

## Tocqueville and American Foreign Policy: Its Relevance to Israel

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One customarily refers all important questions concerning American politics and society to Alexis de Tocqueville. For only the obtuse regard *Democracy in America* as a mere historical document, a portrait of a simpler time and place. Americans recognize themselves in Tocqueville's Americans, despite the industrial revolution, high-tech, and the global village.

Indeed, "globalization" itself has come to refer not only to worldwide commerce, particularly the commerce in, allow us to say, "culture" – American movies, music, television productions – but also to the unsteady but persistent advance of social egalitarianism and democracy. Tocqueville saw the social decline of his own class, the titled aristocracy, and predicted that the decline would continue, with profound political consequences around the world. He also predicted that men would attempt to reconstitute aristocracy in new ways – in the form of industrial/business oligarchies, for example. He did not foresee the attempt to form elitest regimes via mass-based political parties, but that is how he might have analyzed both fascism and bolshevism (recall the "nomenclatura").

It follows that *Democracy in America* can also teach us much about Israel and about many Israelis. Even though Israel (as the first author has shown) is not a democracy from a structural or institutional perspective,<sup>1</sup> this does not diminish Tocqueville's potential relevance to this country because by democracy he does not mean a form of government so much as a way of life. In other words, Tocqueville is primarily concerned about the social characteristics of American democracy, which characteristics may also be found among many assimilated Israelis, who, like Americans and like most peoples throughout the world today, find themselves in fundamentally un-aristocratic, egalitarian social circumstances and share the *ethos*, the mental mindset, of their fellow moderns.

It is true that one does not usually refer questions of foreign policy to Tocqueville, but the effort, as we shall see, will yield remarkable insights. After all, can something as profound as social and political democratization *not* profoundly affect the conduct of foreign policy? Even the novel characteristics of contemporary geopolitics – weapons of mass destruction, suicide bombing as "asymmetrical warfare", the worldwide reach of the news media and political websites – all reaffirm Tocqueville's core insights with respect to the democratic character of the modern world. In this respect, widespread anti-Americanism touches all of us, for we are all "Americans" now.

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Tocqueville sees equality or "equality of conditions" as the "primary fact" in describing democratic America,<sup>2</sup> meaning by this that there are no rigid class distinctions: no one is bound by law or custom to the station of his birth, and all may ascend the social or economic ladder. America is the land of opportunity. This is what gives equality its power, its "charms", which are "every instant felt and are within the reach of all; the noblest hearts are not insensible to them (II, 101). So pervasive is the power of this equality that it affects the mentality of Americans, the educated no less than the uneducated. Tocqueville, then, regards democracy as invincible not because History makes it so, but because it appeals to human nature.

This appeal has a dangerous double edge, however. Insofar as equality means what America's Declaration of Independence means, that all men are created equal in the sense that each is equally endowed by his Creator with certain unalienable rights, then increased social and political equality might result in better security for those equal human rights. On the other hand, if clever and ruthless men of tyrannical temperament can find ways to turn social equality *against* political liberty, and therefore against equal

human rights, the very egalitarianism of modern life – its “massification” – will result in cruelties of a scope only dreamed of by the tyrants of antiquity. What is Nero compared to Stalin, Hitler, Mao? It may even be said that modern Israel was or *could* be founded only in reaction to just such a Holocaust.

### **Moral and Intellectual Effects of Egalitarianism**

With democratic egalitarianism come two principal characteristics – one moral, the other intellectual. Morally, egalitarianism emancipates the individual so that, thrust upon himself, he becomes animated not by class interests – class affiliation having lost its compelling character – so much as by self-interest. At the same time, however, his very independence renders him virtually powerless. Accordingly, he must combine with others, moderate his egoism, and learn the give-and-take of democratic life if he is to pursue his interests intelligently.

Democracy thus cultivates what Tocqueville calls, famously, “self-interest rightly understood”, a middling or mediocre virtue which, like the charms of equality, “lies within the reach of all capacities” (II, 131). Unlike virtue pursued spontaneously and for its own sake, self-interest rightly understood (or “enlightened self-interest”) consists of thinking that one serves one’s own material interests by practicing such modest virtues as self-restraint, honesty, and regularity. The pursuit of this kind of self-interest serves the community, if indirectly. And the community takes note of it: “Drive carefully; the life you save may be your own.” Indeed, as we shall see in a moment, self-preservation, along with comfort, is at the heart of American foreign policy.

Intellectually, democracy cultivates what Tocqueville calls the “philosophical method” of Cartesian skepticism, which moves the individual

To evade the bondage of system and habit, of family maxims, class opinions, and, in some degree, of national prejudices; to accept tradition only as a means of information, and existing facts only as a lesson to be used in doing otherwise and better; to seek the reason of things in oneself, and in oneself alone; to tend to results without being bound to means... (II, 3).<sup>3</sup>

Of these characteristics – and note how they describe contemporary pragmatism – Tocqueville points to one “which includes almost all the rest”, namely, “that in most of the operations of the mind [Tocqueville excluded religion] each American appeals only to the individual effort of his own understanding” (II, 3-4). “Think for yourself” is indeed an American imperative. It correlates with, and is essential to, the morality of restrained self-interest, for the pursuit of which democracy cultivates that “homely species of practical wisdom...that science of the petty occurrences of life which is called good sense” (II, 243). This, too, lies within the reach of all, of almost all capacities.

This morality has somewhat contradictory results. Tocqueville foresees that enlightened self-interest can yield “virtuous materialism”, the gratification of petty desires if not of extreme passions. Virtuous materialism “would not corrupt, but enervate, the soul and noiselessly unbend its springs of action” (II, 141). Tocqueville also sees that the democrat’s restrained selfishness coexists with compassion, as egalitarianism causes the extension of one’s sensibility to all men, who, by the grace of democracy, “think and feel in nearly the same manner” (II, 175). These tendencies toward selfish-but-restrained materialism and compassion persist in America today.

Intellectually, common sense combines with moral egalitarianism to produce superficiality. In day-to-day affairs, common sense is enough; we readily learn to be smart “consumers”. Because most of the people we meet resemble us, we habitually consult our own thoughts and feelings as reliable guides to those of

others. Transposed to the domain of foreign policy, common sense, suffused with moral egalitarianism, yields what is known as “mirror-imaging”. Disastrous consequences follow.

Consider Jimmy Carter, America’s peace-maker at-large for some two decades. For Mr. Carter – he never fails to surface, somewhere, on at least a semi-annual basis – good will and mutual understanding can resolve all international conflicts. Mr. Carter came into the White House in 1977 repeating the oft-heard anti-anticommunist refrain that the “Cold War” was over, a claim that eventually came true years later, though through efforts unrelated to the Carter administration. Exuding moral egalitarianism, he told the American people, most of whom disliked and distrusted the Soviets, that “in every person there is something fine and pure and noble”. “The great challenge we Americans confront is to demonstrate to the Soviet Union that our good will is as great as our strength, until, despite all obstacles, our two nations could achieve new attitudes and new trust.”<sup>4</sup> The first of these statements could have led to the comforting conclusion that the Soviets were at heart decent folk, like Americans in general; the second to the self-deprecating conclusion that they had as much reason to distrust Americans as Americans had to distrust them.

