NATIV Online        

  Vol. 4  /  June 2004                      A JOURNAL OF POLITICS AND THE ARTS      

     

The New Map of Chemical and Biological Weapons
in the Middle East

Executive Summary

Since September 2001, the month marking both the conventional-mode plane attacks and the unconventional-mode anthrax attacks on the US, two, remarkably important courses have been shaped:

Intensifying endeavor, mainly an American-British one, aimed at the elimination of WMD possessed by adversaries, which yielded, for the time being, the removal of Iraq and Libya from the CBW map.

Increasing threat of terrorism-oriented WMD posed mainly by Islamic organizations.

A sort of an indirect interplay may underlie the concomitant evolving of those two courses, signifying, apparently, for the overwhelming general trend of terrorism as a rising power that replaces, somewhat, threats posed by states.

Syria, Iran, Egypt and possibly Sudan plus Algeria still hold WMD, merely chemical and biological, in effect. The CBW ordnance of Egypt seems to be mostly static during recent years, while Syria and Iran – to an appreciable degree collaboratively – persist in cultivating their arsenals, qualitatively and quantitatively. Sudan and Algeria might be nearing preliminary significant capabilities. Extraneous biochemical technological suppliers – both state- and non-state-sponsored – continue to act in Pakistan, India, China, North Korea, Cuba, Russia and other formerly Soviet countries, as well as in Western Europe.

While Egypt is occasionally regarded as a country bearing no relevance, ostensibly, with respect to the Middle-Eastern military balances, it is, infect, by all means, a mighty regional power, in any sense, including the non-conventional-weaponry one. Much more tangible, though, the threats posed by Syria and Iran in that sense, are by far worrying, and ought to be treated accordingly.

The menace of chemical and biological terrorism is an aggravating one, whether or not backed by any country. It is an outcome of an additional dimension prevailing beyond conventional terrorism, stemming from the mighty combination of an elusive weapon bearing the capacity to bring about concrete causalities, logistic anachronism and horrifying impact at the same time.

On the whole, the removal of Iraq and Libya from the CBW map is a very meaningful development. The new map thus formed still represents, however, a complex, hardly manageable problem for the Middle-East region and worldwide. It stems from a peculiar conjunction of several state-CBW-possessors and – whether or not interlinked with – several terrorism organizations apt to employ WMD, placed, altogether, within the same space.

This review presents and analyzes the new Arab-Iranian system concerned with chemical and biological weapons. Still, it follows the procurement processes that led to the persisting related programs in Syria, Iran and Egypt, while laying emphasis, in parallel, on the recent shifts that took place in Iraq and Libya. The sphere of chemical and biological terrorism is visited as well, certainly, so as to gain a degree of comprehension regarding that cardinal factor.

Syria

Syria has been active for some 25 years in a consistent, systematic and determined effort to acquire chemical and biological weapons, an effort which is constantly still intensifying.1 Its public references to this effort, which it has never denied, are gradually receiving greater expression. More than any other country, the concept of “strategic balance” with Israel whose primary practical manifestation, beyond balance in conventional forces, involves acquisition of chemical and biological weapons, is attributed especially to Syria and in fact to Hafez Assad himself. Regarding “the other types of weapons” – as Assad was wont to refer to Syria’s chemical and biological weapons, in distinguishing them from the nuclear weapons attributed to Israel – “Syria and the Arabs are willing to dispose of them, but only after Israel undergoes nuclear disarmament”, in his words. Syria’s acquisition of chemical weapons from Egypt, in the framework of their joint preparations for the Yom Kippur War, was, to a great extent, indicative of Assad’s extreme insistence upon strategic balance. Up until the time of his death, Assad and Mubarak coordinated positions regarding leadership of the Arab camp, which negated signing the chemical and biological conventions.

Syria’s reliance on Iran, North Korea, Cuba, and possibly Russia is notable and should be treated with much concern, as it seems to cover, or will cover in the near future, all of the elements whose deficiency still delays the completion of the deployment process to Syria’s satisfaction. China contributes significantly to this as well. Syria aspires, it is unanimously believed, to complete its arsenal of enhanced-range surface-to-surface missiles – including SCUD-C, SCUD-D, M-9 and Nodung – armed with operational chemical and biological warheads, and beyond that, cruise missiles carrying chemical and biological cluster bombs. The portion of the budget and the comprehensive effort commanded by the Syrian armament in the chemical and biological field, especially when it is integrated with ballistic armament, is enormous relative to other strength components and other portions of the Syrian military budget. From this perspective, the situation of the recorded conventional inventory of the Syrian army is deceptive. The transfer of chemical and biological weapons from production and storage facilities to underground facilities should also be mentioned, as it obstructs both intelligence surveillance and attempts to destroy the weapons.

Syria’s acquisition of a CBW option has not occurred in a vacuum. It also has to be viewed in the context of Syria’s own alliances. And the most important of Syria’s strategic ties are not with its “brother” Arab states. For 15 years, Syria’s closest strategic and military bond has been with Iran – a large, powerful Muslim state, one that is close to acquiring nuclear weapons and that has missiles capable of reaching Israel.

Could Syria one day find itself under an Iranian nuclear umbrella? If it did – and the road to that point may not be so long – Syria’s threshold for first use of CBW could be lowered. For example, in a grab for the Golan, Syria might contemplate a limited chemical exchange with Israel, on the assumption that Israel would not retaliate with a nuclear escalation. Given the futility of all past Syrian attempts to gain military superiority over Israel by means of conventional forces, the CBW option might grow legitimate in Syrian eyes. And if a nuclear Iran gave assurances to Syria, it might diminish Syrian fears and inhibitions in choosing its weapons.

But the strategic significance of Syria’s CBW option is not limited to war scenarios. Even if Israel and Syria were to reengage in a peace process, Syria would have every motive for continuing its non-conventional buildup. The goal would be to strengthen Syrian proposals for a comprehensive strategic package, whereby Israel would agree to give up any non-conventional arms it might possess, in return for a pledge by Syria to dismantle its CBW. Syria has presented the total non-conventional disarmament of Israel, in return for a reciprocal Syrian step, as an important component of the “peace process”.2 Syria thus would seek to obtain what Egypt did not even attempt to attain in its peace agreement with Israel, and what Egypt has failed to obtain by its own recent diplomacy: the nuclear disarmament of Israel.

In the meantime, Syria continues to augment its CBW. It is estimated that about half of Syria’s 300 to 400 Scud-B and Scud-C missiles are chemically armed.3 Biological warheads are probably around the corner. The missiles are now much more protected in their new, reinforced underground silos. Many more Scud-C and Scud-D missiles are slated for addition to the force in the near future. Syria has recently carried out tests on modified Scud missiles using solid fuel, rather than liquid fuel, which increases the range of the missiles, improves their accuracy, and shortens the time interval between launches.4

Moreover, Syria has already achieved one of its primary strategic goals. In Israeli eyes, Syria is an adversary that must be reckoned with and that cannot be easily fobbed off by waving Israel’s own non-conventional baton. In 1999, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak explained the urgency of pursuing a peace agreement with Syria. “The Palestinians pose no military threat to Israel,” he noted. But Syria “has surface-to-surface missiles that are neatly organized and can cover the whole country with nerve gas.”5 Several years later, another highly ranked Israeli official elaborated on the Syrian capacity; the head of the Israeli intelligence agency, the Mossad, told a June 2002 meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Council that Syria had adapted sarin and VX to various Scud warheads, as well as to aerial bombs and rockets.6 Quite lately, Syria’s President Bashar Assad clearly stated that “Syria has the right to hold weapons of mass destruction.”7

 

Chemical Weapons

In 1972, Syria received aerial bombs and artillery shells containing sarin nerve gas (non-persistent) and mustard gas (persistent). After 10 years, when the sarin began to age, Syria started producing its own sarin, and loading it onto aerial bombs and later onto SCUD-B warheads missiles. It has been reported that the configuration of Syrian chemical weapons is binary, and in that sense, it is the most advanced among Arab countries. The possibility cannot be ruled out that the mustard gas which Syria received from Egypt is still functional due to its remarkable stability. Furthermore, Syria has stockpiled cyanide in amounts necessary for the purpose of limited warfare, at least. (About 18,000 of the Sunni residents of the city Hama were killed by the Syrian regime in 1982 with cyanide, certainly with Assad’s knowledge.)

In recent years, Syria began producing the extremely toxic stable nerve gas – VX, and to arm aerial bombs and missile warheads with it. This chemical warfare agent is more valuable than sarin or at least constitutes a complementary weapon, in terms of its operational qualities. It is worth emphasizing that Syria received unofficial assistance from Russian scientists who apparently specialized in VX chemical substances (the Russian version of this matter is more potent than the original American version). The Syrian chemical effort, which began in the early 1980s and gradually intensified, expanded significantly in 1996 with the establishment of a large underground installation for the production of chemical weapons in the Aleppo region (in partnership with Libya).

