rule. Note that experience proves that peace saves Arab more than Jewish lives and property. Pity that tyrants do not attach much importance to them.

The Arab communities concerned are prisoners not of Israel, but of the hatred professed by Islam and the Arab states against it.

The State of Israel should put an end to the 33-year long deliberations and act: Since any peace with pan-Arabia/the Arab world and associated Islamic states/formations will be a “peace of no war” whose stability is conditional upon a proper Israeli level of deterrence, matters should be stated loud and clear and the territories vital to Israel’s deterrence facing pan-Arabia should be annexed. Leaving the matters of frontiers in the present limbo, increases diplomatic, media and violent pressures over time.

The territories most concerned are the Golan Heights, the Jordan Valley, the peaks of Samaria and Judea, the western “strip” of Samaria and, of course, the required number of roads leading to them, protected by strips that keep small arms fire out of effective range and by controlling high ground.



Nuclear Threat

Background

Richard Butler, former head of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) charged with dismantling Iraq’s mass destruction weapons and weapons manufacturing facilities, reports⁴³ that he had been startled to find out, at the end of the 1991 Gulf War, that Iraq was but one year away from manufacturing its first nuclear device, to be fitted as payload to a ballistic missile or an air launched bomb.

This was the 1991 reality in spite of the delay incurred by the Israeli bombing of the Iraqi-French Osirak nuclear facility about ten years earlier.

The West was, as usual, surprised.

Two major nuclear efforts are reported by the intelligence communities to be pursued energetically, one in Iran, somewhat accessible for information and one in Iraq, practically inaccessible, both with Russian help. Islamic Pakistan has already detonated its device and drives, by now, on the nuclear highway to stay abreast with India.

Despite all US, UN, etc. major efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation, it is fair to assume that all oil-rich tyrants, especially Iran and Iraq, will possess nuclear arms within a decade, which is a very short time for anything but deliberating.

The world assumes that Israel possesses its own nuclear arsenal, held behind a veil that is constantly thinning because of the resolution improvement of commercially traded satellite imaging.

In many of his appeals for peace, Shimon Peres made his point stating, “convincingly”, that “*peace has to be concluded before the possession by Arabia/Iran of nuclear weapons.*” Barak repeated this statement. The obvious questions to be asked are:

1. Are they going to stop nuclearization once Arab-Israeli agreements are concluded?
2. If halted, can their efforts be renewed at will, under whatever pretexts or viable reasons?

Peres’ statement reminds one of the old joke:

Two brothers drive in a car, in winter, with an open window.

“Please close the window, it’s cold outside,” says one,

“And if I close it, it will be warm outside?”

Same logic.

The ME Arab/Iranian nuclear weapons have another, major objective: ME hegemony.

Careful observation of the ME nuclearization process leads to the certainty that this process has to do, rather, with the inter-Arab + Iranian quest for hegemony over the oil producing regions of the ME, with Iran developing anti-Western deterrence (4,500-6,000 km. range ballistic missiles), to prevent the repetition of Western intervention *à la* Gulf War if/when Iranian hegemony will be established.

Arab-Iranian nuclearization is **not** conditional upon Israel signing peace deals or not. Israel’s problem is that the probability is very high that any Islamic macho-assertiveness required in a quest for dominance, starts, as a result of over 50 years of Islamic incitement, with a move against Israel in order to “obtain the pan-Islamic blessing”, the populations’ cooperation and to achieve a psychological disarming of the competition.

* * *

Israel in a Nuclear Environment⁴⁴

A country like Israel, that may be wiped off the map by two or three medium yield nuclear charges is, by definition, at a disadvantage in a ME nuclear environment, given its fragility and the relative trigger happiness of nuclear weapons possessing fundamentalist despots.

The first nuclear commandment for it should, therefore be:

Stay with that conventional deterrence. Don’t, by any means, substitute nuclear deterrence for conventional. Use all non-military national & international avenues to keep the ME away from nuclearization and prevent the possession of nuclear weapons in dictators’ hands for as long as possible.

Assuming that Israel possesses concealed nuclear weapons, some important persons in the “peace now” extreme suggested that if loss of strategically important territories (given up for “peace”) emasculates Israel’s conventional deterrence, Israel should reestablish it (in their argot - its “peace keeping potential”) by taking the nukes out of the closet and substitute them openly for territories.

By all means, Israel should delay regional nuclearization as long as possible, trying to reach an equitable political accommodation while doing it.

If/when one of the rogue ME countries acquire and is ready to use nuclear potential, note should be taken of the fact that it may be delivered from a proxy third country. Be it a device concealed in a terrorist’s suitcase, be it a missile that may be relocated like the pre or post Gulf War Iraqi missiles’ transfer to Sudan or Libya, or be it “simply” a pan-Arab/Iranian coalition invading mortally wounded Israel, exploiting the loss of its deterrence to share the spoils of victory, the possession of nuclear arms by one of the Arab countries creates a closed ranks/pack pan-Arab coalition against Israel.

Since this scenario is most probable, a nuclear Israeli deterrence has openly and formally to treat pan-Arabia (the Arab nations), as one, homogeneous, united, sovereign entity, which thereby becomes the target for nuclear retaliation second strike. This is why the 50:1 warheads ratio in Israel’s favor was mentioned above. This attitude will help create an intra Arab reluctance to use nuclear weapons and apply some breaks on reckless, trigger happy despots.

Nuclear Deterrence

The particular inherent Israeli extreme inferiority in a nuclear situation demands **multi layered**, highly efficient **offensive and defensive capabilities** in order to restore, following the nuclearization of the ME, the **required level of nuclear deterrence that will prevent the outbreak of war the way the US-USSR “MAD” (Mutual Assured Destruction) did, until they came(?) to their senses.**

It should be thoroughly understood that Israeli nuclear deterrence cannot be allowed to fail, for failure in the Israeli nuclear case, unlike failure in conventional or other forms of warfare, means a high certainty of national and personal disaster.

Offensive deterrence is provided by a “second-strike capability”, which means the possession of a capability recognized by the potential enemy to be able to inflict upon him a retaliating nuclear punishment (after he launched his first strike) of a magnitude that he believes to be unacceptable for him – in which case he will refrain from launching the first strike. Second-strike capability may be the most efficient deterrent; however, Israeli conditions are hardly proper for relying only on it.

As a target, Israel is minuscule, as said, requiring a very limited number of hits for a nuclear enemy to achieve his objective.

Its area is arid and small, ideal for low cost satellite reconnaissance. It is, in fact, “*tabula rasa*”. Until about a decade ago, a US-USSR agreement denied commercial satellite use for photos below 20 meters resolution (i.e. that two white lines would be perceived as two distinct lines only if separated by 20 m. or more). This resolution is insufficient for military use. Of late, US personnel, the Russians, French, Israelis and others sell satellites or satellite imagery of 0.3 m. resolution, day and night, capable of top layer penetration, making use of optical, infra-red and radar imaging of different wavelengths for different results.

Hardened as it may be, a second strike capability sited on a fixed, visible position, i.e. vulnerable even if hardened, achieves a much lower deterrence level, hence less peace keeping capability per warhead than an equivalent force whose location is concealed.

The classical means of concealing a second strike capability is, obviously, submarine carried missiles. There are conventional submarines capable of carrying and launching cruise (not ballistic) missiles.

This is already a great leap forward in securing an efficient second strike posture in a case like Israel’s, but they do have serious limitations. Their limited endurance, that is their cruise time when not refueled and supplied would restrain them to patrol only in the Mediterranean whose area is large yet limited and most of whose littorals are in Arab or sympathetic Arab oil customers’ hands.

Cruise missiles, especially of the existing, ground hugging, long range, subsonic types, although smaller than aircraft, may be intercepted even if stealthy (no radar signature), because of visual or IR (infra-red) signatures.

Although it sounds far fetched and it requires a different budgetary concept⁴⁵, the ultimate, second strike capability, secure, hence decisive for peace keeping deterrence in the foreseeable future, is a squadron of about five nuclear submarines equipped with ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. Two in readiness, patrolling in the Indian Ocean, two in transit (around the Cape) and training and one in maintenance. When testifying before the Joint (Senate and House) Economic Committee of the US Congress, in October 1997 (see endnote 33), this matter was raised by the hosts during the question and answer period. No one found this writer’s reference to the above to be illogical, unattainable, too expensive or having a better, less expensive alternative to serve the ME peace keeping deterrence in a nuclear environment.

Defensive Deterrence

Conditions may develop, especially in the volatile, emotions laden Middle East, where a reckless enemy may chose to launch his missiles regardless of Israel's second-strike wrath.

Conditions may also be emerging where political forces may inhibit an Israel second strike or other factors may reduce Israel's second-strike efficiency. Unlike large, decentralized countries, Israel **must** be in the position to meet a first strike head on, to provide a viable deterrence.

The missile defense system has been the subject of hot debate since the days of Reagan's "Star Wars Project" – Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

Against that (then) fantastic technological undertaking were those who claimed that technology is still not developed far enough, that the costs will be prohibitive, that this will generate a renewed arms race and, finally, those who claimed that Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) is "the deterrence" formula that should not be upset.

The collapse of the Soviet Union reduced substantially the high yield, long-range Soviet-US Bi-Polar ballistic missiles threat.

But that same collapse removed also the Soviet control over its rogue client states that prevented local or regional conflicts generated by them from reaching proportions that might affect great power security.

As a result, a low yield, short and medium range ballistic missiles threat, with a higher probability of launch, omni-directional by definition with improved and accessible technology lending a helping hand has emerged as a prime threat.

This new, hardly confinable threat is considered by many to be much more imminent, given the trigger happiness of the medieval type despots who rule many of the threatening countries.

Aviation Week & Space Technology of February 24, and of March 3, 1997 dedicates 22 and 23 pages respectively to ballistic missile defense, concluding that:

Many analysts and lawmakers on both sides of the US missile defense debate concur that the world is a more dangerous and unpredictable place than it was during the cold war. But they disagree on how effective missile defenses would be in thwarting threats.

How should minuscule, ME Israel interpret the rogue states' ballistic missiles threat, given that they are mostly Moslem and ME, if the US believes it to be more dangerous and unpredictable than the old USSR threat?

The US BMD (Ballistic Missile Defense) establishment works with ever increasing vigor.

Technology has improved materially since Reagan. Also, the technological challenge has been substantially reduced with the decrease in the peak altitudes of the parabolic trajectory and the related re-entry speed, (somehow increased with the shorter range offering a shorter warning time).

BMD is vital for Israel and suitable technology is there.

There are, basically, three zones of missile interception:

1. Boost Phase Intercept (BPI) – that is the use of close loitering, stealth Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), capable of launching anti-missile missiles that home on the huge volume of infrared energy generated for a short few minutes by the missile's rocket engines firing at full thrust at launch. BPI would be ideal, creating reticence, fear of damage at the launch site.
2. Ballistic trajectory interception by longer range antiballistic missiles that have lesser problems of loiter survivability (UAV) in the proximity of launch pads, have a longer compute and

intercept time, yet need a different order of magnitude of sensing, computing and rocket power. (US Navy Aegis anti-missile defense).

