The New Map of Chemical and
Biological Weapons
in the Middle East
Executive Summary
Since September 2001, the month marking
both the conventional-mode plane attacks and the unconventional-mode anthrax
attacks on the US, two, remarkably important courses have been shaped:
Intensifying endeavor, mainly an
American-British one, aimed at the elimination of WMD possessed by adversaries,
which yielded, for the time being, the removal of Iraq and Libya from the CBW
map.
Increasing threat of terrorism-oriented WMD
posed mainly by Islamic organizations.
A sort of an indirect interplay may
underlie the concomitant evolving of those two courses, signifying, apparently,
for the overwhelming general trend of terrorism as a rising power that replaces,
somewhat, threats posed by states.
Syria, Iran, Egypt and possibly Sudan plus
Algeria still hold WMD, merely chemical and biological, in effect. The CBW
ordnance of Egypt seems to be mostly static during recent years, while Syria and
Iran – to an appreciable degree collaboratively – persist in cultivating their
arsenals, qualitatively and quantitatively. Sudan and Algeria might be nearing
preliminary significant capabilities. Extraneous biochemical technological
suppliers – both state- and non-state-sponsored – continue to act in Pakistan,
India, China, North Korea, Cuba, Russia and other formerly Soviet countries, as
well as in Western Europe.
While Egypt is occasionally regarded as a
country bearing no relevance, ostensibly, with respect to the Middle-Eastern
military balances, it is, infect, by all means, a mighty regional power, in any
sense, including the non-conventional-weaponry one. Much more tangible, though,
the threats posed by Syria and Iran in that sense, are by far worrying, and
ought to be treated accordingly.
The menace of chemical and biological
terrorism is an aggravating one, whether or not backed by any country. It is an
outcome of an additional dimension prevailing beyond conventional terrorism,
stemming from the mighty combination of an elusive weapon bearing the capacity
to bring about concrete causalities, logistic anachronism and horrifying impact
at the same time.
On the whole, the removal of Iraq and Libya
from the CBW map is a very meaningful development. The new map thus formed still
represents, however, a complex, hardly manageable problem for the Middle-East
region and worldwide. It stems from a peculiar conjunction of several state-CBW-possessors
and – whether or not interlinked with – several terrorism organizations apt to
employ WMD, placed, altogether, within the same space.
This review presents and analyzes the new
Arab-Iranian system concerned with chemical and biological weapons. Still, it
follows the procurement processes that led to the persisting related programs in
Syria, Iran and Egypt, while laying emphasis, in parallel, on the recent shifts
that took place in Iraq and Libya. The sphere of chemical and biological
terrorism is visited as well, certainly, so as to gain a degree of comprehension
regarding that cardinal factor.
Syria has been active for some 25 years in
a consistent, systematic and determined effort to acquire chemical and
biological weapons, an effort which is constantly still intensifying.1
Its public references to this effort, which it has never denied,
are gradually receiving greater expression. More than any other country, the
concept of “strategic balance” with Israel whose primary practical
manifestation, beyond balance in conventional forces, involves acquisition of
chemical and biological weapons, is attributed especially to Syria and in fact
to Hafez Assad himself. Regarding “the other types of weapons” – as Assad was
wont to refer to Syria’s chemical and biological weapons, in distinguishing them
from the nuclear weapons attributed to Israel – “Syria and the Arabs are willing
to dispose of them, but only after Israel undergoes nuclear disarmament”, in his
words. Syria’s acquisition of chemical weapons from Egypt, in the framework of
their joint preparations for the Yom Kippur War, was, to a great extent,
indicative of Assad’s extreme insistence upon strategic balance. Up until the
time of his death, Assad and Mubarak coordinated positions regarding leadership
of the Arab camp, which negated signing the chemical and biological conventions.
Syria’s reliance on Iran, North Korea, Cuba, and possibly
Russia is notable and should be treated with much concern, as it seems to
cover, or will cover in the near future, all of the elements whose deficiency
still delays the completion of the deployment process to Syria’s satisfaction.
China contributes significantly to this as well. Syria aspires, it is
unanimously believed, to complete its arsenal of enhanced-range
surface-to-surface missiles – including SCUD-C, SCUD-D, M-9 and Nodung – armed
with operational chemical and biological warheads, and beyond that, cruise
missiles carrying chemical and biological cluster bombs. The portion of the
budget and the comprehensive effort commanded by the Syrian armament in the
chemical and biological field, especially when it is integrated with ballistic
armament, is enormous relative to other strength components and other portions
of the Syrian military budget. From this perspective, the situation of the
recorded conventional inventory of the Syrian army is deceptive. The transfer
of chemical and biological weapons from production and storage facilities to
underground facilities should also be mentioned, as it obstructs both
intelligence surveillance and attempts to destroy the weapons.
Syria’s acquisition of a CBW option has not occurred in a
vacuum. It also has to be viewed in the context of Syria’s own alliances. And
the most important of Syria’s strategic ties are not with its “brother” Arab
states. For 15 years, Syria’s closest strategic and military bond has been with
Iran – a large, powerful Muslim state, one that is close to acquiring nuclear
weapons and that has missiles capable of reaching Israel.
Could Syria one day find itself under an Iranian nuclear
umbrella? If it did – and the road to that point may not be so long – Syria’s
threshold for first use of CBW could be lowered. For example, in a grab for the
Golan, Syria might contemplate a limited chemical exchange with Israel, on the
assumption that Israel would not retaliate with a nuclear escalation. Given the
futility of all past Syrian attempts to gain military superiority over Israel by
means of conventional forces, the CBW option might grow legitimate in Syrian
eyes. And if a nuclear Iran gave assurances to Syria, it might diminish Syrian
fears and inhibitions in choosing its weapons.
But the strategic significance of Syria’s CBW option is not
limited to war scenarios. Even if Israel and Syria were to reengage in a peace
process, Syria would have every motive for continuing its non-conventional
buildup. The goal would be to strengthen Syrian proposals for a comprehensive
strategic package, whereby Israel would agree to give up any non-conventional
arms it might possess, in return for a pledge by Syria to dismantle its CBW.
Syria has presented the total non-conventional disarmament of Israel, in return
for a reciprocal Syrian step, as an important component of the “peace process”.2
Syria thus would seek to obtain what Egypt did not even attempt to attain in its
peace agreement with Israel, and what Egypt has failed to obtain by its own
recent diplomacy: the nuclear disarmament of Israel.
In the meantime, Syria continues to augment its CBW. It is
estimated that about half of Syria’s 300 to 400 Scud-B and Scud-C missiles are
chemically armed.3 Biological warheads
are probably around the corner. The missiles are now much more protected in
their new, reinforced underground silos. Many more Scud-C and Scud-D missiles
are slated for addition to the force in the near future. Syria has recently
carried out tests on modified Scud missiles using solid fuel, rather than liquid
fuel, which increases the range of the missiles, improves their accuracy, and
shortens the time interval between launches.4
Moreover, Syria has already achieved one of its primary
strategic goals. In Israeli eyes, Syria is an adversary that must be reckoned
with and that cannot be easily fobbed off by waving Israel’s own
non-conventional baton. In 1999, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak explained the
urgency of pursuing a peace agreement with Syria. “The Palestinians pose no
military threat to Israel,” he noted. But Syria “has surface-to-surface missiles
that are neatly organized and can cover the whole country with nerve gas.”5
Several years later, another highly ranked Israeli official elaborated on the
Syrian capacity; the head of the Israeli intelligence agency, the Mossad, told a
June 2002 meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Council that Syria
had adapted sarin and VX to various Scud warheads, as well as to aerial bombs
and rockets.6
Quite lately, Syria’s President Bashar Assad clearly stated that “Syria has
the right to hold weapons of mass destruction.”7
Chemical Weapons
In 1972, Syria received aerial bombs and artillery shells
containing sarin nerve gas (non-persistent) and mustard gas (persistent). After
10 years, when the sarin began to age, Syria started producing its own sarin,
and loading it onto aerial bombs and later onto SCUD-B warheads missiles. It has
been reported that the configuration of Syrian chemical weapons is binary, and
in that sense, it is the most advanced among Arab countries. The possibility
cannot be ruled out that the mustard gas which Syria received from Egypt is
still functional due to its remarkable stability. Furthermore, Syria has
stockpiled cyanide in amounts necessary for the purpose of limited warfare, at
least. (About 18,000 of the Sunni residents of the city Hama were killed by the
Syrian regime in 1982 with cyanide, certainly with Assad’s knowledge.)
In recent years, Syria began producing the extremely toxic
stable nerve gas – VX, and to arm aerial bombs and missile warheads with it.
This chemical warfare agent is more valuable than sarin or at least constitutes
a complementary weapon, in terms of its operational qualities. It is worth
emphasizing that Syria received unofficial assistance from Russian scientists
who apparently specialized in VX chemical substances (the Russian version of
this matter is more potent than the original American version). The Syrian
chemical effort, which began in the early 1980s and gradually intensified,
expanded significantly in 1996 with the establishment of a large underground
installation for the production of chemical weapons in the Aleppo region (in
partnership with Libya).
