NATIV Online        

  Vol. 2  /  2004                                A JOURNAL OF POLITICS AND THE ARTS      

     

A Disaster Foretold:
The Strategic Dangers of a Palestinian State

    This article is an excerpt from the book, ISRAEL AND A PALESTINIAN STATE: ZERO SUM GAME?, ACPR Publishers & Zmora Bitan Publishers, 2001, Hardcover (Large format), 532 pages.

    Aharon Levran

In the “Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip” (Oslo II), deliberately or carelessly, the groundwork for the Palestinian state was laid. This manifests itself in the provisions of the foundations of a state for the Palestinians along with clear attributes of sovereignty. However, this state, which is probably the inevitable consequence of the agreement, poses severe strategic dangers to Israel, which ought to be scrutinized systematically.

Such a state poses palpable military hazards as well, but the strategic dangers are no doubt weightier. In any case, prior to discussing these strategic risks, the serious error and folly in granting the PLO the components of a state (as if the Oslo and Cairo agreements were rousing success stories) should be highlighted as well as how the Rabin-Peres government violated the Camp David Accords and the Madrid Framework.

 

PART I

 

The Strategic Dangers Emanating from the Oslo II

Agreement

 

A. Distinct Foundations of Independence and

     Sovereignty in Oslo II:

Despite the fact that the heads of the previous Labor government have declared in the past that in the permanent settlement the Palestinians will have “an entity that is quite less than a state” (Rabin), or a “confederation with Jordan” (Peres), the Oslo II (Interim Agreement) will almost inevitably lead to the establishment of a full, sovereign Palestinian state.

This danger is already obvious from the wording of the preamble to the Interim Agreement (similar to the wording in the “agreement of principles” known as Oslo I) – “recognition of the mutual legitimate political rights”.1 The version in the Interim Agreement is even worse than its counterpart in Oslo I.2 Furthermore, the preamble also states that the “elections to the [Palestinian] Council will constitute a significant preparatory transition period for the realization of the just rights and demands of the Palestinian people.” (emphasis added). These passages can only be understood as advance Israeli agreement and recognition of a separate Palestinian state, although Oslo II is defined as merely an interim agreement whose main purpose is to test the very possibility of any solution.

According to the agreement, the Palestinians will have three state-like bodies – legislative, executive and judicial – just like any proper country. The part of the agreement which quite obviously lays the foundation for the state is the section which relates to the Palestinian Council, its composition and its authority. The Council’s size3 – 82 representatives according to the agreement and in fact, 88 – characterizes it as a full-fledged parliament. This number is not significantly smaller than the number of members in Israel’s Knesset, and is certainly much greater than that which one might anticipate in a “limited autonomy Council”, as it was called and envisioned by the Israeli signatories of the Camp David agreement. Besides, the agreement enables the “rais” to appoint additional members.4 The Israeli excuse for allowing a Council of that size was pathetic: “We pressured them to have a large Council…in order to provide them with some sort of chance at democratization,” said Uri Savir, Peres’ aid.

The Council was granted the authority to legislate both primary and secondary legislation including the power to enact “basic” (constitutional) laws.5 The legislative powers were already granted to the Palestinians in Oslo I (in contrast to the intent of the Camp David Accords), but in the present agreement things went too far, as basic laws are unequivocal characteristics of an independent, sovereign legislature of a political entity.

The Council’s mandate – legislative and executive – contains the authority to draft and carry out Palestinian policy.6 It is true that “the Council will have no authority to conduct foreign policy”,7 but the provision allowing the very formulation and execution of “policy” is itself ominous, certainly with all of the loopholes existing regarding foreign policy activity. One of such loopholes, for example, is that the PLO can “conduct negotiations and sign agreements with countries and international organizations to benefit the Council”.8 So, too, it is permissible to establish “representative offices of foreign countries”9 in their territory. In addition, we have, in any case, been told by Arafat that “Israel has agreed to the existence of PLO diplomatic legations around the world.”

Regarding the power granted to the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the agreement, the phrase “it will have territorial control”10 whose meaning is clearly obvious and which stands in blatant contravention of the Camp David Accords, appears repeatedly. The territorial control applies to land, infrastructure and territorial waters as well.11 It has been claimed that the Rabin government originally intended to cede to the PA territorial authority over only 10% of the area of Judea and Samaria, but ultimately tripled the area relinquished. In any event, it is clear from the agreement that the Palestinians have full rights to all lands ceded to them even before the commencement of final status negotiations. It is no accident that the Palestinians insisted on the inclusion in the agreement (a number of times) of the phrase, “the territorial unity of Judea, Samaria and Gaza”, as “one unit”.

In addition to control over territorial waters, the Rabin-Peres government also recognized the Palestinian “water rights” in Judea and Samaria (even though “they were to be discussed in final status negotiations”).12 Yet the recognition in principle of Palestinian water rights itself indicates that even at this stage they already have a right to independence regarding disposition of water resources, a clear prerogative of statehood, and all that is left to discuss is secondary details. Incidentally, the Palestinians claim legal proprietorship over the mountain aquifer (from which Israel draws approximately one-third of its annual water supply) and beyond that – the ownership of the waters of the Jordan River as well!.

Jerusalem is, indeed, mentioned in the agreement as one of the topics to be discussed in final status negotiations (along with Israeli settlements, defined military locations, Palestinian refugees, borders and foreign and Israeli relations).13 However, two aspects of the agreement weaken Jerusalem’s status as the exclusive and undivided capital of Israel. First, Jerusalem is repeatedly mentioned in the agreement in the same breath as the West Bank and Gaza,14 in other words, not only is it not taboo as a topic for negotiations but it is implied as an integral part of the PA’s territory. Second, as to the “voting arrangement regarding Jerusalem”,15 a “number of Palestinians” will be allowed to vote through the good offices of post-office branches in Jerusalem (for the PA’s Council). This severely undermines Jerusalem’s status as the exclusive capital of Israel as it recognized Palestinian rights there too.

No less unfortunate was the stipulation that “international observers will be present in the aforementioned post-office branches on the day of elections”. It is reminiscent of the disgraceful “capitulation” era under Ottoman rule.16 According to the agreement,17 these observers were to be present throughout Judea, Samaria and Gaza during the elections. The fact that they were to do the same in Jerusalem proves our claim that the Rabin-Peres government carelessly agreed to equate the status of Jerusalem with that of Judea, Samaria and Gaza.

Furthermore, Israel’s agreement to designate the three large villages adjacent to Jerusalem (Abu-Dis, Azaria and Beit Iksa) as Area B – joint control – indicates that the Rabin government, to some degree, agreed to the de facto partition of Greater Jerusalem. The PLO’s insistence and its ability to “twist Israel’s arm” regarding Jerusalem is no accident, as it is a top priority of theirs to establish Jerusalem as the capital of their future state.

It is worth noting that three villages in the Jordan Valley were also ceded to the functional and personal control of the PA. Even regarding the operationally vital Jiftlik area, the version reached – favors the Palestinians. If any illusion still existed that the Rabin-Peres government would minimally demand the implementation of the “Allon Plan” or at the very least insist that “the security border will be the Jordan Valley”, it exists no longer. That, of course, had severe ramifications not only regarding the direction in which the Rabin government was heading and to the size of the Palestinian state, but for Israel’s security as well. There was always a majority supporting the consensus which viewed, at least, the Jordan Valley and the eastern slopes of the central mountain range as Israel’s security belt. This is no longer the case.

“Safe Passage” – paragraph X of appendix 1 of the agreement relates to “the safe passage of people, vehicles and goods between the West Bank and Gaza”. Although the specific details and the implementation of that section had been delayed (until Barak’s premiership), it granted the Palestinians, in principle, a legal land connection between the two parts of their territory. This strengthens their aspiration for “territorial contiguity” in their future state and fragments Israel’s territory – reminiscent of the 1947 partition plan. In addition, the extra-territorial aspect of the “safe passage” corridor further chips away at Israel’s already shrunken territory.

There is further good indication in the Oslo II agreement of the intention to establish a full political entity separate from Israel. To mention a number of them:

  • Tourism – Tourists visiting Israel, continuing on to Judea, Samaria and Gaza will be subject to a separate (Palestinian) judicial authority.18
     

  • Exploring and Drilling for Gas and Oil – Not only will Palestinians be permitted to explore and produce natural gas and oil anywhere in areas A and B, but even in Area C19 (all that we need is for natural gas and oil reserves to be discovered…).
     

  • Air Transportation – Palestinians will have their own commercial and international air service.20 Thus, the near-Rafah airport and a small airline started to operate.
     

  • The Palestinian Coast Guard will function up to 6 miles from the coast and its boats will fly the Palestinian flag.21
     

  • Gaza Port – The port in Gaza was already mentioned in Oslo I. Yet, its establishment will assert clear independence in terms of the entrance and exit of sailing vessels, passengers and merchandise, for domestic and international journeys. Such freedom will have serious security ramifications beyond the fact that it advances the cause of independence.
     

