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**AFTER OSLO –
THE QUEST FOR POLITICAL STABILITY
A "POLITICALLY INCORRECT" PAPER
ON AN APPARENTLY CORRECT SOLUTION**

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The reawakening of the Arab nation, and the growing Jewish efforts at rebuilding the ancient monarchy of Israel on a very large scale – these two movements are destined to fight each other continually, until one of them triumphs over the other.

Naguib Azoury – “*Le Reveil de la Nation Arabe*”, Paris, 1905.

1. Posit

- The probability of failure of the "Oslo Process" is very high and seems to be increasing with time. Since the main issues like statehood, boundaries, Jerusalem, the "Law of Arab Return," water, etc., have been deferred to the end of the present troubled negotiations of "territory for peace enhancing measures", it may be expected that, regardless of the Israeli government's policies, whether militant and demanding or conciliatory and compromising, the Oslo Process will die either suddenly, like of cardiac arrest, or gradually, like of a progressive paralysis.
- The sooner the crisis (Oslo's death), the more strategic and/or national assets will still be in Israeli hands. The later, the fewer assets.
- The years between 1993 and 1998, whether under Labor or Likud governments, have seen either **an increased peace euphoria with a parallel increase in terror and murderous "jihad" incitement** on the Arab side, **or an ebbing of the peace hopes paralleled by an ebbing of terrorist activities** and a slight toning down of the Arafat leadership's rhetoric¹. A paradox? Or, is it, rather, "herding" or "railroading"? Let's have a look:
- Territory has changed hands, but Arab animosity seems to be higher than ever, hatred as profound as ever, attitudes as vitriolic as ever, problems insoluble as ever and the horizon moves further away. Add the above mentioned main issues heretofore avoided and the conclusion will certainly be that the "Oslo Process" stands a very thin chance of success.
- However, slim is not nil. Let's, therefore, assume that the "Oslo Peace Process" **will** yield an agreement and a third Palestinian entity (Israel and Jordan being the first two) will emerge, either as an "Autonomous Entity" or as a State under Arafat's (or his followers') leadership.

How high will the chances be that this entity/state will provide the solid base required for the true emancipation of Arafat's subjects? After all, the call for "legitimate rights of the Palestinian people" is about the emancipation of the Arabs of Judea, Samaria and Gaza, and not about creating a nation for Arafat to rule... or at least this is what the world is told.

The probability of success of Mr. Arafat's entity in providing a base for his subjects' emancipation appears to be distressfully low. Following are some of the reasons:

- The (third) Palestinian state, very much smaller than stamp-sized Israel, will include three micro-regions, Samaria, Judea and Gaza, isolated from one another, like three separate small islands within the Israeli State.

Unlike Singapore, Hong Kong or the small oil rich islands of the Persian Gulf, Arafat's land will not, most probably, have outstanding economic or natural resources. Its water will have to be shared with Israel (common aquifers), its access will be, by agreement, tightly controlled by Israel to ensure its demilitarization and prevent unwarranted immigration, its airspace will be Israeli and its foreign policy subject to Israel's scrutiny.

Its economy will be almost totally dependent on Israel's (and, to a certain extent, Jordan's), subjected to Israeli customs, excise, taxation and other political economic rules – cut to fit Israel's measurements. With a GNP per capita gap ratio of between 1:13 and 1:15 constantly growing and an educational gap in high-tech and other modern high yield professions growing as well, with a major part of its labor force dependent on Israeli menial jobs, Arafat's land will be sentenced to a status of "choppers of wood and hewers of water" if confined to its self-inflicted state of siege, squeezed between the two states of Israel and Jordan.

This is fertile ground for unrest which, combined with the temptations of the relative "glittering riches" over the Israeli fence, is a recipe for an avalanche of violence that may lead to war.

A vicious circle of unrest/violence and Israeli counter-measures will result in a continuous state of friction or "twilight"², i.e. unsuccessful attempts to find a way to peacefully coexist intertwined with terror and with conventional and total war threats of the Arab World ("Arab Nation", correctly named in the Palestinian Covenant). The threats may, at the flicker of a spark, result in a major conflagration. The major conflagration will be avoided only by an Israeli deterrence fit to par the increasing intensity of threat. (See further – "Definition of Peace").

Thus, the promise of Arafat's "Promised Land" is one of a "stable instability", a continued "twili" situation, hardly one conducive to personal or community emancipation.

Where Israel is concerned, although it was born and has successfully matured with almost unheard of achievements during over half a century, surviving a prolonged sequence of "twilights", wars, embargoes, boycotts, ostracism ("Zionism equals Racism") and downright international mercantilist amorality, more "twilight" is yet another period of major, tiring, futile efforts that has to be catered to and faced with courage and determination. But, while coping with twilight, ways and means have to be sought to break out of the vicious circle and reach for normal cohabitation, striving to reach a state of political stable equilibrium, much like the stable equilibrium of a ball resting effortlessly at the bottom of a semi-spheric bowl, rather than balanced (with or without dexterity) on that same bowl turned upside down (which is not unlike the present political situation).

- After the parties pronounce Oslo dead and buried or after the Arabs of Judea, Samaria and Gaza find the conditions of emancipation totally unsuitable in Arafat's land – causing tensions to rise once more to a dangerous level, people will look again for a solution to the problem of what can be done to achieve stability. They will, probably, reach a number of conclusions not unlike the following:

There are two main prerequisites for a stable political equilibrium between Jews and Arabs:

- i. Safeguard a suitable level of Israeli deterrence vital to maintain peace facing the Arab Nation's (pan-Arabia) plus Iranian threat (of which the threat of the Arabs of Judea, Samaria and Gaza is a minor component) – (see further – The Definition of Peace).
- ii. Provide for the emancipation of the Arabs of Judea, Samaria and Gaza, i.e. the conferring of legitimate civil rights that include defined citizenship and opportunities to join, economically, politically and socially the family of developed or fast developing nations.
 - * Each of the two above mentioned vital prerequisites have a territorial imperative.
 - * The two territorial imperatives are practically super-imposed on stamp-sized Western Palestine, which renders the two prerequisites almost irreconcilable, a contradiction in terms.
 - * If peace between Israel and the Arab Middle East plus Iran is to prevail, no compromise on Israeli deterrence is to be allowed – for the good of both Jewish and Arab populations. (See further – The Definition of Peace).
 - * Oslo was bound to fail because it never provided for the two main prerequisites of Israeli deterrence and Arab emancipation. It attempted to achieve peace through a complex territorial compromise which, on one hand, is insufficient to become a solid base for Arab emancipation and, on the other, lowers Israel's deterrence level while the pan Arabian and Iranian threat against it rises continuously and dangerously.³
 - * The re-association of the Arabs of Judea, Samaria and Gaza with the kingdom of Jordan, which was a timidly exposed objective during the Madrid peace talks in November 1991, should be re-examined because, in spite of the monumental personal and political obstacles, it seems to be the only way to achieve a working settlement between the Jews and Arabs of Palestine.