Quite recently, Syria also armed its SCUD-C missiles with chemical warheads, adding them to their stockpile of thousands of aerial bombs loaded on Suhoi-22, Suhoi-24 and MiG 23 warplanes and 100-200 SCUD-B chemical warheads. Indirect assistance from Russian experts effected the successful development of cluster chemical missile warheads. Lately, chemical warheads carrying SCUD-D missiles were successfully field tested by Syria.

The warning given by the Syrian ambassador in Egypt (in 2000), that Syria will threaten the use of chemical weapons against an Israeli threat of nuclear weapons is, for all intents and purposes, the climax of expressions in this context rather than a new direction or breakthrough.

Already in January 1987, in an interview in a Kuwaiti newspaper, Assad noted that Syria is seeking a technical response which will constitute a direct reaction to Israel’s nuclear weapons. A few months later, Damascus radio emphasized that Syria has an answer to Israel’s nuclear threat. Shihabi, Syria’s Chief of the General Staff, asserted in 1988 that there is a sense of satisfaction in Syria from its accomplishments in the area of strategic balance, and that Syria possesses weapons whose deterrence effect can counter Israel’s extremely lethal weapons.

In his conversation with Senator McLain in Damascus in January 1989, Assad confirmed that Syria possesses chemical weapons. In 1993, Assad contended that a Syrian solution to the problem of repatriating the Golan Heights exists, regardless of the cost and despite Israel’s nuclear superiority. Syria’s Minister of Information held in 1995 that Syria possesses “trump cards” which it had not yet “played” but would, if need be, in case of the conflagration of a war against Israel. Furthermore, different reports indicate that Syria possesses biological weapons as well – in addition to its chemical weapons – whose strategic value is significantly greater than chemical weapons. Assad proclaimed that Syria has the ability to cause Israel significant damage by means of “the special weapon” in its arsenal and that the Syrian army has attained strategic balance with the IDF. And, indeed, beyond these declarations, the Syrian army conducted a series of SCUD missile launch tests with different models of the missile, for use with chemical warheads, possibly along with increasingly closer chemical cooperation with Russia. Iran and North Korea are contributive, too. Meanwhile, that cooperation has effected the successful development of chemical cluster warheads. Furthermore, the exposure of the Syrian operational deployment of SCUD-C missiles by satellite photographs indicates that a chemical armament has been integrated with the missile program in a manner enabling a surprise chemical attack option, and that the missiles are pointed at the reactor in Dimona, airports and Israel’s big cities. At the same time, the revelation of the operational nuclear deployment attributed to Israel by Jane’s Defence Weekly, by means of satellite photographs, apparently enables Syria to launch a chemical strike against that deployment. Conceivably, this is a first-rate Syrian strategic option. At least 100 chemically armed missiles are steadily maintained by Syria ready to be launched on short notice. They carry VX nerve agent and are hidden in deep caves in Northern Syria.8

One of the central consequences of this capacity is Syria’s intention to achieve prior (at least methodical) neutralization of Israel’s nuclear threat, which is liable to frustrate Syrian military accomplishments in the Golan Heights, if and when Syria sees fit to stage an attack in that sector, especially if it includes Syrian utilization of chemical weapons.

 

Biological Weapons

Syrian spokesmen have remarked that Syria is equipping itself with an even more powerful, technical response to Israel’s nuclear weapons, and that it is legitimate for Syria to equip itself with a variety of weapons of mass destruction. In response to the pressure effected by the UN against Iraq’s attempts to conceal its biological weapons, the Syrian Foreign Minister emphasized (in December 1997) that the pressure is totally unjustified, as Israel is given free reign to develop all types of weapons of mass destruction and, therefore, Syria and other Arab countries have the right to develop countermeasures against belligerent Israel. It seems that despite Syrian remarks regarding biological weapons and due to their limited number, the weapons represent a conceptual approach whose purpose includes indirect leaks regarding the intention to equip themselves with biological weapons while simultaneously maintaining maximal obscurity. This is necessary because despite the fact that it is common knowledge that Syria possesses chemical weapons, it is questionable whether or not chemical weapons, in and of themselves, can erode the nuclear deterrence capability attributed to Israel. A background document was circulated in the Syrian army itself regarding the biological weapons, which illustrated their significant strategic value as perceived by the army.

The public reference to Syria as a country developing biological weapons, in addition to chemical weapons, began in 1988 and has continued since. Today, at least 16 years after the start of development, Syria is, at times, described as a producer of biological weapons: two toxins (botulinum and ricin) and two bacteria (anthrax and cholera). Russian experts hired by Syria are hard at work to produce the anthrax bacteria and load it onto warheads. In the Scientific Studies and Research Center in Damascus, in which development activity of chemical weapons has been proven, a Department of Biology is active as well. Studies published under its auspices indicate, indeed, activity involving germs and proteins.

Botulinum, ricin, anthrax and cholera constitute four especially powerful types of biological warfare agents: botulinum – a lethal toxic protein (produced from a bacterium) is more poisonous than any other substance, natural or synthetic; ricin – a lethal toxic protein (produced from castor beans, easily grown in Syria) that optimally fulfills the criteria in terms of the relation between (production) costs and (respiratory) toxicity; anthrax – a lethal bacterium easily cultivated with optimal durability under unfavorable conditions (during storage, launch, plus environmental stability upon implementation); and cholera – a typical epidemic incapacitating germ for guerrilla warfare. In addition to the aforementioned development center functioning in Damascus, another biological weapon facility in Cerin has been mentioned. One can assume that the new chemical weapons factory in the Aleppo region includes a biological weapons section as well.

Syria apparently intends to attain the capability to biologically arm all types of its long-range surface-to-surface missile warheads, and it is reasonable to assume that this goal can be realized in the course of a few years, if it has not yet been attained.

Syria’s official position regarding biological weapons maintained that Syria “supports closer international cooperation in the field of biology for peaceful purposes which will certainly increase the influential power and the realism of the biological convention”. Despite its positive tone, there is, of course, nothing in this vague formulation of the Syrian position to indicate anything about Syrian inactivity in the field of biological weapons. In fact, since 1983, if not earlier, Syria has expended a considerable effort in the realm of biological weapons and, presumably, it has already had biological weapons in its possession since the early 1990s.

 

Egypt

Egypt was the first Arab country to equip itself with chemical and biological weapons. It was also the first to utilize chemical weapons (in Yemen in the 1960s). Further, Egypt supplied Syria with chemical weapons (during their joint preparations for the Yom Kippur War), and also provided chemical weapons to Iraq and assisted it in producing chemical and biological weapons in the 1980s. Egypt itself continues to maintain chemical and biological weapons even today, despite the fact that it denies that truth and for years has taken pains to cultivate an image of a country clearly striving to eliminate them. However, simultaneously, Egyptian spokesmen take the trouble to emphasize that the acquisition of chemical and biological weapons are extremely necessary and completely justified.9

In preparation for the international convention for the prohibition of chemical weapons (January 1993), and especially in its wake, the clear consolidation of a pan-Arabic approach was obvious – with Egypt in the lead – calling for withholding signatures from the chemical convention – and implicitly supporting the maintenance of an offensive chemical and biological capability, as is the practice in Egypt itself – as long as a comprehensive ban on chemical, biological and nuclear weapons in the Middle East is not implemented. Egypt’s Foreign Minister Amru Moussa, even stressed that this issue constitutes a main topic in the reorganization of the regional alignment in the Middle East. In January 1993, when the chemical convention was signed, Mubarak was in Damascus, and together with Assad, called upon the Arabs to refrain from joining the convention.

Egypt is naturally well aware and familiar with the biochemical armament efforts of Syria and Iran. One can assume that, according to its perception of the present-day strategic balance in the Middle East, it even prefers, or at least views, this armament effort as legitimate, if not imperative, something much more difficult and complicated to say about nuclear armament.

Until 1990, the ballistic and biochemical cooperation between Egypt and Iraq flourished; shortly before the latter’s invasion of Kuwait, Egypt’s foreign and defense ministers rallied to the defense of Iraq’s acquisition of chemical and biological weapons, apparently in anticipation of joint Iraqi-Egyptian benefit.

The tip of the iceberg of Egypt’s deep involvement in the Iraqi ballistic and biochemical armament effort was noteworthy in the Gulf War, when Egyptian insiders publicly assessed it; however, it was only four years later, in June 1995, that a UN contingent arrived clandestinely in Egypt in order to attempt to expose the scope of the Egyptian-Iraqi cooperation – with extremely limited success. At the same time, tens of thousands of Egyptians, who worked in Iraq and left in the wake of the invasion of Kuwait, began returning to Iraq, apparently without pan-Arabic agreement. Some evidently returned to Iraqi military industrial plants.