  • Satellite Network – The Palestinians will have “the right to establish a satellite network for various services”, except for international services.22 Why do the Palestinians need satellites already, today – is an appropriate question, but they will not miss any opportunity to attain another accoutrement of sovereignty and independence.
     

  • Archeological Finds – “In consideration of the Palestinian demand that Israel return all archeological finds exposed in the West Bank and Gaza since 1967, the issue will be discussed in the final status negotiations.”23 Beyond the fact that therefore Israel recognizes, in principle, a separate state-like authority, the phrasing is unfortunate – as if Israel has been conquering a foreign country (and not Eretz Yisrael – the cradle of the Jewish People). Moreover, with its withdrawal, all “that was stolen from those to whom the land belonged from time immemorial” must be returned. This was a cynical expression of the Rabin-Peres government’s preparedness to undermine the roots and antiquity of the Jews in Israel.
     

  • Changing the Israeli Status at Border Crossings: “Israel will consider the Palestinian request relating to control of border crossings. The Israeli military government will replace the Port Authority.”24 The upshot: While the border crossings with Egypt and Jordan are managed by the Port Authority designating, de facto and de jure Israel’s permanent claim over them, it is important to the Palestinians that the border crossings with the PA be controlled at least by military government – characterized by its temporary nature and easy removability – paving the way for them ultimately to control the border crossings – a clear manifestation of sovereignty.
     

  • Taxes – “Income tax on Israelis for income accrued (also) in Area C outside the Israeli settlements and military sites will be subject to the Palestinian tax code, and the tax collected will be transferred to the Palestinians.”25 This speaks for itself.
     

  • The Title of “Rais”Presidentfor Arafat – Throughout the text of the agreement, Arafat is referred to as “rais” and not chairman as he was called in his exchange of letters with the late Prime Minister – Rabin. The term “rais” in Arabic is synonymous with president, and it is no accident that Arafat insisted on the title. Moreover, in a number of instances in the agreement, Arafat’s title appears explicitly as “President”.26

Other than the above-cited indications of statehood, the clear manifestations of sovereignty should also be cited, as most of them were already agreed upon in the Cairo Agreement (May 1994), among these:

  • Mail, Stamps and Communications,27 including international28 communications implying political independence.
     

  • Palestinian Currency – “The two sides will proceed with discussing the introduction of a Palestinian currency by mutual agreement.”29
     

  • Palestinian Passports and Travel Documents –These were agreed upon in previous pacts and are obviously clear manifestations of sovereignty. 

Thus, in the above quotations (and other entries in the agreement), the Rabin-Peres government, despite its denials, agreed eventually to elevate the PA to the status of an independent sovereign state. Whether consciously or otherwise, a terrible blunder was committed – “a disaster foretold.

 

B. The Difference between the Oslo Agreements and the  Camp David Accords and the Madrid Conference Framework

There is no doubt that the Oslo agreements differ fundamentally from the Camp David Accords and from the “Madrid Framework” although the words autonomy, self-rule, etc. appear in all of them. Furthermore, the Oslo agreements are an egregious breach of the Camp David Accords.

The autonomy prescribed by Camp David was to apply to the “inhabitants” alone; meaning it was to be an individual and municipal autonomy and not territorial in any way, shape or form (“Autonomy to the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza”). It was clear to the Israeli drafters of Camp David that in this way they could guarantee that a Palestinian state would not emerge, and they, therefore, focused on granting personal, local and municipal autonomy, but not territorial autonomy which would necessarily lead to an independent sovereign entity, something that they neither wanted nor could accept. Hence, there is no mention in the Camp David Accords of “political rights”. The term emphasized in Camp David is the Palestinian “inhabitants” and not the Palestinian “people”. There is certainly nothing in Camp David describing the autonomy as “a significant preparatory step toward the realization of the political rights of the Palestinians”, and certainly nothing about “mutual rights”.

In addition, at Camp David, no responsibility whatsoever for internal security or combating terrorism was transferred to the Palestinians other than the mention of a “strong” Palestinian police force (which was itself a mistake or an unfortunate concession in the phrasing). In any case, neither the PLO nor the Palestinians were viewed as a “political partner”, and certainly not one whom we would entrust with our security. Similarly, they assuredly had no legislative authority and absolutely no mandate to legislate basic laws. Of course there was no mention of Jerusalem nor was it discussed.

It is hard to believe that Rabin and Peres were unaware of the enormous differences between the original Camp David Accords and the Oslo agreements. Their claim that they were simply continuing to implement the Camp David Accords and follow in Menachem Begin’s footsteps was especially cynical. It is permissible to change one’s opinion or alter an agreement, but it is grossly abusive to brazenly deceive the public as if such change were the extension of a pre-existing process.

These leaders also claimed that they were acting within the framework established for the Madrid Conference deliberations. This, too, has no basis. Regarding the Madrid Conference, it was stipulated that the Palestinians were to be part of the Jordanian delegation. In that context, as in Camp David, there was no mention whatsoever of the PLO. In Oslo I and II, these terms were violated and completely distorted. Again, one might claim that the Madrid Conference framework was not a good one, but one cannot claim that Oslo is a continuation thereof.

Consequently, like its predecessor (Oslo I), Oslo II is unfortunately laying the groundwork for the establishment of a Palestinian state, while misleading the Israeli public that these agreements are direct descendants of Camp David and Madrid.

 

PART II

The Strategic Dangers Posed by a Palestinian State

Now we turn to discuss the crucial risks stemming from a Palestinian state, i.e. the strategic dangers.

In the term “strategic”, we refer to the combined security and political dangers in macro. These are the most significant dangers in the intermediate- and long-term, not only to Israel, but beyond.
 

A. The Strategic Significance of the Success of the Intifada

     and Terror

There is no doubt that if it were not for the intifada and Palestinian terror, Oslo I and II would never have come about. However, it appears that the signatories of these agreements and their supporters ignored, consciously or due to an unfortunate misunderstanding, the severe consequences which the success of terrorism and violence brings to bear. The main significance of the Palestinians’ violent struggle is that after some 50 years of Arab conflict with the State of Israel, the Palestinians, and only they, have found a way to overcome it. Incidentally, they have achieved this in a simpler and more effective manner than through the “classic” wars or terrorist attacks along its borders and abroad.

The Palestinians have succeeded where the Arab countries have failed – in forcing Israel’s hand. This was accomplished by employing very primitive methods: the rock, the bottle, activation of women and children, etc. After a long period of violent clashes, they, and not their brethren in Arab countries, found the appropriate “niche” for the struggle against Israel and the formula for its success.30

When the then leadership of the Labor Party claimed that the intifada and terrorism had only a “political solution”, they decreed its inevitable success. Furthermore, by surrendering to terrorism, Israel, for the first time in its history, made it clear that terrorism pays and that its perpetrators are worthy of being rewarded. But Israel has failed to understand that we are engaged in a continuing existential struggle in which the victor will be the one with the greater breathing space. However, in Israel today (in contradiction to the Palestinians), this commodity is non-existent. But failure in this struggle is an ominous harbinger for the fate of Israel and its future, as it is engulfed in a perpetual strategic situation of “the few against the many”.

The Palestinian success in their struggle also signifies a display of Israeli impotence (for the first time) in dealing with a violent power struggle and, at the same time, a general weakening of its deterrent capability, especially vis-à-vis the Palestinians under its rule. Israel’s rolling back and its profligate concessions stemming from a position of weakness illustrate that a violent struggle against it is a rewarding investment. The intifada and the violence proved to the Arabs that Israel only understands and can be defeated by the “language of force”. But for the Arabs and especially for the Palestinians, this will serve as a paradigm of success and a model for emulation in the continued struggle against Israel, until they fulfill all of their national aspirations. On the other hand, Israel will be held hostage in perpetuity for these tactics.

The demonstration of internal polarization in the face of violent Palestinian pressure is also, for the first time, a clear signal of Israeli lack of resolve to defend itself, by all means, thus striking a severe blow to its national strength. Not only have the Arabs always anticipated Israel’s internal dissolution, i.e. the strategy of “Inkimash”, but the undermining of the State from within can lead, eventually, to the renewal of the military option (which has faded over the last few decades).

The claim that terrorism cannot be overcome and therefore its perpetrators ought to be appeased, means not only surrender to terrorism and to brutal pressure, but it also creates confusion between Israel’s inability to solve the conflict with the Arabs by force (due to the quantitative-physical asymmetry) and the supreme necessity (for the same reason exactly) to emerge victorious from every power struggle with them.
 

