Israel’s founding leaders shaped its national security’s fundamental
concepts in the early 1950s in view of the contemporary geopolitical,
demographic, social and economic conditions. Despite the major changes
that the 1967 and 1973 wars generated in all these fields, no thorough
revision of the prevalent principles has taken place ever since. An
analysis of the present military and non-military threats which Israel
encounters on the one hand, and its socio-cultural situation on the
other hand, reveals a huge gap between the menaces’ intensity and the
readiness of Israeli society to cope with them and face reality. The
IDF’s traditional character as “The People’s Army” has turned,
therefore, from an asset to a liability.
The
essential reform of the national security’s principles and organization
covers a reexamination of the three basic concepts – deterrence, alert
and overpowering; reshaping the military’s relations with the political
authority and creating a national security team besides the PM; and,
particularly a revision of the relative role and composition of the
career army, the conscripts and the reserves.