3. Re-entry warhead interception, endospheric or exospheric, like the Israeli Arrow System.

Each system has its pros and cons.

Given the imminence of ballistic missile threats (be they equipped with “only” conventional, chemical or biological warheads), Israel chose first the Warhead Reentry interception, whose technology was at hand.

This writer believes that Israel’s technological capabilities allow it to attempt BPI, which is, tactically, the preferred system.

Israel should try to come to terms with the US on the use of the Aegis Ballistic Trajectory (free flight) Intercept system.

To alleviate the economic burden, consortiums may be established with interested parties like India, Turkey, or other threatened countries which, by now, should include Europe.

Israel’s future depends upon the maintaining of a valid deterrence posture facing a pan-Arabia/Islam armed with whatever armament it may acquire.

A multi-tier nuclear deterrence is vital.

Conclusions

The Arab-Iranian (Islamic fundamentalist) nuclear threat, delayed one way or another, is bound to take shape within a decade, regardless of any signature by Israel on any peace or other documents.

Israel should tend to the high probability that a nuclear strike against it, detonating two or three medium yield charges over the metropolitan Tel Aviv (Hadera-Gedera) area, will result in the disemboweling of the country, that will certainly be followed by a pan-Arab (conventional) invasion of the two remaining, northern and southern severed stumps. Therefore:

Any Arab/Islamic nuclear threat has to be regarded as a pan-Arab joint threat requiring a nuclear response to or deterrence of Arabia as a whole, whose targets are about 50 times more numerous than the one Israeli target. A 50:1 nuclear warheads ratio in Israel’s favor are required. A byproduct of relating openly to pan-Arabia + Iran as one nuclear entity, will be the intra-Arab nuclear inhibition that may be professed by non-nuclear Arab states which, were they not to be threatened, would have encouraged the nuclear strike.

Israel’s minuscule size puts it at a bad disadvantage in a nuclear ME, hence:

1. Israel should do its best to mobilize international efforts to deny or delay ME nuclearization.
2. Israel should **not** be tempted to substitute nuclear (assuming it’s there) deterrence for that provided by territories occupied during the Six Day War, as suggested by certain political pro-Oslo circles. Doing this will encourage ME nuclearization.

Israel’s present nuclear policy should be continued.

3. Given the size of Israel and its features, present resolution (0.3-1.0 m) of optical, infrared and radar satellite intelligence renders a land-based second-strike deterrence capability doubtful.

First step – diesel submarines with cruise missiles, sailing the Mediterranean as a mobile second-strike base.

Optimum step (for foreseeable future) – 5 nuclear powered submarines carrying nuclear tipped ballistic missiles, sailing the Indian Ocean. Two on station, one in transit (around Cape), one in training and one in maintenance. (To achieve this, some accommodation with the US and/or India may be required and an assumption made that the Israeli defense budget stays put percentage-wise, while GNP per capita reaches \$25,000-30,000 per year.)

4. Given the vulnerability of Israel and its desire for survival (of a first strike), a multi-layered anti ballistic missile defense is imperative⁵⁶. While, technology-wise, the Arrow reentry intercept system is available, Boost Phase Intercept technology is within reach and should be actively pursued. An agreement should be attempted for mutual use of the US Navy's Aegis ballistic trajectory long-range interception.
5. With nuclear threat "knocking at the door", urgent consideration should be given to Israel's long term pan-Arab deterrence structure and long term measures initiated.

* * *

Territorial Nuclear Deterrence Prerequisites⁴⁶ – Enhancing Israel's Survivability

Preventing Israel's demise by nuclear attack requires a high credibility deterrence which is synonymous with a perfect anti-nuclear defense and a second strike capability. Yet, there is no hundred percent solution to anti-nuclear deterrence. Other active measures are to be taken in addition to the offensive and defensive deterrence systems described above.

Basically, it looks as if two of these measures have to become part and parcel of the national planning. The first, is to decentralize, that is to take the required steps to see to it that northern and southern Israel become autonomous, self supporting in as many fields as possible, certainly in defense, including logistics and economy.

The second, is to connect northern and southern Israel through backup control, highways, power, communications, water, etc. that are bypassing the Tel Aviv metropolitan area and the fringes of the area affected by blast or radiation.

An alternative north-south link, non-affected by metropolitan Tel Aviv destruction and a forceful dispersal policy may reduce the country's nuclear vulnerability; hence discouraging a "trigger happy" first strike. Giving stricken Tel Aviv a wide berth is possible only through the Jordan Valley, that will have to be equipped with fully developed roads, communications, rail, power and water systems, i.e., "outfitted" well in advance, not treated as an afterthought.

The time to start is right now.

That calls for permanent Israeli sovereignty over the Jordan Valley and advance construction of the said infrastructure.

NOTE: The reader of whatever political creed is kindly requested to consider this prerequisite as a definitely apolitical one.

Were any one to favor the surrendering of the Jordan Valley to a Palestinian state which will, by definition, side with an emerging Arab/Islamic nuclear threat, could he offer an alternative for keeping north and south Israel bound together as a coherent unit?



About Individual States/Entities/Sectors

"Ever since the fall of the Second Temple, prophecy has been in the realm of the feeble-minded," says an old, wise Jewish proverb.

Jesus claimed that children and feeble-minded are about to speak God's own truth.

"There is no prophet in his town," another proverb.

As an old man living in "his town", whose pains at what he experiences bear witness that he may not be blessed by a feeble mind, the writer has attempted to draw a rough sketch of the past and present, so as to enable the reader and himself to identify a number of extrapolations that stand higher probabilities of implementation than others; by no means prophecy and not promises.

Palestinian Entity (State/Autonomy/Other)

Present

The Arabs of Judea, Samaria and Gaza together with the Arabs of Israel and those of Jordan were named, after World War I, "Palestinian Arabs", the way the Jews of the new entity of Palestine were "Palestinian Jews", which did not entitle them to declare that they belong to a brand new ethnic entity, separated from the Jewish people at large.

Palestinian Arabs and their various clans and tribes are no less part and parcel of the ethnic, cultural, historic heritage of the people known as Arabs. Therefore, when one refers to the "homeless Palestinian people whose rights are to be respected," what he means, off record, is 1.2 percent of the Arab people, or some 20 percent of the Palestinian-Arab community which, like the German community, suffer the consequences of the war Arabia initiated and lost, but in Silesia, Pomerania, Sudentland. East Prussia, etc.

The Palestinian Arabs of West-Palestine (Cis-Jordan), rejected the UN partition plan of November 29, 1947, turning, in the morrow, 50 years of past violent opposition into an all out war with the Jews of Palestine and Zionism.

About to lose that war, a coalition of Pan-Arabia (Arab Nation) invaded Israel... losing the war nevertheless, and signing an Armistice Agreement, later infringed upon, in Rhodes, in 1949. Responsibility, as international law and customs go, is cast upon the party that opened war, be it after it has lost.

Israel should bear no responsibility for changes, be they borders, demographic, material and others caused by the hundred year war waged by the Arab nation (pan-Arabia) against Israel, as consistently declared and advertised by the Arab states or leaders themselves.

Since the creation of the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) in 1964, a political rift became evident between the non-Israeli Arabs of Western Palestine and those of the Kingdom of Jordan which claimed itself to be "Palestine" following the annexation of Judea and Samaria in 1951.

President Reagan's recognition of the PLO (during the twilight of his administration) as the representative of (West) Palestinians and further related **political acts, brought about the artificial division of the East and West Palestinian Arab segments of the Arab nation, into "Palestinians" and "Jordanians"**.

This is as true, historically, socially, culturally, ethnically and in terms of destiny as was the separation of East and West Germans in two "nations" apart. Plainly speaking, this is a political separation, bound to disappear with time.

The Oslo, etc. agreement(s) deal(s) with the establishment of a separate (West) Palestinian entity within Judea, Samaria and Gaza which are, in fact and legally, unaffected territories, not annexed by either Israel or Jordan.

The Arabs of Palestine who live in Israel, Judea, Samaria and Gaza and in Jordan are, as a society, probably the most advanced Arabs in terms of modern ways, and, undoubtedly, in terms of violent political awareness, which brought them to clash with British, Israeli, Jordanian and even Egyptian authorities. It may be, that this had an influence on the Arab states' refusal to accept them as citizens.

While the Madrid Peace Conference of 1991 searched for a solution within the framework of a general settlement with the Arab nation/pan-Arabia, the Oslo DOP of 1993 referred to the Israeli – “Palestinian” (i.e. Judean, Samaritan and Gazan Arabs) settlement as if it were a “stand alone” case, not interacting with the general Israeli - Arab relations, i.e. as if a peace of harmony in a “New Middle East” were about to emerge against all odds and logic.

This utopian, romantic attitude was only that of the various Israeli delegations. Arafat and his peers were explicit, candid, open and absolutely resolute in their aims. The Israelis, with no clear objective in mind, subjected to massive US, UN, international and home generated pressures, were overanxious, hesitant, constantly giving in, in the hope that Arafat would, finally, oblige and revert to the attitude of King Feisal I of Iraq.⁴⁷

What went down on paper in Oslo, repeated in Washington, Hebron, Wye, etc. was a new version of “constructive ambiguity” or the “Balfour Declaration”, where all major issues were omitted (postponed) and each party was left with its own interpretation: Israeli missions dreamed of a peace of harmony (how?) whose expression in the field was industrial parks at the seams, common roads or Israeli roads with Palestinian shoulders, etc., a typical accommodation for a case of harmony – all that in spite of Palestinian violence, reneging on matters that have been concluded and open professing, in blatant acts of war-propaganda, the demise of Israel.

The absurdity of Israel's naive stand at Oslo, repeated *vis-à-vis* Syria (see further), became the “politically correct” attitude adopted by **peace loving Jews, not unlike the naive position of the Western liberal peace loving intelligentsia in support of Stalin's Gulag communism or, at times, Nazi Germany.** Even when, for want of a definition of peace and feeling the cold wind of reality, the **Israeli Oslo-fans professed that “we need a strong military (Zahal) to safeguard the peace,” i.e. deterrence, i.e. peace of no war, they continued to pour hundreds of millions of dollars in harmony enhancing infrastructure.**

“*My mind is made up, don't confuse me with facts.*” Oslo was a meeting between academic, Rousseau inspired visionaries and the archetype of extreme cynicism. It was a pathetic failure of logic and realistic outlook characteristic of Western intelligentsia of the 1930s through the 1940s. Like the visions of the 1930s and 1940s, Oslo will fade out with the hopes it created.

