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Liberal Democracy vs. Transnational Progressivism
John Fonte
The key concepts of
transnationalism can be described as follows: The primary political unit
is the ascriptive group (racial, ethnic or gender) and not the
individual. Groups are divided into oppressors versus victims, which is
largely the Hegelian-Marxian dichotomy between privileged versus
oppressed groups. Institutions within society must provide
representation to the diverse groups, i.e. group proportionalism is to
substitute for the individual vote that heretofore formed the basis of
constitutional democracy in the United States. On the global level,
transnationalism, as the word conveys, advocates termination of the
nation-state in favor of world citizenship that will construct some form
of world governance subject to “international law.” The author discusses
the implications of transnational ideology for democracy in the United
States, which he connects with the post Zionists in Israel.
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Transforming Israeli Society: Redefining the Israeli Ethos
Yoav Gelber
The
post-Zionists’ critique of Israel and the Zionist enterprise revolves
around the struggle over who and what will determine Israel’s
cultural-ideological future. That struggle focuses on secularism versus
religious orientations, particularist national identity versus
cosmopolitan assimilationsim, individualism versus the collectivity,
Jewish national identity for Israel versus ethnic relativism. These
topics have been in dispute among Jews since the earliest days of
Zionism. In addition to these well-known conflicts, the Israeli version
of anti-Zionism includes the conflict over the legitimacy of accepted
national symbols shared by all of Israel’s Jewish citizens as opposed to
the adoption of other national symbols representing the Arabs. The
post-Zionist myths concentrate on the right to self-centeredness to
replace the collectivity as the critical substance of the Jewish-Zionist
ethos. The latter would replace Zionism’s Jewish identity with an
individualistic, a-historical, cultural amalgam. The author argues that
these latter approaches indubitably lead to a dismantling of the Jewish
state.
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The
European Union: “Al-Aqsa Intifada” and the State of Israel
Shlomo Perla
The European Union’s perceived
anti-Israeli attitude in the wake of the al-Aqsa Intifada
may be studied, as other similar issues relating to Israel’s
international standing, through different aspects and disciplines, not
the least of which being the historiosophic aspect that attributes a
decisive role to anti-Semitism.
It is difficult to dispute the
premise that anti-Semitism has been an immanent component of European
culture, molding the tragic events in Jewish history. It is likewise
unjust to denounce Israeli spokesmen whose response to various
international measures adverse to Israeli interests, was indicative of
their preoccupation with this perception of anti-Semitism. The European
Parliament resolution of April 10, 2002, accusing Israel for its policy
vis-à-vis the Palestinians is one such measure.
The current author, however,
maintains that although legitimate, this historiosophic angle should not
overshadow other aspects commonly encountered in the study of
international affairs. This article, accordingly, seeks to highlight
some strategic considerations of the European Union’s approach to the
Middle East peace process both from an inter regional and a global
perspective. The former perspective points at the Arab-Israeli conflict
as hindering a European Union’s ongoing endeavor to substantiate a
European Mediterranean Partnership as a precondition to a Mediterranean
socio-economic and political stability, a situation projected by the
European Union as crucial to European security.
Referring to Israel as the oppressor
and to the Palestinians as the oppressed party the European Union
demands that the former offers substantial concessions in order to reset
the peace process which would eventually facilitate the realization of
the European Mediterranean Partnership.
The second perspective underlines a
French led European Union policy aimed at augmenting its power and
international posture to such a degree that would lend it a super-power
status capable of performing in the global arena parallel to and
independently of the United States. This policy is a symptom of a world
system in the making in the post Cold War era.
Both perspectives reflect a
constant European Union awareness that an intra-union equilibrium be
maintained between integrational interests on the one hand and
fragmentation forces on the other so that the Union can continue its
existence as an ever evolving entity.
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The
Normalization of India-Israel Relations
Moshe Yegar
India received its independence in
1947, and Israel a few months later, in 1948. Official diplomatic
relations between the two countries had to wait until January 1992.
