Palestinian Ideology and Practice
- 5 Years After Oslo
Moshe Sharon
The Oslo agreements were aimed, from the moment they were signed to end all acts of hostility, both physical and verbal, between Israel and the Palestinians. It was clearly understood that the Palestinians would not only stop all acts of violence against Israel but would change the tone of their propaganda, and endeavor to disseminate messages of peace and good neighborliness. The Israeli public was made to believe that similar to Israel, the Palestinian Authority would develop special educational programs for the schools to educate the young generation in the spirit of peace, and prepare it to live in a new era of no-war, just as Israel had been doing for years. It was also hoped that the anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic line of propaganda, common in the Palestinian press (and other sources of information), would at least be tempered if not completely changed. It was hoped that on the official level the notorious symbols of the hatred for Israel, in the official documentation of the PLO would be modified, notwithstanding the Palestinian Covenant and the FATEH Charter.
In reality none of these hopes were realized. After the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip and the "West Bank" the terrorist actions against Israeli citizens were intensified. Stealing Israeli vehicles became a national sport, the PA did nothing to change the atmosphere of hatred among the Palestinians. On the contrary, the language of hatred, the incitement for war against the Jews, the belligerent speeches - the books in schools, the ideology of negating Israel's existence and the Jewish right to a homeland, remained the same as they had been even before World War II. All of this has been advanced through the media.
This article was published in English in the ACPR's
Policy Paper No. 57,
in the book
ISRAEL AND A PALESTINIAN STATE: ZERO SUM GAME?, 2001
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Israel's Public Broadcasting: Reporting
or Managing the News?
Yisrael Medad and Eli Pollak
Israel's public electronic
broadcasting agencies, both radio and television, are powerful and
influential factors in the country's political, cultural, social and
economic life. Indeed, they exert a pervasive presence and succeed,
more often than not, in establishing the agenda of the day and how media
consumers will perceive and relate to that agenda. Some would even
claim that they can control the public figures themselves.
The central question
addressed in this study is whether Israel’s media have expanded their
roles from reporting, observing and interpreting news to making the news
and managing it.
The study indicates that
electronic media journalists, in too many instances, have been operating
in blatant violation of the normative codes of professional ethics as
well as the law. The news they bring into the living rooms of Israel's
media consumers is more than occasionally slanted, biased and
non-objective. In fact, they have proclaimed that "objectivity" is no
longer a realizable goal and that media consumers must settle for no
more than "fairness".
This study outlines the
reasons for the excessive impact the electronic media possesses and
deals with several central issues which highlight, the failure to uphold
the obligations of media ethics. These include a review of balance in
regular news programs; public affairs discussion shows; treatment of the
Oslo peace process; the media's role during the aftermath of the Rabin
assassination; coverage of the 1996 elections; and sundry other topics.
In addition, the authors
marshal a significant body of material relating to the ideological
identity and character of Israel's media, including first-person
accounts and testimonies.
The study is based on over
three years of monitoring and researching Israel's three television
channels (Channel One, Channel Two and the Educational Television
Network) as well as the two main radio stations (Kol Yisrael [The Voice
of Israel] and IDF Army radio).
This paper
was published in English in the ACPR's
Policy Paper No. 50, 1998
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Nuclear Deterrence in the Information
Age
Stephen Cimbala
One
aspect of the much touted "Revolution in Military Affairs" has been the
possibility of using information warfare as a force multiplier or even
as an independent arm of strategy. However, new means for information
conflict will not appear within a political and military vacuum. The
proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and of
long range delivery systems for these weapons is among those patterns
carried forward from the Cold War into the "new world order". There is
potential danger and great uncertainty in the future relationship
between nuclear weapons and information warfare. Nuclear deterrence
depends upon the reliability and certainty of information about the
sides' capabilities and intentions. Information warfare attempts to deny
the opponent a clear picture of what is happening by destroying or
disrupting its information means for coping with crisis and war.
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Missile and Nuclear Proliferation in South
Asia and its Implications
Ashok Kapur
China’s
missile and nuclear supply to Pakistan, and India’s belated but clear
nuclear response, highlights and illustrates the problem of missile
proliferation and missile defense in two connected regions of conflict
viz. South Asia and the Middle East. China’s military supply behavior
in Pakistan (and Iran), and Clinton administration support of PRC
activity in the 1990s, brought out of the closet a new problem in
international relations, i.e. the non-proliferators (USA and PRC in
South-Asia, and Russia and China in Iran) are also dangerous promoters
of proliferation in regions of conflict in a selective way; they insist
on the importance of non-proliferation with their adversaries, and they
support or tolerate proliferation with their strategic partners.
