In light of Syrian strategic objectives and their historical attitudes and perspectives towards Israel, this essay challenges the position of those favoring full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights and Syria’s interest in achieving a lasting comprehensive peace. Such a peace would have a deleterious effect on Syria’s ability to achieve its regional strategic objectives and would prove threatening to Hafez Assad’s domestic power base. It would lead to the collapse of the Syrian-Iranian alliance and would likely lead Iranian supported forces in Lebanon to target Syrian forces. While Assad has a vested interest in continuing the Arab-Israeli conflict, geo-strategic realities compel him to participate in the peace process; interested in participating in the peace process he is unwilling to make any of the requisite security, economic, or political concessions necessary to achieve "real" peace. By supporting Hizbullah actions in Lebanon, and by threatening a broader war if Israel does not withdraw from the Golan Heights, Assad hopes to facilitate an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights on Syrian terms. The collapse of the Soviet Union has left Syria bereft of the political and economic support needed to sustain a conventional war. While a Syrian-Israeli war cannot be completely ruled out, it is highly unlikely, given the cost of such a conflict to Syrian regional strategic objectives. Assad is far more likely to pursue a strategy of "no war and no peace", rather than emulate Sadat's 1973 strategy of initiating a limited strategic war.
Assad will continue to make any peace agreement contingent upon a full Israel withdrawal. The utility of Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights is dependent upon the perspective of Israeli decision makers. The Israeli short-term matrix demonstrates that the optimal Israeli strategy is a partial withdrawal from the Golan Heights. The results of the medium/long-term decision matrix illustrates that a partial or no Israeli withdrawal is favored over a full withdrawal by a ratio of more than 4:1. The matrices also suggest that a partial Israeli withdrawal is significantly more beneficial to Syria than no Israeli withdrawal and may present an opportunity for progress in the peace process. Be that as it may, until Assad truly inculcates the notion of achieving a "real and lasting peace", Israel would be prudent to give precedence to its security concerns.
The Decision Matrix
The decision matrix is a tool used by the United States military to assist in the decision making process. It allows for the quantitative measurement of subjective data, and facilitates decision making when confronted with a number of courses of action. The decision matrix program solves decision matrices under the conditions of risk and uncertainty with multiple criteria. It selects the optimal strategy and lists the values calculated for each strategy. The sensitivity analysis subprogram conducts an analysis of how sensitive the results are to changes in the values of the probabilities or weights.
Methodology
Four different matrices were conducted for this study. The first two matrices examined the short-term optimal choices for Syria and Israel when considering a myriad of variables and the impact of full, partial, or no Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights on those variables. The third matrix evaluates the optimal Israeli choice by looking at the same variables in the medium/long-terms. Finally, the last matrix determines the optimal Syrian option in light of its medium and long-term strategic goals.
The assumption in the development of these matrices is that Israel has in principle accepted the "land for peace" formula, and that it defines peace as including the principles of full normalization of relations with all its trappings.
While the previous Israeli government was in principle committed to total Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights, the current Israeli government appears willing to negotiate a partial withdrawal to some agreed point on the Golan Heights. The matrices were developed with the assumption that Syria may be compelled to violate an agreement with Israel if that agreement is in variance with more intrinsic Syrian strategic interests.
Israeli and Syrian Short-Term Decision Matrices
War Amelioration – Defined as those actions taken that will discourage neighbors from resorting to violence as a form of conflict resolution.
Winning – Defined as the ability to emerge victorious, and keeping its economic, political, and social infrastructure intact, in a future military conflict.
Casualties – Defined as the number of killed and wounded in a conflict, military engagement, or terrorist attack.
Terrorism – Defined as violence directed toward civilians, with the intent of eroding the national will of the people or forcing the government to make political concessions.
Early Warning – Defined as ability to assess the current distribution of forces, new developments, and intentions of neighboring states.
Strategic Freedom of Maneuver – Defined as the ability of the government to make decisions, and take appropriate action, unencumbered by external political constraints.
Tactical Freedom of Maneuver – Defined as the ability of military forces to conduct military operations unencumbered by topographical physical constraints.
Weights and Values
Each of the criteria has been evaluated as to the effect Israeli withdrawal, or no withdrawal, will have on each one. A numerical value has been assigned to each effect.
