Islamic Fundamentalism
and the Arab Political Culture
David Bukay
|
This
article is an excerpt from the book,
Muhammad’s Monsters,
David Bukay (ed.),
AR: Balfour Books and
Israel: ACPR Publishers, 2004.
To order the book, contact:
www.balfourbooks.net |
The 20th century was one of the most
turbulent in human history, marked by total wars and severe ideological
struggles. Two ideologies competed against the Western liberal-democratic system
and were defeated unconditionally. The first, Nazism, was vanquished in a total
war that exacted one of the greatest human and economic costs in history. The
second, Communism, was overcome after a political and ideological struggle that
lasted three-quarters of a century. When it seemed that a “New World Order” had
emerged and the period of total wars, and especially fanatic ideologies, had
ended, the world became aware of the danger of fundamentalist Islam, whose
borders, as Samuel Huntington has observed, are borders of blood.
Indeed, in several regards, this is a more
extreme danger, certainly a graver and more massive threat. There are many
Islamic states in the world, there is a total Islamic population of over a
billion human beings, and the reality is one of an extroverted and aggressive,
totalistic religion with an ideology of perpetual expansion. It should also be
stated clearly, even in the age of the “politically correct”, that the problem
is also one of Arabs, the “savage kinship” as scholars have called it, which is
still immersed in many values of anarchic tribalism. We are not speaking of
Islam as a religion, nor of the Arabs, per se. However, the combination of
radical Arabs and fundamentalist Islam is deadly, and constitutes the greatest
threat to the existence of modern society and culture. Their ideology is
uncompromisingly murderous and nihilistic, and they are supported by millions of
frustrated and destitute people who seek to convert the humiliating present back
into the glorious past.
Islam constitutes a universal world-view,
an all-inclusive civilization that lays down positive and negative commandments
for the believer. It is a comprehensive system of religion (din)
and state (dawlah) which does not distinguish between the kingdom of
Allah and the kingdom of the ruler, and signifies total and exclusive
submissiveness and devotion to the will of Allah. The Islamic ideal was the
establishment of a political community (ummah), and the goal was defined
as achieving an Islamic order and political stability while maintaining the
unity of the community. Any rule is preferable to lack of rule, and any ruler
can be accepted, because he is preferable to anarchy. Arab history, from the
days of the prophet Muhammad to the present, is one of patrimonial leadership in
military or monarchic authoritarian regimes. Yet, from the historical
standpoint, political activity in the Arab world tended to encourage
rebelliousness and political violence.1
How can we explain this paradoxical
phenomenon? The answer is fascinating: there is no need for legitimacy stemming
from the people and its sovereign political will, since sovereignty comes from
Allah, and the moment one rule is replaced by another, it becomes accepted and
consented to. Everything is done according to the will of Allah, and the test is
always the result. Whether an act has succeeded or failed, that is the will of
Allah. This is the ideological-religious basis for violence in Islam. Today,
this model endures even in the secular conception of rule, with sovereignty
consisting of the leader’s personality and the forcefulness of his rule. The
Islamic state is theocratic: Allah is the only source of faith, and the
religious cult is the symbol of collective identity. Any criticism, any
opposition, constitutes heresy. This orientation is linked to the legitimacy of
the government. Islam completely rejects the Western view that the state is the
product of a “social contract”. The state reflects and embodies the will of
Allah. Sovereignty (hakmi-yah) stems from Allah alone and does not
pertain to the will of the ruled. The Western doctrine of a right to oppose a
bad government, and a duty to replace it, does not exist in Islam. (Saddam
Hussein’s maintenance of power in Iraq, and Arafat’s continuing to lead the
Palestinians, are real-life examples.) The question of the citizenship and of
civil sovereignty is irrelevant. In this regard, it is clear what the army’s
role will be, and that the leadership will remain in power. From the standpoint
of Islam, any attempt to alter the structure of legitimacy and sovereignty
constitutes heresy and rebellion. The Arabic word for “state” is dawlah,
which means dynasty, but connotes becoming or replacing (Sura 3,
134-140). Most of the population is estranged from the government, and is not
regarded as a factor to consider in conducting politics. The political culture
is native (submissive) in the center and parochial in the periphery. There is no
tradition of a civil society that constitutes the sovereign, and citizenship, as
a critical phenomenon, is practically nonexistent. Political participation is on
the level of supportiveness only, and mobility is low. Intellectual thought in
Islam, like legitimacy and sovereignty, is also different from the Western
concept, and this has important implications for basic principles and political
behavior. The concept is atomistic rather than integrative, meaning that the
principle of causality does not exist, since everything stems from the will of
Allah. The result is the crystallization of a synthetic culture that manifests
mental collectivism, with an overarching goal of preserving stability, and a
fear of questioning the political order lest disintegration, anarchy, and
disorientation result. The values of Islam were profoundly influenced by the
basic values of the Arabs in the jahali era. Allah is from the jahali
period. He was regarded as a supreme god, and he had three daughter-gods:
al-Lat, al-Manat, and al-`uzza. The cult of the stones was central in
jahali Arab society, particularly the “black stone” in Ka`bah in Mecca.
