Ariel Center for Policy Research (ACPR)
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NATIV |
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A Journal of Politics and the Arts ■Volume 11 ■ Number 4-5 (63-64) ■ September 1998 |
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Table of Contents |
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Israel: Five Years to Oslo: Notes on Demoralization |
Articles |
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Arnon Soffer |
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Raphael Israeli |
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Jordanian-Israeli Strategic Partnership in Historical Perspective |
Alexander Bligh |
Angelo M. Codevilla |
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Frank J. Gaffney, Jr. |
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Moshe Yegar |
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Who is Really Responsible for Not Preventing the Murder of the Prime Minister? |
Eliav Shochetman |
The African Giant: From Military Rule to National Reconciliation |
Moshe Gilboa |
Reviews |
Fit for Every Soldier's Kitbag – Eviatar Ben Zedeff on Science, Technology and Battlefield by Azriel Lorber ■ Judea and Samaria New Research – Ehud Netzer on Judea and Samaria Research Studies Proceedings of the Fifth Annual Meeting 1997 by Yaakov EshelAharon Amir ■ Ruth Netzer ■ Orzion Bar-Tanna ■ Raphael Israeli ■ Moshe Shafrir |
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The Arts ■ Editor: Moshe Shamir |
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Poetry |
Aharon Amir ■ Ruth Netzer ■ Orzion Bar-Tanna ■ Raphael Israeli ■ Moshe Shafrir |
Essays and Reviews |
Hillel Weiss – Ram Caught in a Thicket ■ Benyamin Gallay – Kaddish ■ Reuven Ben-Yoseph – On the Poetry of Rammi Ditzany ■ Esther Silber-Vitkon – The Poetry of Miriam Godal |
Document |
Yaakov Orland – The Land of Israel ■ Yitzhak Lamdan – Letters |
Selected Summaries |
Population Dispersal – The Next Zionist Challenge Arnon Soffer
This paper was also published as the ACPR's Policy Paper No. 42, 1998
The Israel-Jordan Agreement – A Missed Opportunity
Raphael Israeli
According to conventional wisdom, in Israel and the rest of the world, the peace between Israel and Jordan was a positive step in the peace process in the Middle East. This assumption rests on the premise that King Hussein being moderate and pro-Western, it was necessary to accommodate him and reinforce his rule by binding him more closely with the West via Israel.
This paper shows that not only Hussein is neither moderate nor pro-Western per-se, but he lacks legitimacy for his throne in the eyes of the Palestinian majority in his country. And so, instead of supporting democracy and the rule of the Palestinian majority in Jordan, the West, and Israel, find themselves approving of an autocratic king, who is neither a country nor a people, thus exacerbating, not resolving the Palestinian issue.
The paper also makes the point that the Palestinian problem, which needs to be addressed and resolved if there is to be peace in the Middle East, cannot even begin to taper off if we exclude Jordan, the main demographic and territorial basis of the Palestinians, from the settlement equation.
However, addressing the Palestinian problem in all its components, territorial and demographic (in Israel, the Territories and Jordan), does not have necessarily to mean the removal of the King, if he consents to rename his realm the "Hashemite Kingdom of Palestine", turns his rule into a constitutional monarchy and delivers the power to the Palestinian majority. Once in government, that majority, under Arafat or otherwise, will negotiate with Israel the permanent settlement in the West Bank and Gaza, these being a small part of the much larger Palestino-Jordanian entity. Under these circumstances, solutions will not only be easier but they could ultimately accommodate the Palestinian aspiration for statehood and in-gathering of the refugees, Hashemite survival
as a royal house, and Israeli security concerns.
This paper was published in English as the ACPR's Policy Paper No. 26, 1998
Jordanian-Israeli Strategic Partnership in Historical Perspective
Alexander Bligh
The signing ceremony of the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty in October 1994 made public one of the most known secrets in Middle Eastern politics: the strong bond between Israel and Jordan. It began in 1960 as top level negotiations between military officers and later developed into a king-prime ministers direct, secret and regular forum, which survived two wars and numerous political challenges.
This regional strategic alliance has been the result of a powerful sense of common aims, present interests and the realization that any future threat to any of them might in turn change the fate of the other.
Direct Israeli-Jordanian relations are approaching their 40th anniversary. It is clear that both sides have benefited from this relationship. Israel shared the burden of Egyptian enmity in the 1950s and 1960s with Jordan, while in the 1980s and 1990s found in Jordan a buffer state separating Iraq from Israel. Jordan found in Israel a trustworthy ally: in 1967 under circumstances not yet clearly discussed, Israel relieved the Hashemite kingdom of the Palestinian threat to its very existence by taking over the Palestinian West Bank. Again, in 1970 and 1980 Israel stood guard and deterred Syria from taking aggressive measures against the kingdom.
