Yuval Levin
The prospect of renewed Israeli-Syrian
peace negotiations has brought into sharp focus a serious misconception
about Syria’s intentions and strategic goals. Some decision makers in the
United States and Israel appear to believe that by making “a strategic
choice for peace,” Syrian President Assad is abandoning his long held
anti-American policy objectives and choosing to enter the American camp.
In fact, a peace deal with Israel will allow Assad to accomplish more
easily those longstanding goals, which run flatly counter to American
interests in the Middle East. These goals include the final subjugation of
Lebanon under Syrian rule, the weakening and isolation of Turkey, an
increased Syrian influence in the region and a strengthening of Assad’s
own regime. By investing its prestige and resources in the current
process, and thus investing itself in the future of the Assad regime, the
United States risks enabling Assad to accomplish these objectives, and at
the same time it risks impairing its own ability to exercise some measure
of control over Syria’s actions. A deal with Israel will certainly shift
the regional balance of power in Syria’s favor, and Syria’s favor equals
the detriment of America’s closest allies and most vital interests in the
region. Before committing itself to back any Israeli-Syrian deal, the
United States must carefully consider the consequences such an agreement
may have for its own interests and policy objectives. This study aims to
examine precisely what some of those consequences may be.
