The American
Realpolitik and Its Cost to Israel
Mark
Silverberg
As Hamas
gains political ascendancy in Gaza, Iran exports Islamic radicalism
throughout the Middle East, the Moslem Brotherhood threatens the
balance of power in Egypt, Lebanon faces the possibility of a
Syrian-backed, Iranian-funded Hizbullah coup-d’etat
and Iraq explodes into sectarian violence, it is clear that American
hegemony in the Middle East is under attack. As a consequence, the
era of actively promoting democratic change in “friendly”
authoritarian states is nearing its end, at least for the
foreseeable future. With reformist forces in retreat, in fear, in
prison or in exile, the Bush Administration has made a calculated,
tactical foreign policy shift back to supporting “moderate” secular
dictators and despots over “aggressive” Islamic dictators who
represent a greater threat to American interests. In so doing, it
has chosen what it considers to be the lesser of the two
evils...none of this will work in Israel’s favor.
back to top
The Day of Reckoning Has Come:
Israeli Arabs Want Out
Raphael
Israeli
The Arab minority in Israel, which amounts to
over one million souls (20% of the total population), has been
undergoing a process of Islamization and Palestinization in the past
few years which has brought it much closer to the Palestinian and
Hamas positions in their conflict with Israel.
Lately, the leadership of the Arabs in Israel
has submitted a list of demands that if adopted, would put an end to
the Jewish nature of the state and invite its inundation by Arab
refugees who would take over the country. These suicidal measures
are therefore to be rejected by Israel, who can offer some much
better steps to avert its demolition from within.
back to top
Tired of Winning: How
True and Why?
The Second Lebanon War and Its Failure
Aharon
Levran
The question of victory or lack thereof in the
Second Lebanon War is extremely disturbing. Even though we were not
routed in the war – neither did we achieve a clear, decisive
victory. Despite the fact that the Chief of the General Staff claims
that we won on points, a draw would be a more appropriate
characterization. Furthermore, considering its significant
superiority in every military parameter, a draw is not a flattering
result for Israel.
The primary reason for the non-victory lies in
the spirit of “tiredness of winning”, in the belief that “the
disengagement will bring more security and prosperity and much joy
and pleasure to all of the nations of the Middle East” (as Olmert
claimed in 2005). The spirit of those statements and the delusional
belief in “peace” and the “New Middle East” since Oslo, have
trickled down to significant segments of the Israeli population
(which voted it into power), including the upper echelons of the
army. This spirit led to the lack of preparation of the IDF for a
possible war and the failure to undertake, certainly not in a timely
manner, the proper, necessary military steps. The severe cuts in the
military budget and striking decreases in troops and weapons, which
brought about the deterioration of the ground forces and the
reserves – are a practical manifestation of the quixotic spirit that
has enveloped the leaders of the country and the army and most of
the nation in general.
An additional central strategic reason for the
non-victory was the assessment that air power alone would bring
about the victory. While that assessment was not totally baseless,
it was mistaken. That is because of the old, well-known principle
that the Air Force alone does not win wars, although it does have
the ability to contribute significantly to achieving victory and to
enhancing deterrence. The mistake was also in military strategy –
over-reliance on firepower at the expense of ground movement and
maneuvers. And worst of all – once they became aware of the fact
that the Air Force was not “delivering the goods”, it was still
possible to change tactics and introduce ground forces to occupy
territory and destroy enemy units.
Additional central reasons for the non-victory
are tied to the severe deviation from defense theory and the
principles of war. An intolerable level of terrorism and guerilla
activity against Israel has always been an extremely just casus
belli, and Hizbullah frequently provides it. Nevertheless, and
despite the fact that it was a confrontation between rogue Iran and
the United States and the West, Israel did not exploit the great
opportunity to rout Hizbullah.
Despite the fact that the ultimate objective of
any war is victory or clear decision, it does not appear that Israel
sought a clear victory over Hizbullah and certainly not its defeat.
Although Hizbullah absorbed quite a bit – by refraining from
occupying the territory (at least) to the Litani River, the IDF
missed the opportunity for a demonstrative victory. That is
primarily because the term “occupation”, which is an elementary
component of military strategy, has (totally unjustifiably) become
abominable in the eyes of many in Israel.