B. The Palestinian Concept of “Phased Struggle”

The ultimate Palestinian goal is the establishment of a “secular democratic state in Palestine”. However, reality dictates that this be accomplished in stages: First by correcting the “1967 results”, then the “1948 results”, and so on. The term “Palestine” means, to the Palestinians, all territories west of the Jordan River, although Jordan and parts of Lebanon are also included in the concept, “Greater Palestine”.

In contrast to some “moderate” Palestinian declarations regarding “existence of two neighboring states”, there exists a plethora of Palestinian statements to the contrary, i.e. concerning the non-abandonment of the conflict with Israel until all national goals are achieved in their entirety.31

The most significant statements on the matter are those made by Arafat himself, even subsequent to his signing the Oslo I (September 1993), the Cairo (May 1994) and Oslo II (September 1995) Agreements. In September 1995, he said to a Jordanian newspaper that “the Oslo II agreement is a delayed realization of a stage in the PLO’s 1974 phased plan.”32 Especially blatant was his statement in a Johannesburg mosque in May 1994 (which he repeated more than once) in which he compared the Oslo agreements to the Hudaibiya Pact. This 7th century treaty33 serves in Islam as an historical model for suitable behavior when Moslems are in a transitory period of weakness, allowing them to violate agreements at their convenience. In an interview with an Egyptian newspaper, in May 1998, he again said: “The fate of the Oslo agreements will not be different than that of the Qureish agreement.” Arafat repeated similar statements in Stockholm in January 1996 again, after Oslo II.

These pronouncements prominently raise two basic issues regarding the relations with the Palestinians – trustworthiness and intentions. Even without these and other similar statements by Arafat, the man never had a reputation for reliability and credibility, all the more so after statements like these.

In the course of the signing of Oslo I (September 1993), Arafat committed, in writing, to Israel that he would abrogate all paragraphs in the Palestinian Charter which invalidated Israel – and he did not. But in Oslo II the commitment was recycled and it was established that the charter would be repealed no more than two months after the election of the Palestinian Council (i.e. until March 1996). Yet Arafat had already declared in the United States (October 1995) before the ink of his signature on Oslo II even dried, that it would not be done.34 In April 1996, to support Peres’ election, Arafat passed a nondescript resolution calling for changes in the charter and appointed a legal committee to review which paragraphs ought to be amended. Once again, though, the promise to amend/abrogate the charter was recycled without anything actually being done. In Gaza, in December 1998, in the presence of US President Clinton, the charter had been “canceled” again... for the umpteenth time.

Israel’s tragedy is that the Rabin-Peres government wanted to put its faith in someone who has never been caught telling the truth. One of the superficial excuses provided is that Arafat’s declarations were intended for internal consumption. Even so, that government should have remembered its own statement in the wake of Rabin’s assassination that “words can kill”, and therefore should not have so casually overlooked Arafat’s pronouncements concerning “jihad”, “Hudaibiya”, “the continuation of the struggle until the liberation of Palestine and Jerusalem”, “the internal dissolution of Israel”, “in the name of the suicide bombers”, and more.

Furthermore, Arafat’s words reflect the true intentions of the PLO regarding the unceasing struggle with Israel and its continuation in phases. The failure to read an adversary’s true intentions is what always underlies strategic blunders and surprises, in Israel and the world over. This was the case, for example, in the Yom Kippur War and in the second Gulf War. The oversights took place because the “true intentions” of the enemy were difficult to decipher. But in our case, the issues are clear as day. The Rabin government ignored them due to blindness and did not take them seriously due to a mistaken preconceived notion for which we will eventually pay dearly.35

It is worthwhile noting that the recently published constitution of the Fateh (Arafat’s core organization) determines that “the armed struggle for the uprooting of the Zionist existence will not stop until its elimination and Palestine will be liberated in its entirety.” Even more important is (the fact) that even before achieving their goal of correcting the 1967 results, the Palestinian leaders already started bringing up UN Resolution 181 (from 1947) which is in fact the old Partition Plan, whose terrible meaning is the chipping away of Jaffa, Ramle, the Galil and Negev away from Israel.

Arafat and his cronies openly admit that the present change in their position is tactical and not strategic, in other words, no major upheaval has taken place regarding their true attitude towards Israel’s right to exist.  The “change” stemmed from the Palestinian need to win over world opinion to support their cause, especially that of the United States, and from the awareness that the “balance of power” today does not enable them to achieve their goals all at once. In the summer of 1995, in responding to the critics of the treaties with Israel, Arafat expressed “amazement”; “this is the phased program which we all adopted in 1974 – why do you oppose it?” A senior representative of the PLO added that no difference exists between Hamas and the PLO in terms of goals – a state in all of Palestine – the only difference is tactical: Hamas wants to achieve it all at once, while the PLO method is in stages.

It should be remembered that the “phased struggle” stems from ideological and religious roots, whose core is the inability truly to come to terms with the existence of the Zionist State – “the extension of Western imperialism which stole the land from its original inhabitants and evicted them from it”. There is no doubt that, at first, “after the establishment of their state”, the Palestinians will demand that Israel at least shrink back to the 1947 UN Partition Plan borders – and so on and so forth. Present day pronouncements already corroborate this!

 

C. Realization of the Right of Return

The “Right of Return” is, to the Palestinians, more important than any other right, even the right of “self-determination”. This right is, after all, the raison d’étre of the PLO and the core of its existence. The PLO was born of the “1948 refugees” and to them it owes its very being. The PLO was born exactly to amend the “1948 injustice”, therefore its agenda is not only rectifying the “1967 conquest”. In addition, this right received legitimization being anchored in the 1948 UN Resolution 194. Thus, it is a right which the Palestinians neither can nor want to forego. No wonder that its realization has been integrated into both Oslo agreements, albeit circuitously – granting visas for “uniting families”, for purposes of “studies and work”, and the like.36

Thus we might be witnessing the beginning of the realization of the Palestinian right of return, with Israel’s approval, as Israel will be unable to supervise those entering Palestinian territory and remaining there after their visas expire. And all this was permitted before the sides had even begun to deliberate the issue and the difference of opinion regarding, for example, the “number of displaced persons and refugees” who will be permitted to enter the PA’s territory.

The severe ramifications of the prospect of 2.5 million (or even fewer) Palestinian refugees and displaced exercising their “right of return” to pre-1967 Israel could not be clearer. Our contention is, that even if only one million refugees exercise this right to return to a “Palestinian state” with limited space,37 it will lead to unbearable overcrowding and, along with the economic hardships which can almost certainly be anticipated, to internal pressure which will necessarily erupt violently in Israel’s direction. It is reasonable to assume that even if only a few hundred thousand return they will turn into a time bomb and a threat to the demographic equilibrium. In addition, the success of the Palestinians to return to Judea, Samaria and Gaza first, will be a source of encouragement to the Palestinians and of perpetual pressure on Israel to allow repatriation within the pre-1967 borders. After all, what is the difference for them between Jenin and Acre and between Shechem (Nablus) and Ramle?

Moreover, it must be emphasized that in the eyes of a Palestinian refugee, the return to Judea, Samaria and Gaza does not carry with it much significance as it was not from there that he was “uprooted”. His attachment is to Israel’s territory proper. In other words, repatriation of refugees to the PA territories in Judea, Samaria and Gaza will in no way realize the “right of return”, and it will continue to be a Damocles’ sword, pending and used against us.

Similarly, it is not unrealistic to imagine a scenario where tens or hundreds of thousands of Palestinians will decide to exercise their “rights” unilaterally with their authorities’ encouragement and will simply march from the Palestinian state towards their “homes” in Israel. The success of the mini-march by the residents of Jericho in the summer of 1995 in which they overran IDF outposts can be viewed as a harbinger of things to come.

Once again, the PLO will not acquiesce to anything less than maximal realization of the “right of return” for Palestinians in exile. If they agree to moderate slightly their demand, it will lead to a persistent counter-demand that Israel correspondingly abrogate the “Law of Return” (which more than anything else, characterizes it as a Jewish state), which will transform it into a “state of all its citizens” if not worse than that.

 

D. The Risks from the Israeli Arabs

One of the grave dangers posed by the establishment of a Palestinian state to Israel is the possibility of the recruitment of Israel’s Arab citizens to join the continuing battle against the Jewish state. Large segments of the Israeli Arab population who identify nationally with their brethren in the “territories” are ripe, in any case, to join the battle due to their subjective feelings of discrimination and the incipient extremist tendencies among them.

Three months after the Cairo Agreement (May 1994), and after the Rabin-Peres government granted Arafat bases of operation in Gaza and Jericho, a message was sent to Israeli Arabs in his name stating that “...the activities of the Palestinian Authority will spread within the borders of Israel and will concentrate on the Palestinian Arabs within. The mission will be entrusted to our brother, Dr. Ahmed Tibi… It should be achieved discreetly, far from the media and statesmen.38

The PA even issued passports to Israeli Arabs who registered for the haj in Mecca in blatant violation of Oslo I. In Arafat’s office there is a department which deals with the ongoing relations with the Israeli Arabs – “The Committee for Ties with the Palestinians of Occupied Palestine”.