This democratic leveling of distinctions between an imperialist regime with global ambitions, one based on the primacy of force and fraud, and a regime inclined toward pacifism if only because it is based on the primacy of consent rather than conquest, makes it easier for the latter, especially when given to virtuous materialism, to pursue a policy of phased unilateral disarmament. This was the policy of the Carter administration.<sup>5</sup> (In Israel, the policy goes by the misnomer of “unilateral disengagement”, whose left-wing advocates – suffice to mention only Shimon Peres and Yossi Beilin – hobnob with Arab terrorists in the spirit of moral egalitarianism.) Carter hoped that such demonstrations of American good will (influenced by economic factors) would induce the Soviets to reciprocate. They didn’t. The bourgeois virtue of self-interest rightly understood was foreign to the communist mentality (just as Israel’s humanitarian gestures to the Palestinians remain foreign to the Arab mentality – indeed, incites their contempt.)

Meanwhile, let us recall that the Soviet Union, with less than half of America’s GNP, but animated by a different kind of materialism, continued to outspend the US on strategic and conventional arms, until the administration of Ronald Reagan. Reagan rejected moral egalitarianism and displayed his loathing of the Soviet Union by calling it the “Evil Empire”. By so doing he degraded that otherwise respected regime and signaled his intention to relegate the Soviet Union to the dust heap of history. He proceeded to bankrupt its communist economy by increasing American defense spending on the one hand, and by aiding the *mujahadeen* forces against the Soviets in Afghanistan on the other. Reagan’s foreign policy was a departure from the mirror-imaging attitude of the Carter administration. And his policy, unlike Carter’s, did work.

That attitude toward the Soviet Union did not begin with Mr. Carter, and did not end with Mr. Reagan. It may be traced back to 1946, to a most influential book sponsored by the Yale Institute of International Affairs under the title *The Absolute Weapon*. Written by academic strategic theorists, the book maintains that nuclear weapons have an “absolute” character in that there is no defense against their utterly destructive power. In nuclear war, we are given to believe, there can be no victor and no survivors. Hence war is no longer a “rational” policy. Moreover, in an era of the absolute weapon, military superiority ceases to be meaningful. All one needs is enough missiles to be able to threaten a potential aggressor with unacceptable retaliation.<sup>6</sup>

Thus was born the American doctrine of mutual – actually *minimum* – deterrence, or what has come to be known as Mutual Assured Destruction. This doctrine, it should be noted, was concocted without reference

to the character of the Soviet Union, then ruled by Stalin. It was merely assumed that Russian Communists would think and feel like American democrats about nuclear war. As one contributor put it: “Neither we nor the Russians can expect to feel even reasonably safe unless an atomic attack by one were certain to unleash a devastating attack on the other” (p. 135).

The conclusions of the Yale study eventually became official American policy. In 1965, when the United States had roughly four times as many ICBM launchers as the Soviet Union, it decided to stop their production and allow the Soviets to achieve parity so as to encourage them to engage in strategic arms limitations talks. The Soviets caught up in 1969, the talks began, and, three years later, SALT I was produced – by which time, however, the Soviets had 1,618 ICBM’s while the United States had 1,054. Henry Kissinger, the chief architect of SALT I, was merely translating into policy the mirror-imaging (and non-ideological) mentality of the authors of *The Absolute Weapon*. As he said at a news conference, “What in God’s name is strategic superiority? What do you do with it?” Or as he explained while still an academic: “The traditional mode of military analysis which saw in war a continuation of politics but with its own appropriate means is no longer applicable.”<sup>7</sup> Exit Clausewitz. But not from the Soviet Union, as may be seen in the November 1975 issue of *Communist of the Armed Forces*, the USSR’s foremost military journal:

The premise of Marxism-Leninism on war as a continuation of policy by military means remains true in an atmosphere of fundamental changes in military matters. The attempt of certain bourgeois ideologists to prove that nuclear missile weapons would lead war outside the framework of policy, and that nuclear war ceases to be an instrument of policy, and does not constitute its continuation is theoretically incorrect and politically reactionary... The description of the correlation between war and policy is fully valid for the use of weapons of mass destruction.

It would be remarkable indeed if nuclear-armed Islamic states were not cognizant of Soviet military doctrines. Like Soviet strategists, they do not mirror-image. And given their ethos of jihad they are all the less prone to consider nuclear war as “unthinkable” or “unwinnable”. Perhaps they are familiar with the words of Colonel A. Sidorenko, a leading Soviet theoretician: “Pre-emption in launching a nuclear strike is expected to be the decisive condition for the attainment of superiority over (the enemy) and the seizure and retention of the initiative.”<sup>8</sup> The Soviets regarded the doctrine of mutual deterrence as “bourgeois pacifism”, and there is no reason for Americans (or Israelis) to believe that Islamic mullahs have a kinder view of the peaceful professions of the Great Satan or of the Small Satan.

In fact, Israelis already know, perhaps better than any other people today other than the Iraqis, that *jihadis* do not “mirror-image” our rights-respecting moderns. The use of mass-murdering suicide bombers may be considered to have been pioneered on Israeli soil, against Israelis. *Jihadis* need no weapons of mass destruction to murder dozens of innocents at a throw. As 9/11 indicates, why should they stop at mere dozens?

Moral egalitarians given to mirror-imaging might be reminded that neither those who ruled the Soviet Gulag of yesterday, nor the Islamic rulers of today, have the same regard for human life as, for example, George F. Kennan, the scholar-diplomat whose influence on academic thinking and official attitudes toward the Soviet Union is second to none – Kennan, who could say that statements about communist brutality and aggressiveness “impute to Soviet leaders a total inhumanity not plausible in nature...”<sup>9</sup> (Might he not have said this of Saddam Hussein?)

In contrast to Patrick Henry’s famous (if now trite) statement, “Give me liberty or give me death, Kennan’s moral egalitarianism prompted him to say, “Rather red than dead”.<sup>10</sup> Tocqueville illuminates

Kennan's democratic yet servile mentality: "I think that democratic communities have a natural love for freedom; left to themselves, they will seek it, cherish it, and view any privation of it with regret. But for equality their passion is ardent, insatiable, invincible; they call for equality in freedom; and if they cannot obtain that, they still call for equality in slavery" (II, 102).