On the basis of Egypt’s enormous expenditures as far as its unprecedented military buildup is concerned, in addition to its decision not to join the accords preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons, it would be very unreasonable to conclude that this buildup does not include chemical and biological weapons, as the Egyptian leadership claims.10 Still, Egypt’s President Mubarak recently demanded: “Israel ought to give up its WMD, of whatever means, just like Libya did.”11

 

Chemical Weapons

The Egyptian acquisition of chemical weapons began in the early 1960s, and only barely preceded its frequent implementation by the Egyptian Air Force in the Yemen war from 1963-1967.

The primary facility is located in Abu-Za`abal (supported by local insecticide and pharmaceutical plants) and secondary facilities are located in Abu-Rawash (the assembly point for filling aerosol cans) and adjacent to Beni-Suaf (an air force base). A primary research and development plant is located in the National Research Center in Doki, and a central production adjunct point functions within the framework of the chief Egyptian company which produces dyestuffs and chemicals.

Egypt first produced mustard and phosgen (asphyxiation gas), which were also employed in Yemen. Subsequently, they moved to producing psychomimetic incapacitating agents, sarin nerve gas and later VX nerve gas. All these were produced in industrial quantities and were loaded onto land mines, artillery shells, aerial bombs, rockets (including cluster rockets) and finally onto missile warheads. After the Egyptian-Iraqi-Argentinian “Condor” missile program was frozen, which was designed for chemical and biological armament from the Egyptian and Iraqi perspectives, Egypt turned to arming alternative missiles, and that armament effort has already certainly been realized.

Many Egyptian experts have been integrated over the years in various international forums, and have acquired knowledge and access in the field of chemical weapons. Egypt participated in a trial challenge inspection exercise for the tracing of chemical weapons under United Nations auspices, conducted for the first time by a multi-national staff, at a West German operational Air Force base, together with experts from Iran, Pakistan, Argentina, England and Germany. Egypt even conducted a national trial challenge inspection exercise on a chemical plant in its own country and reported on it to the Conference of Disarmament, without exposing the plant. The Egyptian representative noted in his report that “Egypt does not possess or produce chemical weapons” even though “the inspected plant is definitely capable of producing chemical weapons of all types” – a purposeful claim designed to create uncertainty and obfuscate the distinction between production ability and actual production. In contrast, and at about the same time (1991), Egypt claimed that “in the past it possessed a large supply of chemical weapons, but at present its chemical weapons production is limited to that which is necessary to ensure defensive and deterrence capabilities”; in other words, indirect Egyptian admission of the existence of chemical weapons in its possession and its production.

 

Biological Weapons

Anwar Sadat and Saddam Hussein were the only two Arab leaders to this point who unambiguously declared (20 years apart) that Egypt and Iraq, respectively, possess operational biological weapons.

In the early 1960s, Egypt embarked on an integrated chemical and biological weapons project which was code-named “Izlis”. It was implemented (and apparently continues to be) in a military-civilian consortium located in Abu-Za`abal which includes a military installation called Military Industry 801, a civilian installation called “The Abu-Za`abal Company for Chemicals and Insecticides”, and an additional civilian installation called “The El-Nasser Company for Pharmaceutical Chemicals and Antibiotics”. The last plant constitutes a cover for military activity in the field of biological weapons, concomitant to its real civilian activities.

Sadat first announced the existence of biological weapons in Egyptian possession in 1970, when he was still vice-president, and once again in 1972 when he was already president: “Egypt has biological weapons, stored in refrigerators, which can be used against Israel’s dense population.” It seems that in the early 1970s, a decade after the project’s inception, and after the massive stockpiling of operational chemical weapons and their implementation in Yemen, Egypt stockpiled biological warfare agents in operational quantities and also the means to deliver them. However, it seems that Sadat’s declaration was not incidental, but was timed to coincide with the decision to launch a surprise attack against Israel and was designed to greatly enhance Egypt’s non-conventional strategic deterrence capability in order to neutralize to whatever extent possible the plausibility of a nuclear counterstrike by Israel. The existence of chemical weapons in Egypt’s possession was already public knowledge, while the strategic deterrence (and offensive) potential of biological weapons is much greater.

After the Yom Kippur War, Sadat and his Chief of Staff even declared that Egypt would employ all types of weapons which it did not utilize in the Yom Kippur War, should Israel act unreasonably, and that it possesses a genuine mass destruction capability which includes sufficient biological and chemical weapons, though not nuclear weapons. Indeed, in the 1970s, Egypt significantly intensified its activity in the field of biological weapons, and in the 1980s, worked in close cooperation with Iraq in the development of biological weapons.

“The Egyptian plagues” which included pestilence, anthrax and Rift Valley Fever, have been preserved there in the present day as well, and have enabled its scientists to closely investigate these two classic agents of plague and to adopt them as biological warfare agents. Furthermore, Egypt’s advanced biotechnological ability enabled it to deal in these instances with two germs (the agents of pestilence and anthrax) whose development and storage are not simple, and a virus (the agent of the Rift Valley Fever) – whose treatment is even more complicated than that required by germs. Add to these the development of biological warfare agents like the botulinum toxin and the encephalitis virus, at least.12

Egyptian strategists, who have dealt with the issues relating to the Israeli-Arab balance of power, have repeatedly emphasized the importance of both biological and chemical weapons as a vital component of Arab and Egyptian armament efforts. One can assume, therefore, that the goal is to equip themselves with long-range missile warheads carrying biological warfare agents, as an optimal strategic power component, and that Egypt’s technological capability enables that.

 

Iraq

The Big Enigma

The complexity marking the fate of Iraq’s CBW is featured by a multi-factorial sequence of events – geo-strategic, political and technological. It is far beyond the banal question: were there WMD in Iraq, or not? As a matter of fact, that question is totally meaningless, if not ridiculous, as long as it does not pertain to any specific point of time. A perfect distinction ought to be made, first of all, between the following chronological elements:

  • During the 1980s CW and BW were produced in Iraq on a fully industrial scale;
     

  • During the Iraq-Iran war, CW were often massively employed by the Iraqi army – the proportion to the produced quantities is not known;
     

  • During Gulf War One (and occasionally during the 1990s) CBW-related facilities were in part destroyed; effectiveness – if any – in terms of resultantly reducing the CBW arsenal is not known;
     

  • During the 1990s, known quantities of CW were eliminated by the UN in accordance with Iraq’s agreement; although perfectly known, their relative proportion of the total CW arsenal is unknown
     

  • On many occasions during the 1990s, UN inspectors evidenced on-spot, circumstantially to the least, rescuing of CBW by the Iraqis;
     

  • By 1995, Iraq admitted – perfectly in contrast to earlier Iraqi declarations – that it produced BW on an industrial scale. Iraq claimed that the BW arsenal has been wiped out.

It follows that:

Reduction of CW did take place, both by consumption of CW (during the Iran-Iraq War) and by coordinated elimination of CW (by UN inspectors). In addition, there is also spontaneous chemical degradation along time. Theoretically then, overall reduction could possibly bring about the removal of the entire Iraqi CW arsenal. However, the chances for the extent of such reduction equalizing the magnitude of CW production during the 1980s, especially combined with ostensible non-production of further CW during the 1990s, may be regarded as far less that 50%.

Reduction of BW could have not been taken place at all. The chances that reduction did occur – one way or another – equalizing the magnitude of the Iraqi original BW arsenal, combined with ostensible non-production of further BW during the 1990s, may likewise be regarded as far less that 50%.

Completely irrespective of political and other considerations prevailing within the US, UK and Israeli administrations and intelligence communities – since the inception of the current Bush presidency – in regard to the CBW arsenal attributed to Iraq, the existence of such an arsenal, then, is much more likely than its absence. The emerging enigma, therefore, is when and what happened to that arsenal, in purely physical or technical terms. Objectively, other mysteries or debates of whatever kind are less significant.

It was no other than the head of IDF intelligence who lately contended: “Iraq continued to sustain and maintain its residual (offensive chemical and biological) capability after the UN inspectors were expelled. We have intelligence proofs that they carried on”.13 Needless to say, “intelligence proofs”, unlike evidence or indications, constitute, basically, the best, essentially absolute, verification of any seemingly unsound information pertaining to an adversary’s capacity. Otherwise, the phrase “intelligence proofs” would not have been applied in that case.

