American Interests and an Israeli-Syrian Deal
Yuval Levin
Policy Paper No. 92 (Hebrew),
Published in Nativ, Vol. 73/2, 2000
Summary
The prospect of renewed Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations has
brought into sharp focus a serious misconception about Syria’s intentions and
strategic goals. Some decision makers in the United States and Israel appear to
believe that by making “a strategic choice for peace,” Syrian President Assad is
abandoning his long held anti-American policy objectives and choosing to enter
the American camp. In fact, a peace deal with Israel will allow Assad to
accomplish more easily those longstanding goals, which run flatly counter to
American interests in the Middle East. These goals include the final subjugation
of Lebanon under Syrian rule, the weakening and isolation of Turkey, an
increased Syrian influence in the region and a strengthening of Assad’s own
regime. By investing its prestige and resources in the current process, and thus
investing itself in the future of the Assad regime, the United States risks
enabling Assad to accomplish these objectives, and at the same time it risks
impairing its own ability to exercise some measure of control over Syria’s
actions. A deal with Israel will certainly shift the regional balance of power
in Syria’s favor, and Syria’s favor equals the detriment of America’s closest
allies and most vital interests in the region. Before committing itself to back
any Israeli-Syrian deal, the United States must carefully consider the
consequences such an agreement may have for its own interests and policy
objectives. This study aims to examine precisely what some of those consequences
may be.
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