Since Israel was “tired of winning”, not to
mention that it didn't want and didn't take action to achieve a
decisive victory, it formulated the objectives of the war in a
nebulous, unquantifiable manner. Routing Hizbullah was not set as a
clear objective of the war, and even worse, removal of the threat
posed by rockets to northern Israel was not included as an
objective. This was a colossal mistake as the ballistic threat is
not a secondary threat but rather an intolerable strategic threat.
That threat could have been neutralized had the IDF acted in
accordance with the basic principle of military strategy – speedily
transferring the war to enemy territory, in other words, conquering
its territory by means of firepower and movement (a flanking
maneuver from north to south). A course of action of that type is
likely to minimize casualties and certainly to realize a clear
victory.
Regarding deterrence,
whose enhancement was a component of the “strategic objective” of
the war – it is difficult to arrive at an unequivocally
determination - only time will tell. On the one hand, the
destructive power of the Air Force was displayed; Hizbullah was
moved away from its extreme proximity to the border and the Lebanese
Army, supplemented by an enhanced UNIFIL force, deployed in southern
Lebanon. On the other hand, there were also clear IDF failures,
especially on the ground and in achieving its objectives and it
seems that these intensified the radicalism among the Arab public
and the Palestinians vis-à-vis Israel.
back to top
Deter a War – Or Win It
Bernard
Smith
The Arabs have not given up the dream
of a Jewish state disappearing following a defeat, or turning it
into a bi-national state. For many in the Arab street, Israel is a
deadly tumor that must be excised. Arab countries and Iran are
building conventional weapons as well as weapons of mass destruction
capabilities. If Israel grows weak militarily, economically and its
societal morale continues to weaken while the Arabs grow stronger
militarily, an inducement will exist for an Arab/Muslim coalition to
attack.
Israel should be preparing to deter
such an eventuality. And, if deterrence fails – to win on the
battlefield. Instead, under the influence of, to borrow a phrase
from American history, an “Era of Good Feeling”, Israelis dreamed
that peace was at hand. Egypt signed a peace treaty, followed by
Mauritania and Jordan. Some years later, the PLO and Israel signed
the Oslo Accords. Relations with Gulf and North African countries
looked promising. It appeared that Israel could start shifting its
heavy defense investment into social expenditures. Or, whenever a
problem exists balancing the national budget, Treasury officials
sought to cut the defense budget.
The effects of the cuts damaged
important segments of Israel’s defense preparations. Planning was
harmed by loss of the five-year plan. Compulsory service was
shortened (the more complex the weaponry, tactics and operational
concepts, the less time required to master them?). Downsizing of
personnel and platforms were thought of as necessities as were
delays or suspension of essential weapons and projects.
The Palestinian war, allowed to
continue for six years under a policy of containment, turned the IDF
into experts in urban warfare. However, this resulted in a shameful
curtailment of regular Army and reserve training year after year.
For some, there was a fear that the
IDF was losing its primacy in the Middle East. Others assuaged that
worry with the notion that the IDF was becoming a “smaller and
smarter” military force. In fact, Israel was in the process of
taking “risks for [keeping the] peace”, as well as giving up
strategic land for the promise of peace. It was entering into
a very dangerous experiment.
To
eliminate the experiment and the risk, it will be necessary to
enlarge Israel’s gross national product, necessitating structural
changes in the economy and government.
back to top
The Return of the Ground
Offensive
Ran
Baratz
The present article analyzes Israel’s
new strategic status quo in the immediate aftermath of the recent
war in Lebanon. For years, Israel’s international borders were quiet
because the Arab states had lost all hope of reaping any military
gains against Israel, even via a small-scale campaign. However, as a
result of the war, Israel has lost two major components in its
strategic deterrence: the latest models of the Merkava
tank have proven to be vulnerable; and the Israeli Air Force failed
to live up to expectations. Consequently, the option of a Syrian
ground offensive, accompanied by a Palestinian attack on three
fronts (Judea and Samaria, Gaza, and inside Israel), is once again a
distinct possibility.
The only strategic deterrent that
remains is Israel’s nuclear capacity. However, barring a military
initiative, the Islamic theocracy of Iran will soon possess a
nuclear weapon. Therefore, the question that begs asking is, ‘How
will Israel’s enemies view the new nuclear balance?’ Until now, the
Arab world knew that if faced with imminent defeat, Israel would
resort to a nuclear strike; but a mutual nuclear deterrence would
force Israel to choose between defeat on the battlefield or
annihilation at the hands of a reciprocal Iranian nuclear bombing.
