A New and More Dangerous Era
Anthony J. Dennis
This article is an excerpt
from
the book,
Muhammad’s Monsters, David Bukay (ed.),
AR: Balfour Books and
Israel: ACPR Publishers, 2004. |
In the 1990s, fundamentalist Islam began to emerge
as the only coherent ideology to pose a credible threat to the West. Islamic
fundamentalism is clearly a global phenomenon. Its adherents can be found in an
almost unbroken line from the Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines to the Armed Islamic
Group in North Africa. This article will discuss the resurgence of Islamic
fundamentalism in the post-Cold War era and will explain why this ideology
represents a threat to the safety and security of the West in particular, and
all non-Muslims generally, as demonstrated by the words and deeds of the
fundamentalists themselves. Recent attempts by President Khatami of Iran to
establish a more moderate and less confrontational brand of Islamic rule will
also be addressed. This article will conclude with several recommendations for
Western governments faced with the challenge of dealing with the Muslim
fundamentalists in the international political arena today.
To understand the extent of the threat posed by
Islamic fundamentalism to the non-Muslim world, it is important to understand
the impact the end of the Cold War has had on the political landscape, and to
carefully consider the political agenda and salient characteristics of the
transnational fundamentalist movement itself.
THE POST-COLD WAR: A MIXED LEGACY
The end of the Cold War left the world with a
more mixed legacy than is generally admitted. While the defeat of communism and
the peaceful annihilation of the Soviet Empire represented a tremendous moral as
well as political victory for the West, the collapse of the Soviet Union and its
satellite empire also meant the extinction of a tremendous restraining influence
on scores of ethnic and religious rivalries. One of the stabilizing facts of the
Cold War competition was that both East and West kept their client states in
check. While some rivalries were fueled during the Cold War, others clearly were
suppressed by it. With communism’s collapse, many nations forged in the crucible
of communism died with it. The people of the former Soviet Union and of
Yugoslavia, for example, have found that there is no longer anything that
commonly defines and therefore unites them. As a result, nations have fragmented
or have disappeared entirely with astonishing swiftness. Cut loose by the failed
ideology of communism, many have fallen back on their long suppressed religious
identity as a principle of political organization and as a means of
understanding themselves and their world. We should not be overly surprised to
see new countries and even new empires arise from the ashes of the old.1
One can say that the end of the Cold War
and the collapse of the Soviet Union have had at least three major effects.
These watershed events created 1) an ideological vacuum, 2) a power vacuum, and
3) the largest weapons bazaar and black market in world history. Islamic
fundamentalism as a political movement and as an ideology has benefited from
each of these effects.
Ideological Vacuum
The collapse of the Soviet empire discredited
communism as a viable ideology, especially in the eyes of developing nations. As
a consequence, communism is no longer viewed as worthy of emulation. Yet, while
communism was defeated, democratic ideals have not necessarily triumphed.
Democracy, like communism before it, is essentially a non-indigenous ideology
imported into Muslim territories only in the last one hundred years or so. By
contrast, the notion of governance according to traditional Islamic principles
is a familiar and appealing concept in these regions. Islam clearly has what one
might call the “home-field advantage”.
The post-Cold War ideological vacuum has been
filled by Islam as many leaders in the Muslim Middle East, North Africa and
Central Asia have fallen back on their “Muslim roots” for models of governance
and as a way to remain politically relevant in the eyes of their largely Muslim
populace. By the early 1990s, the language of socialism, with all its references
to the liberation of the masses, the exploitation of capitalists, and the
misdeeds of various imperialist powers, had become outdated. The language of
fundamentalist Islam, with its disturbingly violent references to jihad, its
moral and religious endorsement of terrorism against civilians, and its
glorification of martyrdom, had taken its place.
Power Vacuum
The political universe, like the natural one,
abhors a vacuum. At its height, the Cold War generally worked to suppress other
political ideologies and movements as both the Americans and the Soviets (and
their respective allies) committed tremendous resources to either democratic or
communist parties and leaders in Asia, Africa and the Middle East. Anyone not
aligned with one or the other political camp was, at best, unfunded and ignored
and, at worst, ruthlessly suppressed. Now that the superpowers have largely
withdrawn from many of these areas, Islamic fundamentalism has had a chance to
“break out” and evolve from being a relatively marginal political movement to a
mainstream movement.