Trying to “sell” the necessity of a peace definition since Madrid, 1991, this writer, wrote 4 years ago, a position paper that was published by ACPR in 1998.⁴⁸

The paper's main ideas are:

- Oslo, etc., is water under the bridge. National and international events and idiosyncrasies prevent backtracking, hence its course should be left to run until...it fades away.
- The probability of successful conclusion of the chain of Oslo accords is extremely low, regardless of the positions adopted by various Israeli governments.
- Autonomy for the Palestinian entity is not a solution. It cannot apply in this particular case. Palestinians do not recognize Israel as a source of authority entitled to delegate autonomy powers to them, and Israel does not want to assume responsibility for the powers non-delegated, like citizenship. Hence, autonomy is not practical.
- If, in spite of the extremely low probability of Oslo's successful conclusion, a Palestinian independent state does emerge (although limited in its freedom because of Israeli and Jordanian

defense and economic considerations), its political, territorial, economic and other constraints will result in a very low probability of its becoming the tool it was meant to be for the emancipation of the Arabs of Judea, Samaria and Gaza.

As probabilities go, that means that there exists a high probability of the Israeli-Palestinian relationship reverting, with time, “back to square one”, i.e. to the pre-Oslo impasse. The process of Oslo “fizzling out”, which may take years, will have its periods of violence whose intensity will depend upon the Israeli deterrence level (in this kind of war).

What Then?

Three interested parties, enriched by the unfortunate Oslo experience, may sit patiently down and reconsider the case *ab initio*, looking for new ways.

The parties are Israel, Jordan and the (West) Palestinian leadership where, hopefully, business and other economic factors will have more of a say, substituting realism for rhetoric-fired emotions.

Palestinians will realize that Arafat’s solution of an independent (West) Palestine, free and unlimited by any constraints, that stretches (meanwhile) from the Israeli Green Line to the Jordan, has a Palestinian corridor between Gaza and the West Bank,⁴⁹ its capital is East Jerusalem including the Holy Places and is, of course, ready to receive all Arab refugees of the 1948 and 1967 wars - is not a feasible proposition. However, they will continue to strive for emancipation. They may eventually realize that a more compact solution, acceptable to Israel, will limit their national, intellectual, economic, etc. “elbowroom” (*Lebensraum*) to the point of denying emancipation.

Israel may be wiser⁵⁰ after the clash of cultures, having experienced Arafat’s non-compliance with basic articles of the Oslo, etc., faced with perpetual incitement, illegal weapons acquisition and periodic violent eruptions leading to the present low intensity war, a total disregard of the clause of the “end of violent confrontation” agreed and signed seven years before at Oslo and over and over since.

It may have to reconsider the definition of peace that can be achieved in the ME and conclude that it has to lower its sights from a peace of virtual harmony (“backed by a strong military”) to a plain peace of no war where compromises on deterrence posture are considered “war promoting” and not “peace enhancing”.

The result will certainly be a firmer hold on to (West) Palestinian positions that are vital to deter a low intensity Palestinian-Israeli conflict **and** on to the positions, like the Jordan Valley, the Samarian mountain peaks, etc., as well as the roads leading to them (that include wide lateral clearance, and controlling high-ground), to maintain a reinforced deterrence of a pan-Arab/Moslem attempt to use the new entity as a springboard against Israel. **This is not “military talk”. It is, rather, about non-belligerence and stability that is safeguarded by deterrence.**

These measures render the Oslo, etc. solution impractical, the Palestinian Entity’s area becoming more fragmented and subjected to tighter control as a result of its own handling of the “non-violence” clauses of the agreements. But Israel has to look for cooperation with, and emancipation of, the (West) Palestinian Arabs. This is destiny.

Jordan relinquished control of Judea and Samaria voluntarily in 1988, when it assessed that either the *intifada* would spill over into Jordan or Jordan should be politically cut off from it.

Jordan’s strategic and economic interests demand an Israeli presence on the Jordan River and cooperation with its strong economy.

Israel’s interests coincide with Jordan’s.

Three alternative paths may be trodden upon after an established, bitter, violent, strong (West) Palestinian entity composed, as said, of a number of “islands” scattered at distance from one another

will emerge and fail to deliver: (The entity's "islands'" interconnection, skies, water, power, signals communications, economy and armed forces will be controlled by a watchful Israel, wary of the entity's irrident posture. In spite of all above limitations, the PA will develop to become a challenge to the free, much larger and politically-established, yet fragile Jordan, which is unhindered by any limitations, maintains working relations with Israel and the Arab nation/Islam, and is inhabited mostly by Palestinian Arabs under the Hashemite Crown.)

- i. If Jordan outpaces the (West) Palestinian Entity in GNP per capita, stability, economic growth, well-being, military might and in a national solidarity that results from the confidence created, there may not be a (West) Palestinian attempt for a "*Drang Nach Osten*" type of military challenge for Palestinian Unity, i.e. hegemony.
- ii. If Jordan lags behind Arafat's creation, there would be overwhelming odds that a quest for hegemony would be attempted, especially if Israel renders control over the Jordan Valley to Arafat.
- iii. If the (West) Palestinian entity does not materialize, if it limps or dismembers into intra-fighting fiefdoms, Jordan's intervention, or rather, involvement with Israel to find a solution would become imperative.

As mentioned, the writer believes that chances are that (i) or (iii) would be the case. However, since (ii) may result in a Palestinian-Iraqi (or Syrian, or Saudi, or all three) alliance bound to attempt the demise of Israel, it is in Israel's interest that (i) or (iii) materialize.

To conclude the point: It is, of course, in Jordan's interest to upgrade its well-being and coherence, as well as its economic and military posture as fast as possible, be it for its own national sake or as a provision to counter a usurpation attempt by a (West) Palestinian entity, *à la* Black September 1970.

It is also in Israel's interest to provide help to Jordan's upgrading in a way that does not impinge upon the Kingdom's economic independence and prevents uneasiness and suspicion of Israeli economic colonialism, which it is, of course, not in fact.

A following step would be to consider, conditional upon the Jordanian Kingdom's wholehearted cooperation, a joint Israel-Jordanian campaign to "sell" the (West) Palestinian population and its probably new emerging leadership, the idea of transforming the urban or densely populated areas of Judea, Samaria **and** Gaza into Jordanian enclaves that enjoy freedom and Israeli cooperation, within the Israeli sovereign area, a situation which provides them with ample, established hinterland and contributes materially to Jordan's defense and rule. Doing this may end in an Israeli-Jordanian confederation (not federation). If this sounds far fetched, it is; but it is more realistic than a microstate, irredentist and frustrated, confined within Israel's entrails. Let's revert the new "Arafat is Palestine" set of notions which is now "politically correct" to its old, accepted "politically correctness" advocated by King Abdullah I and King Hussein, that is "Jordan is Palestine," a truism which was one of the first *intifada*'s victims. No one challenged the "Jordan is Palestine" notion before, not even Arafat who tried, unsuccessfully, to usurp the Amman throne more than once.

Repeat; the creation of the "(West) Palestinian nation", like that of "East German Nation", is a political, ephemeral compromise arising from Israeli indecision after the Six Day War, Camp David I and Oslo. Built upon political expediency, it will fail when reality prevails.

Israeli Arabs

The outbreak, out of the blue, of the present low intensity war activities initiated by the Palestinian Authority against Israel, beginning October 2000, brought to light what was a well kept yet well

known open secret, namely that since Oslo, the Arab (Palestinian) citizens of Israel have adopted a new notion of purpose, in perfect tune with Arafat's Palestinian Authority.

The recent display of hatred, extreme violence, and the fierce anti-Israeli posture adopted by the Israeli-Arab Members of Knesset dispel the dreams of peaceful assimilation and revert public order keeping back 33 years to the pre-1967 means.

The Arab Israelis are against the **existence** of a **Jewish** state in Palestine. Their objective is to transform Israel into a bi-national Arab-Jewish state aligned with the Arab ME, which means that the Jews should accept a Diaspora-like position of an autonomous recognized minority in their own country. This, of course, they will not do.

Like so many other matters, this fact is kept under wraps for Israeli internal political partisan interests.

To substantiate this observation, the writer attaches a short article that was published (heavily edited) by *The Jerusalem Post* on November 16, 1994, exactly six years ago.

Although the symposium mentioned in the article lasted two days at the Dayan Center of the University of Tel Aviv and was covered by TV and printed media during all its proceedings, some parties, interested not to eclipse the Oslo euphoria which was then at its height, saw to it that **nothing saw light in the Hebrew media** and only the attached article was published in English in *The Jerusalem Post* (November 16, 1994):

“The Dream of Israeli Arabs”

“Equality now!” was the message that resonated from Arabs attending a symposium held at Tel Aviv University last month.

The objective for the gathering, entitled “Arab Politics in Israel at a Crossroads”, was an overview of Israeli Arabs' political stand in the light of developments over the last year, especially the emergence of the autonomy.

About a dozen Arab speakers came to the Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, as did around 10 Jewish academics.

All the Arab speakers without exception demanded “equality now” clearly and powerfully. This was so whether they used the beautiful, poetic Hebrew of writer and philosopher Dr. Anton Shammas or the rough, revolutionary staccato of Dr. Azmi Bishara from Bir Zeit; whether they were fundamentalist leaders or members of Zionist parties.

“Equality now”, they said, has to follow close on the footsteps of “peace now”, as a consequence of the latter's victory.

“Equality now”, they declared loud and clear, means Israel must renounce Zionism and Jewish particularism and become the binational state it should be.

Given the fact that the Jews were the aggressors who chased the Arabs away from their lands, the speakers said, the Jews must now consider the Arabs' generous offer (to let them stay), or take responsibility for the inevitable outcome.

Following the establishment of the PLO State beyond the Green Line, the Israeli Arabs will remain the only Arabs under the Israeli boot, the speakers noted, adding this is both undemocratic and unacceptable.

Most of the Jewish speakers engaged in pseudo-intellectual exercises designed to try and soften the Arab message, apparently without the Arabs' permission.

One of these speakers, Alouph Hareven, tried to be helpful. He suggested that Israel consider a new flag and a new anthem acceptable to all, while the blue-and-white Star of David flag and the Hatikva remain the Jewish sector's symbols. An Arab participant added a remark about the name of the state.

Some people in the audience, including former President Yitzhak Navon, protested. He said he advised Israeli Arabs not to follow such a dangerous path.

Dr. Raphael Israeli, who disagreed with the tone of the proceedings, was practically silenced by the moderator.

The media, as a whole, didn't consider the event worth mentioning, despite the fact that almost all the Arab "stars" were there, including Dr. Ahmed Tibi, Yasser Arafat's adviser.

When the symposium did receive media notice, like on Israel TV's Channel 1 Arabic program on November 4, the report was so heavily edited that even this writer's (repeated) suggestion that legislation regarding Israel's Jewishness and defense should require a 75 percent majority was presented as a protest against extremists on both sides.

Sheer schmaltz. George Orwell could have learned a lesson or two.

