


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POLICY PAPERS



# At what Price the Golan Heights?

Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto

# AT WHAT PRICE THE GOLAN?

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## SUMMARY

The Golan Heights are considered by the Israeli military chiefs (incumbent) to be vital and irreplaceable in case of war. This opinion has been shared by U.S. military missions, Russian GHQ Generals and practically everyone who evaluated the situation *in situ*. The loss of the Golan means a dangerous deficiency in deterrence, which, by definition, requires a capability to win a war, with Syrian and her allies in this case.

However, the Israeli parliamentary factions and population are divided over the nature of peace that may, eventually, be achieved with Syria. Is peace with Syria to instantly become a "state of harmony", like that between the U.S. and Canada or, will it be, if at all, a "state of no war", like that between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in the past, in which case, the deterrence is the only one vital and sufficient safeguard of peace and has to be kept at the proper level, based upon the lessons of the past?

The division on the nature of peace became, in the case hereby discussed, a division on whether or not Israel should surrender the Golan to Syria in exchange for a peace agreement. Yet both those favouring surrender and those who are against it insist on a strong Israeli deterrent. An Israeli paradox. This paper analyses the nature and cost of a partial military substitute for the Golan, were those in favour of surrender to carry the day.

The military partial substitute's costs are assessed to be about US \$20 billion plus another US \$5 billion a year for maintaining the units' readiness, and the civilian relocation costs are estimated to be US \$10 billion. The Israeli economy may not be able to carry this burden and, if the U.S. is going to foot the bill, the question to be asked is whether it is worthwhile to pay such a price in order to turn a U.S. asset (see Sen. Helm's remarks) into a liability?

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- \* Member of the 12th Knesset (Israeli Parliament).
  - \* Member of the Israeli Peace Mission, Madrid, 1991.
  - \* Air Force participant, during Deputy Secretary of State Joseph Sisco's visit of the Golan in 1974 to finalise demarcation lines prior to Cease Fire agreement.
  - \* Senior Air Staff Officer at Army Corps level during the Lebanon War 1982-3.
  - \* Head of Air Force Planning and Air Force Operational Requirements (including Program Definition, R&D, T&E, Operational Research, Tech. Intelligence) - prior to the Six Day War. (See writer's book "By Day, By Night, Through Haze and Fog", Ma'ariv Publishers, April 1995).
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## 1. Background

Like Gen. Amnon Shahak in a December 1995 statement, like his four predecessors as Chiefs of General Staff (while incumbent), like the U.S. military missions that studied the case and like the Russian G.H.Q. generals who visited Israel in June 1992, the writer is of the opinion that the Golan Heights are absolutely indispensable to Israel's defense in case of war, even more so at present and in the future than in the past, given the enormous quantities and quality of arms now threatening its frontiers and the deployment of significant quantities of ground-to-ground ballistic missiles (possibly with mass destruction warheads) threatening its rear.

That means that the loss of control over the Golan Heights entails a grave loss of deterrence for Israel, which translates, especially in totalitarian regimes like Syria's, into an irresistible temptation to start a fifth round in its war against Israel. A lower level of deterrence, i.e., a higher uncertainty of winning an eventual war with Syria (or Syrian and Pan Arab alliance) means also that, like during the Six Day War of June 1967, Israel will find itself compelled to preempt at an earlier stage of what it perceives to be a mounting threat than if it were certain of winning under any circumstances.

Having said that, the writer believes that possible substitutes, be they partial, for the Golan Heights like, for instance, the suggestions allegedly made by State Dept. Warren Christopher<sup>1</sup>, have to be discussed and quantified as much as possible, be it to gain a better insight into the potential implications.

## 2. Lessons of the Israeli Recent Past that Apply to Present Negotiations or Deterrence Posture.

### 2.1 *The Lesson of the Balfour Declaration* — November 1917

"**A Jewish National Home in Palestine**". A typical diplomatic, politically correct, generally acceptable document, the Balfour Declaration, endorsed in its entirety by the League of Nations (U.N.'s predecessor), was, nevertheless, catastrophic when put to test.

- **What is a National Home?** A state? A dominion? A protected minority? A country club?
- **"In Palestine"**? The whole of Palestine? Part thereof? Which part thereof? We are approaching the eightieth year of warring to clear the ambiguities of the Balfour Declaration.

