Ariel Center for Policy Research (ACPR)

 

 

NATIV

A Journal of Politics and the Arts Volume 12 Number 3 (68) ■  May 1999

Table of Contents

Editorial

181 - Declaration of War

Articles

Ideological Tyranny in the Guise of Democracy (I)

Raya Epstein

A Palestinian State and the State Department

Ezra Sohar

Post-Oslo "Peace and Prosperity": Fantasy in the Guise of Vision

Martin Sherman

The Conceptual Difficulties in Defining Terrorism

Boaz Ganor

To a Sliver of Land Without Oil

George Steiner

A Scenario for the Jewish State in 2020

Paul Giniewski

Technological Changes, Strategy and IDF Force Structure

Zeev Bonen

The Palestinians - A Useful Past for a People that Never Existed in History

Eliyahu Green

Hamas and the "Peace Process"

Yehezkel Shabath

Book Reviews

"Dawn Rising in Hebron" - Elyakim Ha'etzni on Morning Star (Barkai) by Naomi Frenkel  "Explanation or Exculpation?" - Laurence Weinbaum on Explaining Hitler by Ron Rosenbaum

The Arts ■ Editor: Moshe Shamir

Poetry

Asher Torren Herzl Hakkak

Fiction

Hava Pinhas - Cohen - A Meeting in the Valley

Essays and Reviews

Gideon Setter - "Jullius Caesar" in HaBimah Gyora Leshem - "Don Pancho and Sancho Quixote" Yoram Elad - Continuity of Destiny, Continuity of Language

Document

Natan Alterman - How Not to Vote and How To Vote

 

Selected Summaries

 

181 - A Declaration of War

Editorial 

In its session in Gaza on Tuesday, April 29, l999, the Palestinian National Council (PNC) discussed the postponement of the declaration of Palestinian statehood, scheduled for May 4.  The debate centered primarily on the demand to establish a Palestinian state which will include all territories designated as Arab land in UN Resolution 181.  For about a half a year now, the Palestinian Authority has vigorously pushed forward a political initiative calling for the implementation of UN Resolutions 181 (November 1947) and 194 (December 1948).  In other words, fulfilling those resolutions which call for the State of Israel to return to the partition borders and for millions of Arabs to overrun the emasculated stump which will remain of the Jewish state.

After a series of meetings with personalities in Europe in which this matter was raised, Arafat met with Kofi Anan, the Secretary-General of the UN, on March 21, 1999 and received his blessing.  Anan claimed that Arafat's demand was firmly anchored in the General Assembly's resolutions.

After receiving the green light from the UN Secretary-General on March 25, the PLO, now operating in its role as the Palestine Liberation Organization, submitted an official request for a General Assembly session in which Israel be called upon to explain its violations of the UN Resolutions.  The PLO demand is supported by all of the Arab states - led by Egypt.

Europe, at the insistent urging of Germany, the dominant force on the continent and the nation currently presiding over the European Union, supports the Arab demand.  It was Germany which raised the demand for the internationalization of Jerusalem by transforming it into a separate entity (corpus seperatum) based on the partition borders. 

The UN Human Rights Commission (a body which enjoys great prestige and influence), in its annual meeting in Geneva on April 28, l999, adopted a resolution calling for self-determination for the Palestinian nation on the basis of Resolution 181 from November 1947, and demanding that Israel fulfill Resolution 194 from December 1948.  Of the committee's 53 member nations (Israel's candidacy was rejected due to the claim that Israel violates human rights), 44 voted in favor of the resolution, including all the European nations, and 8 abstained. Though the United States voted against, it adamantly refused to accede to the Israeli request to expend efforts to prevent the resolution's adoption.  As a result, within a short time, the residents of Jerusalem, Nahariya, Lod, Ramle, Jaffa and Beersheba, to name but a few, can anticipate their cities being labeled "illegal settlements and obstacles to peace" by the international community. 

The precedent for the new Arab demand is a direct result of the strategic abuse to which Israel has been subjected since 1990 (better known by its sarcastic euphemism: "peace process").  From the moment that Israel waived its basic right as an attacked nation to maintain territories which served the aggressor as a springboard for war, the return to the partition borders and the liquidation of Israel have become merely a function of time.