High Positive Effect – 7
Medium Positive Effect – 6
Low Positive Effect – 5
Neutral – 4
Low Negative Effect – 3
Medium Negative Effect – 2
High Negative Effect – 1
Selected Weights Criteria
It is important to stress that the sensitivity analysis addresses disagreements over the weighting of criteria. If the criteria are not sensitive then no significant shifting in the importance of criteria will change the matrix.
Israeli Selected Weights
War Amelioration is favored over winning and casualties, and strongly favored over all others. Winning is equal over casualties, slightly favored over strategic freedom of maneuver, and favored over all others. Casualties is slightly favored over strategic freedom of maneuver and favored over all others. Strategic freedom of maneuver is slightly favored over terrorism, and favored over all others. Terrorism is slightly favored over all others.
All others are equal.
Syrian Selected Weights
Prioritizing Syrian interests was aided by circulating a questionnaire among various Israeli experts from the Jaffee
Center in Tel Aviv University and the Begin – Sadat Center from Bar-Ilan University. The results of the questionnaires were tabulated and added to existing research data.
Winning is favored over war amelioration and strategic freedom of maneuver, strongly favored over all others.
War Amelioration is slightly favored over strategic freedom of maneuver and casualties, favored over tactical freedom of maneuver, and early warning, and strongly favored over terrorism.
Strategic freedom of maneuver is equal over casualties, slightly favored over tactical freedom of maneuver and early warning, and favored over terrorism.
Casualties is slightly favored over tactical freedom of maneuver and early warning, and favored over terrorism.
Tactical freedom of maneuver and early warning are equal, and favored over terrorism.
Discussion
I
n the short-term, full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights will have a high positive effect on deterring the prospects of war. Return of the Golan Heights to Syria will
fulfill one of Syria's primary short-term strategic objectives. It will resolve an issue of national importance to the ruling Syrian regime and restore a vestige of Syrian pride. Additionally, assuming that any treaty will be coupled with an economic aid package, Syria will have a huge financial incentive to restrain from military action. Syria will be able to focus on continuing the modernization of its military, and consolidating its control over Lebanon.
Full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights will enhance Syrian strategic security by removing the threat Israeli forces pose by their deployment in close proximity to Damascus. Moreover, any potential Israeli aggression will be deterred by the probable deployment of multinational forces and the untenable prospect of having to fight to regain the Golan Heights should it initiate hostilities.
Partial Israeli Withdrawal
In the short-term, partial Israeli withdrawal may have a high positive effect on deterring the prospects of future war. Any partial Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights will be accompanied by many of the same safeguards and constraints as a full Israeli withdrawal.
No Israeli Withdrawal
In the short-term, no Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights will have a low negative effect on deterring the prospects of war. Refusal of Israel to withdraw will exacerbate tensions with Syria and prompt that country to take measures to derail the peace process with other states. the possibility of Syria initiating a war in the short-term is low. Syria is still in the process of accumulating and assimilating large quantities of military hardware. This process coupled with the positioning of Israeli forces in close proximity to Damascus, serves as a powerful deterrent to Syria in the short-term.
Winning
Full or Partial Israeli Withdrawal
Full or partial return of the Golan Heights will have a neutral effect on winning a conflict since returning the Golan Heights is believed to significantly reduce the prospect of war to negligible proportions in the short-term.
No Israeli Withdrawal
N
o withdrawal from the Golan Heights will have a high positive effect for Israel and a high negative effect for Syria on winning a conflict. Israel would enjoy a decisive tactical and strategic advantage under such conditions.
Casualties
Full Israeli Withdrawal
In the short-term, full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights will have a high positive effect on reducing Israeli casualties. These reductions will occur due to a presumed Syrian commitment to control Hizbullah activities along Israel's northern border.
Partial Israeli Withdrawal
In the short-term, partial Israeli withdrawal will have a medium positive effect on reducing casualties. These reductions will occur because it is believed that any agreement will be accompanied by a Syrian commitment to control Hizbullah activities along Israel's northern border.
No Israeli Withdrawal
I
n the short-term, no Israeli withdrawal will have a medium
negative effect on reducing Israeli casualties. These casualties will occur
due to an incremental increase in the amount of terrorism from Israel's
northern border.