**Lesson 1.** A peace treaty with the Arab world or any Arab nations which are part thereof has to be unambiguous, clear, accurate, leaving no room for doubt or misunderstandings. (This lesson does not refer to the collaterals required for such a treaty.)

### 2.2 *The Lesson of the War of Independence*

The fate of European Jewry during World War II and the existential problems of the Jews in Palestine and throughout the Arab world did not activate the powers in control of the Middle East until Jewish resistance forced the British out of Palestine and thrust the necessity of a decision upon the international community, i.e., the reluctant United Nations.

Nobody was interested in the fate of the Jews as an ethnic group in spite of the Holocaust during WWII.

When the U.N. could not enforce its partition plan of November 1947 and the Arabs attacked, nobody was there to help the fledgling emerging state. On the contrary, with the Soviet Union out of the Middle East, even the U.S. refrained from a "*de jure*" recognition of the Jewish state and embargoed all arms shipments to the "Middle East", knowing only too well that the Arabs were openly supplied by the British with arms and, in some cases, with officers. Attacked by the Arab Nation, sabotaged politically by Britain's Bevin and written off militarily by famous generals like George Marshall of the U.S. and Montgomery of Britain, Israel was left to bleed white before winning the war.

**Lesson 2.** Nobody bets on a dead or dying horse. When weak, one's left alone to break it, or, eventually, make it.

### 2.3 *The Lesson of the Sinai Campaign/Suez Affair of October-November 1956*

After a number of days of war and deliberations, when it became clear that the U.S. disproves of the Anglo/French/Israeli move, the Soviet Union stood by Egypt's Nasser and threatened his foes with a nuclear strike unless fire ceased immediately.

It is improbable that the U.S. would have tolerated a Soviet nuclear attack on its NATO allies or (even) on Israel, although it related angrily to their action.

The precedent would have meant courting disaster. This considerably reduced the credibility of the Soviet ultimatum but, given the amplitude of the risk of total destruction, the warring alliance/collusion had to comply, be the probability of threat implementation as small as it may.

The Soviet ultimatum found the Israelis in full possession of the Sinai, having achieved all their objectives in four days. At that same time, the Anglo-French were far from occupying the Suez Canal Zone, as planned.

While Israel was in a perfect position to accept a cease-fire and negotiate, the Anglo-French suffered total defeat and had to withdraw unconditionally.

Time, about a ten-day window, was of essence.

**Lesson 3.** "In a conventional war fought by non-nuclear antagonists in an area of Super Power interests, military decision has to be reached before a nuclear threat develops to one or both parties".<sup>2</sup>

#### Notes:

- a. Planning for the contingency that became the Six Day War, the writer took this time constraint into account.
- b. Although the Cold War is over, the most probable possession of weapons of mass destruction and large quantities of ballistic missiles by irresponsible dictatorships like Syria for example, revalidate the "Nuclear Time Constraint".

### 2.4 *The Six Day War (June 1967) Lessons*

- a. After the Sinai Campaign, Israel returned the Sinai to Egypt in 1957 under very intense U.S. pressure, in exchange for U.S. guarantees of Egyptian demilitarisation of

the Sinai and of Israeli free shipping southbound, through the Egyptian controlled Red Sea passages. The U.S. guarantees were reinforced by the presence of U.N. troops in the Sinai to ensure the bona fide Egyptian adherence to the demilitarisation and free passage clauses. When, ten years later, Nasser decided to renege on his obligations, closed the Red Sea passages to Israeli shipping and poured his troops into the Sinai, the U.S. found itself unprepared to fulfill the obligations assumed and the U.N. troops left. Israel remained alone, minus the Sinai, facing a Soviet-backed Egyptian-Syrian-Jordanian war situation.<sup>3</sup> The world was very sympathetic to Israel but did not move a finger to prevent its pending doom.

- b. The Soviet backed Egyptian move came at a time when the Israeli Government was considered to be lacking willpower (Eshkol) and after the enormous supply of Soviet arms was integrated, with the help of Soviet instructors, into the Syrian and Egyptian armed forces so that the Israeli quantitative and (so believed) qualitative inferiority was certain. The barrier of deterrence lowered, war stepped in.
- c. At the end of the war, when Israel's crushing victory became evident... it was censured by the international community that did nothing to enforce Egyptian adherence to the cease fire agreed upon in 1957. The U.N. and the U.S., which reneged on their own obligations, joined those insisting on immediate Israeli withdrawal.