From the preceding it should be evident that the influence of egalitarianism on the intellect and feelings of Americans extends to "realists" and "moralists" alike. The absence of hierarchy in American society levels or simplifies the thinking of intellectuals as well as that of ordinary men. Certainly the formulation of foreign policy is made a lot easier if people on the "other side" think and feel as we do. In fact, however, to the extent that the ordinary American does concern himself with foreign affairs, he is more apt than many an intellectual to harbor doubts about "foreigners" and to be less favorably disposed to cutting the defense budget.<sup>11</sup> His common sense, though superficial, may impute to Communist (as well as Islamic) leaders the inhumanity denied by Kennan, the implacable hostility piously obscured by Carter, and the goal of world conquest ignored by Kissinger.

### **Common Sense Insufficient in Foreign Policy**

Nevertheless, common sense is not sufficient in the domain of foreign affairs, especially when rendered more superficial by another aspect of democracy revealed by Tocqueville.

Because Americans find themselves in an egalitarian but competitive society where everything is in motion, a society that assigns to no one a permanent place but instead requires each to be many things in many places in one lifetime, such persons develop broad but hurried minds, minds which care "more to know a great deal quickly than to know anything well". "The habit of inattention must be considered as the greatest defect of the democratic character" (II, 235). Tocqueville thus anticipates the familiar lament that Americans have short political memories, suggesting that they do not really pay attention in the first place. (In addition, they refuse to take unpleasant facts seriously – something that requires more than common sense – as this might entail burdens and sacrifices beyond the capacity of virtuous materialism. Common sense, which "suffice[s] to direct the ordinary course of society", does not always suffice to direct "relations with foreign nations." Says Tocqueville:

...a democracy can only with difficulty regulate the details of an important undertaking, persevere in a fixed design, and work out its execution in spite of serious obstacles. It cannot combine its measures with secrecy or await their consequences with patience (I, 243).<sup>12</sup>

Despite this homogenization of mankind throughout much of the world, foreigners remain foreigners – people not fathomable by simple introspection and common sense. Muslims do not think like Americans. Their monotheism does not incline them to respect human rights, to cherish peace, or be receptive to democratic freedom and equality – notwithstanding the effusive statements of President George W. Bush after 9/11.

Eleven days later, Mr. Bush addressed Muslims gathered in the Islamic Center of Washington, DC: "Both Americans and Muslim friends and citizens, tax-paying citizens, and Muslims in [other] nations were appalled and could not believe what we saw on our TV screens," Mr. Bush averred. "The face of terror is not the true faith of Islam," he continued. "That's not what Islam is all about. Islam is peace. These terrorists don't represent peace. They represent evil and war."<sup>13</sup>

In December of the following year, Mr. Bush praised Muslims for their "spirit of tolerance;"<sup>14</sup> a month earlier, he described Islam – "as practiced by the vast majority of Muslims", as "a religion that respects

others”.<sup>15</sup> In June of that year, he put such sentiments in the hopeful-conditional mood: “If liberty can blossom in the rocky soil of the West Bank and Gaza, it will inspire millions of men and women around the globe who are equally weary of poverty and oppression. I have a hope for the people of Muslim countries. Your commitment to morality, and learning, and tolerance led to great historical achievements... And even in the violence and turmoil of the Middle East, America believes that hopes have the power to transform lives and nations.”<sup>16</sup> “We do not fight Islam, we fight against evil.”<sup>17</sup> And finally, “The terrorists are traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself.”<sup>18</sup>

This is not the place to dispute Mr. Bush’s theological exegesis, but it should be noted that Rice University Professor David Cook (*Understanding Jihad*, 2005) makes a powerful case that jihad, defined as “warfare with spiritual significance”, is a quintessential principle of Islam, evident in the Koran and manifested in fourteen centuries of Islamic history.<sup>19</sup> Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a tradition that is more ideally suited to terrorism.<sup>20</sup> Not that the Koran is devoid of any sanction to peacableness. Moreover, there is something to be said for a statesman who seeks not to offend but to persuade a population of 1.3 billion Muslims that they are in their heart of hearts a peace-loving people who would rather not perpetrate mayhem against others or (perhaps most persuasively) amongst themselves. In other words, Mr. Bush is no Jimmy Carter.

But it is also sobering to consider that Mr. Bush’s liberal and generous interpretations of Islamic doctrine have met with less than universal acclamation among the populations to whom they have been addressed. Only in response to the most recently jihadist atrocities in London have we begun to hear Islamic voices forthrightly labeling such acts as being against Islam. And all too often such statements have ended with the usual boilerplate about Israeli “occupation” of “Palestinian land”, as if acknowledgment of the evil of terrorism somehow might be turned into a prelude to the perennial theme of “blame the Israelis”.

That is, Mr. Bush finds himself in what might be described as a rhetorical dilemma. Faced with an intractable enemy that he knows and identifies as intractable, he must attempt to isolate that enemy from what, he hopes, is the large mass of potential and in many cases actual Muslim sympathizers – all without offending the egalitarian sensibilities of his own mass audience, part of which consists precisely of Muslims.

Mr. Bush’s comments thus bring us to consider a fundamental problem of democratic statesmanship. In the modern world, while dealing with foreign countries, democratic politicians must also deal with three groups in their own country, aside from fellow-politicians and the general public: business men, who partake more of virtuous materialism than of compassion, intellectuals (academicians and bureaucrats) who aspire to partake more of compassion than of virtuous materialism, and soldiers, who are expected to partake of neither: all reflect the moral and intellectual habits Tocqueville describes.

## **The Businessman**

Taking the businessman first, in an interview given to *US News and World Report*, while Mr. Carter was in the White House, Mr. J. Paul Lyet, chairman of Sperry Rand Corporation, revealed the paraMarxist assumptions of American capitalists (assumptions underlying Shimon Peres’ *The New Middle East*):

I’m no politician. I’m just a businessman trying to make a living – so you may think this is self-serving – but I would think that trade builds bridges. When you think back to the situation in the “40s and 50s at the height of the cold war – well, it’s a lot better. I don’t subscribe to the Russian system. But eventually there is going to be a coming together – peaceful coexistence, if you want to call it that. I think the more their people see

our system and how it works, the more it's going to moderate their views. There just somehow seems to be more freedom in nations where economic freedom is stressed. I would like to assume that economic growth in the Soviet Union [or in the Muslim world of Shimon Peres] will lead – even if slowly – toward more freedom for the people of that country as well as a more accommodating attitude toward world peace.”<sup>21</sup>

As Mr. Lyet tried to make his living, limping along on his seven-figure salary, he rightly noticed that trade builds bridges; he might have added that it also built the trucks that the Soviets used whilst invading Afghanistan. Things were indeed a lot better off now than they were in the 40s and 50s – for Mr. Lyet, if not for our military planners, Americans generally, and the free world. And notice the prediction of increased if gradual, Soviet moderation, liberalization and peaceableness – precisely what the Bush administration is saying – perhaps even more accurately, hoping for – today about the Islamic world's tilting toward democracy. To his credit, Mr. Bush at least demonstrates that he knows that the advance of democracy needs a spearhead not an accounting ledger, but many of his critics in the business world, ever eager for oil profits, have preferred not to think that way.