Now that all pretenses have been eliminated and the malicious Arab intentions to annihilate the Jewish state have been exposed, the critical mass which demands courageous action required of any sane nation standing on the verge of a national catastrophe has crystallized.  The minimal response required to upset the Arab strategy would be to immediately announce  suspension of the "peace process",  annexation of those parts of Judea and Samaria which have not yet been relinquished to the Palestinian Authority, expulsion of the PLO from Jerusalem and disarming the "Palestinian police force".  This step will almost certainly lead to the severing of diplomatic relations with Egypt and Jordan, riots in Judea and Samaria and possibly economic sanctions by the European Union.  Taking all factors into account, it is a reasonable price to pay.  The probability of a comprehensive war is low, as the Arabs are unprepared at this point.  On the other hand, if the Arabs decide to wage a war, there is a reasonable chance that they would be routed, as Israel has not yet squandered its strategic holdings in Judea and Samaria and the Golan Heights.  If Israel does not take the above actions and chooses "disgrace instead of war", ultimately, to paraphrase Churchill ("You chose disgrace in fear of war, you got disgrace and war as well."), Israel will get both "disgrace and war".  However, one major distinction exists:  Disgrace was the worst that Churchill feared as he never considered the possibility that Britain might be destroyed.  The Jewish state does not have that sort of British luxury at its disposal. 

 

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A Palestinian State and the State Department

Ezra Sohar

The British Royal Committee in 1937 (Peel Committee) and the Anglo-American Committee in 1947 both advised to divide Mandatory Western Palestine into two states, Jewish and Arab.  The plenary session of the UN opted for this solution on November 29, 1947.  The world accepted the Jordanian occupation of the so called "West Bank" as the equivalent of a Palestinian state.  Ever since Israel occupied the West Bank in 1967, the United States has put heavy pressure on Israel to withdraw from the West Bank.  The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was established in 1964 by Abdul Nasser in Egypt and taken over by Yassir Arafat in 1969.  By becoming an international terror organization it forced the Arab League to recognize it as the authentic representatives of the Palestinian people.  After Jordan waived its interest in the West Bank, the PLO was openly recognized by the European Union.  The United States promised Israel in writing in 1975 not to talk to the PLO, but conducted secret talks with them all the time.  Since 1989 the dialogue is official.

Israel was a strategic ally of the USA during the Cold War.  After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the USA reverted to the attitude of the State Department during the Fifties, and is jeopardizing the manifold advantages of the alliance with Israel for shortsighted appeasement of despots in the Arab world.  The ISA forced Israel to agree first to the so called "legitimate rights" of the Palestinians and then to negotiate with the PLO in Madrid.  The dwarfing of Israel and the now almost open support for a full fledged Palestinian state is a heavy blow to Israel.  It is being inflicted by the USA on its faithful and only ally in the Middle East, thereby endangering its very existence.

 

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Post-Oslo "Peace and Prosperity": Fantasy in the Guise of Vision

Martin Sherman

The article presents a gloomy analysis of the economic prospects for the Middle East in general and for Israel in particular, as a result of the implementation of the Oslo "peace process". It points out that unless one is willing largely to "de-Arabize" a Palestinian state there is no reason to believe that its economic performance will be significantly better than the dismal economic performance of other oil-devoid Arab states. Furthermore, the essay exposes the basic contradiction in the position of Oslo advocates, who insist that even after the implementation of the peace process, Israel will still require a "strong army to maintain the peace". Unless one is willing to discount totally military threats from the co-signatories of peace agreements with the Jewish state, the new borders to which Israel will be obliged to withdraw will impose a huge escalation in the defense spending needed to deal with such threats. Thus, contrary to the claims of the Oslo adherents, this increased expenditure on conventional defense will not only reduce the amount of resources available for the civilian sector, but is also most likely to diminish the resources available for spending on defense systems against non-conventional threats from the "outer ring" countries such as Iraq and Iran. Likewise, the vision of an economically prosperous "New Middle East" is dismissed as dangerous fantasy. For there is little chance of establishing a new economic order on the basis of the prevailing political order in the region, where most of the regimes are military dictatorships which cannot permit the freedoms required for the promotion of pan-regional development. For Israel, the most prudent way to economic prosperity would be to adhere to the tried and tested method embodied in the classic Zionist formula of "one more acre, one more goat", that of gradual and doggedly determined progress which brought the country its considerable economic accomplishments up until the Oslo era.

