Ariel Center for
Policy Research

A JOURNAL OF POLITICS AND THE ARTS

 

NATIV   ■   Volume Fifteen   ■   Number 6 (89)  ■  November 2002   ■  Ariel Center for Policy Research

 

SYNOPSIS

 


The Future Middle East Battlefield

Iraq – The Preparations for War

Shawn Pine

Despite fielding one of the largest militaries in the region, Iraq poses a negligible challenge to US forces in any potential conventional confrontation. A decade of sanctions has left Iraqi conventional forces in disarray and ill prepared for modern combat. Iraq’s armored forces and aircraft are less than half the size they were prior to the 1991 Gulf War.

More important, these forces are antiquated as compared to US forces. Unlike in 1991, the United States enjoys an enormous familiarity with the area of operations, potential targets, and the potential threat. With the possible exception of the Republican Guard forces, the Iraqi forces are poorly trained, lack competent leadership, and are suffering from low morale. These factors, coupled with a decade of technological improvements in US smart weapons, will ensure that any conventional war will result in a decisive military victory within a short period of time.

This reality has prompted Saddam Hussein to try to continue his robust non-conventional weapons development program. While the UN weapons inspection regime, coupled with international sanctions, has retarded its non-conventional weapons development program, it has not prevented Iraq from making substantial progress in its programs. Currently, Iraq possess a credible biological and chemical offensive capability and is close (within 1-3 years) to producing a nuclear weapon. Acquisition of a nuclear weapon will afford Iraq a deterrent credibility that will allow it to continue its pursuit of regional hegemony.

The main challenges to United States military operations are political. The international community, driven by a fear of war and lucrative economic deals with Iraq, currently opposes US military operations. Iraq will attempt to exploit this schism by agreeing to another UN inspection regime. Iraq estimates that it can hide critical components of its weapons of mass destruction programs from inspectors and forestall military operations.

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