We can't say Tocqueville doesn't warn us. He observes that the men who constitute America's so-called ruling class are, for the most part, the sons of wealthy men of poor or middle-class origins: “born, it is true, in a lofty position, but their parents were humble; they have grown up amid feelings and notions which they cannot afterwards easily get rid of...” (II, 258). These feelings and notions are commercial ones, and they remain so even if the manners of commerce are rejected for more elegant customs and more refined tastes.

Commerce is naturally averse to all the violent passions; it loves to temporize, takes delight in compromise, and studiously avoids irritation. It is patient, insinuating, flexible, and never has recourse to extreme measures until obliged by the most obvious necessity (II, 268).

Tocqueville is thinking about domestic revolution – the unlikelihood of it – but his suggestion applies to foreign policy as well. Tocqueville fears not revolution but stagnation in a democracy, the development of a people who “so entirely give way to a cowardly love of present enjoyment as to lose sight of the interests of their future selves and those of their descendants and prefer to glide along the easy current of life rather than to make, when it is necessary, a strong and sudden effort to a higher purpose” (II, 277). The average American, the average businessman, has yet to reach this state of moral torpor, but the tendency persists.

It is a tendency that brings with it, above all, the decline of honor (a decline conspicuous in Americanized Israel). Tocqueville contrasts the sense of honor cultivated among the feudal aristocracy with democratic honor. Aristocrats honor military courage, loyalty to one's leaders, the pride that finds satisfaction in vast enterprises, and a liberality based on magnanimity, greatness of soul. Democrats replace military courage with what can only be called commercial or economic courage: risking one's capital or the brave endurance of financial loss. They replace loyalty to leaders with patriotism and substitute for grand pride the smaller pride in lesser achievements. They base their liberality not on magnanimity but on compassion (at best) or expediency, and honor “all those quiet virtues that tend to give a regular movement to the community and to encourage business...” (II, 248).

“The American lauds as a noble and praiseworthy ambition what our own [i.e., European and aristocratic] forefathers in the Middle Ages stigmatized as severe cupidity, just as he treats as a stupid and barbarous frenzy that ardor of conquest and martial temper which bore them to battle” (ibid.). (If that American is a contemporary international businessman, he is less given to patriotism than to insisting that that he is just trying to make a living and that trade builds bridges.) His sense of honor gradually becomes more

obscure because the social distinctions between men which gave rise to aristocratic honor have faded – “ruling class” or no “ruling class”.

## **The Intellectual**

In and out of government, intellectuals present a different aspect of the same egalitarian phenomenon. Tocqueville correctly predicted that “If the entire existence of the [American] Union were perpetually threatened, if its chief interests were in daily connection with those of other powerful nations, the executive government would assume increased importance...” (I, 130). The Americans have indeed developed such an executive, aided by a pseudo-aristocracy that deals with foreign policy – one that, if nothing else, rarely stands accused of limiting itself to democratic common sense. Selected, not elected, it thrives in the university and the bureaucracy, protected by that quasi-aristocratic institution, tenure.

Like the corporate “oligarchs”, the foreign policy “aristocrats” have democratic tastes, regardless of the invincible snobbishness cultivated by some of them. Historically, they are heirs of Woodrow Wilson’s politics of compassion – Wilson, the eminent political scientist who imbued them with the ideal of “a government rooted ... in the pains and sufferings of mankind...a government which is not pitiful but full of human sympathy.”<sup>22</sup> The egalitarian compassion of these “aristocrats” assures them of their righteousness, which only reinforces their snobbery. Indeed, their snobbery owes much to the feeling that they are *plus populaire que la populace*, members of ever-progressing “History’s” enlightened and enlightening vanguard.

Once again, Tocqueville anticipates this sort of thing. In his time, American universities were church-affiliated, and seriously so. The intellectual class, if not entirely religious, was noticeably shaped by religion; even men like Jefferson retained many of the sturdier qualities that religion fosters: discipline, perseverance, wholehearted dedication to a cause. From Puritanism on, Americans had found in their religions means of both spiritual and temporal satisfaction. By “giving men a general habit of conducting themselves with a view to eternity, religions reveal “the great secret of success” in this world; they teach men not to “turn from day to day to chase some novel object or desire”, but to “have settled designs which they are never weary of pursuing” (II, 158). The social stability provided by the belief in eternity served as ballast for a ship that otherwise would have swayed uncontrollably in the unpredictable gusts of democratic opinion.

For “no sooner do [men] despair of living forever, than they are disposed to act as if they were to exist for a single day.”

In skeptical ages it is always to be feared...that men may perpetually give way to their daily casual desires, and that, wholly renouncing whatever cannot be acquired without protracted effort, they may establish nothing great, permanent, and calm... In these countries in which, unhappily, irreligion and democracy coexist, philosophers and those in power ought to be always striving to place the objects of human actions for beyond men’s immediate range (II, 159).

Tocqueville would oppose the indulgence of fickle appetites with discipline and spiritedness. He would have democracies “teach the community day by day that wealth, fame, and power are rewards of labor”, and arrange things so that “no greatness should be of too easy acquirement” (ibid.). Tocqueville hoped thus to achieve the effect of religion without religion; he suggests that these practices might, somehow, bring an irreligious people back to religion.

As religious faith declined among the intellectuals in the latter half of the nineteenth century and was replaced by faith in science and social progress, institutional Christianity metamorphosed. It did not disappear but became secularized, materialist, with a worldly compassion and a worldly paradise replacing *caritas* and Heaven. Woodrow Wilson, whose father was a preacher, exemplifies this perfectly. Still believing in a sort of eternity, a *telos* in “History”, the intellectuals could discipline themselves and find the courage to fight for something. No longer. In the domain of foreign policy, the apolitical character of Christianity – “resist not evil”, “turn the other cheek”, “love thine enemy” – has reinforced the democratic tendency toward pacifism and appeasement evident in *détente* and, more obviously, in the Vietnam anti-war movement: “make love, not war”.

The foundations of this liberalism had been decaying long before the stalemate in Vietnam. Existentialism weakened them as did the threat of nuclear war. (Once one’s hoped-for paradise depends on the continued existence of this world, the possibility of the latter’s destruction gets to be a serious worry, indeed.) But the most important of the intellectual preparations for liberalism’s demise was moral relativism.