Terrorism
Full Israeli Withdrawal
In the short-term, full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights will have a high positive effect on reducing the frequency and intensity of terrorism against Israel. This is based on the assumption that any treaty with Syria will include understandings concerning Lebanon.
Partial Israeli Withdrawal
In the short-term, partial Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights will have a low positive effect on reducing the frequency and intensity of terrorist attacks.
No Israeli Withdrawal
In the short-term, no Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights will have a high negative effect on reducing the amount of terrorism against Israel.
Early Warning
Full Israeli Withdrawal
In the short-term, full Israeli withdrawal with have a medium negative effect on Israel's early warning capabilities. Israel will have to give up its ground early warning stations and rely on airborne platforms. These platforms will degrade Israeli early warning capabilities as their effectiveness is debilitated during periods of bad weather.
Partial Israeli Withdrawal
In the short-term, partial Israeli withdrawal will have a medium positive effect on Israel's ability to maintain its early warning capabilities.
Partial Israeli withdrawal will have a high positive effect on Syrian early warning capabilities since they also will be able to establish early warning stations on the Golan Heights.
No Israeli Withdrawal
In the short-term, no Israeli withdrawal will have a high positive effect on Israel's ability to maintain its early warning capabilities.
Strategic Freedom of Maneuver
Full or Partial Israeli Withdrawal
In the short-term, full or partial Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights will have a medium negative effect on strategic freedom of maneuver for Israel and a medium positive effect on Syria.
No Israeli Withdrawal
In the short-term, no Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights will have a medium positive effect on allowing Israel to pursue its strategic national interests free from third party interference.
Tactical Freedom of Maneuver
Full Israeli Withdrawal
Full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights will have a high negative effect on Israeli tactical freedom of maneuver. The effect would be medium positive on Syria’s tactical freedom of maneuver.
Partial Israeli Withdrawal
A partial Israeli withdrawal would have a medium positive effect on Israeli tactical freedom of maneuver. For Syria, medium negative.
No Israeli Withdrawal
In the short-term, no Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights will have a high positive effect on Israeli tactical freedom of maneuver and a high negative effect for Syria.
The two short-term matrices accurately reflect the bargaining positions taken by both sides during the peace negotiations between Syria and the previous Israeli government. Syria really only wanted a full withdrawal. An increase in the weighting (importance) of terrorism or casualties changes the optimal short-term Israeli strategy from partial withdrawal to full withdrawal. This demonstrates how the regularity of Hamas and Hizbullah terrorist attacks against Israeli targets created a new set of dynamics for the former Israeli government, and shifted the optimal Israeli strategy from partial to full withdrawal from the Golan Heights. This partially explains why the previous Israeli government was reportedly willing to commit itself to a full withdrawal from the Golan Heights. Faced with incessant terror attacks emanating from both the Lebanese border in the north, and from the West bank and Gaza, the importance of relieving the threat of terrorism, and reducing the number of casualties, gained an importance out of proportion to its real value. From a short-term political perspective the previous government had little choice but accelerate the peace process or to discredit itself.
Israeli And Syrian Medium/Long Term Strategic Interest Matrices
Medium/Long Term Effects of Israeli Full, Partial or No Withdrawal from the Golan Heights
The same values and weighted criteria used in the short-term Israeli decision matrix were used for the medium/long-term matrix.
War Amelioration
Full Israeli Withdrawal
In the medium and long terms, full Israeli withdrawal will have a high negative effect on deterring the prospects of future war. Evolving Syrian strategic interests and military capability may motivate Syria to renege on existing or future commitments. Moreover, the removal of Israeli forces from the Golan Heights will have removed the deterrent effect of having Israeli units deployed in close proximity to Damascus.
Partial Israeli Withdrawal
In the medium and long terms, partial Israeli withdrawal will have a high positive effect on deterring the prospects of future war. This assessment is predicated on the belief that any partial Israeli withdrawal will keep Israeli forces in occupation of key strategic points thereby deterring Syria from initiating hostilities.
No Israeli Withdrawal
No Israeli withdrawal will have a low positive effect on deterring Syria from initiating hostilities. The strategic advantage afforded Israeli forces, coupled by the close proximity of these forces to Damascus, will deter Syria from launching an attack until it is convinced that it has achieved strategic and tactical military parity with Israel.