Quite recently, Syria also armed its SCUD-C missiles with
chemical warheads, adding them to their stockpile of thousands of aerial bombs
loaded on Suhoi-22, Suhoi-24 and MiG 23 warplanes and 100-200 SCUD-B chemical
warheads. Indirect assistance from Russian experts effected the successful
development of cluster chemical missile warheads. Lately, chemical warheads
carrying SCUD-D missiles were successfully field tested by Syria.
The warning given by the Syrian ambassador in Egypt (in
2000), that Syria will threaten the use of chemical weapons against an Israeli
threat of nuclear weapons is, for all intents and purposes, the climax of
expressions in this context rather than a new direction or breakthrough.
Already in January 1987, in an interview in a Kuwaiti
newspaper, Assad noted that Syria is seeking a technical response which will
constitute a direct reaction to Israel’s nuclear weapons. A few months later,
Damascus radio emphasized that Syria has an answer to Israel’s nuclear threat. Shihabi, Syria’s Chief of the General Staff, asserted in 1988 that there is a
sense of satisfaction in Syria from its accomplishments in the area of strategic
balance, and that Syria possesses weapons whose deterrence effect can counter
Israel’s extremely lethal weapons.
In his conversation with Senator McLain in Damascus in
January 1989, Assad confirmed that Syria possesses chemical weapons. In 1993,
Assad contended that a Syrian solution to the problem of repatriating the Golan
Heights exists, regardless of the cost and despite Israel’s nuclear superiority.
Syria’s Minister of Information held in 1995 that Syria possesses “trump cards”
which it had not yet “played” but would, if need be, in case of the
conflagration of a war against Israel. Furthermore, different reports indicate
that Syria possesses biological weapons as well – in addition to its chemical
weapons – whose strategic value is significantly greater than chemical weapons.
Assad proclaimed that Syria has the ability to cause Israel significant damage
by means of “the special weapon” in its arsenal and that the Syrian army has
attained strategic balance with the IDF. And, indeed, beyond these declarations,
the Syrian army conducted a series of SCUD missile launch tests with different
models of the missile, for use with chemical warheads, possibly along with
increasingly closer chemical cooperation with Russia. Iran and North Korea are
contributive, too. Meanwhile, that cooperation has effected the successful
development of chemical cluster warheads. Furthermore, the exposure of the
Syrian operational deployment of SCUD-C missiles by satellite photographs
indicates that a chemical armament has been integrated with the missile program
in a manner enabling a surprise chemical attack option, and that the missiles
are pointed at the reactor in Dimona, airports and Israel’s big cities. At the
same time, the revelation of the operational nuclear deployment attributed to
Israel by Jane’s Defence Weekly, by means of satellite photographs, apparently enables Syria to
launch a chemical strike against that deployment. Conceivably, this is a
first-rate Syrian strategic option. At least 100 chemically armed missiles are
steadily maintained by Syria ready to be launched on short notice. They carry VX
nerve agent and are hidden in deep caves in Northern Syria.8
One of the central consequences of this capacity is Syria’s
intention to achieve prior (at least methodical) neutralization of Israel’s
nuclear threat, which is liable to frustrate Syrian military accomplishments in
the Golan Heights, if and when Syria sees fit to stage an attack in that sector,
especially if it includes Syrian utilization of chemical weapons.
Biological Weapons
Syrian spokesmen have remarked that Syria is equipping
itself with an even more powerful, technical response to Israel’s nuclear
weapons, and that it is legitimate for Syria to equip itself with a variety of
weapons of mass destruction. In response to the pressure effected by the UN
against Iraq’s attempts to conceal its biological weapons, the Syrian Foreign
Minister emphasized (in December 1997) that the pressure is totally unjustified,
as Israel is given free reign to develop all types of weapons of mass
destruction and, therefore, Syria and other Arab countries have the right to
develop countermeasures against belligerent Israel. It seems that despite Syrian
remarks regarding biological weapons and due to their limited number, the
weapons represent a conceptual approach whose purpose includes indirect leaks
regarding the intention to equip themselves with biological weapons while
simultaneously maintaining maximal obscurity. This is necessary because despite
the fact that it is common knowledge that Syria possesses chemical weapons, it
is questionable whether or not chemical weapons, in and of themselves, can erode
the nuclear deterrence capability attributed to Israel. A background document
was circulated in the Syrian army itself regarding the biological weapons, which
illustrated their significant strategic value as perceived by the army.
The public reference to Syria as a country developing
biological weapons, in addition to chemical weapons, began in 1988 and has
continued since. Today, at least 16 years after the start of development, Syria
is, at times, described as a producer of biological weapons: two toxins (botulinum
and ricin) and two bacteria (anthrax and cholera). Russian experts hired by
Syria are hard at work to produce the anthrax bacteria and load it onto
warheads. In the Scientific Studies and Research Center in Damascus, in which
development activity of chemical weapons has been proven, a Department of
Biology is active as well. Studies published under its auspices indicate,
indeed, activity involving germs and proteins.
Botulinum, ricin, anthrax and cholera constitute four
especially powerful types of biological warfare agents: botulinum – a lethal
toxic protein (produced from a bacterium) is more poisonous than any other
substance, natural or synthetic; ricin – a lethal toxic protein (produced from
castor beans, easily grown in Syria) that optimally fulfills the criteria in
terms of the relation between (production) costs and (respiratory) toxicity;
anthrax – a lethal bacterium easily cultivated with optimal durability under
unfavorable conditions (during storage, launch, plus environmental stability
upon implementation); and cholera – a typical epidemic incapacitating germ for
guerrilla warfare. In addition to the aforementioned development center
functioning in Damascus, another biological weapon facility in Cerin has been
mentioned. One can assume that the new chemical weapons factory in the Aleppo
region includes a biological weapons section as well.
Syria apparently intends to attain the capability to
biologically arm all types of its long-range surface-to-surface missile
warheads, and it is reasonable to assume that this goal can be realized in the
course of a few years, if it has not yet been attained.
Syria’s official position regarding biological weapons
maintained that Syria “supports closer international cooperation in the field of
biology for peaceful purposes which will certainly increase the influential
power and the realism of the biological convention”. Despite its positive tone,
there is, of course, nothing in this vague formulation of the Syrian position to
indicate anything about Syrian inactivity in the field of biological weapons. In
fact, since 1983, if not earlier, Syria has expended a considerable effort in
the realm of biological weapons and, presumably, it has already had biological
weapons in its possession since the early 1990s.
Egypt was the first Arab country to equip itself with
chemical and biological weapons. It was also the first to utilize chemical
weapons (in Yemen in the 1960s). Further, Egypt supplied Syria with chemical
weapons (during their joint preparations for the Yom Kippur War), and also
provided chemical weapons to Iraq and assisted it in producing chemical and
biological weapons in the 1980s. Egypt itself continues to maintain chemical and
biological weapons even today, despite the fact that it denies that truth and
for years has taken pains to cultivate an image of a country clearly striving to
eliminate them. However, simultaneously, Egyptian spokesmen take the trouble to
emphasize that the acquisition of chemical and biological weapons are extremely
necessary and completely justified.9
In preparation for the international convention for the
prohibition of chemical weapons (January 1993), and especially in its wake, the
clear consolidation of a pan-Arabic approach was obvious – with Egypt in the
lead – calling for withholding signatures from the chemical convention – and
implicitly supporting the maintenance of an offensive chemical and biological
capability, as is the practice in Egypt itself – as long as a comprehensive ban
on chemical, biological and nuclear weapons in the Middle East is not
implemented. Egypt’s Foreign Minister Amru Moussa, even stressed that this issue
constitutes a main topic in the reorganization of the regional alignment in the
Middle East. In January 1993, when the chemical convention was signed, Mubarak
was in Damascus, and together with Assad, called upon the Arabs to refrain from
joining the convention.
Egypt is naturally well aware and familiar with the
biochemical armament efforts of Syria and Iran. One can assume that, according
to its perception of the present-day strategic balance in the Middle East, it
even prefers, or at least views, this armament effort as legitimate, if not
imperative, something much more difficult and complicated to say about nuclear
armament.
Until 1990, the ballistic and biochemical cooperation
between Egypt and Iraq flourished; shortly before the latter’s invasion of
Kuwait, Egypt’s foreign and defense ministers rallied to the defense of Iraq’s
acquisition of chemical and biological weapons, apparently in anticipation of
joint Iraqi-Egyptian benefit.
The tip of the iceberg of Egypt’s deep involvement in the
Iraqi ballistic and biochemical armament effort was noteworthy in the Gulf War,
when Egyptian insiders publicly assessed it; however, it was only four years
later, in June 1995, that a UN contingent arrived clandestinely in Egypt in
order to attempt to expose the scope of the Egyptian-Iraqi cooperation – with
extremely limited success. At the same time, tens of thousands of Egyptians, who
worked in Iraq and left in the wake of the invasion of Kuwait, began returning
to Iraq, apparently without pan-Arabic agreement. Some evidently returned to
Iraqi military industrial plants.