Selective proliferation by members of international non-proliferation
regimes vis-à-vis their friends, or where economic gain is indicated,
also highlights the fact that the supply chain cuts across traditional
regional boundaries; the suppliers’ controls are weak and the boundaries
– geographical as well as the rules of the non-proliferation regimes –
are porous. Chinese and North Korean missile supply relations with
non-nuclear weapon states reveal a supply/recipient interface between
East Asian states and South Asian/Middle Eastern states (Pakistan, Iran,
among others). Russian nuclear supplies – whether or not there are
officially approved – create a Russia/Middle East interface. To the
extent that recent Indian and Pakistani nuclear testing is likely to
further stimulate proliferation tendencies in Iran because of its
internal and strategic compulsions, a South Asian/Middle East interface
is also indicated. Can countries in the volatile South Asian and Middle
East region rely on international regimes for their security? Or do the
Indian tests signal that countries outside the NATO alliance, or who do
not trust a foreign power to protect them, must engage in self-help and
autonomy of strategic choice by independent military means or in concert
with friendly strategic partners? The recent developments in South Asia
highlight the problem of missile and nuclear proliferation and the
importance of BMD among other measures.
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The Operative Response to the TBM Threat
Haim Assa
A conceptual confusion between strategic and operative dimensions causes Israel to neglect what is termed "the operative response". The operative response, based on the IAF, provides Israel with the critical answer to the TBM threat.
While the operative dimension entails the launching of missiles with conventional warheads on Israel, the strategic dimension refers to the launching of non-conventional warheads.
Israel's answer to the strategic dimension threat is based on deterrence. In the operative sphere, Israel's response must be based on focused operative ability, which will enable Israel's air force to operate freely on Syrian and Iraqi territory, thus allowing the IDF to extinguish the threat.
The operative response does not provide complete protection against enemy missile attacks, but it does provide a high probability that they will be stopped within a number of days of combat. A response based solely on interception, on the other hand, will not prevent the enemy from launching missiles, and will not serve as a deterring element in the operative dimension after the fighting has ended. This, in turn, will directly affect the strategic balance of Israel in relation to Syria and Iraq.
In the 1982 Lebanon War, Israel destroyed Syria's surface-to-air missiles (deployed in Lebanon). This operative dimension operation had direct strategic ramifications and served as the main reason for Syria's later equipment with TBMs.
In order to create a meaningful operative response, Israel must both significantly increase its air force's order of power and concentrate efforts on the development of original weapons systems, which will provide adequate answers to existing threats. All further investment in American ideas, such as BPI or interceptive missiles (beyond what has already been invested in the "Arrow"), constitutes a waste of funds, for the reason that the systems and strategic environments of both countries are completely different. Moreover, such weapons systems create the illusion that Israel possesses an effective response to operative threats. It is Israel's air power which must serve as its operative pillar, while interceptive capabilities (such as the "Arrow") serve as a supportive element.
It is important to note that the air response is intended to strengthen Israel's position in the face of additional threats in the Middle East, in contrast to the interceptive response, which has a single goal and is not versatile.
This article was published in English as the ACPR's Policy Paper No. 49, in the book
BALLISTIC MISSILES: THE THREAT AND THE RESPONSE, 1999
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Developing BPI / API Capability
David Vaughan, et. al
This report documents an analysis of countering theater ballistic missiles (TBMs) by using manned aircraft with onboard radar sensors in an airborne intercept role. Although current defense planning does not anticipate such a role for manned aircraft, more-advanced airborne intercept options harbor significant uncertainties with respect to development, and it remains to be demonstrated that they will prove practicable in the decade ahead. Thus, the approaches we analyzed and similar ones may be revisited as nearer-term options in the future.
Moreover, although recent discussions have focused almost exclusively on boost-phase intercept (BPI), ascent-phase intercept (API) has significant operational merits that should not be dismissed wholesale. Indeed, our analysis suggests that the development of a dual BPI-API capability should be strongly considered for the reasons cited in this report.
Our approach consists of first describing the factors that bear on the decision to develop airborne interceptors, then assessing three nominal development paths, illustrated in Table S.1. Each path is characterized by the sequence of boosters used for development and for the final (objective) operational system. The paths differ in test and development, early contingency, and final objective capabilities. The first two paths, which start with exoatmospheric API early contingency options and end with endoatmospheric BPI systems, are sometimes called "grow down" paths, implying that lower-altitude BPI may be pursued later through follow-on development. The final path, which starts with an early BPI capability, is called "direct."
Table S.1
Airborne Intercept Development Paths
Development
Path |
Test and
Development |
Early Contingency Capability |
Final Objective
Capability |
Path 1:
SRAM-ASAS
(grow down) |
Test and develop KKVs on SRAM-
ASAS |
API on SRAM-
ASAS |
BPI/API on SRAM-ASAS |
Path 2:
SRAM-ASAS/ Peregrine (grow down) |
Test and develop KKVs on SRAM-
ASAS
|
API on SRAM-
ASAS |
BPI/API on Peregrine |
Path 3: AMRAAM-Hellfire/Peregrine (Direct) |
Test and develop KKVs on AMRAAM-Hellfire |
BPI/API on AMRAAM-
Hellfire |
BPI/API on Peregrine |
NOTE: Short-Range Attack Missile (SRAM); Advanced Solid Axial Stage (ASAS); Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM).