Another key example is the custom of the hajj, which was entirely
incorporated into Islam. Apart from the customs that were replicated from the
jahali era, it seems that only two of the five pillars of Islam (arkan
al-Islam) – prayer (salat) and testimony (shahadah)
– are originally Muslim.
The determinative affiliation is inward,
involving the blood relations within the family or clan. This is manifested in
the proverb, “I and my brothers against my cousin. I and my cousin against the
neighbor, I and the neighbor against the foreigner.” The duty to uphold the
affiliative and clan-family framework against others exists without any
connection to the question of right or wrong.
The hostility and suspicion toward other
tribes is deep and intense, and is well reflected in the relations between Arab
states. There have never been relations of peace and fraternity between these
countries, but rather a cold and alien détente. The summit conferences are a
powerful filter for synchronizing the severe disagreements that exist. These
summits are held when sharp disputes arise on the political agenda. To avert
conflicts as well as the shame of failing to arrive at agreement, the Arab
leaders decide to formulate a joint document in a festive conference that aims
at covering up the shame and creating an atmosphere of solidarity. Even this
goal is achieved only with great difficulty. To prevent failure, and the
intensification of the collective Arab shame, the Arab foreign ministers meet
before holding the summit to formulate a summary document. That document is then
transmitted to the heads of state for approval. The leaders’ level of
participation manifests their agreement or opposition to the positions that have
been reached. No less important, the defense and security agreements that are
signed between Arab states are not worth the paper they are written on, and they
are not regarded as applicable even by the signatories themselves.
From the state of affairs just presented,
we may draw conclusions about the likelihood of reaching political arrangements
with Arab states, let alone in the case of Arab land considered to be inhabited
by infidels, such as the Crusaders and Israel. The attitude toward the foreigner
shows fascinating paradoxes: on the one hand, courtesy, sympathy, and
hospitality, yet on the other, an aloof suspicion. This indicates the social
basis of the Arab-Islamic hatred, which is mingled both with fanaticism and
feelings of inferiority toward the West. Peace is hardly a familiar phenomenon
between the Arabs, and it is illusory to think they can reach peace with
foreigners.
Muhammad succeeded in laying the political
and intellectual foundation for the Islamic social system, but he failed to
eradicate the tribal-clan structure. The tribes became part of Islam on the
basis of the existing commonality of customs, and swore personal loyalty (mubaya`ah)
to it because it was perceived as triumphant. This is a salient phenomenon
among the Arabs, rooted in the spread of Islam, and it has major implications
for the issue of Islamic fundamentalism: the victor is righteous, and the
righteous always triumphs.
The test for righteousness is the same as
the test for success. These are facts dispensed by Allah; hence, Islam triumphs
and succeeds because it is righteous. In the tribal society, secular ideas held
a central place and were expressed in the concept of “manhood” (muruwwah).
This refers to the traits of the perfect Bedouin man. The most important
framework was that of maintaining the rules of tribal solidarity (`asabiyah).