Leaving the premises at the end of the symposium, one of the most prominent Labor party generals, stunned by the proceedings, remarked: "This demand for 'equality now' could pose one of the greatest dangers to our existence."

"And it is emerging on this side of the Green Line."

There is, of course, a logic to the Arab attitude. A large number of (West) Palestinians have suffered forced relocation as a consequence of the war they imposed upon the Jews and lost. Albeit within territories occupied by the Arab nation that speaks the same language and shares culture, customs and religion, forced relocation is bitter suffering and, given the adverse attitude of the host populations (contrary to Arab legends about hospitality), offence and hurt pride. All that brought more frustration and hate followed by terror that brought tighter Israeli measures, a vicious circle.

No Arab could or should be persuaded to embrace Zionism. However, where leadership is concerned, facing facts from a regional perspective is a must if the vicious circle is to be broken. Compared with the commotion created by the allied severance of the Middle East from Turkish rule and its partition to placate Arab tribes and chieftains as well as a recognized need for Jewish self rule, the relocation of about 0.3 percent of the Arab nation who picked up arms to resist the verdict has parallels not unknown in history.

A large number of Jews, numbering probably more than Arab refugees, had to flee Arab countries, although they were not involved in the Arab-Jewish Palestinian war.

Much larger populations were relocated by the victors of World War I and World War II. Germans, Russians, Poles, Finns, Hungarians, French, Romanians, Bosnians, Albanians, Greeks, Turks, Croats, to count only some. They assimilated in their new surroundings and the Earth continued spinning. Only Arab refugees were not assimilated in Arab countries.

Israel itself is a country built by refugees that fled a hundred countries. There must be a reason why the Arab Israelis rekindle the fire after more than half a century. The guilt ridden, clumsy, apologetic way Israel handles the issue, combined with political partisan courtship by Zionist parties, seem to be the main reason. Limbo and false expectations created anxiety and insecurity. Then Oslo let accumulated steam off. The October Israeli Arab mutiny revealed a bare truth: Israel questions Zionism. The longer it takes to make its mind up, the wider the rift between Jews and Arabs will become. If the Zionist purpose of the ingathering of the exiles in a Jewish democratic state is reinvigorated, Israel's leaders, Jews and Arabs, will have to draw the conclusion, which is personal

equality, fairness, equal opportunities and freedom, but certain limitations imposed on Arabs as a community (the way they profit by not serving in the armed forces). No guilt complex for expressing the truth. If Jews cannot bear being masters in their **only** home, rebuilding Israel over a century with that expense of blood and effort may have been a waste. Let them, in that case, leave the steering to the Arabs, who will be only too glad to oblige. Then the Jews, relieved of responsibility, may resume their “urban-Bedouin” nomadic custom of 2000 years and leave, again, the stage of history. The sooner an explicit constitution is written and its articles executed, the better. There can be no **ambiguity where the Jewishness of the only Jewish state is concerned.**

Conclusions

Israel should revert to the principles established in its “Declaration of Independence” regarding the state being “Jewish and democratic”.

“Democratic” applies equally to all Israel’s citizens and this should be assiduously respected.

“Jewish” does not and this, also, should be respected.

That means that matters relating to the state’s “Jewish” existence, i.e. defense-deterrence, Jewish immigration, Jewish settlements, etc. have to be dealt with, avoiding personal injustice, outside the jurisdiction of the Arab minority which, by ethnicity, culture and political affinity, sides with Israel’s enemies. This survival necessity may fade out with gradual ME democratization and Israel’s true acceptance by the Arab world.

There are Israelis who claim that the latest Israeli-Arab upheavals are but the deed of a small minority, hence the Arab community, as such, cannot be blamed. True, in principle, but as all Israel have it on the TV, the main instigators of mutinous behavior and unconditional supporters of the, well, **Arafat led enemies of Israel are the Arab members of Knesset, elected by the Arab community as such.** Israel, besieged for over 50 years cannot, for the sake of its overriding right of survival, tolerate the repetition of the “*Sudetendeutsche*” Czech parliamentary experience and the course of history it created.

A sobering position taken by the Israeli Arab Community regarding its predicament of conflicting dual loyalty:

A number of between one and two thousand Arab families of Judea, Samaria and Gaza whose heads cast their lot with Israel, for ideological, private or pecuniary reasons, were issued Israeli Citizenship and invited to relocate, at government expense, “this side” of the Green Line.

Attempting, for cultural, religious or other reasons to settle in Israeli Arab townships or villages, they were rejected, chased out, boycotted or, at times, bodily harmed, accused of being traitors to the Arab cause, quislings, etc.

Traitors because they served the country of the Israeli Arab’s citizenship? A clear position of the population at large, that justifies a corresponding clear disposition.

There are many ways of catering for this situation.

One may be to bestow citizenship upon an individual (of whatever creed) conditional upon taking the oath of allegiance to the state of Israel, an oath whose betrayal would be a crime.

Another way may be the extrapolation of the logic of outlawing Kahane (a Jewish Ultra-Orthodox, fiercely theocratic group) to cover support of enemy activities or positions taken that are bound to harm the State of Israel.

To remember: The Declaration of Independence posits Israel as a Jewish and Democratic country. Anti-Jewish, like anti-democratic, stands are unwelcome.

This demands, of course, that the state of Israel be endowed with a “law of laws”, a solid, stable constitution that prevents legislative manipulations to enlist (occasionally) Arab votes’ support for Jewish competing partisan initiatives.



Egypt

Egypt is the most populated and mightiest Arab country. It signed a Peace Treaty with Israel some 20 years ago. A typical “peace of no war” or, some say, a cold war. The benefits of peace have been enormous for Egypt. Israel surrendered Sinai with that entire infrastructure, including oil wealth that it developed. The Suez Canal could be reopened, generating badly needed cash. With Israel beyond the desert, certainly not threatening (it never has), the Egyptian government could focus on the country’s gigantic problems of high rate of reproduction, poverty, hunger, ill health, environment (the damaging impact of the Aswan Dam), political unrest, inter-religious strife (the Christian Coptic minority) and, of late, the danger of Islamic fundamentalism.

After the Soviet Empire, Egypt’s super-power ally, collapsed, peace with Israel let Egypt land comfortably in the US camp, enjoying a bounty of diplomatic, material and military support.

Egypt’s international repute was enhanced. It reached even the status of mediator between Israel and the Palestinians.

Egypt, at peace, should have done much to improve its lot. Its population is over ten times that of Israel, yet its GNP is about two thirds that of Israel.

But Egypt has different priorities.

It maintains a strident anti-Israeli hate campaign during all these peace years, the result being that human relations between the two countries are strangled. No public or private organizations or personalities dare to maintain friendly, peace-enhancing relations with their Israeli peers. Hostility and hatred are promoted by government-dominated media.⁵¹

Demonization is common and thereby Israel is feared. People who dare establish ties, unless with government blessing, are interrogated. Why?

It maintains an aggressively anti-Israeli posture in the international arena.

It has built by far the largest US-equipped, armed forces to which Iraqi/North Korean ballistic missiles and home made chemical and biological weapons (defying its defense agreements with the US) have been added. Shawn Pine⁵² claims that Egypt’s true, covert defense budget is about 14 billion US Dollars against the overt budget of 2.7 billion. Over five times. Why?

Egypt’s neighbors are Libya, Sudan and Israel. Who threatens Egypt or, rather, whom does Egypt attempt to intimidate? Answer: Egypt fulfils the role of regional major power and bids for Arab hegemony. Translation: Egypt is a threat “in being”.

The most probable course of events will be the maintaining by Egypt of its option of joining a pan-Arab coalition to do away with Israel. It maintains its claims for the Southern Negev⁵³ as a land bridge that should join African with Asian Arabia under Egyptian domination.⁵⁴

This was the Nasser formal claim on the eve of the Six Day War and has remained, dormant or half awake, ever since.

Whether Egypt will maintain its strained peace or opt for war with Israel depends upon:

1. Egypt's shift toward democracy or, rather, to Islamic fundamentalism.
2. Egypt's dictatorship giving in to or diverting popular dissent toward a confrontation with Israel.
3. The emergence of a strong Iraq or Iraqi-Syrian alliance that overthrows the Hashemite Kingdom in Jordan and joins the (West) Palestinian state in its attempt to destroy Israel, in which case Egypt will make sure to share the glory and control the above mentioned territorial continuity between African and Asian Arabia.
4. A major Israel - third Arab country conflict with US, UN and worldwide political support for the Arab cause.
5. A nuclear strike at Israel by a third party.

The probability of the realization of one of these or other conflict prone scenarios is a function of the Israeli-pan-Arab and, **not and/or**, Israeli-Egyptian deterrence.

The probability of Egyptian armed intervention in the present Israeli-Palestinian Authority low intensity conflict seems to be low (although dictators are unpredictable). If a (West) Palestinian state emerges controlling the Jordan Valley or if a peace agreement is reached with Syria, resulting in the transfer of the Golan Height to it, the Egyptian threat will substantially increase, requiring an increase of Israeli-Egyptian deterrence level.

Conclusions

The point is that, like in any typical "peace of no war" situation, Israel cannot dismiss an Egyptian threat just because it has a signed peace treaty.

Again, it seems that for want of a clear definition of peace, some quarters in Israel consider the possibility of an Egyptian military act against Israel to be nonexistent. This is not so.

Although Egypt is not yet in position to join a major war against Israel at present, except if conditions are created that force it to do it, it seems that the Egyptian build up aims at reaffirming its Arab hegemony which, as previously mentioned, may include:

1. The renewed Egyptian quest for the (Nasser requested) land bridge joining African to Asian Arabia at Israel's expense (the Negev).
2. Remilitarization of the Sinai, compelling the manning for the duration of the Egyptian frontier with Israeli standing armed forces.
3. Steps to contain Israel and reduce its ME standing - hence deterrence - it being looked upon by Egypt as contesting its pan-Arab hegemony.

Israeli policy making and military planning should, by no means, dismiss the Egyptian potential threat, which seems to be increasing during the last decade or so. The higher the Iraqi or Iranian efforts for pan-Arab hegemony, the higher the Egyptian counter-efforts, i.e. the higher all three threat intensities to Israel.



Lebanon

At present, Lebanon is a Syrian colony for all intents and purposes, enjoying a Hong Kong type special economic and political status for the benefit of both Syria and Lebanon, and that of Iran.

Unlike Hong Kong, Lebanon is composed of a multitude of religious and/or tribal clans that are, more often than not, at war with one another.

Geographically, it is a typical Levantine beachhead on Syrian territory, set apart by Ottoman “capitulations” to Catholic France and Austria to secure the predominance of its Christian majority, which is by now a minority, many of the Christians having emigrated under Islam’s pressure like the Christians of Judea, Samaria and Gaza (see Bethlehem 2000 census).

Before the migration to Lebanon of Arafat’s forces (PLO), expelled from Jordan in September 1970 (Black September) upon his failure to usurp the Hashemite throne, Lebanon was said to be “the second Arab state to sign a peace treaty with Israel”. It was too small to muster the audacity required to be the first and it had no reason whatever not to formalize a *de facto* peace.