2. The Oslo Hangover

- The Israeli Labor government's endeavour to reach an agreement with the Arabs following a century of conflict was decidedly a valiant and commendable one.

Its execution, however, left much to be desired. Arafat sent his team there with a crystal clear mission: "The objective is the establishment of a (third – Y.T.C.) Palestinian state whose capital is to be Jerusalem. The first phase is to roll Israel back to its 1949 Armistice demarcation lines." (there are no definite frontiers – Y.T.C.).

- Facing a politically well tried, mature, intelligent and streetwise Arafat team was an Israeli group of novices, young enthusiastic academics who "sneaked in" financed by European Union/Belgian money that allowed them complete academic freedom.

Apart from genuinely wishing to reach a peace agreement in exchange for territories, they had no detailed briefing, no set "milestones", no definite path to follow and, most important, no defense, economic or even legal and "hands on" grip on the situation. When agreeing to postpone the major issues of boundaries, Jerusalem, the Law of Arab Return, water, etc., to the end of the **negotiation and execution** of the "interim" withdrawals, the Israelis lost their trump cards before ever attempting to confront the hardcore of the issue. This is how the D.O.P. (Declaration of Principles) became nothing more than an agreement on the procedure of "Territories for the perpetuation of the process of further ceding of territories" instead of the team's aim of "Territories for Peace," which is a debatable objective as it is. The result was like that of a real dogfight between a simulator trained "pilot" who never left virtual reality and a veteran fighter pilot who never left the real environment.

How Rabin was "brought around" to endorse what he defined as "Swiss (Emmenthaler – Y.T.C.) Cheese, more full of holes than matter" is for historians to research.

- The U.S. State Department seized the opportunity most enthusiastically: the D.O.P. was an “improved” version of the State’s old “Rogers Plan,” this time proposed by the very Israelis whose Laborite Prime Minister, Golda Meir, rejected it with contempt in 1969.

Endorsed by President Clinton, whose Middle East foreign policy seems to be under a complete State Dept. spell, the D.O.P. has gained vertiginous momentum, terror increased in intensity and, combined with Arafat’s non-compliance, it went out of Israeli control until derailed by worried Israeli voters. Back on track, with shine, pomp and circumstance gone, with tooth-grinding insistence on vital but “gray” details, the Oslo process is sputtering along, if moving at all.

All the parties involved, mainly Israel, the PLO and the US., are working hard to resuscitate it, “*faute de mieux*”, disregarding both prerequisites of providing for the **Arab population’s emancipation** rather than buying the tolerance of a hostile leadership, and of catering to Israel’s grand **deterrence topographical imperatives** rather than dealing with the demarcation as if it were an issue between two quarrelsome neighbors on a far away island.

Oslo is not going to recover. President Weizman of Israel made a sad remark saying “the joy has been taken out of the Oslo peace process”. It is true, but in a different sense: the euphoric joy of the drunkard has been replaced by the hangover of sobering. “The day after the night before.”

3. Definition of Peace (The Function of Deterrence)

PEACE

- Although peace is the objective of all the diplomatic to-ing and fro-ing of the last years, no one has cared to define it the way an objective should be. Defining peace may have been too binding for politicians. Dictionaries, like “The New Collins Concise Dictionary”, do define peace basically as one of two totally different states of affairs:

- i. “Peace is a state of harmony between people or groups.”
- ii. “Peace is a state of no war.”

A “state of harmony” exists, for example, between the U.S. and Canada.

A “state of no war” existed, for example, between the U.S. and the late Soviet Union.

A listing of each of the two definitions’ “building blocks”, i.e. parameters, helps to understand their different natures and structures.

- To achieve a “**state of harmony**”, the following set of parameters is required:
 - i Common ethics and norms, culture, social structure, way of life, economic concepts, values in life, aspirations and political (democratic)⁴ outlook.
 - ii Freedom of across borders economic, tourist, cultural and ideological interaction.
 - iii No relevant conflict of interests.
 - iv Absolutely no aggressive motivation.

A “package” consisting of all, or, in specific situations, some dominant parameters mentioned above define a “state of harmony” and the harmony’s level.

- A “**state of no war**” implies that a relationship is war prone, defined by parameters in totacontradiction to the above mentioned, with the outbreak of hostilities aonly by adding one additional parameter capable of offsetting the negative influence of all others.

As world relationships indicate, the one, single and sufficient element capable of preventing outbreak of hostilities in a war prone situation is **deterrence**, as was the case between the US and USSR.

- **Deterrence** is defined, for the purpose of this paper, as “The mechanism of preventing war when war is otherwise highly probable or imminent”.

The main components of deterrence are:

- i A military might ready and capable of winning a war with the deterred antagonist, which will mean inflicting upon him a punishment of intolerable magnitude and consequences.
- ii A national will to use the military might if/when strictly necessary.
- iii A national economy capable of sustaining the military might and its readiness and of maintaining the national will’s intensity.
- iv A national leadership that exercises proper judgement in real time decision making and leads events rather than reacts to them.
- v An unambiguous conveyance of items “i” to “iv” to the antagonist so that he will be fully aware of their true meaning. (An unambiguous understanding of Israel’s deterrence would have prevented the misreading of the map by Nasser and the Soviets which caused the Six Day War of June 1967).

A proper deterrence posture will deter the antagonist on one hand and prevent own premature preemption, i.e. war, caused by underconfidence.

- **Military Might** is basically an informed, controlled, equipped, logistically supported, adequately managed, simultaneously combined manipulation of:

- i Fire power.
- ii Mobility.
- iii Terrain.

A certain trade off among firepower, mobility and terrain is the rule rather than the exception in the fielding of military might. Israel, for instance, succeeded to win its wars in spite of an acute inferiority in firepower, compensating for it by maximizing its mobility factor, thus achieving local superiority at focal points for a crucial period of time.

Russia (or the Soviets) wore off Napoleon and Hitler’s armies, trading terrain, vast expanses of it, for time and for the preservation/bolstering of its own forces. France did the same against Germany during World War I. So did the British in the North African campaign of World War II.

The major problem faced by the Israeli military is the total lack of geographic depth, which precludes classic trade-offs of terrain.

This is why Ben Gurion first established the war doctrine that stipulates that Israel’s wars must be waged on enemy territory, with Israel’s armed forces organized to do so, preempting by surprise.

