“Man Pads”* Shoulder Fired Anti-Aircraft Missiles –
What Do They Mean – Politically?
Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto
The successful interception
of the arms smuggling boat “Santorini”, caught before it could deliver its
load of Katyushas and SA-7-Strella anti-aircraft missiles to Arafat, should
finally break the smug Israeli assumption that “Arafatehland”, the Arab
West-Palestinian “state”, is going to stay demilitarized, as per the Oslo,
etc., agreements.
Israeli “ostrich” policy
brought about the freezing of the Ben Gurion 2000 airport design, declining
to consider the fact that if a Palestinian entity were to emerge, the final
approach to Ben-Gurion’s east-west runway will expose incoming aircraft at
an optimum angle and range for the launching of SA-7s to down them.
The same policy led Israel
to consider a secondary airport at Zikkim, between Ashkelon and Gaza, well
within SA-7, Katyusha and even mortar range.
“We talk peace,” the writer
was told by (former MK) Eli Goldschmidt, “if war comes, it’s the IDF’s, not
our business.” One wonders whether Israel is two states: one for peace, the
other for war.
The JED (Journal
of Electronic Defense), April 2001 issue is devoted mostly to the
shoulder missile’s importance, placing it among the breach-loaded rifle, the
submarine, aircraft and radar, in the class of weapons that changed military
thought, proving the article’s point with recent Gulf, Afghanistan and
Yugoslavia statistics.
If/when a “no war”
settlement between Israel and the Arabs of Judea, Samaria and Gaza will be
renegotiated, Israel has to ensure that Strella-range and also terrorist
overnight walking distance will not cover Israeli major targets.
* Man Portable Air
Defense System = Man Pads
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EU-Israel Relations: Fraternity between Democracies vs. Political
Elasticity?
Ran Ichay
When considering the lack of political support for
Israel in the international arena, we refer mainly to Europe. US-Israeli
relations can be explained in several ways, but basically, American support
for Israel is consistent and reliable, particularly in terms of public
opinion on Capitol Hill.
Other countries are either non-democratic, or simply
uninterested in the Arab-Israeli conflict. But there is one group of
countries where democratic and moral values are – or are considered to be –
a tradition. Despite this, many European countries prefer to support
tyrannies and dictatorships in their consistent antipathy towards the only
democratic state in the Middle East. The European countries, almost without
exception, share their same social, political and moral values with Israel.
Furthermore, the common European cultures, religion and civilizations are
based upon the very roots that were planted by the Jewish people thousands
of years ago. Yet these same countries choose the Arab-Muslim side – an
ancient enemy of Europe, in the war against the Jews.
This picture may perhaps surprise and frustrate those
who are not familiar with the true history of the trilateral relations of
Arabs-Christians-Jews, and moreover, might not be acquainted with the
alternative values which truly motivate Europe.
The tendency to lay the entire problem upon poor public
relations on the part of the State of Israel vis-à-vis Europe is to
oversimplify. Israel uses more or less the same public relations tools in
the US with much better results. Needless to say, while Israel enjoys some
short-term victories in the European public opinion and foreign policy
forums, generally following a particularly cruel terrorist attack, the
hostile attitude towards Israel in its struggle against the Palestinians or
other Arab countries is much deeper and more profound.
There are several reasons for which the Europeans do
not traditionally support the State of Israel. But beyond this, we must
examine the extent to which this lack of support affects the State of
Israel, both in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, as well as in the general
arena of Israel’s foreign relations.
Despite high expectations, even after the Palestinian
refusal at Camp David to accept an offer that will likely never come again,
the nascent European support vanished just a few days later after clashes,
initiated by the Palestinian Authority, broke out.
Over the years, Israel managed rather well without
being backed by Europe. Although it has always expected such backup, Israel
has never counted on it to materialize. Europe’s leverage over Israel is
limited – although it does exist. Israel, unlike its neighbors, does not
enjoy any bilateral aid from Europe, and the trade agreements it has with
the EU are entirely reciprocal. Thus, any threats to suspend or harm extant
trade relations will be of consequence, first and foremost, to several major
European exporters.
There is no doubt, that from a regional point of view,
proper bilateral relations between Europe and Israel are no less important
to the Europeans than to Israel. It has been proven in the past, that any
international body that has not maintained good relations with all parties
to the conflict, failed to play a significant role in the region. The UN is
but one example.
For the most part, over the years it is the US which
has been the principal catalyst for the different peace processes –
including the latter stages of the Oslo process. This enlarged role could
only be played after having normalized US relations with Arab countries and
gaining credibility with the Arabs.
Until such credibility is achieved by the EU in its
attitude towards Israel, or by European countries in theirs, there is no
reason for Israel to have the EU as a partner in the regional dynamics one
way or another – after all, what is at stake is much more important than EU-Israel
relations.