The increased popularity of Islamic rule in the
post-Cold War era was eloquently demonstrated in Turkey, an economically
advanced and Westernized nation and a longtime member of NATO. In 1996, for the
first time in modern Turkish history, the Islamic party’s candidate for prime
minister won in a stunning electoral upset, beating out candidates from the two
mainstream parties, True Path and Motherland. The elevation of Necmettin Erbakan
to the office of prime minister that year demonstrates that parties calling for
a rejection of the West (including termination of military and diplomatic
alliances with Western nations) and a return to traditional Islamic rule have
substantial electoral clout, even in relatively wealthy and developed nations
like Turkey. These parties are serious contenders for political power and should
not be dismissed out of hand. Nor should their popularity be ascribed solely to
poor economic conditions. Those who assert that Islamic parties are popular
solely or principally because of poor economic conditions are able to make such
declarations only by studiously ignoring the facts.
Elsewhere in the world, the absence of Soviet authority in places like Central
Asia has given native leaders and local religious heads in these areas a golden
opportunity to politically organize. As predicted, we have seen parties calling
for Islamic forms of government rise to some prominence throughout the former
Soviet Central Asian Republics in the last ten years. The Islamic Renaissance
Party, for example, was active in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of
Soviet rule. In 1991, four of the former Soviet Asian Republics banned all
activities of this party out of concern over its growing strength.2
Where were the budding democratic parties at this time? They were,
comparatively speaking, non-existent.
Black Market Weaponry
On the military front, the disintegration of the
Soviet Empire and the concomitant loss of centralized control over its vast
military arsenal have given the fundamentalist Muslims unprecedented access to
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capable of making relatively small terrorist
groups or nations into world military powers literally overnight. In fact, there
have been a number of detailed reports concerning the ease with which
Soviet-made nuclear weaponry or other sophisticated military technology can be
smuggled out of the country and purchased in the black market.3
This is the world into which Osama bin Laden and others have stepped, with ready
cash in hand, and it is the reason why the fundamentalist movement represents
such a grave threat to world peace in the present age.
DEFINITION AND OVERVIEW OF POLITICAL AGENDA
Before proceeding any further, let me state here
as I have stated previously in other contexts that my remarks are limited to one
politically active and politically radical segment of the vast Muslim world, and
that I do not mean to suggest or imply that all 850 million to 1 billion of the
world’s Muslims are terrorists or necessarily supportive of terrorism of any
kind. In fact I consistently use the modifier “fundamentalist” in connection
with the term “Muslim” in order to make evident that I am referring specifically
to this radical segment. If Islam is an issue in the current political debate, it
is not because of anything I or others have written or said but because
fundamentalist governments (e.g., Iran, Sudan), political parties (e.g., Islamic
Salvation Front), terrorist groups (e.g., Hizbullah,
al-Qa`idah, Vanguards of
Conquest) and guerrilla organizations (e.g., Armed Islamic Group, Taliban) have
themselves made Islam a central issue by pointing to that ancient monotheistic
faith as the justification and inspiration for their violent words and deeds.
Unfortunately, these groups have essentially hijacked and appropriated the
language of Islam in explaining and justifying their actions and by purporting
to act for expressly religious reasons.
The term “Islamic fundamentalist” is not
a theological term but a politically descriptive one which describes persons or
parties that have a very specific and defined domestic and foreign policy
agenda. I tend to favor the foregoing term over the terms “Islamist” or
“political Islam”. “Islamist” is a colorless term that does not convey the
return to the early days of the Prophet’s rule and the fundamentals of the early
faith to which the modern day fundamentalists aspire. The term “political Islam”
strikes me as similarly unedifying and even redundant since Islam is, by
definition, a faith that has been intimately and inextricably involved in
politics from the very beginning.
Domestic Policy
The Muslim fundamentalists seek on the domestic
front the establishment of an Islamic theocracy or religious dictatorship
(including, if necessary, the violent overthrow of the existing government), the
adoption and strict application of the
shari`ah, Islam’s traditional legal
code, and the eradication and expulsion of all non-Muslim influences on their
society and way of life.