The question raised considering, in view of the lessons of Israel’s wars, the magnitude and sophistication of the present Arab “Order of Battle”, the modern weapons’ technology⁵ and the Middle East geo-political facts, is whether the Ben Gurion doctrine is still valid in today’s circumstances?

The answer is not “yes”. Israeli Preemption by surprise, á la June 1967, is, in the circumstances, rendered quasi-impossible, while a variation on the theme of the Arab surprise of October 1973⁶ is a possibility. Remembering that it was the “occupied territories” that saved Israel in 1973, the conclusion is that the new reality created by the wisdom acquired since 1967, by the increased Arab-Iranian Order of Battle and the new weapons technology, including ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction requires much higher stress on the “terrain” factor than in the pre-1967 period. Given the fact that geographic expanses are non-existent on the Israeli side, the topography, i.e. terrain features aspect of geography acquires dominant importance.

Unfortunately, all Israel's topographic-strategic assets are situated east of the "Green Line" (that is the pre-1967 demarcation lines) on the Golan Heights or in Samaria, Judea and the Lower Jordan Valley (depression) which, incidentally, were all parts of the British Mandate for Palestine. Yet Samaria and Judea have a significant Arab population that, like Gaza's, has to be offered the proper environment for emancipation.

- Deterrence, the Determinant Factor of Arab-Israeli Peace

A survey of the parameters that define a "peace of harmony" in the light of Middle Eastern reality does not inspire much optimism.

Ethics and norms are as different between Arabs and Israel as they are between Saddam Hussein and Chirac (in spite of their business affinity) or between Saudi Arabia and the US or Western Europe.

The Islamic culture is, probably, the most important obstacle to understanding. It is an offshoot of the Moslem religion which professes Moslem hegemony, with Jews and Christians to be "tolerated infidels" named "*Dhimmis*".⁷ The world of Islam is divided into "*Ard El Salaam*" the Country(ies) of Peace, which are the Islamic countries and "*Ard El Harb*", the "Country(ies) of War", which are the infidel countries, to be eventually conquered by the Islam in a "*Jihad*", i.e. Holy War.

Another angle of the Arab-Islamic culture is its inbred anti-Western attitude, possibly the outcome of an inferiority complex resulting from Islam's containment and, later, eviction from Europe which coincided with the downfall of its eminence and the rise of Western civilization.

Although King Feisal of Iraq, the Hashemite, wrote Dr. Haim Weizman a brotherly letter of welcome following the issue of the Balfour Declaration that confirmed Palestine's consecration as a "Jewish National Home", the Arab xenophobic, anti-Western and anti-Jewish culture, combined with the religious animosity for the infidel who, against the Islamic logic, occupies part of "*Ard El Salaam*" and sets a Western bridgehead in the heart of Arabia⁸ stirred up the endemic Middle Eastern unrest, channelling its fury against the Jews from as early as 1920 and before, as prophesied by Naguib Azoury in the opening note of this paper.

Be it by error or by design, the British Mandate's governments added their own imperial fuel to the fire⁹, the result being the inevitable collision that reached its climax with the Israeli War of Independence of 1947-49 (called "The 1948 War"), when the pan-Arab defeat at the hands of the inferior Jewish forces added an unforgettable affront to injury.

The tribal, authoritarian, paternalistic, male-dominated Arab social structure stands in total contrast with the Jewish modern, Western society as do their way of life, respect of human life¹⁰, aspirations, character¹¹ and, of course, political regimes. Western-styled, democratically vibrant, economically unparalleled in performance in the Middle East, Israel is certainly the anathema of the Arabian-Iranian anachronistic dictatorships.

The conflicts of interests are intense. The Arab aggressive motivation is formally expressed in the pan-Arab aim of war: "Obliteration of the Zionist entity (i.e. Israel) and "repatriation" of the Jews to their respective countries of origin". This is the aim against which Israel has to provide an adequate level of deterrence or war waging capability if it is to survive.

The conclusion is that the philosophy of the Madrid Peace attempt of 1991 is rather more befitting the Middle East situation than the Oslo philosophy of 1993:

An Israeli-Arab peace, if attainable, is to be a peace of "no war" rather than a "peace of harmony" which is based upon a "new Middle East" as Oslo professed. The one stabilizing element of that peace is deterrence. Concluding an agreement with a segment of the Arab nation, a commendable act in itself, is, first and foremost, conditional upon that agreement not having a negative impact upon the overall Israeli deterrence of all pan-Arabia and Iran.

4. Emancipation of the Arabs of Judea, Samaria & Gaza

(The second of two prerequisites for Israeli-Arab peace).

- Given the geographic superposition of the Israeli deterrence topographic imperatives on the areas earmarked for the emancipation of the Arabs of Judea, Samaria and Gaza, a smooth, elegant separation between Israel and the Arabs is impossible to achieve, the two territorial requirements being practically mutually exclusive.

Admitting that peace between Israel and the Arab Nation (World) or parts thereof is decidedly gto be a “peace of no war”, means assuming that Israeli deterrence is the determinant factor of peace, working for the benefit of Jews and Arabs alike by preventing war and the resulting suffering. The well-being of the two ethnic populations demands to avoid war. This being the situation, logic, if not politics, indicates **that it is in both parties’ interest to give preference to Israeli deterrence** where and when a conflict of interests emerges between it and the kind or quality of the emancipation of the Arabs in these contested areas.

- Free from the Oslo intellectual and political shackles (this is a post-Oslo situation, remember), it would be advisable to go back and start from square one:

“Who are the Arabs of Judea, Samaria and Gaza, where do they belong, what are the alternatives for their emancipation, if any?”

“Which alternative, when selected, is promising to best provide for the peaceful development of the population proper rather than cater to any leadership’s ambitions?”

As ethnic particularism goes, the Arabs of Judea, Samaria and Gaza are one with the Arab citizens of Israel or the Arab citizens of Jordan. They all belong to the Palestinian sub-division of the Arab Nation at large. Family, tribal, cultural, economic and even political affinities disregard the existing frontiers or demarcation lines that cut through the areas inhabited by Palestinian Arabs. They maintain their ties regardless.

There is an argument, promoted mostly by the Israeli leftist intelligentsia and by some in Arafat’s elite, claiming that a new Arab nation, the “Palestinian Nation”, has emerged out of the purgatory of war in Western Palestine, especially with the separation of the Arabs of Judea and Samaria from Jordan, physically in 1967, as citizens – as of 1988, and the separation of the Arabs of Gaza from their Egyptian rulers as from 1967. History does not support this argument.

For example, the two Germanies emerging from the truncated Reich at the end of World War II in 1945, were led by their respective super-power “allies” on divergent paths, until becoming virtual enemies, antagonists in political systems, economic structure, culture, etc., even shooting at one another. Yet, when 44 years later the Berlin wall collapsed, (end 1989), the two Germanies fused into one in no time.