The Syrian occupation (1975), ostensibly carried out to control a civil war, turned Lebanon into a Syrian colony, a proxy to conduct its war against Israel at no risk to itself. The Israeli-PLO-Lebanon/Syrian war of 1982 did not change the basic situation materially. It was started without clear, defined objectives regarding anything but the forced expelling of the PLO from that country. A “small, surgical operation against the PLO”, that was, in fact, a major war against Syria, Lebanon and the PLO. With Syria being the actual sovereign, it could not be different. Israel stopped, equivocating when finding this out. Limbo equals defeat.

Were the 1982 Lebanon War to aim, openly, to expel not only the PLO but Syria as well and firmly re-establish the (friendly) constitutional Christian rule, Israel may have brought about a major strategic shift. But with a badly divided home front, which has not been keyed up for a major engagement, with US and world criticism and lack of clear objectives, it was a fiasco that ended in a stronger Syrian hold than before.

Sensing Israeli weakness, some of the Druze and Shiite Moslems, essentially pro-Israeli (or, rather, anti-PLO) groups changed allegiance. The Hizbullah, a Shiite fundamentalist group, cultivated and supported by Iran with Syrian approval, became particularly active against Israeli forces, offering Syria an anti-Israel guerrilla support from a “third party territory” and Iran a prestigious foothold in the Arab world; a festering wound for Israel.

With an outstanding strike force which could not be brought to bear against the elusive guerrillas that enjoyed local population support and government tolerance in a difficult terrain, and a spoiled home front lacking cohesion, tenacity and moral strength to bear Katyusha rocket attacks, Israel saw Lebanon as a lost cause and **withdrew without securing a guarantee against the threat of launching Katyusha rocket attacks on its northern settlements**. Its deterrence was thereby badly mutilated.

The prognosis is bleak, at least for the near future.

Israel holds its fire against Hizbullah guerrilla actions, wishing to contain present engagement to the Palestinian Authority front, which, again, proves that a strategic commitment to unilateral Israel-Palestinian Authority “peace” is an exercise in futility.

The fronts are interlaced.

Were the Hizbullah to intensify their activity and Israel to make good on its promise to upgrade its deterrence by means of massive offensive (mainly air) measures against Lebanon and Syrian forces in Lebanon, there is a probability of a major conflict resulting from Katyusha rockets retaliations against the Galilee, as far south as Haifa, then stronger Israeli attacks, and so on – a vicious circle.

The prevention of that potential major conflict eruption means, obviously, raising the level of Israeli deterrence, which calls for a clear decision in the Israeli-Palestinian sporadic fight. Stuttering and stammering may be effective in negotiations, but they do convey a message of hesitation where the

application of force is concerned, which is very badly interpreted by Arab psychology, hence deterrence is lost. It would be preponderant to guess how the Israeli security along the Lebanese frontier will develop, except one valid observation:

Conclusions

1. Israeli deterrence should be conceived so as to cover simultaneously pan-Arabia (and Iran) and each particular front sector separately. Deterrence includes home front willpower, which has been systematically undermined by pseudo-democratic excesses that none of the great democracies has tolerated in periods of national emergencies. Unless the Israeli home front comes to terms with reality, trouble lies ahead.
2. Israel has interests to cater to vis-à-vis Lebanon. It should not be dragged by circumstances. A firm stand (either/or) has to be formed on:
 - a. Israel's non warring yet active support to Lebanon, as a country, required to evict Syrian armed forces and thereby Syrian hold on to it, to prevent Syrian control over a topographically nightmarish border, forestall Syrian world acceptance by proxy and Syrian economic (drug) benefits.

Or,

 - b. Israel's accommodation with Syrian rule in Lebanon provided Syria keeps the peace and accepts a de facto status quo on the Golan Heights.
3. An assertive Israeli stand on Lebanon is possible only after the Hizbullah is neutralized by aggressive actions, which the government is postponing until Judea, Samaria and Gaza are pacified.



Syria

Overview

The second most powerful neighbor of Israel, Syria, is the most aggressive. Since signing the Rhodes Armistice Agreement in 1949, when Israel had to surrender some mandatory territory to Syrian control, Syria has continued to encroach and seize further (limited) areas, which is the reason why it demands a return to the May 1967 lines as a condition for "peace" and not an adherence to the Rhodes Armistice Agreement of 1949.

Sovereign over the domineering Golan Heights until June 1967 (Six Day War), Syria signed over 400 cease fire agreements with Israel between 1949 and 1967 breaking all of them either by shelling Israeli settlements along the demarcation lines or by encroaching and holding on to more territory. Given the topography, Israel could do little to defend itself, except initiating a major war that it tried to avoid for 19 years.

Syrian society is an amalgam of tribes and religions. Sunni Moslems are the nominally dominant sector. There are Shiite Moslems, Druze, Bedouins and Christians. The cast considered lowest and denied access to "high" Syrian society are the Alawis, branded by the Sunni majority as a mongrel creed of Moslem, pagan and Christian faiths.

Excluded from the mainstream of Syrian society, many Alawis found their way into the armed forces, where promotion was considered to be more egalitarian. Hafez Assad was an Alawi who made a

career in the military, becoming Chief of the Air Force. As a general, he joined other malcontents to overturn the regime and finally to become President, despot of Syria.

Operating along Soviet security principles, Hafez Assad killed between 25,000 and 30,000 Syrians (20,000 during the siege of the Moslem Brotherhood in Hama), in order to maintain his iron-fist control. He ruled Syria until his recent death, succeeding in creating a “hereditary presidency” by supervising, ante-mortem, the process of nomination of his son, Bashar Assad, a young ophthalmologist trained in the West, who had to substitute for his older brother who was killed in a car accident (?).

Hafez Assad, famous for his total disregard for human life and other “decadent western values”, attempted, in 1964, to deny Israel about one third of its scarce water supply by diverting the River Jordan sources from Lebanese and Syrian springs, via a canal dug along the Syrian Golan Heights’ slopes and waste the water into the Yarmuk tributary of the River Jordan, turning in the process, the Lake of Galilee into a saline pond.

This being a deadly threat, the then Israeli Commander of Northern Command, General Yitzhak Rabin, supported by the Israeli Air Force, attacked the Syrian engineering works in what was called “The Water War”. The Syrian attempt was stopped but armed ground and air clashes continued, culminating in the shooting down of twelve Syrian fighter planes over the Lake of Galilee and around it in early 1967.

When, in spring 1967, the Soviet and Egyptian intelligence concluded that Israeli deterrence had been substantially reduced by a weak government, hence the time had come to overrun Israel, the false pretext for the war acts committed by Egypt was an “Israeli troop concentration to attack Syria”, a concentration which, were it to exist, could readily be duly observed, in detail, given the unobstructed view from the Syrian Golan Heights.

In June 1967, the Golan was in Israeli hands.

Dealing with Syria

When Israel’s Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, who stated before being elected in 1992, that “leaving the Golan Heights endangers Israel’s security”, proposed to negotiate peace with Syria surrendering the Golan, Hafez Assad refused to substitute for demilitarization of the Golan, Israeli intelligence outposts and other defense measures for the Golan.

He agreed to negotiate only **after** the return of the Golan, which has been formally annexed by Israel for defense reasons. That precondition to sit and talk post facto was an impossible risk for Israel.

Netanyahu (Likud), who succeeded Shimon Peres (after Rabin’s assassination in November 1995) as Prime Minister, followed up on Rabin’s proposal through his US friend, Ron Lauder (Revlon). He got the same cold shoulder. President Clinton, who sought to meet terror promoting, drug pushing Assad was refused too when they met in Geneva, and the result of some other US sponsored meetings was the same.

Prime Minister Barak went even further, offering to consider a Syrian presence on the shores of the Lake of Galilee, which would have bestowed upon Syria riparian rights (over its waters) according to international law. Hafez Assad refused. When Bashar Assad became President, he also refused.

The opinions on Bashar are divided. Some see him as a west educated intellectual, mellowed by his education as a medical doctor. Others believe, and the writer had some substantiated evidence to this effect, that Bashar Assad is every bit as bloodthirsty as his father. He will have to prove it by being even less forgiving in order to stamp out his weak, intellectual image if he wants to survive. Why

would he refuse to get the Golan back in exchange for fairly esoteric gestures? There are answers to this question almost as many as there are intelligence or political analysts.

Some of these assumptions regarding Bashar's character are:

1. Bashar Assad, an inexperienced, western educated young weakling has to pay heed to the junta's advice in order to survive and keep Syria under Alawi rule. This is the junta's only way to survive the expected Sunni pressure.
2. Bashar Assad is as cruel and as mean as his father, bound to do his best to impose his leadership upon the ruling circles that have been pre-purged by his father prior to his death.
3. Bashar Assad is wary of "rocking the boat" too early in his presidency. He'll delay for a while but do it.
4. Bashar Assad is aware of the fact that "an end to hostilities" may generate internal pressures that could result in a Sunni bid to regain power in Damascus or in a pro-democratic revolt.
5. Syria, one of the poorest Arab countries with one of the highest reproduction rates, relies on the Lebanon cash infusion:
 - It garrisons about 30,000 Syrian soldiers there.
 - About 900,000 Syrians work in Lebanon and send most of their revenue home.
 - Syrians own and control the vast drug industry and trade of Lebanon.

The poppy fields of the Beka'a Valley are some of the world's largest, protected by the Syrian army and cultivated by senior Syrian officers whose militant activism derives from personal pecuniary interests. "Benign corruption" by Syrian standards.

Syria signed already three formal agreements to leave Lebanon and refused to carry them out. The Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon has raised again the matter of Syrian withdrawal, with Christians and Druze becoming insistent about it. Reoccupying the Golan may start the Syrian count down in Lebanon, which is much more important to Syria than the Golan.

The collapse of the Soviet Empire, which has traditionally been Syria's arms, doctrine and training supplier "on credit" since the mid-1950s, denied Syria's logistic hinterland. Russian deliveries were made conditional upon the debt payment of some \$6 billion which Assad father did not have. Although not paid, the Russians have obliged of late by delivering some relief. Analysts believe the Syrian army, air force, air defense (anti-aircraft missiles and control) and navy to be in a low readiness status and lacking training and spares.

For its participation, in name only, on the Allied side in the (US) anti-Iraqi Gulf War of 1991, Syria received, through Saudi Arabia, \$2 billion which it spent on North Korean ballistic Scud missiles and a Scud manufacturing facility. Having already used Soviet short-range ballistic missiles during the Yom Kippur War, Syria acquired a ballistic missile operational orientation. It also witnessed the effect that the "trickling" of 39 Iraqi missiles that were launched by Iraq during 14 days against Tel Aviv and Haifa had on Israeli (panicky) behavior.