The tribe was the primary social unit, the
basis of personal and collective existence; hence the centrality of the
collectivist rather than individualist approach. The crucial phenomenon in the
society is that of honor. This is the supreme value, more important than life
itself. Sharaf is a man’s honor of the man. It is dynamic and can rise or
fall in line with the man’s activity and how he is perceived. `ird is the
honor of the woman (and also refers to her pelvis, which is related to her
modesty). `ird, unlike sharaf, is permanent and static. The woman
was born and grew up with her honor, and her duty is to guard it closely. The
moment `ird is lost, it cannot be restored, and the honor of the man is
severely compromised.2 Muslim tradition
ascribes supreme importance to the man’s honor and the woman’s modesty. This is
the basis for the status of woman in Islamic society, and one of the primary
concepts in Islam that fosters male-female inequality.3
The opposite pole of honor is shame.
Researchers are not certain what is more important, the notion of honor or the
fear of the shame that will be caused if honor is compromised. It is not honor,
but shame that is the key issue. Public exposure is what harms a man’s honor and
humiliates him. The Arab is constantly engaged in avoiding whatever causes
shame, in word and deed, while striving vigorously to promote his honor. Beyond
shame and preventing its occurrence, there is vengeance, which is also to be
displayed to all.4 Arab culture reflects a
collective ethos, and esteems tradition and honor. It is circumspect in regard
to avoiding insult or causing
shame; hence, it is better to lie so as to prevent conflict and not offend
someone. Whereas the Jewish approach turns one cheek, on the basis of “We
have sinned, we have transgressed, we have done wickedly,”
and the Christian approach turns the other cheek and discards
responsibility, the Arab-Islamic approach is essentially aggressive: “I have a
problem? Then you are to blame.” This constitutes open and emphatic defiance of
everything that is perceived as wrong, unjust, and an inability to accomplish
one’s goals. There is no effort at compromise, certainly no tolerance and
consent to the rights and rightness of the other. Nor is there any comprehension
that relative concepts are involved. The phenomenon has been starkly evident in
the Arab approach to the issue of Palestine. The concept is absolutely total.
Justice and truth belong only to the Palestinians, in a manner absolute and
without appeal, and the political discourse manifests this clearly. Language is
a cultural phenomenon of supreme importance. Prominent among the Arabs is the
use of expressions, proverbs, metaphors, linguistic allegories, as well as
exaggeration (mubalaghah) and glorification (mufakharah).
As a result, spoken Arabic is replete with exaggeration, verbal pathos, and the
frequent use of high-flown phrases. This approach contrasts completely with the
language of understatement in Western culture. This linguistic contrast
contributes to a major problem of communication between members of the two
different cultural spheres. What happens in an encounter between Arab culture’s
language of overstatement and Western culture’s language of understatement? This
is one of the major causes of Israel’s difficult position in world public
opinion which believes the Arab culture of exaggeration reflects an actual
reality. The impact of the rich and beautiful Arabic language on Arab conduct is
remarkable. There would not be such ardent feelings of veneration, such
conscious and intensive use of the language, if these were not so powerfully
propelled by the written or spoken word. The Arabic language is a mirror through
which the Arabs examine the world. Even the language of the uneducated is very
rich, and fosters exaggerations and excessive emphases. The Arabs are proud of
their language and convinced that it is the greatest and most beautiful of the
world’s tongues. The Arab personality abounds in contradictions. This is a
deeply rooted duality: only a small part of the people is happy and content, yet
they give strangers a warm and enthusiastic welcome. They are also intensely
emotional, and easily prompted to extremes of hostility and resentment with no
self-control. Under the influence of distress and fanaticism, they are capable
of any act of cruel violence in an appalling magnitude. The shift can be
dramatic and extreme. This is characteristic of tribalism: an admirable fatalism
and passivity of self-control along with an astonishing impulsivity and
capacity for draconian, uncontrolled violence. All the mechanisms of
hospitality, blessings, and affability are aimed at creating a defensive buffer,
at mitigating the threatening interpersonal encounter. Life in a hostile
environment in the desert, with scarce resources, in social and political
alienation, forged a society that acquiesces to the harsh reality out of
political conformism, and accepts the rules of behavior that defined society’s
objectives in religious terms. These are ingrained symptoms of behavioral
polarity between: a) unity and separateness, b) honor and shame, c) violent
aggression and passive submission to rule, d) fantasy that ascends to the
heavens and the earthliness of the burning desert, e) hatred of the imperialist
West and admiration for its attributes, f ) the desire for anarchic desert
freedom that reflects the turbulent and emotional personality, and g) patience
and endurance in the face of the harsh reality. The tribal origins of the Arab
Middle East were assimilated into a rural society. The urban society developed
only in the 20th century, but retained the patterns of thought and activity of
the rural-tribal frameworks. Indeed, in many respects, Arab society manifests the
desert anarchy, whether they wear fine tailored suits or gold jalabas.