 

The Fate of Iraq’s Residual CBW Arsenal

The temporal point of reference serving within the given context for examining the fate of Iraq’s residual CBW arsenal in the outset of Bush’s presidency is that:

“The residual arsenal” is defined here as the overall quantities of chemical and biological agents plus munitions designed to carry them. (Those quantities are mostly unknown; yet, as explained, their existence is at any rate much more likely than their absence.)

The outset of Bush’s presidency is regarded here as the most meaningful event, influencing, thereafter, the reduction (rather disappearance) of that arsenal – since the last completely and fully documented reduction preceding that event, namely the UN-conducted elimination of CW – even in comparison with all other UN inspection activities.

One way or another, his presidency, chiefly, shaped the fate of the residual CBW arsenal, propelling, gradually, its eventual disappearance at some point of time, most probably during the last months preceding the invasion of Iraq. Though less likely, that process could have been extended into the phase of the war itself. In practice, three main possibilities may underlie, then, the fate of the residual CBW arsenal, forwarded in an ascending order of probabilities:

  • Destruction conducted by the Iraqis;
     

  • Hiding conducted by the Iraqis in Iraq;
     

  • Smuggling into another country, apparently Syria.

Those possibilities are not in contrast with each other, and may rather be complementary. At least one of them supposedly took place in actuality. Time is not a contradicting factor in that case, even if the mystery remains unsolved. Comparatively, in a sense, the mystery of bin Laden has not yet been deciphered – does this imply that he vanished, or just disappeared? Various political, diplomatic, professional and legal issues stemming from the above described tangle – both domestically (referring to the US, UK and Israel) and internationally – are of paramount importance, certainly, yet they prevail within another dimension. The core of the CBW arsenal enigma is but a physical or technical one: when disappearance began, in what temporal rate, and onto what grounds, Iraqi or other ones.

For the time being, answers are far from adequate, not only in terms of lack of satisfactory information that may produce a clear solution for that cardinal enigma, but, unfortunately, also in the sense that this lack of information is politically used – domestically and internationally – in improper ways, much beyond its objectively problematic complexity. Up until today, there are, yet, some significant events that should be noted in that they are in support of deciphering the mystery. First, once again it was the head of IDF intelligence who very recently asserted: “We are now more convinced that (unspecified) equipment was translocated from Saddam’s palaces to Syria. This move involved directly the presidential levels of Iraq and Syria, and was carried out by more than one track.”14 Second, Douglas Hanson, who served in Summer 2003 as Chief of Staff in the Iraqi Ministry of Science and Technology, held that on various occasions there was solid information about the existence of hidden chemical and biological weapons in Iraq during that period of time.15 Those two explanations do not contradict each other; rather, they are complementary.

 

Chemical Weapons

One can assume that the (very significant, by all accounts) quantity of CW which was destroyed by UN inspectors was, to a large extent, “sacrificed”, unwillingly, by the Iraqis, in a manner which obscured the concealment of smaller quantities of considerably higher quality chemical weapons, which they either did not disclose, or which they acknowledged were in their possession and claimed that they themselves or their allies destroyed them before the initiation of UN inspection. If that is the case, they retained relatively high quality chemical warfare agents along with delivery and dispersal systems. One can surmise that the CW which were acknowledged by the Iraqis include relatively outdated CW (possessing inferior military value) or leaky weapons and/or CW which do not fit into the above categories but which the Iraqis decided to “sacrifice” in order to satisfy the UN inspectors.

The variety of chemical warfare agents and delivery systems developed and produced by the Iraqis since the early 1980s was extensive; primary among them were:

  • Blistering gases – sulfuric and possibly nitric mustard gas;
     

  • Hallucinogenic (psychochemical) gases – glycolates;
     

  • Blood gases – cyanide;
     

  • Nerve gases – tabon, sarin, GF, VX and possibly soman;
     

  • Delivery systems – shells (many types), aerial bombs (many types), rockets (various types), aerial spray systems (various types), mobile spray systems (various types) and surface-to-surface missile warheads (various types). Surface-to-surface missiles adopted to carry chemical warheads included long-range missiles whose scope even exceeded that of regular and enhanced SCUDs.

In fact, the Iraqis were involved in the development of an intricate network of sophisticated delivery devices, including binary and cluster systems, and of sophisticated combat gases, including thickened chemical warfare agents, and powdery chemical warfare agents which penetrate filters. In doing so, they accumulated expertise unprecedented in the Arab world in terms of quantity and quality. The Iraqi army was also the most experienced in the world in implementing chemical weapons against a wide range of targets in various topographical and environmental conditions. This too is the case as far as employing suppliers of forbidden technology and circuitous ways to acquire them were concerned and also in terms of concealment, development, production and storage alignments. There is no doubt that the Egyptian army and the Egyptian military industry absorbed a significant portion of this extensive inventory of expertise as well. Libya – in addition to Egypt, Iraq’s ally in the 1980s – has been benefiting from the technological fruits of this period.

As a result, despite the diminishing dissonance between Iraq and the Iranian-Syrian bloc, Libya – and perhaps Egypt, – served as a conduit for the flow of information of this sort to its long-time good friends, Syria and Iran. This depiction, for all intents and purposes, canceled the positive value of Islamic divisiveness as a barrier, as far as the transfer of strategic-technological information is concerned, and increased the possibility of pan-Arab and Iranian reliance on a joint database, which, at least apparently, has the ability to facilitate vital upgrading/leaps and breakthroughs.

It is noteworthy that the Iraqis have also experimented with the implementation of toxic chemical substances clandestinely – first they assisted in the mercury contamination of Israeli citrus fruits marketed in Europe; afterwards, they shortened the lives of many dissidents by poisoning their food or drinks with thallium; and finally, they killed the fugitive Kurds by covertly poisoning them with nerve gas.

 

Biological Weapons

Basically, the Iraqi biological weapons program, like its chemical counterpart, was second in its scope and pretensions to just one other country in the world – the Soviet Union. However, amazingly, just as Iraq and Russia both agreed to destroy their chemical weapons, and even took steps to implement that agreement, so, too, they are aligned in their consistent and resolute evasiveness in terms of admitting that they were in possession of  biological weapons – and as a result, from destroying them. It is possible that this was a well thought out strategic approach – conceding chemical weapons (partially or totally) whose loss would have been offset by biological weapons.

Even if one assumes (incorrectly, most probably) that the Soviet Union refrained from or limited the passing of biochemical military information to Iraq in the past, the latter has been supplied with this information through East Germany. However, unfortunately, Iraq’s close ties with East Germany in the 1980s led to close ties with West Germany, which has proven to be money-hungry and filled with greedy suppliers. Indeed, democratic, commercially unobstructed, Germany stood at the head of a large camp of technology suppliers from Western Europe, and to a certain degree, Americans as well, who were joined by Yugoslavians and Egyptians. Furthermore, recently, and as a result of the dismissal of thousands of scientists from the Russian biological-chemical alignment, some of them were employed in Iraq, along with covert, semi-institutionalized dual assistance extended by Russia.

In contrast to the frequent implementation of chemical weapons, Iraq has implemented biological weapons in only a few instances – the difficulty in confirming or denying said implementation attests to the great potential advantage of biological weapons substances – fungal toxins against the Iranians, malaria carrying mosquitoes and typhoid bacteria against the Kurds, and, allegedly, unidentified biological warfare agents (plus unidentified chemical warfare agents) against the Allies. (The last case raised a contentious issue in the United States in that they did not find a satisfactory explanation for the medical complaints of many of the participants in the Gulf War, even though it can be simply accounted for as the result of leaks which took place in the wake of the bombing of ammunition storage facilities.)

There are various circumstantial evidence indicating Iraqi involvement in the anthrax letters affair (USA, Sep. 2001), an intriguing mystery not yet deciphered, unfortunately.

Nonetheless, there is no doubt concerning the vast Iraqi experience in development, production, storage and concealment of biological weapons during the 1980s and 1990s. Throughout the 1980s, Iraq’s efforts to amass an extensive operational stockpile of biological weapons were maximal, and for the most part, successful. This effort was identified in its early stages but did not lead to attempts to gather intelligence or genuine efforts to halt its progress, like those unsuccessfully taken against Iraq’s chemical efforts (until the war in Kuwait). In retrospect, it turned out that assessments regarding the Iraqi biological missile capabilities in Gulf War One were, for all intents and purposes, accurate, though they were the subject of much skepticism.