Winning
Full Israeli Withdrawal
In the medium and long terms, full Israeli withdrawal will have a high negative effect on Israel's ability to win a future conflict. Even a demilitarized Golan Heights would pose a serious threat since the possibility would remain that Syria could achieve strategic surprise and occupy the Golan Heights before Israel reacted.
Partial Israeli Withdrawal
In the medium and long terms, partial Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights will have a medium positive effect on Israel's ability to win a future conflict. This is predicated on the assumption that under any partial agreement Israel will maintain control over those portions of the Golan Heights deemed tactically important to Israel.
No Israeli Withdrawal
In the medium and long terms, no Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights will have a high positive effect on Israel's ability to win a future conflict. Israel would start such a conflict with a significant strategic and tactical advantage virtually insuring that the ground conflict will be conducted on Syrian territory.
Casualties
Full Israeli Withdrawal
A high negative effect on reducing the number of Israeli casualties.
Partial Israeli Withdrawal
A high positive effect on reducing Israeli casualties. This is predicated on the conclusion that under any partial agreement Israel will maintain control over those portions of the Golan Heights deemed tactically important to Israel.
No Israeli Withdrawal
In the medium and long terms, no Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights will have a high positive impact in reducing the number of Israeli casualties should hostilities be initiated.
Terrorism
Full Israeli Withdrawal
In the medium and long terms, full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights will have a low positive effect in reducing terrorism from Israel's northern border.
Partial Israeli Withdrawal
Partial Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights will have a low positive effect in reducing terrorism from Israel's northern border.
No Israeli Withdrawal
No Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights will have a low negative effect on reducing terrorism on Israel's northern border.
Early Warning
Full Israeli Withdrawal
In the medium and long terms, full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights will have a low negative effect on Israel's early warning capabilities.
Partial Israeli Withdrawal
Partial Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights will have a medium positive effect on Israel's early warning capabilities.
No Israeli Withdrawal
A high positive effect on Israel's early warning capabilities.
Strategic Freedom of Maneuver
Full or Partial Israeli Withdrawal
In the medium and long terms, full or no Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights will have a medium negative effect on Israel's strategic freedom of maneuver.
No Israeli Withdrawal
No Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights will have a low positive effect on Israel's strategic freedom of maneuver.
Tactical Freedom of Maneuver
Full Israeli Withdrawal
A high negative effect for Israel. Any outbreak of hostilities would require that Israel fight below the Golan Heights.
Partial or no Israeli Withdrawal
Medium positive effect on Israel's tactical freedom of maneuver.
The results of the Israeli medium/long-term decision matrix illustrates that a full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights would be detrimental to medium and long-term Israeli strategic interests. Both a partial or no withdrawal are favored over full withdrawal by a ratio of over 4:1. Consequently, any Israeli government looking at its long-term interests would be compelled to refuse Syrian demands for a total withdrawal. Moreover, all of the criteria, with the exception of casualties, are sensitive to changes in the weighting of the criteria toward no withdrawal. Meaning that the cost to benefit ratio, among those variables measured, between partial and no withdrawal are virtually equal.
The Syrian Strategic Interest Matrix
Determining, and prioritizing, Syrian strategic interests was aided by circulating a questionnaire among various Israeli experts from the Jaffee Center in Tel Aviv University and the Begin-Sadat Center from Bar-Ilan University. The results of the questionnaires were tabulated and added to existing research data. The Syrian strategic interest matrix reinforces the prevailing perception that it is in Syria's long-term interest to press for full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights. However, it is critical to note that as with the Syrian short-term matrix, it would serve Syria's long-term interests to achieve a partial Israeli withdrawal than no Israel withdrawal from the Golan Heights.
Conclusions
The decision matrices accurately reflect current Syrian and Israeli negotiating positions. Unfortunately, it also reflects how difficult it will be to reconcile Israeli and Syrian interests concerning resolution of the territorial issue of the Golan Heights. The decision matrices confirm that it is in Syria's short-term and long-term strategic interest to secure full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights. In this respect, Syria's negotiating position has not wavered. Conversely, the Israeli decision matrix is somewhat more complicated, and reflects how both the previous Israeli government, and current Israeli government, could take seemingly antithetical positions concerning Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights, while maintaining that they were both pursuing a coherent strategy. Review of the results of the Israeli decision matrices explain the willingness of the previous Israeli government to agree in principle to a full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights, and to understand the seemingly antithetical positions taken by the present Israeli government.