In any case, the overwhelming majority of Israeli Arabs see themselves as divided citizens: Physically they are indeed in Israel, but their consciousness and national identity are totally Palestinian-Arab.39 In this context, a video produced by the Association of Arab Writers in Israel (!), which was circulated among Israeli Arabs in late 1995 and calls for the PLO to take over the State of Israel, is most instructive. (“Force 17 will be in Gaza and Jaffa, Jerusalem and Haifa, Jenin and Ramle, Lod and Acre. The Zionist enemy stole our land by force and will return it by force.”)

No doubt Israeli Arabs will be unable to remain indifferent if their brethren in the “territories”, who were viewed as their inferiors for many years, realize the national Palestinian aspirations. Especially since their “Palestinian brethren” who achieved their national objective – a Palestinian state through violent struggle, would enjoy enhanced prestige. More importantly, they will serve as role models in the battle against the Jewish state. In other words, it is difficult to imagine that in the wake of the establishment of the Palestinian state, the nationalist feeling resonating within Israeli Arabs will diminish (as was contended). On the contrary, it is almost certain to cause only greater agitation. In addition, the problem is not limited to the close ties between Israeli Arabs and the PLO, but to their ties to Hamas and the Islamic Jihad as well. (The security forces’ discoveries in Nazareth and Um-a-Fahm in recent years attest to that fact.)

It can be anticipated, therefore, that Israeli Arabs will not remain content with their present minority status in Israel. They will strongly bring up their national demands which will range from annexation into the Palestinian state to gaining broad political autonomy and self-rule in different sections of Israel: the Galil, Wadi Ara, Rahat and the like. These demands will probably be accompanied by violent struggles, thereby weakening the foundation of the Jewish state. Thus it will accelerate Israel’s disintegration, not to mention increasing the friction and the violence between Israeli Arabs and the Jewish state.

In any case, already today, aided by the support of the Israeli Left, Israeli Arabs, led by the Arab members of Knesset, are voicing the demand that Israel be transformed into a “state of all its citizens”. This demand begins with the call to change the authentic symbols of the Jewish state like the flag (blue-white with a Star of David) or the anthem (“Hatikva” which “doesn’t speak to the Arabs”). The Arab members of Knesset – Darouche, Dahamshe, Bishara, et al. – went even much further by expressing opinions totally delegitimizing the Jewish state, its army, its government and its right to existence. But most importantly, transforming the state (God forbid) into a “state of all its citizens” (let alone delegitimizing the Jewish state), means a radical change in its Jewish character and in the intentions of its founding fathers as expressed in its declaration of independence and in the hopes and prayers of millions of Jews throughout the generations. The State of Israel as a “state of all its citizens” will be a definitely different country which will be one step away from total assimilation in the surrounding Arab region. It will certainly not be a unique, quality state which will exist in calm.

There is little doubt that most Israeli Arabs are undergoing a process of radicalization and Palestinization. As a result, we witness those sharp and severe pronouncements by their leaders against the State of Israel, leading eventually to an unwarranted cooperation with the PA. It should not be overlooked that the Israeli Arabs are essential for the PLO in implementing the “1947 Partition Plan”, by which they could claim the Galil, Negev and other integral parts of Israel. Consequently, we are not dealing here with an innocent minority, but rather with one that harbors sovereign demands over Eretz Israel and which is an integral part of all Palestinians and Arabs.

 

E. Terror and Violence as a Strategic – and Not Only a

    Security – Threat

For years, many in Israel have perceived terror as a “current” (routine) security nuisance and less as a strategic risk. But for a while now, there is no longer any doubt that it poses a strategic threat of the first order. It was with the intifada and “internal terrorism” that the Palestinians succeeded in defeating Israel, or in the words of the Prussian military strategist, von Clausewitz, “imposed their will” upon Israel. That is why the Rabin-Peres government even abandoned the concept that terror must be stopped, and acceded that it would continue to be “part of our reality”. But what is the point of “peace” and concessions if there is no security, quiet or tranquility and if the number of victims of terrorism has increased threefold?

From the moment that terrorism achieved its political aims and caused us to change our positions, the fact that it is a “primitive struggle”, an “expression of weakness” and the like, as Israeli Leftists try to present it, is irrelevant.

Not only has the Palestinian struggle altered traditional, bona fide Israeli positions, it has also undermined our self-confidence – including our belief in the righteousness of our cause in the conflict – and above all it has destroyed our willingness and determination to fight back when necessary. At this critical juncture, Israeli society’s battle fatigue has been exposed, but this should not have occurred, as the struggle is, as mentioned above, existential, i.e. “the few versus the hostile many”.

The Palestinian success in the conflict has caused the loss of Israeli territorial assets and the shrinking of its geographic dimensions. Thus, the Palestinians accomplished that which we always feared would happen in war: loss of territory. So, the Palestinians achieved, for the first time in the history of the conflict, that which the Arab armies always failed to achieve in “classical wars”. No wonder that even Rabin reached the conclusion that terrorism had become a “strategic threat”.40

One of the reasons for our thorny problems with Palestinian terror, especially as it relates to international (and even Israeli) public opinion, is that the Palestinians and the Arabs do not view terrorism and public violence as totally invalid, but rather as the legitimate “armed struggle for national liberation”. Even if they distort (as is their wont) the true meaning of their struggle against Israel, not to mention their improper and even inhuman methods, the strategic and existential dangers which stem from their armed struggle to liberate the land (which the Jews view as their exclusive home), can be found in their terminology.

Palestinian terror has become a strategic danger also because of the difficulty (although it is not impossible) to combat against and crush it in a conventional manner. A central factor disturbing a determined confrontation with terror is the sense that we are militarily superior and “what harm can terrorism cause anyway?” But this sentiment is fundamentally mistaken. Israel is indeed strong militarily, but its power is of not much significance if it does not demonstrate resolve and willingness to exercise it when necessary. One of the proofs of this was the shallow claim that only a “political solution” could put an end to the intifada. Those claimants have ignored that a “political solution” comes only after victory, and after the opponent has been defeated or at least has significantly changed his character or behavior.41 If a political solution is offered at the outset, it means that we are admitting our weakness and our inability to solve the terror problem in any other way. This, indeed, expresses itself in the unfortunate results of the “political solution”. Likewise, this is a deviation from the principle which has always guided us – that Israel (“the few”) cannot allow itself to lose any significant battle with its enemies (“the many”). Moreover, while we are boasting about our might, we forget that F-15 aircraft, Merkava tanks and sophisticated weapons are of little use against the primitive Palestinian struggle, so our might is practically irrelevant for such a struggle.

The Oslo agreements’ signatories took great pride in their unconvincing claim, that through these agreements they have led a significant portion of the Palestinians off the path of terrorism. But, if these signatories achieved this outstanding “achievement” by capitulation, rewarding terrorism and turning it into a model to be emulated in the continuing struggle against Israel – they accomplished very little and very badly. Additionally, what good is a remedy (the Oslo agreements) if it is worse than the disease (terrorism and violence) itself? Secondly, when the PA is not truly fighting terrorism, not destroying its infrastructure and is even ideologically legitimizing it in the eyes of the Palestinians – of what use is the “remedy”? And third, if some of the Palestinians have laid down the weapon of terror today, there is no guarantee that this will continue in the future, and the bloody events of late September 1996 proved that PA police can also resort to terrorism.

 

F. Specific Risks of Terrorism and Violence from a

    Palestinian State

According to the Oslo agreements, the main responsibility for combating terror was ceded to the Palestinians. “They will do it better than us, without the High Court of Justice and without B’tzelem” (human rights advocates) – it was said. But not only did terrorism fail to come to a halt or diminish, but it increased. Since Oslo I (September 1993), the number of victims has reached some 290 dead and 1,000 wounded* – more than three times the prior toll. In the 15 years preceding Oslo, “only” about 255 Jews were murdered. The upshot is that even in this pragmatic respect, the signatories’ concept was fundamentally flawed, not to mention that Arafat is not truly and consistently combating terrorism.

Moreover, the Oslo Agreements have the real potential to exacerbate the dangers posed by terrorism and violence for a number of primary reasons:

  • The terrorists’ freedom of action in the autonomous territories has increased, and the cities of Judea, Samaria and Gaza have become terrorist bases and cities of refuge.
     

  • Arafat and the PA will neither have the will nor the ability to combat terrorism wholeheartedly.
     

  • Israel’s ability to combat terrorism decisively on its own is drastically diminished, both from the standpoint of intelligence and operations.

