The probability of an appropriate conclusion of the "Oslo Peace Process" is
assessed as very low, regardless of the Israeli political scene.
Were a "Palestinian" state to emerge in defiance of the aforementioned
probabilities, the probability of a successful emancipation of its Arab
population is also assessed to be very low, for want of an economic,
geographic, etc. critical mass and a cohesive, people-oriented political
culture and leadership.
Contrary to some Oslo expectations, the 1993-1999 trends point to the
(possible) emergence of a "Palestinian" state, not as a result of a heartfelt
understanding but, rather, as the result of a bitter, acrimonious, long
drawn-out confrontation that deepens hatred and mistrust.
Over 30 years ago, in February 1967, the then Deputy Prime Minister Yigal
Allon made a defense policy statement declaring that given its non-defensible
borders, Israel can only win a war imposed upon it, or, in some cases, survive,
if it can preempt by surprise (see June 1967).
Under 1999 conditions, given the increase in the pan-Arab (Moslem) threat
intensity created by the enormous growth in order of battle, the comprehensive
revolution of weapons technology, the permanence of asymmetry in aims of war
and war potential, the lessons of the last 30 years of war, the geopolitical
changes, etc., the reliance on preemption by surprise has become obsolete, nay,
Therefore, Israel has to maintain a higher deterrence level by holding onto
borders, i.e., onto some of the topographical assets, all of which are beyond
the (1967) "Green Line".
An emerging "Palestinian" state will therefore be forced, by definition, to
surrender its "rights": to maintain armed forces, to control its own airspace,
to conclude pacts, etc., which may endanger Israel, in addition to its being
criss-crossed by Israeli defense positions dictated by the present pan-Arab
realities, all that in a very constrained area.
The obvious outcome of an emergence of a "Palestinian" state under such
circumstances will be:
A constant collision of will, a fight for elbow-room with Israel, acrimony.
A permanent state of "twilight", i.e., a situation of alternating terror and
relative calm, highly erosive over a lengthy period of time.
A high certainty of "Palestine" joining any pan-Arab armed effort against
Israel, using its "under the skin" proximity to Israeli targets to give
guerrilla support to the joint effort.
A Palestinian "Drang nach Osten"
– irredentist efforts or even open conflict to challenge Jordan for
Importantly, combining the results of ballistic missile attacks on Israeli
urban concentrations with a determined "Palestinian" guerrilla effort may
seriously endanger the mobilization, equipment and deployment of Israel's
reserves, (main forces) that are counted upon to stem the tide when battle
starts. This delay stresses the importance of natural defense and strategically
important positions, i.e., topography. This scenario bears negatively on
It needs to be noted also that since Israeli deterrence prevents war, it is as
important a life saver to the Arab population as it is to the Jews, hence,
logically if not politically, (the level of deterrence) needs to be given
higher priority than the level of emancipation of what amounts to less that one
percent of the Arab nation, even if the Arab despots subduing these populations
may thereby be discontented.
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