This paper was published as the ACPR's Policy Paper No. 87 in the book
ISRAEL AND A PALESTINIAN STATE: ZERO SUM GAME?, 2001

 

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The Conceptual Difficulties in Defining Terrorism

Boaz Ganor

Issues of definition and conceptualization are usually theoretical matters, designed to allow scholars to agree on the appropriate set of parameters for the research they intend to undertake. Unlike the case in other topics, however, the implications of defining terrorism and guerrilla warfare tend to exceed the confines of theoretical discussions. In the struggle against terrorism, definition problems are a crucial element in the attempts to organize international cooperation.

Other issues related to the definition of terrorism include:

   The boundary between terrorism and other forms of political violence.

   Whether government terrorism and resistance terrorism are part of the same phenomenon.

   Separating "terrorism" from simple criminal acts, from open war between "consenting" groups, and from acts that arise out of clear mental illness.

     Is terrorism a sub-category of coercion? Violence? Power? Influence?

     Can terrorism be legitimate? What gains justify its use?

     The relationship between guerilla warfare and terrorism.

     The relationship between crime and terrorism.

The prevalent definitions of terrorism entail conceptual difficulties and many problems of wording. It is thus not surprising that alternative concepts with more positive connotations - guerrilla movements, underground movements, national liberation movements, commandos, etc. - are often used to describe and analyze the activity of terrorist organizations. Generally, these concepts are used without undue attention to the implications of the definition, but at times, the use of these definitions is tendentious and originates in a particular political viewpoint. By resorting to tendentious definitions of terrorism, terrorist organizations and their supporters seek to blur the uniqueness of terrorism, establishing their activities on more positive and legitimate foundations (relying on terms reflecting basic values of liberal democracies, such as "revolutionary violence", "national liberation", etc.).

This article tries to inform the reader about the latest developments in this field.

 

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To a Sliver of Land Without Oil

George Steiner

Babylon, Thebes, Carthage are archaeology.  Modern Athens is a travesty of an unredeemable past.  The laws, the epigraphy of Imperial Rome turn up in the desert.  Israel relives; the Diaspora, notably in North America, is animate with creative force and a lust for renewal...Jews insist on existing contra the norm and logic of history, which, even barring genocide, are those of gradual melting, assimilation, cross-breeding and the effacement of original identity...The Jew has been chosen and branded for eternity.  If he was to perish from this earth, God's truth and declared intent, the revelation of monotheism and of morality on Sinai, would be falsified.

Has the survival of the Jew been worth the appalling cost?  Would it not be preferable, on the balance sheet of human mercies, if he was to ebb into assimilation and the common seas?  Every Jewish father is, at some point in his life and paternity, an Abraham to an Isaac on the unspeakable three-day journey to Mount Moriah.  When he begets a child, a Jew knows that he may be bestowing on that child the inheritance of terror, of a sadistic destiny.

It may be that the Jew in the Diaspora survives in order to be a guest – so terribly unwelcome still at so many shut doors.  Intrusion may be our calling, so as to suggest to our fellow men and women at large that all human beings must learn how to live as each other's "guests-in-life".  Morality must always have its bags packed.  This has been the universalist precept of the prophets, of Isaiah, Deutero-Isaiah and Jeremiah in their ancient quarrel with the kings and priests of the fixed nation, of the fortress-state.  Today this polemic underlies the tensions between Israel and the Diaspora.  Though the thought must, like the ritual name of God, be unspeakable, the greater verity is that Judaism would survive the ruin of the State of Israel.  It would do so if its "election" is indeed one of wandering, of the teaching of welcome among men.

It is not the "slaying of God in the person of his son", whatever that macabre phantasm is taken to signify – which is fundamental to the detestation of the Jew.  It is the narrative "creation", "invention", "definition", "revaluation" of God in Jewish monotheism and its ethics.  It is not as killer but as "begetter" of God that the Jew is unforgiven.

Three times, in Western history, the Jew has striven to confront human consciousness with the concept of the one God and the moral-normative consequences of that concept. 

The moral dictates which emanate from Sinaitic and prophetic monotheism are uncompromising...They entail the mutation of the common man.  We are to discipline soul and flesh into perfection.

The second comes with the Sermon on the Mount.  Nearly inconceivably against the human grain is Jesus' bidding that we offer the other cheek, that we forgive our enemy and persecutor – no, that we learn to love him.

