Before Israel disburses the
billions of dollars in US aid – to defray the cost of another Israeli
retreat (“Realignment”) – the US has to approve such an aid package.
However, the chance of approving such a package is identical to the chance
of Israel receiving US financial aid for previous retreats from Southern
Lebanon, Northern Samaria and Gaza – Zero!
The expectation – by top
Israeli officials – that the US would eventually help finance a
mega-billion dollar retreat from Judea & Samaria and the uprooting of scores
of Jewish communities ignores recent precedents, demonstrates lack of
sensitivity to US budgetary constraints, reflects misunderstanding of the US
political system, and manifests miscomprehension of vital US interests in
the Mideast. Such an expectation undermines the strategic posture of Israel
in the US.
In 2000, Prime Minister
Barak contended that President Clinton was committed to an $800MN aid
package, in order to induce a retreat from Southern Lebanon. In 2004/5,
Prime Minister Sharon and Deputy Prime Minister Olmert impressed upon the
Israeli public that President Bush would provide $1BN-$2BN, in order to
facilitate the $3BN retreat from Gaza and Northern Samaria. Not a penny was
transferred to Israel! Contrary to Barak’s, Sharon’s and Olmert’s
statements, Clinton and Bush never committed to these aid packages, just as
they never committed to recognize Israel’s sovereignty over any Jewish
settlement beyond the 1949 Green Line. Moreover, Congress – and not the
Administration – possesses the Power of the Purse, and all disbursements
require a complex legislative process, and not just positive presidential
declarations, which are constitutionally and internationally non-binding.
The US
Congress is currently debating a series of painful budgetary cuts,
against the background of a threatening $300BN budget deficit, the rising
cost of the wars in Afghanistan and in Iraq ($4BN monthly), the dramatic
increase in the price of oil, the $200BN devastation caused by Katrina and
other storms, etc. Legislators are raiding the defense budget, in order to
fund domestic projects. Senator Thad Cochran, Chairman of the Appropriations
Committee, is fighting over $900MN for the reconstruction of a shipyard and
railroad tracks in Mississippi. Senator Landrieu is struggling to secure
$12BN for the rebuilding of the Katrina-plagued area. The Senate seeks a
$14BN cut, and the President’s political-base threatens to desert him unless
he trims the budget deficit.
The aftermath of Israel’s
retreats from Southern Lebanon, Gaza and Northern Samaria has convinced
leading US legislators that Israel’s retreat from terrorist strongholds
undermines vital US concerns in the Mideast. Thus, the US is the leader in
the war on Islamic terrorism, it has decimated two major terrorist regimes
in Afghanistan and Iraq, it acts to neutralize the Iranian nuclear threat
and intimidates the Assad regime, it supports the Hashemite regime and other
pro-US regimes in the Persian Gulf, and it attempts to lower the Mideast
profile of Russia, China and North Korea. But, Israel’s retreat from
Southern Lebanon (June 2000) has propelled Hizbullah – the role model of
IEDs – to a major role in the anti-US terrorist campaign. Moreover, Israel’s
retreat from Gaza and Northern Samaria (August 2005) has transformed these
areas into the largest terrorist base in the region, has adrenalized the
veins of regional – including anti US – terrorism (which has escalated since
“disengagement”), has upgraded the effectiveness of Hamas and Islamic Jihad
terrorists (who have been credited, by the Palestinian Street, with Israel’s
retreat), has enhanced the influence of their allies in Iran, Syria and the
pro-Saddam camp, has intensified the threat to the survival of the Hashemite
regime and pro-US regimes in the Persian Gulf, has advanced the regional
profile of Russia, China and North Korea, has undermined Israel’s posture of
deterrence, and therefore has set the area closer to an all out war and
farther from peace. Another retreat from Judea & Samaria – which possesses a
unique strategic edge – would exacerbate the aforementioned threats and
would threaten the supply lines to – and the operational maneuverability of
– US troops in Iraq. A continued US and Israeli support of an expanded
Palestinian domain would defy the consequences of Palestinian entrenchment
in Syria (1966), Jordan (1970), Lebanon (1975/6) and Kuwait (1990) – fueling
instability, subversion and bloodshed in the Mideast.
“Realignment”, just like
“disengagement”, is not an American idea, and therefore the US does not
feel obligated to support it. The US has always respected (although many
times disagreed with) an Israel, which is a producer – rather than a
consumer – of national security and deterrence. The US has preferred an
Israel, which extends the “Long Military Arm” of the US rather than an
Israel which requires an American helping hand, an Israel which defeats
terrorists rather than an Israel which negotiates with terrorist, an Israel
which attacks terrorists at their own End Zone rather than retreats from
terrorists towards its own End Zone, an Israel which excels in military
operations à la 1988 (counterterrorism), 1982 (blasting Soviet
surface to air missiles), 1981 (Osirak), 1976 (Entebbe), 1967 (Six Day War),
1956 (Sinai) and 1948 (War of Independence) and not in retreats.
Rather than fantasizing over
a special US aid package, the Israeli public should study the Texas
colloquialism: “Fool me once shame on you, fool me twice shame on me!”