Foreign Policy
In terms of foreign policy, these groups adopt an
implacably hostile and adversarial posture toward the West, with talk of
military and terrorist strikes against it, the desirability of killing Western
citizens, and the necessity (indeed the religious duty) of undertaking a jihad
against America and other nations, including Israel. As incredible and
unrealistic as it sounds, the ultimate foreign policy objective of these groups
is the conversion or extermination of all non-Muslim peoples including those
living in Europe and North America. Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman, the Egyptian cleric
who was later convicted of involvement in the World Trade Center bombing in New
York City, was quoted on the front page of The Wall Street Journal one
month before that bombing as saying that his goal was to “show all Americans
that they’ll never be happy if they don’t follow Islam.”4
The Islamic Republic of Iran, in fact, has a clause in its
constitution calling for spreading the Islamic revolution to other lands.5
Both Iran and Sudan have found that preaching
jihad against America is a useful centerpiece around which to organize
their foreign policy, and in Sudan’s case – even their military and local
militia.6
Iranian government officials have been quite honest about their rhetorical and
literal war against America. In 1991, Ali Akbar Mohtashemi openly admitted that
“[i]t is necessary to target all US objectives throughout the world,” and stated
that “Iranians are ready for sacrifice and Holy War.”7
Needless to say, normal diplomatic relations with such governments or groups in
the face of these homicidal intentions are highly problematic at best.
Fundamentalist groups can be
Shi`ites like the
Islamic Republic of Iran or Sunnis like the regime in Sudan or the Taliban in
Afghanistan. It should be noted that religious differences have not prevented
Shi`a and Sunni groups or regimes, including Iran and Sudan, from working
together against a common perceived enemy and do not present an insurmountable
hurdle to transnational cooperation.8
PROGRAM OF CULTURAL DESTRUCTION
In addition to instituting strict Islamic rule
inside their own countries, fundamentalists from several different areas of the
Muslim world also have advocated a program of cultural destruction which ought
to be roundly condemned by Muslim and non-Muslim alike. In Turkey, the Islamic
party, known formerly as the Refah (Welfare) Party and more recently as the
Islamic Virtue Party, advocated banning ballet as a degenerate art form and the
closing of women’s shelters. The party has also advocated the destruction of
those historical monuments and archeological sites within Turkey that do not
glorify the nation’s Muslim past. At one point, the fundamentalist mayor of
Istanbul even called for the destruction of the magnificent and historic
Byzantine-era walls around the city. It was only after the threat of an
international outcry and expected pressure from Turkey’s secular national
government that this program of cultural destruction was at least temporarily
abandoned. Nothing in the Qur`an would appear to authorize, let alone compel,
this kind of cultural vandalism yet these disturbing initiatives appear to be
part and parcel of the fundamentalists’ domestic program.
Farther east in Afghanistan, the
Taliban engaged
in the most infamous act of cultural vandalism in recent times when, in March,
2001, it ordered and swiftly carried out the destruction of thousands of
irreplaceable, ancient Buddhist statues that resided in the Kabul Museum and the
dynamiting of the two largest, stone-carved Buddhas in the world at Bamiyan. The
Taliban claim they were compelled in the name of Islam to engage in this morally
bankrupt action. Having destroyed an irreplaceable part of our world heritage,
the Taliban has now proceeded to require Afghan citizens who happen to be Hindu
to wear a special identifying yellow badge on the outside of their clothing
reminiscent of the yellow Star of David which Jewish citizens were required to
wear in Nazi Germany. With each passing year, it seems the political agenda of
the Muslim fundamentalist movement becomes more morally and ethically
disturbing.
SALIENT CHARACTERISTICS: HATRED OF THE WEST
Although I find the human rights abuses and the
persecution of religious minorities (both of which lie outside the scope of this
essay) extremely troubling from a moral as well as an international human rights
law perspective, it is the fundamentalists’ implacably hostile foreign policy
and highly emotional rhetoric demonizing America and other Western nations which
is of most concern to me because of the implications for future acts of
terrorism against the West and because of the national security implications
generally. We all know and have heard the slogans uttered by the highest levels
of successive Iranian governments over the last twenty-two years which
characterize America as “the Great Satan”. This has been followed by chants of
“Death to America!” in officially organized street demonstrations in Teheran.