The Iraqi success (during the 1990s, to the least) in concealing its arsenal of biological weapons, including, apparently, biological warfare agents and delivery systems beyond those which they declared is many times more serious; in that context, it is worth noting the following Iraqi development activity:

Biological warfare agents: anthrax, botulinum, plague, gas-gangrene, smallpox, conjunctivitis, encephalitis, Crimean-Congo Fever, malaria, typhoid, fungal toxins and more. It is important to stress that the Iraqi development of biological warfare agents was based significantly on cooperation with senior Egyptian scientists, and was aided both by types of biological warfare agents which were isolated in Iraq itself (and probably in Egypt and Mauritania as well), and on pathogens and toxins purchased from the United States, from quasi-governmental suppliers of biological strains, who acted carelessly.

Delivery systems: aerial bombs (of various types), aerial spray systems, unmanned drones (of various types), super guns and super gun shells (almost certainly for the purpose of launching anthrax spores), rockets and long-range surface-to-surface missile warheads. Similarly, there was great importance attached to cluster armaments developed by the Iraqis in order to attain an extremely effective launch of biological elements, and also to the processing of powdery biological elements, which they acquired.

Moreover, in the course of UN inspection in Iraq, and despite the inspection, Iraq managed to conduct new and more advanced field experiments with biological weapons, and to retool and improve unmanned drones to carry and disseminate those weapons. Saddam ascribes supreme importance to biological weapons. As a result, the production of biological warfare agents, and especially anthrax bacteria, in hidden facilities in Iraq, has been renewed during the 1990s.

Furthermore, in 1997, in the midst of UN efforts to reveal and destroy Iraqi biological weapons stockpiles, the “Samsam Project” began in Iraq, designed to harness scientists and biotechnological resources from South Africa (due to the termination of the South African efforts to acquire biological weapons) in partnership with the Iraqi general intelligence apparatus. For this purpose, South African branches of German companies and key merchants were recruited to purchase centrifuges for the separation of bacteria, stainless steel for the production of fermenters and accessory equipment in the guise of milk and pharmaceutical industries.

 

Libya

Libya apparently represents the first case of a veracious deproliferation process, which it voluntarily undertook, by December 2003. Indeed, there is a variety of factors – geo-strategic, political and personal – that altogether propelled and fueled this outstanding move conducted by Qaddafi, who for many years was one of the most radical anti-Western leaders, WMD-seekers and terrorism-supporters all over the world. As a matter of fact, since the early 1980s, he persistently – though not very effectively – pursued WMD, which he intended to install into long range ballistic missiles, capable of covering Israel and parts of Europe.

This enduring course continuously fueled an opposing American-British endeavor aimed at hindering any Libyan progress in that field. Tirelessly and variedly being conducted, that endeavor eventually brought about the desired outcome, and Libya is now fully committed to not just inspections and control (as was the case, compellingly, with Iraq, and is the case with Iran’s nuclear program) but rather to a totally unlimited deproliferation process, pertaining to any item included or in support of its WMD programs, in whatever place and sense.

For now, that process is continuing properly. Libya first let US and British experts, and later on UN inspectors explore any facility they wanted to. It declared, showed and handed over whatever it was requested to: equipment, material, munitions and documents. It fully cooperated so as to destruct stockpiles, components and other items. Moreover, it undisclosed much information about its WMD-related technological interfaces with Iraq (in the past), Iran, Syria, Pakistan and additional countries and suppliers. Invaluable intelligence assets have thus been achieved, significantly facilitating steps conducted towards those technological supporters by the US, Britain and the UN.

Libya exhibited, at any rate, a degree of daring in that context. Increasing, indirect pressure was imposed upon Qaddafi during 2003, while his son and head of intelligence were having intensifying contacts with US and Britain. Yet eventually, he could equally choose to carry on with WMD procurement, and to unreveal the interfaces with Libya’s Moslem sisters. His elderly soberness, however, apparently turned dominant, especially since he witnessed the fate of Iraq and Saddam.

Otherwise, Libya would very slowly – but consistently – make progress towards acquisition of biological and nuclear weapons, in addition to chemical weapons. Such development could have not been tolerated, and hence the preemptive efforts made by the US and Britain. If abortive, those efforts would leave Libya unharmed, approaching its primary goal one way or another. Earlier, Qaddafi had emphasized many times that Libya has every right to equip itself with non-conventional weapons.16 For years he acted in accordance, and now it is what he resultantly achieved that he is giving up, as detailed hereafter. 

 

Chemical Weapons

The uncovered and declared items included:

  • CW stockpile consisting of approximately 23 metric tons of mustard gas (reportedly produced a decade ago);
     

  • Some 3,500 artillery shells and aerial bombs to be filled with this chemical warfare agent on short notice;
     

  • Two CW storage facilities;
     

  • 1,300 metric tons of precursor chemicals needed to produce nerve gases17;
     

  • 14 filing boxes filled with documents – some in Arabic, some in English. Two of the boxes carried a reference to the German-built ostensibly pharmaceutical facility at Rabta18;
     

  • One inactivated CW production facility; namely, a dual-use capacity to produce mustard gas and nerve agents, in terms of equipment in storage that could outfit a backup chemical weapons production line to reinforce or replace the Rabta facility. Beyond mustard manufacturing, Libya is thought to have carried out research to produce two nerve agents, meaning sarin and soman19;
     

  • No filled munitions have been declared or found.

In March 2004, the OPCW inspectors verified through continuous on-site monitoring the complete destruction of Libya’s entire declared stockpile of unfilled munitions. Inspections and any review and approval are conducted by the OPCW. Libya has provided a destruction plan for these weapons and production facilities. The complete destruction of Libya’s CW and the capacity to produce them is intended to be completed by April 29, 2007. Libya is expected to pay for the disposal, but can seek expertise and financial support from other convention member states. Costs and accomplishments vary according to destruction technology applied: incineration ($100 million, two years), or neutralization ($10 million to $50 million, one year). Considerations relating to needed expertise and environmental pollution are playing a role, as well.20

The key issue of Libyan past preparedness to manufacture nerve agents was addressed by the Director General of the OPCW, Rogelio Pfirter: “I think they were pretty close to producing nerve gases. I’m not sure they were in a position to produce them, but we need to look more thoroughly into the declaration for that.” Closer scrutiny of the documents provided by Libya should also shed more light on the status of the country’s chemical weapons production. It is believed the program has been dormant for some time. Rogelio Pfirter stated:

The actual production of chemical agents was inactivated sometime in the early 1990s. But in as much that there were chemical weapons, there were the bombs to deploy them. I would say the program should be considered to be alive. But the bombs were destroyed in the last few days. So the immediate danger has in a way been diminished.

Mr. Pfirter said the OPCW was “not aware that Libya helped other countries” to acquire chemical weapons. He noted, as well, that Libya has received no outside help in the development of its chemical weapons.21

The above detailed yield of findings, declarations and remarks was rather unsurprising, in general. It is fairly compatible with the following data known previously, namely:

Procured Precursor Chemicals (mainly from West European and Far-Eastern firms):

  • 60 tons of phosphorus-trichloride;
     

  • 20 tons of dichlorethane;
     

  • unspecified – yet industrial – quantities of: thionyl-chloride, thiodiglycol, ethylene oxide, dimethylamine, sodium sulphide, sodium-fluoride, and pynacolyl alchohol.
     

  • Those chemicals are used for the production of mustard (hence mostly consumed while mustard was being manufactured by Libya) and nerve gases. Pynacolyl alchohol is a strait-forward precursor for synthesizing soman, a notably advanced nerve agent.
     

  • Extraneous supplies of CW: Iran, at least, provided Libya with CW. They were employed by Libya – possibly all the amount supplied – against Chad.

Equipment:

Production line mustard synthesis;
 

Glass-lined vessels designed to contain corrosive chemical reactions, and ancillaries – mainly for synthesis of nerve agents.

 

Facilities:

The Rabta complex was founded as a “Technology Center” by an Iraqi specialist, Dr. Ihsan Barbouty, an architect by profession, possessing huge European-based companies, already serving the Iraqi CW program. It included a war gases production plant camouflaged as a pharmaceutical project and built by Dr. Urgen Hipenstil Imhauzen, a German chemist owning the firm “Imhauzen Chemei”. Besides, a CW munitions factory was built at the Rabta compound, separate from the chemical warfare agent plant. For its construction, assistance was afforded by Japanese firms. US officials learned that Japan Steel Works was building Rabta’s metalworking plant. The facility housed precision machines capable of turning out artillery shells plus aerial bombs, as well as corrosion-resistant containers for chemical agents. In 1994, another underground wing was constructed in the Rabta compound, intended to develop and produce CW. This time, the main constructor drafted for the project was a German mechanical engineer, Roland Franz Berger, who has been living in Libya since 1973. Tens of tons of mustard were assessed to have been produced in that facility before it was converted, ostensibly, for civilian purposes. Many more details about the Rabta facility are available elsewhere.22 Later, two additional facilities, located in Sebha and Tarhunah, were constructed, regarded to contain further installations for the Libyan CW program. The site of Sebha was picked because it already housed strategic installations for development and production of ballistic missiles. The Tarhunah facility aroused an intensive political confrontation with Tripoli, while the latter was totally denying any link to CW. That cardinal discrepancy has not been fully deciphered.23

All in all, the Rabta chemical facility is now described as the “inactivated chemical warfare agent plant”, while the two uncovered “CW storage facilities” are probably located in two of the three compounds mentioned. The mustard stock still found in Libya had been manufactured at the Rabta chemical factory, and the aerial bombs in the Rabta metalworking plant. The mustard, the bombs and the precursor chemicals (some of which were already utilized for mustard production) were housed in the identified storage sites.

