The Mediterranean Sea always was a
central field of the Israeli-Arab battle. As a
geographically-diplomatically isolated country, Israel does not have any
means but the sea for maintaining vital contacts with its allies. It was
through the sea, that the Hebrew community in pre-independent Israel was
able to bring two main and extremely needed resources: people and arms.
This urgent need to use the sea as
a central line for supplies to Israel in turbulent times, came up again
25 years later, during the Yom Kippur war, when members of the IDF,
severely at risk, received arms and equipment from the US.
The above mentioned must be
considered along side the well-known fact that Arab armies prepare
themselves for future war by studying deeply Israel’s advantages and
examining methods to overcome them – and thus, leave the Israeli side
surprised and unprepared.
In addition, the non-conventional
threat from Iran, far away from Israeli borders and on the edge of
Israeli fighter aircraft’s range leads to a conclusion, that Israel must
increase its ability to act also in places outside the normal range of
its ships and fighters.
The most simple solution might be
that Israel will have one or even two small aircraft carriers, less then
20,000 tons each – in order to sail its strike power to areas that are
outside its normal range. It is not always possible to bring the enemy
to the right corner, where your full advantage is clear. In this case,
you have to do the opposite: to bring the right corner to the enemy. The
aircraft carriers will also be able to react, in the first few hours of
the war, when Israel’s land air bases and reserve forces will be heavily
attacked by the enemy – missiles and fighter-bombers from the ships will
be the initial reaction of the IDF.
This
reform in the Israeli seaborne capacity – will turn the sea forces from
a small force into a real navy.