Sadly, this kind of rhetoric is common in fundamentalist circles and represents
yet another barrier to productive communication between the Muslim and
non-Muslim worlds.
A few more examples, out of many that could be
recited, should suffice: In 1993 Sheikh al-Tamimi, then the leader of Islamic
Jihad, was publicly quoted as saying, “I pray that Allah may tear apart
America just as the Soviet Union was torn apart.”9
For his part, Sheikh Abdel-Rahman made many tapes for his followers
in which he called the US a “den of evil and fornication”.10
More recently Osama bin Laden called the US “the head of the
snake”. Besides the bombings of the US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya on August
7, 1998 which left 257 dead, Osama bin Laden is perhaps best known in the West
for his February 23, 1998 fatwa or religious decree calling for Muslims
worldwide to kill Americans and their allies – civilians and military – wherever
and whenever they can find them. “This is an individual duty for every Muslim”
and “is in accordance with the words of Almighty God,” stated bin Laden as part
of his decree.
Even the Palestinian Authority has gotten into
the act. On July 22, 1997 The Wall Street Journal carried an excerpt of a
July 11th sermon of Palestinian Authority Mufti Ikrama Sabri (an
Arafat appointee, noted the Journal) at the al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.
Sabri publicly prayed in part: “Oh Allah, destroy America, for she is ruled by
Zionist Jews…Allah will paint the White House black!”11
At the time Arafat’s appointee was publicly praying for the literal destruction
of the United States and its historic symbol, the White House, American
taxpayers were providing Arafat’s organization with millions of dollars in aid
as part of the Clinton Administration’s efforts to buy peace in the Middle East.
REASONS FOR FUNDAMENTALIST FURY
There are several reasons for the Muslim
fundamentalist world’s hatred of the West. First of all, as a puritanical
movement aspiring to return Islamic society to the early days of the faith,
Islamic fundamentalism by definition is hostile to any outside influence that
makes the achievement of that objective harder to attain. The world has become
smaller with the advent of the Internet and the World Wide Web, the
globalization of trade and the ease with which non-Western populations are able
to access Western music, movies, theater, literature, television shows and so
forth. These developments are taken as a serious cultural threat by
fundamentalist leaders who have called the Western cultural onslaught
“Westoxification”. Hence, we see vigorous efforts in many traditional Islamic
countries to confiscate and destroy satellite dishes and radios as a way to
prevent ordinary Muslim citizens from being exposed to Western culture and the
free expression of ideas.
Hatred of the West also springs from feelings of jealousy, resentment and
insecurity, and an inclination at times to blame others for one’s own problems.12 If the
fundamentalists are living and governing according to God’s law as they believe,
then why, might they ask, is their civilization less advanced, their military
less powerful, their people less healthy and less wealthy than the infidels
living in the West? This is a source of great consternation and embarrassment to
the fundamentalists. The fundamentalists view themselves as the heirs of the
ancient Arabic Empire founded by the Prophet, and they are acutely conscious of
their failure to live up to that grand inheritance. They are also painfully
aware of the fact that the material, scientific, political, military and
technological achievements of Western civilization dwarf the achievements of
their own Islamic civilization in the modern age. Instead of blaming themselves,
at some level they blame America and the West for reminding them of their own
failings. The unqualified triumph of the West in defeating the Soviet Union in a
virtually bloodless fight only adds to the pressure the fundamentalists feel
either to define an alternative Islamic world order or be forced to fall in line
with Western values and political and economic ideals.
Fundamentalists, of course, take their hatreds
and insecurities to extreme and unprecedented levels. They want to do more than
simply expunge Western influences from their own societies and define their own
alternative Islamic political order. These groups and governments have declared
a rhetorical as well as a literal war on America and its allies. As L. Paul
Bremer, former head of the United States State Department’s Office of
Counterterrorism, has stated:
The agenda of these people [Muslim fundamentalists]
is to attack us for what we are... They don’t like American culture, our movies,
pornography, women, etc. It’s something very hard for Americans who live in a
multi-cultured and secular society to understand.13
Unlike the IRA or the Basque separatists, the
Muslim fundamentalists aren’t seeking merely the transfer of territory or the
release of political prisoners. Nor is it America’s longstanding record of
friendly relations with Israel which alone make it a prime fundamentalist
target. The stark and simple fact is the fundamentalists hate Americans (and
other Westerners) for who we are and therefore, there is nothing we can do, no
cognizable demands we could ever satisfy, short of stepping into a cultural gas
chamber that would ever satisfy the essential demands of the Muslim
fundamentalists.