The third is that of utopian socialism, notably in its Marxist guise.  Marxism is Judaism's other principal heresy.  Marxism demands a complete inversion of the priorities of privacy, of acquisition, of egoism.  We are to abstain from superfluity, to share and share alike, to invest the resources, the ambitions of the self in the anonymity of the collective.

 

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A Scenario for the Jewish State in 2020

Paul Giniewski

Political fiction, utopia and futurology have a legitimate function in politics and in the writing of History,  Did not Herzl's Judenstaat and Altneuland serve as blueprints for the Jewish state?

Paul Giniewski predicts at what horrid cost Israel survived the establishment of an Arab state of "Palestine", which triggered off the most destructive of its wars, in the year 2005:  600,000 Jewish victims, Haifa razed to the ground by an Iranian nuclear bomb and even much more severe destruction in the Arab world.

But inn 2020, the former foes are reconciled.  They have rejected Islamism and the European selfish mercantile yoke which had fanned the flames of hate in order to sell arms of mass destruction to Israel's enemies.  Instead of pursuing the path of mutual destruction, Israel and her neighbors have united in a viable and prosperous Confederation.  The Arab dictatorships have become democracies.

This evolution had deep historical roots.  As early as 1919, Zionists and Arabs had concluded an ephemeral peace.

The Middle East could have been spared decades of wars and bloodshed, had not the disastrous Oslo agreement and the ensuing "peace process" impeded and prevented real Peace.

 

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Technological Changes, Strategy and IDF Force Structure

Zeev Bonen

Present sophisticated conventional warfare enables killing at distance by precision and non-precision fire.  In the frontline, war killing at distance capability will lead to fire dominance and to the decline of mobility.  In the rear, ballistic missiles attacks will cause substantial damage and casualties, leading to considerable delays in reserves call-up, despite all active and passive defenses.

Thus, the critical first stage of a surprise frontline war will have to be fought with regular units in place.  Simultaneously, the campaign depth fire battle will weaken and fragment enemy forces.  These combined frontline and in depth fire battles will be followed by a mobile ground maneuver, intended to force a political decision to end the war.

Unfortunately, the opportunities for open area warfare are decreasing. Urbanization around Israel is increasing rapidly; at the same time, the range and lethality of anti-tank weapons are also increasing.  Consequently, the Arabs may adopt a defense strategy based on infantry anchored on built up areas.  Hence, a direct reduction of some built up areas by infantry attacks may be unavoidable.  Consequently, high-quality volunteer close-combat infantry will be indispensable.

The shape of large scale conventional war and the IDF force structure will be influenced by three factors:  The increasing dominance of fire over maneuver, the war on the rear and its effect on reserves call-up and the growing urbanization around Israel.  All of these changes and the increasing population have reached the point where Israel may have to and can defend itself in a full scale war with a professional volunteer army, aided perhaps by some reserves.  This would apply both for the fire heavy technological force component and the elite infantry component.

In the rear a large scale civil defense system is required.  Also, the Palestinian threat must be contained. Hence, considerable manpower would be required to handle the war in the rear. Paradoxically, the external technological war against enemy forces may perhaps be carried out mostly by professional volunteers; on the other hand, it may be necessary to call up a lot of reserves to deal with the intensive and extensive internal war. This is a paradigm change from the present IDF.

The paper also discusses some other types of war.  The increasing threat of weapons of mass destruction requires specific technological force components for defense and credible deterrence.  The availability of various types of weapons of mass destruction raises the problem of cross deterrence.  In South Lebanon our soldiers in the wide security zone suffer painful casualties both by killing at distance means and by close combat.  These casualties may be reduced by changing our strategy to one of static defense using a narrow, sophisticated blocking strip on the international border.

 

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The Palestinians - A Useful Past for a People that Never Existed in History

Eliyahu Green

A sizable literature has sprouted in recent decades to propound the notion of a "Palestinian people" and its real or imagined anguish, agonies, and grievances. Eliyahu Green examines a specimen of the genre, a book by B. Kimmerling and J. Migdal. Green finds the book marred by conceptual confusion, as well as significant omissions and evasions, plus serious falsehoods, which provide a tableau of a useful past for this "people", a somewhat romanticized view of a distinct "Palestinian people", related to the Arabs yet somehow separate. Conceptually, the authors do not clearly or reasonably explain that this is indeed a distinct people or nation, nor precisely how the notion of a distinct "Palestinian people" developed, nor do they explain what they mean by people or nation in principle.