All this is reflected as well in the polar duality of Islam. The phenomenon of
the “return of Islam” has many names, according to the eye of the beholder:
awakening, rebirth, return,
reassertion, resurgence, resurrection, fundamentalism, messianism,
political Islam, Islamism, radical Islam, Islamic extremism, Islamic movement,
Islamic fanatics. The Muslims refer to the phenomenon in positive terms: rootedness (usuliyah), origins (asliyun), Islamists (Islamiyun),
believers (mu`minun), and God-fearers (mutadayinun). However, the
notion of fundamentalism, which initially referred to the late 19th century
Protestant movement in the United States, is the most useful, both because it is
related to “rootedness” in Arabic (usuliyah) and because it is
more understood and meaningful in the Western political discourse. Only on
September 11, 2001, after the terrorist strikes on the Twin Towers and the
Pentagon, was the Islamic threat internalized in the West. It then began to
penetrate the Western political consciousness that the Arab-Islamic political
culture is aggressive and violent, can arouse popular forces that are enormous
in scope, and embraces worldwide aspirations. The Muslim weakness, compared to
Western supremacy, left profound feelings of frustration and inferiority among
the Muslims, a sense that their just, victorious religion had been humiliated by
the infidel West. This reality is not only unfamiliar, but unacceptable, since
it contradicts all the laws of Muslim logic. The reactions to the weaknesses of
Islam were perceived and defined as religious. The problems were formulated in
religious terms, and so were the solutions that were proposed for them: a return
to the original Islamic tenets, with the goal of restoring in the present the
achievements of the past, and applying the principles of the past to successful
activity in the present. The violent Islamic aggression does not stem only from
frustration, the most prominent factor in social science theories of aggression.
Islam is characterized by violent and aggressive principles and a radical
ideology, whose source is in the Arab political culture. The combination between
sweetness and amiability as preached by the Qur`an on the one hand, and the
fanaticism of wild, destructive violence on the other, is amazing. The
phenomenon of the suicide bombers, for example, is Islamic in nature: from
Chechnya to Iran, Hizbullah, and the Palestinians. The society sanctifies the
phenomenon of turning abject cowards who attack innocent, defenseless civilians,
into heroes whose murderous deeds are approved by their families, not to mention
the monetary rewards and adulation they receive. In the West, this phenomenon is
neither perceived nor understood. It must be emphasized that it is not a matter
of a few extremists. Yet the West has a hard time understanding why Islam does
not work to eradicate the phenomenon. The first fundamentalist movements in
Islam developed on the periphery of the Arab world, amid the waning of the
Ottoman Empire. Its devotees had an internal orientation, focusing on reforms or
a revolution in Islamic society. The Wahabiyah movement in the Arabian
Peninsula founded by Muhammad ibn `Abd al-Wahab (1703-1792), was influenced by
the radical, puritanical hanbali movement and the interpretations of
Ibn-Taymiyah. The Sanusiyah movement founded by Muhammad bin `Ali al-Sanusi
(1787-1859) in Cyrnaika (Libya) was a mystical and reformist movement, suited to
the cultural values of North Africa. And the Madhiyah movement founded by
Muhammad Ahmad bin `Abdallah al-Mahdi (1843-1885) flowered in Sudan as a
puritanical movement similar to Wahabiyah. But the movement that led
fundamentalist Islam into the 20th century was the reformist al-Salafiyah
movement headed by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-1897), who preached pan-Islamic
solidarity and resistance to Western penetration. The success of this movement
was via its disciples, Muhammad `Abduh (1849-1905) and Rashid Muhammad Rida
(1865-1935), who were active in Egypt. The triumphant stream was the radical
activism of the Muslim Brotherhood lead by Hasan al-Bana (1906-1949). This
movement gained enormous success, and established influential branches in almost