During the 44 years that elapsed between the emergence of these two
independent countries until the establishment of full diplomatic
relations, India demonstrated reservation, unfriendliness and even
hostility towards Israel. Israel, for its part, invested many efforts in
order to bring about a change in India’s hostile policy, but to no
avail.
Towards the end of the 1980s and
beginning of the 1990s, the world underwent profound changes and the
international environment changed most drastically. First of all, the
collapse of the Soviet Union, India’s ally and biggest supplier of
military equipment, was a serious blow to India. Secondly, the Gulf War
of 1991 exposed deep divisions in the Arab world and reduced its clout
in Indian foreign policy. Thirdly, for reasons of national prestige,
India wanted to get involved, like so many other countries, in the
so-called “peace process” of those days in the Middle East. And – no
less important – Narasimha Rao was elected Prime Minister. He changed
the “socialist” economic policy of his predecessors and needed US
support.
All of these reasons, and others,
made it opportune for Israel to try to develop a new political dialogue
with India. Such a dialogue began at the end of June 1991. It was a slow
process. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs tried to procrastinate
on the contacts. But, on January 29, 1992, Prime Minister Rao decided to
overrule the objections within the government and the Congress party and
to normalize diplomatic relations with Israel that same day.
Since
then, bilateral relations between the two countries have developed very
rapidly in various spheres of activity, especially in agriculture,
scientific cooperation, hi-tech, communications, trade, defense matters
and various other fields. Many agreements, in all those areas, were
signed. Practical relations between Israel and India continue to expand
in a most friendly atmosphere.
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The Crisis
of the Israeli Arabs: What Can Be Done? (II)
Raphael Israeli
Excerpt from the book,
Arabs in Israel:Friends or
Foes?, by Raphael Israeli
Eli Gabbai, Publisher with ACPR Publishers, (Hebrew), 2002,
Hardcover, 280 pages
The
current crisis in the relations between the State of Israel and its
large Arab minority has peaked since the October 2000 events. Added to
this, the flurry of the recent revelations of Israeli Arabs’ involvement
in terrorist activities against the country where they seek equality,
has made devising new measures by the authorities imperative, in order
to avert a major disaster in the not-too-distant future. These measures
can be categorized in two levels of emergency: immediate, pending a
solution, and medium- to long-range with a view to finding a permanent
solution for this festering issue. In the short term, Israel must create
an incentive for the Israeli Arabs to identify with their state, on an
individual, not collective, basis, especially by integrating those who
accept to be integrated, into the national security service and system
of education, in Hebrew, together with all Israeli youth, and then
ensuring full citizenship and participation in all avenues of
advancement in the state; and at the same time depriving those who
refuse to comply of all the perks of citizenship, including the right to
vote and civil amenities, and let them educate their children as they
wish, but at their own expense. In the long run, the fate of Israeli
Arabs, should be linked to the Palestinian entity, with which they claim
affiliation and to which they vow their loyalty. When a Palestinian
entity emerges, they will be allowed to gain its citizenship, while
remaining only as alien residents in Israel, without the right to vote,
so as to neutralize the demographic menace they pose to Israel in the
present circumstances.
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The "Bimbos" of Israel
Paul Eidelberg
Anyone watching the televised
behavior of Israel’s Knesset will be astonished by the vulgarity.
Personal insults and obscenity abound or what critics call a “politics
of pornography”. The proceedings of the American Congress (on C-Span)
and those of the House of Commons (on the BBC), at their worst, appear
refined by comparison.
Why does Israel have so many
boorish politicians? What allows them to remain in office for decades
despite their shameless shouting matches in the Knesset? Why do
accusations even of criminal behavior have no effect on the tenure of
Israeli politicians, when polls indicate they are despised by almost 90%
of the public?