The Six Day War lessons are four:

**Lesson 4.** "Foreign guarantees (see also Munich in 1938 and others) are eroded by time, for one reason or another".

**Lesson 5.** "U.N. troops have never been a worthy instrument unless led by a major power, normally the U.S., when they served that major power's major interests" (for instance, Korea).

**Lesson 6.** "An image of political weakness and military inferiority means loss of deterrence which, when facing non-democratic, Middle East antagonists, is a sure recipe for war".

**Lesson 7.** All wars, be they waged by a party forced to wage it by the most justifiable circumstances and supported by the vast majority of world opinion, require a very energetic enlightenment<sup>4</sup> support effort to prevent the loss of the spoils of victory gained at a high cost in life and material.

### 2.5 *The Yom Kippur War (1973) Lessons*

**Lesson 8.** "All evaluation of the situation in the volatile unstable, highly emotional, totalitarian Middle East, has to cater to a 'worst case' scenario, unless absolutely certain, solid intelligence data indicates the contrary".

**Lesson 9.** Even the government of a war wise country like Israel is prone to err and choose 'wishful thinking'.

### 2.6 *The Gulf War Lesson - The enhanced importance of the Time Factor.*

Thirty-nine SCUD missiles were launched in 1991 by the Iraqis at Israel during the Gulf War over a period of 14 days. One life was lost directly due to a missile hit and three more through events related to the bombardment. A large number of homes were destroyed. However, the noticeable effect of the SCUDS was a mass exodus from the urban target areas and almost a complete paralysis of the economy. Under these circumstances, one may assume that, even at this rate of bombardment, a reserves mobilisation would have been very sluggish, hence delayed.

#### 2.6.1 *The Time Factor*

- a. The Israeli war doctrine calls for the Standing Armed Forces (S.A.F.) to be able to par any enemy onslaught and prevent its advance for a period of about 48 to 72 hours until the reserves, of which the vast majority of the Israeli Armed Forces consist, are mobilised, equipped and deployed (very short distances!) for counter attack.

The S.A.F. are to hold the line while covered and supported (fire and assault transport) by the Air Force whose constant readiness is high and which is supposed to achieve immediate air superiority<sup>5</sup> over the battle zones.

- b. In the case of Egypt, the Sinai expanse of desert offers a certain leeway to Israeli time/distance decision considerations.
- c. In the case of Jordan, if Israel insists on Jordan being free of other than Jordanian troops (its occupation being a "casus belli") the time taken for third party armed forces to occupy it, in whole or in part, also offers Israel a certain leeway in time/distance decisions, provided that Israel holds positions on the length of the Jordan River.

It should be noted that the basic Jordanian strategic interest is to have a strong Israel by its side so as to deter such "brotherly" incursions. Jordan will feel compelled to join an enemy alliance only if it will believe that Israel is doomed, as was the case during the beginning of the Six Day War. Otherwise, like in 1973, it will provide depth.

- d. The case of the Syrian-Lebanese front is totally different. With the Golan in Syrian hands, one may assume that a Syrian decision to attack Israel will be followed by an immediate deployment of forces on the (demilitarised) Golan, guarantees or "observers" notwithstanding, in which case the Syrian threat will be at close quarters, bearing from a forbidding topographical superiority in the tactical, mobility, intelligence and air defense domains.

The only way to partially offset such an immediate threat is to deploy a much larger standing army ready to confront the Syrians from (down) the Jordan Valley and beyond, ready to take position at the foot of the Golan, within a time lapse shorter than that required for the Syrians to occupy the demilitarised zone (and yet allowing for high level political and military decision making).

#### 2.6.2 *The Ballistic Missiles Impact on the Time Factor*

It is reasonable to assume that a Syrian sudden attack will start with a massive launching of SCUD type missiles against urban concentrations and large military targets such as air bases, depots, etc.

Apart from lives, material and morale losses, the certain effects will be:

- A significant delay of reserves mobilisation and deployment, as mentioned.
- A diversion of the Air Force from front line air superiority and support efforts to large scale anti-SAM and then anti-SCUD efforts and possible punishing retaliations.

This way to start a war is an additional, very powerful argument in favour of maintaining the best geographical and topographical deployment of the S.A.F., i.e., of keeping the Golan.