Tocqueville comes very close to anticipating the phenomenon of moral relativism. This may be seen by recalling his description of the “philosophical method” of Americans. He notes that, under conditions of equality, not only does each individual seek the reason of things in himself alone, but equality tends to invade the intellect such that the individual becomes the “source of truth” (II, 273). Relativism reflects egalitarianism, for it consists in believing that there are no objective standards for determining whether the way of life of one individual, group, or nation is superior to that of another. To admire a Socrates or a Charles Manson; to condemn PLO terrorists or to call them “freedom fighters”; to prefer liberal America to Communist Russia or Saddam’s Iraq – all these so-called value-judgments are deemed “subjective” or “socially determined”. Relativism thus regards all moral principles (which it also calls “values” as opposed to “facts”) as theoretically equal. It dovetails with the intellectual’s worship of science, described by its advertisers as “value-free”.

Visible not only in the writings of the most ardent proponents of *détente* and opponents of the war in Vietnam and Iraq, moral relativism appears in writings by men regarded as “hawks”. Here are Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, in their book, *Political Power: USA/USSR* (which went through more than eleven printings since it was published in 1963):

We are students of politics; we write this book in that capacity. And here we are concerned not with vices and virtues but with strengths and weakness. Moral judgments have been passed often enough and with predictable results – on both sides of the Iron Curtain.<sup>23</sup>

Such talk obscures the fact that vices and virtues *are* strength and weakness, depended upon and routinely exploited by every politician every, person, who ever lived. It also reflects the moral relativism of numerous contemporary intellectuals, “left” and “right”, who imagine an “end of ideology” in what Brzezinski later calls the “technetronic era”. According to his teaching, we must abandon our prejudices about individual, group, or national superiority and enter a period of universal toleration and – no surprise – egalitarianism.

Brzezinski and Huntington’s non-judgmental or relativistic approach to international conflict is prevalent among Israeli intellectuals. For example, in his book, *The Middle East: Nations, Superpowers and Wars*, Israeli political scientist Yair Evron teaches: “Only by avoiding questions of right and wrong and also by limiting oneself to an analysis of patterns of behavior and strategies in conflict, can we approach this complex [Arab-Israel] conflict not in any emotional or apologetic way but scientifically and analytically.”<sup>24</sup> As Paul Eidelberg has elsewhere written:

We see here [in Evron's methodology] a tension between the apparent needs of "science" and the needs of society. To persevere in the Arab-Israel conflict, the people of Israel require steadfast belief in the justice of Israel's cause. But for academics to preserve their "scientific", i.e., academic credentials, they must adopt a morally neutral attitude toward that conflict. But wait! Evron's book was published in 1973. To appreciate the pernicious impact of his relativism, come with me to the year 2003, and let us see what has happened to students attending Israeli universities.

Caroline B. Glick, an editor and gifted writer of *The Jerusalem Post*, addressed some 150 political science students at Tel Aviv University, where she spoke of her experience as an embedded reporter with the US Army's Third Infantry Division during the Iraq war. Any person not corrupted by moral relativism would favor, as she did, the US over the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein. Yet the general attitude of her audience was expressed by a student who asked, "Who are you to make moral judgments?" Now ponder this exchange between Ms. Glick and a student who spoke with a heavy Russian accent:

Student: "How can you say that democracy is better than dictatorial rule?"

Glick: "Because it is better to be free than to be a slave."

Student: "How can you support America when the US is a totalitarian state?"

Glick: "Did you learn that in Russia?"

Student: "No, here."

Glick: "Here at Tel Aviv University?"

Student: "Yes, that is what my professors say."

Ms. Glick spoke at five liberal Israeli universities. She learned that all are dominated by moral relativists who indoctrinate their students and ban "politically incorrect" publications. The deadly consequences are clear: "A survey carried out by the left-wing Israel Democracy Institute on Israeli attitudes toward the state [indicates that] ... a mere 58% of Israelis are proud of being Israeli ..." Ms. Glick concludes: "Is it possible that our academic tyrants have something to do with the inability of 42% of Israelis to take pride in who they are?"<sup>25</sup>

One might think that moral relativists would adopt a neutral attitude in the conflict between Jews and the Palestinian Arabs – as political scientists like Yair Evron might have done back in 1973. To the contrary, today's relativists have demonized Israel. Never mind the well-known fact that Arabs use their own women and children as human bombs. Because moral relativists – typically liberals – cannot acknowledge the enormity of evil, they not only ignore the genocidal intentions of Israel's enemies, but they identify Jews as the cause of the conflict! Moral relativism has thus produced *moral reversal!*<sup>26</sup>

It needs to be borne in mind that political scientists tainted by relativism influence statesmen and a nation's foreign policy. It may appear paradoxical that Brzezinski, a moral relativist, was the National Security Adviser of President Jimmy Carter, a born-again Christian. However, the above-mentioned Christian precepts, "resist not evil", "turn the other cheek", and "love thine enemy", readily lend themselves to the non-judgmental tendency of moral relativism.

Huntington, who also served on the National Security Council, provides a more revealing case study of the influence of democracy on the intellect of Americans. In his 2004 book, *Who Are We?* in which Huntington provides a comprehensive historical analysis of "The "Challenges to America's National Identity", the university-bred doctrine (and corrosive influence) of moral relativism is conspicuous by its absence.<sup>27</sup> By the way, Huntington's ancestor and namesake Samuel Huntington was a signer of the Declaration of Independence, a very judgmental document that confidently speaks of "self-evident" truths derived from the "Laws of nature and of Nature's God". American intellectuals have come a long way since 1776.

Insofar as many Americans and Israelis ask, “Who Are We?” and thus betray a loss of national identity, it should be obvious that moral relativism is largely responsible for this state of affairs. But as we have seen, moral relativism flourishes in democracies. There equality renders all lifestyles and therefore all generations equal, which makes nonsense of national identity or even of patriotism.

Tocqueville anticipated this development.

So long as a strong religious or even secular faith inspires a people, democracy thrives; when the faith declines to the level it reaches in Brzezinski and Evron, discipline and spiritedness are going to be difficult to arouse. The keepers of a lukewarm faith cannot appeal to positive belief alone, whether it be the aristocratic faith in his leader, the religious man’s faith in his God, or the democrat’s faith in his country; they must, rather, urge us on by means of the dispiriting lure of moral relativism. We are to pursue, with good will toward friends and adversaries alike, a morally neutral or non-ideological foreign policy, a policy which, by definition, can only be motivated by material interests.

Although the “Bush Doctrine” seems to depart from such “even-handedness” by calling for democratic reform in Arab-Islamic regimes, the Bush administration continues to appease Saudi Arabia, a totalitarian state that not only bankrolls international terrorism, but also hatred of America via thousands of mosques which that oil-rich kingdom has constructed in the free world. Many of these mosques now thrive in America itself, taking advantage of American constitutional guarantees of religious liberty.