Although the scars of the past are not yet completely healed, nobody refers to the Germans as two nations.

Inversely, many nationalities have been cast together into the Russian Tsarist and, later, Communist “pressure cooker” for centuries. One would assume that the result would be a new “alloy”, a new nation, yet when the Soviet Empire broke up in the early 1990’s they all emerged practically intact, each one with its own traits of character and aspirations, as if nothing happened since they lost their independence. Yugoslavia is another, sore, example.

Nationhood proves to be a much tougher fabric than the promoters of the “New Palestinian Nation” profess. That raises the suspicion that they are more interested in “creating a nation” so as to prevent the “loss to humanity” of one of the two contenders to leadership of the Palestinian Arabs, the way

East-Germany's Ulbricht has been pushed off history's stage. Be that a legitimate aspiration or not, it has nothing to do with nationhood.

Let's then, agree that the Palestinian Arabs of Judea, Samaria and Gaza are not a "new" nation. They are, rather, a regional grouping of the Palestinian Arabs. Separated, for political reasons, from the first (main) Arab Palestine – Jordan – this regional grouping is led to autonomy or eventual (partial) independence by the Arafat elite which, if unsuccessful in its attempt, will remain "unemployed". Therefore, Arafat's stakes in a second Arab Palestinian state are obvious. This raises the question of whether this obviousness applies also to the Arab population proper of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza? If Arafat will be successful, chances are that ethnical forces will have the two ruling elites of the Palestinian Arabs challenge one another for Palestinian hegemony.

Wishing to avoid or, at least, delay the quest for Palestinian Arab hegemony, King Hussein dissociated himself from the Arabs of Judea and Samaria, his citizens, in July 1988, withdrawing his and his grandfather's claim to all Palestinian leadership. Time will tell whether this step will prevent the confrontation.

- **Alternatives**

If/when the Oslo process will collapse under the weight of negotiations and come to a final standstill or the Arafat entity/state will prove incapable of catering to the needs of its subjects, the "twilight" will, again, settle for the duration.

Assuming¹² that the Arab and Iranian expenditure on arms and military technology will stay at the present level¹³, that the level of the Arab and Iranian revanchist enmity will remain at the present level and that the totalitarian political structure of the Arab world will persist, the Israeli deterrence will also have to be kept at the adequate level to warrant a "peace of no war". That means that the deterrence territorial imperatives remain come what may.

Since emancipation has to be linked to statehood, i.e. to a citizenship, Israel and Jordan, Arafat entity's neighbors who are bound to bear the repercussions of instability or unrest, be it "twilight" or even war or a quest for Arab Palestinian hegemony "à la September 1970" (Black September), will have to look again for true, real, adequate solutions to the plight of the population of Arafat's entity, be it against the contentment of its leadership.

There are, in fact, only three alternatives of citizenship, the base of emancipation, to be bestowed upon the Arabs of Judea, Samaria and Gaza:

- i Israeli citizenship
- ii Citizenship of a restructured Arafat entity/state.
- iii Jordanian citizenship.

5. Israeli Citizenship

Israeli Citizenship for the Arabs of Judea, Samaria and Gaza is absolutely impossible to bear on Israeli defense and national grounds. The State of Israel will cease being a Jewish State and become, for demographic reasons, a bi-national state. As such, its **Arab sector will have to become privy to Israel's defense budget, policy and its implementation without any reserve, assuming Israel's democratic regime is to prevail and equality reign between its two sectors.**

But Israel's defense measures and deterrence are conceived to counter the very threat of pan Arabia, to which the Arab sector of Israel belongs and with which it is associated in every possible way, allegiance, blood and political aspirations included.¹⁴

Such a solution will not only be the end of the Jewish State as such and of the ideal of the so many thousands who died for it. It will be tantamount to a nation's mass suicide since it will dismantle the Jewish defenses in a viciously antagonist Islamic Middle East that is certainly not going to "change its spots" for the occasion and whose basic aims will not change right when opportunity is there.

Except for providing the Arab Nation with a Trojan Horse to penetrate the sanctum sanctorum of the Jewish fortress, Israeli citizenship to the Arabs of Judea, Samaria and Gaza will not be of a great help to their emancipation either.

As previously noted ("Posit"), a GNP per capita gap of 1:13 to 1:15 which is bound to increase, the educational gap, the cultural gap, the fact that J.S.G. Arab jobs are mainly menial, etc., will create a situation worse than that of African or Hispanic minorities in the US, to which doubt, deep mutual mistrust and even hatred will be added as a result of the Arab sector's dual loyalty, considering the Arab threat intensity that surrounds Israel. All these will combine to build a thick separating wall between the two sectors.

The tensions created by the mismatching of the two societies, be they economic, cultural, religious, political or even of a (legitimate) defense nature, will not only be counterproductive to emancipation but downright dangerous to the bi-national state's internal security as well. Bad for both sides.

Unrest will surely and, when "push comes to shove", why should the Arab half of Israel side with the Jews instead of participating in their d, the fulfilment of the basic, formal, initial aims of war professed in the name of Islam?

Logic and history say that in this case, all Arabs will stick together.

This is not a situation conducive to a bona fide assimilation of the Arabs in Israel and the parties' peaceful coexistence which should be the basis of their emancipation. Israeli citizenship is decidedly not the way.

6. Citizenship Of A (Restructured) Arafat (Or Pseudo-Arafat) Entity/State

The very rough sketch of an Arafat state presented in Part 1 of this paper ("Posit") should suffice to doubt its chances of survival. It would, however, be instructive to look into some Israeli defence orientated studies carried out during the Rabin – Peres government which promoted Oslo. The picture they portray is distressing.¹⁵ For instance, Gaza, with the highest rate of reproduction in the world (but for the Bedouins of Israel), with the highest density of population in the world, with an economy almost totally dependent on Israel for work and on the UN and others for handouts, with no education to speak of preparing the new generation to function in tomorrow's markets, with rampant corruption, assessed by the "Palestinian Authority" Comptroller to be about 40 percent (with others setting the percentages higher), with enormous "government" overheads, with spasms of terror that prevent normal economic intercourse with Israel, and with no Arab material, management or moral support other than incitement to unrest, is practically doomed to become another of the world's "black holes" like Rwanda or Southern Sudan.

Since the autonomy, the rulers rule, the religious leaders incite, palaces sprawl and Mercedeses abound, but the water aquifers have become saline because of excessive drilling, with thirst threatening to follow hunger, agriculture endangered, and the per capita income, down from about US\$3,500 (before the *Intifada* started at the end 1987) to a mere US\$1,200 per capita which, for a population with high intellectual potentials means, if not hunger, complete desolation. Gaza's unemployment is at about 50 percent.