On the basis of Egypt’s enormous expenditures as far as its
unprecedented military buildup is concerned, in addition to its decision not to
join the accords preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons, it would be
very unreasonable to conclude that this buildup does not include chemical and
biological weapons, as the Egyptian leadership claims.10
Still, Egypt’s President Mubarak recently demanded: “Israel ought to give
up its WMD, of whatever means, just like Libya did.”11
Chemical Weapons
The Egyptian acquisition of chemical weapons began in the
early 1960s, and only barely preceded its frequent implementation by the
Egyptian Air Force in the Yemen war from 1963-1967.
The primary facility is located in Abu-Za`abal (supported
by local insecticide and pharmaceutical plants) and secondary facilities are
located in Abu-Rawash (the assembly point for filling aerosol cans) and adjacent
to Beni-Suaf (an air force base). A primary research and development plant is
located in the National Research Center in Doki, and a central production
adjunct point functions within the framework of the chief Egyptian company which
produces dyestuffs and chemicals.
Egypt first produced mustard and phosgen (asphyxiation
gas), which were also employed in Yemen. Subsequently, they moved to producing
psychomimetic incapacitating agents, sarin nerve gas and later VX nerve gas. All
these were produced in industrial quantities and were loaded onto land mines,
artillery shells, aerial bombs, rockets (including cluster rockets) and finally
onto missile warheads. After the Egyptian-Iraqi-Argentinian “Condor” missile
program was frozen, which was designed for chemical and biological armament from
the Egyptian and Iraqi perspectives, Egypt turned to arming alternative
missiles, and that armament effort has already certainly been realized.
Many Egyptian experts have been integrated over the years
in various international forums, and have acquired knowledge and access in the
field of chemical weapons. Egypt participated in a trial challenge inspection
exercise for the tracing of chemical weapons under United Nations auspices,
conducted for the first time by a multi-national staff, at a West German
operational Air Force base, together with experts from Iran, Pakistan,
Argentina, England and Germany. Egypt even conducted a national trial challenge
inspection exercise on a chemical plant in its own country and reported on it to
the Conference of Disarmament, without exposing the plant. The Egyptian
representative noted in his report that “Egypt does not possess or produce
chemical weapons” even though “the inspected plant is definitely capable of
producing chemical weapons of all types” – a purposeful claim designed to create
uncertainty and obfuscate the distinction between production ability and actual
production. In contrast, and at about the same time (1991), Egypt claimed that
“in the past it possessed a large supply of chemical weapons, but at present its
chemical weapons production is limited to that which is necessary to ensure
defensive and deterrence capabilities”; in other words, indirect Egyptian
admission of the existence of chemical weapons in its possession and its
production.
Biological Weapons
Anwar Sadat and Saddam Hussein were the only two Arab
leaders to this point who unambiguously declared (20 years apart) that Egypt and
Iraq, respectively, possess operational biological weapons.
In the early 1960s, Egypt embarked on an integrated
chemical and biological weapons project which was code-named “Izlis”. It was
implemented (and apparently continues to be) in a military-civilian consortium
located in Abu-Za`abal which includes a military installation called Military
Industry 801, a civilian installation called “The Abu-Za`abal Company for
Chemicals and Insecticides”, and an additional civilian installation called “The
El-Nasser Company for Pharmaceutical Chemicals and Antibiotics”. The last plant
constitutes a cover for military activity in the field of biological weapons,
concomitant to its real civilian activities.
Sadat first announced the existence of biological weapons
in Egyptian possession in 1970, when he was still vice-president, and once again
in 1972 when he was already president: “Egypt has biological weapons, stored in
refrigerators, which can be used against Israel’s dense population.” It seems
that in the early 1970s, a decade after the project’s inception, and after the
massive stockpiling of operational chemical weapons and their implementation in
Yemen, Egypt stockpiled biological warfare agents in operational quantities and
also the means to deliver them. However, it seems that Sadat’s declaration was
not incidental, but was timed to coincide with the decision to launch a surprise
attack against Israel and was designed to greatly enhance Egypt’s
non-conventional strategic deterrence capability in order to neutralize to
whatever extent possible the plausibility of a nuclear counterstrike by Israel.
The existence of chemical weapons in Egypt’s possession was already public
knowledge, while the strategic deterrence (and offensive) potential of
biological weapons is much greater.
After the Yom Kippur War, Sadat and his Chief of Staff even
declared that Egypt would employ all types of weapons which it did not utilize
in the Yom Kippur War, should Israel act unreasonably, and that it possesses a
genuine mass destruction capability which includes sufficient biological and
chemical weapons, though not nuclear weapons. Indeed, in the 1970s, Egypt
significantly intensified its activity in the field of biological weapons, and
in the 1980s, worked in close cooperation with Iraq in the development of
biological weapons.
“The Egyptian plagues” which included pestilence, anthrax
and Rift Valley Fever, have been preserved there in the present day as well, and
have enabled its scientists to closely investigate these two classic agents of
plague and to adopt them as biological warfare agents. Furthermore, Egypt’s
advanced biotechnological ability enabled it to deal in these instances with two
germs (the agents of pestilence and anthrax) whose development and storage are
not simple, and a virus (the agent of the Rift Valley Fever) – whose treatment
is even more complicated than that required by germs. Add to these the
development of biological warfare agents like the botulinum toxin and the
encephalitis virus, at least.12
Egyptian strategists, who have dealt with the issues
relating to the Israeli-Arab balance of power, have repeatedly emphasized the
importance of both biological and chemical weapons as a vital component of Arab
and Egyptian armament efforts. One can assume, therefore, that the goal is to
equip themselves with long-range missile warheads carrying biological warfare
agents, as an optimal strategic power component, and that Egypt’s technological
capability enables that.
The Big Enigma
The complexity marking the fate of Iraq’s CBW is featured
by a multi-factorial sequence of events – geo-strategic, political and
technological. It is far beyond the banal question: were there WMD in Iraq, or
not? As a matter of fact, that question is totally meaningless, if not
ridiculous, as long as it does not pertain to any specific point of time. A
perfect distinction ought to be made, first of all, between the following
chronological elements:
-
During the 1980s
CW and BW were produced in Iraq on a fully industrial scale;
-
During the
Iraq-Iran war, CW were often massively employed by the Iraqi army – the
proportion to the produced quantities is not known;
-
During Gulf War
One (and occasionally during the 1990s) CBW-related facilities were in part
destroyed; effectiveness – if any – in terms of resultantly reducing the CBW
arsenal is not known;
-
During the 1990s,
known quantities of CW were eliminated by the UN in accordance with Iraq’s
agreement; although perfectly known, their relative proportion of the total CW
arsenal is unknown
-
On many occasions
during the 1990s, UN inspectors evidenced on-spot, circumstantially to the
least, rescuing of CBW by the Iraqis;
-
By 1995, Iraq
admitted – perfectly in contrast to earlier Iraqi declarations – that it
produced BW on an industrial scale. Iraq claimed that the BW arsenal has been
wiped out.
It follows that:
Reduction of CW did take place, both by consumption of CW
(during the Iran-Iraq War) and by coordinated elimination of CW (by UN
inspectors). In addition, there is also spontaneous chemical degradation along
time. Theoretically then, overall reduction could possibly bring about the
removal of the entire Iraqi CW arsenal. However, the chances for the extent of
such reduction equalizing the magnitude of CW production during the 1980s,
especially combined with ostensible non-production of further CW during the
1990s, may be regarded as far less that 50%.
Reduction of BW could have not been taken place at all. The
chances that reduction did occur – one way or another – equalizing the magnitude
of the Iraqi original BW arsenal, combined with ostensible non-production of
further BW during the 1990s, may likewise be regarded as far less that 50%.
Completely irrespective of political and other
considerations prevailing within the US, UK and Israeli administrations and
intelligence communities – since the inception of the current Bush presidency –
in regard to the CBW arsenal attributed to Iraq, the existence of such an
arsenal, then, is much more likely than its absence. The emerging enigma,
therefore, is when and what happened to that arsenal, in purely physical or
technical terms. Objectively, other mysteries or debates of whatever kind are
less significant.
It was no other than the head of IDF intelligence who
lately contended: “Iraq continued to sustain and maintain its residual
(offensive chemical and biological) capability after the UN inspectors were
expelled. We have intelligence proofs that they carried on”.13
Needless to say, “intelligence proofs”, unlike evidence or indications,
constitute, basically, the best, essentially absolute, verification of any
seemingly unsound information pertaining to an adversary’s capacity. Otherwise,
the phrase “intelligence proofs” would not have been applied in that case.