The agreements have the potential to increase the threat of Palestinian violence, inter alia due to the large number of armed police allowed. According to Oslo II, at most 30,000 police are permitted in Gaza, Judea and Samaria. This number is, incidentally, about double the number of police in Israel! But thousands of Palestinian police beyond the authorized number were recruited (amounting to some 50,000) and were equipped with many more weapons than were sanctioned.42 Indeed, the growing Palestinian self-confidence and their readiness to confront Israel face-to-face were exhibited during the bloody events of September 1996.

The PA never has been and still is not excessively motivated to combat terrorism and violence, because it views them as legitimate tools which have proven highly effective in achieving their political objectives. In addition, when “peace” is perceived by Arafat in the first place as a transient imperative, it is difficult to expect him vigorously to combat terrorism or bring about a civil war at Israel’s behest. Besides, if Israel continues to shower him with generous concessions, despite the continued terrorist attacks and violence, he is perfectly correct in asserting that “the peace of the brave will not be affected by a few acts of terrorism”.43

No wonder then that not only is Arafat not acting against the terrorist infrastructure, but he does not fundamentally negate or reject terrorism and he certainly has no intention of indoctrinating his people against it. On the contrary, his statements regarding jihad in general, and “in the name of the suicide bombers” in particular, along with statements referring to Israel as an enemy, only serve regularly to pour oil onto the bonfire of incitement and consistently inflame terror and violence. Similarly, he does not extradite (nor is there any chance that he might extradite) habitual murderers and terrorists to Israel, despite the fact that it is mandated by the agreements.44

If the PA has occasionally acted against terrorism at all, it has only been in response to Israeli specific pressure, i.e. in the wake of brutal acts of terrorism, and not a moment sooner. Even then its activities were “cosmetic” and short-lived. Thus Arafat and his people can, in fact, be blamed in particular for the savage February-March 1996 wave of terrorism, since, had they combated terrorism earnestly, it is almost certain that this wave could have been avoided. One proof of this is the absence of many brutal terrorist attacks since. So, too, the PA bears responsibility for not preventing the bloody terrorist attacks in Jerusalem (in the Mahane Yehuda market and the Ben-Yehuda promenade) in 1997.

Rabin himself brought up, on occasion, the fact that the PA is not “sufficiently” combating terrorism, and that he is not convinced that they are either capable or willing to do just that.45 Although Shimon Peres said that the war against terrorism had become a Palestinian interest, he blatantly contradicted himself by stating that “their commitment to agreements is worth only about 40%, and all the rest is rhetoric, embellishment and high-flown phrases.”46 Besides, why should Arafat wage war against his own people and endanger his national unity and power base for Israel? True, he has no interest in allowing any factor to endanger his rule, but the distance between that and a civil war over an issue (terrorism) which he himself has a vested interest in its continuation (in order to weaken Israel and elicit concessions) is great. Arafat prefers occasional minor confrontations with Israel, which in any case will be of limited duration, to bloodshed within his own camp, especially since he eventually benefits from those confrontations.

If a Palestinian state is established, there is no reason to expect that the terror and violence will dissipate. On the contrary, everything which was said about the potential terrorism stemming from the Oslo agreements, holds true here as well. Moreover, one can even foresee a number of “variables” which will exacerbate the situation:

  • The Palestinian state, from which the terrorist acts will originate, will have greater immunity against Israeli reprisals and disciplinary measures. A state of that sort will have much greater existential immunity than the PA has today.
     

  • The Palestinian state or its residents will be in a much better position to perpetrate terrorist acts against Israel. Terror could originate among some of its residents whether the state approves or not. Furthermore, if the Palestinian state enjoys, as suggested, greater immunity, it could allow itself greater freedom in fanning the flames of terrorism, and would have limited desire to prevent it.

  • As the IDF will not have any presence in the “state”, its ability to combat Palestinian terrorism and prevent it independently will diminish even further than it has already.
     

  • With the establishment of the “state”, and the aid of the geographic and other conditions extant, many new terrorist threats which today seem unrealistic, might emerge. For example, the terrorist cooperation with Israeli Arabs may increase. The “safe passage” which has been provided for the Palestinians according to Oslo II, will facilitate this, despite “creative” solutions to the security problems which were to be invented.

Those claiming that the Palestinian state will have a vested interest in combating terrorism are ignoring the following prominent factors:

  • It can be assumed that with the establishment of the “state”, not all of the Palestinian aspirations will have been realized (for example “the right of return” to areas within “the Green Line”, liberation of all of Palestine, etc.). Thus they will have an overriding interest in obtaining what they were unable to secure in negotiations (as the Palestinians will not be satisfied with anything less than total fulfillment of their national objectives, even if the process is a long one). In order to further the realization of their as yet, unrealized goals, they will almost certainly choose the path of terrorism and violence, which has proved effective heretofore.
     

  • One may assume that the “security arrangements” (among them demilitarization and the like) which will limit the Palestinians’ independence and sovereignty, will not be acceptable to the Palestinians, certainly in the long term. Even if they accept these limitations due to the exigencies of time and lack of alternative, they will strive to erode them and revoke them as soon as possible, while conducting a campaign rife with violence and terrorism.

There is no reason to assume that the phenomenon of fundamentalism among the Palestinians will disappear or become moderate with the advent of the “state”, as the causes of this phenomenon are not tied exclusively to frustration resulting from the lack of independence. The fundamentalist Palestinian organizations themselves will continue to play a leading role in the terrorist campaign in cooperation with fundamentalist elements throughout Moslem countries.

 

G. The Threats to Israel’s Power Base and National

    Strength

The establishment of a Palestinian state will necessarily serve a dire blow to Israel’s national strength and deterrence capability, which have already been considerably eroded.

National strength, as known, is not less essential than military power as a central pillar in the overall strength of a nation. National strength engulfs such components as national cohesion, motivation and morale, preparedness and determination to employ force, staying power, ideology as a national compass, quality of leadership, etc.

Establishing a Palestinian state on the background of the success of terrorism, accompanied by lip service paid to moderation of the ingrained hostility harbored by the Palestinians towards Israel, will necessarily lead to a schism and grievous rupture in Israeli society. Even if it appears that half of the nation believes in the “peace process” (“because there is no alternative” and the like), the fact remains that many Jews in Israel view it as a virtual peace and are not interested in excessive concessions, as was proven in the May 1996 elections. It is clear that once the Rabin-Peres government began worshipping the “supreme” value – “peace” – and forced it upon the other half of the nation through reliance on a scant, incidental and non-Jewish majority, a palpable erosion in Israel’s national strength took place.

The policy of the Rabin-Peres government which called for the uprooting and gradual isolation of Jewish settlements in Judea, Samaria and Gaza further exacerbated the schism. Yet uprooting Jewish settlements is a blatantly anti-Zionist act, i.e. a mortal blow to the ideology and philosophy which led to the establishment of the State of Israel. The trauma of the obliteration and evacuation, and the psychological jolt which will accompany the uprooting of settlements, pose potentially fatal threats to Israel’s national fabric and a grave assault on its national strength, as ideology is one of the components of that strength.

Even worse is that the Rabin-Peres government was not deterred from the idea of transferring settlements in Judea and Samaria to Palestinian sovereignty and rule. The clear meaning of that step was that we, by our own hand, were prepared to create a new Diaspora at our own doorstep. The most pathetic aspect of it all was that the State of Israel – the fruit of the Zionist ideology – intended to take an action whose result would be a fatal blow to the very roots of that philosophy (whose main idea was the elimination of the Diaspora and the creation of Jewish sovereignty in the Land of Israel). It seems that we have not yet completely rid ourselves of the exile (ghetto-like) character of ours.47

The establishment of a Palestinian state will be a clear expression not only of victory over Israel, but also of the destruction of the Israeli belief in the justice of our cause. For dozens of years, the majority of Israeli society believed in the justice of its cause in the conflict with the Arabs and the Palestinians and this belief gave us, the “few”, the staying power to continue in our long and arduous struggle against the “hostile many”. Ironically, in order to resolve the conflict it is we (“the powerful” and “the cruel occupiers”) who must concede, even at the risk of exposing ourselves to far-reaching dangers.

Furthermore, if at one point there was talk of compromise, including territorial compromise, between the two adversaries, the more likely solution, which is apt to lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state, is total capitulation to the other side (with poor demands for “security arrangements”, which will be ineffectual in any case, the exception). Giving up about 80-90% of the land (for starters) is not a “compromise” whatsoever.

Abandonment of the firm beliefs which have always guided us (including the non-establishment of a Palestinian state) must severely erode the national strength.48  The situation is many times worse in light of the materialistic, hedonistic atmosphere in which we live, which places egotistical self-fulfillment at the top of the list of priorities, and views the individual as principal and the state secondary. However, ideology is no less a fundamental component of the national strength than physical power, and without it, it is impossible to sustain a Jewish state in this troubled region.