In addition to these mutual strategic benefits Jordan used Israeli connections in Washington to convey the message that Jordan is now a stable and moderate state. Clearly, the Israeli-Jordanian block, with constant US backing in the background have contributed significantly to the survival of the monarchy. All past crises follow one clear pattern of political and strategic behavior by the two partners: assisting each other against a third Arab player, usually the Palestinian threat.
During these almost 40 years of negotiations Jordanian foreign policy has been based on two pillars: a constant - a strong coalition with Israel, and a variable - a short term coalition with one of the Arab neighbors of Jordan. This way, publicly, Jordan has paid its dues to the cause of Arab solidarity, while secretly the kingdom based its very survival on the meeting of interests with the Jewish State. This duality has also characterized the Jordanian position vs. the components of the final settlement in the Middle East.
This paper was also published as the ACPR's Policy Paper No. 45, 1998
Angelo M.
Codevilla The reader will quickly grasp that this study is about more than just Israel. This small, beleaguered country in the Middle East is, however, an instructive paradigm of the role of ballistic missiles in international affairs at the turn of the twenty-first century. While analysts treat missile warfare as something of a theoretical matter regarding other parts of the world, especially the United States, the role of ballistic missiles in war against Israel is undeniably real and reasonably straightforward. Ballistic missiles struck Israel during the Gulf War. Israel’s retaliatory capacity and reputation did not deter its enemies. Nor did any measures designed to inhibit proliferation prevent the attacks. The most strenuous efforts to strike the missiles before they were launched, by massive unchallenged air forces in Iraqi’s skies, backed by the United States’ reconnaissance assets, failed totally. Hence, there is every reason to expect that missiles will be fired at Israel again and that, in the absence of defenses, they will land again. First, nothing is deterring any number of countries in the Middle East from acquiring ever better missiles - primarily with a view to shooting them at Israel. Israel’s enemies have learned that it is easier and safer to threaten or use missiles against Israel than to launch other kinds of military attacks. In short, the missile threat against Israel is as open-ended as it is real. So it is against the United States and other countries as well. Second, the plans being made to defend Israel against ballistic missiles bear no relationship whatever to the threat. This is even truer for the United States. Third, the insufficiency of American preparations becomes undeniable when one examines the contribution that the antimissile defenses under active development in the United States could make to the defense of Israel. This is as significant for the United States as it is for Israel or any other ally that might seek US protection against missile threats. This brings us to the main point of the study: Defending Israel (or the United States, or anyplace else) against all kinds of ballistic missiles, even in large numbers, is eminently possible. The missile defense devices now under the most active development in the United States are insufficient because of the restrictions imposed on their designers by officials who value the 1972 ABM Treaty more highly than they value defense. In sum, Israel - and the United States and its other allies - will continue to be vulnerable to ballistic missiles until such time as the US government decides to remove self-imposed restrictions on the use of available technology. Until that happens, Israel’s (and the United States’) best efforts at missile defense amount to tokenism.
This paper was also published as
the ACPR's
Policy Paper No. 28, in the book
Frank J. Gaffney,
Jr.
Once such incremental improvements are made, these assets can begin providing significant anti-missile protection for large parts of the globe within a few years’ time. For example, US warships routinely deployed in the Persian Gulf and eastern Mediterranean could be able to fire on missiles launched by Israel’s enemies before they come within range of the Arrow’s interceptors. Such attrition will greatly increase the effectiveness of the protection afforded by the Israeli system. And, if the anti-missile potential of the AEGIS system is properly exploited, the same system could provide highly effective protection against shorter-range missiles aimed at the Jewish state (so-called "theater" ballistic missiles) and longer-range (or "strategic") missiles aimed at the US. In an era of budgetary restraint, it is important to note that - thanks to the large prior investment - the AEGIS approach affords the opportunity to secure such a dual benefit at a small fraction of the cost of alternative approaches. A blue-ribbon panel sponsored by the Heritage Foundation determined that 22 ships and 650 missiles could be so configured for between $2-3 billion - less than the outlay for the construction of one of the US Navy’s most modern warships.
This paper was also published as
the ACPR's
Policy Paper No. 37, in the book
The Bible in the Arts Festival in Prague 1995 Moshe Yegar
Who is Really Responsible for Not Preventing the Murder of the Prime Minister? Eliav Shochetman
The African Giant: From Military Rule to National Reconciliation Moshe Gilboa
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Ariel Center for Policy Research / NATIV POB 99, Shaarei Tikva 44810, Israel URLs: www.acpr.org.il, http://nativ.cc Email: ariel.center@gmail.com Tel: +972-3-906-3920 |