all the Arab states. Geertz defines religion as a system of symbols that confers
meaning on reality, formulates views and outlooks, supplies answers to all the
issues, and creates an ethos for action.5
It is commonly claimed that Islam is the
political movement of the popular strata, and provides a solution to the
social-economic-cultural difficulties of the Muslims. By contrast, we maintain
that the Islamic awakening (al-sahwah al-Islamiyah) does not
involve the return of Islam as a religion, since in fact it was always there,
and never underwent a secularization process. What has occurred is that Islamic
religion has become a significant factor in political discourse. Furthermore,
there are many different Islamic movements that employ a variety
of modes of attaining political
ends and of gaining power via political and social mobilization of the masses.
These are aggressive and violent movements that use modern technological tools
to subvert Arab and Islamic states that are defined as secular. The
Islamic movements are not part of the regime, but their functional orientation
is strongly political. Islam is, indeed, the most political of all the
religions. In contrast to the Christian ideal of the kingdom of heaven, and the
Jewish ideal of the messianic age, Islam sees the ideal as immediately
applicable via the state as long as it functions according to the shari`a.
In practice, this means that Muslims strive for a blend of Arab nationalism and
Islam in its fundamentalist formulation. The mixture of the two is tantamount to
embark upon a revolution whose ultimate objective is the reinstatement of the
Islamic caliphate embodied in the Ottoman Empire until the beginning of the 20th
century. The dominant notion in the West is that Muslims today are expressing
disappointment and frustration over the failure of modernization. They are
displaying a cultural rearguard battle against a modernity that dissolves their
traditional value system. Our view differs. We contend that the current Muslim
uprising is a political reaction that seeks to promote political objectives as
an alternative to the existing regimes, and, no less significant, it seeks to
counteract capitalist and communist ideology for which it regards itself as an
alternative. The Islamic awakening is not a negation of modernity, but a
reaction to its Western model. Western modernity is perceived as a direct threat
to Islamic civilization, which is the most important collective framework of
identity. Thus, the only possible resistance to the West’s cultural onslaught is
Islam in its fundamentalist form presented as a comprehensive system that
provides all solutions (al-Islam huwa al-Hall) to the problems of
society. The Islamic solution is authentic and its roots run deep in the
existing culture. Western penetration induced a severe reaction precisely among
those who came into direct contact with the West, those in the middle class who
experienced modernity and higher education. Modernity is perceived as the source
of all sin, and permissiveness and materialism as a catastrophe. But the
greatest sin of the West is to place the individual and the rule of reason at
the center, as opposed to total submission and devotion to Allah. The Islamic
victory in Afghanistan and overthrow of the Communist regime there in 1988
raised the issue anew, and served as proof that Islam could vanquish the
infidels through the power of enthusiasm and religious faith. Indeed, Allah is
with Islam, and Islam triumphs because he is just.
Fundamentalist Islam has begun its march
through Arab-Islamic society. Analysis of the causes of its rise focuses on a
number of factors: a reaction to Western penetration, and a fierce animosity
toward its presence and influence in the Arab political system. This mindset is
prevalent among city dwellers, those who have had more direct contact with the
West, and the educated middle class, who have experienced modernity and
technology: first there was an economic conquest, then a military-territorial
one. And when the Arab states succeeded in liberating themselves from Western
colonialism, the Western cultural invasion began. The challenges of Western
technology and the global village threatened the foundations of Islamic society.