Similarly, the leaders of the Left, for some time now, have lost their belief in the employment of power even when it is essential and justified, and instead they endlessly pontificate how using it no longer has any value or benefit.49  When they say that it no longer has any usefulness, not only do they transmit to the other side a very dangerous message of encouragement to harm us, but we, ourselves, erode our own deterrent power which has always been one of the pillars of our defense doctrine. The Israeli leadership failed to understand that, although Israel is indeed strong militarily, military power is meaningless unless accompanied by the willingness and resilience to employ it. Yet Israel has exhibited no real inclination to exercise force to crush the intifada and terror (or to pacify, for that matter, the situation in Lebanon). So Israel has demonstrated weakness and weariness from a just struggle, which can only be interpreted by our enemies, especially the Palestinians, as a comprehensive state of frailty to which our society and state have deteriorated. Again, might is not necessarily connected to the contents of one’s arsenal, but more by the readiness to use it when necessary, and it is highly doubtful that that is still the Israeli case. The proof – far-reaching concessions to the Palestinians and preparedness to establish a Palestinian state. It is no accident that the Labor party, in its 1996 election platform, canceled the plank opposing the establishment of such a state.

The above setbacks weaken not only the national consensus but also the morale and the national motivation. Since the IDF is the people’s army, it can only be expected that Israel’s societal illness will reflect upon it as well. Indeed, there are dangerous indications already afield. Motivation (along with consensus and the faith in the justice of our cause) has always been the cornerstone of the IDF’s might, and its fighting ability against its many enemies. The propensity for self-sacrifice stemmed from a love of the homeland, but, as it is now less important than the new Moloch – “peace” – it must fade. The erosion of the motivation, therefore, seriously weakens the IDF and Israel (this was demonstrated just recently in the clear decline in the motivation to serve in combat units and in the reserves).

On parallel, it is distinctive in the last years, especially since Oslo, that both national morale and cohesion have sharply declined. Although many Israelis are longing for peace and personal security (either from mental fatigue or innocent belief in “peace”) – many others are well aware of Israel’s overall deterioration, as she backs down from every security confrontation, be it in Lebanon or vis-à-vis the Palestinians. Though not all are knowledgeable of the genuine strategic implications – the public’s gut feelings, that Israel’s plight is bad indeed and will not be better in the foreseeable future – cause much frustration and depression.

A Palestinian state will certainly fatally weaken Israel, including its deterrence ability, and will increase the danger of internal decay. Very instructive in this context are Sheikh Yassin’s (the leader of the Hamas) words: “You indeed have lost the will to fight and this draws us nearer to our final victory.”

Indeed, if there is no will to fight for our causes and rights, there is no Zionism and we have no reason to be here.

 

H. “Surrounding Risks”: Jordan, Syria and Iran

The establishment of a Palestinian state must inevitably conflict with the existential interests of Jordan, as the PLO had and will continue to have irredentist claims on it. These stem from the historic and geographic ties connecting the two banks of the Jordan River and because the Palestinians form a vast majority (about 60-65%) in the Hashemite Kingdom. The ties connecting the Jordanian-Palestinian majority and a future Palestinian state on the West Bank will have a dire impact on the future of the Hashemite Kingdom. Because of its inherent geo-strategic weakness, Jordan is forced to acquiesce and compromise in its declarative policies, but the fact that the establishment of a Palestinian state will pose a perpetual threat to the Hashemite regime should not be overlooked.

Not incidentally, Jordan prefers Israel to rule in the buffer zone, i.e. the Jordan Valley and the border, thereby separating the kingdom and the Palestinian entity.

Those (like Peres) who suggest that confederation will resolve or mitigate the dangers of a Palestinian state, are, for all intents and purposes, suggesting a solution even worse than an independent state. First, a confederate framework means the joining of two originally independent states. Second, it is reasonable to assume that the Palestinian state and not Jordan will be the dominant factor in the confederate framework as Jordan almost always avoids confrontations in general and with the Palestinians in particular. And third, the framework will not blunt the Palestinians’ irredentist aspirations and will simply play into their hands in eventually enabling them to dominate the Hashemite Kingdom due to their dominance and their majority in the population. Then, instead of a tiny state lodged between two rather strong, established political entities, a large Palestinian state will emerge controlling both banks of the Jordan. In this scenario, the Palestinians will also take over the Jordanian army and alongside its “strong police force”, a significant military force will be at their disposal.

In any event, it is difficult to see the wisdom in a solution which replaces an agreeable, neighboring state, dependent on Israel for its existence, with a radical Palestinian entity. It is no accident that Jordan rejects this solution, although it is repeatedly brought up without consulting “the bride”.

A Palestinian state also contradicts a basic interest of Syria which views the Land of Israel as part of “Southern Syria”. Interestingly, the Syrian Defense Minister, Tlas, markedly expressed this in a Summer 1988 interview: “There is no need for an additional Palestinian state. Twenty-one Arab countries – that is enough.” His leader, Assad, said in an interview with an Egyptian newspaper in September 1993 (concurrent with the signing of Oslo I): “When I refer to Palestine, I view it as part of Syria.” It is true that Syria has lost much of its ability to force the PLO (and Jordan) to accede to its wishes, but it is not totally powerless, not least since it remains the patron of a number of Palestinian “rejectionist organizations”. Syria’s subversive arm, which may cause ferment in the Palestinian state, will not add to regional stability and security.

In any case, Syria possesses the capability to undermine the political process or “end the conflict” and to upset the stability of the region simply because it can prevent the resettlement of the Palestinian refugees, some 750,000 of whom live under its control in Syria and Lebanon. Therefore, a situation can develop, whereby Syria will have the ability to pressure the Palestinians much in the same way that it does regarding the Hizbullah today. On the other hand, a radical Palestinian state will find a loyal ally including in a strategic pact in Damascus in the continuing battle against Israel and in the undermining of regional stability.

A Palestinian state may forge close ties or even make a binding pact with fundamentalist Iran for ideological and pragmatic reasons. The Palestinian state is likely eventually to adopt a radical, militant profile and anyone who maintains that sort of approach is a potential ally or patron. Therefore, Syria, Iran and Libya are “candidates for the position”. After Syria, the country posing the greatest danger to Israel in this context is Iran. Pragmatically, this may be especially true if the “state” feels threatened by Israel and will come to feel the need to have an ally which will provide powerful patronage, and an umbrella discouraging Israel from retaliating harshly against the Palestinian state. It should not be excluded that Iran is liable to go even so far as to grant nuclear backing to a Palestinian state when it develops nuclear capability. The end result would be a fundamentalist axis from Teheran to the gates of Tel Aviv.

 

PART III
 

Can There Be a Remedy in Case of a Bad Bargain?
 

A.   The Value of a Palestinian Commitment

It has widely been asserted in Israel that the value of a Palestinian commitment regarding Israel is negligible or non-existent.50 Former Prime Minister Shimon Peres himself said it best when he stated (as mentioned earlier) that “their commitment to agreements is worth only about 40%, and all the rest is rhetoric, embellishment and high-flown phrases.” If this is the way that the architect of the “peace treaties” with the Palestinians relates to the commitments (ignoring the fact that the percentage ratio might be even worse), how can anyone relate to the Oslo agreements as binding agreements, how is it possible to take the Palestinian commitments seriously; and how is it possible to relinquish Israel’s vital interests and its security to the favor and the pathetic credibility of our new “peace partners”?

Yet the agreements were signed one after another, although prior to each new agreement, the previous agreement was blatantly violated by the Palestinians. The Israeli negotiators repeatedly recycled commitments which had already been made in the previous rounds but remained unfulfilled. In this way, Oslo II recycles Arafat’s commitment to cancel the Palestinian Covenant “two months after the elections and the investiture of the Palestinian Council”. But Arafat, as stated earlier, said at Harvard (after signing Oslo II), that he would not do it (“I’d be lying if I told you that we will abrogate the Charter”,51 or after the signing of the Hebron Agreement in January 1997, “I will change the covenant when Israel has a constitution.”). The Rabin-Peres government, and even that of Netanyahu, swallowed every Palestinian lie, and was ready to continue swallowing them incessantly.52

Already in the early months of 1995, a number of Israeli publications appeared detailing Palestinian violations of the agreements. In January 1995, a military advocate’s report was published, detailing the many Palestinian violations of the Oslo agreements, among them: Suspects in the murders of Israelis were not extradited to Israeli jurisdiction, no measures were taken to prevent terrorist attacks against Israel, PA activities in East Jerusalem continued, contravening the agreement, torture of collaborators with Israel, the list of Palestinian policemen was not submitted, the Palestinian police force used stolen vehicles, the PA characterized itself in English as the Palestinian National Authority and even as the “State of Palestine”, stamps and international driver’s licenses bearing the heading “Palestine” were printed, passports were issued to the residents of Judea, Samaria and Gaza, etc. When the document was reproachfully presented to the then Foreign Minister, Peres replied: “This report was not commissioned by us and I am not disturbed by the violations.”53

In an interview with the Jerusalem Lawyers Association in April 1995, the then legal advisor of the Foreign Ministry, and a close partner in the Oslo agreements, Yoel Singer, launched a strong criticism of the PA: “The violations of the agreement perpetrated by the PA in Jerusalem are the most severe. If I had the authority, I would address those first.”54 On the same occasion, Singer said that there is no doubt that the declaration of a Palestinian state by the Palestinians would be a substantive violation of the agreement. Singer repeated the same observation as recently as Spring 1999 (in “Mayday for Oslo”, The National Interest, No. 55). It can be assumed that this holds true of Oslo II as well. Yet in Ramallah, Arafat began declaring the establishment of the “state”55 and he did so repeatedly. However, the Rabin-Peres government remained silent and did not view it as a substantive violation. At the end of 1996, the Defense Ministry’s Coordinator of Activities in the Territories in Netanyahu’s government again reported to the Knesset 50 Palestinian violations of the agreement.

