Israel has always relied on conventional warfare to
survive in the Middle East. The IDF’s victories in the wars enabled Israel
to remain an independent state. This article examines the various aspects
of conventional warfare in the Middle East during the past fifty years,
focusing on the Yom Kippur War. It will attempt to demonstrate the
particular importance of this war for Israel’s military doctrine, and its
bearing on possible future wars.
The battlefield has gradually become more crowded
with forces and weapons. This limited the ability of an army that relied
on maneuver, such as the IDF, to destroy the enemy. One of the chief
problems was the increase in the range and penetration of different
missiles and cannons. This caused the battlefield to expand, but at the
same time restricted it by complicating its advance, as the Yom Kippur War
shows.
Other key factors to conventional warfare were the
importance of logistics, and the improvement of the main weapon systems,
in most of the armies in the area.
The direction of conventional warfare in the coming
times is not clear.
Possibly firepower will neutralize attacks of an
army, certainly adding to its cost. The situation of World War I may
repeat itself, i.e., no side will be able to strike decisively. Wars may
turn into wars of attrition, bringing the states in the Middle East to
consider using non-conventional weapons, so conventional war may,
paradoxically perhaps, not deteriorate. In order to prevent mass
destruction in the Middle East, Israel may choose to fight “the old way”.
In this case, the lessons of the 1973 (Yom Kippur)
War, along with others learned from military history and the art of war,
will continue to be vital to Israel’s military doctrine.