Ariel Center for Policy Research (ACPR)

 

 

NATIV

A Journal of Politics and the Arts Volume 14 Number 4-5 (81-82) ■  September 2001

Table of Contents

Current Affairs Digest

The Editor and his Guests: Ariel Sharon – Defeatism as National PolicyDavid Bukay – Is Suburban Tel Aviv the Jewish State? ■ The Zionist Congress on The Hill ■ Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto “Man Pads” Shoulder Fired Anti-Aircraft Missiles – What Do They Mean – Politically?Rachel Ehrenfeld – Intifada, Arafat, Deceit, and Corruption ■ The Mitchell Report and the Runciman Report – A Short Lesson in History ■ Elyakim Ha'etzni – The Mitchell Report – Just Don’t Say “I Didn’t Know” ■ Jonathan Pollard – An Open Letter to the Prime Minister ■ Eilat Mazar – The Destruction of the Temple Mount – Irreversible Damage ■ The Orwellian Column ■ Martin Sherman – The Oslo Gang to Stand Before a Board of Inquiry ■ The Fatal Mistake of Arnon Soffer ■ Hillel Weiss – Reflections After a Visit to Auschwitz ■ Ezra Sohar – The Struggle Should Be Comprehensive ■ The Israeli Generals’ Plan for the Destruction of the Palestinian Authority

Articles

EU-Israel Relations: Fraternity between Democracies vs. Political Elasticity?

Ran Ichay

Russia and the Mideast Vacuum

Ilan Berman

The Islamic Threat - A New and More Dangerous Era

Anthony Dennis

The National Identity of the Residents of the Golan Heights

Efrat Tahar-Kedem

Moshe Shamir's "Yair": The Bell of Time

Yosef Oren

The Joint Community of Israel and Jordan

Motti Ashkenazi

The "Afghan Alumni" and the Clash of Civilizations (I)

Shaul Shay

Turkey and the West

Walter A. McDougall

Ideological Debate: The Ariel Center and The Israeli Left - Edited by Yona Hadari (Part III)

Did the Zionist Mainstream Collapse?

Moshe Lisak

Book Reviews

Eliyahu Green on The Forgotten Millions – The Modern Jewish Exodus from Arab Lands by Malka Hillel Shulevitz Haim Misgav  on Who is Afraid of a Jewish State? by Yehuda Cohen

The Arts ■ Editor: Moshe Shamir

Poetry

Oded Mizrahi Lois Ungar T.S. Eliot Moshe Shafrir Asher Torren William Blake Esther Zilber-Vitkon

Fiction

Y. Sikka Aharoni – Shops in Spain Moshe Gannan – A Day of Prayer
Ari Allenby – Mission

Essays and Reviews

Arieh Stav – Language, Metaphor and Translation in Three Poems of T.S. Eliot
Zur Ehrlich – An Analysis of Alterman’s Poetry

 

Selected Summaries

 

“Man Pads”* Shoulder Fired Anti-Aircraft Missiles –
What Do They Mean – Politically?

Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto

The successful interception of the arms smuggling boat “Santorini”, caught before it could deliver its load of Katyushas and SA-7-Strella anti-aircraft missiles to Arafat, should finally break the smug Israeli assumption that “Arafatehland”, the Arab West-Palestinian “state”, is going to stay demilitarized, as per the Oslo, etc., agreements.

Israeli “ostrich” policy brought about the freezing of the Ben Gurion 2000 airport design, declining to consider the fact that if a Palestinian entity were to emerge, the final approach to Ben-Gurion’s east-west runway will expose incoming aircraft at an optimum angle and range for the launching of SA-7s to down them.

The same policy led Israel to consider a secondary airport at Zikkim, between Ashkelon and Gaza, well within SA-7, Katyusha and even mortar range.

“We talk peace,” the writer was told by (former MK) Eli Goldschmidt, “if war comes, it’s the IDF’s, not our business.” One wonders whether Israel is two states: one for peace, the other for war.

The JED (Journal of Electronic Defense), April 2001 issue is devoted mostly to the shoulder missile’s importance, placing it among the breach-loaded rifle, the submarine, aircraft and radar, in the class of weapons that changed military thought, proving the article’s point with recent Gulf, Afghanistan and Yugoslavia statistics.