Some incompatibilities seemingly exist regarding the production of sarin, tabun and lewisite.

 

Biological Weapons:

Libya declared the existence of a past research program to develop and produce BW, and the procurement of dual-purpose biological essentials. Apparently, no specific BW facilities were explored following the declaration. The US and UK specialists invited to Libya found no concrete evidence of an ongoing biological weapons effort. The team was given access to medical and pharmacological scientists and facilities, and Libyans were questioned about equipment and research that could be applied to biological warfare, but the Libyans denied that a BW program had ever existed in an operational state.24

Earlier reports indicated that during the 1980s and 1990s an attempt to establish a BW infrastructure took place in Libya, in the form of some masked projects, the main location being apparently at Taminhint (a small town northwest of Sebha in south central Libya.)25

Those masked projects included:

  • General Health Laboratories
     

  • Health Research Center
     

  • Microbiological Research Center

 

Supporting Civilian Facilities:

  • High Institute of Technology, Brack
     

  • Biotechnology Research Center, Tajura
     

  • Tripoli and al Fattah universities.

Also, during the 1990s, a secret project, code named “Ibn Hayan”, aimed to produce bombs and warheads filled with anthrax germs and botulinum toxin. It was led by top Iraqi BW experts who left Iraq due to the UN inspections, and were allowed by Saddam to assist Libya. The project was directly linked to the Libyan presidency bureau. A number of organizations, including universities and laboratories attached to the ministries of agriculture and health, were engaged in making ostensibly innocent purchases of dual-use diagnostic and laboratory materials. Reportedly, mobile equipment designed to producing biological warfare agents through maintaining constant sterile environment, as well as ancillaries were purchased primarily from China, India and Serbia.

Meaningful assistance had been extended by Cuba. US officials noted Libya (aside from Syria and Iran) was especially interested in advancing its biological weapons programs. Assistant Secretary of State Carl Ford said there was evidence of Cuban exports of dual-use BW technology to Libya, and other Moslem countries in the Middle East. Apparently, several Indian and Pakistani specialists were helping the Libyan biological effort to achieve some tangible advance.

On the whole, it is clear that an endeavor for practically implementing a BW program took place, and for certain periods of time, was highly prioritized. Seemingly, it was not productive; distinctively, yet, there is a lack of published information on that subject, particularly on the Ibn Hayan project.

 

Iran

Despite the fact that Iran is the only non-Arab country included in this survey, and despite its relative distance from Israel, it potentially constitutes the greatest chemical/biological threat in a number of senses26:

  • Its present chemical and biological and future nuclear armament efforts result from its resolute perception of the three types of weapons of mass destruction as vital (the gravity of this issue was discussed above);
     

  • Its many scientific and technological resources which surpass, for all intents and purposes, those of any Arab country;
     

  • Its signature on the chemical and biological conventions treaty, despite its chemical and biological armament efforts, which it denies;
     

  • Its close ties with hostile Arab countries, especially Syria and Libya (along with its ties to radical North Korea), which include cooperation in the chemical/biological realm;
     

  • Its gradual, though prioritized, acquisition of long-range surface-to-surface missiles (with ranges reaching thousands of kilometers), designed to carry chemical/biological warheads, and its interest in cruise missiles; its development of a missile with a range long enough to reach Israel has been completed, and its adaptation to carry chemical/biological warheads has begun;
     

  • The extensive quantity and dispersal of facilities included in the development, production and storage alignment of chemical and biological warfare agents and of the delivery systems designed for them. Noteworthy facilities are located in Teheran, Kharj, Karai, Ispahan, Marv-Dasht, Shiraz and Bandar Khomeini;
     

  • The lack of a significant change in concept and strategic armament policy after the change in government. Iran was characterized as the most concrete existential threat to Israel since the War of Independence for good reason;
     

  • The excessive cultivation of terrorist capability, including chemical and especially biological terrorism;
     

  • Its enmity towards Israel and its Islamic fanaticism;
     

  • The match between Iran and Syria, alongside North Korea, represents, therefore, an unusual and powerful strategic relationship in general, and in the non-conventional context in particular.

However, lately, the significance of the aid to its chemical/biological armament programs including in the ballistic realm, which Iran receives from China, Russia, Pakistan and South Africa, is gradually burgeoning. At the same time, it is the beneficiary of extremely advanced Russian technological expertise which is accelerating the pace of Iranian development and deployment and is apparently continuing despite the vigorous American and Israeli efforts to persuade Russian authorities to halt those transfers. Recently, it was reported that 10,000 Russian chemical, biological and nuclear experts were employed in Iran.27 Even if we assume that the quantity is much exaggerated, Russian aid remains very significant. In fact, the American sanctions have not been at all successful in slowing the Iranian chemical/biological armament efforts. At the same time, Iran is receiving extensive assistance from German companies, a large number of which previously aided Iraq, and by doing so, were, ironically, bitterly condemned by Iran – a typically fraudulent Iranian approach – in fact, one of many which have constituted the Iranian strategic philosophy for a considerable period of time.

Chemical Weapons

Iran, more than any other country, has learned from bitter experience, one which absorbed seven years of frequent, mostly effective, Iraqi chemical attacks. This accumulated experience had ramifications for Iranian chemical armament efforts. In the course of its war with Iraq, Iran attempted to produce chemical weapons, but implemented them on a very limited scale, not at all comparable to the scope of the Iraqi use of chemical weapons. However, by the end of the bitter war, Iran had gained considerable momentum in its preparations for the extensive production of chemical weapons, and the practical implementation of those preparations. Today, it possesses chemical weapons, including artillery shells, aerial bombs, rockets and missile warheads as well. The chemical weapons substances, which it produces, include cyanide, mustard gas, lewisite, phosgene, VX and sarin. Iran does possess operational missiles with chemical warheads capable of reaching Israel, and it is clear that it is striving to appreciably extend their range.

 

Biological Weapons

In the field of biological weapons, too, Iran is operating tirelessly. It possesses extensive and sophisticated biotechnological infrastructures in which trained personnel are concentrated. Therefore, it does not require much outside assistance and it is likely that its biological efforts will garner results, in terms of deployment. The biological warfare agents which it produces coincide surprisingly or not so surprisingly with those noted above regarding Syria – botulinum, ricin and anthrax. Foot and mouth disease (an anti-livestock agent) has been mentioned as well. Nevertheless, its ability to develop and produce biological warfare agents, including viral biological warfare agents, is much more extensive than Syria’s, and there is no doubt regarding their aspiration to equip themselves with biological warheads carried by long-range missiles. The development of warheads of that type was recently completed in Iran. The Iranian effort to equip themselves with biological weapons is a concentrated effort; in this area, it is assisted by Russia, among others, which contributes to the operational Iranian offensive biological capability whose effect, according to American intelligence sources, will be comparable to that of nuclear weapons. The Iranians are even expending an effort to recruit biological weapons experts from the CIS.28 The significance of biological weapons in the context of terrorist activity has not escaped the attention of the Iranians, and it has equipped itself with guerilla warfare instrumentality designed to implement biological warfare agents by aerosol or by contaminating water systems.

 

Other Arab Countries

Sudan represents an outstanding example of a country attempting to develop chemical and biological weapons, a development process which was primarily inspired and managed by another friendly country – Iraq. The beginnings of the phenomenon were in the winter of 1991, when Iraq, under the threat of a powerful Arab coalition in the wake of its invasion of Kuwait found a solitary outpost in the desert in the guise of Sudan, transferred SCUD units to it, and in doing so, effected a threat to Egypt. Over the years since, and due to increasing UN pressure on Iraq to expose and destroy its non-conventional weapons arsenal, Iraq’s remarkable outpost in Sudan has gradually been strengthened. Teams of experts, equipment, components and apparently whole weapons systems were transferred to Sudan for purposes of concealment and establishing local infrastructures which would both assist the rehabilitation of Iraq’s depleted arsenals and Sudanese armament efforts.