Judea and Samaria are in better shape than Gaza, but not much. Its GNP per capita is down to "only" about 1,400 and rate of reproduction some 4 instead of 5 percent.

It is, of course, simple to put the blame on Israel (who else, of course?). Never mind the ten university colleges set up by Israel where none existed, never mind a revolutionary rise in GNP per capita from a few hundreds to about US\$3,500 per annum by the time the Arab *Intifada* broke out killing not only Jews and Arabs, but the economy as well. At the end of 1987 (start of *Intifada*), the Judean, Samaritan, and Gazan GNP

per capita represented some 47 percent of the Israeli GNP per capita of US\$7,500. Today, with terror, unrest, the resulting restrictions of work in Israel and tighter controls, the Arab GNP per capita went down, as mentioned, while Israel's GNP per capita soared, mainly due to the hi-tech revolution, to US\$17,500, about equal to that of Britain. About 250,000 - 300,000 foreign workers, Thais, Rumanians, Poles and Chinese work in Israel, replacing the Arabs of Judea, Samaria and Gaza who are suspect (because of Arab terror), unstable (because of frequent curfews due to terror), recalcitrant (because of their confrontational attitude) and often counterproductive because frequent cases of purposeful sabotage of their work (like pouring concrete to invisibly block a newly installed toilet, etc.).

Rather than create circumstances conducive to peaceful coexistence and mutual trust, the terror blood bath more than doubled over the *Intifada* average during the peak of the Oslo dialogue (see table on page 2 – POSIT). This was the main reason behind the Labor (Rabin, then Peres) government's downfall in May, 1996.

It is, therefore, hardly conceivable that the Israeli jobs, the mainstay of Arafat entity's economy, may be taken for granted once the autonomy or independence become fact while hatred and terror remain, or increase in intensity as during the Oslo euphoria.

It is also highly doubtful that the foreign aid, insufficient as it already is, will be there for an unlimited time. It is inconceivable that Arafat's totalitarian rule (95 percent votes "in favor" – does it ring a bell?) will be tolerated for long.

It is most probable that the main Arafat economic supporter, the European Union, will, sooner or later, follow in the US footsteps and demand more economic and political accountability from Arafat, which is practically impossible for him to deliver. No forecast development points to Arafat entity's substantially improving its top heavy, inefficient functioning.

The opposite seems to be true. Already before total independence, corruption is rampant, with Arafat appointing tens of "ministers" (beginning August 1998) without firing the ones his own comptrollers accused of corruption. He cannot, probably, do it, being accused himself of stashing billions of US dollars away, cuts of protection money, ransom, bona fide political or charity support, etc. Some sources assess Arafat's personal worth to reach ten digits.

After the exaltation and euphoria of autonomy/independence and its "*de rigueur*" festivities will die down, the daily life will be in bleak contrast to the expected. Unable to control the terrorist bases, careful Israel will tighten the "border" vigilance, reduce the ingress of the entity's workers into Israel to a bare minimum and unemployment will rise to impossible levels.

Overhead expenses will increase substantially with embassies, large UN missions and the associated Arab expensive manifestation of power. Weaning the new country from dependence on Israeli electricity, phone communications, water supply, etc. to reduce the "state of bondage" will mean huge investments that private enterprise will find too risky, politically. The higher the unemployment the more bitter the fight for jobs. Nepotism will go rampant.

Repression will increase and so will reaction to it. Almost no one doubts that the future is bleak for Arafat's entity. Opinions may differ on how bleak.

First, disillusion will set in, then bitterness, then fury. Fury generates unrest, both within and without, in Israel and Jordan. Lawlessness will prevail and the rulers' hand will be heavier, as will Israeli and, probably Jordanian controls.

Vicious circle, back to square one, back to the "twilight" situation that Israel will not, or cannot tolerate for long, so Israeli measures will become tighter. So will Arafat's measures. At a certain point during the negotiations, the late Rabin tried to justify the surrendering of control over the poor, unemployed, unruly Arab masses of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza to Arafat, saying that Arafat, unhindered by such "niceties" as High Court of Justice, B'Tzelem and other Western attributes, will do a better job suppressing terror and

unrest. That means that he conceded that there are situations where democracy cannot function and that Judea, Samaria and Gaza realities pertain to that situation. It was not easy for Rabin to concede that he needed a brute to do the dirty job for him. But even a brutal regime has its limits.

The conclusion is that an Arafat entity, whether autonomous or “independent”, will be, by its very nature and structure, a fomenter of poverty, injustice and repression and therefore a generator of unrest, mutiny and instability.

Arafat will have to do all he can to redress the situation. He will most probably use his plight to blame outside interference, Israeli oppression, Jordanian measures, an indifferent world, etc. All dictators did and do it. Friction will increase and sparks fly.

The fight for more “elbow room” on the Israeli “border” or Palestinian Arab hegemony on the Jordanian side (by subversion or force) will start.

The establishment of a (third) Palestinian entity, whether autonomous or independent will be counterproductive to the prerequisites of proper emancipation the Arab population of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza as it will be to the stabilization of the political equilibrium between Arabia and Israel, i.e. to peace. Although expedient in the present “Oslo” created circumstances, the establishment of an Arafat entity promises to be a short-lived, costly and very dangerous exercise in futility, the result of a myopic search for “quick fixes” to satisfy, maybe, mercantilistic interests and idealists’ or opportunists’ woes, etc. in the short range at the expense of future stability and regional peace, beneficial to the Jews and to the very Arab masses it is supposed to help emancipate.

7. JORDANIAN CITIZENSHIP

- Scanning Historical Events

When King Abdullah of Jordan, King Hussein’s grandfather, annexed Judea and Samaria at the end of Israel’s War of Independence, only two countries in the world recognized the annexation: Britain, Jordan’s creator, and Pakistan, also Britain’s creation and friend in the Indian sub-continent. No Arab or other country, nor the UN did.

Substituting for the beaten Arabs of Western Palestine by taking the lead of the war with the Jews of Palestine on May 15, 1948 (and ever since), the pan-Arab coalition had no plans for the establishment of yet another, second Palestinian, Arab state.

In fact, their plans to split the booty of the Jews have been thwarted by the Jewish victory. Apart from lack of sympathy with Abdullah’s growing in status to become the king of Arab Palestine, there has been another angle to the Arab refusal to recognize the annexation: Like Egypt in Gaza, the Arab countries preferred to prevent the political stabilization of the Western Palestinian Arabs’ situation, thus perpetuate their refugee or stateless status as a means of justifying their repeated war actions against the Jewish State and generate worldwide compassion. Hardly a brotherly loving attitude for the refugees turned pawns for over fifty years, but a very successful, if cynical political maneuver. To underline the Arab political success in keeping the refugees hostage, consider the total disinterest and indifference of the world community to the fact of Israel’s total integration of (among others) about the same or a larger number of Jewish refugees who fled, stripped of their belongings, the Arab countries, where their lives were endangered by the Arab-Israeli war.