If/when a “no war” settlement between Israel and the Arabs of Judea, Samaria and Gaza will be renegotiated, Israel has to ensure that Strella-range and also terrorist overnight walking distance will not cover Israeli major targets.

*   Man Portable Air Defense System = Man Pads

 

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EU-Israel Relations: Fraternity between Democracies vs. Political Elasticity?

Ran Ichay

When considering the lack of political support for Israel in the international arena, we refer mainly to Europe. US-Israeli relations can be explained in several ways, but basically, American support for Israel is consistent and reliable, particularly in terms of public opinion on Capitol Hill.

Other countries are either non-democratic, or simply uninterested in the Arab-Israeli conflict. But there is one group of countries where democratic and moral values are – or are considered to be – a tradition. Despite this, many European countries prefer to support tyrannies and dictatorships in their consistent antipathy towards the only democratic state in the Middle East. The European countries, almost without exception, share their same social, political and moral values with Israel. Furthermore, the common European cultures, religion and civilizations are based upon the very roots that were planted by the Jewish people thousands of years ago. Yet these same countries choose the Arab-Muslim side – an ancient enemy of Europe, in the war against the Jews.

This picture may perhaps surprise and frustrate those who are not familiar with the true history of the trilateral relations of Arabs-Christians-Jews, and moreover, might not be acquainted with the alternative values which truly motivate Europe.

The tendency to lay the entire problem upon poor public relations on the part of the State of Israel vis-à-vis Europe is to oversimplify. Israel uses more or less the same public relations tools in the US with much better results. Needless to say, while Israel enjoys some short-term victories in the European public opinion and foreign policy forums, generally following a particularly cruel terrorist attack, the hostile attitude towards Israel in its struggle against the Palestinians or other Arab countries is much deeper and more profound.

There are several reasons for which the Europeans do not traditionally support the State of Israel. But beyond this, we must examine the extent to which this lack of support affects the State of Israel, both in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, as well as in the general arena of Israel’s foreign relations.

Despite high expectations, even after the Palestinian refusal at Camp David to accept an offer that will likely never come again, the nascent European support vanished just a few days later after clashes, initiated by the Palestinian Authority, broke out.

Over the years, Israel managed rather well without being backed by Europe. Although it has always expected such backup, Israel has never counted on it to materialize. Europe’s leverage over Israel is limited – although it does exist. Israel, unlike its neighbors, does not enjoy any bilateral aid from Europe, and the trade agreements it has with the EU are entirely reciprocal. Thus, any threats to suspend or harm extant trade relations will be of consequence, first and foremost, to several major European exporters.

There is no doubt, that from a regional point of view, proper bilateral relations between Europe and Israel are no less important to the Europeans than to Israel. It has been proven in the past, that any international body that has not maintained good relations with all parties to the conflict, failed to play a significant role in the region. The UN is but one example.

For the most part, over the years it is the US which has been the principal catalyst for the different peace processes – including the latter stages of the Oslo process. This enlarged role could only be played after having normalized US relations with Arab countries and gaining credibility with the Arabs.

Until such credibility is achieved by the EU in its attitude towards Israel, or by European countries in theirs, there is no reason for Israel to have the EU as a partner in the regional dynamics one way or another – after all, what is at stake is much more important than EU-Israel relations.

 

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Russia and the Mideast Vacuum

Ilan Berman

Practically unnoticed, Russia has regained its status as a major power in the Middle East. Over the past several years, Moscow has expanded its sphere of influence beyond its “near abroad” and into the Gulf and Levant. There, it has worked to alter the regional balance of power and fill the vacuum left by American diplomacy.

Russia’s regional policy is both multifaceted and ambitious. Through its relationship with Tehran, Moscow has furthered the Islamic Republic’s quest for weapons of mass destruction and complicated the West’s access to Caspian basin energy. Through its efforts to undermine the international sanctions regime against Baghdad and supplant the United States as chief broker of the Middle East peace process, Russia has attained growing control of regional diplomacy. And through arms sales and proliferation, the Kremlin has reestablished ties with a host of traditional client states, tilting them conclusively back into its orbit. Now, Russia stands poised to become the preeminent power in the Gulf, much to the detriment of both the United States and its regional allies, Turkey and Israel.