But if Israel is to withdraw from the Golan, as suggested by Christopher, the event of the ballistic missiles will require an additional strengthening of the already strengthened (para. 2.6.1.d) S.A.F. facing the Golan, an increase in Air Force size to enable it to allocate sorties to both SAM and ballistic missiles as well as front line and added Israeli anti-aircraft capabilities on the front line plus more real time intelligence collecting and processing units, airborne, space or otherwise and, of course, enhanced Command, Control, Communications & Intelligence facilities (C3I) to coordinate all above.

#### Note:

The anti-ballistic missiles effort requirements that are not induced by the Israeli withdrawal from the Golan (which go into more billions of US dollars) are, of course, not discussed in this article.

**Lesson 10.** The event of the massive Arab (potential) use of ballistic missiles, be they armed with conventional warheads only, implies, among other matters, a considerable delay in the mobilisation, equipment and deployment of the Israeli reserves and a reduction in the Air Force's air superiority and support capabilities on and in the vicinity of the front line.

### 3. Highly Probable Scenarios

Given the highly volatile, unpredictable Middle Eastern political realities, one may, where the fate of the Golan Heights is concerned, assume that there exists a high probability that the following will happen:

- a. Internal developments in Syria and/or
- b. An Israeli display of political/military weakness and lack of national will and/or

- c. An increased Syrian aggressive attitude resulting from a Syrian-Iraqi or Syrian-Iranian (or a threesome) active military alliance plus the promise of Egyptian pinning down of Israeli forces (at least) and/or
- d. The occupation of Jordan by either Syria, Iraq or Saudi Arabia (or the three), be it by force or through the usurpation of the Hashemite throne, which forces Israel to re-occupy whatever "Palestinian" entity that may have emerged following Oslo and/or
- e. An unsatisfied Arafat resorts to renewed use of force in the Autonomous Areas (Arafatahland) and enlists Syrian support and/or
- f. Egypt reneges on its peace agreement with Israel and joins Syrian alliance, threat, etc. As a result, Syria may opt for war with Israel, irrelevant of whether it signed a peace treaty with it or not. (Remember the mutual defense, etc. treaties between Iraq and Kuwait).

If Israel is in full possession of the Golan, i.e., proper intelligence outposts, natural topographic defensive positions, close to front logistics, solid lines of communications and it threatens Damascus from close range, the chances of Syria actually launching the war are infinitely lower than if Israel returned the Golan to Syria which will then enjoy a crushing topographical, strategic, tactical and intelligence superiority, unless a substitute for the Golan is in existence.

### 4. The Nature of a Partial (Poor) Substitute for the Golan Heights, Discussion:

#### 4.1 Definitions of Peace.

- 4.1.1 The dictionaries define peace as either of two situations: i. A state of harmony between people or groups. ii. A state of no war. An unbridgeable gap separates the two.
- 4.1.2 **A state of harmony**, like the peace prevailing between the U.S. and Canada, is characterized by commonality of culture, political structure, economic system and income per capita. Welganschaung, by cultural and economic interaction, etc. and upon the total lack of relevant

conflicts of interests and, of course, of aggressive motivation.

- 4.1.3 **A state of no war**, like the U.S. - U.S.S.R. Cold War that ended, exists when there are very large gaps/divergences among all or many of the above mentioned factors (that require commonality) as well as powerful conflicts of interest and aggressive motivation. In fact, a state of no war exists only when a decisive factor - deterrence - intervenes to offset the other, negative factors that are otherwise conducive to war.

#### 4.2 *The Israeli Paradox*

- 4.2.1 Although any fleeting or profound examination of the Arab-Israeli conflict leads to the firm conclusion that an Israeli-Arab peace can only be one of "No War" (as expected at the Madrid Peace talks of November 1991), for the foreseeable future at least, the Israeli electorate is, in fact, divided over whether it is possible to attain a peace of harmony ("New Middle East"), regardless of the parameters pointing only to the possibility of reaching a peace of "No War". A fact hard to explain, but a fact, nevertheless. One party is, of course, more willing to forgo strategic assets than the other.

##### 4.2.2 *Definition of Deterrence.*

- i. Deterrence is the single, vital and sufficient instrument of maintaining peace (of No War) when the existent circumstances are otherwise conducive to war.  
The prevention of war is achieved by letting the deterred party understand fully that a war will be unacceptably costly to it. It is also achieved by relieving the deterring party of the imperative premature preemption due to lack of confidence.
- ii. Deterrence consists of:
  - A military capability (force) sufficiently strong to win a war with the opponent being deterred, were it to break out.
  - A national will to apply the said force if/when circumstances demand.