So it was neither justice, sympathy or brotherly empathy that kept the Arab flame of war alive against Israel but, rather, the obsessive desire to drive the infidel Jewish Western state out of the Arab Middle East, a result of a “grand Islamic design” or simple gut feeling. Or the compulsion to recover lost pride - or both. When invoking “The plight of the Palestinians” helps Arabia’s purpose of containing Israel, harassing it, or eroding its capacity to resist the hoped for “*Jihad*”, “the plight” is invoked with gusto and imagination.

In spite of being technically still at war with Jordan, Israel did not feel particularly uneasy about the annexation. The obvious importance of Judea and Samaria to the defense of Israel was not lost on Ben Gurion. Two plans were made to take the regions at the end of the War of Independence,¹⁶ when the Israeli Armed Forces reigned supreme, but they were cancelled shortly before “H” – hour due to outside pressures.

The correct relationship being established with Hashemite Jordan alleviated Israel’s preoccupations with the control by the topography of Samaria and Judea high-ground over the Israeli narrow “waist” flatlands. Relying on Jordan turned often to be exaggerated. However, under present Autonomy conditions anxiety reigns. The Arafat army/police/militia forces are becoming increasingly antagonistic, to the point where Israeli forces have to be readied to face them in battle.

On the eve of the Six Day War, in June 1967, Israel made a formal, confidential demarche to King Hussein, letting it be known that, in case of Jordanian standstill in the coming war, Israel will not attempt to review the existing demarcation lines and refrain from any military act. Believing, probably, what the whole world believed, that Israel’s fate was sealed and that his position within the Arab world would become untenable if he does not join, King Hussein was, in fact, the only Arab commander to shoot first at Israel which preempted by surprise on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts.

He lost, therefore, Judea and Samaria following **his** aggression, proving that no “correct relationship” is permanently valid in the Middle East.

After the Six Day War, Hussein came to a fair understanding with Israel which retained control of the two regions, but let the Jordanian law prevail there (except in Jerusalem) for the Arabs, kept the Jordanian dinar as (also) legal currency and opened the bridges on the Jordan for what amounted to relatively free trade and travel.

Without Jordanian firm support, the outbreaks of terror were put down between 1968 and 1970. It so happens that they coincided in time with Arafat’s PLO armed uprising against Hussein in an attempt of the usurpation of the throne of the “foreign” Hashemites in Amman. Black September (1970) saw the chasing of Arafat and his PLO out of Jordan and his settling in Lebanon.

Later, in July 1988, when, after seven months of *Intifada* (December 1987 – 1993 unrest), Israel did not yet restore order in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan felt its interests threatened and unilaterally annulled the citizenship bestowed upon the population of Judea and Samaria in 1950, agreeing, however, to maintain ties and the validity of the Jordanian legislation and currency in these areas until today.

The status of Judea and Samaria became similar to that of Gaza – a no man’s land.

In spite of the cancellation of the Jordanian citizenship, most probably out of genuine concern, King Hussein agreed to attend the Madrid Peace Conference of November, 1991 at the head of a joint Jordanian – “Palestinian” delegation following Israel’s refusal to recognise a new (third) Palestinian entity.

Reviewing the Jordanian – West Palestinian Arab relationship over the last 51 years (and even before), the inevitable conclusion is reached that the two groups acted as one people torn between two political antagonistic leaderships widely separated by personalities and by their attitude vis-a-vis the Jewish National Home in Palestine.

The one, established by the late King Abdullah ever since he was appointed by the British as Emir of Transjordan (1921), aimed at reaching a working relationship with Jewish Palestine while keeping the “brotherly” pan-Arab embrace at an arm’s length, and yet simultaneously maintaining a close relationship with the Arab world.

This posture did, certainly, not endear him to his peers, the Arab rulers, who did not digest well his close relationship with Britain and pragmatic relationship with Israel.

The other, established by Hadj Amin El Hussein, an extremist who was appointed by the appeasing British as “Grand Mufti of Jerusalem”¹⁷, refuses to this day to accept the idea of a Jewish State in Palestine and aims to impose Arab rule in all Palestine (West and East), be it by violent or diplomatic means.

The Jordanian (Abdullah) school believes firmly in Jordanian independence, that implicitly means that the vicinity of a strong Israel which has no claims east of the Jordan except that of the exclusion of any stationing of alien armed forces on Jordanian territory, is a powerful strategic asset in its favour.

Independent Jordan and Israel do, thereby, have a potent common strategic interest that, when coupled with economic (and other) cooperation, act as a bond for peace, in favor of a political stable equilibrium.

The Hussein school, of which Arafat is a disciple, prevails in its single-mindedness of taking possession by force or by guile of all Palestine, i.e. Cis-Jordan (Western Palestine) and Trans-Jordan (Jordan), unifying all Palestinian Arabs under one rule and expelling the Jews, at least as a political entity, out of the Middle East.

The Oslo “agreement” seems to be an Israeli attempt at coming to terms with the Hussein School, starting with a (third) Palestinian political entity under the rule of Arafat or his followers.¹⁸

This is the way to a permanent state of instability.

In lieu of the above, it is logical to establish that:

- i Internal political division is no more a reason for splitting a nation in the Arab world than it would be in the intensely divergent Israeli Jewish political environment or elsewhere.
 - ii While Jordanian representation of the Arab-Palestinians holds a promise for stability, the artificial separation between Trans-Jordanian and Cis-Jordanian Arab Palestinian, although seemingly straightforward, is unnatural and counterproductive to stability in the area as it is to all the Palestinian Arabs’ safety, well-being and emancipation.
- The Downside

The tension between the House of Hashem and a fair number of its Palestinian Arab subjects, dating ever since the British imposition of Abdullah’s rule in 1921, is still fairly intense, the Arab memory being long on pride. Tension bred suspicion and suspicion brought about a heavy-handed treatment of the subjects by the Emir, who relied mostly on his faithful Bedouins.

King Abdullah was murdered while at prayer in the Mosque of Omar, on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. King Hussein survived quite a number of attempts on his life and coups aimed at the usurpation of his throne.

A major coup took place in August-September 1970, when Arafat’s PLO, tolerated at the time by the King in Jordan, rose against him and was defeated with very heavy losses, being subsequently chased out of the country.¹⁹

Claiming that Hussein’s rule was repressive since he suspected them of colluding with Arafat, the Arabs of Judea and Samaria were but passive onlookers when the Israeli Army moved in the regions in 1967.

