A retrospective analysis of the
Egyptian policy toward Israel indicates that Israel is considered by
Egypt, if not a declared enemy, then certainly its main rival for
regional hegemony, and a dangerous competitor for the benefits of peace.
Today, the Egyptian perception of
peace with Israel still harbors a potential of conflicting relations
between the two countries that could lead to the brink of war. Egypt has
conceived the peace with Israel at its narrowest possible
interpretation. President Mubarak and the former Foreign Minister and
today’s Secretary General of the Arab League, `Amru Musa, perceive the
goal of the peace process as reducing Israel to its “natural dimensions”
e.g. pre-1967 borders, and divesting it of its strategic assets. Egypt
in fact still views its relations with Israel as a zero sum game.
In signing a separate peace
agreement with Israel in 1979, Egypt signaled other Arabs to follow
suit. Yet, ever since the signing of the peace treaty between Israel and
Jordan in 1994, Egypt seems to have regretted its historic move in 1979.
The faster the Egyptians perceived the process of normalization
progressed, the more concerned their leaders became. They would rather
keep the process on slow motion in order to preserve inter-Arab
legitimacy for their diplomatic activism and maintain Egypt’s relevance
as a regional linchpin.
Given the Egyptian gloomy domestic
reality and the disenchanting history of Egypt’s “peace” policy toward
Israel during the last 22 years, the forecast for future relations
between both countries in the first decade of the twenty-first century
is dispiriting. At best, the present “cold peace” will be sustained.
Unless Israel is stripped of its strategic assets and deterrent
potential, no comprehensive normal peace will be “granted” by the
Egyptian current regime.
At worst, there is a risk, under
the current regime, of sliding from “cold peace” to a low-key military
tension by Egyptian violation of the peace treaty of 1979, regarding the
demilitarization status of Sinai.
The risk for a reversion to a
highly intensified conflict between Israel and Egypt could increase in
the post-Mubarak era, when Egypt might experience instability. The
religious radicalization of the already religiously oriented population
could generate Islamic pre-revolutionary unrest resembling the situation
preceding the Khomeini revolution in Iran in 1977/78.
The built-in hostility toward
Israel in Egypt’s political discourse could serve as the lowest common
denominator cementing Mubarak’s successors and the Muslim Brotherhood,
as well as other militant Islamic movements.
The
irreversibility of the formal peace prevailing between Egypt and Israel
shouldn’t be taken for granted. It is in Israel’s interest to shake up
the “Egyptian” file and reassess her relations with its southern
neighbor.