In this lose-lose scenario, a conventional defeat might seem
preferable. Consequently, this state of affairs is liable to
rekindle — and rationally so — the aspirations of conquering Israel
by means of a conventional Arab attack, under the aegis of the
Iranian nuclear umbrella.
Since the conventional war option
might materialize rather soon, the author has conducted an in-depth
comparison of the Arab world’s military preparations vis à vis
the state of the Israeli military, with the grim conclusion that the
IDF is on the decline on all fronts and fields – including military
power and strategic expertise – while its foes are bolstering their
military prowess.
back to top
Reason, Science and Progress:
Modern Pretexts for Judeophobia, Left and Right
Eliyahu
Green
For the complete text of this article (in
English), click
here.
Today, throughout the world, the left
is generally hostile to Israel, and often hostile to Jews and
Judaism. Some commonly held themes, views and attitudes which
reflect this – including the Israeli left – go back to the Middle
Ages or even to the Christian Church Fathers in late antiquity. It
may surprise some that the Church Fathers generally viewed the Jews
in a paradoxical way. They saw the Jews as pioneers of civilization
and rational thought, while simultaneously hating the Jews as
alleged conspirators against Jesus (punished by loss of their
Temple, their city, Jerusalem, and their homeland, Judea). The
favorable view was held throughout the Middle Ages and Renaissance
by Jean Gerson, Marsilio Ficino, and others. In the late 1600s,
Bossuet articulated both the favorable and hostile sides of the
paradox. Meanwhile, medieval Christian theologians and philosophers
believed that they had proven Christian dogmas, such as the virgin
birth, the trinity, angels, purgatory, etc., by means of reason.
Therefore, whoever did not accept these dogmas was unreasonable,
incapable of or opposed to reason. This conclusion was applied to
the Jews first of all.
Luther, who rebelled against the
Catholic Church, expounded views of the Jews more hostile even than
those of Catholic tradition. Subsequently, German Protestant
theologians following Luther proved to their own satisfaction, that
ancient Greek testimony as to Jewish influence on classical Greek
philosophers was incorrect. This negative conclusion, canceling the
favorable part of the Church Fathers’ paradox, was adopted by Kant
and Hegel, who were in turn major influences on shaping the views on
Jews and Judaism held by modern Leftist and Liberal ideologies, such
as Marxism. Further, Kant and Hegel saw the Orient as incapable of
progress. Therefore, since Judaism was Oriental, it was incapable of
progress. Indeed, they viewed Judaism as inferior, even within the
Oriental sphere.
Voltaire viewed Jews much as did the
two German philosophers. The view of these three and others, that
ancient civilization did not have any roots in Judaism and had not
undergone Jewish influence, paralleled the claim of the Church
Father Marcion that Christianity had no roots in Judaism. Marcion
was considered heretical by the bulk of Church Fathers. However, he
was studied by Luther, Voltaire, etc. Kant, Voltaire and Hegel’s
denial of any ancient Jewish contribution to civilization supplied a
paradigm followed not only by Marxists but by students of classical
culture, archeologists, anthropologists, historians of antiquity,
Nordic racists, German nationalists, and so on.
Utterances of certain Israeli
leftists demonstrate that the values of reason, progress, and
science – at least as abstractions – continue to be revered by the
Israeli left, who believe Judaism and religious Jews are defective
in these areas.
The Israeli left perpetrated the
disastrous Oslo accords on the people, demonstrating that the left
is far from rational or scientific itself. It made these accords
paying no heed to Clausewitz’ teachings about war and diplomacy,
while it refused and refuses to realize that Israel’s Arab-Muslim
adversaries have their own unique culture and character which must
be understood. Likewise the West – which often reproaches Israel for
alleged moral breaches, while overlooking Arab and Muslim crimes –
must be understood.
back to top
The Security and
Defense Policy of the EU –
A Foundation
of Rhetorical Inertia
Shlomo
Perla
Ever since the early 1990s, the
European Union, which was established and has developed as a joint
economic framework, has attempted to develop a mechanism of joint
security activity as part of a broader framework of CFSP – Common
Foreign and Security Policy. This is an integral component of the
European Union Charter (the Maastricht Charter) that was formally
signed in February 1992 and went into effect in November 1993.
The objective of the Common Foreign
and Security Policy is the creation of a unified European voice on
important international issues, with the declared assumption that
Europe cannot function as a giant economic bloc in the world arena
if it does not function as a political monolith. The point of the
Common Foreign and Security Policy is that Europe cannot guarantee
its international status as a political player without the support
of joint military capability that will enable it to intervene in
crisis regions, as a unified body, to guarantee stability in its
periphery and to implement humanitarian aid programs.