This phenomenon developed to the point of the establishment and operation of several facilities functioning in research, development, production and storage of chemical and biological weapons in Sudan, with – in addition to the Iraqis – Iranians, Libyans, Egyptians, Syrians and Arab terrorists of undetermined origins, all involved in this alignment.29

In other Arab countries, it is difficult to clearly identify efforts to develop a chemical/biological capability, and a significant distinction exists between them and the countries discussed above in technological-scientific and other characteristics. Saudi Arabia is noteworthy in that scientifically and technologically, generally speaking, it is no less advanced than the group of nations equipping themselves with these weapons.30 Regarding countries like Saudi Arabia, as well as Algeria, for instance, the primary limiting factor (not to speak of financial ability) in the chemical/biological context is the decision as to the need to equip themselves. The fact that Saudi Arabia possesses long-range Chinese surface-to-surface missiles capable of carrying chemical/biological weapons, and that it participated substantively in the planning and funding of the Pakistani nuclear effort (it is hard to imagine that its funding will not be repaid in chemical/biological weapons, which, by the way, the Pakistanis possess) are liable to accelerate a decision of that sort. Along with Saudi Arabia, Algeria should be mentioned, as in the past, France developed chemical weapons within its borders and Iraqi biological weapons arrived there in 2000. Its apparent attempts to establish a nuclear-military infrastructure point to an intensifying orientation in the area of non-conventional weapons.

 

Chemical and Biological Terrorism

One of the serious concerns recently aroused in the Western world, and especially in the United States, is related to the heavy damages liable to be caused by terrorist acts involving chemical or biological weapons systems.31

This suspicion is to a great extent focused on terrorists who will be dispatched (in the sense of human “launch devices” of chemical and biological warfare agents, including suicide potential) from an Arab country or Iran. Technically, a significant fundamental feasibility exists for this sort of terrorism, whose implementation is possible with relative ease, and the launch destination could just as easily be in Israel. In fact, over the last decade, there were many incidents in which the Palestinians attempted sabotage through toxic materials (attacks with poisonous chemicals), though they were limited in scope, and it is possible that it was just a result of individual initiatives and not of a guided framework. Some incidents involving biological terrorism occurred as well. They included attempts to bring about infections by hepatitis virus, AIDS virus, and gastrointestinal pathogens (food contaminations).

However, in recent years, as well as now, concern is growing regarding purposeful, official and well-organized bio-chemical terrorism, which will be initiated and might be fueled under the auspices of Syria and especially Iran. The former director of the CIA, James Woolsey, recently noted that it is near certain that Hizbullah is apt to perpetrate a terrorist attack with biological weapons, as it is the easiest way to kill many people. It was also discovered that Hamas planned to poison sources of drinking water and swimming pools in Israel32 and that the Saudi grand-terrorist, bin Laden, who heads the al-Qai`dah apparatus which has already equipped itself with chemical/biological terrorism abilities, plans on attacking Israel using those abilities. Indeed, connections between al-Qai`dah, Hizbullah, and Palestinian terrorist organization have been uncovered, and it is feasible, then, that some joint venture against Israel, involving bio-chemical warfare agents may be configured in that context. More than any other entity worldwide, al-Qai`dah represents the intensifying power of terrorism, both conventional and unconventional. It most probably conducted – apparently in conjunction with Iraq – the anthrax letters attack against the US, and several additional attempts to employ chemical and biological agents. Al-Qai`dah openly exhibits its intentions: “al-Qai`dah possesses bombs with deadly viruses that would spread out lethal diseases in American cities.”33

Furthermore, one of course cannot rule out that a directed “ecological intifada” in the media’s phrase, is indeed transpiring, referring to the sewage pollution flowing from Judea and Samaria to the coastal plain’s streams.

The term “chemical/biological terrorism” signifies sabotage or guerilla warfare implemented by means of toxic materials or micro-organisms which are liable to inflict damage upon people, animals, crops or functional materials, like gasoline. Chemical/biological terrorism includes sub-categories like environmental terrorism, in other words, when the environment – air and water, for example – is the element carrying the chemical/biological substances to murder specific people, or random people, indiscriminately, and narco-terrorism – introducing hallucinogenic drugs to the target population, and non-lethal warfare, which was recently developed to sabotage logistical infrastructures by means of chemical/biological substances. Lately, the importance of radiological terrorism significantly increased. This type of terrorism consists in radioactive toxic materials, which may be regarded as a specific sub-category of chemical warfare agents. The consequences of chemical/biological terrorism are liable to be tactical or strategic, acute or chronic, and/or physical or psychological. There are those who relate to chemical/biological weapons as weapons of mass impact rather than weapons of mass destruction. Chemical/biological terrorism is not a new threat, but it is progressively becoming more and more worrisome.

The terrorists must have a motive to implement chemical/biological terrorism, but they will not need to manufacture the weapons on their own. Today, it is possible to purchase or steal many industrial or laboratory toxic materials, in substantial quantities. The decisive technical factor will, therefore, be the effectiveness of the dispersal of the chemical/biological substances at the time of attack. According to Stoke, chemical or biological weapons provide terrorists with certain advantages34:

  • The terrifying results of their implementation will exacerbate anxiety and cause panic;
     

  • These substances are undetectable by traditional anti-terrorist detection systems;
     

  • The difficulty to defend against this sort of substance;
     

  • The ease with which they can be camouflaged, transported and introduced into the target area, relative to conventional weapons;
     

  • Their effectiveness as a means to murder individuals;
     

  • The possible time lapse between dispersal and the appearance of symptoms;
     

  • The possibility of attacking without being identified;
     

  • Certain substances cause temporary disability and are not lethal;
     

  • It is easy to purchase the technical equipment necessary to prepare the substances on a limited basis;
     

  • The technology for the production of chemical or biological substances is described in detail in literature available to the public;
     

  • Delivery of toxic or pollutant substances can be accomplished employing very effective methods, like the utilization of municipal water systems, or the atmosphere.

Generally speaking, the chemical/biological terrorism threat constitutes a danger, which must be practically confronted in an appropriate manner. The chance that this danger might really come to bear and spin out of control is relatively greater now than ever before and more conspicuous in absolute terms, and it is worsening. There is no doubt that chemical, biological and radiological terrorism today constitutes a non-conventional threat with especially grave potential. There are a number of trends predominant in the world, which are apt to sustain each other and engender escalation in the nature of this threat:

  • In terms of concept – the appearance of “avant-garde” terrorists and the implementation of extreme terrorist tactics;
     

  • In practical terms – the increasing availability of chemical and biological agents suitable for terrorism;
     

  • Accumulated and developed abilities of various countries to conduct chemical/biological warfare which will be transferred or channeled improperly as a result of chemical/biological disarmament processes, and will constitute important resources for chemical/biological terrorism;
     

  • Innovative technical approaches which will be developed in the area of chemical engineering and biotechnology which will be suitable for chemical/biological terrorism;
     

  • The ability to avoid leaving tracks which could implicate the perpetrator or his sponsors.

It is reasonable to expect that this confluence of trends will manifest itself the world over, including the Middle East. There are characteristics and tactics which are prone to develop into a stark extension of conventional to non-conventional terrorism.

Terrorism is active in the Middle East these days and it is ongoing both in state-sponsored organizations and in those not sponsored by any country. The knowledge regarding chemical and biological weapons and their applicability has been revealed in most of the Middle East and the proliferation of these weapons unavoidably reaches terrorist organizations at least in terms of its ideas, theories and beyond. Various “legitimate” terrorist organizations are supported by Arab countries and Iran as far as the conduct of conventional warfare is concerned, while at the same time, those countries are trying to equip themselves with chemical/biological weapons and cultivate them, particularly Syria and Iran.

It can, therefore, be concluded that all of the circumstances described above are liable to arouse, and encourage, Middle Eastern terrorist organizations to contemplate the usefulness of chemical/biological weapons, especially against Israel. The next steps expected, presumably, to take place are the equipping of terrorists with chemical/biological weapons and their deployment (steps which have already taken place randomly, for the time being, as was described above). It does not seem to be an especially difficult mission: Chemical laboratories exist which deal with explosives and are capable of treating toxic substances and regular microbiology laboratories, which are connected to hospitals and universities, can handle germs without much difficulty. There is no doubt that the fact that throughout most of Israel streams flow which originate in lands populated by Arabs, will ease intentional pollution. Reciprocal trade between Israel and the Arabs is liable to play a similar role.

