Ariel Center for
Policy Research

A JOURNAL OF POLITICS AND THE ARTS

 

NATIV   ■   Volume Fifteen   ■   Number 4-5 (87-88)  ■  September 2002   ■  Ariel Center for Policy Research

 

SYNOPSIS

 


 

Kissinger, Israel and the Airlift Issue in the 1973 War:
The Manipulations of the Dependency
in Patron-Client Relationships

David Bukay

The pattern of relationships that characterizes superpowers and small states is a patron-client relationship, which is explained on a continuum, from symbiotic relations to complete coerciveness. This is a communication bargaining process, which is exemplified especially during crisis management. We have raised six general assumptions to explain the framework of interactions in patron-client relations, and proved them through the relationship structure between the United States and Israel.

After describing the strategic situation in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and explaining the reason for Israel’s false self-contentment and haughtiness, we have explained the day by day processes that shaped the battlefield in 1973, and in parallel the conduct of relations between the United States and Israel. The issue was the military airlift to Israel, and Kissinger, who was almost the acting president, played the most important role. He had used the Israeli dependency to manipulate Israel through its diplomatic representatives, Ambassador Dinitz and Foreign Minister Eban.

The questions we have raised were: What kind of relationship exists between Israel and the United States in this era of crises? How can we explain the reasons for the United States conduct to Israel during the 1973 war? What were the reasons for the prolonged debate on military supply to Israel? Was it a deliberate holdup in order to submit Israel to the United States global interests?

On the face of it, the issue was an internal one, the struggle between the State Department and the Pentagon, but the real issue was a strategic global one, between the United States and the Soviet Union, through the eyes of Kissinger, as to the delineation of their boundaries of interests in the Middle East.

It was Kissinger’s statement to Heikal in the middle of November 1973, which explains our argument best:

The United States policy during the 1973 war in general, and the airlift to Israel in particular, had nothing to do the Arabs and/or Israeli interests. The real issue was directly the strategic balance of power between the superpowers and changing their boundaries of interests in the Middle East.

 

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