The Fate of Iraq’s Residual CBW Arsenal
The temporal point of reference serving within the given
context for examining the fate of Iraq’s residual CBW arsenal in the outset of
Bush’s presidency is that:
“The residual arsenal” is defined here as the overall
quantities of chemical and biological agents plus munitions designed to carry
them. (Those quantities are mostly unknown; yet, as explained, their existence
is at any rate much more likely than their absence.)
The outset of Bush’s presidency is regarded here as the
most meaningful event, influencing, thereafter, the reduction (rather
disappearance) of that arsenal – since the last completely and fully documented
reduction preceding that event, namely the UN-conducted elimination of CW – even
in comparison with all other UN inspection activities.
One way or another, his presidency, chiefly, shaped the
fate of the residual CBW arsenal, propelling, gradually, its eventual
disappearance at some point of time, most probably during the last months
preceding the invasion of Iraq. Though less likely, that process could have been
extended into the phase of the war itself. In practice, three main possibilities
may underlie, then, the fate of the residual CBW arsenal, forwarded in an
ascending order of probabilities:
-
Destruction conducted by the Iraqis;
-
Hiding conducted by the Iraqis in Iraq;
-
Smuggling into another country, apparently Syria.
Those possibilities are not in contrast with each other,
and may rather be complementary. At least one of them supposedly took place in
actuality. Time is not a contradicting factor in that case, even if the mystery
remains unsolved. Comparatively, in a sense, the mystery of bin Laden has not
yet been deciphered – does this imply that he vanished, or just disappeared?
Various political, diplomatic, professional and legal issues stemming from the
above described tangle – both domestically (referring to the US, UK and Israel)
and internationally – are of paramount importance, certainly, yet they prevail
within another dimension. The core of the CBW arsenal enigma is but a physical
or technical one: when disappearance began, in what temporal rate, and onto what
grounds, Iraqi or other ones.
For the time being, answers are far from adequate, not only
in terms of lack of satisfactory information that may produce a clear solution
for that cardinal enigma, but, unfortunately, also in the sense that this lack
of information is politically used – domestically and internationally – in
improper ways, much beyond its objectively problematic complexity. Up until today, there are, yet, some significant events that should be noted in that they
are in support of deciphering the mystery. First, once again it was the head of IDF intelligence who very recently asserted: “We are now more convinced that
(unspecified) equipment was translocated from Saddam’s palaces to Syria. This
move involved directly the presidential levels of Iraq and Syria, and was
carried out by more than one track.”14
Second, Douglas Hanson, who served in Summer 2003 as Chief of Staff in the Iraqi
Ministry of Science and Technology, held that on various occasions there was
solid information about the existence of hidden chemical and
biological weapons in Iraq during that period of time.15
Those two explanations do not contradict each other; rather, they are
complementary.
Chemical Weapons
One can assume that the (very significant, by all accounts)
quantity of CW which was destroyed by UN inspectors was, to a large extent,
“sacrificed”, unwillingly, by the Iraqis, in a manner which obscured the
concealment of smaller quantities of considerably higher quality chemical
weapons, which they either did not disclose, or which they acknowledged were in
their possession and claimed that they themselves or their allies destroyed them
before the initiation of UN inspection. If that is the case, they retained
relatively high quality chemical warfare agents along with delivery and
dispersal systems. One can surmise that the CW which were acknowledged by the
Iraqis include relatively outdated CW (possessing inferior military value) or
leaky weapons and/or CW which do not fit into the above categories but which the
Iraqis decided to “sacrifice” in order to satisfy the UN inspectors.
The variety of chemical warfare agents and delivery systems
developed and produced by the Iraqis since the early 1980s was extensive;
primary among them were:
-
Blistering gases – sulfuric and possibly nitric mustard
gas;
-
Hallucinogenic (psychochemical) gases – glycolates;
-
Blood gases – cyanide;
-
Nerve gases – tabon, sarin, GF, VX and possibly soman;
-
Delivery systems – shells (many types), aerial bombs
(many types), rockets (various types), aerial spray systems (various types),
mobile spray systems (various types) and surface-to-surface missile warheads
(various types). Surface-to-surface missiles adopted to carry chemical warheads
included long-range missiles whose scope even exceeded that of regular and
enhanced SCUDs.
In fact, the Iraqis were involved in the development of an
intricate network of sophisticated delivery devices, including binary and
cluster systems, and of sophisticated combat gases, including thickened chemical
warfare agents, and powdery chemical warfare agents which penetrate filters. In
doing so, they accumulated expertise unprecedented in the Arab world in terms of
quantity and quality. The Iraqi army was also the most experienced in the world
in implementing chemical weapons against a wide range of targets in various
topographical and environmental conditions. This too is the case as far as
employing suppliers of forbidden technology and circuitous ways to acquire them
were concerned and also in terms of concealment, development, production and
storage alignments. There is no doubt that the Egyptian army and the Egyptian
military industry absorbed a significant portion of this extensive inventory of
expertise as well. Libya – in addition to Egypt, Iraq’s ally in the 1980s – has
been benefiting from the technological fruits of this period.
As a result, despite the diminishing dissonance between
Iraq and the Iranian-Syrian bloc, Libya – and perhaps Egypt, – served as a
conduit for the flow of information of this sort to its long-time good friends,
Syria and Iran. This depiction, for all intents and purposes, canceled the
positive value of Islamic divisiveness as a barrier, as far as the transfer of
strategic-technological information is concerned, and increased the possibility
of pan-Arab and Iranian reliance on a joint database, which, at least
apparently, has the ability to facilitate vital upgrading/leaps and
breakthroughs.
It is noteworthy that the Iraqis have also experimented
with the implementation of toxic chemical substances clandestinely – first they
assisted in the mercury contamination of Israeli citrus fruits marketed in
Europe; afterwards, they shortened the lives of many dissidents by poisoning
their food or drinks with thallium; and finally, they killed the fugitive Kurds
by covertly poisoning them with nerve gas.
Biological Weapons
Basically, the Iraqi biological weapons program, like its
chemical counterpart, was second in its scope and pretensions to just one other
country in the world – the Soviet Union. However, amazingly, just as Iraq and
Russia both agreed to destroy their chemical weapons, and even took steps to
implement that agreement, so, too, they are aligned in their consistent and
resolute evasiveness in terms of admitting that they were in possession of
biological weapons – and as a result, from destroying them. It is possible that
this was a well thought out strategic approach – conceding chemical weapons
(partially or totally) whose loss would have been offset by biological weapons.
Even if one assumes (incorrectly, most probably) that the
Soviet Union refrained from or limited the passing of biochemical military
information to Iraq in the past, the latter has been supplied with this
information through East Germany. However, unfortunately, Iraq’s close ties with
East Germany in the 1980s led to close ties with West Germany, which has proven
to be money-hungry and filled with greedy suppliers. Indeed, democratic,
commercially unobstructed, Germany stood at the head of a large camp of
technology suppliers from Western Europe, and to a certain degree, Americans as
well, who were joined by Yugoslavians and Egyptians. Furthermore, recently, and
as a result of the dismissal of thousands of scientists from the Russian
biological-chemical alignment, some of them were employed in Iraq, along with
covert, semi-institutionalized dual assistance extended by Russia.
In contrast to the frequent implementation of chemical
weapons, Iraq has implemented biological weapons in only a few instances – the
difficulty in confirming or denying said implementation attests to the great
potential advantage of biological weapons substances – fungal toxins against the
Iranians, malaria carrying mosquitoes and typhoid bacteria against the Kurds,
and, allegedly, unidentified biological warfare agents (plus unidentified
chemical warfare agents) against the Allies. (The last case raised a contentious
issue in the United States in that they did not find a satisfactory explanation
for the medical complaints of many of the participants in the Gulf War, even
though it can be simply accounted for as the result of leaks which took place in
the wake of the bombing of ammunition storage facilities.)
There are various circumstantial evidence indicating Iraqi
involvement in the anthrax letters affair (USA, Sep. 2001), an intriguing
mystery not yet deciphered, unfortunately.
Nonetheless, there is no doubt concerning the vast Iraqi
experience in development, production, storage and concealment of biological
weapons during the 1980s and 1990s. Throughout the 1980s, Iraq’s efforts to
amass an extensive operational stockpile of biological weapons were maximal, and
for the most part, successful. This effort was identified in its early stages
but did not lead to attempts to gather intelligence or genuine efforts to halt
its progress, like those unsuccessfully taken against Iraq’s chemical efforts
(until the war in Kuwait). In retrospect, it turned out that assessments
regarding the Iraqi biological missile capabilities in Gulf War One were,
for all intents and purposes, accurate, though they were the subject of much
skepticism.
