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Summary
The differing geostrategic
positions of the USA, Western Europe and Israel have given rise to the subject
of missile defense. Even between Western European states there are diverse views
on the subject, reflecting the variations in military capabilities, foreign
policies, financial and technical resources, threat perceptions, and in the
proximity and precise nature of any such threats. Whereas the USA, and, to a
lesser extent, Israel, might pursue purely national policies and solutions with
regard to missile defense issues, the Western European states are more
constrained because of their geostrategic positions and because of the degree to
which their foreign and military policies have become interwoven through
international organizations, notably the European Union and NATO. If European
air-space is indivisible, then so are the technical, military, economic, moral
and legal problems which missile defense involves.
NATO’s policy on Extended Integrated
Air-Defense (EIAD) weaves together four distinct strands: deterrence,
counterforce, passive defense (including arms control) and active defense. At
the moment, deterrence is accorded the most importance. NATO’s counterforce
capabilities are strong, but there is considerable debate in Europe as to
precisely how and when these might be employed. Furthermore, the elements of
EIAD are not only mutually reinforcing but also competitive to a degree.
Arms-control or effective counterforce capabilities could reduce the passive
defense burden. Alas, furnishing an appropriate level of passive and active
defense for anything but deployed forces would be prohibitively costly. Nor
could pure defense offer total protection; providing passive defenses for entire
populations is largely impracticable and would offer only scant protection
against WMD. Active defenses, by contrast, could be circumvented by
unconventional delivery means, including acts of terrorism involving WMD, and,
in any case, could not be made wholly impermeable to orthodox threats. A major
difficulty is discerning and achieving the appropriate blend of EIAD ingredients
in a mercurial, scenario-dependent environment, for this is the key to force
design and strategic planning.
Although the USA is investing
considerable resources in BMD especially, the difficulties involved in
intercepting missiles once they are in flight are awesome. At the moment,
European NATO envisages that the whole of its territory will be in range of
ballistic missiles, some armed with WMD, by 2010. The expansion of NATO
eastwards is compounding this problem. An active defense is unlikely to
materialize in the foreseeable future, except perhaps for the protection of
deployed forces. This means that the reliance on deterrence and counterforce is
likely to persist, prompting questions about the precise circumstances in which
military force will actually be used: will it be as an act of prevention, or
pre-emption or of retaliation?
The article covers the following
themes:
The different strands of EIAD and contrasting
Western attitudes to them;
Historical experience of missile defense,
notably Britain’s in World War !! and the problems highlighted by the Gulf War;
The mechanics of missile interception and
the operational and technical difficulties involved;
The legal, political, moral,
economic and procurement difficulties inherent in missile defense, particularly
those relating to the active force in preventive or pre-emptive attacks.
For the complete text of this article in Hebrew, click
here.
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