After the 1948 Israeli War of Independence, the
world looked at the Arab-Israel conflict through the prism of the
David versus Goliath paradigm, Israel as David and the Arabs as
Goliath. Since the Six Day War the world has continued to regard the
conflict through the prism of the David versus Goliath paradigm, but
has reversed the roles. This paper argues that viewing the
Israeli-Arab conflict through this paradigm obscures the facts,
distorts the true picture and leads to faulty conclusions.
For decades, Israeli leadership was convinced
that Israeli Arabs had undergone an Israelization process,
characterized by intensified involvement with the State of Israel and
a diminishing Palestinian identity. Reality has upset their whole
frame of reference. A survey conducted in the year 2000 demonstrated
the steep decline in the identification with Israel, plummeting from
38.4% in 1996 to 11% while identification as Palestinians soared to
74% from 46.4%. In tandem with this process, the demarcation between
realization of civil rights for Arabs within Israel and the national
struggle of the Palestinians in the territories has gradually blurred.
The ultimate result has been the adoption of an agenda that is
incompatible with Israeli citizenship but congruent with the
Palestinian Authority’s political and territorial goals. This agenda
is reflected in the following processes, where each one and all
together imperil the continued existence of the State of Israel as a
Jewish-Zionist state:
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The accelerated growth of Islamic
fundamentalism in general and in Israel in particular
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The Palestinization of Israeli-Arabs’ civic
identity and the Arabization of their political identity
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Demographic trends that indicate a growing
preponderance of Palestinians between the Mediterranean Sea and the
Jordan River, driving Palestinian territorial expansion and
contiguity
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The concerted efforts of Israeli-Arab
leadership to abolish the Jewish-Zionist character of Israel
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The unequivocal demand to be recognized as a
national minority with national rights, such as cultural and
institutional autonomy
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The unqualified support Israeli Arabs, citizens
of the State of Israel, grant the Palestinian Authority and its
territorial goals, irrespective of the jeopardy to the existence of
Israel.
Islamic fundamentalism regards the very existence
of Israel within the Islamic world, as an existential battle between
Islam and Judaism. This problem has been compounded in modern times by
the investment of holiness to Palestine and to Jerusalem. Within this
worldview there is no room for accommodation; therefore, territorial
concessions, regardless of their generosity, do not have the capacity
to resolve this conflict.
In the 1990s the predominant political trend
within the Arab community was to establish “pure” Arab political
parties that propound the establishment of a Palestinian state. To
this effect, Israeli Arabs formulated the ideology of “two nations two
states”. Their attitude to the State of Israel resonates in the
statement made by MK Ahmed Tibi: “I believe that the Palestinian
people have to struggle against the occupation and it is the
obligation of each Israeli Arab to say "yes’ to the Palestinian
struggle.”
Another linchpin in their policy is the
transformation of Israel into a “state of all its citizens” and the
granting of autonomy to Israeli Arabs. These demands create a zero sum
game, whereby Israel recognizes Palestinians as a national entity with
the right to self-determination in a Palestinian state and autonomy in
Israel, while Jews, who do not constitute a nation, have no national
rights, including the right for self-determination in a Jewish state.
Capitulation would disenfranchise Jews and precipitate a train of
events that could lead to the fragmentation of Israel, sow the seeds
of a bi-national state and encourage irredentist aspirations.
The accelerated growth of the Palestinian
population constitutes both a demographic and a geographic threat. The
implementation of the “right of return” will further exacerbate the
situation, as repatriation of millions of refugees will
demographically overwhelm Israel. This demographic dimension
translates into widespread non-Jewish territorial expansion and the
creation of Palestinian trans-border territorial contiguity, giving
momentum to the demand for autonomy, initially cultural and
institutional, and ultimately territorial and national.
Although one of the primary socio-economic
disparities does indeed exist between Jews and Arabs, neither poverty
nor inequality is exclusive to Arabs. Inequality and polarization are
endemic to Israeli society at large, the rich-poor gap growing from
year to year. The great divide is not Jew-Arab but rather ethnic and
geographical. Nonetheless, Israeli governments have expended
substantial efforts in the past years to bridge the gaps between the
Jewish and Arab sectors, increasing budget allocations in all spheres.
The
al-Aqsa Intifada within the “Green Line” has forced the
Jewish citizens of Israel to make a reevaluation of the future of
their relationship with the Arabs. They have begun to realize that the
Israel-Arab conflict transcends territorial and equalization issues,
but rather relates to the core existence of the State of Israel as a
Jewish, Zionist, Western and modern state in the heart of the Arab
world.