There is no doubt that the Home Front is Israel's weakest. Spoilt by the airtight protection of its Air Force in previous wars, the Israelis of the hinterland (which may be 10-15 miles from where the fighting goes on) felt secure, far away from war.

With real, conventional war about 20 years previously behind it, the longest period ever, and the population doubled by the influx of unseasoned immigrants, the Israeli Home Front may be considered by the Syrians to be the weak link in Israel's defense. This is why Syria seems to believe that, 'for

want of money' ballistic missiles may be the most cost-efficient Main Battle Armament when the budget is short.

Scud B missiles that cover only half of Israel, and Scud C missiles that cover it all, have a World War II, V-2 like C.E.P. (Circular Error Probability)⁵⁵ which is too inaccurate for tactical use. Their mission is to strike urban concentrations and disrupt the rear, substituting for the US, British and German air attacks of yesteryear. The accurate Russian ballistic missiles that Syria possesses, the SS21, have a short range and may be used for tactical purposes.

Cheap to manufacture and deploy, sparing the Syrian soldiers the closeness of conventional combat, Syria is now capable of launching up to 40 ballistic missiles per day at Israeli targets, maintaining this rate of fire for about a month.

Studies by the Israeli Air Force about the lethality of V-2/Scud type ballistic missiles were started in 1963, when Nazi scientists attempted to build those missiles in Egypt (and were dispersed following Israeli intervention). They were renewed before the Gulf War, given the huge Arab missile build up, confirming the 1963 findings.

Statistically, the optimistic studies results were incredibly accurate in so far as lethality and even damages were concerned, confirmed by the Iraqi missile hits on Tel Aviv and Haifa.

But no one studied the prevention or delay in reserves (the mainstay of Israel's armed forces) mobilization created by a Syrian rate of launch.

Judging by the effect of the Iraqi missiles, the panicky population dispersal efforts and the refusal to leave one's family when it is subjected to enemy fire, a ballistic missile attack on Tel Aviv may decide the fate of battle by delaying reserves and logistics, which calls for a more acute requirement to position the regular forces and logistics on optimum defensive, i.e. topographically advantageous positions, i.e. the present line on the Golan Heights.

The event of ballistic missiles increases the absolute need for optimal positions rather than disposes of it.

Complementing the ballistic missiles with knives, explosives and Kalashnikovs, a Syrian-Arafat synchronization may add guerrilla disruptions of troops and logistic movements to the front (remember October 2000) to the havoc played by the missiles.

Talking peace to Syria involves (West) Palestinian considerations and vice versa.

In 1974, C.G.S. Mordechai (Motta) Gur guided Joseph Sisco, Henry Kissinger's deputy, and Harold Saunders, Kissinger's strategic advisor, on a tour of the Israeli positions on the Golan, substantiating the reasons permitting Israel to withdraw from its position in the vicinity of Damascus, and compelling it to hold the watershed line. As the Senior Air Force Officer accompanying Gur, the writer had the opportunity to contribute his arguments. Sisco concluded that the withdrawal "according to UN Resolution 242" and the present lines are "secure borders" according to that same 242.

There are, basically, no other than personal ego reasons to prevent a Syrian-Iraqi alliance. They are both under a Ba'ath, Arab socialist rule, both were enjoying Soviet support in more than armaments, both are anti-clerical (anti-Moslem Brothers), both anti-American, both bloodthirsty despots, both caring precious little for human life and despising the West and Zionism which they consider to be a Western beachhead, etc., both Soviet educated. Saddam Hussein and Hafez Assad were mirror images of one another. It would be a grave error if, in deterrence/defense planning, the possibility of Israel facing a Syrian-Iraqi force were to be dismissed. As Gur wrote, such an event turns the Israeli withdrawal from the Golan into a major catastrophe.⁵⁶

Scanning the Syrian political-military landscape, it may be assumed that, in the foreseeable future:

1. Were a choice to be strictly necessary, Bashar Assad will prefer to keep his control of Lebanon instead of recovering the Golan, i.e. if Israel's surrender of the Golan endangers Assad's hold on Lebanon, he will do without it.
2. Syria's rapidly deteriorating economy (including the exhaustion of oil resources) forces Assad to:
 - Decide which weapon system should enjoy priority. This he did: ballistic missiles.
 - Recognize his dependence on Lebanese drugs, contraband and plain labor income.
 - Do something about his economic recovery, while Syria maintains the highest or second highest birth rate in the world.
 - Equivocate on other capital issues.

That could be achieved by opening up to the West, in which case he'll lose his job, or creating an upheaval that will bring Arab, French, Russian or other succor.

3. It is highly probable that Bashar Assad will try first to reinforce his hold on Syria before proceeding to take any dramatic measures.
4. Since the adoption of the ballistic missile (+ chemical, conventional and biological warheads) as a main battle weapon, the flexibility of a Syrian initiative or response is limited, it's, roughly speaking, either low intensity or extreme conflict, with a localized conventional engagement bound to "slip" into a major conflagration.
5. All Bashar Assad's decisions will be a function of his perception of Israel's level of deterrence, the main component of which is the Golan, whose location and topography translate into a straight forward, easy, short range (~ 50 km.) access to Damascus and a formidable defense line against Syrian attack on Israel.

Judging by Islamic teachings⁵⁷ that became established norms, ethics and Arab tradition and by modern Arab (and particularly Syrian) practices, Bashar Assad's respect for signed papers, be they backed up by third party collateral (for what it may be worth) - is, like his father's, next to nil. Accordingly, trading tangible assets (Golan) for a Syrian IOU backed by intangible third party collateral is worth the same. Nil.

Probability seems to be high enough that the ME will not see a major aggravation initiated by Syria against Israel in the foreseeable near future, unless there will emerge a desperate internal power struggle in Damascus or a major Israeli retaliation in Lebanon (following a Hizbullah operation) that will skid out of control.

Russia is bound to try a super-power comeback through the ME, particularly through Syria and Iraq. Such an act may, on one hand, bring about a Syrian-Iraqi rapprochement, **which stresses the importance of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights and the Jordan Valley**, yet, on the other hand, it may have a tempering influence, a major power being cautious to prevent being dragged into a confrontation.

Of course, an Iraqi-Syrian closer relationship may be rekindled without Russian influence. This may be more of a threat to Israel.

The state of "war in abeyance" may continue for years, unless Israel capitulates to third parties' pressures and reinitiates negotiations, making tempting proposals.

Conclusions

1. The structure of the Syrian military renders a classic, conventional war hardly conceivable. Any conflict with Syria beyond a low intensity engagement is bound to become an all out war, including the involvement of the (weak) Israeli home front, that is the massive use by Syria of ballistic missiles outfitted with mass destruction warheads interspersed with conventional high explosive heads.
2. The probability of Syria joining the PLO in a major encounter with Israel at present is low, however, the opposite, namely the probability of a Syrian-Iraqi alliance engaging (West) Palestinian guerilla support in order to eliminate Israel and wrestle thereby the pan-Arab hegemony is by no means to be discarded. (There exists, of course, the possibility of Egypt joining, precisely for the same purpose).
3. Rendering the Golan Heights to Syria, Israel will create the temptation to form an Iraqi-Syrian aggressive alliance by substantially lowering its deterrence.

Such an alliance may also bear its pressure against Jordan, a pressure that may become irresistible if a (West) Palestinian entity will have a common (or almost) border with Jordan along the Jordan Valley.

Loss of Israeli tangible, visible, understandable deterrence may:

- a. Revive the Syrian thrust for “Greater Syria” (pre-World War I Sanjack of Damascus) or “the Fertile Crescent” to which Israel is **the** obstacle.
 - b. Reinforce the Iraqi quest for pan-Arab/oil hegemony (aimed also at containing Iran).
 - c. Reinforce Egyptian efforts to ensure its hegemony by establishing that old (first British-1948), then Egyptian, (since early 1967) “*Drang nach Osten*”, the land bridge joining African and Asian Arabia.
4. Surrendering the Golan to Syria in exchange for a despot’s IOU with no tangible collateral may:
 - a. Give Syria a free hand in Lebanon.
 - b. Render Israel’s eastward defense/deterrence quasi - impossible, as stated by General **Motta Gur**, the Laborite, dovish Minister in Rabin’s cabinet:

I absolutely refused to conclude an interim agreement with Syria, because, from a purely military point of view, Israel cannot defend itself against the East without (holding) the Golan Heights and it cannot defend the Golan Heights without control of the central ridge (watershed, “spine”) line on which we are presently deployed - from the Hermon in the North, to the Rakkade (seasonal) river in the South.

5. The control of the Golan is imperative.

Surrendering it to Syria for what stands a very good chance of being a temporary expediency is bound to be a reckless, historically irresponsible and economically catastrophic act.

In 1948, Israel stood its ground against UN etc attempts to confine it to the indefensible November 1947 partition lines. Israel 2000, infinitely stronger in body but weak at heart, should ask what would have become of Israel in its 1947 boundaries and think year 2000 It should also ask how can it best deter pan-Arabia in year 2000 and save thereby the cost of war to Arabs and Jews alike.

A state of “war in abeyance” that has continued since 1974, be it interspersed with spouts of low intensity hostilities, is a preferable non-belligerence than a short lived peace followed by a catastrophic major war that results from Israeli loss of deterrence in the wake of the surrender of the Golan Heights.



Iraq

Outline

The only country at war with Israel that refused to sign the Rhodes Armistice Agreement of 1949 is also the country which, although having no common border with Israel, insisted in participating in all the major wars against it, sending expeditionary forces to Syrian, Jordanian or Egyptian front sectors or in the air.

It was also the first (Arab) enemy to launch ballistic missiles against Israeli urban concentrations in 1991, during the Gulf War in which Israel was **not** a participant. Heavily supported by the Soviets and French, Iraq pursued or it may presently pursue energetically the development and manufacture of nuclear devices and possesses significant quantities of chemical and biological weapons, some of which it used in the past against Iran and its own Kurdish population when in revolt (hence no qualms about using them against Israel).

Saddam Hussein's Iraq is, like Assad's Syria, a vicious, Stalin type despotism with a twist of medieval Middle Eastern sadism. But unlike Assad's, Saddam's oil wealth and water resources (Tigris and Euphrates) are abundant, as is his research and development potential.

Iraq's traditional enemy is Iran, the first being mainly Arab and Sunni Moslem, the second Persian and mainly Shiite. Both rule large regions of Kurdistan (Kurds). For British imperial/oil reasons, the Kurds were the only Moslem (non-Arab) nation in the ME not to attain post World War I independence in this region of the former Turkish Ottoman Empire. Iraq, like Iran and Egypt, lays claim to hegemony in the Middle East.

The Iraqi-Iranian war of 1980-1988, during which about 1,000,000 people were killed, was a typical war of hegemony that ended in limbo, with Iran maintaining the upper hand. The US provided intense support to Iraq during that war.