The answer is fairly simple: Unlike
the US and Great Britain, Israeli parliamentarians are not elected by
the people! They are not even elected in multidistrict elections
(contrary to the practice of 74 reputed democracies). Instead, the
entire country constitutes a single electoral district in which parties
compete for seats in Israel’s 120-member Knesset on the basis of
proportional representation. Under this system, Israelis do not vote for
individuals or even for a party. They select a letter or combination of
letters that represents a party’s list of candidates.
Except for the names at the very
top of each list, most candidates are unknown to the average voter!
Since a Knesset Member owes his
seat to his party and does not have to campaign for election in a
district, where any incriminating statement he may have uttered might be
exposed by a rival candidate, this restraint on his human-all-too-human
vices will be lacking along with due concern for his public image. His
party’s list is his fig leaf.
Because Israel’s parties insulate
politicians from the voters, politicians can usually ignore public
opinion with impunity. Parties can thus become havens for job-seekers,
especially army officers pensioned, as it were, on a party list. The
ineptitude of many Israeli politicians is notorious.
Consider Shimon Peres, Oslo’s
architect, which Charles Krauthammer referred to as “the greatest
diplomatic blunder in history”. Peres has never had to contest a Knesset
seat against a rival candidate. Suppose he had to face a rival in a
district election. His rival could wryly point out that Peres is a man
brimming with Chelm-like wisdom, such as the following:
1. “The
more we give up land, we discover that we have more Ph.D.s per
kilometer – so we are going to make a living on Ph.D.s and not on
mileage.”
To this
our rival candidate could respond: “The more Israel gives up land
the more idiots it will have per kilometer!”
2. “I
don’t think we should judge the [peace] process by the performance of
Yasser Arafat. We’re not negotiating with Arafat. We’re negotiating
with ourselves...”
To this
our rival candidate could respond: “We really should judge the
peace process by the performance of Shimon Peres: a disaster!”
3. Asked
about the wisdom of a peace agreement with Syria, a military
dictatorship, Peres declared: “Well, the system of government is
transitional; peace is permanent.”
To this
our rival candidate could respond: “To make Israel permanent we had
better make Shimon Peres transitional.”
The preceding may explain why Mr.
Peres has never won an election. Nevertheless, this septuagenarian’s
seat in the Knesset is guaranteed by his privileged place on his party’s
list. Clearly Israel’s parliamentary electoral system enables political
bimbos, and worse, to remain in office.
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Amran Mitzna's Inaugural Address as the New Prime Minister of the State of
Israel
Steven Plaut
Ladies and gentlemen, I want to
thank you for electing me as Prime Minister of Israel. As you know, I
ran on a platform of peace and it is now my intention of keeping my
promises to you and my backers and financiers from around the world and
I shall be fulfilling what I have pledged to do.
In my election campaign, I ran on a
platform that you voted for through me. I promised that I would conduct
negotiations with Arafat and the PLO no matter how many Jews the PLO was
murdering during the talks, with the intention of reaching an agreement
for a complete withdrawal from the Gaza Strip within six months. I also
promised that if the PLO refused to strike a deal with me in that time,
then I would withdraw from the Gaza Strip unilaterally and without any
agreement on the part of the Palestinian Authority for anything. I
confirm tonight that this is my solemn intention.
In addition, within a year, I will
reach an agreement with the Palestinian Authority for a complete
withdrawal by Israel from the entire West Bank and the eviction of all
Jewish settlers living there. And if the PLO refuses to reach a deal or
agree to my terms, then Israel will simply pick up and withdraw from the
West Bank anyway, whether or not the PLO agrees to it. Any settlers who
refuse to cooperate with the withdrawal will simply be left for the PLO
and the Hamas to deal with.