THE KHATAMI PHENOMENON
President Mohammad Khatami of Iran deserves
mention for the novelty of his ideas and the courageousness with which he has
expressed them. He is that rare and endangered creature – a moderate politician
in a fundamentalist Muslim state. Khatami is important because if the “Khatami
revolution” sweeps away the unreconstructed aspects of the Iranian revolution
leaving Iran with a less confrontational, more moderate and participatory form
of Islamic-based government, then such an event will have removed one of the
biggest stars in the fundamentalist constellation.
In his writings and public pronouncements,
Mohammad Khatami has attempted to replace conflict between Islamic civilization
and the Judeo-Christian West with dialogue.14
Khatami uttered his now famous call for a “dialogue among civilizations” in an
hour-long interview on the Cable News Network (CNN) which was broadcast
worldwide on January 7, 1998. His statements stand in stark contrast both to the
statements of the transnational fundamentalist movement and to the remarks of
many of his colleagues in the Iranian government, including Iran’s Supreme
Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei who continues to adhere to a harsh, anti-American
and anti-Western line. The appearance of individuals like Mohammad Khatami is a
hopeful development because it provides an individual with whom it is
potentially possible to have a peaceful and productive dialogue and because it
breaks the monopoly the fundamentalists have held on much of the political
speech emanating from the Islamic world of late. If Khatami survives and
succeeds in his political quest, his presence will give powerful encouragement
to other moderate, democratic forces working from within the Muslim world to
combat the fundamentalists.
INSTITUTIONAL AND IDEOLOGICAL HURDLES TO REFORM
President Khatami faces both institutional and
ideological hurdles to the realization of his vision of a more moderate, less
confrontational Islam. He is like a man on a raft in the middle of a powerful
and turbulent fundamentalist sea. On the political front, the power of the
presidency in the Islamic Republic of Iran is overshadowed and circumscribed by
the office of the Supreme Leader and the Council of Guardians. The President is
not the most senior executive branch official in the Iranian government. As a
result, President Khatami does not control Iran’s foreign policy or its military
and intelligence branches. He has also been powerless to prevent his own
government’s zealous prosecution and imprisonment of many of his allies and
supporters. Scores of Khatami’s allies from the press, the universities and from
Iranian political circles have been sent off to prison for disagreeing publicly
with the fundamentalist line. Khatami’s lack of executive authority in Iran has
proven to be a great source of frustration for the President himself and for his
supporters.
These institutional limitations constitute
significant stumbling blocks on Iran’s path to reform. They may also discourage
other governments from initiating a dialogue or having relations with Iran out
of concern that the cordial words of Khatami by no means reflect the actual
attitudes and intentions of the Iranian government, which is controlled by
hardliners under Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei.
President Khatami’s political vision, a vision
which acknowledges and incorporates important aspects of Western political
thought, also faces significant ideological hurdles within the Muslim world.
These ideological hurdles represent additional friction points between the
Islamic and Western worlds. Islamic and Western conceptions of the state, the
individual and society, are often totally at odds. According to Western political
thought, governmental power arises from the governed. In contrast, in a
theocracy such as exists in Iran, governmental power is presumed to originate
directly from God. An Islamic ruler represents Allah’s agent on earth. In such a
setting, liberal democratic institutions – including a robust multi-party
system, free and fair elections and freedom of intellectual expression including
political expression – simply cannot work since all political disagreements are
ultimately religious disagreements, the penalties for which can be severe.
For a
Shi`a cleric living in the theocracy that is
Iran, Khatami has made some daring and highly unconventional statements:
The legitimacy of the government stems from the
people’s vote. And a powerful government, elected by the people, is
representative, participatory, and accountable. The Islamic government is the
servant of the people and not their master, and it is accountable to the nation
under all circumstances.15
Khatami’s views on government are plainly at odds
with those of his political opponents.