Iraq's second bid was the annexation of Kuwait in 1990, a clear hegemony drive toward the Arab oil fields of the Persian Gulf. This drive resulted in the Gulf War of 1991, where the US scared or coaxed Arabs and Europeans to tow its line and fought Iraq to prevent it from projecting its power over about 60 percent of the world's oil reserves.

When the UN decided to punish Iraq for its unwarranted aggression and apply firm control on its re-equipment with mass-destruction weapons, Saddam, now "on his third US President", outmaneuvered the UN, illegally "leaking" oil through his erstwhile enemy, Iran and others, chasing the UN supervisory team out⁵⁸ with French and Russian cooperation and with pan-Arab mellowed enmity turned, with time, into fraternity.

At present, Iraq is the most virulent and vociferous Arab enemy of the "Zionist entity" and of Israel, which is considered the spearhead of the (hated) US in the Middle East.

During the months of January-February 1991, at the beginning of the Gulf War, when Israel stayed neutral at US request (to keep its edgy Arab allies and Syria in line), Saddam Hussein's Iraq launched 39 modified Scuds (lighter payload, longer range) at Israel, with no provocation. It was a statement of "who is the true Arab" and a plan to drive a wedge between Arabs and the US, were Israel to join the fray. A demonstration of Arab "machismo". Arafat, a close friend of Saddam's, was delighted. Arabs of Judea, Samaria and Gaza, as well as some Arabs in Israel, literally danced on the roofs at the sight of the fireworks which, as said, had a minor military impact.

When Arafat's turn came and he started his present "*Intifada-el-Aksa*", Saddam Hussein moved five Republican Guards (Iraq's elite troops) divisions westward, creating a force in being that "hinted" at the possibility of turning Arafat's uprising into a major ME conflict. Israel had to cater to this potential step although all signs attached a minimal probability to its being taken.

Taking into consideration major Arab states' potential involvement in an Israeli-(West) Palestinian low intensity conflict, **certainly did influence** the volume, tactics and policy of the Israeli handling of Arafat, the way Arafat's little war did influence the low profile anti-Hizbullah measures taken by Israel in Lebanon.

The Pan-Arab web of threats is obvious.

Partial Conclusion

Since it has no common border with it, Iraq belongs to what is known in Israel as "the Second Ring". However, it represents a major, ambitious, malicious and determined enemy whose quest for Arab hegemony in the ME enhances the threat.

In the light of its deeds and attitudes, Iraq is to be seen as a major, constant and constantly increasing threat to Israel and its intervention in any war against Israel is to be assessed as a high probability of occurrence.

The "Iraq Factor" has to be considered in both the (West) Palestinian and Syrian peace deliberations which, as facts prove, can by no means be looked upon as one-on-one, stand alone negotiations.

Iraq's drive to Pan-Arab/Moslem/ME hegemony by means of unconventional warring potential is a major threat to Israel. Whatever can be done against it, should be.



Iran

Insofar as the quest for hegemony over the ME Moslem, oil-producing countries goes, Iran is an identical twin of Iraq. This is also the background of their enmity. Yet, unlike twins, Iran is different.

1. It is larger, belongs to a different culture and civilization
2. It possesses more resources.
3. It has ceased being the world's "leper colony" hence its access to markets and technologies is relatively free.
4. Its budget is much larger.
5. Being Shiite, Iran is considering the Southern Iraqi Shiite population to be akin. This claim reinforces Iran's quest for control of the Shat-el-Arab estuary, Iraq's access to the sea.

Iran sees Iraq as a Sunni competitor to its aim of pan-Islamic Moslem hegemony.

6. Following the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq's propaganda conveys mixed messages, anti-Zionist, anti-US, Ba'ath socialist and yet pseudo-Islamic, pan-Arab, etc.

The Iranian message is clear: Islamic fundamentalism pitted against the infidel West of which Israel is the advanced party thrust into the body of ME Islam.

Judging by Iran's ballistic missile efforts, it seems that, in accordance with the above point (5), Iran's designs are more grandiose than Iraq's, possibly consisting of a global outreach. The ballistic missile arsenal, existing and being developed by Iran, hints at the targeting of the Western Persian Gulf Arab

oil regions in a potential quest for hegemony (Scud “B”) and at the build-up of a ballistic missile deterrent (4,500-6,000 km.) against a potential Western Gulf war-type reaction to Iran’s quest.

Be it as it may, “anti-Zionist” intervention is welcomed as “*Jihad*” by Iran’s fundamentalists, as kinship by Arab militant states (Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, etc.), as an “entrance fee” to the club of ME oil hegemony aspirants, as an anti-Western demonstration of power and as plain fulfillment of Prophet Muhammad’s anti-Semitic preaching.

Hence, whether it is Iranian sponsored Hizbullah low intensity conflict, support to Syria in its confrontation with Israel or in “peace negotiations”, the Zalzal 3,1300 km. ballistic missile, the possibility of moving to Syria some of its 1,000 Scud B ballistic missiles, or its nuclear effort – Iran’s threat to Israel does not seem to be attenuated by its distance from it.

Again, like in Iraq’s case, no settlement with Syria (Lebanon) should be attempted by Israel without the inclusion of the “Iran Factor” in the deterrence equation.



Iraq and Iran, Conclusions

1. Iraqi and/or Iranian alliance with Syria is highly probable in the near future.
2. Reinitiating Iraq’s quest for pan-Arab hegemony may well depend upon opportunities created by Israeli surrender of the Golan Heights to Syria and/or the Jordan Valley to a (West) Palestinian entity.
3. A proper Israeli anti ballistic missile defense deterrence linked to a properly conceived, safe second strike capability, may tone down the world danger of the Iranian arsenal.
4. The containment of the Iraq/Iran inclusion of mass destruction, long range weapons as main battle weapons in their arsenals, is as vital a US (world) interest as it is Israeli. However world or major power response is bound to be sluggish, which allows the rogue countries enough time for aggression against Israel.

Israel should organize its own independent deterrence if a status of peace of no war or non-belligerence against it is to be maintained, adapting that deterrence level and technology to the character and intensity of threat over time. It should enlist US or other support for its deterrence but, as far as possible, not depend on it.

5. Israeli deterrence requires (because of technology, budgets, R&D and acquisition lags) at least a 10-year advance planning. To date, it seems that, for want of planning, and given the lack of peace definition, deterrence is looked upon as a factor affecting the present situation only. It is normally subjected to political mantra, rather than future projection. “Muddling through” is the term. Planning, execution and general confidence building disclosure are required.



Endnotes

¹ *Holy Bible, King James Version*, book of Genesis, Chapter 1, verses 1 to 27.

² Quote from H.N. Bialik’s poem “In The Town of Murder”, written in 1903, following the Tsar inspired Kishinev Pogrom: “*And you called for nations’ mercy and prayed to gentile pity.*”

³ 1921-1922. The League of Nations (the UN’s predecessor) adopts the Balfour Declaration dealing with “The Establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine,” that is in the Holy Land conquered by the WWI Allies from the Turkish Empire.

- ⁴ A position created by the first British High Commissioner in Palestine, Sir Herbert Samuel who, being Jewish, did his best to placate the Arabs in a masterly show of British impartiality.
- ⁵ During WWI the Royal Navy substituted oil for coal as fuel for its steam boilers. At the time Saudi, North Sea, Nigerian, Angolan, Egyptian and many other oil sources were yet undiscovered.
- ⁶ Anwar Sadat among them.
- ⁷ The original Palestine Mandate included the territory West of the River Jordan, named Cis-Jordan and the one East of it named TransJordan, that covered about 3/4 of Palestine. Trans-Jordan became, eventually, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.
- ⁸ Jewish “illegal” immigrants’ ships intercepted were sequestered and their passengers exiled to Mauritius (1940) or to Cyprus (1946-1948).
- ⁹ No Arab, and for that matter no other state in the world, with the notable exception of Britain and Pakistan, recognized the annexation by Jordan of Judea and Samaria in Cis-Jordan which, in 1951, were not occupied by Israel. Egypt maintained Gaza as occupied territory, the Gazans being required to gain a special permit to enter Sinai.
- ¹⁰ The 1987-1990 unrest or *intifada* of Judea, Samaria and Gaza Arabs, as well as the present Palestinian unrest, cum terror cum low intensity guerrilla campaign are not wars in the classical sense.
- ¹¹ See: *Islamic Anti-Semitism as a Political Instrument*, by Yossef Bodansky, ACPR Publishers, 1999.
- ¹² Twice tried for “High Treason” in French fabricated trials and found guilty (1882), Capt. Alfred Dreyfus was totally exonerated and reinstated only in 1906, when his supporters brought the real guilty party to trial after discovering that he was sheltered by the “nationalist” right wing military.
- ¹³ “Palestina” was the name given some two milleniums ago by the Romans to the land of the Philistines to which the Holy Land regions of Judea and Samaria were joined after the destruction of the second Jewish Temple (70 AD). It was, at times, used by the Crusaders and European maps. Finally, it was revived to name the arbitrary, often changing borders of the British Mandate bound to become a Jewish National Home.
- ¹⁴ According to *CIA World Facts Book* (Summer) 2000, there are/were:
 5,336,394 Danes in Denmark
 5,167,486 Finns in Finland
 4,481,162 Norwegians in Norway and
 3,797,257 Irish in Ireland
 (The writer asks forgiveness for omitting the date and the hour of the census).
- ¹⁵ Firms trading with Israel were denied the right to trade with the 22 Arab (and some other Islamic) countries, contrary to UN and WTO free trade regulations. Each firm trading with Arab states had to sign a formal form declaring that neither it nor any of its affiliates (more than 50 percent) is trading with Israel. Western European, Japanese and even US firms bowed and obliged. To this day, none of the great world oil firms is trading openly with Israel.
- ¹⁶ The US arms embargo on Israel, enforced in 1948, when the British were supplying the Arabs and were active officers and/or instructors in Arab countries, was lifted only in the second half of 1967, after Israel won the historic Six Day War (June 1967) when Israel was accepted by the US as a strategic asset and admired as the party that dishonored Soviet weaponry.
- ¹⁷ ~ 19,000 US Dollars per year per capita is the country average, that includes the somewhat lesser Arab population’s income and the burden of the almost non-productive Jewish ultra-orthodox sector.
- ¹⁸ Average longevity in Israel is among the ten highest in the world.
- ¹⁹ Islam, an aggressively expansionist religion, divides the world in two: “*Dar el-Islam*” (the country/ies of peace), i.e. countries under Islamic rule, and “*Dar-El-Harb*” (countries of the sword or war), i.e. the non-Islamic countries that are yet to be conquered by Islam in a “*Jihad*”, that is a Holy War. It is, therefore, inconceivable that an infidel rule be tolerated in a land that is or was part of the (be it Ottoman) *Dar-El-Salaam*.
- ²⁰ See Martin Sherman, *Despots, Democrats and the Determinants of International Conflict*, MacMillan, Ltd., 1998, St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1998.