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Russia and the
Mideast Vacuum
Ilan Berman
Practically unnoticed, Russia has regained its status as
a major power in the Middle East. Over the past several years, Moscow has
expanded its sphere of influence beyond its “near abroad” and into the
Gulf and Levant. There, it has worked to alter the regional balance of
power and fill the vacuum left by American diplomacy.
Russia’s regional policy is both multifaceted and
ambitious. Through its relationship with Tehran, Moscow has furthered the
Islamic Republic’s quest for weapons of mass destruction and complicated
the West’s access to Caspian basin energy. Through its efforts to
undermine the international sanctions regime against Baghdad and supplant
the United States as chief broker of the Middle East peace process, Russia
has attained growing control of regional diplomacy. And through arms sales
and proliferation, the Kremlin has reestablished ties with a host of
traditional client states, tilting them conclusively back into its orbit.
Now, Russia stands poised to become the preeminent power in the Gulf, much
to the detriment of both the United States and its regional allies, Turkey
and Israel.
In this article, “Russia and the Mideast Vacuum”, the
author explores the tools with which the Kremlin has sought to achieve
regional dominance, control over Caspian and Gulf energy, and the creation
of an anti-Western coalition aimed at ousting American influence from the
region.
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The Islamic
Threat - A New and More Dangerous Era
Anthony Dennis
The article is an overview of a wide range research
regarding the collective identity of the Golan Heights settlers during the
period of the attempted negotiations with Syria.
Initially, an historical survey was made focusing on
the strategic aspect of the water component and the Golan settlement.
Extensive theoretical background was used to identify
problems which were raised during interviews with 18 Golan settlers, which
took place during the months February, June and July 2000, when the Golan
was experiencing a stormy public campaign.
The population of the study includes two
representatives: the generation of veteran Golan settlers, who arrived at a
young age as of July 1967, and the second generation born on the Golan.
Many questions were raised on the following issues:
identity, memory, population, territory and citizenship.
Furthermore, the contents of documents and newspaper
articles have been analyzed. From all the gathered information, the author
has created a human mosaic whose purpose is to analyze the process of change
and future of the Golan inhabitants from their own introspection and
discussions.
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The
National Identity of the Residents of the Golan Heights
Efrat Tahar-Kedem
The article is an overview of a wide range research
regarding the collective identity of the Golan Heights settlers during the
period of the attempted negotiations with Syria.
Initially, an historical survey was made focusing on
the strategic aspect of the water component and the Golan settlement.
Extensive theoretical background was used to identify
problems which were raised during interviews with 18 Golan settlers, which
took place during the months February, June and July 2000, when the Golan
was experiencing a stormy public campaign.
The population of the study includes two
representatives: the generation of veteran Golan settlers, who arrived at
a young age as of July 1967, and the second generation born on the Golan.
Many questions were raised on the following issues:
identity, memory, population, territory and citizenship.
Furthermore, the contents of documents and newspaper
articles have been analyzed. From all the gathered information, the author
has created a human mosaic whose purpose is to analyze the process of
change and future of the Golan inhabitants from their own introspection
and discussions.
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The
Joint Community of Israel and Jordan
Motti Ashkenazi
A political strategy is proffered in this article,
one which in my humble opinion, enables the formation of a gradual process
which will lead, employing confidence-building measures, step-by-step to
the formation of peaceful and neighborly relations without a “contractual”
peace treaty, without concessions on substantive issues and vital
interests, and without taking unnecessary risks. This policy avoids any
attempt to make dramatic decisions over brief periods of time and does not
take any shortcuts. It attaches significance to the psychological aspects,
which typify the conflict and relies on Israel’s economic strength, on its
ability to grow quickly and to adjust to changes relatively easily. The
policy ascribes to hope and faith in a better future, and greater strength
in frustrating violence than any other measure. The incitement to hatred
and violence is a chronic societal illness, which, in the long run, harms
its purveyors much more than it affects the objects of its hatred and the
victims of its violence. The efforts to build a community of this sort is
likely to restore the dynamism, the vision and the creative initiative to
the Zionist revolution, which have eroded and dissipated over recent
decades, and to furnish us with more favorable conditions for its
realization. Specifically, when the “guns are firing”, there is a need to
create a new understanding. May we be successful in internalizing the
dictum of our sages: “Who is a hero? One who converts an enemy into a
friend.”
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The "Afghan
Alumni" and the Clash of Civilizations (I)
Shaul Shay
In recent years, some scholars have spoken of a clash
of civilizations between Islam and modern secular (or Judeo-Christian)
democratic values and culture, or between Islamic civilization and the
West.
Professor Samuel P. Huntington, in his article “The
Clash of Civilizations” and later in his book of the same name, argues
that the root of global conflict at the turn of the century is neither
ideological nor economic, but primarily cultural.
Huntington singles out Islamic civilization as the
most militant cultural form, and emphasizes the inherent conflict between
it and Western and other civilizations.
