Immanuel Kant wrote his Perpetual Peace
in 1797, claiming that a democracy is less prone to go to war since its
voters are the ones to bear the brunt of the fighting and the costs of
damages.
Kant claims that, for dictators, going to
war is a relatively simple decision. He has been proven right over the
last 200 years. Democratic Israel versus Arab tyrannies is a major Middle
East asymmetry, as are the resulting aims, secure growth for one, Israel's
demise for the other.
Other asymmetries include the ratios of
500:1 geographical area, 80:1 population, 22:1 UN votes, 60% of world oil
production (by volume) to none, 4.19:1 tanks, 6.45:1 combat aircraft. All
these favor the Arab dictatorships.
Weapons technology has undergone nothing
short of a revolution since 1967 and the lessons of war have taught that
Israeli deterrence has not always been adequate. The Iraqi "trickling" of
ballistic missiles on Israel (39 missiles in 14 days) during the Gulf War
has taught a major lesson: missile attacks on urban areas, even with
conventional warheads, can disrupt and badly delay Israeli mobilization of
its reserves and its main forces, creating a situation on the front line
akin to that of the Yom Kippur of 1973.
In spite of the demise of the Soviet Union
and the peace agreements signed with Egypt and Jordan, the geopolitical
situation has not changed realistically for the better since 1967.
Considering all these said changes,
Israel, if attacked, is not capable of defending itself any more within
its 1967 borders. The protection of the high ground, all of it situated
beyond the "green line" (pre-1967 demarcation), becomes a vital condition
for Israel's survival, the Golan Heights being more important than all
other high ground.
The advocates of "instant peace", prodded
with a heavy hand by the US administration, claim that Israel may withdraw
from the Golan – this, against all its own advice, that of the Pentagon,
Russian, and others’ military "if peace is agreed upon", provided the
Golan and parts of Syria will be demilitarized under UN/US "observers" and
with US guarantees and the Israeli defense bolstered to the tune of some
US $20 billion.
The requirement to "have a strong force to
protect the peace" as the US and Israeli governments demand, is proof that
the peace anticipated will be a "peace of no war", or a cold war, US-USSR
or Israel-Egypt style, meaning that the lowering of Israel's level of
deterrence increases the probability of war.
Handing the Golan to Syria is equivalent
to a catastrophic lowering of Israeli deterrence, broadly characterized by
loss of control of 35% of Israel's water, an unbearable defense burden
that will reflect on Israel's economy and worse, the cracking of the
claims of Zionist legitimacy and weakening of Israel’s national and moral
fiber. The "window of opportunity", on which President Clinton insists,
is "unique" (for the last ten years) and has no glass pane anyway – it is
a virtual window.
There are simply not enough safety margins
in an Israeli-Syrian "peace" agreement because demilitarization, third
party guarantees, and the rest, have always proven to be valid only when
both parties desire them to be so, (for example US guarantees and UN
troops in Sinai, 1967).
Signing a peace treaty is no guarantee of
peace, as, for instance, shown by the case of the Iraqi-Iranian War that
erupted in 1980 after a five year negotiated peace was signed in 1978
(among a number of such examples).
Technology is not a substitute for the
Golan, as declared by General Amnon Lipkin-Shahak on December 10, 1995, an
opinion shared by this writer, who has been involved most of his life in
weaponry.
"We are strong enough to afford
withdrawal," claim some. But we are not strong if we lose the high ground
of the Golan, which represents the "terrain" asset of the "firepower",
"mobility" and "terrain" triad of which military strength is composed.
Finally, there are the advocates of
nuclear deterrence, assuming Israel has this "in the closet".
Israel may be destroyed completely by 2-4
nuclear charges due to its minute size. For the same reason, given
present satellite surveillance, it cannot house a secure second strike
capability which has to have a ratio of about 50:1 in Israel's favor.
Deploying nuclear deterrence means the legitimization of the Middle East
going nuclear, a sphere in which Israel is at its weakest. Nuclear
deterrence may also be weakened by international pressures.
The conclusion is that Israel cannot
succumb to the "instant peace syndrome" even if a friendly US president
insists upon it. This is especially the case when Assad may not be in
power for long.
As Motta Gur, former Chief of the General
Staff and Labor Party Minister, said in his book Chief of General Staff,
(Ministry of Defense Publishers, 1998): "Israel cannot defend its Eastern
flank without the Golan Heights and it cannot defend the Golan Heights
without the line of ridges it presently holds."
As Joseph
Sisco said at the time: "The (large) areas Israel vacated in 1974 are
withdrawal according to 242 and the line retained represents 'secure
borders' according to the same 242 (UN resolution)." The writer witnessed
the delivery of this statement.