The
profound gulf between Islamic and Western conceptions of the state extends to
the individual and society. To the fundamentalists, there is “no doctrine of
human rights, the very notion of which might seem an impiety. Only God has
rights – human beings have duties.”16 The whole Lockean concept of natural rights – or the more modern concept
of universal human rights – that predate and are superior to the rights of any
government to take them away, finds no place in fundamentalist thought. In fact,
the fundamentalists view the West’s insistence on certain basic and universal
human rights as an arrogant attempt to place the rights and privileges of human
beings above God, and above God’s agents on earth (i.e. the government run by
the fundamentalists).
Islamic rule as practiced in fundamentalist
countries completely dominates both the individual and society. Islam in its
classic formulation recognizes no separation between the religious and secular
spheres. It represents a complete way of life for its followers regulating
virtually every aspect of individual and group behavior. This leaves very little
room to maneuver for reformers like Khatami.
Khatami’s attempts to institute civil society and
a fully functional democracy in the Islamic Republic of Iran encounter other
troubles as well. Democracy and the whole concept of “human rights” are viewed
by many as Western imports and as another legacy of colonialist rule. If the
Muslim world which Khatami inhabits has any hope of reconciling democracy with
religion, free speech with the authority of the religious establishment, and
human rights (including especially women’s rights) with the Qur`an, then ideally
he and his supporters must find indigenous sources for such ideals in order to
legitimize them in the eyes of the public and religious authorities alike.
Otherwise, his program may be attacked and contemptuously dismissed by his
fundamentalist opponents as “Western imports” whose adoption by the nation would
represent a capitulation to the West and a betrayal of the Islamic revolution.
In summary, Khatami treads a difficult path both practically and intellectually.
President Khatami and his supporters will have to work energetically to point
out how aspects of their progressive political program in fact have their
origins in the Qur`an and the Hadith (the Tradition).
We can wish Khatami well and do what we can, at
arm’s length and from across the waters, to encourage the growth and development
of politically moderate voices within the Islamic world. Western governments
cannot do much more than that since a close embrace of Khatami and his program
may give his hardline opponents an opportunity to criticize him as a puppet of
the West. In the meantime, we must still deal with the hostile intentions of the
fundamentalist government of Iran and the deadly threats uttered by
fundamentalist groups around the world against the US and other Western
countries.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Very briefly, several policy recommendations flow
from the above state of affairs.
-
Condemn Words and Deeds not Religious
Status: We should condemn words and deeds, not religious status. No one
should be condemned as a terrorist or supporter of terrorism merely because they
happen to be followers of Islam. The West must avoid falling into the trap of
condemning a particular religion. Rather, Western governments should condemn
those individuals and groups who interpret Islam in such a way as to justify
their violent actions.
-
Support Civil Society, Not Elections:
Western governments should not rigidly support calls for immediate elections in
certain Islamic countries today which would only serve to betray democratic
principles tomorrow. The West must not be beguiled by the fundamentalists in
places like Algeria into betraying its allies by blindly joining calls for
immediate elections. We should instead support and rally around the concept of
“civil society” which consists of those governmental and nongovernmental
institutions that are the prerequisite of a mature and fully functional
democracy. I am referring here to the ground rules of a democratic system such
as recognizing the rights of opposition parties, allowing political opposition
and dissent to exist without the threat of torture, imprisonment or death,
allowing a free press, free speech, the right to demonstrate peacefully, the
right of minority religions to co-exist with Islam without persecution or
harassment, the establishment of an independent judiciary and so on. The
institution of civil society ensures that a political culture will be in place
that guarantees the orderly transition of power between elected governments and
that future elections will in fact take place.
-
Deterrence is Dead: We must recognize
that the military doctrine of deterrence is dead. The cornerstone of America’s
and NATO’s Cold War defense strategy – the deterrence doctrine – is not going to
be sufficient in dealing with the transnational fundamentalist movement. How
does one deter a fundamentalist soldier, terrorist group or military detachment
that believes the surest and swiftest way to heaven is to commit a terrorist act
against a Western target and die in the course of that attack? You cannot
“deter” that person or party in the conventional sense. You can only neutralize
the threat.
Emphasis must be on thwarting such attacks,
whether through the use of counter-terrorism measures or the deployment of
missile defense systems to prevent a successful attack against America and its
allies. The positive aspect of missile defense systems is that they are not
offensive systems but defensive ones. They do not threaten particular
adversaries or single out any one particular threat. They protect against
all-comers, and there is very little danger that the Muslim fundamentalist
countries or others will feel “threatened” or “discriminated against” as a
result of the deployment of such defensive systems.