The falsehood and very questionable value of the Palestinian commitment to genuine peace with Israel are especially manifest in the area of incitement against it on the one hand and the total absence of Palestinian education toward true reconciliation with the Jewish state on the other. The consistent Arab incitement against Israel with no attempt, modest as it may be, to facilitate a genuine reconciliation with the Jewish state are, to my mind, the most deep-seated, severe Palestinian breach of the Oslo agreements and prove conclusively that the “peace process” has no basis or future.

All Palestinian leaders and their media unceasingly (years after Oslo) refer to the establishment of the State of Israel as the plundering of their land and country. Israeli cities like Haifa, Jaffa, Lod, Ramle, Safed, Tiberias, Beit-She’an, Acre, Kfar Sava and others are depicted as Palestinian cities while indubitable Israeli cities like Petach Tikva, Hadera and others are referred to as “colonial settlements”. The map of Palestine as it appears in their media includes all of Israel, which is not mentioned by name but rather as the “Zionist entity”, “Tel Aviv government” and the like.

Even in these few examples there is unequivocal proof of the deep-rooted Palestinian non-acceptance of the existence of the State of Israel despite their explicit commitments in signed agreements to recognize not only its existence but its right to exist too. Furthermore, not only is there non-acceptance of the Jewish state (not to mention a total absence of indoctrination towards reconciliation and coexistence), but there is hope extant to expel this state from the region, and in their words – “terminate the Zionist project” and similar.

No less severe is the fact that even the Netanyahu government followed and documented the blatant Palestinian violations without taking any drastic measures to curtail them, other than grumbling and publicizing them from time to time and even recycling Oslo I and II terms in the Hebron and Wye agreements. In their lack of drastic reaction to the intolerable Palestinian violations, the Israeli governments have contributed and continue to contribute to and be responsible for their perpetuation. Moreover, the fact that the Netanyahu government just prattled and lamented periodically about them without imposing any sanctions was not only useless but it encouraged the PA to persist. And the blatant Palestinian violations were all well-known and detailed earlier.56

Those who back the establishment of a Palestinian state try to tranquilize the Israeli public by contending that it will and must be a restricted state, i.e., completely demilitarized, unable to sign military pacts against us, not allowed to permit entry to a foreign army west of the Jordan and likewise. But this is sheer delusion. Will the Palestinians agree to a restricted, crippled state? Will they agree to a state without armed forces when they already possess a solid nucleus of them? Will they agree that we fly over their skies permanently and control the borders and port entrances? And why should they agree to such humiliating restrictions – are they inferior to their brethren – the Lebanese, those from Qatar and Bahrain, et al.?

Netanyahu has introduced into our political polemics the term – reciprocity, which has even gained ground. But this notion was hollow from the outset:

First, the Palestinians are not exactly on the same footing as we are both strategically and in terms of the rights over this land.

Second, they are not in a position to give us what we need, e.g., security (nor should we entrust to them such a task).

Third, reciprocity assumes that the Oslo agreements coincided greatly with our national interests and therefore should be abided by strictly if only the Palestinians will abide by them too.

Fourth, it assumes that we should strip ourselves from our tiny homeland as well as from our defense essentials, for pieces of paper that are not worth their ink.

And finally, experience with the Palestinians teaches and proves that there is no basis or future to their commitments (except for pathetically recycling them).

The upshot of the reality described above is that it is impossible to believe in or rely on any Palestinian commitment regarding Israel. Their interests are polar opposites of our national interests, and they are interested exclusively in slyly extorting as many concessions, territorial and others, as possible from Israel, and transforming their gains into the basis for the continued struggle with Israel. It is, therefore, to be expected that the more Israel acquiesces and grovels before them, the more they will treat their own commitments with contempt. Weakness certainly encourages violations of agreements, if not worse than that.

 

B. Is the Use of Force Against the Palestinian State Possible in the
    Case of a Bad Bargain?

Those supporting the establishment of a Palestinian state claim that if it were to take hostile action against Israel or act contrary to its commitments, the IDF would be free to eradicate it or employ effective, forceful measures against it.57  Without a doubt, Israel will be unable to obliterate an Arab state which was established and accepted by the community of nations. Israel’s hands will be tied both by the United States and Egypt, which will certainly hasten to abrogate its peace treaty with Israel and will inspire Jordan to follow suit. As far as the UN, the European nations and world opinion are concerned, they will be more than happy to impose far-reaching sanctions against Israel. Needless to say, the internal situation in Israel will pose problems as well, and its Left will raise every possible objection against harming the Palestinian state. As stated, Israel has lost the willpower and the determination to exercise its might in order to secure vital interests.

Furthermore, in the past, the Palestinians tended to act and express themselves in a very open, audacious manner. Today, they behave in a much more circumspect manner, concealing their actions and positions behind smooth talk in order to avoid providing Israel with a categorical pretext to employ strong, forceful measures against them. In addition, even if they continue the violent, terrorist struggle against Israel, whether to express their hostility or to pressure it into further capitulation and concessions, the Palestinians will be careful to ensure that the struggle not escalate to intolerable extremism but rather remain somewhat “latent”. In other words, letting the blood slowly and periodically, in order to avoid going too far and forcing Israel into a corner from which it will have no recourse but to strike back. If they just act “wisely”, that is, harass Israel and let its blood gradually and in a manner which will not mandate an extreme reaction, they will achieve their goals: weakening Israel and undermining its strength without provoking or creating unreasonable risks. They can endure and continue along such a chosen path while belittling the hollow Israeli occasional warnings. (“We cannot and will not accept”; “we will not allow these events to recur”, etc.) The net result will be perpetuation of the situation of insecurity and instability and it goes without saying, no real peace. On the other hand, Israel’s total impotence and inability satisfactorily to remedy the situation will be exposed.

Apropos, historically, it is instructive to recall that the repeated attempts to call the Lebanese government to order (to restrain the PLO or the Hizbullah), were ineffectual. Similarly, the history of Israel’s reprisals against Arab states is far from a success story. Therefore, once the Palestinian state is established it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to punish it appropriately or to return to the status quo ante. Despite the flowery promises of the capitulators, Israel’s freedom of action, today and in the future will be severely curtailed.

“They will have a lot to lose,” prattle those who desire a Palestinian state. But already today the PA has a lot to lose and this does not impress them as they recognize Israel’s leaders’ and society’s weaknesses. The latter prefer the “meat pot” to struggling for justified national rights. The Palestinians are also encouraged by the international hypocrisy by which the Palestinians turned into a “darling son”.

 

Epilogue

Only one weighty conclusion emerges from the above discussion: Better not to reach a situation where we enable the establishment of a Palestinian state, which will be “a disaster foretold”. If this stems only from analyzing its strategic dangers, consider what will be the true overall consequences when the military-operational dangers are added, such as:

  1. Losing the Judea-Samaria mountain ridge and
     

  2. Abandoning “strategic depth”, i.e. Israel’s territorial shrinking into the coastal plain with the width and breadth of 10-15 kilometers only, and
     

  3. The difficulties of mobilizing its military reserves in case of a surprise attack, etc.

It is claimed that already today a Palestinian state does exist. But this is at an embryonic stage and such a distorted entity can still be thwarted. Secondly, today the PA still does not have the aura and full status of a sovereign standing. Above all, Israel should not acquiesce to a crooked reality even if it starts “forming some crust”. The experience with the Palestinians since Oslo is a successive failure story and there is no reason in the world that this will change “if only a Palestinian state will be established”. On the contrary, the cure will only be worse than the disease. And a tiny state like Israel cannot allow itself to blunder or gamble.

As a final word, what is more fitting than quoting Senator Connie Mack’s (R-FL) most telling lines from a speech to the US Senate on March 3, 1999:

How is it possible to engage in peace negotiations with people who maintain the right to obliterate you, who are filled with hatred toward you, and who harbor the dream of one day destroying your homeland? Peace is a matter of the heart... But what I saw, which was the outcome of the Palestinian Authority rule, convinced me that their hearts and minds are set on other goals. The Palestinian leadership does not want peace. They want, first, their own state which they can control with total power. Then they want to use that state to eliminate the State of Israel.