All in all, this is a bleak picture which has to be addressed. The two primary directions are, naturally, preventing chemical/biological terrorism and managing situations of this sort after the fact. Recently, substantial efforts relating to the chemical/biological terrorism threat have been expended in the United States, and the American program, which was consolidated and developed in this matter, is extremely comprehensive. The modalities in Israel are very different, of course, but, nevertheless, the American program is a suitable model, in a fundamental sense; in any case, Israel has attained a certain degree of readiness. As a result, in practical terms, the implication will be primarily that the two alignments that already exist in Israel – preparation for all kinds of terrorist attacks and for incidents involving chemical/biological weapons – should be a coordinated task force for dealing with issues and incidents of chemical/biological terrorism. In actuality, things are moving that way. The proper steps are being currently conducted.35

Appendix:
Charting Chemical and Biological Weapons in Arab Countries and Iran

Syria

Chemical Weapons

Acquisition of Egyptian Chemical Weapons – 1972 (aerial bombs and artillery shells containing sarin and mustard gases)

Beginning of (self) Development– 1978

Beginning of Deployment – 1983

Chemical Warfare agents  – sarin, VX and cyanide

Armaments – aerial bombs, surface-to-surface missile (SCUD-B, SCUD-C, SCUD-D) warheads, perhaps also for Frog missiles

Implementation – killing 18,000 Syrian Sunnis with cyanide

Primary objectives – arming SCUD-D, M-9, and Cruise missiles with warheads

 

Biological Weapons

Beginning of Development – 1982

Beginning of Deployment – 1992

Biological Warfare agents – anthrax, cholera, ricin and botulinum

 

Egypt

Chemical Weapons

Beginning of Development – 1960

Beginning of Deployment – 1963

Chemical Warfare agents – nitrogen and sulfur-based mustard, phosgene, psychochemicals, sarin, VX

Armaments – mines, artillery shells, rockets, aerial bombs, surface-to-surface missile warheads

Implementation – in Yemen: Aerial bombs containing phosgene or mustard gas (1963-1967)

Primary objectives – arming SCUD-C and Vector missiles with warheads

 

Biological Weapons

Beginning of Development – 1963

Beginning of Deployment – 1970

Biological Warfare agents – botulinum, plague, cholera, Q fever, Rift Valley Fever, viral encephalitis

Armament – aerial bombs, surface-to-surface missile warheads

Primary objectives – as above

 

Iraq

Chemical Weapons

Beginning of Development – 1974 (in partnership with Egypt)

Beginning of Deployment – 1982

UN-controlled destruction of large proportions – the 1990s

Disappearance of residual arsenal – 2003

Chemical warfare agents – mustard gas, cyanide, tabun, sarin, GF, VX. Most of the chemical warfare agents were destroyed.

Armaments – artillery shells, aerial bombs, surface-to-surface warheads and air-to-air rockets. Most of the ammunition was destroyed.

 

Biological Weapons

Beginning of Development – 1975 (in partnership with Egypt)

Beginning of Deployment – 1984

Disappearance of maintained stockpiles – 2003

Biological Warfare agents – anthrax, plague, gas-gangrene, botulinum, smallpox and more. The biological warfare agents apparently were mostly saved.

Implementation – against Kurds and Iranians, locally

Extrication and transfer of development and production technology – to Sudan, Libya and Algeria (at least)

Primary objectives – preservation of remaining weapons and rehabilitation of its production capability

Libya

Chemical Weapons

Beginning of Development – 1982

Beginning of Deployment – 1989

Deproliferation – 2004

Chemical Warfare agents  – mustard gas, tabun

Armaments – artillery shells and aerial bombs

Implementation – one-time utilization of aerial bombs containing mustard gas (from Iran) in Chad

Primary Objectives – producing lewisite, sarin and soman and arming long-range warheads (including Nodong, Otrag and others)

 

Biological Weapons

Beginning of Development – 1986

Beginning of experimental production – 1994

Deproliferation – 2004

Biological Weapons Substances – botulinum, brucella, anthrax

Armaments – aerial bombs

Primary objectives – arming long-range warheads

 Iran

Chemical Weapons

Beginning of Development – 1984

Beginning of Deployment – 1986

Chemical Warfare agents  – cyanide, phosgene, mustard gas, tabun

Implementation – against Iraq, on a limited basis

Primary Objectives – production of lewisite and sarin and arming long-range (thousands of kilometers) warheads

 

Biological Weapons

Beginning of Development – 1986

Beginning of Deployment – 1992

Biological Warfare agents – botulinum, ricin, anthrax, foot and mouth disease

Armaments – aerial bombs, aerosol generators

Primary Objectives – arming long-range warheads

 

Sudan

Transfer and concealment of chemical weapons from Iraq – 1991

Implementation of Iraq’s chemical weapons – since 1993

Iraqi establishment of chemical and biological weapons production facilities – 1997

 

Endnotes

1

Dany Shoham, “Chemical Weapons in Egypt and Syria: Evolution, Capability, Control”, Middle East Security Studies No. 21, BESA Center for Strategic Studies, June 1995, pp. 51-86.

2

As-Safir, Beirut, January 15, 2000.

3

Richard M. Bennett, “The Syrian Military: A Primer”, Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, August 2001, <http://www.meib.org/articles
/0108_s1.htm>.

4

Yedi’ot Aharonot, December 27, 1999.

5

Ha’aretz, June 18, 1999.

6

Yedi’ot Aharonot, June 28, 2002.

7

Daily Telegraph, January 6, 2004.

8

Foreign Report, August 7, 2003.

9

Dany Shoham, “Chemical and Biological Weapons in Egypt”, The Nonproliferation Review 5, 3/1998, pp. 48-49.

10

Dany Shoham, “The Evolution of Chemical and Biological Weapons in Egypt”, Policy Paper No. 46, Ariel Center for Policy Research, ACPR Publishers, 1998.

11

“Egypt President: Israel Should Learn from Qaddafi”, Ma’ariv, December 22, 2003.

12

Dany Shoham, “The Evolution of Chemical and Biological Weapons in Egypt”, Policy Paper No. 46, Ariel Center for Policy Research, ACPR Publishers, 1998.

13

“They Would Torture Your Soul”, Yedi’ot Aharonot, April 11, 2004.

14

Ibid.

15

Douglas Hanson, “Case Not Closed: Iraq’s WMD Stockpiles”, March 2, 2004, <http://www.americanthinker.com/articles.php?article_id=3399>.

16

Shoham, Dany, “Libya, Egypt and Weapons Systems of Mass Destruction”, “Current Affairs Digest”, Nativ, 3/1996, pp. 15-16.

17

David Ruppe, Global Security Newswire, Wednesday, April 14, 2004, <http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2004_4_14.html>.

18

Hans de Vreij, “Libya Comes Clear”, Radio Netherlands Wereldomroep, March 5, 2004.

19

Jonathan Marcus, “Libya Destroys Chemical Weapons”, BBC News – World Edition, March 4, 2004.

20

Chris Schneidmiller, “Experts Say Much Work Needed To Finish Libyan Disarmament”, Global Security Newswire, Tuesday, March 23, 2004, <http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2004_3_23.html>.

21

Hans de Vreij, “Libya Comes Clear”, Radio Netherlands Wereldomroep, March 5, 2004.

22

G.M. Burck, & C.C.  Flowerree, International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation, Greenwood Press, NewYork, 1991.

23

John Hart. Libyan WMD Proliferation: Motivated to Defy America, University of Michigan Political Science, 472, Professor Raymond Tanter, December 10, 1997.

24

“Libyan Biological Warfare”, <Global Security.org>, January 18, 2004.

25

John Hart, Libyan WMD Proliferation: Motivated to Defy America, University of Michigan Political Science, 472, Professor Raymond Tanter, December 10, 1997.

26

Dany Shoham, “The Chemical and Biological Threat to Israel”, in Ballistic Missiles – The Threat and the Response, Arieh Stav, ed., London: Brassey’s (UK) Ltd. with ACPR Publishers, 1999, pp. 124-148.

27

The Jerusalem Post, January 21, 1999, p. 2.

28

Ma’ariv, December 9, 1998, p. 20.

29

Yossef Bodansky, “The Iraqi WMD Challenge – Myth and Reality”, Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, US House of Representatives, Washington DC, 1998.

30

Dany Shoham, “Does Saudi Arabia Have or Seek Chemical or Biological Weapons?”, The Nonproliferation Review 6, 3/1999, pp. 122-130.

31

Dany Shoham, “Chemical/Biological Terrorism: An Old, But Growing Threat in the Middle East and Elsewhere”, Politics and the Life Sciences 15, September 1996, pp. 218-219.

32

Yedi’ot Aharonot, June 18, 1999, p. 2.

33

Al-Qai`dah website.

34

A.P. Stock, “Fighting C/B Terrorism: Means and Possibilities”, Politics and the Life Sciences 15, September 1996, pp. 225-227.

35

“Viruses Instead of Missiles: Terrorism in a Bottle”, Ma’ariv, March 12, 2004.