The Israeli short-term matrix reflects that the optimal Israeli strategy is a partial Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights. However, this strategy was only narrowly better than a full Israeli withdrawal and was sensitive to changes in the weighting of two critical criteria. Either an increase in the change of casualties or terrorism shifted the optimal strategy from a partial Israeli withdrawal to a full withdrawal. These two inter-related issues were precisely the ones that rose to the fore of the Israeli consciousness during the peace process.
In the medium/long-term matrix, the optimal strategy is still a partial Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights. However, unlike the short-term matrix, the medium/long-term matrix is extremely sensitive in favor of no withdrawal, rather than full withdrawal. A change in all but one of the criteria (casualties) changes the optimal Israeli strategy from partial withdrawal to no withdrawal. In fairness to the Rabin/Peres government, their apparent decision to agree to total withdrawal from the Golan Heights may have been motivated by a favorable weighing of factors other than those measured in this study. Moreover, under the Rabin/Peres government, there was a sense of optimism that the implementation of the peace process, coupled with mutual confidence-building measures would create a new set of dynamics. This new set of dynamics could conceivably change the importance and values of the criteria measured. The results of the matrices confirm the prevailing conventional wisdom that resolution of the Golan Heights issue is extremely complicated.
The results of the decision matrix support claims by opponents of a full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights that Syria may not be interested in achieving a full and comprehensive peace and resolving the Arab
– Israeli conflict. Indeed, full peace with Israel would create a number of regional problems for Syria. Full peace with Israel would create a number of regional problems for Syria. Peace with Israel would lead to a deterioration of relations between Syria and its neighbors. Syria would then find itself bordered by a hostile Iraq and Iran. Its control in Lebanon would be challenged as any Syrian attempts to prevent attacks against Israel would be challenged by Hizbullah. Consequently, since such a peace is a non-starter with Assad, it would be prudent for Israel to pursue its long-term strategic interests.
The Prospects for War with
Syria
Examination of Syria's regional strategic goals and interests, coupled with its historical and current perceptions toward Israel, casts serious doubts as to the veracity of claims that Assad has made the "strategic" decision to make peace with Israel. The previous sanguineness of Maoz, and scores of other scholars and pundits, that a new Middle East was just beyond the horizon, may have been more a product of wishful thinking and misplaced optimism than an accurate appraisal of the situation. Should any future Israeli-Syrian peace treaty fail and the two countries drift towards war, then the removal of Israeli forces from the Golan will have left Israel in a much more tenuous position. Nor has the advent of new, more sophisticated weapons systems mitigated the strategic importance of the Golan Heights since most of these systems are dependent upon electromagnetic ray transmissions which require high-ground, line-of-sight locations.
Syrian Perspectives on Israel
As with most Arab states, Syria has traditionally viewed Israel as a foreign and expansionist entity forced upon the Arab world by the former European colonial powers. Syria defines its conflict with Israel in existential terms and believes the Arab-Israeli conflict is a struggle for survival between two irreconcilable movements. Syria views Israel as an obstacle to fulfilling its ambition of expanding to what it considers its historical, rightful, and natural boundaries. These boundaries include present-day Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel. Syria regards itself as the leader of Arab pan-nationalism, and sees the existence of Israel as an anathema to that movement. Assad views a peace treaty as the price he has to pay in order to regain the Golan Heights. His concept of a final agreement does not include any of the trappings of normalized relations such as trade, open borders, or full diplomatic relations. In short, Assad's concept of peace is different than Israel's, and more closely resembles a non-belligerency agreement than a peace agreement.
Syrian Strategic Objectives
Assad's departure from Syria's traditional confrontational strategy concerning Israel is designed to achieve three primary objectives:
- Establish and consolidate its power and dominance in the Fertile Crescent in light of new political realities.
- Build bridges to the United States in order to facilitate goal #1 and weaken United States support for Israel.
- Legitimize its rule in Lebanon.