So as you see, I refuse to abandon
my principles and my struggle for a just and lasting peace. And just as
I intend to resolve the conflict with the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip
and the West Bank, whether or not the PLO agrees to my terms or agrees
to any compromise, so I intend to resolve the Palestinian refugee
question. I intend to turn the Negev into a large resettlement district
for all those people around the world claiming to be Palestinian
refugees. They will be settled in the Northern Negev and in the area
around Beer Sheba, and Israel will withdraw from these areas of
Palestinian resettlement whether Arafat and the PLO like it or not. We
will negotiate with the PLO in good faith for 18 months, but if the PLO
refuses to agree to our terms, we will withdraw from Beersheba
unilaterally.
The next stage in my peace program
will consist of settling Israel’s conflict with the Hizbullah and Syria
once and for all. I pledge that Israel will enter into serious
full-hearted negotiations with the Hizbullah and Syria and I hope they
will produce a peace accord. I am willing to wait for 24 months for
these talks to yield results. If at the end of this two year period
there is as yet no accord, then Israel will solve the problem
unilaterally, whether the Syrians like it or not. I will order a
complete withdrawal from the Golan Heights, whether Bashar Asad has
agreed to my terms or not, and I will order a 20 mile zone created along
the Lebanese border within Israeli territory in which no Jews will be
permitted to live and in which Lebanese Shi`ites may exercise their own
sovereign self-rule.
As the next step in my problem, I
hereby pledge that I will allow no longer than 30 months for talks with
Israeli Galilee Arabs to produce a peace accord. As you know, my party
and I are committed to granting equal national rights to Israel’s
Palestinian nationals, which is what we now call the Israeli Arabs. So,
if by the end of these 30 months no peace accord has been reached in the
talks, then I intend to solve the matter unilaterally by withdrawing
Israel from all of the Galilee, whether the Galilee Arabs like it or
not, and will order all Israeli troops and civilians to withdraw behind
the new secure borders stretching along the Kishon Creek next to Haifa.
Yes, I am aware of the fact that I will have to order my own parents to
abandon their homes in the Haifa suburb of Kiryat Haim, but I am sure
they are willing to make sacrifices for peace.
If my good friend Gad Zeevi is not
in prison at the time, he promises he will set them up in a nice
penthouse.
Next, I intend to resolve once and
for all the conflict between the Jews and the Arabs in the central parts
of Israel, in Nazareth and the Wadi Ara district. I will conduct good
faith negotiations with their representatives from the communist parties
and the Islamic fundamentalist movement. I will give these talks no
longer than 36 months. If by that time there is no accord reached, then
I will order Israel to withdraw from all areas outside of the greater
Tel Aviv-Gush Dan district. Israel will have peace, while maintaining
its heritage and historic control of both banks of the Yarkon River.
Naturally, I expect the Jews of Jerusalem to relocate there. I will try
to obtain permission from the President of Palestine for them to visit
their old homes in Jerusalem al-Quds every once in a while, but
if he refuses, then we will take the matter into our own hands and not
allow any Jews to go to Jerusalem any more, whether the PLO likes it or
not.
Finally, as my fallback plan, I
intend to conduct serious round-the-clock negotiations with all of our
neighbors, including the President of Palestine in al-Quds. I
will allot a maximum of 48 months for the talks to succeed, that is, the
period before the next elections in Israel will be called and voting
conducted at the Yarkon voting booth. But if those negotiations do not
succeed, I intend to take things into my own hands and end the conflict
once and for all. The Yarkon colonists will be ordered onto the nearby
American cruise ships, and Israel will be converted into a website,
whether or not the Arabs approve, and peace shall reign in the Middle
East once and for all, for ever and ever and ever.
You have may solemn oath!
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Correction: In contrast
with Friday’s posting, Yossi Ginossar was NOT one of the two agents
who executed the two terrorists in the Bus 300 Affair (and so would be
deserving of my nomination for a medal of valor), but rather was the
very senior official in the intelligence services (“intelligence”
being used loosely) who tried to cover up for the two agents who did
perform the euthanasia and so enraged the Compassionate Caring Left.
Sorry for error.
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