- An economy capable to sustain the force (and the will) at the required readiness.
- Having the leadership for building the force, the will and the economy and maintaining them.
- Efficiently conveying the message of force, will, economy and leadership to the antagonist, to prevent his underestimating the deterrence capability, as has been the case in the Six Day War of 1967.

##### 4.2.3 *Definition of Force (Military Capability)*

- a. A military force is an informed, managed, supplied, maintained and coordinated use of three factors:
  - i. Firepower;
  - ii. Mobility;
  - iii. Terrain.
- b. Terrain has two distinct features:
  - i. Geography, like expanse, climate, vegetation, road infrastructure, population, etc.
  - ii. Topography - i.e., the contours and nature of the terrain, like mountains, valleys, rivers, etc. affecting both mobility and firepower as well as the force's natural defenses, intelligence potential (line of sight), anti-air protection (line of sight) and communications (line of sight).

A certain percentage of each of the three factors may be traded off against a certain percentage of either of the two others, hence one may say that:

$$\text{deterrence} = f(\text{firepower} \times \text{mobility} \times \text{terrain}).$$

This "equation" is laid down to emphasize that if one of the three factors is reduced ad absurdum, the value of deterrence approaches zero.

This is, in fact, Israel's case where "terrain" is concerned, its being no more than a modest "bridgehead" in a hostile Arab area, a stamp sized sliver of land smaller than New Jersey.

##### 4.2.4 *The Israeli Paradox:*

Even the most dovish (Jewish) proponents of a "New Middle East", i.e., of "Peace of Harmony",

who propose to surrender the vital, strategic Golan to Syria in exchange for a peace agreement, insist that Israel should, nevertheless, maintain a very significant and efficient deterrence posture, agreement regardless.

- A contradiction in terms? Certainly.
- A lack of total conviction? Maybe.

Yet their wish, if they win at the polls, may be translated into a quest for a full or partial substitute for the Golan in the deterrence equation.

Since, for many a reason, whose elaboration is beyond the scope of this paper, conventional deterrence has to balance the Syrian conventional and ballistic missiles threat (provided the missiles' warheads are conventional), the substitute for the Golan territory and its vital strategic topography has to be found, if at all, in the substantial increase of the readily available firepower and mobility factors, i.e., in the substantial reinforcement of the standing armed forces which are to be kept close to the Golan in a condition of high readiness so as to be able to match an eventual Syrian dash for the (supposedly) demilitarised Golan, U.N./U.S. or other observers or peace agreements notwithstanding.

4.2.5 The reinforcement of the standing army has to close, at least partially, the horrendous gap created by the loss of the Golan, taking into consideration all the lessons learned (above paras. 2.1-2.6) from the Israeli recent history (or other sources):

- a. The peace treaty, if signed, should leave no room for misinterpretation, misunderstanding or further negotiation (Lesson 1).
- b. Israel has to maintain a high power profile (Lesson 2).
- c. Were war to erupt, Israel should be capable of reaching a positive military decision within a span of no more than 10-14 days (which may, unfortunately, be followed by post decision convulsions of the type called "wars of attrition") (Lesson 3).
- d. The Israeli deterrence should be independent of any foreign guarantees (Lesson 4).
- e. The Israeli deterrence should be totally independent of any positioning of foreign troops on the Golan (Lesson 5).

- f. Israel should maintain a high profile projection of its military and political strength (Lesson 6).
- g. Israel should engage, throughout periods of tranquillity or tension, in a sustained, aggressive and clear enlightenment campaign (Lesson 7).
- h. Given the Middle East circumstances, Israel should strive, in time of peace, standstill or war, to promote an atmosphere conducive to peace and tranquillity, yet its defense planning should always be made to meet the "worse case" scenarios (Lesson 8).
- i. The Israeli defense establishment and deterrence has to provide margins wide enough to cater to government leadership errors in the evaluation of the situation (Lesson 9).
- j. Provision has to be made in the Israeli defense planning (operational, operational requirements, logistics and budget) for the delays that will most probably be incurred to the mobilisation of the reserves by the massive ballistic missile attacks on urban concentrations, to be expected in case of war (Lesson 10).

4.2.6 The generalisation of any Syrian-Israeli conflagration, that will cover all the Arab Middle East plus Iran, and which includes an armed uprising into the autonomous areas (Arafatahland), has to be considered as the most probable scenario if/when a Syrian/Israeli war breaks out or has to be deterred.