Second is the failure of the secular political alternative. The authoritarian
regimes and patrimonial leadership repress and alienate the masses who
experience no political participation and exert no influence over how the
government functions. The third factor is the collapse of the secular Arab
ideologies, not only socialism and communism but also nationalism, Nasserism,
and Arab unity, together with the Arab inability to solve the “question of
Palestine”. As a result of these processes, a severe dissonance developed
between the world-view of the Muslim Arab and the reality of his
social-political environment. The cultural conflict of values acted as a strong
catalyst for a return to the familiar world of Islamic values, which offered a
lifeline in a stormy sea. Alongside the ideas developed thus far, it remains
important to focus on still another dimension of the current Muslim predicament,
namely the crises of identity and legitimacy,6
and
personal and collective. In Arab-Islamic society, no practical ideology
developed that could provide a platform for nation building, a basis for
socio-economic development, enabling the formation of a civil society. The
Islamic societies have mostly remained rural and traditional, hence suffused
with a religious mentality. Most of the Arab states are in a pre-industrial
stage, and some of them are in the feudal era, with
religion exerting wide influence over the population.
The processes
of vast and uncontrolled demographic growth had a destructive impact. The
results are the subversion of the social and traditional frameworks, the
widening of the socio-economic disparities, and the frustration and anomie of an
alienated society, in states that comprise non-political and non-civil
societies. The combination of a frustrated intellectual and religious minority,
the force that exhorts and leads, and the indigent masses, the flock with its
numerical magnitude, forms the basis for the rise and endurance of the Islamic
movements, a raft in the storm that gave the population feelings of affiliation
and self-worth.
In such circumstances, the conclusion of
the Islamic movements was clear and unyielding: one must return to the sources,
to a pure and just Islam that offers solutions for all distress and need,
especially for the cultural contradictions and
identity crises of Arab society. Arab unity cannot be achieved, and a solution
to the Palestine problem requires the overthrow of the secular Arab regimes. In
place of the secular Arab state, what is offered is the pan-Islamic framework
under the laws of the shari`a.
Secularism is regarded as the gravest threat to traditional society. That is why
secularism and Islam cannot join forces, a fact that only a few authors about
Islam still fail to comprehend. Islam is a permanent opponent of secularism, and
the Islamic awakening contradicts modernity.7
In the view of Lewis and Pipes, Islamic
anti-Westernism stems from deep feelings of humiliation among those viewing
themselves as the inheritors of the dominant
civilization of the past, which was subjugated by those regarded as inferior.
The more appealing Western civilization became, the greater the fundamentalist
hostility and will to struggle against it.8 It
is worth, however, considering a different aspect of this attitude. The
resentment and abhorrence are at Western culture, not necessarily at the West.
It is not Western politics but rather the cultural ubiquity of the West, and the
threat to Islamic society that shape the Islamic outlook and behavior. Under
such circumstances, the Arabs put their ears to the ground to listen for ancient
drumbeats calling them back to the Golden Age.
What are the Main Characteristics of Islamic Fundamentalism?
The Islamic movements represent different
trends, varied plans of action, and different views of how to achieve
objectives. They are complex, multi-dimensional movements that function mainly
within national political systems, although they have links to regional (mutual
influence and ties between movements and states) and international (sources of
funding and activity) organizations.
These movements play a major role in shaping the
system of relations and conflicts in Arab politics at the level of government
and of groups that oppose the government. They
include groups acting within a messianic revolutionary regime, as in Iran; in a
conservative and closed regime, as in Saudi Arabia; and in the coalition of a
military regime, as in Sudan. At the same time, some of them function in violent
opposition to the regime, as in Egypt, Algeria, Syria, and Tunisia; or in agreed
partnership with the regime, as in Jordan (where there are also radical
movements of the bin Laden type, which the state harshly represses).
The Islamic movements are deeply entrenched
in most social and economic strata of Moslem society. Their leadership comes
from the professional organizations of the educated, urban middle
class (engineers, doctors, lawyers, teachers). The
voice of the Islamic movements is the most clear-cut and assimilable. They are
not only a political but a significant social force as well, arising from an
educated and radical generation, with an academic background in the sciences,
concentrated in the middle strata of the urban society. Moreover, they make
intensive and sophisticated use of the media.