The Iraqi success (during the 1990s, to the least) in
concealing its arsenal of biological weapons, including, apparently, biological
warfare agents and delivery systems beyond those which they declared is many
times more serious; in that context, it is worth noting the following Iraqi
development activity:
Biological warfare agents: anthrax, botulinum, plague,
gas-gangrene, smallpox, conjunctivitis, encephalitis, Crimean-Congo Fever,
malaria, typhoid, fungal toxins and more. It is important to stress that the
Iraqi development of biological warfare agents was based significantly on
cooperation with senior Egyptian scientists, and was aided both by types of
biological warfare agents which were isolated in Iraq itself (and probably in
Egypt and Mauritania as well), and on pathogens and toxins purchased from the
United States, from quasi-governmental suppliers of biological strains, who
acted carelessly.
Delivery systems: aerial bombs (of various types), aerial
spray systems, unmanned drones (of various types), super guns and super gun
shells (almost certainly for the purpose of launching anthrax spores), rockets
and long-range surface-to-surface missile warheads. Similarly, there was great
importance attached to cluster armaments developed by the Iraqis in order to
attain an extremely effective launch of biological elements, and also to the
processing of powdery biological elements, which they acquired.
Moreover, in the course of UN inspection in Iraq, and
despite the inspection, Iraq managed to conduct new and more advanced field
experiments with biological weapons, and to retool and improve unmanned drones
to carry and disseminate those weapons. Saddam ascribes supreme importance to
biological weapons. As a result, the production of biological warfare agents,
and especially anthrax bacteria, in hidden facilities in Iraq, has been renewed
during the 1990s.
Furthermore, in 1997, in the midst of UN efforts to reveal
and destroy Iraqi biological weapons stockpiles, the “Samsam Project” began in
Iraq, designed to harness scientists and biotechnological resources from South
Africa (due to the termination of the South African efforts to acquire
biological weapons) in partnership with the Iraqi general intelligence
apparatus. For this purpose, South African branches of German companies and key
merchants were recruited to purchase centrifuges for the separation of bacteria,
stainless steel for the production of fermenters and accessory equipment in the
guise of milk and pharmaceutical industries.
Libya apparently represents the first case of a veracious
deproliferation process, which it voluntarily undertook, by December 2003.
Indeed, there is a variety of factors – geo-strategic, political and personal –
that altogether propelled and fueled this outstanding move conducted by Qaddafi,
who for many years was one of the most radical anti-Western leaders, WMD-seekers
and terrorism-supporters all over the world. As a matter of fact, since the
early 1980s, he persistently – though not very effectively – pursued WMD, which
he intended to install into long range ballistic missiles, capable of covering
Israel and parts of Europe.
This enduring course continuously fueled an opposing
American-British endeavor aimed at hindering any Libyan progress in that field.
Tirelessly and variedly being conducted, that endeavor eventually brought about
the desired outcome, and Libya is now fully committed to not just inspections
and control (as was the case, compellingly, with Iraq, and is the case with
Iran’s nuclear program) but rather to a totally unlimited deproliferation
process, pertaining to any item included or in support of its WMD programs, in
whatever place and sense.
For now, that process is continuing properly. Libya first
let US and British experts, and later on UN inspectors explore any facility
they wanted to. It declared, showed and handed over whatever it was requested
to: equipment, material, munitions and documents. It fully cooperated so as to
destruct stockpiles, components and other items. Moreover, it undisclosed much
information about its WMD-related technological interfaces with Iraq (in the
past), Iran, Syria, Pakistan and additional countries and suppliers. Invaluable
intelligence assets have thus been achieved, significantly facilitating steps
conducted towards those technological supporters by the US, Britain and the UN.
Libya exhibited, at any rate, a degree of daring in that
context. Increasing, indirect pressure was imposed upon Qaddafi during 2003,
while his son and head of intelligence were having intensifying contacts with US
and Britain. Yet eventually, he could equally choose to carry on with WMD
procurement, and to unreveal the interfaces with Libya’s Moslem sisters. His
elderly soberness, however, apparently turned dominant, especially since he
witnessed the fate of Iraq and Saddam.
Otherwise, Libya would very slowly – but consistently –
make progress towards acquisition of biological and nuclear weapons, in addition
to chemical weapons. Such development could have not been tolerated, and hence
the preemptive efforts made by the US and Britain. If abortive, those efforts
would leave Libya unharmed, approaching its primary goal one way or another.
Earlier, Qaddafi had emphasized many times that Libya has every right to equip
itself with non-conventional weapons.16
For years he acted in accordance, and now it is what he resultantly achieved
that he is giving up, as detailed hereafter.
Chemical Weapons
The uncovered and declared items included:
-
CW stockpile consisting of approximately 23 metric
tons of mustard gas (reportedly produced a decade ago);
-
Some 3,500 artillery shells and aerial bombs to be
filled with this chemical warfare agent on short notice;
-
Two CW storage facilities;
-
1,300 metric tons of precursor chemicals needed to
produce nerve gases17;
-
14 filing boxes filled with documents – some in
Arabic, some in English. Two of the boxes carried a reference to the
German-built ostensibly pharmaceutical facility at Rabta18;
-
One inactivated CW production facility; namely, a
dual-use capacity to produce mustard gas and nerve agents, in terms of equipment
in storage that could outfit a backup chemical weapons production line to
reinforce or replace the Rabta facility. Beyond mustard manufacturing, Libya is
thought to have carried out research to produce two nerve agents, meaning sarin
and soman19;
-
No filled munitions have been declared or found.
In March 2004, the OPCW inspectors verified through
continuous on-site monitoring the complete destruction of Libya’s entire
declared stockpile of unfilled munitions. Inspections and any review and
approval are conducted by the OPCW. Libya has provided a destruction plan for
these weapons and production facilities. The complete destruction of Libya’s CW
and the capacity to produce them is intended to be completed by April 29,
2007. Libya is expected to pay for the disposal, but can seek expertise and
financial support from other convention member states. Costs and accomplishments
vary according to destruction technology applied: incineration ($100 million,
two years), or neutralization ($10 million to $50 million, one year).
Considerations relating to needed expertise and environmental pollution are
playing a role, as well.20
The key issue of Libyan past preparedness to manufacture
nerve agents was addressed by the Director General of the OPCW, Rogelio Pfirter: “I think they were
pretty close to producing nerve gases. I’m not sure they were in a position to
produce them, but we need to look more thoroughly into the declaration for
that.” Closer scrutiny of the documents provided by Libya should also shed more
light on the status of the country’s chemical weapons production. It is believed
the program has been dormant for some time. Rogelio Pfirter stated:
The actual production of chemical agents was inactivated
sometime in the early 1990s. But in as much that there were chemical weapons,
there were the bombs to deploy them. I would say the program should be
considered to be alive. But the bombs were destroyed in the last few days. So
the immediate danger has in a way been diminished.
Mr. Pfirter said the OPCW was “not
aware that Libya helped other countries” to acquire chemical weapons. He noted,
as well, that Libya has received no outside help in the development of its
chemical weapons.21
The above detailed yield of findings, declarations and
remarks was rather unsurprising, in general. It is fairly compatible with the
following data known previously, namely:
Procured Precursor Chemicals
(mainly from West European
and Far-Eastern firms):
-
60 tons of phosphorus-trichloride;
-
20 tons of dichlorethane;
-
unspecified – yet industrial – quantities of: thionyl-chloride,
thiodiglycol, ethylene oxide, dimethylamine, sodium sulphide, sodium-fluoride,
and pynacolyl alchohol.
-
Those chemicals are used for the production of
mustard (hence mostly consumed while mustard was being manufactured by Libya)
and nerve gases. Pynacolyl alchohol is a strait-forward precursor for
synthesizing soman, a notably advanced nerve agent.
-
Extraneous supplies of CW: Iran, at least, provided
Libya with CW. They were employed by Libya – possibly all the amount supplied –
against Chad.
Equipment:
Production line mustard synthesis;
Glass-lined vessels designed to contain corrosive
chemical reactions, and ancillaries – mainly for synthesis of nerve agents.
Facilities:
The Rabta complex was founded as a “Technology Center” by
an Iraqi specialist, Dr. Ihsan Barbouty, an architect by profession, possessing
huge European-based companies, already serving the Iraqi CW program. It included
a war gases production plant camouflaged as a pharmaceutical project and built
by Dr. Urgen Hipenstil Imhauzen, a German chemist owning the firm “Imhauzen
Chemei”. Besides, a CW munitions factory was built at the Rabta compound,
separate from the chemical warfare agent plant. For its construction, assistance
was afforded by Japanese firms. US officials learned that Japan Steel Works was
building Rabta’s metalworking plant. The facility housed precision machines
capable of turning out artillery shells plus aerial bombs, as well as
corrosion-resistant containers for chemical agents. In 1994, another underground
wing was constructed in the Rabta compound, intended to develop and produce CW.