The problem, simply stated, is to decide which capabilities to enable and to choose the most desirable development path. In what follows, the results of our analysis to inform this decision process are summarized briefly.
If the BPI requirement is limited to TBMs with ranges of 600 km or more, the desired capability can be most quickly and cheaply developed with a SRAM-ASAS system (Path 1, Table S.1). If desired, an API capability with an exoatmospheric kinetic kill vehicle (KKV) could be developed first as an early contingency capability. The endoatmospheric KKV for the BPI system would be designed for dual-mode operation, unless this is prohibited by technical barriers (e.g., size, weight, lethality). The SRAM-ASAS booster would be used for all developments and operational systems. Because of its weight and size, this booster could not be operated from carrier-based aircraft.
If the BPI requirement is to include intercepts of TBMs with ranges as short as 300 km, a more capable endoatmospheric KKV and a shorter-burn (i.e., high-acceleration) booster are required. Two distinct paths differing primarily in their early contingency capabilities are attractive:
-
In the first approach, the more capable endoatmospheric KKV would be developed on SRAM-ASAS. Assuming satisfactory progress, a shorter-burn, smaller Peregrine-type booster would be developed to be ready for the operational system. This booster would be compatible with joint (Air Force, Navy) operation, and an early contingency API capability with an exoatmospheric KKV could be developed first.
-
In the second approach, the more capable endoatmospheric KKV would be developed on AMRAAM-Hellfire, a much shorter-burn, smaller, and somewhat lower-velocity booster than SRAM-ASAS. An early contingency capability for BPI of TBMs down to 300 km range would be possible with this booster coupled with an interim endoatmospheric KKV matched to AMRAAM-Hellfire’s lower velocity. As in the first approach, this booster would be compatible with joint (Air Force, Navy) operation, and assuming satisfactory progress, the higher velocity, somewhat larger Peregrine-type booster would be developed to ensure a full-capability operational system.
In conclusion, several operational considerations deserve some attention in sorting through development options for BPI/API. For example, a long-range API system carried in bombers could contribute in a standoff mode in the early phases of a conflict before air superiority has been achieved. Operating a BPI system with a small footprint could require a large number of aircraft to maintain combat air patrol, and puts a premium on positioning the interceptor platform properly. Finally, several potential synergies between API/BPI and ground-attack operations may be exploited, including post-launch ground attack of launchers and other assets fleeing to hide and resupply sites.
A detailed examination of these issues is clearly beyond the scope of the present work. Nonetheless, highlighting them underscores the need for a broader analytical context within which the operational viability of airborne intercept may be understood properly.
This article was published in English as the ACPR's Policy Paper No. 44, in the book
BALLISTIC MISSILES: THE THREAT AND THE RESPONSE, 1999
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The Need for Revision of the Israeli
Military Doctrine
Yoav Gelber
Israel’s founding leaders shaped its national security’s fundamental
concepts in the early 1950s in view of the contemporary geopolitical,
demographic, social and economic conditions. Despite the major changes
that the 1967 and 1973 wars generated in all these fields, no thorough
revision of the prevalent principles has taken place ever since. An
analysis of the present military and non-military threats which Israel
encounters on the one hand, and its socio-cultural situation on the
other hand, reveals a huge gap between the menaces’ intensity and the
readiness of Israeli society to cope with them and face reality. The
IDF’s traditional character as “The People’s Army” has turned,
therefore, from an asset to a liability.
The
essential reform of the national security’s principles and organization
covers a reexamination of the three basic concepts – deterrence, alert
and overpowering; reshaping the military’s relations with the political
authority and creating a national security team besides the PM; and,
particularly a revision of the relative role and composition of the
career army, the conscripts and the reserves.
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A Palestinian Guerilla Offensive on the
Outskirts of Tel Aviv
Yuval Steinitz
A basic assumption underlining the Oslo agreements has been that deployment of a Palestinian military presence in Judea and Samaria would not create a strategic threat to Israel. This argument assumed that a Palestinian force would be insignificant against the mighty IDF, as well as in comparison to the huge armies of the three regional powers: Egypt, Syria and Iraq.
Our aim is to challenge this view. An analysis of the optimal Arab strategy shows that Palestinian forces in the immediate surroundings of Israel's civilian and military backyard will make them the decisive factor in case of war. The Palestinians, in coordination with a general Arab offensive will simply cross the green-line and move several kilometers into Israel in order to attack or to interfere with most of the country's airfields, reserve camps, main roads, telecommunication centers, national TV and radio stations, major military headquarters, civilian neighborhoods, government offices, etc., as was alleged in the past by one of Israel's most prominent political thinkers, former Prime Minister Shimon Peres.
The paper examines three prevalent dogmas which "allow" generals to neglect the possibility of such a guerrilla-like offensive. The paper suggests some operative answers, focusing on the need to supply a wide spectrum of self-defense capabilities to Israel's rear.
This article was published in English in the ACPR's Policy Paper No. 60, in the book
ISRAEL AND A PALESTINIAN STATE: ZERO SUM GAME?, 2001
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