Military solutions covering this general conflict scenario have to be part of any contingency plan relating to a Syrian-Israeli war or its deterrence, whether the Golan is in Israeli hands and much more so if it is not.

## 5. The Context and Cost of a Partial Substitute for the Golan

5.1 **Why partial?** Because, as the Chief of the Israeli General Staff General Lipkin-Shahak stated publicly in December 1995, there is no technological or other substitute for the Golan in time of war. Add the negative impact of the evacuation of the Golan over Israeli morale (the "will" factor) and/or the euphoria the evacuation



will create in totalitarian Syria. These cannot be quantified.

Nor can the loss of optimal defensive positions or sites for intelligence and anti-aircraft be early warning deployment (even when an accomplished AWACS system will be operative) be fully quantified.

## 5.2 *The Structuring of the Additional Units*

5.2.1 The elements of firepower and mobility, i.e., the standing military units and their composition that may, partially, be substituted for the loss of the Golan are subject to a wide variety of opinions of military planning staffs.

The view hereby presented is believed to be a fairly conservative one. The writer believes that classified military contingency planning, although more detailed and accurate, is based rather on budgetary considerations than on real operational requirements.

5.2.2 The cost estimates of the additional units required vary even more than their number and composition.

The reason is not that information is classified or unavailable but, rather, the outfitting of the vehicle or, for instance, armaments or logistics, like the number of combat days estimated or costs of bases and auxiliary forces or facilities, including real estate, etc.

5.2.3 Another obstacle in the way of precision is the pricing of the equipment by the seller, normally the U.S., and whether the equipment is purchased new, from redundant stocks or used, and then to what degree?

5.2.4 For the reasons mentioned in above paras. 5.2.1, 5.2.2 and 5.2.3, the standing military units enumerated hereunder and their quoted prices are to be looked upon only as rough orders of magnitude which, to the best of the writer's knowledge, have been kept as low as permissible.

## 5.3 *The Main Standing Army's Additional Units, Formations or Efforts Required to Substitute, Partially, for the Golan Heights - A Modest Estimate*

5.3.1 Two heavy mechanised divisions (with about 500 Main Battle Tanks), fully equipped, manned, in high readiness, deployed close to the Golan.

U.S. sources, relating to U.S. divisions equipped with "Abrams" M1A1 tanks and Bradley personnel carriers, quote a general, ball park figure of **US \$1.2 billion per division**, exclusive of divisional artillery, communications, electronic warfare, auxiliary and base facilities and exclusive of the ammunition for, say, seven combat days.

Assume that the battle ready Merkava MkIV and Bradley equipped Israeli division investment cost will be US \$1.5 billion. Two battle ready divisions, including armed, artillery, signals, EW and base supported divisions (including battle damage field and base facilities), may be assumed to cost about **US \$5.0 billion**.

5.3.2 About 100 Apache (AH64) type attack helicopters. Aviation Week and Space Technology weekly have often quoted the cost of these helicopters to be between US \$14 and US \$20 million a unit, depending on the equipment and production block, exclusive of C3I and base facilities and, of course, exclusive of its, say, seven days ammunition allocation of Hellfire missiles and 30mm cannon shells.

The cost of four squadrons of 25 or five squadrons of 20 Apache type attack helicopters, ready to do battle, may be assumed to be about **US \$3.0 billion**.

5.3.3 About 20 additional CH53 type heavy assault transport helicopters which may average a cost (surplus? new?) of about US \$15 million a piece. A battle ready unit of these helicopters may be assessed to cost about **US \$400 million**.

5.3.4 One light, air transportable, anti-tank brigade equipped with Hellfire or equivalent missiles. Cost estimate, including communications, locating and base equipment is presently not available to the writer. It may be assessed to be in the order of **US \$500 million**, including basic ammunition stock.

5.3.5 Two squadrons of F15I multi-purpose long range strike fighters to bolster anti-SAM and ballistic missiles capabilities and free F16, F15 fighters for front line air superiority and fire support, at US \$2.1 billion per squadron (as per official figures), may be assumed to cost, battle ready, about **US \$6 billion**, including C3I (base added facilities and, say, a seven day combat ammunition allocation).

5.3.6 Continuous, 24 hrs/day, 365 days/year airborne Command Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I), AWACS type aircraft, including GHQ and tactical encrypted units downlink, plus back up for both aircraft and link.