This time, the main constructor drafted for the project was a German mechanical
engineer, Roland Franz Berger, who has been living in Libya since 1973. Tens of
tons of mustard were assessed to have been produced in that facility before it
was converted, ostensibly, for civilian purposes. Many more details about the Rabta facility are available elsewhere.22
Later, two additional facilities, located in Sebha and Tarhunah, were
constructed, regarded to contain further installations for the Libyan CW
program. The site of Sebha was picked because it already housed strategic
installations for development and production of ballistic missiles. The Tarhunah
facility aroused an intensive political confrontation with Tripoli, while the
latter was totally denying any link to CW. That cardinal discrepancy has not
been fully deciphered.23
All in all, the Rabta chemical facility is now described as
the “inactivated chemical warfare agent plant”, while the two uncovered “CW
storage facilities” are probably located in two of the three compounds
mentioned. The mustard stock still found in Libya had been manufactured at the Rabta chemical factory, and the aerial bombs in the Rabta metalworking plant.
The mustard, the bombs and the precursor chemicals (some of which were already
utilized for mustard production) were housed in the identified storage sites.
Some incompatibilities seemingly exist regarding the
production of sarin, tabun and lewisite.
Biological Weapons:
Libya declared the existence of a past research program to
develop and produce BW, and the procurement of dual-purpose biological
essentials. Apparently, no specific BW facilities were explored following the
declaration. The US and UK specialists invited to Libya found no concrete
evidence of an ongoing biological weapons effort. The team was given access to
medical and pharmacological scientists and facilities, and Libyans were
questioned about equipment and research that could be applied to biological
warfare, but the Libyans denied that a BW program had ever existed in an
operational state.24
Earlier reports indicated that during the 1980s and 1990s
an attempt to establish a BW infrastructure took place in Libya, in the form of
some masked projects, the main location being apparently at Taminhint (a small
town northwest of Sebha in south central Libya.)25
Those masked projects included:
Supporting Civilian Facilities:
-
High Institute of Technology, Brack
-
Biotechnology Research Center, Tajura
-
Tripoli and al Fattah universities.
Also, during the 1990s, a secret project, code named “Ibn
Hayan”, aimed to produce bombs and warheads filled with anthrax germs and
botulinum toxin. It was led by top Iraqi BW experts who left Iraq due to the UN
inspections, and were allowed by Saddam to assist Libya. The project was
directly linked to the Libyan presidency bureau. A number of organizations,
including universities and laboratories attached to the ministries of
agriculture and health, were engaged in making ostensibly innocent purchases of
dual-use diagnostic and laboratory materials. Reportedly, mobile equipment
designed to producing biological warfare agents through maintaining constant
sterile environment, as well as ancillaries were purchased primarily from China,
India and Serbia.
Meaningful assistance had been extended by Cuba. US
officials noted Libya (aside from Syria and Iran) was especially interested in
advancing its biological weapons programs. Assistant Secretary of State Carl
Ford said there was evidence of Cuban exports of dual-use BW technology to
Libya, and other Moslem countries in the Middle East. Apparently, several Indian
and Pakistani specialists were helping the Libyan biological effort to achieve
some tangible advance.
On the whole, it is clear that an endeavor for practically
implementing a BW program took place, and for certain periods of time, was highly
prioritized. Seemingly, it was not productive; distinctively, yet, there is a
lack of published information on that subject, particularly on the Ibn Hayan
project.
Despite the fact that Iran is the only non-Arab country
included in this survey, and despite its relative distance from Israel, it
potentially constitutes the greatest chemical/biological threat in a number of
senses26:
-
Its present chemical and biological and future
nuclear armament efforts result from its resolute perception of the three types
of weapons of mass destruction as vital (the gravity of this issue was discussed
above);
-
Its many scientific and technological resources which
surpass, for all intents and purposes, those of any Arab country;
-
Its signature on the chemical and biological
conventions treaty, despite its chemical and biological armament efforts, which
it denies;
-
Its close ties with hostile Arab countries,
especially Syria and Libya (along with its ties to radical North Korea), which
include cooperation in the chemical/biological realm;
-
Its gradual, though prioritized, acquisition of
long-range surface-to-surface missiles (with ranges reaching thousands of
kilometers), designed to carry chemical/biological warheads, and its interest in
cruise missiles; its development of a missile with a range long enough to reach
Israel has been completed, and its adaptation to carry chemical/biological
warheads has begun;
-
The extensive quantity and dispersal of facilities
included in the development, production and storage alignment of chemical and
biological warfare agents and of the delivery systems designed for them.
Noteworthy facilities are located in Teheran, Kharj, Karai, Ispahan, Marv-Dasht,
Shiraz and Bandar Khomeini;
-
The lack of a significant change in concept and
strategic armament policy after the change in government. Iran was characterized
as the most concrete existential threat to Israel since the War of Independence
for good reason;
-
The excessive cultivation of terrorist capability,
including chemical and especially biological terrorism;
-
Its enmity towards Israel and its Islamic fanaticism;
-
The match between Iran and Syria, alongside North
Korea, represents, therefore, an unusual and powerful strategic relationship in
general, and in the non-conventional context in particular.
However, lately, the significance of the aid to its
chemical/biological armament programs including in the ballistic realm, which
Iran receives from China, Russia, Pakistan and South Africa, is gradually
burgeoning. At the same time, it is the beneficiary of extremely advanced
Russian technological expertise which is accelerating the pace of Iranian
development and deployment and is apparently continuing despite the vigorous
American and Israeli efforts to persuade Russian authorities to halt those
transfers. Recently, it was reported that 10,000 Russian chemical, biological
and nuclear experts were employed in Iran.27
Even if we assume that the quantity is much exaggerated, Russian
aid remains very significant. In fact, the American sanctions have not been at
all successful in slowing the Iranian chemical/biological armament efforts. At
the same time, Iran is receiving extensive assistance from German companies, a
large number of which previously aided Iraq, and by doing so, were, ironically,
bitterly condemned by Iran – a typically fraudulent Iranian approach – in fact,
one of many which have constituted the Iranian strategic philosophy for a
considerable period of time.
Chemical Weapons
Iran, more than any other country, has learned from bitter
experience, one which absorbed seven years of frequent, mostly effective, Iraqi
chemical attacks. This accumulated experience had ramifications for Iranian
chemical armament efforts. In the course of its war with Iraq, Iran attempted to
produce chemical weapons, but implemented them on a very limited scale, not at
all comparable to the scope of the Iraqi use of chemical weapons. However, by
the end of the bitter war, Iran had gained considerable momentum in its
preparations for the extensive production of chemical weapons, and the practical
implementation of those preparations. Today, it possesses chemical weapons,
including artillery shells, aerial bombs, rockets and missile warheads as well.
The chemical weapons substances, which it produces, include cyanide, mustard
gas, lewisite, phosgene, VX and sarin. Iran does possess operational missiles
with chemical warheads capable of reaching Israel, and it is clear that it is
striving to appreciably extend their range.
Biological Weapons
In the field of biological weapons, too, Iran is operating
tirelessly. It possesses extensive and sophisticated biotechnological
infrastructures in which trained personnel are concentrated. Therefore, it does
not require much outside assistance and it is likely that its biological efforts
will garner results, in terms of deployment. The biological warfare agents which
it produces coincide surprisingly or not so surprisingly with those noted above
regarding Syria – botulinum, ricin and anthrax. Foot and mouth disease (an
anti-livestock agent) has been mentioned as well. Nevertheless, its ability to
develop and produce biological warfare agents, including viral biological
warfare agents, is much more extensive than Syria’s, and there is no doubt
regarding their aspiration to equip themselves with biological warheads carried
by long-range missiles. The development of warheads of that type was recently
completed in Iran. The Iranian effort to equip themselves with biological
weapons is a concentrated effort; in this area, it is assisted by Russia, among
others, which contributes to the operational Iranian offensive biological
capability whose effect, according to American intelligence sources, will be
comparable to that of nuclear weapons. The Iranians are even expending an effort
to recruit biological weapons experts from the CIS.28
The significance of biological weapons in the context of terrorist
activity has not escaped the attention of the Iranians, and it has equipped
itself with guerilla warfare instrumentality designed to implement biological
warfare agents by aerosol or by contaminating water systems.
Sudan represents an outstanding example of a country
attempting to develop chemical and biological weapons, a development process
which was primarily inspired and managed by another friendly country – Iraq.
The beginnings of the phenomenon were in the winter of 1991, when Iraq, under
the threat of a powerful Arab coalition in the wake of its invasion of Kuwait
found a solitary outpost in the desert in the guise of Sudan, transferred SCUD
units to it, and in doing so, effected a threat to Egypt. Over the years since,
and due to increasing UN pressure on Iraq to expose and destroy its
non-conventional weapons arsenal, Iraq’s remarkable outpost in Sudan has
gradually been strengthened. Teams of experts, equipment, components and
apparently whole weapons systems were transferred to Sudan for purposes of
concealment and establishing local infrastructures which would both assist the
rehabilitation of Iraq’s depleted arsenals and Sudanese armament efforts.