By mid-1988, when realising that the *Intifada* uprising, started at the end of 1987, would be a long drawn-out affair over which he had no control, King Hussein decided (July 1988) to dissociate himself from his troublesome subjects of Judea and Samaria and annulled their citizenship, declaring that any claims to regions in Cis-Jordan (Western Palestine) were revoked.

The Oslo agreement offered the king a golden opportunity to formally and elegantly sever all ties with his former subjects, without raising any pan-Arab interference. Following his dissociation from the

Arabs of Judea and Samaria, he concluded peace with Israel, which was acceptable to the Arab world under the circumstances.

The severance of ties between the king and his former subjects, by now controlled by Arafat, deepened, following some frictions created by already obvious conflicts of interests, manifested mostly in Jerusalem.

Hussein, who before the *Intifada* declared proudly, like his grandfather, Abdullah during his reign, that “Jordan is Palestine”, presently considers this slogan to be downright offensive, although **Jordan and Israel, are Palestine**. Both states are the legitimate heirs to the British Mandate of Palestine created by the World War II victors following the disintegration of the Turkish Ottoman Empire.

Examining the pros and cons of establishing a third Palestinian State that will be struggling for breath and for a cleavage between Israel and Jordan, should convince King Hussein that some solution in line with the concepts of the Madrid Conference of 1991 would be more beneficial to peace and to all Palestinian Arabs. However, as it stands at present, strong opposition from the House of Hashem is to be expected when suggesting to get Jordan involved in Cis-Jordan again. Only if/when the House of Hashem will be certain that such an involvement will bring Jordan substantial economic, political and other benefits and that, following the mis-firing of Oslo and/or Arafat’s entity, a genuine loyalty of the Arabs of Judea, Samaria and (this time) Gaza can be secured, may King Hussein become disposed to reconsider. This is not impossible.

Arafat is also surely going to oppose any bowing to Jordanian authority or association with it.

Like Ulbricht of East Germany, he and his immediate entourage are going to become superfluous in this case and join him in the trash bin of history.

Therefore, even if logic indicates that there is no better way of securing peace (deterrence) and Arab emancipation than some kind of Israeli-Jordanian association in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, the political obstacles will seem to be insurmountable, discouraging any attempt to implement it. But if logic does not prevail, war will be, again, around the corner and the process will be repeated until stability is achieved.

- The Joint Israeli-Jordanian Involvement

Suppose that an academically diverse, high-quality group of positively inclined Israelis, Jordanians and jointly invited foreign participants meet, Oslo fashion, exploring alternatives or, rather, contingency plans in case of the Oslo negotiations breakdown or the Arafat entity malfunction.

Their objectives will include the long range stabilization of the Israeli-(pan) Arabian relationship (not only Israeli – “Palestinian”), the emancipation of the stateless Arabs of Western Palestine and the solution by way of “real politik” of the perennial refugee problem, taking into account the present realities and the property losses of the 1947 and 1967 Arab refugees **as well as those of the Jewish refugees forced to flee the Arab countries on account of the same wars**, (although the Jewish refugees are by now integrated in Israel).

In order to fulfil its mission, the group will have to dig to the roots of the conflict that started during the sunset of the Ottoman Empire (see opening note of Naguib Azoury), when neither Arabs nor Jews had a say in the Middle East, and it should proceed to learn from the errors of the past how to improve present coexistence, lessen frictions and maximize the well-being of the respective populations, while letting the present situation coalesce, not considering personal or partisan disagreements (*tabula rasa*).

People may try to ridicule such a “naive” approach, yet there is no basic difference between the Oslo procedure and the hereby suggested one, **except that the Oslo talks assumed that a peace of harmony could be achieved at will and that that peace with Arabia could be bought in exchange for territories ceded to the Arabs of Judea, Samaria, Gaza and Syria.**

Learning from Oslo's shortcomings, it is suggested that, this time, the terms of reference will be different:

- i The first objective is the creation of a politically stable situation between Israel and Arabia, starting with a peace of no war.
- ii The second objective is the bestowing of legitimate civil rights, especially citizenship, upon the stateless Arabs of Western Palestine, aiming at their full civil emancipation.
- iii The two above-mentioned objectives have to be reached in the Middle East as we know it (one does not reinvent or change the Middle East. at the flip of a switch).
- iv The final liquidation of the points of friction, including the "refugee problem" will be a third objective.

With different terms of reference, one may expect the team to come to a conclusion at complete variance with Oslo.

8. Conclusion

An ad hoc group of defense policy oriented, politically heterogeneous, academics carried out a number of brain-storming and formulating sessions whose objective was to assess the trends of future development of the Israeli-Arab relationships as from the present (July 1998) stage of the Oslo negotiations.

The unanimous opinion was that Israel is facing an indefinite state of "twilight" (as described), regardless of the Israeli government's structure and perseverance with the Oslo process. The emerging suggestion has been that Israel should adapt its defense concept and policies to cater for an indefinite period of "stable instability" involving intermingled negotiations, terror, threats and, in extremes, war with pan-Arabia.

It is felt, however, that a "twilight" situation is one of limited control over the country's fate, dangerous, morale-shattering, economically damaging and politically harmful. It should, therefore, not be accepted as an axiom, like weather, and no effort should be spared to find a way out of it, a path leading to a stable political equilibrium between Israel and Arabia (Iran) at large (not, as some do believe that coming to terms with the Arabs of Judea, and Gaza is sufficient).

Simulations made by the writer on the basis of facts, assessments, thoughts and speculations presented in this paper or expressed elsewhere, led to the conclusion that the (only?) way out of the twilight is for Israel to adopt, when the Oslo process stalls or the Arafat entity breaks down, a Jordanian orientation and enlist Jordanian as well as Judean, Samaritan, and Gazan Arab acquiescence or, better, support for a solution that will satisfy the two prerequisites for a stable, durable peace, namely:

- The Israeli control over its peace keeping grand deterrence territorial imperatives, which, by avoiding war, may be just as beneficial to Arab as it is to Jewish populations.
- The creation of an adequate political environment for the emancipation, political, economic, moral and peace orientated of the stateless Western Palestinian Arabs.

The formula that allows for positive answers to the two above mentioned prerequisites is the transformation of the heavily Arab populated areas of Judea, Samaria and Gaza into **JORDANIAN MUNICIPAL ENCLAVES LOCATED IN AN AREA WHOSE SOURCE OF AUTHORITY IS ISRAEL – (west of the Jordan River)**. This implies a steep uphill climb on the path to stability.