...if the Palestinian leadership fails to abandon incitement of hatred, persecution and terrorism, then we are all dreaming, only dreaming... There will not be peace until hearts and minds are changed... The United States’ role...stand up for peace – real peace based upon security, freedom and a change of heart.


*NOTE:   The numbers and statistics cited in this article have not been updated and reflect 
 those at the time the article was written (a few years ago).


 

Endnotes

1

All emphases in the text is that of the author.

2

In the Oslo I Agreement it states, “Mutual recognition of the political rights only”
without the word “legitimate”.

3

Oslo II Agreement, Article IV.

4

Article V (4c).

5

Article XVIII.

6

Article IX (2).

7

Article IX (5a).

8

Article IX (5b).

9

Article IX (c).

10

Article I (7) and Article XVII (2), etc.

11

Article XVII (2a).

12

Appendix III, Article 40 (1).

13

Article XVII (1a).

14

Preamble, Article III (3), etc.

15

Article VI to the Protocol of Elections.

16

Under Ottoman rule in Palestine, especially during the nineteenth century, residents of Western and European extraction were permitted to retain citizenship of their various countries of origin, enabling them to remain under the protection of their national consul, rather than under the rule of Ottoman Empire. In fact, the decaying Ottoman rule and law did not apply to them at all.

17

Article V to the Protocol of Elections.

18

Article IX (1b) to the Protocol of Redeployment and Security Arrangements.

19

Appendix III, The Civil Protocol, Article XV.

20

Article XIII (13) to the Protocol of Deployment.

21

The Civil Protocol, Article XIV (2).

22

Appendix III, Article XXXVI (b).

23

Appendix III, Article II (10).

24

The Protocol, Article VIII (1d).

25

Appendix III, Article VIII (2b).

26

Appendix III, Article X (9).

27

Appendix III, Article XXIX (2) and Article 36.

28

Appendix III, Article XXXVI (5).

29

The Economic Protocol, Article IV (10b).

30

And Arafat is well aware of this as he declared to his audience: “It is forbidden to descend from the mountaintop until we pass on our flag to our children who are the new generals, who carried the intifada on their shoulders for seven years and defeated the most powerful army in the region … With your struggle, your jihad, we will together build this state.Ma’ariv September 7,1995, Yediot Aharonot, September 15, 1995.

31

Farouk Kadoumi’s statement is indicative (from August 8, 1994, that is one year after Oslo I). “It is impossible that we will concede even one grain of our land. We know that there is a state which will be established by the force of history which must eventually arrive. They stole our land. The refugees must return to their land.”

32

Arafat’s interview with A-Dastur, September 19, 1995, and the addition in the Jerusalem Post from November 18, 1994 where Arafat said among other things: “And only a Palestinian state can continue the struggle to remove the enemy from all Palestinian lands.”

33

Hudaibiya Pact – In the year 629, Muhammad attempted to conquer Mecca together with his Bedouins. On the way, most of the Bedouins abandoned him, and realizing that he did not have the manpower to subjugate the Qureish tribe of Mecca, he entered into a ten year non-belligerence pact with them, known as the Hudaibiya Pact. Ten months later, after Muhammad had managed to rally sufficient forces, he violated the pact, attacking and conquering Mecca. Muhammad’s behavior has since become a model for how to treat the enemies of Islam when found in a position of weakness. Agreements are to be breached when expedient.

34

See the statement of the former head of military intelligence, General Moshe (Bogi) Ya’alon, at the Knesset Committee of Foreign and Security Affairs, Ma’ariv, November 15, 1995 and Arafat’s statement at Harvard: “I would be lying if I told you that I will abrogate it. No one can do that.”

35

Arafat’s lack of intention to sustain true peace was reiterated (in September 1995) when he said: “Be blessed Gaza, your sons are returning; Jaffa, Lod, Haifa, Jerusalem – you are returning.”, Ma’ariv, September 7, 1995. These statements and those concerning the jihad do not indicate that his intention is true peace with Israel or that he intends to honor agreements with it. As Arafat explicitly said on the “Voice of Palestine”, November 11, 1995: “The battle will not end until all of Palestine is liberated.”

36

In Article XXVIII (11) of Appendix III of the Oslo II agreement it states: “In order to reflect the spirit of the peace process, the Palestinian side is permitted, with the prior approval of Israel, to grant permanent resident status in Judea, Samaria and Gaza to the spouses and children of Palestinian residents and to other people on humanitarian grounds in order to facilitate and improve the reunification of families.” Later – in Article XXVIII (13) it continued: “The Palestinian side is permitted to issue, after Israeli approval, visitation visas for purposes of study and work for a period of one year, which can be extended with Israeli agreement.

37

The area of Judea, Samaria and Gaza is 5,850 square kilometers (approx. 2,340 square miles). If we assume that the Rabin-Peres government strove to maintain at least some territory in Israeli possession, the Palestinians will be left with only 4,000-5,000 square kilometers (approx. 1,600-2,000 square miles), and this is for four million people (about two million today plus the “returnees”).

38

B. Begin, Ma’ariv, October 27, 1995.

39

MK Darouche with A-Dastur, June 30, 1995: “Do not refer to us as Israeli Arabs…they tried to obscure our Palestinian identity. Since 1948 we have been guarding the purity of our identity as Arabs and Palestinians. It should be noted that the motto of ‘Land Day’ in 1995 was - ‘return the displaced persons of 1948 to their villages.’”

40

Ma’ariv, February 1, 1995.

41

Peace is not made with enemies but rather with former enemies.

42

When Rabin pressured Arafat on the issue of the excessive number of police officers beyond the agreed-upon limit, Arafat excused the phenomenon by claiming: “so that they will have something to eat.” Yediot Aharonot, February 5, 1995.

43

Ma’ariv, August 19, 1994.

44

And Israel also was not pressuring Arafat on this issue, in order, among other reasons, not to weaken the position of the “new partner”.

45

Ma’ariv, July 4, 1995.

46

Yediot Aharonot, October 8, 1995.

47

After all, 2,000 years of exile are not a light matter and exile-like genes must still be running in our veins. We were evidencing it in the last Gulf War and ever since in all Saddam’s confrontations with the US. In the Palestinian context, this has been reflected in constant fear from Palestinian violence, terrorist bombings and even threats.

Instead of taking on the challenge and confronting the Palestinians, the Israelis are prepared to pay “protection money” in order to gain some temporary, pitiful peace.

48

Rabin addressed this issue in order to justify his policy when he said: “Once Israel had staying power, but today – no longer.” He just overlooked that the national strength emanated from our sense of purpose and the belief of the justice of our cause. A society is strong when it adheres to a just cause, but when the justness of the cause erodes – it weakens considerably.

49

“The map in Peres’ head is one of overhauling the order of priorities from the military to the economy with all of the ramifications inherent in that change.” From an interview with Uri Savir in Ma’ariv, November 17, 1995. He adds there: “In this era of missiles and nuclear arms the concept of national security must be redefined,” and his intentions in downgrading it are clear. Peres’ own statement that “ten hotels on the Kinneret supercede ten army outposts there” – speaks for itself.

50

See for example A. Levran, “The Arabs Are Not to be Trusted”, Ha’aretz supplement, February 18, 1994, in response to an article by Professor Y. Harkabi.

51

Yediot Aharonot, October 8, 1995.

52

Arafat and his “Legal Committee” can be clever and “revoke” one or two paragraphs of the covenant, in which Israel is mentioned, and leave the rest intact (altogether 33), which negate Zionism and exhort strongly to continue “the armed struggle for the liberation of Palestine”. In any case, any similarity between what will be amended, if anything will be amended, and the genuine abrogation of the covenant is extremely slight.

53

Ma’ariv, January 24, 1995.

54

Ma’ariv, April 11, 1995.

55

Ma’ariv, December 31, 1995.

56

As of late, then Foreign Minister Sharon reported to the Knesset as well as in an official meeting with the PA and the US (at the Erez installation) that the PA has even accumulated anti-aircraft guns, anti-tank launchers, hand grenades, mines, mortars and explosive, and has even started to manufacture weapons! All these are strictly forbidden.

57

In Yediot Aharonot, March 6, 1991 (right after the Gulf war), Yossi Sarid wrote, for example, that “if after the Palestinian state is established it will dare to endanger Israel, it will be conquered by us within 24 hours and will remain Judea and Samaria forever.” Not to mention that during the Gulf War he published an article in Ha’aretz entitled: “Let Them Look for Me”, expressing his deep disappointment with the behavior of the Palestinians who were openly rejoicing at the landing of Scud missiles in Israel.