This phenomenon developed to the point of the establishment
and operation of several facilities functioning in research, development,
production and storage of chemical and biological weapons in Sudan, with – in
addition to the Iraqis – Iranians, Libyans, Egyptians, Syrians and Arab
terrorists of undetermined origins, all involved in this alignment.29
In other Arab countries, it is difficult to clearly
identify efforts to develop a chemical/biological capability, and a significant
distinction exists between them and the countries discussed above in
technological-scientific and other characteristics. Saudi Arabia is noteworthy
in that scientifically and technologically, generally speaking, it is no less
advanced than the group of nations equipping themselves with these weapons.30
Regarding countries like Saudi Arabia, as well as Algeria, for
instance, the primary limiting factor (not to speak of financial ability) in the
chemical/biological context is the decision as to the need to equip themselves.
The fact that Saudi Arabia possesses long-range Chinese surface-to-surface
missiles capable of carrying chemical/biological weapons, and that it
participated substantively in the planning and funding of the Pakistani nuclear
effort (it is hard to imagine that its funding will not be repaid in
chemical/biological weapons, which, by the way, the Pakistanis possess) are
liable to accelerate a decision of that sort. Along with Saudi Arabia, Algeria
should be mentioned, as in the past, France developed chemical weapons within
its borders and Iraqi biological weapons arrived there in 2000. Its apparent
attempts to establish a nuclear-military infrastructure point to an intensifying
orientation in the area of non-conventional weapons.
One of the serious concerns recently aroused in the
Western
world, and especially in the United States, is related to the heavy damages
liable to be caused by terrorist acts involving chemical or biological weapons
systems.31
This suspicion is to a great extent focused on terrorists
who will be dispatched (in the sense of human “launch devices” of chemical and
biological warfare agents, including suicide potential) from an Arab country or
Iran. Technically, a significant fundamental feasibility exists for this sort of
terrorism, whose implementation is possible with relative ease, and the launch
destination could just as easily be in Israel. In fact, over the last decade,
there were many incidents in which the Palestinians attempted sabotage through
toxic materials (attacks with poisonous chemicals), though they were limited in
scope, and it is possible that it was just a result of individual initiatives
and not of a guided framework. Some incidents involving biological terrorism
occurred as well. They included attempts to bring about infections by hepatitis
virus, AIDS virus, and gastrointestinal pathogens (food contaminations).
However, in recent years,
as well as now, concern is growing regarding
purposeful, official and well-organized bio-chemical terrorism, which will be
initiated and might be fueled under the auspices of Syria and especially Iran.
The former director of the CIA, James Woolsey, recently noted that it is near
certain that Hizbullah is apt to perpetrate a terrorist attack with biological
weapons, as it is the easiest way to kill many people. It was also discovered
that Hamas planned to poison sources of drinking water and swimming pools in
Israel32
and that the Saudi grand-terrorist, bin Laden, who heads the
al-Qai`dah apparatus which has already equipped itself with chemical/biological
terrorism abilities, plans on attacking Israel using those abilities. Indeed,
connections between al-Qai`dah, Hizbullah, and Palestinian terrorist
organization have been uncovered, and it is feasible, then, that some joint
venture against Israel, involving bio-chemical warfare agents may be configured
in that context. More than any other entity worldwide, al-Qai`dah represents the
intensifying power of terrorism, both conventional and unconventional. It most
probably conducted – apparently in conjunction with Iraq – the anthrax letters
attack against the US, and several additional attempts to employ chemical and
biological agents. Al-Qai`dah openly exhibits its intentions: “al-Qai`dah
possesses bombs with deadly viruses that would spread out lethal diseases in
American cities.”33
Furthermore, one of course cannot rule out that a directed
“ecological intifada” in the media’s phrase, is indeed transpiring, referring to
the sewage pollution flowing from Judea and Samaria to the coastal plain’s
streams.
The term “chemical/biological terrorism” signifies sabotage
or guerilla warfare implemented by means of toxic materials or micro-organisms
which are liable to inflict damage upon people, animals, crops or functional
materials, like gasoline. Chemical/biological terrorism includes sub-categories
like environmental terrorism, in other words, when the environment – air and
water, for example – is the element carrying the chemical/biological substances
to murder specific people, or random people, indiscriminately, and narco-terrorism
– introducing hallucinogenic drugs to the target population, and non-lethal
warfare, which was recently developed to sabotage logistical infrastructures by
means of chemical/biological substances. Lately, the importance of radiological
terrorism significantly increased. This type of terrorism consists in
radioactive toxic materials, which may be regarded as a specific sub-category of
chemical warfare agents. The consequences of chemical/biological terrorism are
liable to be tactical or strategic, acute or chronic, and/or physical or
psychological. There are those who relate to chemical/biological weapons as
weapons of mass impact rather than weapons of mass destruction.
Chemical/biological terrorism is not a new threat, but it is progressively
becoming more and more worrisome.
The terrorists must have a motive to implement
chemical/biological terrorism, but they will not need to manufacture the weapons
on their own. Today, it is possible to purchase or steal many industrial or
laboratory toxic materials, in substantial quantities. The decisive technical
factor will, therefore, be the effectiveness of the dispersal of the
chemical/biological substances at the time of attack. According to Stoke,
chemical or biological weapons provide terrorists with certain advantages34:
-
The terrifying results of their implementation will
exacerbate anxiety and cause panic;
-
These substances are undetectable by traditional
anti-terrorist detection systems;
-
The difficulty to defend against this sort of
substance;
-
The ease with which they can be camouflaged,
transported and introduced into the target area, relative to conventional
weapons;
-
Their effectiveness as a means to murder individuals;
-
The possible time lapse between dispersal and the
appearance of symptoms;
-
The possibility of attacking without being
identified;
-
Certain substances cause temporary disability and are
not lethal;
-
It is easy to purchase the technical equipment
necessary to prepare the substances on a limited basis;
-
The technology for the production of chemical or
biological substances is described in detail in literature available to the
public;
-
Delivery of toxic or pollutant substances can be
accomplished employing very effective methods, like the utilization of municipal
water systems, or the atmosphere.
Generally speaking, the chemical/biological terrorism
threat constitutes a danger, which must be practically confronted in an
appropriate manner. The chance that this danger might really come to bear and
spin out of control is relatively greater now than ever before and more
conspicuous in absolute terms, and it is worsening. There is no doubt that
chemical, biological and radiological terrorism today constitutes a
non-conventional threat with especially grave potential. There are a number of
trends predominant in the world, which are apt to sustain each other and
engender escalation in the nature of this threat:
-
In terms of concept – the appearance of “avant-garde”
terrorists and the implementation of extreme terrorist tactics;
-
In practical terms – the increasing availability of
chemical and biological agents suitable for terrorism;
-
Accumulated and
developed abilities of various countries to conduct chemical/biological warfare
which will be transferred or channeled improperly as a result of
chemical/biological disarmament processes, and will constitute important
resources for chemical/biological terrorism;
-
Innovative technical approaches which will be developed
in the area of chemical engineering and biotechnology which will be suitable for
chemical/biological terrorism;
-
The ability to avoid leaving tracks which could
implicate the perpetrator or his sponsors.
It is reasonable to expect that this confluence of trends
will manifest itself the world over, including the Middle East. There are
characteristics and tactics which are prone to develop into a stark extension
of conventional to non-conventional terrorism.
Terrorism is active in the Middle East these days and it is
ongoing both in state-sponsored organizations and in those not sponsored by any
country. The knowledge regarding chemical and biological weapons and their
applicability has been revealed in most of the Middle East and the proliferation
of these weapons unavoidably reaches terrorist organizations at least in terms
of its ideas, theories and beyond. Various “legitimate” terrorist organizations
are supported by Arab countries and Iran as far as the conduct of conventional
warfare is concerned, while at the same time, those countries are trying to
equip themselves with chemical/biological weapons and cultivate them,
particularly Syria and Iran.
It can, therefore, be concluded that all of the
circumstances described above are liable to arouse, and encourage, Middle
Eastern terrorist organizations to contemplate the usefulness of
chemical/biological weapons, especially against Israel. The next steps expected,
presumably, to take place are the equipping of terrorists with
chemical/biological weapons and their deployment (steps which have already taken
place randomly, for the time being, as was described above). It does not seem to
be an especially difficult mission: Chemical laboratories exist which deal with
explosives and are capable of treating toxic substances and regular microbiology
laboratories, which are connected to hospitals and universities, can handle
germs without much difficulty. There is no doubt that the fact that throughout
most of Israel streams flow which originate in lands populated by Arabs, will
ease intentional pollution. Reciprocal trade between Israel and the Arabs is liable
to play a similar role.