Although Huntington’s premise can be brought into
question, as shown by John Esposito (“Political Islam and the West”,
JFQ, Spring 2000), the Muslim world today is torn by a deep internal
conflict over the essence and purpose of Islamic society. The outcome of
this internal conflict has dictated, and continues to dictate, the nature
of the ties between Muslim civilization and Western and other
civilizations.
Islamic fundamentalism is funneled through dozens of
Islamist organizations that operate throughout the Muslim world. In
addition, there are three states – Iran, Afghanistan, and the Sudan –
whose fundamentalist Islamic regimes provide spiritual and material succor
to the radical Islamic movements. These states work independently and
through the radical Islamic movements to export the Islamic revolution to
the entire Muslim world, and spearhead the struggle against foreign –
particularly Western – civilizations.
In this article we shall be focusing on a recent
phenomenon which clearly exemplifies Huntington’s theory of the “clash of
civilizations” – that of the “Afghan mujahideen” – the spearhead of
radical Islam’s struggle against heretical cultures. Despite their name,
the “Afghan terrorists” are not affiliated with a specific movement or
state, but see themselves as the representatives of Islam’s relentless
struggle against secular Muslim regimes and heretical cultures.
Osama bin Laden is one of the outstanding “products”
of the Afghan war, and his organization “Al-Qa’idah” is one of the main
expressions of the “Afghan” phenomenon. Bin Laden views his struggle as
part of the conflict between Islamic and other civilizations, particularly
“the Jewish-Crusader civilization”, as he calls it.
As a cultural struggle, the world-wide Afghan
struggle is being waged on three fronts: within Muslim countries (to
reinstate the rule of shari’a law); in countries with Muslim
minorities, situated on “fault lines” with other cultures (the Balkans,
the Caucasus, Kashmir, etc.); and, internationally, in the struggle
against Western, particularly US, civilization, which is perceived by the
fundamentalists as the source of all evil, and the primary threat to
Islam.
It looks as if the clash of civilizations as
perceived by Huntington, at one extreme, and Osama bin Laden, at the
other, is with us to stay, at least for the foreseeable future.
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Turkey and the West
Walter A. McDougall
Turkey was a major threat to Europe for much of its
history, epitomized by the siege of Vienna (1529). World War I toppled the
German, Austrian, Russian, and Ottoman Empires, with catastrophic
political results everywhere – except Turkey. Under Ataturk, reform and
change were far-reaching, and Turkey became a responsible state in the
region. Present relations between Turkey and the West should be warm, but
are not: Turkey stood up to the Soviet Union (late 1940s), supported the
United Nations war effort in Korea, maintained NATO’s southeastern flank
throughout the Cold War, sacrificially supported the Gulf War, cracked
down on political Islam inside Turkey, and now offers a rare hand of
friendship to Israel.
Turkey outdoes most other non-European regimes in
international standards of human rights and democracy, and aspires to
European Union membership. Yet, the EU is consistently critical and
negative in its responses to Turkey, scrutinizing for errors, excesses and
violations to find excuses for Turkey not entering the EU.
This is partly due to an increase in racially motivated
violence across Europe. EU states crack down on racists and neo-Nazis but
also try to minimize the source of resentment by restricting the influx of
immigrants, refugees, and guest workers, most of whom originate in Turkey.
Geographical and demographic statistics show Turkey could well be
important in European councils, flood the continent with workers, and
become by far the largest recipient of EU subsidies.
Crucially: European failure to deal justly and fairly
with a politically sound, economically adequate Turkey may cause an
Iranian-style revolution, and turn Turkey militant and pan-Turkic, or
become so demoralized that the nation collapses. That would create a mess
and show the EU had chosen the wrong path.
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Did the Zionist Mainstream Collapse?
Moshe Lisak
The primary topic, “Did the Zionist mainstream
collapse?”, which has been discussed over the course of ten sessions,
covered many different areas. From a disciplinary perspective, the
analysis is sociological in nature and focuses on delineating the social,
political-ideological map on the one hand, and the ramifications of that
map on the nature of the Jewish-Arab conflict and its strategic aspects on
the other.
The drawing of the political map was not an objective
in and of itself. It was an attempt to assess the moral strength of the
Jewish population in the face of both the armed struggle with the
Palestinians and the social-cultural and ideological schisms.
The principal motif of the talks was an attempt to
point to the fact that the settlement enterprise in Judea, Samaria and
Gaza, or at least part of it, was an undertaking which disrupted the
course of the history of the central Zionist movements, movements which
strove to achieve Jewish sovereignty while in the process achieving
optimal disengagement from the Arab population. Religious-theological
motives and insufficiently validated military considerations disrupted
this process on the Right. Conversely - illusions, conceptual errors,
historical impatience and even extreme naiveté – often characterized the
Left.
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