However, the constitutional, i.e., legal, guarantees of religious liberty rest on the existence of Creator-endowed unalienable rights vis-à-vis the all-too-human propensity to deny those rights by tyranny. To abandon adherence to natural, unalienable rights in the name of (the supposed sophistication of) moral relativism is to deprive fidelity to such constitutional rights of any serious justification. Legal right without moral right behind it must collapse.

Like Mr. Carter, Mr. Bush is a born-again Christian, and therefore has no reason to veer off into moral relativism. Nonetheless, he has stooped to moral reversal by pressuring Israel to make unilateral concessions to the Palestinian Authority, knowing full well that the PA, by offering Hamas a leadership role and insisting on the “return” of millions of Arab “refugees” to Israel, remains committed to terrorism and Israel’s destruction.<sup>28</sup>

With respect to his policies towards Israel, therefore, Bush remains within the democratic weltanschauung portrayed by Tocqueville. As we saw, democracy yields egalitarianism, which yields self-interest rightly understood. Self-interest rightly understood, unchecked by discipline and spiritedness, yields virtuous materialism, which finally yields moral flabbiness and decay. The Bush administration – including its “neo-cons” – has succumbed to moral egalitarianism by advocating a Palestinian state, which, remarkably, is opposed by most Americans. But perhaps not so remarkably: Americans, like Mr. Bush, wholeheartedly continue to support the principles of the Declaration of Independence. Unlike Mr. Bush, when they apply those principles to Arafat yesterday or the Palestinian elites of today, they do not hesitate to draw the logical conclusion. Perhaps they see what Tocqueville would have seen in an instant: whether taking their ideology from modern nationalism or from jihadism, the Palestinian elites seek to constitute themselves as yet another instance of a self-made aristocracy in the egalitarian modern world.

As Tocqueville would have understood, in America, appeals to “even-handedness”, a euphemism for moral equivalence or relativism, almost always serve the speaker’s desire for comfortable self-preservation – comfortable self-preservation for all if he is an “idealist”. Brzezinski himself sees the practical, if not the theoretical problem with this attitude: “subjectivism may not suffice to meet the challenge of subjective activism”, domestic or foreign.<sup>29</sup> Nevertheless, both he and Huntington reject

what they derisively refer to as the “black and white” image of the (former) Soviet and American political systems. Although it would be comforting to think that such *naiaseries* confine themselves to academic textbooks, no less experienced a soldier and politician than Prime Minister Ariel Sharon said, in an April 13, 2001 *Ha'aretz* Magazine interview, that he does “*not see things in black and white*” – this, while Jews were being reduced to body parts by Arab homicide bombers! Perhaps this is why Sharon has not pursued a policy of zero tolerance for Arab terrorism.

## **The Military**

The thought of General Sharon brings us, finally, to the soldiers. The Left points to Tocqueville’s chapter, “Why democratic nations naturally desire peace, and democratic armies, war”, wherein he argues that the same desire for personal advancement which leads the majority of democrats into peaceful pursuits also inclines the minority who are soldiers to desire war, which brings their advancement. The Left ignores Tocqueville’s prescription, which is not to weaken the army and to make civilians fear it, but to educate citizens to “a manly love of order” that inclines them to “freely submit themselves to discipline”. Such men,

If they follow the profession of arms, bring into it, unconsciously and almost against their will, these same habits and manners...Teach the citizens to be educated, orderly, firm, and fee and the soldiers will be disciplined and obedient (II, 285).

The Left has advocated the reverse of this for 90 years, at least. It shows.

And not only has the Left ignored Tocqueville’s further warning:

If the love of physical gratification and the taste for well-being, which are naturally suggested to men by a state of equality, were to possess the mind of a democratic people and to fill it completely, the manners of the nation would be so totally opposed to military pursuits that perhaps even the army would eventually acquire the love of peace... (II, 385-386).

Contrary to pacifist doctrine. “nothing is more dangerous for the freedom and tranquility of a people than an army afraid of war”, because “such an army no longer seeks to maintain its importance and its influence on the field of battle, [but] seeks to assert it elsewhere” (ibid.).

To prevent this, Tocqueville recommends that the love and habit of liberty combat the love and habit of virtuous materialism. In this he follows Pericles, who praised the non-egalitarian virtues of honor, courage, and glory by invoking the democratic love of liberty.<sup>30</sup> Liberty requires the moderate spiritedness that underlies self-assertion, but does not necessarily contradict discipline freely submitted to.

In conducting a war, American politicians must assess democracy’s strengths and vulnerabilities. The awesome destruction of the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, though denounced by almost all Americans as an unmitigated evil, did not erase the fact that American universities, the mentors of America’s most prominent newspaper and television journalists, remain tainted by moral relativism, in consequence of which the President of the United States has yet to define America’s enemy or the nature of the war. America is not only a democracy, but a multicultural democracy in which tolerance of ethnic differences is preached and for the most part practiced. No one was offended when Mr. Bush declared war against “international terrorism”. But two years had to elapse before his administration, which had previously and loudly described Islam as a peace-loving religion, found enough candor and courage to whisper that the enemy is “militant Islam”. That epithet, which now enjoys political correctness, had been emphasized by Daniel Pipes in his journalistic articles; in his scholarly writings, “militant Islam” is

Islam pure and simple.<sup>31</sup> This means that America and Islam are involved in what Samuel Huntington, and Bernard Lewis before him, rightly described as a clash of civilizations – something Muslim writers regard as obvious.

That Huntington and Lewis speak of a clash of civilizations does not mean they have not been influenced or constrained by democratic relativism. Neither would dare echo Tocqueville's assessment of Islam:

I studied the Quran a great deal. I came away from that study with the conviction that by and large there have been few religions in the world as deadly to men as that of Muhammad. So far as I can see, it is the principal cause of the decadence so visible today in the Muslim world and, though less absurd than the polytheism of old, its social and political tendencies are in my opinion more to be feared, and I therefore regard it as a form of decadence rather than a form of progress in relation to paganism itself.<sup>32</sup>

Be this as it may, how can the President of the United States arouse his fellow-citizens to engage and persevere in a war against Islam, when Americans are bombarded daily by media steeped in moral relativism and well disposed to magnify American casualties on the one hand, and anti-war demonstrations on the other. And if this were not enough – and we have said nothing of the millions of Muslims residing in the United States – how does this President maintain moral consistency when his country's economy depends on Saudi oil, and when his people, habituated to ease and comfort, may not long endure the material sacrifices demanded by a protracted (and amorphous) war?

Since the United States obviously lacks the military manpower to subjugate Islamdom and its 1.3 billion denizens, it has no choice but to stand forthrightly against Islam itself, insofar as Islam preaches – as the Koran does, repeatedly – that jihad against “infidels” and “apostates” is the path to Paradise. Toward this end, the “divide-and-dilute” rhetoric of the Bush Administration alone will not suffice. The conquest of the Ba'athist regime in Iraq and the removal of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan point the way to a more realistic policy.