All in all, this is a bleak picture which has to be
addressed. The two primary directions are, naturally, preventing
chemical/biological terrorism and managing situations of this sort after the
fact. Recently, substantial efforts relating to the chemical/biological
terrorism threat have been expended in the United States, and the American
program, which was consolidated and developed in this matter, is extremely
comprehensive. The modalities in Israel are very different, of course, but,
nevertheless, the American program is a suitable model, in a fundamental sense;
in any case, Israel has attained a certain degree of readiness. As a result, in
practical terms, the implication will be primarily that the two alignments that
already exist in Israel – preparation for all kinds of terrorist attacks and for
incidents involving chemical/biological weapons – should be a coordinated task
force for dealing with issues and incidents of chemical/biological terrorism. In
actuality, things are moving that way. The proper steps are being currently
conducted.35
Syria
Chemical Weapons
Acquisition of Egyptian Chemical Weapons – 1972 (aerial
bombs and artillery shells containing sarin and mustard gases)
Beginning of (self) Development– 1978
Beginning of Deployment – 1983
Chemical Warfare agents – sarin, VX and cyanide
Armaments – aerial bombs, surface-to-surface missile (SCUD-B,
SCUD-C, SCUD-D) warheads, perhaps also for Frog missiles
Implementation – killing 18,000 Syrian Sunnis with cyanide
Primary objectives – arming SCUD-D, M-9, and Cruise
missiles with warheads
Biological Weapons
Beginning of Development – 1982
Beginning of Deployment – 1992
Biological Warfare agents – anthrax, cholera, ricin and
botulinum
Egypt
Chemical Weapons
Beginning of Development – 1960
Beginning of Deployment – 1963
Chemical Warfare agents – nitrogen and sulfur-based
mustard, phosgene, psychochemicals, sarin, VX
Armaments – mines, artillery shells, rockets, aerial bombs,
surface-to-surface missile warheads
Implementation – in Yemen: Aerial bombs containing phosgene
or mustard gas (1963-1967)
Primary objectives – arming SCUD-C and Vector missiles with
warheads
Biological Weapons
Beginning of Development – 1963
Beginning of Deployment – 1970
Biological Warfare agents – botulinum, plague, cholera, Q
fever, Rift Valley Fever, viral encephalitis
Armament – aerial bombs, surface-to-surface missile
warheads
Primary objectives – as above
Iraq
Chemical Weapons
Beginning of Development – 1974 (in partnership with Egypt)
Beginning of Deployment – 1982
UN-controlled destruction of large proportions – the 1990s
Disappearance of residual arsenal – 2003
Chemical warfare agents – mustard gas, cyanide, tabun,
sarin, GF, VX. Most of the chemical warfare agents were destroyed.
Armaments – artillery shells, aerial bombs,
surface-to-surface warheads and air-to-air rockets. Most of the ammunition was
destroyed.
Biological Weapons
Beginning of Development – 1975 (in partnership with Egypt)
Beginning of Deployment – 1984
Disappearance of maintained stockpiles – 2003
Biological Warfare agents – anthrax, plague, gas-gangrene, botulinum, smallpox
and more. The biological warfare agents apparently were mostly saved.
Implementation – against Kurds and Iranians, locally
Extrication and transfer of development and production technology – to Sudan,
Libya and Algeria (at least)
Primary objectives – preservation of remaining weapons and rehabilitation of its
production capability
Libya
Chemical Weapons
Beginning of Development – 1982
Beginning of Deployment – 1989
Deproliferation – 2004
Chemical Warfare agents – mustard gas, tabun
Armaments – artillery shells and aerial bombs
Implementation – one-time utilization of aerial bombs containing mustard gas
(from Iran) in Chad
Primary Objectives – producing lewisite, sarin and soman and arming long-range
warheads (including Nodong, Otrag and others)
Biological Weapons
Beginning of Development – 1986
Beginning of experimental production – 1994
Deproliferation – 2004
Biological Weapons Substances – botulinum, brucella, anthrax
Armaments – aerial bombs
Primary objectives – arming long-range warheads
Iran
Chemical Weapons
Beginning of Development – 1984
Beginning of Deployment – 1986
Chemical Warfare agents – cyanide, phosgene, mustard gas, tabun
Implementation – against Iraq, on a limited basis
Primary Objectives – production of lewisite and sarin and arming long-range
(thousands of kilometers) warheads
Biological Weapons
Beginning of Development – 1986
Beginning of Deployment – 1992
Biological Warfare agents – botulinum, ricin, anthrax, foot and mouth disease
Armaments – aerial bombs, aerosol generators
Primary Objectives – arming long-range warheads
Sudan
Transfer and concealment of chemical weapons from Iraq – 1991
Implementation of Iraq’s chemical weapons – since 1993
Iraqi establishment of chemical and biological weapons production facilities –
1997
Endnotes
1 |
Dany
Shoham, “Chemical Weapons in Egypt and Syria: Evolution, Capability,
Control”, Middle East Security Studies No. 21, BESA Center for Strategic
Studies, June 1995, pp. 51-86. |
2 |
As-Safir, Beirut, January 15, 2000. |
3 |
Richard M. Bennett, “The Syrian Military: A Primer”,
Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, August 2001, <http://www.meib.org/articles
/0108_s1.htm>. |
4 |
Yedi’ot Aharonot, December 27, 1999. |
5 |
Ha’aretz, June 18, 1999. |
6 |
Yedi’ot Aharonot, June 28, 2002. |
7 |
Daily Telegraph, January 6, 2004. |
8 |
Foreign Report, August 7, 2003. |
9 |
Dany
Shoham, “Chemical and Biological Weapons in Egypt”, The Nonproliferation
Review 5, 3/1998, pp. 48-49. |
10 |
Dany
Shoham, “The Evolution of Chemical and Biological Weapons in Egypt”, Policy
Paper No. 46, Ariel Center for Policy Research, ACPR Publishers, 1998. |
11 |
“Egypt President: Israel Should Learn from Qaddafi”, Ma’ariv,
December 22, 2003. |
12 |
Dany
Shoham, “The Evolution of Chemical and Biological Weapons in Egypt”, Policy
Paper No. 46, Ariel Center for Policy Research, ACPR Publishers, 1998. |
13 |
“They
Would Torture Your Soul”, Yedi’ot Aharonot, April 11, 2004. |
14 |
Ibid. |
15 |
Douglas Hanson, “Case Not Closed: Iraq’s WMD Stockpiles”, March 2, 2004, <http://www.americanthinker.com/articles.php?article_id=3399>. |
16 |
Shoham, Dany, “Libya, Egypt and Weapons Systems of Mass Destruction”,
“Current Affairs Digest”, Nativ, 3/1996, pp. 15-16. |
17 |
David
Ruppe, Global Security Newswire, Wednesday, April 14, 2004,
<http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2004_4_14.html>. |
18 |
Hans
de Vreij, “Libya Comes Clear”, Radio Netherlands Wereldomroep, March 5,
2004. |
19 |
Jonathan Marcus, “Libya Destroys Chemical Weapons”, BBC News – World
Edition, March 4, 2004. |
20 |
Chris
Schneidmiller, “Global Security Newswire,
Tuesday, March 23, 2004, <http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2004_3_23.html>. |
21 |
Hans
de Vreij, “Libya Comes Clear”, Radio Netherlands Wereldomroep, March 5,
2004. |
22 |
G.M. Burck,
& C.C.
Flowerree, International Handbook on Chemical Weapons
Proliferation, Greenwood Press, NewYork, 1991. |
23 |
John
Hart. Libyan WMD Proliferation: Motivated to
Defy America, University of
Michigan Political Science, 472, Professor Raymond Tanter, December 10,
1997. |
24 |
“Libyan Biological Warfare”, <Global Security.org>, January 18, 2004. |
25 |
John Hart, Libyan WMD Proliferation: Motivated to
Defy America, University of
Michigan Political Science, 472, Professor Raymond Tanter, December 10,
1997. |
26 |
Dany
Shoham, “The Chemical and Biological Threat to Israel”, in Ballistic
Missiles – The Threat and the Response, Arieh Stav, ed., London:
Brassey’s (UK) Ltd. with ACPR Publishers, 1999, pp. 124-148. |
27 |
The Jerusalem Post, January 21, 1999, p. 2. |
28 |
Ma’ariv, December 9, 1998, p. 20. |
29 |
Yossef Bodansky, “The Iraqi WMD Challenge – Myth and Reality”, Task Force on
Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, US House of Representatives,
Washington DC, 1998. |
30 |
Dany
Shoham, “Does Saudi Arabia Have or Seek Chemical or Biological Weapons?”,
The Nonproliferation Review 6, 3/1999, pp. 122-130. |
31 |
Dany
Shoham, “Chemical/Biological Terrorism: An Old, But Growing Threat in the
Middle East and Elsewhere”, Politics and the Life Sciences 15,
September 1996, pp. 218-219. |
32 |
Yedi’ot Aharonot, June 18, 1999, p. 2. |
33 |
Al-Qai`dah website. |
34 |
A.P.
Stock, “Fighting C/B Terrorism: Means and Possibilities”, Politics and
the Life Sciences 15, September 1996, pp. 225-227. |
35 |
“Viruses Instead of Missiles: Terrorism in a Bottle”, Ma’ariv, March 12,
2004. |