The crises in the Balkans during the
nineties proved that in order to achieve that level of intervention
in crisis regions, the members of the European Union must achieve a
high level of political coordination and to radically improve their
military capability. That would enable them to act as a united
factor even outside the framework of NATO, that is, when the United
States is not interested in intervening in a specific crisis. The
tendency to create joint European military capabilities also
expressed European independence from the American hegemony extant
during the Cold War.
This article seeks to point out that
despite the rhetoric of its leaders, the countries which make up the
European Union have not achieved significant consolidation of their
foreign and security policy, even on a theoretical level. At the
same time, the integrative dynamic creates appropriate rhetoric,
just like the establishment of institutions that create the illusion
of consolidation of a common foreign and security policy. This
illusion in and of itself is important for the continued existence
of the European Union.
The article focuses on the political
aspects and does not deal with military capabilities, which
themselves are insufficient to facilitate Europe assuming the role
of a military superpower with global pretensions.
Five years of activity to consolidate
a unified security framework in Europe, from the Saint-Malo
Agreement (1998) until the convening of the Inter-Governmental
Conference for the drafting of the European Constitution (2003), did
not bring about any significant change that could indicate an
erosion of the level of sovereignty of the European Union member
nations in favor of pan-European sovereignty in that area.
The process of European integration
since the early fifties is characterized by fierce rhetorical
inertia and in the creation of institutions and apparatuses that
were supposed to assume pan-European roles. This process is
self-sustaining; however it is shaped by developments in the
international community and by internal political and economic
interests as well as by separate social and national traditions.
Manifestations of this development led to the situation that in
those areas where the European partnership provides added value to a
separate state-society, as in different matters in the realm of
economics and finance, the unification process is indeed successful
in transferring authority from national institutions to pan-European
institutions. This is not the case in areas reflecting symbols of
sovereignty perceived as more significant from a national-emotional
perspective and constitute a guarantee of national existence and of
separate national establishments. It is easier to formulate a
strategic position than to establish an autonomous, pan-European
military headquarters. This is true not only because of United
States opposition on this matter, but also because of the stated and
unstated apprehension of several member nations - especially the new
members - regarding German and French domination of the pan-European
military system, if it in fact is established.
The primary problem in the
establishment of a European defense framework is, of course, the
lack of uniformity in matters of foreign and security issues. The
instance of Iraq proved this. Fifteen-nation Europe does not have a
single voice on international issues. Twenty-five to thirty-nation
Europe will be exposed as even less in harmony. Not only does the
unilateral United States policy cause differences of opinion among
the European nations, but also additional issues that will place
significant geopolitical challenges before Europe. In Russia, for
example, the trend, which sharply disagrees with Eastern Europe’s
integration into Europe, is on the rise. This will cause additional
disharmony among the members of the Union on the issue of relations
with Russia.
Is the
conclusion that the European countries should halt the trend towards
integration in the area of security and defense? The answer is
absolutely not. Even a rhetorical dynamic is important in
international relations as it can influence the maintenance of the
status-quo, or its modification. In this case, it is better for
Europe to maintain the status-quo of production of programs and
establishment of institutions, as the lack of this process is liable
to lead them down the slippery slope of disintegration to the point
of undermining the basis for unity and to transform it into a focal
point of international tension.
back to top
Germany –
Good Old Anti-Semitism
William
E. Grim
More than 60 years have passed since Nazi
Germany was defeated in World War II and anti-Semitism ceased to be
its official policy. Nevertheless, anti-Semitism was not eradicated.
It is alive and kicking beneath the surface and is prevalent among
all strata of society and all ages. Anti-Semitism ostensibly reveals
itself in the “small things”, however the cumulative effect is evil
and bodes ill. The author of the article, an American of German
descent, in his contacts with different groups in supposedly
democratic, enlightened German society, was exposed to
manifestations of clear anti-Semitism typical of German society such
as expressions of hostility towards Jews, adherence to the Jewish
stereotype of “controlling the American media”, driven by greed,
Israel as a Jewish state worse than the Nazis, etc. The conclusion
drawn by the author is that anti-Semitism has been part of the
fabric of German life and culture for hundreds of years, and that
Germans are “instinctively” anti-Semitic. Furthermore, a strong
European Union led by anti-Semitic Germany, judenrein and
supporting the Arabs, is the greatest threat to Jewish existence as
well as to the United States. The author calls upon the United
States to prevent Germany form completing what it began during the
Nazi era.
back to top
Sixty
Years Since the Bombing of the King David Hotel
and a Reassessment of the Propaganda and the Counter-Propaganda
Shaul
Avishai
In Palestine, the “Etzel”
(National Military Organization) attacked approximately 20 British
targets between February 1, 1944 and November 1, 1945, issued
approximately 40 proclamations and operated an underground radio
station.