In his recent book, *America's Secret War*, George Friedman argues that a central target of the invasion of Baghdad (and, one might add, Kabul some months earlier) was Riyadh. That is, America signaled, in its deeds and not merely in its words, that the US not only could, but would punish regimes that contemptuously and systematically ignore human rights and assault Americans in the name of Islam. The Saudis were reminded of the vulnerabilities of wealth defended weakly. Thus far, all too many elements of Saudi Wahhabism seem not to have taken the message. Only by military action, followed by moral and political transformation, *or* by a moral and political transformation obviating such devastation, can the jihadism of Islam be “refuted”. It is up to the Saudi elites to decide upon which of these alternatives they prefer.

As to the countless mosques the Wahhabists have established in the democracies, where mullahs spew their ideological pseudo-justifications of suicide bombing, democrats should recall that the same principles of American republicanism that Mr. Bush so eloquently invoked in his Second Inaugural address provide the underpinnings of the constitutional protections for religious freedom. Religious freedom is not religious license – as the English recently learned, the hard way. Just as a religious sect that revived the beliefs of the ancient Incans or Mayans could not hide behind the First Amendment to the US Constitution to defend the sacrifice of virgins to the sun “god”, so too clerical *jihadists* may not pretend that either free speech or the free exercise of religion provides cover for incitement to murder. Whatever our religious convictions, in a properly ordered regime one must not pretend to religious sanction for the violation of unalienable rights granted under the “Laws of Nature and of Nature's G-d”.

Needless to say, American democracy is by its character incapable of undertaking still more devastating action than it has undertaken already in Afghanistan and Iraq, unless driven to desperation by a terrorist attack on the American mainland using either nuclear or biological or chemical weapons of mass destruction. Pearl Harbor, recall, prompted the democratic Roosevelt administration to forcibly place 112,000 Japanese in detention camps, and to mount a war of conquest and regime change on the Japanese mainland.<sup>33</sup> The reaction to a WMD attack on a US city could make that reaction to Pearl Harbor appear mild by comparison.

However, just as the US refrained from launching a “first strike” against the USSR, so it will not launch a “first strike” against Islam; obviously, Islam is anything but geographically localized, and so unsusceptible to such attack, in any event. But just as the US would have wiped out the Soviet Union in retaliation for having been attacked by that communist tyranny, so it will have no choice but to retaliate severely if attacked again by communism’s religious counterpart, “Islamism”. The aim of the latter was recently stated on Palestinian TV:

We [Muslims] have ruled the world before, and by Allah, the day will come when we will rule the entire world again. The day will come when we will rule America...except for the Jews. The Jews will not enjoy a life of tranquility under our rule, because they are treacherous by nature, as they have been throughout history. The day will come when everything will be relieved of the Jews.<sup>34</sup>

If attacked by weapons of mass destruction (WMD), we would not likely see anything so mild as the removal of the Taliban and of Saddam, including the fatal hesitation at Tora Bora that allowed Bin Laden to slip the noose. Retaliation against another, more murderous attack would more likely be quick, precise but geographically widespread, and awesome.

Tocqueville would not have been surprised by the mistakes the US made *before* 9/11 and which led to the indiscriminate slaughter of 3,000 innocents. He saw that, given the democratic love of physical gratification, “There are two things that a democratic people will always find very difficult, to begin a war and to end it” (II, 283).

As an example of the former, consider the years of the Clinton presidency. Muslim terrorists truck-bombed the World Trade Center in 1993, killing six people and wounding over a thousand. In 1995 the FBI foiled an Islamic plot to blow up landmarks in the New York City area, including the Lincoln and Holland Tunnels and the George Washington Bridge. In 1996, terrorists attacked the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, killing 19 US military personnel and wounding hundreds. In 1998, al Qaeda operatives bombed the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, in nearly simultaneous attacks, killing 12 Americans, more than 200 Kenyans and Tanzanians, and wounding over 4,000. On October 12, 2000, terrorists conducted a suicide attack against the USS Cole, an American naval warship stationed in the port of Aden, Yemen, killing 17 sailors and wounding 39 more.<sup>35</sup> Apart from firing a few multi-million dollar cruise missiles on worthless targets, it was business as usual in the world’s number one superpower – a democracy in which considerations of national honor (to say nothing of justice) had at least temporarily succumbed to the all-too-human desire for careless and commodious living.

But having (belatedly) commenced the war against “international terrorism” by terminating the Taliban’s hold on Afghanistan as well as Saddam Hussein’s tyranny in Iraq, Americans readily can see that in neither country is the war really over. Elsewhere, for example in Iran and Syria, the terror masters remain unchallenged. Indeed, the Palestinian Authority (PA), a consortium of terrorists groups, has been encouraged by the Bush administration, while its allies, Hamas and Islamic Jihad, enjoy safe havens in Gaza. As indicated above, the PA is no less America’s enemy than Israel’s.

The tendency of U.S policy-makers – and this applies also to their British and continental European counterparts – to distinguish between terrorist attacks against American targets and terrorist attacks against Israel may be attributed in some cases to latent (and overt) anti-Semitism. Anti-Semitism is nothing but an especially ugly example of the tyranny of the majority that Tocqueville warned against as a bane of democratic regimes. Moreover, the failure to support Israel also reflects democracy’s love of physical gratification – the open door to Saudi Arabia’s petrodollar influence. Even a religious president like Mr. Bush, who unabashedly referred to terrorists and their state sponsors as the “Axis of Evil” – language ridiculed by moral relativists – has pursued a policy in the Middle East all too influenced by the ethos of materialism. If Israel sat on a few billion barrels of crude oil, we suspect, its security needs would meet with more concern in the great capitals of the West. When Saddam rolled his tanks into oil-rich Kuwait, the democracies swiftly lost their complacency.

Nevertheless – and this is crucial – Americans have proven time and again that they are tougher and better than both their enemies and even their elites believe them to be. The war in Iraq indicates that Americans will fight when the enemy is geographically defined and damned as evil. Indeed, in this age of publicity, the first concern of government must be not only to follow the right policies, but, even more important, to see that everything is called by its right name. For Americans to persevere in a protracted war, their leaders must maintain moral clarity and consistency, high-minded purpose and determination. Given Islam’s implacable bellicosity, they must avoid the tendency of commercial democracies to engage in unnecessary compromise. Such compromise is the easy refuge of irresolute or unprincipled men. Of course compromise is appropriate when dealing with temporary and partial interests. But a nation’s survival is not a matter of compromise. Accordingly, the leaders of a democracy must pursue, with vigor and persistency, a war-winning strategy. To do this, the course of action decided must be clear not only the eyes the President’s cabinet, but also in the eyes of the public.