One fully equipped AWACS aircraft outfitted on a Boeing 707 or 767 platform is assessed (Aviation Week and Space Technology) to cost about US \$250 million.

A complement of minimum five aircraft to provide continuous surveillance plus back-up will cost about US \$1.25 billion. The whole system, including secure downlinks, data processing, interpretation and dissemination facilities, exclusive of fighter escort which is normally required, may be assessed to cost **US \$2.0 billion**.

5.3.7 Ground and airborne SIGINT and active EW facilities, say, **US \$1.0 billion**.

5.3.8 GHQ, Air Force and Northern Command HQ, U.A.V. reconnaissance, enhanced C3I, artillery, engineers, ordinance and service units to cater for the above forces, say, **US \$2.0 billion**.

5.3.9 Enhanced R&D, production and deployment of Arrow anti-ballistic missiles for reentry-approach interception and of B.P.I. (Boost Phase Interception) systems - the share accrued to the loss of the Golan, say, **US \$3.0 billion**.

5.3.10 The total cost of the military units that may compensate, partially, for the loss of the Golan Heights through the enhancement of the Fire Power and Mobility elements, may be assessed to be US \$22.9 billion, say, **\$20.0 billion**.

#### **Remark:**

If the concept of real time reacting military units substitution for the loss of the Golan is admitted, different planners may reach different unit composition and mix concepts. However, any equivalent substitute which also caters to the constraints set by the teachings of the past, the ten lessons, will probably not reach a lower cost figure than \$20 billion. The writer suggests that the figure be accepted as given.

5.3.11 The yearly readiness maintenance of the above mentioned units/equipment, including

training costs, equipment maintenance, storage, periodic upgrading, base maintenance, replacements, ammunition recycling and maintenance, etc. are assessed (personal past experience updated) to average about 20 percent of the basic units cost, i.e., **US \$5.0 billion a year**.

This sum may be higher because these being active duty (standing) units, their manpower will consist mainly of conscripts whose turnover, i.e., training costs is higher than that of reserve units.

5.3.12 The minimum time required by these new units for reaching battle readiness will be about four years from the word "go", which means that even if a decision to evacuate the Golan is made, four years are needed from decision to execution if the deterrence balance is to be kept.

## **6. Transfer of Military Installations and Civilian Settlements**

6.1 Surrendering<sup>6</sup> the Golan Heights to Syria means the relocation of, at least, the military installations and the Jewish settlements of the area<sup>7</sup> in yet to be defined (if possible to find) locations west of the Green line.<sup>8</sup>

6.2 An indication of the management budgetary, morale, moral and ethical problems involved in a massive transfer, especially of civil populations, of settlers who settled an area in response to their government's appeal, may be found in Professor Nurit Kliot and Shemuel Albeck's book (Hebrew): "Sinai - Autonomy of Settlements Evacuation".<sup>9</sup>

To the knowledge of the writer, Prof. Kliot shares a leftist outlook and favours the surrendering of the Golan to Syria. However, commenting on the possible transfer of the Golan settlements, when measured by the yardsticks she established following her Sinai evacuation research that concerned 5,000 settlers whose settlements were, on average, 5 years old, she writes (p. 143):

"Some of the Golan and Jordan Valley settlers have been living there for about 20-25 years, that is their whole adult life. Many of them approach 50 years of age. Their uprooting at this age is very meaningful, especially where their capability to

plan their future is concerned.

The uprooting of the Golan, Jordan Valley, Judea and Samaria (Jewish) inhabitants, even if partial, gradual and slow, will be, if it will be, different from the Sinai evacuation..."

Comparing the Golan to the Sinai evacuation, one should bear in mind that instead of 5,000 persons who settled in the Sinai five years previously and feel betrayed, one has to deal, in the Golan only, with 16,000 persons, many of them third generation, Golan born people who feel betrayed. The first ones settled there about 29-30 years ago.

On page 140 of Kliot's book, she establishes that the evacuation of the Sinai, including compensation and resettling of the settlers in the Negev, will cost the Israeli taxpayer 14.8 billion Shekels (at June 1990 prices)<sup>10</sup> at today's prices, the cost would have been 33.3 billion Shekels or, roughly, US \$10 billion. But let's have a look in depth.

6.3 Kliot claims that the transfer of the military installations from the Sinai cost 11.5 billion Shekels according to 1990 prices, i.e., 25.88 billions Shekels according to 1997 values, i.e., roughly US \$7.43 billion.