In the British elections, the Labor
Party declared that if they were to win they would revoke the White
Paper, will allow the surviving European Jews to immigrate to
Palestine and to establish a national home for the Jews. In the
summer of 1945 the Labor Government won the elections and formed the
government, which declared that there would be no changes in its
policy as far as Palestine is concerned.
Moshe Sneh, head of the Haganah
National Staff, sent a telegram to David Ben-Gurion in London on
September 23, 1945 and recommended to clash with the British.
Ben-Gurion supported unification of the combat forces. In late
October 1945, the agreement on the establishment of a unified force
was officially signed. On November 1, 1945 the Haganah, the
Irgun and the Stern Gang established a joint administration
of the Hebrew rebellion movement.
On Saturday, June 29, 1946, the
British raided the institutions of the Jewish Yishuv and the
Hebrew cities in the framework of Operation Broadside. The leaders
of the Yishuv were dragged in disgrace from their homes. On
July 1, 1946, Moshe Sneh sent a written order to the Irgun to
carry out the operation against the King David Hotel as soon as
possible. On July 22, 1946, the Irgun attacked the British
government centers. Conspicuous warning signs were posted and three
warnings calling for an immediate evacuation were delivered. The
British paid no heed to the warnings and 91 men and women were
killed.
Yisrael Galili asked Menachem Begin
to assume exclusive responsibility for the attack. The Irgun’s
willingness to do so was exploited by the Jewish Agency and the
Haganah to unleash a harsh attack on them. The media
confrontationally attacked with the Haaretz newspaper was at
the head of those leading the condemnation.
The attack received great resonance
in the world press, with the exception of the British press, where
the criticism was relatively benign. The American radio stations
broadcast the two Irgun announcements regarding the early
warnings.
The
Irgun was discomfited by the severe attack and the harsh
condemnations of the press and the Yishuv institutions, which
inflated the magnitude of the casualties. The polemic continued for
a long time. The Irgun acted with restraint. It did not react
harshly, did not mention the disasters that the Haganah
brought upon the Yishuv and the deaths of hundreds of Jews.
back to top
Modification of Definitions
–
The First Step toward a New Reality in Israel
Nissim
Amzaleg
Zionist ideology has two primary
motives. The first motive, which began with the “Hovevei Zion”
movement, is the renaissance of the Hebrew nation in its historic
land. The second motive, that of Herzl and his supporters, is the
search for a solution to the problem of anti-Semitism by means of
the establishment of a country of refuge for the endangered Jews.
These two motives are so different one from the other that they gave
birth to conflicting political objectives. This article is designed
to show how the influence of inconsistency on all of the political
movements in Israel, from left to right, is the result of attempts
to synthesize these contradictory tendencies into a single ideology.
This logical failure is considered
the primary source of the ineffectiveness of Israeli policy over the
course of the last 60 years. The creation of the State of Israel did
not resolve the problem of anti-Semitism. This enables the
elimination of the Herzlian component in order to resolve the
internal contradiction in Zionism. Only in that way will Zionism
succeed in restoring its original purpose (a liberation movement of
the Hebrew nation in its land).
This
new perspective immediately led to significant geopolitical changes.
For example, it is now possible to confirm that most of the Arabic
speakers in Israel actually belong to the ancient Jewish people.
Zionism rejected this evidence as according to Herzl’s agenda, it
was an ideology limited to the Hebrews of the Jewish religion.
Zionism, from this new perspective, must assist both the Jewish
segment scattered in the Diaspora to return to Israel and the
segment permanently residing in Israel to return to its original
identity. This perception comes in place of the civil war
(mistakenly called the Israeli-Palestinian conflict) by means of a
struggle between partisans of the renaissance of the Hebrew nation
and those taking action to complete its dismantling, in the wake of
the Arab-Islamic conquest.
back to top
|