The leaders of American democracy must therefore understand the character of the American people. That character has changed little since Tocqueville’s day, and politicians will find him a prudent counselor.

## Endnotes

- <sup>1</sup> See Paul Eidelberg, *Jewish Statesmanship: Lest Israel Fall* (Ariel Center for Policy Research, 2000; New York: University Press of America, 2002), ch. 5.
- <sup>2</sup> Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (2 vols.; New York: Vintage Books, 1945, I, 6, Reeve, Bacon, Bradley, translation. All subsequent references appear in the text.
- <sup>3</sup> Compare Shimon Peres: “There is nothing to learn from history” cited in Roger A. Gerber and Rael Jean Isaac (eds.), *What Shimon Says* (New York: Americans for a Safe Israel, n.d.), p. 4.
- <sup>4</sup> Jimmy Carter, *Why Not the Best?* (New York: Bantam Books, 1976), p. 147. Compare Chamberlain: “Human nature, which is the same the world over, must reject the nightmare of [war] with all its might.” Cited in William R. Rock, *British Appeasement in the 1930s* (London: Edward Arnold Ltd., 1977), p. 28.
- <sup>5</sup> Recall that Mr. Carter canceled the B-1 bomber, shelved the MX mobile ICBM system and the neutron bomb, and postponed the production of other weapons systems.
- <sup>6</sup> The Yale academics never anticipated that a *jihadist* state armed with the absolute weapon might use it, say against Israel, even at the risk self-destruction.
- <sup>7</sup> Cited in Richard Pipes, “Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight & Win a Nuclear War”, *Commentary*, 64:1 (July 1977), n. 6. Kissinger belatedly discovered the importance of nuclear superiority. See his article in *The Washington Quarterly*, 2:3 (Autumn 1979), pp. 5-7. Nevertheless, even after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,

Kissinger could still urge continuation of the myth of détente which continued to disarm the United States until the Reagan administration.

- <sup>8</sup> A.A. Sidorenko, *The Offensive* (A Soviet View), (Moscow: 1970; US Air Force trans.), p. 115.
- <sup>9</sup> Cited in M. Stanton Evans, *The politics of Surrender* (New York: Devin-Adair Co., 1966, p. 44. Kennan's seminal 1947 article, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct", established the principles of "containment", the most significant one of which anticipates the theory of "convergence" implicit in détente. Regarded as a "realist", Kennan, almost two decades later, called for "a new act of faith in the ultimate humanity and sobriety on the other side" (ibid).
- <sup>10</sup> See his *New York Times Magazine* interview, May 7, 1978, pp. 43, 121-127.
- <sup>11</sup> See Samuel Huntington, "American Foreign Policy", *The Washington Quarterly*, 2:4 (Aut. 1979), p. 36.
- <sup>12</sup> This applies *a fortiori* to Israel, given its system of multi-party cabinet government, which has resulted in the deplorable fact that the average duration of a government is less than two years!
- <sup>13</sup> George W. Bush: "Islam Is Peace": Remarks of the President at the Islamic Center of Washington, DC, September 22, 2001. [www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/200109](http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/200109).
- <sup>14</sup> George W. Bush: "Remarks by the President on Eid AlFitr", The Islamic Center of Washington, DC, December 2, 2002. [www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/ramadan/islam.html](http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/ramadan/islam.html).
- <sup>15</sup> Remarks by President George W. Bush in a statement to reporters during a meeting with U. N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, The Oval Office, Washington, DC, November 13, 2002. [www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/ramadan/islam.html](http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/ramadan/islam.html).
- <sup>16</sup> "President George W. Bush Calls for New Palestinian Leadership", The Rose Garden, Washington, DC, June 24, 2002. [www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/ramadan/islam.html](http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/ramadan/islam.html).
- <sup>17</sup> "Remarks by President GWB to the Warsaw Conference on Combating Terrorism", Warsaw, Poland, November 6, 2001. [www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/ramadan/islam.html](http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/ramadan/islam.html).
- <sup>18</sup> George W. Bush: "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People", U. S. Capitol, Washington, DC, September 20, 2001. [www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09](http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09).
- <sup>19</sup> David Cook, *Understanding Jihad* (Berkeley: University of Californian Press, 2005), pp. 2, 26, 43, 126
- <sup>20</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 137.
- <sup>21</sup> *US News and World Report*, Dec. 18, 1978, p. 24.
- <sup>22</sup> For citation and commentary, see Paul Eidelberg, *A Discourse on Statesmanship* (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1974), p. 343.
- <sup>23</sup> Zhigniew Brzezinski \* Samuel Huntington, *Political Power: USA/USSR* (New York: Viking Compass Books, 1963), p. 4.
- <sup>24</sup> Yair Evron, *The Middle East: Nations, Superpowers and Wars* (New York: Praeger, 1973), p. 9.
- <sup>25</sup> Caroline B. Glick, "Of Human Bondage", *Jerusalem Post*, December 26, 2003, pp. 1, 18.
- <sup>26</sup> Paul Eidelberg, *A Jewish Philosophy of History: Israel's Degradation and Redemption* (New York: iUniverse, 2004) pp. 73-74.
- <sup>27</sup> Samuel Huntington, *Who Are We: The Challenges to America's National Identity* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004).
- <sup>28</sup> Although Hamas and the PA are engaged in a power struggle, the PA has thus far used Hamas in something like a "good cop, bad cop" routine with Israel and the United States, since there is some plausible deniability as to the PA's responsibility for Hamas actions. Hamas enables Mahmoud Abbas to obtain gratuitous concessions from Israel (such as the release of terrorists) as well as financial support from the United States. See Cook, p. 116.
- <sup>29</sup> Brzezinski, *Between Two Ages: America's Role in the Technetronic Era* (New York: Viking Compass Books, 1971), p. 93.

- <sup>30</sup> Further discussion of this point will be found in Will Morrisey, *DeGaulle/Malraux: Reflections* (Lanham: University Press of America, 2002), p.102.
- <sup>31</sup> See Eidelberg, *A Jewish Philosophy of History*, pp. 189, 196-197, 199, 202.
- <sup>32</sup> Cited in Eidelberg, *A Jewish Philosophy of History*, p. 185.
- <sup>33</sup> See Michelle Malkin, *In Defense of Internment: The Case for “Racial Profiling” in World War II and the War on Terror* (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing Co., 2004), which refutes conventional and academic denunciation of the evacuation of 112,000 ethnic Japanese from the West Coast during World War II and their internment in the interior of the country.
- <sup>34</sup> Cited in Caroline Glick, “An Attack on Us All”, *Jerusalem Post*, July 8, 2005, p. 24.
- <sup>35</sup> See Steven Strasser (ed.), *The 9/11 Investigations* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), pp. 240-241.