-
Money Does Not Always Talk: Money does
not solve all political or foreign policy problems. It would be condescending
and naïve to assume that the fundamentalists would give up their dearly held,
core beliefs in return for more economic aid. Such a clumsy attempt to “buy them
off” would likely be met with derision and contempt even as it was being
cynically accepted and exploited. Fundamentalists have had many chances over the
years to take the easier and more peaceful path. The luscious fruits of global
trade and world economic prosperity sit like a table filled with bounties before
them. Nonetheless, the fundamentalists have refused to holster their weapons,
remove their gas masks and sit down at the feast. Quite the contrary. They view
Western economic prosperity and the promise of easy living as the temptations of
the Devil. Theirs is a different mental sensibility entirely.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
The Western democracies won the Cold War
but they have not yet won the peace. While democracy and its economic corollary,
capitalism, triumphed over communism in the twentieth century, these ideals have
not yet won a definitive victory over Islamic fundamentalism which many around
the globe have seized upon as a rival ideology. A sizeable portion of the
world’s populace – stretching from Indonesia and the southern Philippines in the
Pacific through Central Asia to the Middle East and Africa – has shown a
willingness to embrace Islamic fundamentalism as a governing ideology. Given the
fundamentalist movement’s openly jihadist foreign policy toward the West, the
world has now embarked upon a new and more dangerous period in human history.
Endnotes
1 |
Anthony J. Dennis,
The
Rise of the Islamic Empire and the Threat to the West, Wyndham Hall
Press, 1996. |
2 |
Ibid., p. 68. |
3 |
“Russian Aide Says Gangsters
Try to Steal Atom Material”, The New York Times, May 26, 1994, p. A5;
“The Plutonium Racket”, The Economist, August 26, 1994, p. 39; Seymour M.
Hirsch, “The Wild East”, The Atlantic Monthly, June 1994, p. 61. |
4 |
“Egyptian Jihad Leader
Preaches Holy War to Brooklyn Muslims”, The Wall Street Journal, January
6, 1993, pp. A1, A5. |
5 |
“Constitution of the Islamic
Republic of Iran”, Middle East Journal, 1980, p. 185. |
6 |
“Jihad”,
The Economist,
42-43, August 7-13, 1993. |
7 |
Reuters, October 28, 1991. |
8 |
Op. cit., Dennis, pp. 61,
76; James A. Phillips, “The Saddamization of Iran”, Policy Review, Vol.
69, Summer 1994, p. 7. |
9 |
Reuters, March 11, 1993. |
10 |
“A World Terrorist Link?”,
The Hartford Courant, June 20, 1993, p. C1. |
11 |
See “Notable and Quotable”,
The Wall Street Journal, July 22, 1997, p. A14. |
12 |
Daniel Pipes,
The Hidden
Hand: Middle East Fears of Conspiracy, Palgrave, 1996. |
13 |
Wright, “New Breed of
Terrorist Worries US”, Los Angeles Times, June 28, 1993, p. A7. |
14 |
Mohammad Khatami, “Covenant
with the Nation”, First Presidential Inaugural Speech, in Islam, Liberty and
Development, Institute of Global Studies, Binghamton University, 1998, p.
150. “The government must emphasize that in our world, dialogue among
civilizations is an absolute imperative. We shall avoid any course of action
that may foster tension. We shall have relations with any state which respects
our independence.”; Mohammad Khatami, “Religious Belief in Today’s World”, Islam, Liberty and Development, p. 96 “[W]e must shun the extremes of hating
the West or being completely enchanted by it, so that on the one hand we can
guard against the dangers posed by the West, and on the other hand utilize its
human achievements.” Khatami’s most dearly held political beliefs mark him as
someone outside the fundamentalist camp. He treads a very thin and dangerous
line as the president of a staunchly fundamentalist government. |
15 |
Op. cit., Khatami, “Covenant
with the Nation”, p. 150. |
16 |
Bernard Lewis, “Islam and
Liberal Democracy”, The Atlantic Monthly, February 1993, p. 98.
|