In this article, “Russia and the Mideast Vacuum”, the author explores the tools with which the Kremlin has sought to achieve regional dominance, control over Caspian and Gulf energy, and the creation of an anti-Western coalition aimed at ousting American influence from the region.

 

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The Islamic Threat - A New and More Dangerous Era

Anthony Dennis

The article is an overview of a wide range research regarding the collective identity of the Golan Heights settlers during the period of the attempted negotiations with Syria.

Initially, an historical survey was made focusing on the strategic aspect of the water component and the Golan settlement.

Extensive theoretical background was used to identify problems which were raised during interviews with 18 Golan settlers, which took place during the months February, June and July 2000, when the Golan was experiencing a stormy public campaign.

The population of the study includes two representatives: the generation of veteran Golan settlers, who arrived at a young age as of July 1967, and the second generation born on the Golan.

Many questions were raised on the following issues: identity, memory, population, territory and citizenship.

Furthermore, the contents of documents and newspaper articles have been analyzed. From all the gathered information, the author has created a human mosaic whose purpose is to analyze the process of change and future of the Golan inhabitants from their own introspection and discussions.

 

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The National Identity of the Residents of the Golan Heights

Efrat Tahar-Kedem

The article is an overview of a wide range research regarding the collective identity of the Golan Heights settlers during the period of the attempted negotiations with Syria.

Initially, an historical survey was made focusing on the strategic aspect of the water component and the Golan settlement.

Extensive theoretical background was used to identify problems which were raised during interviews with 18 Golan settlers, which took place during the months February, June and July 2000, when the Golan was experiencing a stormy public campaign.

The population of the study includes two representatives: the generation of veteran Golan settlers, who arrived at a young age as of July 1967, and the second generation born on the Golan.

Many questions were raised on the following issues: identity, memory, population, territory and citizenship.

Furthermore, the contents of documents and newspaper articles have been analyzed. From all the gathered information, the author has created a human mosaic whose purpose is to analyze the process of change and future of the Golan inhabitants from their own introspection and discussions.

 

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The Joint Community of Israel and Jordan

Motti Ashkenazi

A political strategy is proffered in this article, one which in my humble opinion, enables the formation of a gradual process which will lead, employing confidence-building measures, step-by-step to the formation of peaceful and neighborly relations without a “contractual” peace treaty, without concessions on substantive issues and vital interests, and without taking unnecessary risks. This policy avoids any attempt to make dramatic decisions over brief periods of time and does not take any shortcuts. It attaches significance to the psychological aspects, which typify the conflict and relies on Israel’s economic strength, on its ability to grow quickly and to adjust to changes relatively easily. The policy ascribes to hope and faith in a better future, and greater strength in frustrating violence than any other measure. The incitement to hatred and violence is a chronic societal illness, which, in the long run, harms its purveyors much more than it affects the objects of its hatred and the victims of its violence. The efforts to build a community of this sort is likely to restore the dynamism, the vision and the creative initiative to the Zionist revolution, which have eroded and dissipated over recent decades, and to furnish us with more favorable conditions for its realization. Specifically, when the “guns are firing”, there is a need to create a new understanding. May we be successful in internalizing the dictum of our sages: “Who is a hero? One who converts an enemy into a friend.”

 

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The "Afghan Alumni" and the Clash of Civilizations (I)

Shaul Shay

In recent years, some scholars have spoken of a clash of civilizations between Islam and modern secular (or Judeo-Christian) democratic values and culture, or between Islamic civilization and the West.

Professor Samuel P. Huntington, in his article “The Clash of Civilizations” and later in his book of the same name, argues that the root of global conflict at the turn of the century is neither ideological nor economic, but primarily cultural.

Huntington singles out Islamic civilization as the most militant cultural form, and emphasizes the inherent conflict between it and Western and other civilizations.

Although Huntington’s premise can be brought into question, as shown by John Esposito (“Political Islam and the West”, JFQ, Spring 2000), the Muslim world today is torn by a deep internal conflict over the essence and purpose of Islamic society. The outcome of this internal conflict has dictated, and continues to dictate, the nature of the ties between Muslim civilization and Western and other civilizations.