Assad has chosen to enter the peace process in order to insure Syria a voice in determining its outcome and to achieve Syria's short-term goals, which are to regain the Golan Heights, consolidate its de facto absorption of Lebanon, influence the peace process, insure continued foreign aid and investment, and begin to erode traditional US support for Israel; all this to ultimately ensure her end. Assad's decision to participate in the peace process was motivated by three significant events: the collapse of the USSR, the defeat of Iraq in the Persian Gulf War, and perceived changes in US policy regarding the strategic value of Israel.
The Syrian-Iranian Alliance
The Syrian secular, pan-Arab vision of an "Arab integrated nation" seems incompatible with the Iranian view of creating a "unified Islamic world". While these two visions are destined to clash in the long term, the Syrian-Iranian alliance currently provides ideological and tangible benefits to both countries. Both Syria and Iran oppose the goals of the American-inspired "new world order". Success of the Arab-Israeli peace process will greatly diminish the influence and ability of both countries to achieve their long-term strategic goals. Both countries gain much utility from their vociferous opposition to the Jewish State. A reduction in regional terrorism will cost both countries their main tool for exerting regional and international influence. regional democratization, coupled with its associated concerns for human rights issues, could result in the eradication of the ruling regimes in both countries. The alliance facilitates a number of medium and long-term objectives such as:
- Creating an Arab-Islamic bloc to counter US hegemonic influences in the region.
- Building up a significant military capability to deter any potential threat.
- Creating a geo-strategic sphere of influence until Egypt, Turkey, and Algeria succumb to Islamic radicalism.
- Developing a worldwide terrorist network to facilitate the expansion of their influence.
Military Capabilities
On paper, Syria presents a formidable military threat to its neighbors and has devoted significant resources toward building its military. In a futile attempt to achieve strategic military parity with Israel, Syria has devoted upwards of 65 percent of its yearly budget to the military. The drive to achieve strategic military parity with Israel has reached such proportions that it has precipitated a severe economic crisis in the country. Despite its numerically formidable size, the Syrian military is plagued by logistical and operational problems. Even with replacement problems in some sectors the weaponry for missiles and chemical and biological weapons is formidable.
Towards War?
While the possibility of a limited war is possible, it is improbable given the enormous disparity in the cost-to-benefits ratio. If Syria achieved strategic surprise it could possibly make limited territorial gains in the Golan Heights and try to obtain a cease-fire before an Israeli counter-offensive. Syria would need the support of others. It is unlikely that Syria would risk losing its control over Lebanon and weaken its future ability to exercise hegemonic control in the region in such a risky military venture. By maintaining the region in an atmosphere of "controlled tension”, Assad is able to exploit and manipulate Western fears of a regional war to exert international pressure on Israel and force it to be more forthcoming to Syrian demands. The duration and success of any Syrian-Israeli agreement will be predicated upon Israel's ability to maintain the perception of tactical and strategic military superiority, rather than on fundamental changes of Syrian attitudes and perceptions toward Israel.
Whither the Peace Process?
The peace process has only marginally improved Israel's acceptance in the region. Israeli withdrawal from the territories will not diminish Arab perceptions of Israel as an alien and unwelcome regional interloper. It is the general consensus of most regional scholars and experts that deterrence of a future Arab-Israeli war is a function of Arab perceptions that the balance of forces greatly favors Israel. Assad has broken the "Red Line" understandings reached with Israel in April 1, 1976: Three commitments to withdraw Syrian forces from Lebanon; at least 16 agreements with Turkey. Not keeping an agreement with Israel might result from: failure of Israel and the Palestinian Authority to reach a final settlement on certain issues; Assad's perception of losing the pan-Arab nationalist banner to another; failure to obtain expected Western economic assistance; change in the Syrian regime.
The "land for peace" formula has been complicated by both its ambiguity and inherent asymmetry in negotiating empirically measured territories in return for an ideal that is empirically and conceptually difficult to define and open to differing interpretations. The post-Cold War Middle East more closely resembles 18th century Europe in which hegemonic ambitions, balance of power rivalries, and the security dilemma prevailed, rather than reflecting part of a "new world order”. Until Israel's neighbors prove capable of resolving their core social and economic problems that have provided the momentum for Islamic extremism, Israel has no choice other than to give precedence to its security concerns.