The authors do show that in the nineteenth century and up to the First World War, the Arab-Muslim upper class in the country was integrated into the Ottoman political system. Yet Kimmerling and Migdal insinuate that this integration was limited to Eretz-Israel itself, avoiding the rise to high Ottoman imperial posts of certain local Arabs, chiefly of the Husseini and Khalidi clans. It seems that it simply would not do to show that some "Palestinians" were imperialists. That might spoil the useful tableau of the past. For the same reason, they severely minimize the Holocaust participation of Arabs in general and the Palestinian Arab leadership in particular. On this issue the Hebrew edition of the book is a slight improvement over the English one. Further, the authors disregard considerable evidence showing a consistent - though often surreptitious - British anti-Zionist, pro-Arab policy, although Britain had accepted an international obligation to foster development of the Jewish National Home. They also misrepresent British policy towards Amin Husseini and conceal George Antonius' British loyalties. Yet the Hebrew edition omits the silly claim in the English one that the British left Eretz-Israel out of fear of a renewed Arab revolt.

The book in its superficiality does not ask why the Palestinian Arab refugee problem was preserved and perpetuated by the international community while much larger refugee problems from the same period were solved long ago.

All this helps to provide the "Palestinian people" with a useful past.

 

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Hamas and the "Peace Process"

Yehezkel Shabath

Hamas is a branch of the Islamic movement. It was formed in Gaza in 1987 by the Moslem Brotherhood with the goal of establishing an Islamic state in “Palestine”. Its leader was Shaykh Ahmad Yasin, who together with other Shaykhs, drafted the Islamic Charter. The articles of this charter are very extreme – stating that Palestine in its entirety is sacred to Islam in perpetuity and that no Moslem has the right to relinquish even the slightest part of it.

During the years of the intifada, Hamas committed extremely cruel acts of terror, including suicide bombings perpetrated in the wake of the killing at the Tomb of the Patriarchs and the elimination of Yahya Ayyash. Hamas vehemently opposed the peace process, criticized it, battled against it and believed that it would fall. After ‘Arafat’s entry into Gaza in July 1994 and the consolidation of his power in the autonomous territories, Israel urged him to arrest members of Hamas in order to prevent them from carrying out further acts of terror. ‘Arafat partially acceded to Israeli demands in order to acquire additional areas in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip.

The leaders of Hamas saw that the Peace Process was successfully progressing and the Palestinian Authority was securely established in the autonomous territories, while their own policies were suffering repeated failures and they decided, for the time being, to toe the line and “bend in the face of the storm”. In the course of 1996, they began to issue relatively moderate declarations and the head of the Hamas political office – Musa abu-Marzuq – presented a new plan. According to the plan, Hamas expressed willingness to sign a cease-fire agreement with Israel and stop all terror attacks in exchange for a complete Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, Judea, Samaria and East Jerusalem and the dismantling of all settlements.

In their declarations, the leaders of Hamas added that they would support ‘Arafat’s policies in order to attain as much as possible of Palestine in this generation and leave the liberation of the remainder to future generations. Hence, Hamas, for all intents and purposes, adopted the “step-by-step policy”, which had been the policy of the PLO for some time.

During the years 1996-1997, ‘Arafat continued to “eat away” at Hamas. In those years, three major factions developed within Hamas: One, a relatively small faction, abandoned the jihad and returned exclusively to cultural and philanthropic activities; the second, central faction, supported suspending the jihad, for the time being, and focusing on political activity as opposition within the Palestinian Authority; and the third, smallest faction, continues to advocate the path of jihad. The central faction, which is the predominant one, established, in 1996, a party named the “Islamic National Salvation Party”. This party is, so to speak, a political arm of Hamas and functions as a legal, political opposition party in the context of the Palestinian Authority.

In addition, the Islamic movement has, to a certain degree, split, and other small Islamic parties which function within the Palestinian Authority have been established. The central faction in Hamas attempts, as far as possible, to avoid a confrontation with the Palestinian Authority which would lead to a situation similar to the one encountered by the fundamentalist Islamic movements in Egypt and Algeria – a bloody war with the current regime.

This paper was published as the ACPR's Policy Paper No. 127, 2001

 

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