The implementation of this formula calls for an extreme boost of economic and other cooperation with Jordan, a long period of sustained, energetic worldwide enlightenment²⁰, a meticulous preparation and plenty of time. Although the steps toward implementation will be taken when, eventually, Oslo or Arafat's entity collapse, the time is ripe right now for feelers and contingency planning referring to both a violent and a peaceful transition.²¹

Following is a rough draft of a few articles bracketing the agreement for the implementation.

1. The source of all authority on the Golan Heights and west of the Jordan River is Israel.
2. The Israeli source of authority will delegate all the powers required by grand municipal enclaves in Judea, Samaria and Gaza to conduct a decent, well managed, dignified life in a way that does not impinge upon Israeli defense, ecological or water interests and that ensures massive, active education toward coexistence, cooperation and mutual well-being.
3. The Israeli source of authority will not delegate powers to control immigration or foreign policy of the enclaves.
4. At the conclusion of an Israeli-Jordanian agreement, Jordan will reinstate Jordanian citizenship to the Arab population of Judea and Samaria and bestow Jordanian citizenship upon the Arabs of Gaza.
5. The Government of Israel will remain in charge of the external security of the enclaves, while a local police force, commanded by Arab commanders, will report to the Jordanian Inspector General of the Police on matters pertaining to municipal or Jordanian matters of law and order and to Israeli designated authorities on matters pertaining to common Israeli-Jordanian maintenance of law and order.
6. The Israeli Government will carry out an outstanding effort and seek outside support to close, as much as possible, the gap between the Jordanian economy (including the enclaves) and the Israeli economy.

The Israeli-Jordanian agreement will define confederation as a target, supporting the Jordanian vital strategic interest of having a strong Israel at its side to provide active assistance against outside threats.

8. Where economic encouragement and the quality of life of the enclaves' inhabitants are concerned, their obedience to Jordanian laws and Israeli security regulations will be taken into consideration.
9. Upon the conclusion of an Israeli-Jordanian agreement on the issue of citizenship and Jordanian assumption of responsibility, the two countries will embark upon a joint aggressive enlightenment campaign to enlist international support. Until such an agreement is reached, Israel will do it unilaterally.
10. Subject to security and other specific considerations, the movement of people and wares between the enclaves and Jordan proper or between Jordan, enclaves included, and Israel will be free and unhampered.
11. Until the Jordanian involvement materializes, the enclaves will remain (extended) municipal autonomous units, associated with one another but with no central government.

These articles are but a sample, an indication of direction. ■

Endnotes

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- ¹ Lists supplied by courtesy of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Zahal spokesman, the Yesha Secretariat and MK Rehavam Zeevi, Member of Knesset's Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense.
 - ² A description coined by Haim Assa, late Yitzhak Rabin's National Security Advisor.
 - ³ Arab Order of Battle 1967-1998. See "Israel 2000. How Will It Fare if Shrunk to its Pre-Six Day War (1967) Borders?" Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto. ACPR Publications 1997. Y.T.C. formally testified on this issue before the Joint Economic Committee of U.S. Senate and House on October 27, 1997.
 - ⁴ See Kant's notions on democracies' reluctance to go to war. See Martin Sherman – "Despots, Democrats and the Determinants of International Conflict", McMillan & St. Martin's Press, 1998.

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- ⁵ For instance, Israeli military doctrine requires the standing armed forces to hold the line, when attacked, or a period of 48-72 hours, protected by the superior Israeli Air Force, until the reserves, which are the backbone of the armed forces, are mobilized, equipped and deployed to counterattack. Ballistic missiles launchings on urban concentration may play havoc with mobilization, delaying it considerably and require a major part of the Air Force for anti-missiles strikes. What then? The answer is, of course, proper topographic deployment of the standing armed forces along natural obstacles and on high ground that, for many a reason, is a force multiplier.
- ⁶ See note 4.
- ⁷ See, on this subject: “The Dhimmi, Jews and Christians under Islam”, Cranbury, 1985, by Bat Ye’or (pseudonym) the name withheld by this writer.
- ⁸ See, on this subject: **The Closed Circle; An Interpretation of the Arabs**, by David Pryce-Jones, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, London 1989.
- ⁹ See, on this subject: **A Peace to End All Peace; The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East**, by David Fromkin, Avon Books, 1989.
- ¹⁰ As Arab tradition goes, a man killed in battle is lucky, becoming a “*Shaheed*”, a holy man whose place is in Paradise, where all blessings such as food and women are aplenty.
- ¹¹ See on this subject: **The Hidden Hand; Middle East Fears of Conspiracy**, by Daniel Pipes, St. Martin’s Press, 1996.
- ¹² In October 1973 (Yom Kippur War), the Israeli government assumed that there was no imminent danger of war. The Egyptian and Syrian armies achieved tactical surprise and Israel was almost lost. Lesson: “In the totalitarian Middle East, don’t evaluate the situation according to what you believe the enemy is going to do but, rather, according to what his capabilities are, i.e. pick the worst case scenario.”
- ¹³ 42 percent of the world’s arms trade. US\$100 billion between 1989 and 1996.
- ¹⁴ See “The Dreams of the Israeli Arabs”, by this author, Jerusalem Post, Nov.16, 1996.
- ¹⁵ Y. Ravid, “Demographic Trends Worldwide and in the Middle East”, Draft, April 1997.
- ¹⁶ Operations “*Stav*”, end 1948 and “Tooth for Tooth” beginning 1949.
- ¹⁷ Part of Britain’s pre-WWII policies of appeasement. Amin El Husseini fled the Mandate and joined Nazi Germany during the war, helping to establish Moslem-Bosnian divisions fighting for Germany.
- ¹⁸ Proof of the Hashemite-Husseini divergence of attitude toward the Jewish National Home is abundant. The Israeli-Jordanian commonality of strategic interests was translated into facts during the War of Independence (ejection of Iraqi troops) and the Israeli support of the preservation of the Hashemite throne in 1958, 1968, and 1970.
- ¹⁹ Arafat and the PLO settled in Lebanon, undermining the fragile Lebanese regime and finally causing the Lebanon War of 1982.
- ²⁰ Enlightenment – the presentation of the (Israeli) position to the relevant national and international forums as if were in front of a court of justice, i.e. in a professional, methodical, aggressive manner with perseverance and verve and, of course, persuasion. Propaganda, plain information or public relations are by no means sufficient.
- ²¹ The writer’s experience may be enlightening: As Chief of Operational Requirements and Air Force Planning, the writer started threats analysis and then planning for contingency early in 1963. The outlines were completed in 1964 and detailed operational planning in 1965. When the Six Day War broke out by mid 1967, what was the contingency plan became a War Plan.