Since the Sinai military installations included three Air Force bases worth about US\$ 4.0 billion and naval and other installations, an arbitrary figure for the Golan military installations to be evacuated may be set at roughly US \$2.0 billion.

6.4 Where the civilian population is concerned, Prof. Kliot says (p. 140):

"A careful assessment of the evacuation of the Golan and the Jordan Valley (including the agricultural resettlement of some of the settlers), if their evacuation will be necessary, and compensation to the settlers will be paid as per the Sinai precedent is assessed at present to be tens of billions of 1990 Shekels".

A rough exercise offers an order of magnitude: According to Kliot (p. 140): The evacuation of

the settlements in the Sinai cost I.S. 1.27 billion (1990) The building in Pit'hat Shalom (Negev) cost I.S. 0.78 billion (1990) and compensations paid were I.S. 1.272 billion (1990), a total of I.S. 3.32 billion (1990) which are I.S. 7.47 billion (1997), that is, roughly, US \$2.2 billion for about 5,000 people, i.e., about US \$7.04 billion for the Golan population of **16,000 at the standard of living in the early eighties**, which was about half of that of the late nineties.

Seeing the Sinai evacuation as a precedent and considering the Golan settlements' material standing as well as today's standard of living, **the resettlement cost of the Golan civilian population should be modestly assessed to be US \$10.0 billion.**

## 7. Conclusion

7.1 The total expenditure on military units that are to partially substitute for the loss of the Golan, the loss of military installations on the Golan and expenditures on the relocation/resettlement of the Golan population, are assessed to be about US \$33.8 billion, that is an order of magnitude of **US \$30.0 billion**.

7.2 The added Israeli current military expenses accrued to the Golan surrender will be in the order of **US \$5.0 billion a year**.

7.3 The withdrawal from the Golan may only be carried out after the military substitute has been formed, trained and deployed, i.e., about 4 years.

7.4 Were the said costs to be borne by Israel alone, its economy may be affected to the point of overloading, which, apart from the delay in the country's development, means deterrence breakdown, i.e., an inevitable path to war.

7.5 Were the U.S. to offer to back the Christopher suggestions with the material support required, the obvious question to be put will be: "Why spend so much money to turn an obvious asset (see Sen. Helm's remarks) into a liability?"

It hardly makes sense. ■

## NOTES

1. Return the whole of the Golan to Syria in exchange for a peace treaty backed by U.S. observers, U.S. manned warning stations, enhanced Israeli airborne Space Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I) capability, demilitarisation of the Golan and U.N. guarantees, etc.
2. See "*The Case of the Forgotten War*", by the writer, Society of Experimental Test Pilots "Technical Review" and "Cockpit". First 1971. (English).
3. Israel had to mobilise its reserves which are the backbone of its economy. It was, therefore, short-winded. It had to act when it became clear that neither the U.S./U.N. guarantees/observers nor anybody else will pull its chestnuts out of the fire. The definition of "who starts a war?" should be changed from "he who shoots first" to "he who creates a military situation where his antagonist faces only two alternatives: capitulate or open fire".
4. Enlightenment - the presentation of one's case before its own public and that of the world, including governments, media, etc. as if it were in a court of justice - totally different from propaganda or just information.
5. Except if the positioning of SAM missiles within the reach of the front line is tolerated by Israel despite the demilitarisation agreed upon as per the peace agreement. Toleration of the infringement of such a clause demands one or two days of exclusive anti-SAM Air Force effort. Such an infringement, tolerated at U.S. request in August 1970, permitted the crossing of the Suez by the Egyptians in October 1973.
6. One wonders whether the reader is aware of the fact that the Golan Heights, behind demarcation lines not far from the present ones, was originally part of the British Mandate of Palestine earmarked for a Jewish National Home and of the fact that "turn of the century" Jewish settlements were there before the Balfour Declaration. The Heights were transferred by Britain to France (French Mandate of Syria) in 1923, for reasons exclusively concerning the two Imperial Powers.
7. Two of the four Druze villages on the Golan would prefer Israeli citizenship.
8. Pre-Six Day War (June 1967) demarcation lines.
9. Published by Israeli Ministry of Defense Publishing - 1996.
10. The price index of June 1990 stood at 66.831888 while the July 1997 index is at 150.2. To obtain (Israel Shekels) 1997 prices, multiply by 2.25.