It is often claimed that the activism and
militancy of the fundamentalist movements is essentially a defensive phenomenon,
a way of fending off threatening Westernism, reflecting profound distress
that issues in a blend of cultural and political
protest, a perspective cultivated by a particular line of research in this
field.9 We maintain, however, that this
approach provides only one possible view.
A different perspective notes that the
primary issue is not one of defensiveness and distress, but rather an attempt to
cope with a hostile and dissonance-producing
reality that involves relatively glaring contradictions to the notion of
presumed Islamic superiority. Islamic fundamentalism does not exhibit passivity
but rather an iron determination to disseminate the values of religion, and
provide Islamic answers to the maladies of modern society. This is not at all a
defensive struggle. The Islamic movements do not
display or express a sense of
failure and self-protection, but rather an offensive push toward victory.
Despite their radical zealousness, the fundamentalist Islamic movements have
displayed versatility and flexibility in their activity, and have undergone
different stages that manifest an adaptive, pragmatic approach to changing
circumstances. At first there emerged an all-embracing ideology, based on a just
and righteous Islam rooted in the ancient teachings the Prophet Muhammad. Since
the mid-1960s, the Islamic movements have shifted to the political sphere and
made use of violence and terrorism, striving to overthrow secular Arab regimes.
Since the mid-1980s, they have made attempts to integrate into parliamentary
systems by participating in elections and to seize power from within. Finally,
in light of the political repression and manipulations of the regimes during
elections, as well as the movements’ gains through organized violence, two
sub-groups have emerged within the fundamentalist movements: one decided to
return to ancient Islamic origins and to social activity among the populace
sanctioned by the regime; the other changed its strategy to join the training
camps of Afghanistan, with the encouragement and aid of Saudi Arabia and the
backing of the United States. Belatedly, some Western nations have come to
realize that fundamentalist Islam threatens not only the Arab and Islamic
regimes, but its menace embraces the whole world. By now it is well known that
the menace takes the form of terrorism and violence. Less well known is the fact
that the enormous immigration of Arabs and Muslims into Western countries has
serious implications for their political stability. All the studies in this
volume, with two exceptions, were written before bin Laden’s terrorist
attack on the United States on September 11, 2001. They include analyses of a
wide variety of Islamic issues, and have critical implications for how this
phenomenon is understood in the widest sense.
Endnotes
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1 |
For a fascinating analysis of these movements, in terms of
the “significance of heresy”, the “revolutions in Islam”, and “Islamic
concepts of revolutions”, see B. Lewis, Islam in History: Ideas, Men
and Events in the Middle-East, London: Alcove Press, 1973.
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2 |
R.T. Antoun, “On the Modesty of Women in Arab Muslim
Villages: A Study in the Accommodation of Tradition”, American
Anthropology, 70/4, August 1968, pp. 671-697.
|
|
3 |
F. Mernissi, Beyond the Veil: Male-Female Dynamics in
Modern Moslem Society, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press,
1987; L. Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern
Debate, Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1993.
|
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4 |
D.P. Ausubel, “Relationship Between Shame and Guilt in the
Socializing Process”, Psychological Review, 62/5, September 1955.
|
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5 |
C. Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, New York:
Basic Books, 1973.
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6 |
In other words, a crisis syndrome that is inherent to
modernization processes, involving: identity, legitimacy, penetration,
division, participation, and expectations. As we shall see, in Arab and
Islamic politics the most important of these factors is identity. See L.
Binder et al., Crises and Sequences in Political Development,
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971.
|
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7 |
H. Sharabi, “Modernity and Islamic Revival”, Contention,
2/1, 1992, pp. 127-138.
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8 |
B. Lewis, “Roots of Muslim Rage,” Atlantic Monthly,
September 1990, pp. 47-55; D. Pipes, “Fundamentalist Muslims between
America and Russia”, Foreign Affairs, 64/5, Summer 1986.
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9 |
E. Sivan, Radical Islam, New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1985; E. Sivan, Religious Radicalism and Politics in
the Middle East, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1990.
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