Islamic fundamentalism is funneled through dozens of Islamist organizations that operate throughout the Muslim world. In addition, there are three states – Iran, Afghanistan, and the Sudan – whose fundamentalist Islamic regimes provide spiritual and material succor to the radical Islamic movements. These states work independently and through the radical Islamic movements to export the Islamic revolution to the entire Muslim world, and spearhead the struggle against foreign – particularly Western – civilizations.

In this article we shall be focusing on a recent phenomenon which clearly exemplifies Huntington’s theory of the “clash of civilizations” – that of the “Afghan mujahideen” – the spearhead of radical Islam’s struggle against heretical cultures. Despite their name, the “Afghan terrorists” are not affiliated with a specific movement or state, but see themselves as the representatives of Islam’s relentless struggle against secular Muslim regimes and heretical cultures.

Osama bin Laden is one of the outstanding “products” of the Afghan war, and his organization “Al-Qa’idah” is one of the main expressions of the “Afghan” phenomenon. Bin Laden views his struggle as part of the conflict between Islamic and other civilizations, particularly “the Jewish-Crusader civilization”, as he calls it.

As a cultural struggle, the world-wide Afghan struggle is being waged on three fronts: within Muslim countries (to reinstate the rule of shari’a law); in countries with Muslim minorities, situated on “fault lines” with other cultures (the Balkans, the Caucasus, Kashmir, etc.); and, internationally, in the struggle against Western, particularly US, civilization, which is perceived by the fundamentalists as the source of all evil, and the primary threat to Islam.

It looks as if the clash of civilizations as perceived by Huntington, at one extreme, and Osama bin Laden, at the other, is with us to stay, at least for the foreseeable future.

 

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Turkey and the West

Walter A. McDougall

Turkey was a major threat to Europe for much of its history, epitomized by the siege of Vienna (1529). World War I toppled the German, Austrian, Russian, and Ottoman Empires, with catastrophic political results everywhere – except Turkey. Under Ataturk, reform and change were far-reaching, and Turkey became a responsible state in the region. Present relations between Turkey and the West should be warm, but are not: Turkey stood up to the Soviet Union (late 1940s), supported the United Nations war effort in Korea, maintained NATO’s southeastern flank throughout the Cold War, sacrificially supported the Gulf War, cracked down on political Islam inside Turkey, and now offers a rare hand of friendship to Israel.

Turkey outdoes most other non-European regimes in international standards of human rights and democracy, and aspires to European Union membership. Yet, the EU is consistently critical and negative in its responses to Turkey, scrutinizing for errors, excesses and violations to find excuses for Turkey not entering the EU.

This is partly due to an increase in racially motivated violence across Europe. EU states crack down on racists and neo-Nazis but also try to minimize the source of resentment by restricting the influx of immigrants, refugees, and guest workers, most of whom originate in Turkey. Geographical and demographic statistics show Turkey could well be important in European councils, flood the continent with workers, and become by far the largest recipient of EU subsidies.

Crucially: European failure to deal justly and fairly with a politically sound, economically adequate Turkey may cause an Iranian-style revolution, and turn Turkey militant and pan-Turkic, or become so demoralized that the nation collapses. That would create a mess and show the EU had chosen the wrong path.

 

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Did the Zionist Mainstream Collapse?

Moshe Lisak

The primary topic, “Did the Zionist mainstream collapse?”, which has been discussed over the course of ten sessions, covered many different areas. From a disciplinary perspective, the analysis is sociological in nature and focuses on delineating the social, political-ideological map on the one hand, and the ramifications of that map on the nature of the Jewish-Arab conflict and its strategic aspects on the other.

The drawing of the political map was not an objective in and of itself. It was an attempt to assess the moral strength of the Jewish population in the face of both the armed struggle with the Palestinians and the social-cultural and ideological schisms.

The principal motif of the talks was an attempt to point to the fact that the settlement enterprise in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, or at least part of it, was an undertaking which disrupted the course of the history of the central Zionist movements, movements which strove to achieve Jewish sovereignty while in the process achieving optimal disengagement from the Arab population. Religious-theological motives and insufficiently validated military considerations disrupted this process on the Right. Conversely - illusions, conceptual errors, historical impatience and even extreme naiveté – often characterized the Left.

 

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