Note: Immanuel Kant wrote in his work *Perpetual Peace*, (1797), that democrats are reluctant to go to war because they risk their own lives and pay for it, while dictators are “trigger-happy”, sending others to do the fighting and pay for it with not much risk for themselves.

²¹ Appropriately named by De Gaulle: “*La Disorganisation des Nations Desunies*”.

²² The writer could not identify one case of war between two genuine democracies during the 20th century.

²³ The Six Day War between Israel and the Arab coalition of Egypt, Syria and Jordan, in June 1967 is an outstanding example of deterrence that failed, (hence war broke out) because the Soviet Union, the mentor, and Egypt misread Israel’s deterrence level when believing its government to be too hesitant and inconclusive. They believed the time had come to wipe Israel out and found out the opposite.

²⁴ The question whether Egypt, the largest Arab country, should be the cornerstone of Israel-Arab peace or Jordan has two answers: “Yes, Egypt, the first one to sign a peace-agreement with Israel, thereby establishing a weighty precedent” and “yes, Jordan, establishing, with time, a precedent of friendly ‘cohabitation’ and, hopefully help Israel to resolve the extremely difficult matter of Judean, Samaritan and Gazan Arabs’ emancipation.”

²⁵ The academic, esoteric, idealistic and naive negotiations at Oslo resulted in an academic, esoteric, idealistic and naive understanding that, eight years to date, have proven not to have any tie with reality, and are far from conclusion. As a former fighter pilots’ flight instructor, this writer likens the proceedings of Oslo to the training in a ground-bound simulator and then the dispatch of the trainee to take off in a real fighter without any further ado. Results? Similar!

²⁶ This being a discussion about peace as a factor of deterrence, the human, emotional, moral, ethical and historic factors involved, powerful and valid as they are, are not mentioned.

²⁷ The interaction of the PA’s economy with that of Israel has raised its income per capita way beyond that of the neighboring Arab countries, including Jordan (at present). That difference of economic potential creates a migration trend from the PA to Israel and from Jordan to the PA, both to be strictly regulated according to Oslo and post Oslo agreements (for what they’re worth now).

²⁸ Arafat’s Syrian-supported uprising in August-September 1970 when trying to usurp the Hashemite throne in Amman, aimed at creating a unified Arab Palestinian state under Arafat’s rule. Syrian armor invaded Jordan, taking the town of Irbid, but stopped and withdrew when threatened by Israel with intervention. This is one case of Israeli support for Jordan long before the peace of 1995 was signed.

Arafat and his men were chased out of Jordan to Lebanon, where the name of “Black September” was adopted by an extremist terror formation within the Fateh framework.

²⁹ The Saddam Hussein-Arafat warm relationship is one of long standing that has resisted many ME vicissitudes over time.

³⁰ Arguing a similar situation, in 1991, prior to the Madrid Conference, Dr. Martin Sherman asked a political officer of the US embassy in Tel Aviv, whether when a fourth state (Iraq) invades a third state (Jordan), Israel is legally, morally and politically allowed to occupy a second state (PA). To which the (unnamed) US political officer answered: “*Quite a hell of a situation, Well - Yes!*”

³¹ During the Oslo euphoria, Mr. Peres reacted when criticized by saying that one should not necessarily learn from history but, rather, clean the slate and start writing a new one. This is in perfect tune with Mr. Peres’ upbringing in strict socialist dogma. “The Internationale”, the socialist anthem, mentions that the old world should be destroyed to make way for a new one...with well-known results.

³² Pan-Arabian (or the Arab nation’s) stated and professed aim of war with Israel is Israel’s demise. They stress it often enough for one not to doubt it, although the West tries to read it “tolerantly”. Israel’s “aim of war” is survival and co-existence. It cherishes no idea of aggression if left in peace. It is, therefore, Israel’s deterrence whose task is to keep the peace in the ME for the benefit of all populations. The Arab nation is not threatened.

³³ See: Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto, “Israel 2000. How Will It Fare If Shrunk to Its Pre-Six Day War (1967) Borders?”, *Israel at the Crossroads*, ACPR, 1997.

³⁴ Which seems to be the idea conveyed by a Kissinger letter of February, 8, 1988, to Prime Minister Shamir at the beginning of the first “*intifada*”, saying, as it seems, “*Do whatever and however is required to put it*

down in as short a period of time as possible. You'll be censured and then the whole thing is forgotten. But if it lasts..."

- ³⁵ The US should have learned this lesson since Pearl Harbor or, more recently, when Saddam Hussein took Kuwait in August 1990, but it seems that it did not, at least where others are concerned.
- ³⁶ Constructed under the Rabin-Peres government (1992-1996) in accordance with Oslo territorial preliminary lines.
- ³⁷ See: Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto, "After Oslo – The Quest for Political Stability – A 'Politically Incorrect' Paper on an Apparently Correct Solution", ACPR Policy Paper No. 48, (written 1997) published 1998.
- ³⁸ Caduc or Caduque (French Larousse):
Old, killed by age (leaves shed and reborn each year), obsolete, past its time (a caduque custom), null and void, uterine tissue that peels off with the egg.
Certainly, a curious and suspicious way of saying, during a speech delivered in English, that "I drop terror."
- ³⁹ Three months later Nasser ordered the withdrawal of the UN troops. The UN complied, thus breaking its obligation. Simultaneously, Nasser blockaded Eilat-bound shipping and declared on May 22, 1967, in a Sinai reactivated Air Base: "*Let them come.*" The US equivocated and then reneged on its guarantees, **threatening** Israel not to preempt (See *Head On*, by Gen. (res) Meir Amit, the Head of the Mossad at the time (Hebrew), Hed Artzi (Ma'ariv) Publishers, 1999, pp. 235, 236.
On June 5, 1967 Israel preempted by surprise.
- ⁴⁰ See: Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto, "The Case of The Forgotten War", *Society of Experimental Test Pilots Technical Review*, Lancaster, CA, USA, 1971.
- ⁴¹ See: Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto, "At What Price the Golan Heights?", ACPR Policy Paper No. 5, 1998. Figures criticized at onset as being inflated for political reasons, were revealed as fairly conservative at Shepherdstown.
- ⁴² Circular Error Probability (CEP), i.e. the imaginary circle drawn with the aiming point as its center, within which 50 percent of the aimed warheads will hit. A Scud or Scud derivative missile's CEP renders it inefficient for pinpoint bombing, which means that its main use will be against urban concentrations.
- ⁴³ See: Richard Butler, Former Executive Director of UNSCOM, "The Risk of Leaving Iraq Unchecked", *The Jerusalem Post*, July 21, 2000. Butler's book: *The Greatest Threat: Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Growing Crisis in Global Security*, Public Affairs, May 2000.
- ⁴⁴ See Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto, "No Room for Error in a Minuscule Country – The Case for Enhanced Anti-Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBM)", in *Ballistic Missiles – The Threat and the Response*, Arie Stav, ed., Brassey's (UK) Ltd., 1999.
- ⁴⁵ Putting the Israelis to work, i.e. dispense with as much foreign labor, doing away with unnecessary unemployment benefits, creating a political legal environment (constitution) that does not provide free lunches to special interests and driving productivity and technology up, will provide for a GNP per capita of about \$30,000-35,000 per year, the moderate taxation of which may provide the means.
Another way may be acquiring the nuclear submarines cum nuclear ballistic missiles jointly within the framework of an alliance, be it US-Israeli, Israeli-Indian, tripartite or other, provided the key to launch is in the hands of the most threatened party.
- ⁴⁶ First class roads, water supplies, communications and power lines, etc. bypassing the ravaged Tel Aviv metropolitan areas are not built overnight. Nor are dispersal of population, production and logistics facilities an ad hoc enterprise.
- ⁴⁷ Feisal I, King of Iraq 1921-1933, one of the leaders of the Arab pro-British revolt during World War I, was first appointed King of Syria by the British, chased out of Damascus by the French and then appointed as King of Iraq by the British.
Known for a famous letter of cooperation and "welcome home" he wrote to Chaim Weizman upon the decision to create a Jewish National Home in Palestine. Badly criticized by other Arab leaders for adopting a cooperative attitude.

- ⁴⁸ See: Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto, "After Oslo – The Quest for Political Stability – A 'Politically Incorrect' Paper on an Apparently Correct Solution", ACPR Policy Paper No. 48, (written 1997) published 1998.
- ⁴⁹ A "corridor" mentioned by Arafat since 1992. According to international law, the sovereignty over the corridor should be the party with most inhabitants at both extremes. Since the Negev is sparsely inhabited, that means the transfer of about 250 sq. km. of pre-1967 Israeli territory to the (West) Palestinian entity, severing Israel in two and relocating about 11 Jewish pre and post 1967 settlements, including the township of Sderot. Although it starts now with a road, with Gaza as harbor, railway, high-tension lines, desalinated water piping, phone lines, etc. **will** require that area.
- ⁵⁰ Let's hope so.
- ⁵¹ See: Arieh Stav, *Peace: The Arabian Caricature – A Study in Anti-Semitic Imagery*, Gefen Publishers, Jerusalem & New York, 1999.
- ⁵² See: Shawn Pine, "The Egyptian Threat and the Prospects for War in the Middle East", ACPR Policy Paper No. 110, November 2000, and Shawn Pine, "Egypt's True Defense Expenditures - 2.7 or 14 Billion Dollars?", ACPR Policy Paper No. 6, 1997.
- ⁵³ See: Ilan Asya, "Arab Territorial Continuity as a Focus of the Middle East Conflict", ACPR Policy Paper No. 21.
- ⁵⁴ See: Shawn Pine, "The Egyptian Threat and the Prospects for War in the Middle East", ACPR Policy Paper No. 110, November 2000.
- ⁵⁵ Circular Error Probability (CEP), i.e. the imaginary circle drawn with the aiming point as its center, within which 50 percent of the aimed warheads will hit. A Scud or Scud derivative missile's CEP renders it inefficient for pinpoint bombing, which means that its main use will be against urban concentrations.
- ⁵⁶ During the War of Independence, Iraqi "irregulars" and troops assisted both Syria and Jordan. In 1967, Iraqi bombers attempted to attack Israel.
- During the Yom Kippur War of 1973, Iraqi armored units that were sent to fight on the Golan Heights were attacked and decimated on the approach routes. Iraqi strike aircraft participated in the Sinai, helping the Egyptian effort.
- ⁵⁷ See *The Dhimmi – Jews and Christians under Islam*, by Bat Yeor (Pseudonym), Cranbury, 1985. "There can be only temporary armistice between Islam and Dar (Ard) El Harb country" – Koran: "Lying is permitted only if it serves the purpose of the Islam," etc.
- ⁵⁸ See: Richard Butler, "Iraq Could Have Nukes in a Year", *The Jerusalem Post*, July 19, 2000. Also, Richard Butler's book *The Greatest Threat: Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Growing Crisis in Global Security*, Public Affairs, May 2000.